THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME III

KOREA INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Foreword

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, just five years after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. The war lasted for three years and a month before the two sides agreed to the cessation of hostilities on July 27, 1953, and the uneasy truce survives to this day.

The Korean War unfolded in the broader context of the Cold War under the US-USSR bipolar system. Triggered by North Korea’s southward invasion, the war initially was an intranational conflict between South and North Korea. As the world’s two ideologically opposed camps intervened, however, it developed into a full-blown international war involving troops from twenty different nations. Only in a geographical sense was its scope limited to the Korean Peninsula. During the war, the Korean people suffered horrors and tragedies unprecedented in Korea’s five-thousand-year history. The Korean War, however, only replaced the 38th Parallel with what amounts to a ceasefire line, and failed to provide the Korean people with permanent relief from the possibility of another fratricidal war.

The War History Compilation Committee of the Ministry of National Defense, forerunner of the Korea Institute of Military History, chronicled the history of the Korean War over a ten-year span, starting in 1967. The resulting work in eleven volumes, has made a significant contribution to the study of the Korean War both within the country and abroad. This work, however, was published in a limited edition and had a broad scope that demand for a new, more accessible history of the Korean War has been increasing in recent years.

In response to this interest, the Korea Institute of Military History decided to write a new history of the war. While based on the old edition, this work will reflect subsequent findings—in particular, newly declassified documents made available to the public by the countries that participated in the war. The Institute is
presently writing a three-volume work with the goal of completing it by the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. Volume 1 examines the background of the war and sketches its development up to the intervention by Communist China. Volume 2 then covers the period up to the opening of the armistice talks, and Volume 3 deals with the conclusion the war.

The present volume, the third and final in the series, focuses on restructuring the background of the policy decisions of the two sides in turning from fighting to cease-fire negotiations and the opening of the truce talks based on new materials. In addition, the turbulent progress of the war and the search for the solutions for negotiating the agenda which lasted for two solid years have been analyzed in light of military strategy and diplomatic maneuvering and in terms of the correlation of fighting and negotiations. Furthermore, the operations and combat conducted during this period are arranged in a systematic way in terms of the trend of the war and phases of negotiations. The establishment of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the end product of the armistice agreement, and the start of the cease-fire structure are described in detail. This book ends with the ‘Political Conference’ held in Geneva, which sought solutions for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula; however, with the disruption of the Political Conference due to the uncooperative stance of the Communist side, the redivided Korean Peninsula is still suffering from a state of uneasy confrontation.

I am confident that this new history of the Korean War will contribute to understanding the realities of the war of words at the negotiating tables and the hot war at the stalemated frontline, but also to grasping the gist of the Korean people’s ardent wish for the unification of Korea and their will to defend their freedom, the ROK government’s direction in war efforts and its anti-armistice policy, and the courageous fighting of the ROK armed forces along with its allied forces. It is hoped that valuable lessons on national security could be derived from these volumes of The History of the Korean War.
I would take this opportunity, first of all, to pray for those who gave their invaluable lives to the cause of defending freedom and peace of the world, and also to express my deep, profound gratitude to those living soldiers who fought with us side by side against Communist aggressors. I also tender my thanks to the nations and their people who came to our aid when we were in trouble.

A number of people have contributed to the development of this work. I am grateful to Dr. Cho Sung Kyu, professor emeritus, Yonsei University and Dr. Choi Sang Jin, former Professor, Korea Military Academy, and other professors of the translation team, for their immaculate translation of the Korean version into English. I am indebted to Dr. Kay McClanahan, professor of English, Yonsei University, for her revising labour of the English version. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Allan R. Millett, professor at the Ohio State University, for his voluntary proofreading of the translated manuscript. The following two people made especially valuable contributions to the development of the book, and I am grateful to them. The Director of War History Department Chae Han Kook and junior researcher Yang Yong Jo collected data, wrote the Korean version, and proofread all or part of the manuscript. Particularly, director Chae checked and revised three volumes of English manuscripts in contrast with Korean version.

December 31, 1999

Park Soon Chan
President
Korea Institute of Military History
Notes

1. Chapters, sections, and subsections are inscribed as the following:
   eg. Chapter: One, Two, Three...
       Section: Roman Numerals(I, II, III, etc.)
       Subsection: Arabic Numerals(1, 2, 3, etc.)

2. Proper names of Korean personalities are inscribed with the family name at the front and the first name at the end.
   eg. Kim Hong Il
   But there are exceptions for names of established international use.
   eg. Syngman Rhee

3. Natural features are inscribed with flexibility as follows:
   (1) mountains & hills
       eg. Pukhan-san or Pukhan Mountain
           P’il-bong or P’il Hill(or Peak)
           But names of established use are exceptions.
           eg. Capitol Hill
   (2) rivers & creeks
       eg. the Han-gang or the Han River
           the lan-ch’on or the lan Creek
           But names of established use are exceptions.
           eg. the Yalu River
   (3) Pass(ryong)
       eg. Cho-ryong, Cho Pass, or Cho-ryong Pass

4. Administrative units and man-made constructions such as towns are inscribed as follows;
   administrative units such as ‘do’, ‘shi’, ‘gun’, ‘myon’, ‘ri(ni)’, and etc. are hyphenated.
   eg. Hajinbu-ri Am-dong
       Ch’ungch’ongnam-do or South Ch’ungch’ong Province

5. Periods after initials are deleted.
   eg. ROK, UN

6. A few misprints in the Korean edition were corrected in the English version.
## THE CONTENTS

Foreword
Notes

### Chapter One  Striving for Peace and Opening of Negotiation  .......... 1

I. Striving for Peace and the Military Situation  ......................... 1

1. Progress of the War and Attempts at Peaceful Solution .................. 1
2. Military Situation on the First Anniversary of the War (June 1951) ...... 3

II. The Effort for the Restoration of the Status Quo Ante Bellum .......... 11

1. UN Resolution to Restore Peace, June 26/June 28  ........................ 13
2. The Soviet Stratagem for Truce on October 2  ............................... 16
3. UN Mediation for Truce by Cease-Fire Group of Three Persons .......... 21
4. Proposal for Truce Talks by the Commander in Chief of the UN Forces (MacArthur)  27
5. Decisions of the US-Soviet Truce Policy and Contacts behind the Scene .... 30

III. Opening of Truce Talks at Kaesong  ...................................... 38

1. Strategies and Basic Principles of the Both Sides at the Talks .......... 38
2. Opening of the Truce Talks and the Keynote of Negotiations .......... 50
3. Conflicts over the Neutrality of the Talk Site and Equality of Both Side .... 58
4. Arguments over the Selection of Agenda and its Adoption ............... 63

IV. The Government’s Policy against the Division of Korean Peninsula .... 70
   • Notes  .................................................................................. 78
Chapter Two  Negotiations over a Military Demarcation Line and Developments of Military Situation

I. Difficulties Involved in Negotiations over a Military Demarcation Line 86

1. Disputes over 38th Parallel and Line of Contact as Boundary 86
2. The Fabrication of the Neutrality-Violation Cases and the Breakdown of Negotiations 95
3. Efforts for the Resumption of Truce Talks 100

II. Military Pressures: Development of Position Warfare 110

1. The Military Strategies of Both Sides at the Beginning of the Truce Negotiations 110
2. Removal of the sag in the Punchbowl area 127
3. Advance toward the Nam River 195
4. Securing the Line of Communication between Yonch’on and Ch’orwon 212
5. Securing of the Kumsong Area 222

III. The Agreement on the Military Demarcation Line at P’anmunjom 242

1. Mutual Consent to the Basic Principle of the Line of Contact 242
2. Dispute over the Time to Decide the Line of Contact 247
3. Agreement on Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone 251
   * Notes 256

Chapter Three  A Momentary Lull in the Military Situation and Stalemate of the Truce Negotiations

I. The Strategy of Positive Defense and a Lull in Military Operations 265

1. Building Trenches along the Defensive Line 265
2. Development of Reconnaissance Operations ........................................ 274
3. Combat at Outpost Line .................................................................. 277
4. Anti-Guerrilla Operations ................................................................. 305
5. Interdiction in the Enemy Rear Area ................................................ 319

II. Stagnation of the Truce Negotiations ................................................. 327

1. Negotiation for ‘Concrete Arrangements for Cease-fire and Armistice’ ...... 327
2. Negotiations on the Exchange of POWs .......................................... 342
3. Agreement on ‘the Recommendations to the Governments of the
   Countries Concerned on Both Sides’ .............................................. 353

III. Striving for a Package Settlement .................................................... 356

IV. Incidents in the POW Camps ............................................................. 362

1. North Korea’s Maneuvering and POWs’ Uprising ............................. 362
2. The Kidnapping of the Commandant of the Koje Island POW Camp ...... 367

V. Argument over Biological Warfare .................................................. 371
   • Notes .................................................................................. 377

Chapter Four Disruption of the Truce Negotiations and
Resumption of the Military Operations .............................................. 392

I. Military Situation on the Second Anniversary of the War .................. 392

1. Military Reinforcement of the Communist Forces ............................ 396
2. Reorganization of the UN Forces’ War Potential and
   Improvement of the ROK Army’s Fighting Power ............................ 398
II. Breakdown of the Negotiations for the Exchange of POWs 406

1. Strategies of Both Sides and Alternative Measures 406
2. Negotiations for Optional Proposals and Indefinite Recess 414
3. UN Efforts for Settlement 418

III. Ground Operations: Intensifying the Fight for Critical Hills 428

1. The Contest for Outpost Positions along the Imjin River and Yokkok-ch’ón 428
2. Battles in the Ch’orwon-Kimhwa Area (Operation Showdown) 457
3. Battles in the Vicinity of Kumsong-Ch’ón 473
4. Melee between the Valleys of the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers 485
5. Scramble for the South Shore of the Nam River 494

IV. Air and Naval Pressure Operations 500
   * Notes 507

Chapter Five  The Communist Forces’ Last Offensive and Signing of the Truce 523

I. Change in the International Situation and Indications of a Truce 523

II. Exchange of Wounded and Sick POWs 525

III. Agreement on the Exchange of POWs and Release of
    Anti-Communist POWs 533

1. Conclusion of the Agreement of POW Exchange 533
2. Release of Anti-Communist Prisoners of War 548
IV. The Government’s for Anti-Truce Policy and the Korean and American Conference ................................................................. 557

1. Anti-Truce Movements of the Government and the Korean People .................. 557
2. The Korean and American Conference ..................................................... 567

V. Final Military Operations ........................................................................ 574

1. Military Situation on the Third Anniversary of the War ......................... 574
2. Last Chinese Offensive ; the First Stage: Outpost Action ......................... 587
3. Last Chinese Offensive ; the Second Stage: June Offensive ..................... 593
4. Last Chinese Offensive ; the Third Stage: July Offensive ......................... 630

VI. Signing of the Truce Agreement ............................................................. 681
   • Notes ........................................................................................................ 694

Chapter Six The Management of the Armistice and the Re-division of the North and the South ......................................................... 707

I. Creating of the Armistice Organizations .................................................. 707

1. Establishment of the Demilitarized Zone ............................................... 707
2. Establishment of the Armistice Management Organization ..................... 712

II. Repatriation of POWs and Homecoming of Refugees ............................ 719

1. Exchange of POWs Wishing to be Returned ........................................ 719
2. Handling of POWs not Wishing to be Repatriated ................................. 727
3. Homecoming of the Refugees ................................................................. 736

III. Breakdown of the Political Conference at Geneva .................................. 739
1. Measures taken by the UN General Assembly ........................................ 739
2. Failure in Contacts for Preliminary Talks at P’anmunjom ........................ 747
3. Breakdown of the Political Conference at Geneva ................................. 753

IV. Crossroad between of War and Peace .................................................. 766

1. Characteristics and Damages of the Korean War .................................. 766
2. Armistice and Redivision of Korea ....................................................... 770
3. A Makeshift Bridge between War and Peace ........................................ 773
   * Notes ............................................................................................... 777

APPENDIXES

1. Chronology ............................................................................................ 789
2. Bibliography ........................................................................................... 804
Chapter One  Striving for Peace and Opening of Negotiation

I. Striving for Peace and the Military Situation

1. Progress of the War and Attempts at Peaceful Solution

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, when Kim Il Sung’s North Korean regime suddenly attacked South Korea by moving southward across the 38th Parallel. Kim had as his objective the communization of the whole peninsula in compliance with the Communists’ expansion policy in the context of cold war rivalry created between the free world and the Communist world immediately after the end of World War II. Subsequently, to help South Korea repulse the invasion, the UN Forces of the free world, with the United States at its key participant, joined the conflict to aid South Korea. Then, the Soviet Union (with its air force) and the Chinese Communists intervened in order to support North Korea. The war, therefore, became one between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea into a contest of power between the two camps of the East and the West; consequently, the transformation manifested itself into a war with international ramifications.

No sooner has this collision of powers gotten underway than a series of efforts were begun toward restoring peace. These efforts were spearheaded by the UN and the UN Forces with the goal of peace not only on the Korean Peninsula but also among the world powers involved in the conflict. These endeavors for peace failed, however, because both sides were determined to fight in pursuit of
their goals. The war continued, and the question in everyone's mind was: "Is the war a locally limited one, or is it going to be expanded further?" Both North Korea and South Korea were engaged in an all-out war; both committed the maximum resources they could mobilize. In short, the Communist forces fought the war to "communize" the whole of the peninsula, and the UN Forces fought to punish the aggressors, to protect freedom, and to restore peace and unite Korea until the Chinese intervention.

The front lines had moved southward as far as the Naktong River during the North Korean invasion, and the counterattack of the UN Forces pushed the enemy up to the banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Because of the Chinese Communist Forces' entry into the war, however, the UN Forces were driven southward, down to the line connecting P'yongtaek and Samch'ok. In the summer of 1951 the front lines, where the two opposing forces clashed with each other, hardened just north of the 38th Parallel because of the counteroffensive of the UN Forces. The operation to restore the prewar border was completed in June 1951, the first anniversary of the war, and following that operation, the war was stalled in a geographic sense.

The stalemate reflected the Communists' realization that they could not achieve their goal of communizing the whole peninsula by military conquest, and that the UN Forces had shown that their military response to the Communists' invasion had reached its limit as well. In addition, the US and the Soviet Union, which in fact were the key participants in the war, confirmed each other that neither country would abandon its strategic interests in the peninsula. They were compelled to admit the hard fact that they could not destroy the balance in the cold war rivalry on this peninsula without risking a direct war with each other.

Meanwhile, all of the peninsula, except for the Pusan Perimeter south of the Naktong River, had turned into a battlefield. The land had been ravaged and national assets had been consumed without limit. In addition to this material dam-
age, both sides had suffered devastating losses in terms of human lives. At this stage, both sides decided to explore a cease-fire at the stalemated front line by changing their policy of ending the war by forced settlement to one of ending the war by mutual negotiation and compromise. On the side of the UN Forces, the US settled upon a truce policy at the status quo ante-bellum by the NSC 48/5 on May 17, 1951;\(^1\) on the Communists’ side, the Soviet Union dominated the coalition and stated at the North Korea-Chinese-Soviet Conference at Moscow on June 13, 1951: “A truce is beneficial under the condition that it will recover the boundary line at the 38th Parallel.”\(^2\)

Although the UN’s and the Soviet’s positions sounded similar, their goals in the negotiations and ceasefire were considerably different. The UN Forces’ objective was that once the truce was affected through negotiations, a unified, democratic, and independent state would be established by political means through the leadership of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Communists’ goal was to restore their military power through an armistice, and that to induce the UN Forces to withdraw, and then, to resume their attempt to communize the peninsula through means short of military conquest as they had done elsewhere.

The goals of the two sides were different on the first anniversary of the war, yet they decided to end the war by negotiation, opening truce talks on July 10, 1951.

2. Military Situation on the First Anniversary of the War (June 1951)

In June 1951, when the opposing forces established their truce policy and the frontlines were stalemated, the UN Forces occupied a defensive line extending from the estuary of the Han River on the west coast, through Changdan, Korangp’o, Yonch’on, Ch’orwon, Kimhwa, Hwach’on and Sohwa, to Kansong on the east coast.\(^3\) The defensive line, though abandoning the Ongjin and Yonan
peninsulas south of the 38th Parallel, was 20 to 30 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel in the central and the eastern areas. From the strategic point of the truce, however, the line met two significant objectives: “To recover the 38th Parallel and to secure an advantageous defensive line.”

The Communist forces confronted the UN Forces north of the defensive line by building up their defensive lines extending from the estuary of the Yesong River on the west coast, through To’song-ri, Songak Mountain, Orijung, P’yong-gang, Dungdae-ri, Aemak-dong, Sohwa-ri, and Sach’ol-ri, and finally to Kamho, located south of Kosung on the east coast. At this time, the UN Forces, held the operational initiative with their counteroffensive; the Communist Forces, defeated in the spring offensive, assumed the defensive.

The strength of the Communist Forces at the time were 55 divisions (five Chinese army groups consisting of 19 armies) under the command of Peng Teh Huai, Supreme Commander of ‘North Korean and Chinese Allied Forces’, while the North Korean army had eight corps consisting of 27 divisions. Altogether, the Communist Forces had 77 divisions of infantry alone. The total number of their troops was 1,120,000, 770,000 Chinese and 340,000 North Koreans. The Communist Forces managed these troops by classifying them as the first line (the forward area), the second line (the rear area), and the strategic reserve. On the first line, a total of 33 divisions comprising 11 corps—eight Chinese armies (or corps) and three North Korean corps—were deployed, thus forming the forward defensive line. On the second line, nine Chinese corps and four North Korean corps were deployed on the coast lines and main routes on the east and west coasts with their centers in the areas of Koksan and Yangduk, P’yongyang, and Wonsan, where they defended the rear areas. The rest of the units were assembled in northeast Korea or in Manchuria as a strategic reserve force.

Of those strategic reserves, the Chinese 19th Army Group, which con-
The Battle Organization of the Communist Forces (Ground Forces)

June 29, 1951

North Korean and Chinese Allied Forces Command
Peng Teh Huai

North Korean Forces

- 1st Corps
  8th, 19th, 47th Divs
- 2nd Corps
  2nd, 13th, 27th Divs
- 3rd Corps
  1st, 15th, 45th Divs
- 4th Corps
  4th, 5th, Divs
  105th Div
  26th Brig
- 5th Corps
  6, 12, 32 Divs
- 6th Corps
  17, 18, 36 Divs
  23 Brig
- 7th Corps
  7, 24, 37 Divs
- 8th Corps
  46 Div
  63 Brig
- reserves: 3, 9, 10 Divs

3rd Army Gp

- 12th Army
  31st, 34th, 35th Divs
- 15th Army
  29, 44, 45 Divs
- 60th Army
  179, 180, 181 Divs

9th Army Gp

- 20th Army
  58th, 59th, 60th Divs
- 26th Army
  76, 77, 78 Divs
- 27th Army
  79, 80, 81 Divs

19th Army Gp

- 63rd Army
  187th, 188th, 189th Divs
- 64th Army
  190, 191, 192 Divs
- 65th Army
  193, 194, 195 Divs

20 Army Gp

- 67 Army
  199, 200, 201 Divs
- 68 Army
  202, 203, 204 Divs

23 Army Gp

- 36 Army
  106, 107, Divs
- 37 Army
  109, 110 Divs

13 Army Gp

- 38 Army
  112, 113, 114 Divs
- 39 Army
  115, 116 117 Divs
- 40 Army
  118, 119, 120 Divs
- 42 Army
  124, 125, 126 Divs
- 47 Army
  139, 140, 141 Divs
- 50 Army
  148, 149, 150 Divs


2) The Unit Classification of the Chinese Communists: The Chinese Army group is equivalent to a ROK army, their army is equivalent to a ROK corps.
sisted of the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 47th Corps (47th being dispatched), was
deployed between Yesong River(T’osong) and Ch’orwon (northern part); the 20th,
26th, and 27th Corps of the 9th Army Group were deployed along the P’yonggang
-Kimhwa-and Pukhan River(Dungdae-ri) line. To the east up to Kosong, the North
Korean 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Corps were assigned and were organizing a defensive
line, confronting the UN Forces. Among these enemy forces, in particular, a
division from the Chinese 47 Corps and another division from the North Korean I
Corps (the defensive unit in the region west of the Yesong River) were assigned
the special mission of defending the Kaesong area.

On the friendly side, the strength under the operational command of
General Matthew B. Ridgway, the UN Forces Commander, consisted of ten divi-
sions of one ROK corps and seven divisions of three US corps. These divisions
were the main force of the ground units. The other ground units in action were
two British brigades and battalion-size or regiment-size units dispatched from 13
other countries: Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada, France, the
Philippines, Turkey, Thailand, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, Columbia, and
Ethiopia. These units, combined, made up one division strength. Four countries
(Sweden, India, Denmark, and Norway) had dispatched hospital units and medical
service agencies.

The ground forces of the UN Forces totaled 554,000 numbering
273,000 of the ROK, 253,000 of the US, and 28,000 of the other UN Forces. The
US I Corps defended the line from the Han River estuary to Kimhwa; the US IX
Corps from Kimhwa (east side) to the Pukhan River; the US X Corps from the
Pukhan River (east side) to the Soyang River; and the ROK I Corps from the
Soyang River (east side) to the east coast (Kansong). The fighting power of the
Communist Forces, in terms of number, was twice that of the UN Forces; howev-
er, in terms of fire power, the UN Forces were far superior with a ratio of 2:1.

In terms of naval power, the UN Forces were absolutely superior, and
The Battle Organization of the UN forces (Ground)

July 1, 1951

**UNC HQ**
Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway

**EUSA HQ**
LTG James A. Van Fleet

**ROKA HQ**
LTG Lee Jong Ch’an

- **ROK I Corps**
  - MG Paik Sun Yup
    - Cap. Div.
    - 3rd Div.
    - 11th Div.

- **US I Corps**
  - LTG Frank W. Milburn
    - ROK 1st Div.
      - ROKMC 5th Bn.
    - UK 29th Brig.
      - Bel. Bn.\(^2\)
      - Can. 25th Brig.
      - UK 28th Brig.\(^3\)
      - Gk. Bn.
      - Thai Bn.
    - US 3rd Div.
      - Phil. Bn.
    - ROK 9th Div.
    - US 25th Div.
      - Turk. Brig.

- **US IX Corps**
  - LTG William M. Hoge
    - ROK 2nd Div.
    - ROK 6th Div.
    - US 7th Div.

- **US X Corps**
  - LTG Edward M. Almond
    - ROK 7th Div.
    - USMC 1st Div.
    - ROK 5th Div.
    - US 2nd Div.
      - Fr. Bn.
      - Neth. Bn.
    - ROK 8th Div.

**UNC Camps for POWs**
- Col. Bn.
- Eth. Bn.

**Legend**
- Command
- Coordination
- Attachment

Note: 1) General Chief of Staff Chung II Kwon was replaced by Lee Jong Ch’an on July 1, 1951.

2) The Belgian battalion was transformed to Bel-Lux battalion integrating one Luxembourg platoon (+) attached.

3) An Austrian infantry battalion and one New Zealand artillery regiment were attached to the British 27th Brigade (renamed as 28th Brigade later). The New Zealander artillery battalion was organized as a part of the Commonwealth Division on July 28, 1951 and supported the 28th Brigade directly.
The Frontline of the UN forces is based on Truce Tent and Fighting Front; the frontline of the Communist forces is drawn from History of Resist America and Assist Korea War.
the UN Forces had gained air superiority. The UN Navy was made up primarily of
the US 7th Fleet, complemented by the ROK fleet and ships from Great Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada, France, Thailand, and
Columbia. By this time, the North Korean Navy had been almost completely
destroyed, and Red China and the Soviets had not committed their naval power,
stationed primarily at Darien and Vladivostok.

In terms of air power as well, the UN air force enjoyed absolute
supremacy by holding the air superiority. The main force of the UN air force was
the US Far East Air Forces. Also included were the Korean Air Force and air
force units dispatched from Great Britain (an aircraft carrier), Australia, Canada,
Thailand, the Republic of South Africa, and Greece. The force was equipped with
such aircraft as F-51, F-80, F-82, B-26, and B-29 aircraft. The F-86’s were the
newest jet fighters and provided air superiority.

The Communist side was about at the point of committing the new
Chinese air force and the retrained and reequipped North Korean air force, which
had been both organized by the Soviet Air Force. At the time the Chinese troops
joined the Korean war, the control of the air force of the Communists’ side was
conducted by the Soviet air force, which operated from Manchurian bases and
performed combat missions in the air space above northern North Korea. Stalin’s
plan was that the Soviet Union would train the Red Chinese air force and commit
them to the support of the Chinese ground troops by about June 1951. Right after
the conference attended by North Korea, Red China and the Soviet Union, held in
the middle of June, Stalin decided that for the offensive support of the Chinese
ground forces engaged in the war, sixteen divisions were required including eight
combat air divisions, and he requested that Mao Tse Tung deploy eight combat air
divisions to the front.30 Realizing that these had been no air combat even though
seven or eight months had passed since the start of training, Stalin scolded
Lieutenant General Ivan N. Belov, the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps com-
manding general, for the belated commitment of the Chinese air force and the reorganization of the North Korean air force, reminding him that even during the Second World War, there had been a Soviet precedent of having completed the training of pilots in only five or six months. He repeatedly emphasized that the front line deployment of combat air divisions was most urgently required.  

Meanwhile, Mao Tse Tung requested that planes of the combat air division to be deployed in North Korea be transformed from MIG-15. With the consent of Stalin, the Chinese air force was to change the model and complete retraining of pilots and deploy them during September that year. To comply with this plan, Mao Tse Tung requested that Kim Il Sung construct three air bases south of P’yongyang to be used by the Chinese air force. They were in a great hurry to bring the air force into the Korean Peninsula.

After one year of severe fighting, the two camps, confronting each other in a situation similar to that of the pre-war days, were preparing for the cease-fire, strengthening their defense lines by reorganizing and redeploying respective units, while patiently watching to see what would happen. Judging that it would take two months for the enemy to recover, the UN camps trusted that the 60 days ahead would give them ample time to proceed with the negotiations in their favor by taking advantage of the initiatives of the ground operations, the supremacy of the sea, and the command of the air.

On the other hand, the enemy, too, from June when the front lines were stabilized, assumed a defensive posture in order to recover the fighting power by their ground units and to develop their offensive air force in time for an offensive in August. The period of the truce negotiations was judged to be beneficial for improving their situation.

In conclusion, the two camps were confronted each other as they had before the war. It was one year after the outbreak of the war. The UN Command held the initiative and chose an offensive-defense strategy; the Communist camp
in the defensive posture converted to a strategy of positive defense in preparation for a war of attrition. Both camps judged that the following two months would be advantageous for making an effort for a peaceful solution. It was possible for cease-fire negotiations to proceed rapidly from its opening.\textsuperscript{18}

\section*{II. The Effort for the Restoration of the Status Quo Ante Bellum}

Around June 1951, one year after the war began, the battle lines were stalemated roughly in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel Line at the end of a year’s fierce fighting. The cycle was now complete. The armistice conference of the Korean War could be opened at the beginning of July. The two camps had made policy decisions around June 1951 that the solution of the war not by arms but by negotiation. The earlier attempts to end the war by restoring the prewar situation and solving the conflict through peaceful means had failed. These efforts had been initiated by the United Nation at the very outbreak of the war.

First of all, in 1950, as soon as North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June, the United Nations (Security Council) demanded that North Korea stop the aggression and withdraw to restore the pre-war status quo. Then, in December 1950, when the Communist Chinese Forces invaded Korea, the United Nations General Assembly, by establishing the Three Person Committee for Armistice, demanded that the CCF not invade South Korea south of the 38th Parallel. Thus, the UN had made efforts to restore peace in the early stages of the war. Meanwhile, at the beginning of October 1950, when the North Korean forces were retreating from the UN Forces’ counteroffensive, the CCF proposed an armistice at the 38th Parallel. As this proposal, however, had such strings attached as
demanding ‘the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops’, the UN Forces could not accept it. Besides, the Communist proposal for armistice was nothing but a part of a strategem for war masquerading as peace. They wanted to delay the ROK Army and the UN Forces’ breakthrough at the 38th Parallel and to gain the time necessary for the deployment of the CCF, which had already decided to intervene.

Again at the beginning of 1951, peace efforts by the UN ‘Ceace-Fire Group of Three Persons’ resumed, but to no avail. Toward the end of March, the UN Forces expelled the Chinese from the South and recovered the 38 Parallel. Then the UN Forces commander (General MacArthur) proposed a cease-fire conference directly to the Chinese Communist Forces commander. This proposal, however, was not accepted by the opponents. The Communist side simply greeted all peace efforts with silence.

During the months of April and May in 1951, both sides locked in the greatest battle in the ‘The Chinese Fifth Offensive’, and the enemy as well as the friendly forces paid with a great loss of human life. Only after this battle did they abandon the idea of winning the war by arms and adopt the policy of solving the war by negotiation. In behind-the-scene contacts initiated by the US, the Soviets agreed “to achieve peace by armistice by recovering the ante-bellum situation.” Thus, the pursuit for cease-fire negotiations was finally to be arranged.

Before describing the cease-fire negotiations that were opened through the persistent efforts made by the UN Forces from the outbreak of the war, it is appropriate here to systematically describe the unsuccessful efforts which had been made by the UN Forces for the restoration of peace and the tricks which had been played by the Communist side, and based upon recorded facts in order to reflect on the process through which the Soviets finally agreed to solve the war in a peaceful means.
1. UN Resolution to Restore Peace, June 26/June 28

On 25 June, 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the Republic of Korea government, while taking measures for self-defense, immediately informed the US ambassador and the United Nations Commission in Korea of the North Korean aggression, and requested the support of the US and the UN. Chang Myon, the Korean Ambassador in Washington, acting on instructions by President Syngman Rhee, also requested urgent military support from the State Department.

The US government having decided to solve the emergency through the UN, requested that UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie urgently summon the United Nations Security Council and take action. Secretary-General Lie, after confirming the emergency through local reports from the UN Commission in Korea, summoned the United Nations Security Council at 04:00, 26 June (local time 14:00 25 June). After reviewing the report from the UN Commission in Korea and listening directly to Ambassador Chang’s appeal, the Security Council passed a resolution, ‘Request for curbing Communist Aggressive Behavior’, based upon a draft proposed by the US.

The resolution defined ‘North Korean Army’s military attack on South Korea as behavior destructive of peace’, and advised North and South Korea ‘to immediately stop hostilities’, and urged North Korea ‘to withdraw its army to the 38th Parallel Line’. The resolution also called upon all the members of the United Nations to support the execution of the resolution and to avoid giving any support to the North Korean authorities. The gist of the resolution was the demand that North Korea cease its hostile behavior and withdraw its troops to the 38th Parallel. The resolution showed the firm determination on the part of the United Nations to restore the peace on the peninsula which had been destroyed by the North Korean invasion of South Korea, and to return to the status quo ante bellum.

The resolution was based in a charter provision that allowed the Security
Council to request that countries take temporary actions that are deemed necessary or desirable in order to stop a situation from getting worse, before the Security Council, in compliance with the UN Charter, Article 40, advises or decides on non-military compulsory measures for recovery and maintenance of peace (The Charter, Article 41) or on compulsory military measures (The Charter, Article 42). 19)

For the deliberation or vote on the resolution, however, the delegate of the Soviets, one of the permanent numbers of the United Nations Security Council, did not attend the meeting. Because of this, the resolution was passed without the Soviets exercising veto power, but it was uncertain if North Korea would comply with the resolution. The US instructed Alan G. Kirk, the US Ambassador in Moscow, to visit Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and ask him to exercise his influence over North Korea so that it would comply with the resolution. Vyshinsky and Andrei A. Gromyko, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, refused to even meet with Kirk.

The Soviet’s disinterest had been expected. As North Korea’s invasion of South Korea had been dictated by the Soviet strategy, it was an absurd notion that the Soviets would persuade North Korea to comply with the UN resolution aimed at restoring peace, expressed as ‘suspension of aggression and withdrawal to the original situation’. The Soviet representative boycotted the UN over the matter of seating the Red Chinese representative, so if the Soviet delegation exercised its veto power, the Soviets would become a supporter of the invasion; if that did not, they would be contradicting themselves. Therefore, in order to avoid the dilemma, the Soviet delegation did not attend the Security Council for deliberation of the Korean crisis.

Ultimately, just as had been feared at the time of the deliberation of the Security Council, the Resolution of 26 June was ignored by the Communist side, and the North Korean aggression continued. On the next day, 27 June, the capital
city of Seoul was threatened, the South Korean government had to be moved southward, and the battle situation worsened. With the North Korean forces ignoring the Resolution of 26 June and the war situation getting worse, the UN moved on to the next stage, the resolution of military support. President Syngman Rhee, through Ambassador Chang, requested that President Harry S. Truman provide South Korea with effective and timely assistance necessary to defeat the North Korean aggression, and at the same time, the Korean government and the National Assembly requested assistance from the US Government and the Congress and from the UN Commission in Korea. The UN Commission in Korea, while reporting on the implementation of its duty prescribed in the resolution of 26 June, pointed out that “the North Korean authority has not ceased the aggression, and the items demanded by the Security Council are in danger of not being observed.” It requested additional action by the UN. By this time, the US determined to submit to the United Nations a resolution to ask the UN members for military assistance of Korea as well as to obtain permission for the limited military action that had been taken after the Resolution on 26 June.

In this situation, the Security Council summoned by Secretary-General of the UN at 04:00 28 June (local time 14:00, 27 June), conducted a marathon conference lasting eight hours, and “noticing that the North Korean authority neither ceased hostile actions, nor withdrew to the 38th Parallel Line, but merely continued the aggression,” passed a recommendation to the UN member countries that they provide South Korea with assistance needed to repulse armed aggression and to restore the international peace in the region.30

At the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, the UN did not have military system to take action provided on Article 42, “for the recovery and maintenance of peace, a compulsory action can be taken.” Therefore, the Security Council opted for a resolution which included a ‘recommendation’ that each member country was free to decide on its own whether to offer military assistance
or not. The object of the resolution was to “repel the armed attack, that is, to recover peace by the restoration of the original situation.”

After adoption of the resolution, the US Government, through its American ambassador, handed the memorandum to the Soviet government requesting it use its influence over North Korea to cease the armed attack, but just as anticipated, the request was turned down. In spite of the Soviet absence at the Security Council and its refusal to cooperate, many member nations of the UN, following the example of the US, offered their military, medical, and other assistance.

South Korea received the support of the UN Forces based upon ‘the resolution of military assistance to the Republic of Korea’. The ROK Army checked the North Korean Army’s attack and started to counterattack. Together with the UN Forces, the South Korean units reached the 38th Parallel Line on 30 September, and roughly restore the situation before the war. At this time, therefore, the first of the two goals of ‘the resolution of 28 June’, that is, ‘the repulsion of the armed attack’ was achieved. But, another goal, ‘the recovery of the international peace and security in th Korean Peninsula’, was not realized. North Korea had not abandoned its aggression but had simply retreated in defeat to the 38th Parallel Line. The probability that they would attack again to the north of that line after their reorganization and reconstruction was imminent.

For the recovery of peace in the Korean Peninsula, therefore, South Korea was in great need of additional measures to ward off the possibility of the enemy’s continued aggression.

2. The Soviet Stratagem for Truce on October 2

By the end of September, 1950, the ROKA and the UN Forces had defeated the North Korean forces that had invaded South Korea. However, the
enemy was not completed vanquished. The North Korean government had not abandoned its determination to wage war; therefore, peace in the Korean peninsula had not been restored. North Korea's intention to continue the war was confirmed by its indifference to General MacArthur's advice to surrender. This intention was clearly shown in the 'Soviet Top Diplomatic Documents related to the Korean War', recently released by the Soviet Union; in particular it was evident in Kim Il Sung's letter requesting Stalin to dispatch Soviet troops.

On October 1, General MacArthur asked Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the North Korean People's Army, to suspend hostilities because "it is unavoidable for the North troops and your potential war capabilities to be defeated totally sooner or later and to be crushed thoroughly... Therefore, to prevent you from further unnecessary loss of blood and destruction of property," I demand that you cease hostilities. The enemy, however, did not give any sign of response. Kim Il Sung definitely intended to continue to fight.

About this time, the UN Forces analyzed the enemy's war capabilities as follows: "The enemy's capability, although severely disabled to the degree of being incapable to continue to fight, has not yet been annihilated. The crack contingent units and the main force were exterminated, but 1/4 of the units that had invaded South Korea retreated intact, to the north of the 38th Parallel. Among them were higher commands and high-ranking officers. Besides, the enemy's reserves of military power were not exhausted. Even when the battles were being waged in South Korea, the expansion of the North Korean army was in progress north of the 38th Parallel." In this situation in which the enemy has not given up the will to fight and in which they still retained their ability to fight, should the UN Forces stop at the 38th Parallel, it would merely provide the enemy with the chance of reorganization for battle and with the resumption of strengthening their fighting power. And should the UN Forces withdraw from Korea, continuation of the war, that is, re-invasion of South Korea would be inevitable.
Such analysis proved right on October 1, when General MacArthur tried to persuade the enemy to surrender. Kim Il Sung, on the same day, requested by telegram, that Stalin and Mao Tse Tung dispatch the Soviet troops, International Communist Forces and/or the Communist Chinese Forces. In this telegram, Kim pledged he would keep on fighting ‘until the last drop of blood’. The following section from Kim Il Sung’s request for the dispatch of Communist troops speaks of his preparation for more war and his will to fight.24)

...Dear Comrade Stalin! To keep Chosen [Korea] from becoming a colony of, and also a military bridgehead for, the American Imperialists, we overflow with our determination to overcome all the difficulties developing in front of us. We will struggle with the enemy to the last drop of our blood in order to preserve independence, democracy, and the happiness of the people. For this purpose, we are taking resolute measures for organizing and training a lot of divisions. ...

At this point in time, the UN Forces were not aware that Kim II Sung had requested that Soviet troops, International Communist Troops, or Chinese Communist Forces be dispatched; however, in order to achieve the aim described in ‘the Resolution of June 28’, that is, ‘in order to restore the international peace and security in the Korean peninsula’, the UN Forces, to destroy the North Korean Army which had retreated to the north and its war potential, was in preparation for military and political measures. Militarily, the UN Forces march north was approved compliance with the principle of ‘the Resolution of June 28’ and ‘Instructions of September 27’. Detailed guidance for the operation to the north was conveyed to subordinating units and the UN Forces Command was asked to prepare for the March to the North Operation. Politically, the UN Forces were preparing a draft of a resolution for the unification of Korea, not only to consoli-
date the legal basis for the military operation but also to provide general guidelines for the unification to follow the military operation. The draft resolution for unification was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on September 30 by the British representative as a joint motion of eight countries.²⁵)

Under these circumstances, the ROK Army launched the Advance to the North Operation by an independent policy decision on October 1; meanwhile, the UN Forces Command conveyed the operation order to advance to the north, and was preparing for the Advance to North Operation.

Under this urgent military situation, the Communist camp came up a stratagem to frustrate the strategy of the UN Forces camp. On October 2, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, having completed a confidential conference with Moscow and Beijing, submitted a resolution to the UN General Assembly under the name of “Immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the Korean peninsula,” The gist of the resolution he submitted follows:

1) Immediate cease-fire in the Korean peninsula.
2) Immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces.
3) Election of Members of a National Congress throughout Korea.
4) Organization of a Governing Committee for South and North Korea, with an equal number of representatives from both sides.
5) Execution of an election under the supervision of the UN Commission, including representatives of the countries that share national boundaries with Korea.²⁶)

On the next day, Chou En Lai, through K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, warned the US of potential Chinese participation in the war: “Should the US proceed to North Korea, China will participate in the war.”

The Soviet proposal might at first glance appear plausible, yet it was
problematic for the UN Forces, particularly for the US and South Korea. First of all, the direct reason for the division the Korean peninsula was the Soviet Union’s refusal in 1948 to have a general election in both South Korea and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations. In view of the Soviet’s refusal in 1948, it was not clear why the Soviets would want such an election in 1950? Second, the results of the execution of the election agreements in Eastern Europe after World War II had turned out to be disasters for non-Communist parties. In view of this, the Soviet proposal contained conditions that would be hard to accept. Besides, the initiative of the operation of the war was in the hands of the UN Forces. With this military situation in mind, to cease hostilities on the proposed 38th Parallel and to demand the withdrawal of the UN Forces prior to the establishment of a unified government was not consistent with the reality of the war situation. While the population of South Korea was larger than North Korea, the proposal demanded that the composition of the North and South Joint Governing Committee have equal representation from both Koreas, and participation by Red China in the UN’s supervision of the election. These demands were much more than the Korean and American governments could accept. These things were pointed out, and the Soviet proposal was voted down at the UN Political Committee (the First Committee), and the Joint Proposal by the eight countries was adopted. This proposal was immediately introduced to the UN General Assembly, was put to a vote, and was adopted. The essence of the joint proposal follows:

- To secure safe conditions throughout Korea, all appropriate measures will be taken.
- To establish Korea’s unified, independent, and democratic government, all measures that are constitutional, including the execution of the election, under the auspice of the UN, will be taken.
II. The Effort for the Restoration of the Status Quo Ante bellum

This meant that only after completing military operations in the North Korean region, thereby securing safe conditions throughout the Korean Peninsula, would a unified and democratic government be established by election under the supervision of the UN.

Because of this resolution on October 7 at the General Assembly, the Soviet Union failed in its attempt to arrange the cease-fire on the 38th Parallel. According to diplomatic papers of that period recently published by the Soviets, on October 1, prior to introducing the draft for cease-fire to the United Nations, Stalin had asked Mao Tse Tung to dispatch Red Chinese troops to the Korean War, and on the same day, Kim Il Sung had also asked Mao Tse Tung to send the Chinese Communist Forces to support him. Upon receiving Kim’s request, Mao Tse Tung decided to dispatch his troops on October 2, and it was clarified that he had acquired consent from the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau.

Neither ‘the Warning Utterance’ made through Indian Ambassador Panikkar, nor ‘the Cease-fire Proposal of October 2’ were for the restoration of genuine peace, but the hidden intention doubtlessly lay in supporting the North Korean troop’s reorganization by checking or delaying the UN Forces’ advance to the north, and in gaining time for Red Chinese forces to prepare for the dispatch to North Korea. The Soviet proposal was, therefore, another stratagem, and it was only natural that the UN’s Political Committee rejected the Soviet proposal.

3. UN Mediation for Truce by Cease-Fire Group of Three Persons

At the beginning of October 1950, the Soviet’s proposal was defeated in the UN, and ‘the Resolution for the Unification of Korea on October 7’ proposed by the eight Western countries was adopted, and on the next day, the major operation of the UN Forces into North Korea began. The UN Forces, together the ROK
Army, captured P’yongyang on October 19, and on October 24 they transformed their operation into a full-scale offensive (Thanksgiving Day Offensive) toward the Korean-Manchurian border as the objective. The offensive, however, having collided unexpectedly with the Red Chinese Forces’ the First Offensive on October 25 and came to a standstill. On the very day that P’yongyang fell, the Red Chinese Forces crossed the Yalu River in the darkness, moved to the general area of the Chokyu-ryong Mountains north of the Ch’ongch’on River, and assumed a defensive posture there. The UN Forces and the ROK Army, totally unaware, moved by roads and fell into several ambushes set by the Red Chinese troops.

The UN forces retreated and barely held a bridgehead at the Ch’ongch’on River; then, after reinforcing the front line units, they launched the last offensive (Christmas Offensive) toward the Korean-Manchurian border on November 24. On the next day, the UN Forces encountered the Chinese Communist Forces’ Second Offensive, and soon faced serious tactical situations on all fronts. Only at this time did MacArthur acknowledge that large and systematic Chinese Communist Forces were participating in the war. Outnumbered by the Chinese, the UN Forces had to withdraw on November 30.

Then, the higher level of the United Nations Command, facing a new situation due to Red China’s participation in the war, reviewed such options as expansion of the war, withdrawal, or armistice. In connection with this process, at the Attlee-Truman Conference held in Washington on December 4 through 8, Truman decided that the best policy would be to seek a truce under the supervision of the UN.

On December 5, 1950, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab countries asked that Red Chinese and North Korean units not cross the 38th Parallel, while both sides were being consulted about a truce at the parallel line. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee agreed to the suggestion, but neither Beijing nor P’yongyang responded at all.
Meanwhile, on the battlefields, the UN Forces continued withdrawing, and from December 12 in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, they began to build up the defensive line. While the Chinese Communist forces which occupied P’yongyang, slowly moved southward to the 38th Parallel. The thirteen countries from Asia and the Arab world continued their diplomatic effort on December 11, and introduced two resolutions to the General Assembly for the solution of the Korean problem. The first proposal called for the establishment of a ‘Cease-fire Group of Three Persons’ and the second demanded that a peace conference be held in a timely fashion to deal with the problem of the Far East after the conclusion of the cease-fire.³⁵

The ‘Cease-Fire Group of Three Persons’ was to include the Chairman of the UN General Assembly, and the Committee was to produce a plan without delay for the termination of the Korean War. The proposal for the ‘Opening of the Peace Conference’ was a demand to create a seven-country Peace Conference to handle the problems which were expected in Asia after cessation of hostilities in Korea.³⁶ The Three-Person Group was acceptable to the US since it demanded unconditional cease-fire; the peace conference was intended to drag Red China to the negotiation table, since that country had reason to solve the Korean problem along with other various pending problems in Asia.

Of the two proposals, the latter was voted down at the General Assembly held on December 14, and the former was adopted amidst the opposition of the Soviet Union and the support of the US. On that day, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, Chairman of the UN General Assembly, organized the ‘Cease-fire Group of Three Persons’ with representatives of India, Canada and himself. The group was approved by the General Assembly.³⁷ The group asked Red China to cease military actions in all the territory of South Korea and to conclude cease-fire negotiations for establishing the demilitarized zone about twenty miles from the 38th Parallel; however, the reply received on December 21 from Red China was a can-
did rejection of the proposal because “All the actions taken by the UN without Red China’s participation was illegal.” Such a rejection was reconfirmed by Chou En Lai’s telegram received by the UN two days later on December 23. He criticized the US for its action, saying “the 38th Parallel as the dividing line is invalid because the UN Forces invaded the territory of North Korea. Cease-fire will not be considered apart from an approach that is conducive to the solution of political problems, listed below: 38)

1) Withdrawal of all the foreign armed forces from South Korea;
2) Withdrawal of the US troops from the Taiwan Strait and the Taiwan region;
3) The solution of the Korean problem by the Korean race;
4) The participation of Chinese representatives in the UN and the withdrawal from the UN of Chiang Kai Shek’s government;
5) The summoning of the four powers’ foreign ministers to a conference for the preparation of a peace agreement with Japan.

Early in December, just before the rejection to the Group of Three Persons’ proposal, Red China through its Special Envoy Oh Soo Kwon at the UN Headquarters drafted the conditions given above, as the United Nations Secretary General and the representatives from India, England, and Sweden at the UN attempted to ascertain Red China’s attitude to the cease-fire conditions of the Korean War. Red China reported its demands to Stalin on December 7 and received Stalin’s consent, simultaneously receiving from Stalin guidelines to cope with the UN’s strategy: “Even if such a proposal for the conditions were introduced after the occupation of Seoul, it would not be too late.”39)

It is very clear that Red China’s conditions were not related merely to the Korean problem itself; by utilizing the Korean problem as a link, Red China
was attempting to find solutions to its pending problems. Red China’s demand, therefore, was incompatible with the goal of the US for a cease-fire without any prerequisites, let alone that of South Korea. In consequence, the UN Cease-fire Group of Three Person’s efforts to restore the ante-bellum situation before the Red Chinese Forces crossed the 38th Parallel were not successful. Mao Tse Tung had already ordered the launch of the next offensive on December 19, in compliance with Stalin’s instructions. The Chinese Communist Forces, managing a part of the North Korean units, launched the Third Offensive (New Year’s Offensive) as of January 1, 1951. they succeeded in capturing Seoul, but by the beginning of January, they had already advanced up to the 37th Parallel Line (P’yongtaek-Samch’ok). In this situation, they had lost their offensive power. The CCF had reached the temporary limits of its power because of heavy losses in battle up to that point.

On January 11, 1951, the Three Person Group submitted a new peace proposal to the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Including the establishment of an apparatus or organization for discussing the conditions Red China had tenaciously demanded during the period before the submission of the proposal, the proposal consisted of a five-stage peace process:^{40}

1) An immediate cease-fire should take place in order to prevent unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property;

2) When both sides have agreed to a cease-fire, measures for the restoration of peace should be explored by taking advantage of the official agreement or of the slackening of hostilities;

3) For the realization of the UN’s resolution for construction of a unified, independent, and democratic nation, appropriate measures should be provided to assure withdrawal of foreign armed forces and to implement the Koreans’ will concerning their government;
4) Until the time when the above measures are concluded, temporary agreements will be made under the UN’s principle for the maintenance of administration, peace, and security; and,

5) Simultaneous with the cease-fire agreement, a proper organization including representatives of the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China will be established in order to solve the Far East problems such as Taiwan problem and China’s representation at the UN.

Of the above peace proposal items, the last one was ‘painful’ for the US, but the US ‘ventured’ to support the proposal in consideration of two international political factors: Red China might refuse the proposal itself, and the US should not be called an obstructor of the UN’s efforts for the pursuit of peace.  

This proposal was approved quickly by the Political Committee, amidst the US’ acceptance and the Soviet Union’s opposition. Red China was notified of the approval of the bill by way of the Secretary General of the UN. In reply on January 17, 1951, Red China stated that a cease-fire without political negotiations was absolutely unacceptable and presented an alternative proposal, which was a reiteration of its former position. That is, Red China claimed its own membership in the UN and the withdrawal of the US troops from Taiwan in reward for a cease-fire.

These were conditions the US could hardly accept. The UN’s (Cease-fire Group of Three Persons) efforts for peace failed at this point. This failure could be interpreted to mean that peace in Korea was sacrificed to Red China’s national interests, such as Red China’s membership in the UN and the withdrawal of the US troops from Taiwan.

As a price for the belligerent demands submitted by Red China in opposing the efforts for peace, the UN General Assembly named the Communist Chinese as ‘Aggressors in Korea’ on February 1, 1951.
4. Proposal for Truce Talks by the Commander in Chief of the UN Forces (MacArthur)

The Communist Forces, after refusing the UN’s proposal of the Group of Three Persons for the cease-fire in December 1950, launched the New Year’s Day Offensive in order to achieve their original objective of communizing the Korean peninsula. On the 37th Parallel Line, however, the CCF not only had lost their offensive power, but they also had to suffer the dishonor of being branded as an aggressor. At this point in time, the UN Forces, mounting a counterattack, crushed the Red Chinese Forces’ Fourth Offensive in February, recaptured Seoul on March 15 and recovered the region south of the 38th Parallel by the end of March.

Around this time, the US government, which was guiding the Korean war as the agent of the UN, had been drafting a new Far Eastern policy (NSC 48/2) to solve the Korean war by a cease-fire. The policy that was drawn up on March 15, 1951 divided up the Korean policy objective into two parts, military and political. It would seek a unified and independent nation politically, but militarily it would repel the aggressors and recover peace. The point is that the unification should not be attempted by use of arms, and when the UN Forces reached the 38th Parallel in military operations, a cease-fire should be sought on that line. This policy was strongly supported by the member countries of the UN. These countries hoped that the US would make an appeal for peace before the UN Forces crossed the 38th Parallel.

President Truman, in compliance with the policy and the demands of the allies, decided to publish the following statement: “Hoping for the beginning of peace negotiations, the UN Forces Command is willingly considering concluding a cease-fire in the ante-bellum situation.” The US government was attempting to secure agreements to the drafted statement from the related governments, and informed General MacArthur that the statement would be published soon.43)
The substance of the draft text of the proposed ‘Presidential Statement on Korea’ follows:

United Nations forces in Korea are engaged in repelling the aggression committed first on June 25, 1950, by North Korean forces against the Republic of Korea and subsequently by Chinese Communist forces against the United Nations. The aggressors have been driven back with heavy losses to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched last June. There remains the problem of restoring international peace and security in the area in accordance with the terms of the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950. .... There is a basis for restoring peace and security in the area which should be acceptable to all unless the aggressors are determined to continue their aggression at whatever the cost. The Unified Command is prepared to enter into arrangements which would assure the ending of the aggression, would conclude the fighting and ensure against its resumption. Such arrangements would open the way for a broader settlement for Korea, including the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

... 4A)

The statement that President Truman had been preparing for publication had to be cancelled because, without prior notice, General MacArthur proposed to the Communist Forces on March 24 (Far East time) that “(He was) ready to hold talks with the Communist Commander in the battlefield.” Not only was the statement cancelled, but the cancellation also brought forth mistrust and confusion among the friendly nations.

General MacArthur, in the proposal he published, assumed that “The
military operations will continue as planned. We have repelled the Communist Forces practically out of South Korea.” And then, he proclaimed that “Communist China was a vastly overrated military power. Even under inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.” 49 The rest of his proposal follows:

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.

Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander in Chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.
General MacArthur’s proposal implied that he could directly apply military threats to Red China, but he could not give any guarantee for the solution of political problems which Red China had been so persistently demanding. He did not, therefore, receive any response from them; consequently, his proposal remained just that to the end. It also resulted in damaging President Truman’s efforts to play a leading role in peace negotiations.

In publishing his proposal, MacArthur was not aware of its political ramifications. He wrote in his memoirs that “that announcement was just a communiqué that had been broadcast on a local station in the combat zone. I had induced the enemy’s commanders to surrender twice before, but there were no sanctions from Washington,” he pointed out.\(^\text{46}\) This incident, however, angered the President, and it decisively influenced President Truman on General MacArthur’s fitness to command.

5. Decisions of the US-Soviet Truce Policy and Contacts behind the Scene

By dint of General MacArthur’s ‘Announcement of March 24’, the US efforts for peace had to be interrupted for a short while. In April Truman relieved MacArthur of his command, and General Ridgway was appointed the UN Forces Commander. Meanwhile, on the front line, the friendly forces, encountering the Red Chinese forces’ Fifth Offensive, withdrew to the line connecting Pukhan-san (Seoul), Yongmunsan, and Soksa-ri. Despite being at an another crisis, the friendly forces destroyed the enemy’s willingness to commit massive infantry forces by fire power, thus snatching the initiative of the war and capturing the 38th Parallel for the third time toward the end of May.

While all this was going on, the US had developed a new policy for the Far East. First draft in March, NSC 48/2 was approved by the President on May 17 in its fifth version. The point of the new policy was that the US reviewed the
problem of the Korean Peninsula as both an urgent and a long-term problem and would gradually solve it. The current objective, the end of the war—was to seek an armistice at the status quo ante-bellum, while the ultimate objective, the establishment of a unified country, would be sought through the UN. The main content of the policy, called Policy Guidelines for United States Action, follows:

a. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and punish the aggressor.

b. Consistent with a above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

According to the ‘Policy of May 17’ dictates, Ridgway was given a mission of action on June 1, 1951. The assignment was to inflict maximum damage to
lives and materiel of the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces with the object of maintaining the security of the UN Forces and ending the Korean war by meeting the conditions given in a above, (1) through (4).\(^48\)

To comply with the above mission, the ground operation was limited to Kansas and Wyoming lines east and west of Hwach’on Reservoir. As for naval and air operations, they were allowed to operate within Korea’s geographic boundaries and the adjacent sea areas. They could approach within twelve miles of the Korea-Manchuria and Korea-Soviet borders. These instructions were confirmed on July 10, 1951, with some revisions, including giving the ground forces the right to perform guerrilla operations, limited landing operations, and airborne operations in the enemy’s rear area.

From the time of the North Korean invasions of South Korea, the US had maintained a discreet posture on efforts by the UN to find a peaceful solution to the war. With the New Policy for the Far East (NSC 48/5) as a foundation, however, the US adopted a positive posture. With this new guidance, the US exercised its own diplomatic initiative, and started to make contacts with the Soviet Union and Red China behind the scenes. In May, the US contacted Soviet officials in France and Germany, tried to approach the government of Red China in Hong Kong, and attempted to ascertain the Soviet’s intention in Moscow through government officials of the US and Sweden. All these attempts turned out to be unsatisfactory. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was able to gain some information in confidential contacts between George F. Kennan, a diplomat with special access to the Russians, and Jacob Malik, the Soviet Union’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and representative at the UN. On May 31 and June 5, 1951 Kennan met Malik to learn the Soviet Union’s view concerning the possibility of a truce in the Korean war. Malik expressed the following opinion:\(^49\)

The Soviet Union wants peace, and wants the peaceful solution of the Korean problem—and that, as soon as possible. As the Soviet Union has not
participated in the Korean war, however, I don’t think the Soviet Union is entitled to participate in any negotiation for the matter of cease-fire.

He added that “the US can contact North Korea and Red China as regards the problem.”\textsuperscript{30} Malik’s statement was interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union wished an early solution to the Korean war and would influence North Korea and Red China concerning the Korean problem.\textsuperscript{51} In actuality, as soon the CCF failed in the spring offensive, Stalin realized that the CCF could not win through military operations, and that the Communists had more to gain through diplomatic means than military operations. When he reached this opinion on the situation, he instructed Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, to make a peace proposal, while he discussed the matter with Mao Tse Tung and Kim Il Sung.

On June 13 and 14, Stalin had a meeting with North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and Red China’s Gau Gang in Moscow, and he discussed the cease-fire, the support of Red China with Soviet military advisers, and the Russian program to provide weapons to china and North Korea. Concerning the cease-fire, in particular, Mao Tse Tung sent a telegram to Gau Gang and Kim Il Sung. In the telegram, he clarified his position: “As regards cease-fire, it is advisable that we wait until the enemy proposes, rather than Red China or North Korea does it. This should be decided by discussing it with Stalin, however. The cease-fire should be concluded by restoring the boundary at the 38th Parallel and by assigning the neutral zone to North Korea and South Korea. Under this condition, the cease-fire must be established.” The content of the actual telegram follows:\textsuperscript{52}

To Comrade Gau Gang and Comrade Kim Il Sung,

I received your telegram dated June 13.

Concerning how to propose the cease-fire problem, I think it is illogi-
cal now for North Korea and Red China to propose such a matter themselves. The reason is that North Korean units and Chinese Supporting units should prepare for the defensive posture for the next two months. If you do it in the following manner, it would be better.

(1) To wait for the time when the enemy proposes it.

(2) It is desirable that the Soviet Union, based upon Kennan’s announcement, inquire about the cease-fire of the US government.

The above two methods can be attempted at the same time. That is, while the Soviet government is inquiring about it, and if it gets the enemy to make the proposal, North Korea and Red China will accept it. As to which will be more logical, please send me your view. Please discuss the matter with Comrade Fillipov.

(3) The condition for the cease-fire is to restore the boundary at the 38th Parallel and to allocate not a large area as a neutral zone from North Korea and South Korea. It will not be acceptable to have North Korea allocate a neutral zone. I think it is not necessary to make a claim for Red China’s membership in the UN as a condition, because Red China has become a tool of aggression by the UN. In this way, we can make it clear that we do not give any special significance to the UN membership.

We must think about whether we should raise the Taiwan problem as a condition. I think we should raise the matter to negotiate with them. If the US insists that the Taiwan problem must be solved separately, we will make a proper concession at that time. Please tell Comrade Philipov that we should solve the Korean problem with first priority in order to achieve the great work for peace, and try to get his instruction.

(4) We have ordered Dung Hua and the 13th Army Group Command Post to return to the front line immediately and secure the current front line firm-
ly. The preparation project will proceed powerfully in June and July. In August, a greater operation will be performed. Unless the enemy drops airborne units in our rear area on a large scale, our above objective will be accomplished. If the enemy does not dispatch new reinforcements to South Korea, we will be much stronger in August than now.

(5) We are now planning to move our aviation units to the front line.

Mao Tse Tung

June 13, 1951

In the above telegram, Mao temporarily abandoned the matters of Red China’s representation in the UN and the resolution of the Taiwan problem. In addition, his opinion that “we should solve the Korean problem with first priority” and his request for Stalin’s instruction on the matter is noteworthy. It could be interpreted that the obstacles preventing settlement of the Korean problem had been surmounted. Mao’s opinion having been considered, the strategy for ceasefire negotiation was adopted by North Korea, Red China, and the Soviet Union in another Moscow conference. This was implicitly expressed in a public radio broadcast in the speech entitled ‘The Price of Peace’ and delivered by Malik, the Soviet representative to the UN, on June 23, 1951.

As regards the Korean problem, the address concluded with the following words:53)

The Soviet Union will continue its struggle to strengthen peace and avert a new world war. The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that it is possible to defend the cause of peace.

The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled.

This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a
peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the thirty-eighth parallel.

On the very next day, that is June 25, Red China’s People’s Daily fully supported Malik’s speech. On June 26, Pravda printed the whole text and also published a supporting article: “The peoples of the Soviet Union are confident of every possibility for the peaceful solution of the Korean war. Our UN representative Malik’s proposal for cease-fire is fully supported not only by all the democratic peoples of the world, but also even by the conservative and bourgeois newspapers.” Meanwhile, on June 27, North Korea responded: “The people of North Korea are now encountering the most serious trial in the history of the North Korean people. The people of North Korea, in cooperation with the people of China, are fighting against South Korea National Defense Army and the US Army in order to expel them to the south of the 38th Parallel.” The North Koreans’ response indicated that they had withdrawn from their former position that they would push the South Korean Army and the UN Forces up to the southern seashore in order to communize the whole peninsula. It also suggested that they had revised their tactics to temporarily secure the 38th Parallel.

The Soviet Union, at the beginning of June 1951, having learned of the cease-fire policy and planned proposal for cease-fire negotiations of the US through behind the scene contacts with Kennan, decided on the strategy of seeking a cease-fire. It published its intention in the form of Malik’s speech to the UN and by using its own press. By also using the media of North Korea and Red China, it maximized its propaganda and tried to get ahead of the Western countries in the matter of proposing a cease-fire. The Soviet Union obviously wanted to gloss over its former aggressive policy and declare itself a leader in world
peace.

By introduction of the North Korean Army and the CCF in sequence, the Soviet Union attempted to communize the peninsula by military power, but to no avail. As soon as those attempts failed and the war developed so that it was disadvantageous to them, the Communist allies had to adopt the cease-fire strategy to restore the original state of things. At the beginning of the aggression against South Korea, when North Korean and Chinese forces had the initiative in the war, at the time of the Red Chinese entry into the war, and at the time of the spring offensive, the Soviet Union repeatedly refused to accept cease-fire talks for peace in Korea, proposed by the United Nations Forces.

It is wrong, therefore, to depict Malik's speech, that is, the Soviet Union's proposal for the truce, as a positive contribution to the attainment of cease-fire negotiations. In reality, the UN Forces had proposed a truce in order to restore peace in Korea from the beginning of the war; the Communists had repeatedly ignored the proposals. They had attempted to communize the peninsula by means of armed force. The Communists finally realized that this was impossible in April-May, 1951. Fearing a situation turning against them, they changed their policy hurriedly into one accommodating a truce, but only if they could secure the prewar situation. The Soviet Union, therefore, finally responded favorably to "the draft of solving the Korean war by an armistice."

Trygve Lie, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, described this in his memoirs as follows: 55)

...At that time Communist forces were retreating in Korea under heavy pressure, with enormous losses in men and materiel. Perhaps as a result Malik suggested on June 23 in a radio broadcast that, as a first step toward a Korean settlement, discussions commence between the two sides for a cease-fire and armistice.
III. Opening of Truce Talks at Kaesong

1. Strategies and Basic Principles of the Both Sides at the Talks

(1) The Basic Negotiation Policies of the UN Forces and the Proposal for the Talks.

The UN Forces confirmed that the US government’s policy of restoring peace by truce to the pre-war status as an immediate objective to solve the Korean problem had been established. They had also been attempting to ascertain Soviet intention through contacts behind the scene. When Malik mentioned a truce talk as a peaceful solution to the Korean war in his speech entitled ‘The Value of Peace’, the UN Forces were suspicious. The US government wondered if the content of his speech represented the views of the Soviet government. In order to find out the true intent of the Soviets, the US government asked Alan G. Kirk, American ambassador in Moscow, to contact the Soviet government.

On June 27, 1951, Kirk visited Andrei A. Gromyko, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and asked about the following 5 items:56

1) **Kirk:** Mr. Malik used the expression ‘the Soviet peoples believe’. Are we entitled to believe that this is also the view of the Soviet government? If so, is the Soviet government prepared to lend its supports to the taking of steps toward a peaceful settlement?

**Gromyko:** (avoiding a direct response to the question) Malik’s utterance is the same as he stated. He is the Soviet government’s official representative at the UN. The views of the Soviet government had already been con-
veyed a long time ago. In 1950, when the British government approached the Soviet government for a peaceful resolution of the Korean situation, in view of the friendly actions taken by the Soviets then, these Soviet actions have not been positively accepted by either the US or Great Britain.

2) **Kirk**: Are there any special meanings to ‘cease fire and armistice’? What is the difference between the two concepts? Does it signify that it is a gradual exploration of peace? As to measures preventing a recurrence of war, such as regulations governing a surveillance of cease-fire and armistice, are you considering such measures?

**Gromyko**: I consider cease-fire part of what I term ‘interim military armistice’. By this I mean that this is the first stage for a peaceful solution. By this I mean that the parties fighting in Korea would meet and conclude a military armistice which would include cease-fire, and which would be limited strictly to military questions and would not involve any political or territorial matters. As to assurance against resumption of hostilities, this would be subject of discussion between commands in formulating terms of military armistice.

3) **Kirk**: What do you mean by finding peaceful settlement of the Korean problem? Does the Soviet government have any specific steps in mind?

**Gromyko**: Conclusion of military armistice would in fact be ‘entering on a path of peaceful settlement.’ What (is desirable) is obvious. The Soviet government have no proposals to make. It is up to parties in Korea to decide. And special arrangements will have be made for political and territorial settlements.

4) **Kirk**: Does the Soviet government think that Malik’s speech reflects Chinese views? If it doesn’t, how may Chinese views be ascertained?

**Gromyko**: The Soviet government does not know the views of the Chinese government on Malik’s statement. If the US wants to ascertain
the views of the Chinese government, it will have to ask China. I have no suggestions.

5) **Kirk**: Which of the belligerent parties should attend the talks?

**Gromyko**: The meeting should be held between military representatives of the Unified Commands, that is, American troops and those of other countries participating in the war in Korea plus the South Korean Command and North Korean People's Republic Command plus representatives of Chinese volunteer units.

Through the above queries the United States not only confirmed that Malik's statement was the official view of the Soviet government, but also ascertained the Soviet government's intention for a peaceful settlement of the Korean War. Meanwhile, on June 1, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the UN, issued his statement\(^{57}\) that “a truce roughly along the 38th Parallel Line, if it could recover peace and security in that region, could be construed as satisfying the resolution made in June and July, 1950,” and the ambassadors to the UN who had dispatched the UN Forces to Korea were all uniformly for the negotiation of a truce.\(^{58}\)

The US administration decided that truce talks would be held on the military level, and that the commander of the UN Forces would make a proposal for such talks to the commander of the Communist Forces. The administration wrote the proposal, sending it to the Commander of the UN Forces on June 29, 1951. General Ridgway, broadcasting the message on the radio at 08:00, June 30, 1951, proposed to the Commander of the Communist Forces that truce talks be held on a Dutch hospital ship that was at anchor in Wonsan harbor.\(^{59}\)

To the Commander in Chief of the Communist Forces

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. I have been
instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date on which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.

M. B. Ridgway
General, US Army
Commander in Chief of the UN Forces

When instructing General Ridgway to propose an armistice talk on the previous day, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a general policy statement to be followed in armistice talks with the enemy. The general policy had been prepared discreetly during the previous several months in anticipation of negotiations.60)

General Policy

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations Forces....

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of
the utmost importance to reach agreements which would be acceptable to us over an extended period of time.
c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions; you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental levels.

In addition to the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway that judging from past experiences, negotiating a settlement with the Communists would be very difficult, and that patience would be required in conducting negotiations. He was cautioned that he should not break off, the talks, except in case of the enemy's failure to accept the final, irreducible minimum conditions, and that he should not employ any deceitful devices that would cause international questioning of the good faith of the UN Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also set forth the fundamental stand (the minimum acceptable conditions) that should be maintained by the UN side and other detailed guidelines for the talks. 61)

The UN Side's Fundamental Stand on the Negotiation

The armistice agreements:
a. Shall be confined to Korea and strictly military matters therein, and shall not involve any political or territorial matters.
b. Shall continue in effect until superseded by other arrangements.
c. Shall require the commanders concerned to order a cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea; shall require the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and shall require all ground forces in
Korea to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof.

d. Shall provide for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice arrangements by a Military Armistice Commission of mixed membership of (sic) an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and by the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces. The Commission and teams of observers appointed by the Commission shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and shall be given all possible assistance and cooperation in carrying out their functions.

e. Shall require the commanders concerned to cease the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing air, ground or naval units or personnel during the armistice. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the exchange of units or individual personnel on a man-for-man basis.

f. Shall require the commanders concerned to refrain from increasing the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Commission nor the vehicles, ships or aircraft used to transport such supplies.

Specific Details of the Negotiation of the UN side

a. The Military Armistice Commission must be empowered to inspect to insure that the terms, conditions, and arrangements as agreed to are carried
out by all armed forces, including guerrillas. It shall be provided with
cOMPetent assistants designated equally by the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command, and the Commander in Chief of the
Communist forces in Korea, in numbers sufficient to enable it to carry out
its duties and functions.

b. The armistice arrangements should not become effective until the
Commission has been organized and is ready to exercise its functions.

c. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, to
be determined by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and
the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, based gener-
ally upon the positions of the opposing forces at the time the armistice
arrangements are agreed upon. For purposes of negotiation your initial
demand might be that the Communist forces must withdraw 20 miles or
more along the entire front. If it becomes necessary for purposes of bar-
gaining for you to agree to some withdrawal of United Nations forces, you
may do so to the extent that your present strong military position and your
ability to carry out your military mission are not placed in jeopardy. You
may agree to continued Communist control of the Ongjin and Yonan
Peninsulas for purposes of the armistice only.

d. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing ground forces in
Korea. These forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas
under the control of the opposing force.

e. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing naval forces in
Korea. These forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilita-
rized zone and the land areas under the control of the opposing force.

f. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing air forces. These
forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas
under the control of the opposing forces.
g. Vehicles, naval units and aircraft required for special missions authorized by the Commission shall be excepted from subparagraphs d, e, and f, above.

h. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

i. Organized bodies of armed forces including guerrillas initially in advance of the demilitarized zones shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces.

One item that is of particular note is that “You may agree to continued Communist control of the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas for the purposes of the armistice only.” The UN Command allowed the negotiators to yield to the communists’ occupation of the peninsulas because those areas were a great burden to defend and so vulnerable that they were not worthy of defensive lines. In view of this, the UN Forces were far enough north of the 38th Parallel Line on the east coast to compensate for the territorial loss on the west coast. It was not planned that the boundary line at the time of cease-fire would be the 38th Parallel Line, but the contact line of the two camps.

Abandoning the Ongjin and Yonan region including Kaesong, however, became a factor which threatened the capital area in its defense in terms of ground, sea, and air. As the state of armistice was prolonged for decades, the threat increased with the development of weapons systems.

(2) The Communists’ Basic Strategies for the Negotiation and the Acceptance of the Proposal for Negotiations

As the UN camp was about to propose the talks while consolidating
cease-fire guidelines, the Communist camp was also busy preparing for their negotiation strategies.

First of all, on 29 June 1951, Kim Il Sung, in light of the UPI News of the previous day that General Ridgway would start talks with leaders the of North Korean Forces upon receiving the order from the Department of Defense after it was notified by the UN Forces Command, asked Mao Tse Tung for his opinion about what to say when General Ridgway proposed such talks.

On 30 June, General Ridgway proposed the talks on a cease-fire. Mao Tse Tung notified Stalin that the talks should be on 15 July in Kaesong. Mao further asked Stalin to give Kim Il Sung guidelines for the talks.62)

Stalin replied to Mao on June 30, saying that “Mao Tse Tung will lead the talks, and you should directly contact Kim Il Sung. The Soviets will just give advice.” Stalin instructed Mao in this telegram to change the site of the talks to Kaesong, and he sent Mao a draft reply for the UN Forces Commanding General, as follows:63)

I received your telegram concerning the cease-fire. I think we should immediately convey over radio that we agree with Ridgway’s proposal for cease-fire negotiations conducted by the representatives of both commands.

The notice should be signed by the North Korean forces commander and Chinese Voluntary Forces commander, that is by Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Peng Teh Huai. Without the signature of the Chinese People’s Voluntary Forces Commander, the US would not consider as binding the North Korean signature alone. As to the proposed Danish hospital ship in the Wonsan area for the site of the talks, you should clearly reject it. You should request that the talks be held at Kaesong on the 38th Parallel Line. At present, you can lead the matters on cease-fire, and you should keep in mind that the US will concede in the choice of the truce site.
I hope you will reply to Ridgway with the content below:

To General Ridgway, Commanding General of the UN Forces Command,

We have received your statement of cease-fire dated 28 June. In order to talk about an end of military actions and about cease-fire, we would tell you that we agree to your proposal. We propose Kaesong to be the negotiation site. If you will agree with our proposal, our representatives will be ready to hold meetings with yours from 10 July to 15 July.

Kim II Sung
Commander in Chief of the NKPA
Peng Teh Huai
Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army

In your telegram, you proposed that we in Moscow guide the cease-fire negotiations. This should not be so. And this is an unnecessary thing. The guidance should be done by you, that is, Comrade Mao Tse Tung must do it.

The maximum we could do for you is to give you advice on each individual problem. Besides, we cannot contact Kim II Sung directly, either.

I want you to contact him.

Fillipov (Stalin)
30 June, 1951

On the following day, 1 July, Kim II Sung sent Stalin the draft of his delegates and the conditions of cease-fire that were to be quoted at the talks, asking for Stalin’s advice on the matter. This was sent by telegram via the Soviet Embassy.
To Comrade Shtemenko,

Here is the report.
1) Received Kim Il Sung’s draft of the reply to be sent on the negotiation for the talks by way of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reply should be sent by 2 July or 3 July, 1951. Moscow’s urgent agreement is requested.
2) The representatives of North Korea are Nam II, Chief of Staff of the People’s Army, Park Jung Ju, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and there will be three representatives from the Chinese People’s Voluntary Forces.
3) Nam II is expected to refer to the following items:
   a) The time for cessation of combat activity and firing.
   b) Withdrawal of troops of each camp more than 5-10km north or south from the 38th Parallel Line.
   c) With the cessation of firing, cessation of aircraft flight over the 38th Parallel Line.
   d) Withdrawal of the UN naval forces from North Korean waters and lifting of the blockade.
   e) Withdrawal of all the foreign units from Korea in two months.
   f) Exchange of POWs and return of kidnapped civilians.

Comrade Kim Il Sung is waiting for advice from Comrade Fillipov. Looking forward to your instructions,

Lajubayev
1 July 1951.

Upon receiving the above report, Stalin, saying that he was wondering if Kim’s draft was accepted by Mao Tse Tung, replied to Kim Il Sung that “the
North Korean government should discuss the matter with the Chinese Government and the two governments, in good coordination, should make the proposal.”

As shown above, the Communist camp reached agreement on strategies for the cease-fire talks by the exchange of telegrams among Stalin, Mao Tse Tung, and Kim Il Sung. Notice was then broadcast by Beijing Radio that they accepted Ridgway’s proposal.\(^65\)

To General Ridgway, the UN Forces Commanding General,

We have received your statement dated 30 June concerning Peace Talks. We would like to inform you of our agreement to meet your representatives to discuss the peace talks. As to a negotiation site, we would propose Kaesong on the 38th Parallel Line. If your side agrees, we will make preparations to meet your representatives between 10 July and 15 July, 1951.

Kim Il Sung
Commander in Chief of the NKPA

Peng Teh Huai
Commander of the CPVA

The above reply was the same as that in the telegram (dated 30 June, 1951) which Stalin had sent to Mao Tse Tung. Stalin had given Mao Tse Tung the role of handling the negotiations, but he himself was behind the scenes giving instructions. This was the same posture that Stalin took in planning the attack on South Korea and bringing the Chinese forces into Korea to fight. That is, Stalin not only masterminded the plan to attack South Korea, coached the war, but also
played a primary role in the cease-fire negotiations.

2. Opening of the Truce Talks and the Keynote of Negotiations

(1) Preliminary Talks and Safety Measures

As the Communist camp, in the joint statement of Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai, expressed their agreement with the proposal for cease-fire talks made by General Ridgway, who also proposed to hold a preliminary talk in a message of July 3, 1951. The commanders of the Communist side (Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai) agreed to the proposal, and the preliminary talk was held at a civilian house at Kwangmun-dong, Kaesong on July 8 with lieutenant colonel and colonel level liaison officers from both sides attending.60 Exchanging the lists of the representatives to attend the meeting, the liaison officers also agreed on the date and place of the meeting and on safety measures.

Agreed Items

- The date of the first main meeting: 11:00, 10 July, 1951.
- The place for the talk: Naebongjang, Koryo-dong, Kaesong.
- Security of the road and responsibilities for repairing road:
  Communist Forces side: Kaesong to Pammunjom
  UN Forces side: Munsan to Pammunjom
- Safety measures: Vehicles carrying personnel attending the talk on the Communist side will raise a white flag while moving from P’yongyang to Kaesong by way of Sariwon. Vehicles carrying personnel attending the talk on the UN Forces side will raise a white flag while moving from Munsan to Kaesong by way of P’ansumjom. Except for the representa-
tives to the talks, the members on the UN Forces group will wear white arm-bands.

On 6 July, in relation to the safety measures, General Ridgway informed the Communist side that from the moment the Communist Representative reaches Kaesong, the 2.5-mile radius encircling Kaesong would be considered a neutral zone, thus indicating that Kaesong would be exempt from attack during the talks. At the preliminary talk, when the responsibility for security of the road had been talked about, the UN Forces side at first claimed that the rotary of South Gate in Kaesong should be the boundary point between the two camps, but accepted and agreed to the request from the Communist side that P'anmunjom be the boundary line as this was near where the two front lines met.

At this time, Kaesong was not occupied by either camp; it was located between the two front lines. However, the contact lines were in the vicinity of P'anmunjom, and Kaesong was under the virtual control of the Communist side since Kaesong was closer to the Communist positions. But the result of the agreement on security measures signified that Kaesong practically belonged to the Communists' area. P'anmunjom was in fact the boundary area for the two camps. In spite of the fact that Kaesong was viewed by the UN Forces as being politically and psychologically beneficial to the Communist side, the UN side conceded to the Communist side by accepting their request.

(2) The Keynotes of the Negotiation and Proposals for Agenda

As agreed in the preliminary talk, the truce talks for the Korean War were open at Naebongjang, Kaesong at 11:00, 10 July, 1951. On the UN Forces side, Admiral Joy headed four other representatives; on the Communist side, Nam II, the chief of staff of the North Korean Peoples Army headed four other repre-
sentatives. The names follow:

Chief Representative of UN Forces: Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, USN,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Far East.
Representative: Major General Henry H. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff, US
8th Army.
Representative: Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF, Deputy
Commanding General of Far East Air Forces.
Representative: Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN, Deputy Chief of
Staff, US Naval Forces Far East.
Representative: Major General Paik Sun Yup, ROK I Corps Commander.

Chief Representative of Communist Forces: General Nam Il, Chief of Staff
of the North Korean Army and Vice Premier.
Representative: Major General Lee Sang Cho, Reconnaissance Bureau
Chief, North Korean People’s Army, and former Minister of
Commerce.
Representative: Major General Chang Pyong San, Chief of Staff, I Corp,
North Korean People’s Army.
Representative: Lieutenant General Teng Hua, Deputy Commander of
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, and Deputy Member of Political
Bureau., former Commander of 15th Army.
Representative: Major General Hsieh Fang, Chief of Staff of Chinese
People’s Volunteer Army, Chief of Propaganda, Northeast Area Army.

The UN Forces side consisted of commanders and staffs of the armed
forces and a US officer was in charge of the delegation. On the Communist side,
the members of the delegation consisted of political soldiers with political experi-
ence, and although Red Chinese Teng Hua exercised the greatest power in the negotiations, the representative of North Korea was appointed as chief of the delegation, even if in name only.

After exchanging credentials, the chiefs of the two delegations opened the talks with their keynote addresses. Admiral Joy delivered his keynote speech with the military situation as its central theme. The gist of the speech was that even during the period of the talks, battles would continue until agreement was reached on all conditions of cease-fire, that the armistice agreements would be so concluded as to insure the prevention of recurrence of war, that discussions would be limited to the military problems in Korea, and that military problems not related to Korea and political and economic problems would not be subjects of the negotiations. The essence of the speech is follows:*

It is understood, of course, that hostilities will continue in all areas, except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved Armistice Commission is prepared to function. The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with the representatives of the Communist Forces in

*Naebongjang : Site for Truce Talk in Kaesong*
Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption. This delegation is here for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject. This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind. This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.\textsuperscript{69}

Following Admiral Joy's speech, Nam II delivered his keynote address. The focus of his remarks was upon cessation of military hostilities, withdrawal to the 38th Parallel Line, and early withdrawal of foreign forces. The three-point proposal Nam II made follows: \textsuperscript{70}

1. On the basis of mutual agreement, both sides should issue orders simultaneously to cease all hostile military actions against each other. The armed forces are to cease fire, the naval forces are to cease fire and bombardment, the air forces are to cease bombardment and reconnaissance activities. It is obvious that a cease fire on both sides would not only reduce loss of life and property, but would constitute the first step towards extinguishing the flames of war in Korea.

2. The 38th Parallel should be established as the Military Demarcation Line, the armed forces of both sides to withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel, and simultaneously complete the withdrawal within a definite time limit, leaving the evacuated area as a demilitarized zone, and the civilian administration shall be restored as it was before June 25, 1950. At the same time, the exchange of prisoners of war should be discussed, so that the prisoners of war of various countries may return to their homes and rejoin their families at an early date.

3. The armed forces of all foreign countries should be withdrawn as early as possible. As soon as the armed forces are withdrawn, the people of Korea
and China, and all peace-loving people of the world, including the United
States and Britain, ardently demand an early peaceful settlement of the
war. I hope we can reach an agreement through these talks so as to meet
the demands of the of the whole people.

Nam II’s speech over, Teng Hua, the representative of the Chinese
Communist Forces, seconded Nam II’s speech, adding that the three points Nam II
had presented were the foundation of the armistice for the peaceful solution of
‘the Korean Problem’, and that he fully agreed with what Nam II had presented.

Right after the keynote speeches of the Communist side, Admiral Joy
proposed that in the future talks they discuss only those military problems relating
to Korea. He requested the consent of the Communist delegation. When he did not
receive consent from them, he immediately presented the nine agenda items for
the negotiations drawn up by the UN Command that centered on the military mat-
ters related to Korea.71)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Location of and authority for International Committee of the Red Cross
   (ICRC) representatives to visit prisoner of war camps.
3. Limitation of discussion to purely military matters related to Korea only.
4. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under condi-
   tions that would assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed
   forces in Korea.
5. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea.
6. Composition, authority, and functions of a military armistice commission.
7. Agreement on the principle of inspection within Korea by military observ-
   er teams, functioning under a military armistice commission.
8. Composition and functions of these teams.
9. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

As soon as Admiral Joy proposed the agenda for the negotiations, the Communist delegation, without presenting their drafted agenda, discussed the UN Forces’ draft agenda, emphasizing the importance of the 38th Parallel, no matter what kind of cease-fire agreement resulted.

Admiral Joy retorted that Nam Il’s statement ignored the then-current military reality, arguing that Nam Il’s comments concerned political matters, which was outside of the matters for negotiation; therefore, it was not the time for a detailed discussion of the agenda, he continued, demanding that the Communist’s draft of the agenda be presented.

However, after the noon recess, Nam Il repeatedly pointed out that the UN Forces’ agenda was unduly long and repetitious.\textsuperscript{72}

Item 2 concerning “the matter of ICRC representatives visiting POW camps was connected with the overall POW item (Item 9)” and should be taken up when the Item 9 was considered. Item 3 concerning the limitation of discussions of military matters pertaining to Korea was unnecessary since the meetings were confined to military matters. Item 4 (‘the cessation of hostilities’) and Item 5 (‘the establishment of a demilitarized zone’) were not concrete and should be set forth clearly.... Items 6, 7, and 8, (‘a military armistice commission and inspection teams’) could be settled as they were supplementary matters. Item 9 (‘Prisoners of War’) should be discussed.

Nam Il then presented the following five items as alternatives to the UN items, adding that their agenda would be compact and more appropriate, and asserting that they could be discussed in the order shown.\textsuperscript{73} His five items follow:
1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between the both sides and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.

4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea.

5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war following the armistice.

Concerning Nam Il's proposal, Admiral Joy stated: “Although the UN Forces Command is considering the military demarcation line and the establishment of a demilitarized zone, your proposal that the 38th Parallel Line be the demarcation line cannot be accepted, and as to your proposal for withdrawal of foreign forces, it is a political matter, so those two proposals of yours should be discussed after the conclusion of the armistice.” In short, he made it clear that Items 2 and 3, the key elements of the Communist proposal, were not appropriate matters for discussion.

The first day’s meeting ended simply with both sides’s clarification of their fundamental standpoints and presentation of their proposals, pointing out the inappropriateness of the opponent’s proposals and the validity of their own proposals. After the day’s talks, in the village of tents (the supporting base for the UN Forces’ cease-fire talk) which had been pitched in Munsan, reporters being encouraged by the atmosphere of the talks predicted that the cease-fire talks would be concluded in six weeks, even as the most pessimistic estimate. This view, however, proved to be false, as the talks dragged on and on. The negotiations repeatedly ran into difficulties.

On 11 July, the conference resumed, and most of the time was spent on the wording of the proposed agendas. The UN delegation said that the
International Committee of the Red Cross should visit POW camps, and that a report on the location of POW camps was absolutely necessary; whereas, the Communist delegation retorted that it was unrelated to the cease-fire and that it was a humane matter. They refused to adopt it saying that since only military matters were to be discussed, it could not to be discussed in the negotiations.74)

Concerning the demarcation line, the UN delegation said that the 38th Parallel was not significant to the current military situation. It was an imaginary line, which had no military significance. The Communist delegation immediately responded by saying that the 38th Parallel had existed before the war. And they opposed the UN delegation by saying that as a cease-fire must be made along this line, it should be on the agenda.75)

The UN Forces’ side further argued that withdrawal of foreign troops could not be included in the agenda, while the Communist side insisted on its inclusion by arguing with a rhetorical question, “How can you assure armistice without withdrawing foreign troops?”76)

After concluding the discussion about the proposed agenda items, they moved on to the discussion of the ordering of the agenda. The Communist side maintained that ‘cease fire,’ ‘demarcation of 38th parallel,’ and ‘withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea’ were the basic points, and must be placed first on the agenda.77)

The Communist side remained consistent, and items such as establishment of the military demarcation line, withdrawal of foreign troops, and visits to POW camps remained problems.

3. Conflicts over the Neutrality of the Talk Site and Equality of Both Side

From the time of the keynote remarks at Naebongjang in Kaesong, it was obvious that there was great disparity between the viewpoints of the two
sides, and this suggested that the progress of the talks would not be smooth. In addition, as Kaesong was under the control of the enemy, neutrality in the conference site and equality were not guaranteed.

First of all, on the first day of the conference, the vehicles of the UNC delegation that were moving from Munsan toward Kaesong, which were carrying white flags as agreed, had to be checked by the Communist guards. Even after they reached Kaesong, the delegation had to move to the conference site under the supervision of the enemy’s armed security soldiers. The enemy’s reporters took pictures of the above movement, and took advantage of those pictures in advertisements as if they were ‘the victors’. Even at the conference site, the couriers of the UN Forces were not free to moving around or to perform their missions without delays and restrictions. Needless to say, the UNC delegation protested against the movement control and limitations placed on their activities.

Even inside the conference room, the Communist delegation acted as if they were victors. Seating had been arranged so that the Communist delegates were seated on higher chairs facing south, while the UNC delegates were seated on lower chairs facing north. When the UNC side placed a UN flag on the conference table, the Communist side set a larger flag beside it.

Inequality was also found in the activity of the reporters. From the first day of the conference, the Communist reporters were not only covering the talk freely in the conference area, but they suddenly entered the room, taking pictures for their exploitation. This was one-sided reporting activity. The UNC senior delegate protested that reporting should have been agreed upon beforehand, and informed the Communist side that the UNC would be accompanied by twenty reporters. The senior delegate of the Communist Command evaded answering him by saying that he would have to discuss the matter with Kim Il Sung for reasons of security.

On the second day of the conference (11 July), the UNC delegation
brought up these problems of inequality again; the Communist side said that the
vehicles of the UNC would be allowed to pass freely if they notified the
Communist side before they left Munsan, and that the group of reporters was not
important because the agenda had not been agreed upon. It was apparent that they
would not allow free access to the UNC reporters.\(^{82}\)

Toward the end of the day’s conference, Admiral Joy protested that if the
UN newsmen were not to be admitted the next day, the convoy of the UNC dele-
gation would also return to P’anmunjom from Musan, and demanded that the
Communist side let them know by 07:00 on 12 July when the negotiation could
resume with the UN newsmen attending.\(^{83}\) This steadfast position surprised Nam
II, placing the burden squarely on his shoulders. Either to accept the newsmen or
to delay the negotiations, that was the question.

The next day, 12 July, at 07:30, the convoy of the UNC delegation left
Munsan with twenty newsmen for Kaesong, but at Pammunjom, the newsmen
were not allowed passage beyond a Communist control post. The convoy waited
until 09:30, and then, as Admiral Joy had told Nam II, the UNC convoy, including
the twenty newsmen, returned to Munsan. Admiral Joy immediately dispatched a
message to Nam II stating that he would return to the conference and continue the
discussions “upon notification from you that my convoy, bearing personnel of my
choosing, including such press representation as I consider necessary, will be
cleared to the conference site.”\(^{84}\) In short, he made the point clear that he would
not attend the conference until the UNC reporters were admitted. In response to
Admiral Joy’s message, North Korea announced over P’yongyang Radio that the
UN Forces were delaying the negotiations because of the matter of newsmen. The
cease-fire conference was suspended on third day.

On 13 July, General Ridgway, the UN Forces commander, addressing
the problem of Communist exploitation of their control of Kaesong, proposed to
the Communist side the neutralization of Kaesong and the road between Kaesong
and Munsan. Over the radio, he asked the enemy to agree to neutralize a five-mile radius of Kaesong with its center approximately at the city center so that the UNC delegation, including representatives of the press, could be assured of equal freedom of movement at the conference site. The Kaesong-Munsan road should be free of any armed personnel. He also proposed that the total personnel of each delegation within the neutral area at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. And he continued that “I propose that we agree that the composition of each delegation be at the discretion of its commander.” He concluded his proposal: “Should you continue to insist that restrictions are necessary for our personal safety or for any other reason, I propose that the conference site be moved to a locality which will afford the few simple assurances I have specified herein.”

(Right after the broadcast, the note was directly delivered to the Communist side by the liaison officer.)

The next day, July 14, the Communist side, presumably fearful of world criticism and conscious of unfavorable international opinion against them, agreed to the neutralization of the conference site over P’yonongyang Radio, adding that they would admit twenty representatives of the press. On July 15, their liaison officer transmitted the message to the UN forces at P’anmunjom.

In consequence, the third meeting was opened on July 15, with both sides’ newsmen accompanying the delegations. Among the twenty newsmen of the UN Forces was only one Korean newsman because the South Korean government was opposed to the idea of armistice and the cease-fire conference itself. On that day, the UN delegation presented at the conference three points, given below, concerning the neutral zone and the safety measures that had already been announced by the UN Forces commander; the Communist delegation accepted the three points without any objection.

1) A neutral zone five miles in radius centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong be established. P’anmunjom on the eastern edge to be included
Neutral Zone: Site for Truce Talk in Kasong

5 mile radius (July 15)
2.5 mile radius (July 6)
therein. Each side to refrain from hostile acts in the neutral zone. All military forces to be removed from the neutral zone except those necessary for military police duty and armed only as necessary for this function.

2) The area of the conference be established with a half mile radius centered on the conference house. All armed personnel to be removed from the conference area.

3) The main road from P'Anmunjom to the conference area shall be free of armed guards and the United Nations Command delegation shall have unrestricted use of this road during daylight hours without notification.

For the five days from the opening of the conference, the UN Command delegation made persistent demands of the Communist delegation, and their verbal war finally succeeded in arranging an apparatus to guarantee the neutral zone for the conference site and the mutual equality in the delegations’ activities. After the three days’ recess of the Kaesong conference, the delegation resumed the talks on July 15.

4. Arguments over the Selection of Agenda and its Adoption.

At the resumption of the conference on July 15, 1951, both delegations, after having agreed on the neutrality in the talk site and the conditions of mutual equality, began again to discuss the selection of agenda that had been suspended. On that day, the Communist delegates reconfirmed that they would treat only military matters at the conference. Accordingly, the UN Command delegation said that of the nine agenda points that had been proposed on the first day, the third point (the discussion of purely military matters related to Korea) would be deleted, and that the second point (the International Red Cross visit to POW camps) would be discussed with the ninth point (the discussion of the POWs). The agenda
proposed by the UN Forces was decreased to seven points in number, but the
Communist delegation firmly insisted that the matters of the 38th Parallel and the
withdrawal of foreign troops be included in the agenda and showed no sign of
making any concession.

On July 16, the UN Command delegation presented the condensed agen-
da with four out of nine items by integrating items related to a military armistice
committee and military observer teams into Item 3. The condensed agenda fol-
lows:88)

1) Adoption of the agenda.
2) Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Korea.
3) Concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and armistice that would insure
against a resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea peril-
ing a final peace settlement.
   a. Military armistice commission, including composition, authority and
      functions.
   b. Military observer teams, including composition, authority, and func-
      tions.
4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

The Communist delegation, after discussing the above issues among
themselves during a two-hour recess, finally showed a sign of concession, agree-
ing to the agenda. Adding that when Item 2 was discussed, they would bring up
‘claiming the 38 Parallel,’ they consented to the 4-item agenda as a whole. They
said that Item 3 had been improved, and that they would examine it further. As a
consequence, only the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the
Communist list wanted remained pending in the selection of the agenda.89)
At the July 17 conference, the Communist delegation listened to the explanation of a military armistice commission and military observer on Item 3. They then pointed out that the expressions in Item 3 were too concrete, and presented a revised draft expressed in shorter and more general terms. In the conference the following day, the UN Command delegation accepted the draft, and all the four items were agreed to. Yet, the Communist delegation continued to argue for the inclusion of ‘withdrawal of foreign troops’.

At the July 19 conference, Nam Il spoke again about withdrawal of foreign troops, with an undertone of irony: “War is not a tour, nor are troops tourists. If the order of cease-fire were given and the armistice were concluded, and if you still intended troops to remain in place, it is very clear that such an intention would not lie in letting those troops enjoy the beautiful tourist sights of Korea.”

When the Communist delegation argued ceaselessly for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be on the agenda of the conference, Secretary of State Acheson announced that he opposed the Communist delegation’s claim and agreed fully with the statement of the United Nations Command delegation. In his statement, he said: “This (the withdrawal of foreign troops) is no theoretical argument as to whether the question is political or military. The UN Forces are in Korea because of decisions made by governments to send them to Korea in response to a request by the UN. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area. If there is an effective armistice, a UN Force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression.” That is to say that the problem of withdrawal of the UN Forces, whether it was political or military, was not a the matter to be treated in the armistice conference, and that they should remain in Korea even after the armistice....until peace was assured completely. The full text of the Secretary of State’s remarks follows:
The Communist delegation at Kaesong has raised the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in connection with an armistice. The UN delegation has stated that it cannot go into this question, which is political in character and can only be settled by the UN and the governments concerned. This is no theoretical argument as to whether the question is political or military. The UN Forces are in Korea because of decisions made by governments to send them to Korea in response to a request by the UN. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area. If there is an effective armistice, a UN Force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression. The size of the UN Force remaining in Korea will depend upon circumstances and, particularly, upon faithfulness with which an armistice is carried out. Korea’s neighbors know that the presence of UN Forces in Korea constitutes no danger or threat to them. Repeated expressions of policy by the UN and, indeed, the very nature of that organization, furnish them entirely adequate guarantees on this point. Once before, foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a UN plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against the ROK. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated.

The next day (July 20), the heavy seasonal rain washed away the bridge at P’anmunjom, and the conference could not be opened. Again the following day, the pending problem of the agenda being unresolved, both delegations recessed for four days at the request of the Communist delegation. Meanwhile, also on July 20, the sixteen nations participating in the war issued a statement in support of the US Secretary of State’s statement of July 19. On July 21, the South Korean government also published an announcement supporting Acheson’s statement.
On July 25, the conference resumed, and the Communist delegation made a final attempt to insert ‘withdrawal of foreign troops’ into the agenda. However, the UN Command delegation refused to accept their proposal. Not until then did the Communist delegation retreated from their insistence on the matter, and instead of repeating the phrase, ‘withdrawal of foreign troops’, they requested inclusion of the point called “the suggested item to the related governments of both delegations”. Their intention was to prepare a foundation on which to discuss the problem of the withdrawal of foreign troops right after the conclusion of armistice. That is, after both delegations had reached an agreement on the first four items, they would initiate the armistice only after both delegations adopted a clause that “Within a definite period of time after the agreement of an armistice, both delegations recommend that governments concerned with the Korean War negotiate withdrawal of foreign troops by holding a high-level political conference”. Only after such a recommendation was adopted by both delegations would the armistice be put into practice. After the cease-fire was signed based upon this recommendation, a separate political conference would be held. In connection with this, the concluding part of Nam II’s speech follows:  

.... In order that an agreement may be reached on an armistice at an early date so that the primary wishes of the peace-loving people of the world may be realized, we agree to your view that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces be left to another conference for settlement. .... In view of the deep-rooted relations between the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea and the cease-fire and armistice we seek to achieve, and the eagerness of the soldiers of the various foreign countries participating in the fighting to go back home for a peaceful life after the armistice... we propose to add a fifth item to the four items on the agenda already agreed upon: “Recommendations to the governments of the countries
concerned on both sides” ... that within a definite time limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal, by stages, of all foreign armed forces from Korea. This agenda item and the suggestions that our side is preparing to present at the time of discussing Item 5 will surely speed up the realization of our hope for the armistice negotiation. Not only that, they will also heighten the hope for the assurance of peace in Korea. We trust that the UN Forces delegation will accept our proposal, without fail.

In examining this proposal, the UN Command delegation thought that Nam II’s expressions were too ambiguous, and that his speech suggested that the Communists would again bring up fundamental problems when discussing this item. In view of the fact that the discussion of withdrawal itself would take place after the armistice, the UN Forces consented to the fifth point at the July 26 conference.

During the sixteen days after the opening of the main conference at Kaesong, there were six days of recess and ten days of conference before they finally agreed on the agenda items. The agreed five-item agenda follows:93)

1) Adoption of agenda.
2) Fixing of military demarcation line between the two sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3) Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease-fire and armistice.
4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
5) Recommendation to governments of countries concerned on both sides.

Although the two sides finally agreed on the agenda, the process portended that the conference would not go smoothly. First of all, even though they agreed on the neutral zone and the conditions of mutual equality, it was questionable whether the Communist side would observe them faithfully. Although such terms as ‘the 38th Parallel’ and ‘withdrawal of foreign troops’ were not employed in the agenda, it was apparent that the Communist side would bring up those terms in discussing related items. In addition, the UN Forces side conceded that the issue of International Red Cross visits to the POW camps would be included in the discussion of the POW item but it was not at all certain that the Communist side would accommodate it.

Both delegations defined Kaesong as the neutral zone, and recognized P’anmunjom as the boundary line between the friendly side and the enemy side. This provision proved harmful to the UN Command because it restricted the military operations of the UN Forces and provided the Communist forces with a safe haven.
IV. The Government’s Policy against the Division of Korean Peninsula

Toward the end of May, 1951, Lester B. Pearson, Chairman of the UN General Assembly, and Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the UN, announced their wish to resolve the Korean War on the 38th Parallel. After behind-the-scene contacts of the US with the Soviets, the cease-fire negotiation was open at Kaesong on July 10. After many twists and turns, the negotiation had progressed to the stage where the items of agenda were adopted.

The negotiations were proceeding on the major premise that armistice would halt hostilities first on terms similar to the ante-bellum status, and that the problem of unification would be solved later politically. ‘The redivided territory’ again looked likely, and this was fundamentally contrary to the key policy of the Korean government, because the government regarded the unification principle as supreme object. The Korean government had been consistently seeking unification since the inauguration of the government. Even in the Korean government’s policy in the conduct of war, with North Korea’s invasion of the 38th Parallel, the meaning of the boundary as the dividing line of the north and the south had been lost. Taking the enemy invasion as an opportunity, the Korean government claimed to have achieved the goal of unification.

Moreover, the spring offensive of the CCF in May 1951 had been unsuccessful, and the Chinese had suffered tremendous damage: therefore, the UNC held the initiative in the war. With this change in the tide of the war, the government and the people earnestly hoped to punish the Communist invaders and reclaim the North Korean region for unification. Reflecting this hope, General Chung Il Kwon, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, discussed a project with the 8th
US Army Commander to push the front up to the P’yongyang and Wonsan line.\(^94\)

However, the secret talks about an armistice that had been going on between the US and the Soviets were widely talked about, and on June 5, 1951, the National Assembly of South Korea (the equivalent of US Congress) demanded that the CCF cease their aggressive behavior and withdraw from Korea, and made the point very clear by passing a resolution that South Korea would oppose any type of armistice except for a completely autonomous unification. Aroused by the resolution, a ‘Nation-wide Movement for Opposing Armistice’ spread throughout the country. The people of the nation exclaimed that they would flatly refuse, at the cost of their lives, any armistice that would give the Communist aggressors time and opportunity for re-invasion.

In this tense political situation, on June 8, George C. Marshall, the US Secretary of Defense, visiting UN Forces Command in Tokyo, came to the US 8th Army Headquarters in Taegu, but left Korea without having any contact or coordination with the Korean government. It was assumed that he probably would explain or confer on the new policy for Korea (NSC 48/5). President Syngman Rhee, expecting Secretary Marshall to pay a courtesy call on him, had planned to request that the UN Forces push up to Wonsan. He felt slighted at not being visited by the Secretary. The following day, he called Lee Ki Bung, Minister of National Defense, and Chung Il Kwon, Chief of Staff of the Army, to his office, and expressed his regret: “Since the inauguration of the Korean government, a number of dignitaries of the US government have visited Korea, but there has not been a time like this. How can we say that this was merely his own conduct? Couldn’t it have reflected the thoughts of his own government?”\(^95\)

Concerning the conduct of Secretary Marshall, President Rhee interpreted it as follows: “If he had discussed it with us, it would have been clear that we would oppose him, and because of this, they wanted to discuss it among themselves without letting our government, our army and our people know a compro-
mise with the Communist forces.” And he gave instructions to his minister and his chief of staff to oppose the negotiations.96)

Minister Lee should alert the National Assembly and the people, and should let our will to fight be known at home and abroad. General Chung, we have entrusted the UN Forces commander with the right of operational control of our army, but in order to let our officers’ and soldiers’ earnest wish to advance to the north be known at the front line, we should try to conduct our independent operations, if necessary.

Right after Malik’s speech on June 23, the Soviet Union, Red China, and North Korea issued an announcement in full support of the speech. Having paid much attention to activities of the US and the Soviets, President Syngman Rhee published a statement on June 27, clarifying the position of the Korean government on the content of the speech and on the support of the three countries.97) In the speech, President Rhee clarified his determination to refuse the division of the country: “The Korean people want unification. .... Any proposal to reconstruct the 38th Parallel, which is nothing but an artificial boundary drawn by dividing the territory, will eventually result in profound disappointment for all the people of Korea.” He continued, “If [you] want to solve the Korean problem, we should be given a solid assurance that the Korean people will be free of another Communist invasion. While peace negotiations are in progress, the Korean people,...through their government, should be consulted and notified of information.” President Rhee stressed the importance of establishing a device to insure against resumption of Communist aggression, the participation of the Korean government in the resolution of the Korean problem, and the right of the people to be informed. The essential points of his speech follows.98)
IV. The Government's Policy against the Division of Korean Peninsula 73

What is called a proposal for peace that includes a condition to divide the country with a notion of any artificial boundary, all the Koreans both in the north and the south shall never accept, no matter what the proposal may be. Any proposal for peace, letting the aggressors continually occupy any part of Korea will turn out, after all, to be an insult and a contempt to this country. The very fact that the leaders of the Soviet Union are seeking peace, especially at this time, is nothing but the acknowledgment of their defeat. They are trying to accomplish what they have failed to obtain by the force of military power—that is, to accomplish it through their double-sided diplomacy. .... Since when on earth have the Soviet leaders aspired to achieve the world peace? When they started the invasion of South Korea with the sole aim of throwing South Korea into their domain, were they seeking peace as well? Has it been a guarantee for world peace to have slaughtered the Korean people and to have destroyed the territory of Korea? .... To have the Communist troops consent to retreat to the other side of the Yalu River and the Tumen River will only be the beginning of peace negotiations that are compatible with all the aims that were declared by the UN. .... The Korean government is ardently wishing for the establishment of justice and permanent peace in Korea. It should not be forgotten that the peace we wish to attain is something everlasting in justice. Everyone of us wishes that with the speedy conclusion of the war, all of the soldiers will be able to return home and to be united with their families. Because of the desire for such a hasty peace however, we should not fall for the enemy’s tricks and accept an undesirable consequence of a futile effort.

First of all, all of the Korean people wish to become unified. Just like the South Koreans, the Korean men and women living north of the 38th Parallel want to be unified under one and the same government, that is, under the government of the Republic of Korea. In consequence, therefore, any pro-
posal to reconstruct the artificial boundary that has divided the territory for the past five years disappoints all Koreans.

Second, in order to solve the problem, the guarantee should be given to the Koreans that the Communist aggression against the Korean people will never happen again.

Third, while the peace negotiations are in progress, the Korean people should be continuously consulted through their representatives elected democratically and legally, that is, through the Korean government, and should be kept informed. Is Malik’s proposal compatible with these conditions? If the reply were positive, there would be some hope for peace. We shall warn the world that we refuse any peace proposal that will deceive us by the unreliable promise for hasty peace, which will become an overture to a more terrible war.

Subsequently, on June 29, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea adopted a resolution that clarified its position opposing a cease-fire aimed at the redivision of the country. 99

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea is determined to oppose a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel Line. We declare again that we will not consider any cease-fire unless it satisfies the following condition: that only after the complete disarmament of the aggressors from the Communist countries and their withdrawal to the other side of the boundary made by the Yalu River and the Tumen River, the permanent security of Korea will be guaranteed internationally.

On June 30, however, when General Ridgway, the UN Forces Commander, proposed the cease-fire, and truce talks were sure to take place, Pyun
Young Tae, Minister for Foreign Affairs, issued a statement clarifying the government’s position, saying that the government was ready to participate in any truce conference if the following five conditions were met. ¹⁰⁰)

We think that the time has come when the Republic of Korea should clarify its position regarding cease-fire. We dare not oppose the cease-fire. We want to eliminate the danger of falling into the snare of the tricks and stratagem of Communism by stating the conditions of armistice clearly.

If the following five conditions exist in the base (of the negotiations), the government of the Republic of Korea is ready to accept truce negotiations:

1. The Red Chinese troops should cross over the boundary of Korea and withdraw fully to Manchuria, and they should not injure the non-combatants of North Korea or damage their properties.

2. The troops of the North Korean Puppet Regime should be disarmed.

3. The UN should agree that any third country will be prevented from supporting the North Korean Communist party militarily, financially or in any other form.

4. The official representatives of the Republic of Korea should attend any international conference or meeting for the discussion of all of, or part of, the Korean problem.

5. Any bill or action that infringes the sovereignty or territory will not be recognized as legally binding.

Of the above five conditions, ‘Condition 1 and Condition 2’ were provisions unacceptable to the Communist Forces. Therefore, these conditions were to be interpreted as strong assertions of opposition to a cease-fire. In response to the statement, the cries of the Koreans in opposition to the cease-fire started to rever-
berate around every corner of the country: “Cease-fire that is going to artificially cut the fatherland in half! Cease-fire that tries to divide the Korean race again into the north and the south! Cease-fire that obstructs the unification of the fatherland!” To reject this kind of cease-fire, “the National Rally for Opposing Cease-fire on the 38th Parallel Line and for Proclaiming the Unified Territory” spread all over the country like fire.¹⁰¹

Amidst the sound and fury, on the day the cease-fire talks were opened, July 10, 1951, General Ridgway paid a courtesy call on President Rhee to report on the details and circumstances of the cease-fire negotiations. On July 16, when he visited President Rhee again, he attempted to get the President’s consent to the basic strategies of the UN Forces in the conduct of the cease-fire.¹⁰²

Upon General Ridgway’s explaining face to face the basic concept of the establishment of a demarcation line as a foundation of a demilitarized zone. President Rhee said that it would be much better to press the enemy up to the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, now that the North Korean Navy and Air Force were exhausted. To this, General Ridgway replied that would be impossible without solving the problem of a tremendous reinforcement of strengths and supplies. He added that the policy stipulated that the problems of the 38th Parallel and of the withdrawal of foreign troops would not be included in the agenda; in saying so, he tried to calm the Korean government’s fear that armistice might effect the withdrawal of the UN Forces.

President Rhee, however, stressed that “the Korean people are very anxious to erase the nightmarish memory of the 38th Parallel and to reunify Korea.” “The armistice would assist no one but the Communist forces and would allow them to move toward the Third World War. The alternative would be to defeat the Communist troops by developing the Northward Operation, which would enable (us) to widen the gap between the Soviet Union and China. This would make the Soviet Satellite Empire unstable and help prevent the Third World War”, he con-
tinued. With this reasoning, Rhee emphasized the importance of ‘Advancing to the North’.\(^{103}\)

In the middle of the Korean government's opposition to the re-division of Korea and pursuit of the unification policy, and of the Korean people’s rally expanding throughout the entire country, the cease-fire negotiations at Kaesong set about discussing essential problems of the war.
Notes

1. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *The History of US

2. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.), *Secret Russian Diplomatic
   Documents related to the Korean War, Vol. IV(1994)*, p. 116 & p. 120.

3. This line was generally called Line Kansas-Wyoming. However, the real
defense line on the eastern front was established substantially north of the
Kansas line. Line Kansas-Wyoming made up the defense line linking the estu-
ary of the Han River-Munsan-Chongok-Yonch’on-Ch’orwon-Kumhwa-the
Hwach’on Reservoir-Inje-Yangyang.

4. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *CCF’s History of the Korean
   War*, Seoul: Sekyongsa (1991), pp. 178-179 and map # 12, from The Research
Institute of Military History, the Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.),
*CPVA’s War History of Resist America and Assist Korea*, Beijing: Military

   War: Periodic Intelligence Reports, Vol. IV*, Seoul: ROKA HQ (1985), pp. 429-
430. For the organization of CCF, reference was made to *CPVA’s War History
of Resist America and Assist Korea*(Beijing: 1988). As to the organization of
NK forces, ROKA HQ’s *Periodic Intelligence Report* was referred to.

Hermes’ *Truce Tent & Fighting Front* (GPO: 1966), the CCF were counted as
248,100 and the NK forces as 211,100; the ROKA HQ’s *Intelligence Report* as
of July 1, 1951 counted 231,950 Chinese and 226,803 North Korean troops.
8. Ibid., map # 12.
9. Ibid., p. 179.
10. Among the 16 member nations of the UN that dispatched troops to Korea, South Africa provided only air forces; thus, 15 nations provided ground forces.
11. Among the five nations that provided medical support, Italy, non-UN member-nation, started the support by dispatching hospital facilities from November 1951.
15. Ibid., p. 118 & p. 123.
17. (1) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), op. cit., p. 174. The Chinese had a plan to push southward by counteroffensive in August in case the UN forces declined to pull down south of the 38th parallel in armistice negotiation.

   (2) ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.), op. cit., p. 120. In the telex sent by Mao Tse Tung to Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang who were visiting Moscow, Mao told them to take a defensive posture for two months.


25. Eight countries that made the joint proposal were Great Britain, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Denmark, Pakistan, and the Philippines.


31. In the expectation that the UNC could conclude the total offensive commenced on October 24 by Thanksgiving (November 23, 1950), it was labelled the ‘Thanksgiving Day Offensive’.

32. Chinese offensives were labelled on the bases of order and timing. The first offensive commenced in October; thus, it was named ‘the First Offensive’ or ‘October Offensive’. The second one started in November and was labelled ‘the Second Offensive’ or ‘November Offensive’.
33. Hoping that they could conclude the war by Christmas, the UN forces commenced their offensive on November 24, and it was called ‘Final Offensive’, ‘the Last Offensive’, and ‘Christmas Offensive’.

34. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, (trans.) *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300. The Asian-Arab group of 13 nations consisted of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.


36. The seven nations were the US, USSR, Great Britain, France, India, Egypt, and Communist China. Refer to Chung Il Hyong, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

37. The Group of Three Persons was composed of Nasrolla Entezam (Iran), Benegal N. Rau (India), and Lester B. Pearson (Canada).


42. Chung Il Hyong, *op. cit.*, p. 53; UN General Assembly Resolution, no. 298-v (1951).

43. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, (trans.) *op. cit.*, p. 413.


General MacArthur demanded that the NK forces cease resistance and surren-
der on October 1 and October 9, 1950.


49. US Department of State, op. cit., p. 508.

50. Ibid., p. 508.

51. Ibid., pp. 508-511.

52. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.), op. cit., Vol IV, p. 120.


Between the two sources cited above, there are some differences. Thus, the Russian documents were taken as the base and supplemented by the American materials.


58. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND(trans.), Ibid., p. 19.


60. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND(trans.), Ibid., p. 22.

61. Ibid., pp. 23-25.


63. Ibid., p. 138.

64. Ibid., p. 139.

65. US Department of State, op. cit., p. 609.

67. Water G Hermes, op. cit., p. 17 & p. 23. The titles of Communist delegates were described referring to the book cited above but also supplemented by the source below. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), op. cit.

68. US Department of State, op. cit., p. 649.

69. US Department of State, op. cit., p. 649. The materials from P'annunjom, Vol. I were revised and supplemented by the source cited above.

70. ROK Army G-2, op. cit., p. 58; US Department of State, op. cit., p. 650. Contents from the first source were revised by the materials from the second source.


73. ROK Army G-2, op. cit., p. 61; US Department of State, op. cit., p. 653.

74. Department of State, op. cit., pp. 660-661.

75. Ibid., pp. 660-661.

76. Ibid., pp. 660-661.

77. Ibid., p. 661.


79. Ibid., p. 21. In the Orient, there used to be a tradition that the victorious delegate sat facing the south and the defeated sat facing the north at the negotiating table.

80. Ibid., p. 22.
84. William H. Vatcher, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 35.
85. US Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 672-673.
86. William H. Vatcher, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 36.
87. US Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 685. The three items for the agenda were summarized referring to the source above. There is some discrepancy in expression with the contents on p. 72 of *P'annunjom, Vol. I* published by the ROKA HQ.
97. ROK Army G-2, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-38.
100. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
101. Ibid., p. 44.

102. US Department of State, op. cit., pp. 694-695. At the meeting on 16 July, President Rhee was accompanied by Lee Ki Bung and General Ridgway was with Ambassador Muccio. As delegates for the truce talks Major Generals Paik Sun Yup and Hodes also sat in.

103. Ibid., p. 695.
Chapter Two  Negotiations over a Military Demarcation Line and Developments of Military Situation

I. Difficulties Involved in Negotiations over a Military Demarcation Line

1. Disputes over 38th Parallel and Line of Contact as Boundary

   (1) The Demands and Counter-Demands of Both Sides

   The cease-fire negotiations entered practical discussions following agreement on the agenda on July 26, 1951. Among the five agenda items, after agreement on the first one (the adoption of the agenda), the negotiators discussed a second one, which was the identification of a military demarcation line for the establishment of the de-militarized zone.

   As soon as the negotiators had agreed on the agenda, Nam II, the titular head of the Communist Forces delegation, lost no time in presenting his group’s demands on the military demarcation line and de-militarized zone. They repeated their former assertion that the 38th Parallel should be the demarcation line, reasoning that the 38th Parallel had been recognized by many countries as the demarcation line before the outbreak of the war; therefore, the UNC forces had to return to this line. Since each side was occupying some of the other side’s territory on the either side of the 38th Parallel, when the belligerents returned to the pre-war status, neither side would suffer any loss. Nam II continued that the de-militarized
zone, where no military units would be stationed, should be extended 20 kilometers on both sides of the line. He insisted that this demand was fair in the readjustment of military and territorial matters.

The UNC rebuttal followed on July 27. Admiral Joy came out strongly in favor of a truce line based on battle realities rather than the 38th Parallel, pointing out that the Communists and the UN Forces had crossed the parallel no less than four times during the last thirteen months. He argued that this fact alone proved the unsuitability of the parallel as a demarcation line. An effective delineation of the de-militarized zone should be made on practical military grounds, Joy continued, and should not be influenced by political objectives since, in a military armistice, an imaginary geographical line such as the 38th Parallel had no validity at all.

Rejecting the 38th Parallel as a line of demarcation, Joy presented the UNC proposal. He insisted that a demarcation line required three battle zones: the ground zone, the sea zone, and the air zone. Although the UNC Forces occupied confined positions on the ground, they had superiority in the air over all Korea and controlled the entire Korean sea-coast. Since the Communists would gain freedom of movement and be able to rebuild within their sector of Korea when the air and sea power of the UN Command were restricted by a cease-fire and they, therefore, would gain more proportionately than the UN Command through a truce. Joy suggested that the Communists should compensate the UNC by making concessions on the ground.

Admiral Joy then presented to the Communist delegates the map on which a demilitarized zone twenty miles wide was drawn to the north of the ground positions then occupied by the UNC Forces. This initial offer intentionally sought more than the UNC delegates expected to obtain; it was a novel approach - an attempt to break total military power into its component parts and give them separate values for bargaining purposes.
The initial provisional demarcation line proposed by the UNC

The Communists instantly rejected the plan in a strong and rude statement. ‘Ridiculous,’ was Nam’s comment on the 28th as he asserted that military power was nothing but the combination of all arms of the forces. The UNC battle lines, he went on, were the concentrated result of the military power of its land, air, and sea forces. Although the present battle lines were subject to change, Nam stated that since the 38th Parallel approximately reflected the current situation, it should be accepted as the line of demarcation.

After rebuking Nam for his rudeness and insolence, Joy continued to defend the UNC proposal. Ground progress did not necessarily indicate the status of a war, he contended, for Japan had been defeated without a single soldier setting foot on the Japanese home inland.

Nam derided Joy’s statement that America had defeated Japan. He said that, as everyone knew, it was the Korean people’s struggle, the Chinese people’s
war, and the Soviet Union’s resistance that had brought Japan to her knees. He continued by asking had not the United States fought Japan for three years without victory until the Soviet Army entered the war and gave Japan a fatal blow? Could these historical facts be disregarded lightly?

As was manifest during the following three days discussion on the demarcation line, the Communists clung steadfastly to the principle of returning to the 38th Parallel, while UNC asserted that the line should be drawn based on the current military situation. With each side referring to different historical precedents in presenting its arguments, the prospect of reaching agreement seemed bleak.

Admiral Joy did not pursue this subject any further. Instead he again pointed out the advantages that the Communists would have if a truce was signed. They could repair their roads, bridges, and railroads, bring up supplies needed for the health and well-being of their troops, and restore and rehabilitate their towns and facilities.

The Communists were not interested in the admiral’s argument. They clung to the 38th Parallel as July passed and the dog days of August began. The daily sessions became routine as each side presented the same arguments and refused to concede a point or compromise a proposal. As Nam Il refused to discuss any proposals not connected with the 38th Parallel, the UNC team felt that the conference could break up over this matter.

Since apparently the support of Marshall and Acheson had helped convince the Communists that the United States would remain firm on the troop withdrawal issue, Joy suggested to Ridgway that high-level backing for the UNC position on Item 2 might also have a beneficial effect. 23

(2) Violations of Neutrality and Suspension of the Conference
The meeting which was held at Naebongjang, Kaesong for one week, came to an impasse since both sides clung to their arguments, making no concessions. The UNC refused to discuss the 38th Parallel while the Communists adamantly rejected discussion of anything other than the 38th Parallel. Around this time, in the midst of this impasse, an incident occurred that threatened to end the stalemate conference.

During the lunch hour on August 4 when the 19th meeting was in session, a fully armed company of Chinese troops marched past the UNC delegation house. They were equipped not only with rifles, sidearms, and hand-grenades, but also mortars. It was a clear violation of the neutrality agreement of the conference zone reached on July 24. Not only were there supposed to be no armed troops within a half mile of the conference site but also all troops within a 5-mile radius of Kaesong were to be equipped with sidearms only.31

In the afternoon meeting Admiral Joy entered a strong protest, presenting as proof, the photos taken by the UN pressmen. General Ridgway decided to
adopt a strong position and informed Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai by message that the UNC delegation would not hold any further conversations with the Communists until “a satisfactory explanation of the violation and assurances that it would not happen again were received.”

The first reply from the Communists stated that the troops were guards responsible for police functions and that they had passed through the area by error. Instructions had been issued to prevent a recurrence. Although Admiral Joy recommended that UN Command accept this response, Ridgway determined to press for an inspection team of equal representation to be organized and to carry out a full inspection of the entire neutral zone before the next meeting. Ridgway considered changing the conference site to prevent further incidents in case the Communists refused the inspection. Ridgway felt that the violation was either a deliberate attempt to intimidate the UNC delegations or was due to simple carelessness or lack of discipline.

On the morning of August 6, the Communists broadcast a second message in Korean, English, and Japanese. The Korean and English versions were courteous. The main point was that the UN delegation was asked to return to Kaesong with the assurance that instructions had been given to the guards that such an incident would not be repeated, lest such a minor and accidental incident stand in the way of resumption of the conference. However, the Japanese broadcast had an insolent and peremptory ending.

Ridgway wanted to turn down the Communist explanation and asked for permission to suspend the meetings, but his superiors decided that the enemy had in effect accepted the UNC conditions. Ridgway then broadcast his acceptance; however, he made a strong objection to the Communist usage of ‘minor and accidental’ and warned the Communists that the resumption of the talks depended upon their complete compliance with the guarantees of the neutralization of the Kaesong area. On the following day (August 9) the Communists agreed. and after
a five-day recess, the conference resumed.

On the same day (August 9) Nam protested to Joy that a supply truck of the Communist delegation had been attacked and damaged by the UNC planes at Sibyon-ri at 15:00 on August 7. Nam insisted that since the truck had been marked with a white cover and a while flag, the UNC planes had violated the cease-fire agreement.

Admiral Joy rebutted Nam’s charge as follow. After the Joy’s rebuttal Nam dropped the issues.

First, the Communists had made no prior notification of time and place of the truck as the UNC had requested; second, Sibyon-ri was located far away from the P’yongyang and Kaesong main route, and the UNC suspected the misuse of the white mark for purposes other than truce designation; and third, because of a delay of over 24 hours by the Communists in laying this claim, it had become difficult to confirm its validity.

(3) Groping for Compromise on the Agenda

After a five-day recess, the 20th conference resumed on August 10. Joy, maintaining the UNC position on Item 2, quickly informed General Nam that the UNC delegation was through discussing or considering the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line. He also presented the UNC position that the demarcation line was to be established along the current frontline, and detailed matters of setting up the de-militarized zone should be discussed.  

Immediately General Nam protested against this attempt to limit the discussion and folded his arms and stared at Admiral Joy without saying anything. This curious frozen silence continued for two hours and eleven minutes: the two
delegates, facing each other, fought with their eyes instead of words. This recorded the longest ‘eye-fighting’ in the history of the cease-fire conference and revealed that there was no change in the Communists’ position that nothing other than the 38th Parallel would be considered as a military demarcation line.

Finally Admiral Joy broke the silence and suggested that they turn to Item 3 (detailed agreements to realize the truce), since no agreement could be reached on the line of demarcation. The Communists, however, refused. What with frequent harangues and occasional silences, the conference on the demarcation line came to a standstill.

General Ridgway urged his superiors to take a strong course of action. He proposed giving the Communists seventy-two hours to change their adamant position. If they still would not agree, then they would be told that they had terminated the negotiations because of their deliberate act. The Washington leaders, however, disapproved of this approach. They thought that it was not yet time to present an ultimatum at this stage of the discussions. If and when the negotiations broke down, the blame should fall squarely upon the Communists. After all, they pointed out, the truce talks should not break down because of the issue of the 38th Parallel, and Moscow and Peking would need time to amend their position. Past experience in dealing with the Communists had shown that long and protracted discussions were standard procedure. Calmness, patience, perseverance, and firmness were required on the part of the UN delegation to overcome the Communist attitude. In this way, they concluded, the enemy would be placed under great strain while UNC would maintain the unity and strength of its position.

Although the breaking down of the negotiations was avoided, from August 11 to 14, the routine procedures of the opposing sides criticizing each other’s position and rationalizing their own proposals were repeated without any results.

Nam reiterated his position on the 38th Parallel: “You should know that
truth is not afraid of repetition, and needs repetition....” He termed the UN proposal for ground compensation ‘absurd and arrogant’ while Joy attacked the Communists ‘inflexible and unrealistic stand....’ Since neither side wished to show any sign of weakness nor to make concessions without a quid pro quo, the sparring in the battle of words continued.... As Pravda put it, “The Korean people have not agreed to the negotiations in Kaesong in order to make a deal with the American usurpers over their own territory.”8) Although the UNC delegation recognized that its proposed demarcation line was entirely within the Communist-controlled area and it could make some territorial adjustments based on the current battle line and over-all military situation, it held firmly to the concept of compensation.

Finally in an effort to break the deadlock, at the 25th session on August 15, the UNC made an important suggestion that was to have a considerable effect upon the conduct of the negotiations. It proposed that a subcommittee consisting of one delegate and two assistants from each side be formed. Joy believed that a less formal round-the-table exchange of opinions might lead to freer discussion and help solve Item 2. On the following day the Communists accepted it with the condition of raising the number of delegates to two instead of one. They nominated Generals Lee and Hsieh, and Joy named General Hodes and later Admiral Burke as his representatives. While the subcommittee attempted to work out its recommendations, the plenary meeting would stand in recess.

The first subdelegate discussion took place on August 17, and on the following day (the 18th) the Communists presented a map that slightly modified their stand on the 38th Parallel. The Communists’ proposed line ran about four kilometers north of the 38th Parallel on the east and four kilometers south of it on the west. They even proposed to do away with all previous maps and start afresh. This was a great shift from their previous adamant position on the 38th Parallel. General Hodes and Admiral Burke felt that the Communists might be ready to
discuss other items, provided that the UN Command made the opening gambit. At the third session when Hodes suggested that “for discussion purposes, the conferrees assume that all air and naval effectiveness was reflected in the current battle line,” the Communists were willing to talk on this basis and cautiously waited for the UN Command to make a concrete new proposition. Two days later, the Communists retreated further from their initial position on the 38th Parallel. They indicated that if the UN Command would give up the concept of compensation, they would bring forth a proposal based upon adjustments along the current battle line. Since this was a definite step forward, the UNC delegates agreed to the principle of adjustment. Thus the meeting of August 22 closed with the possibility of agreement much closer at hand.

General Ridgway was encouraged. Anticipating that the Communists might be ready to discuss the ‘line of contact’ as opposed to the ‘general area of the battle line,’ he asked and secured approval for his plan to settle on a demilitarized zone of four kilometers wide with the line of contact as the median.

Unfortunately the promise of progress in the subdelegation meetings soon faded away. At the sixth session on the night of August 22, the Communists called off the meeting, alleging that UN forces successively violated the neutral zone around Kaesong. Thus the truce talks at Kaesong ended.

2. The Fabrication of the Neutrality-Violation Cases and the Breakdown of Negotiations

With the meeting of the subdelegations, the controversy of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone over the 38th Parallel, vis a vis the current frontline, appeared to be solved. However, around this time (August 23), the prospects of the meeting turned gloomy as the Communists unilaterally broke off the conference, claiming the alleged UNC violation of the neutrality agree-
Charges and counter-charges of violations of the conference area and of the neutrality arrangements had been rampant from the outset of the negotiations. Following the Communist refusal to admit the UNC newsmen to the conference area, which was under the former's control with restrictions imposed upon the latter, the UNC delegation had insisted upon an agreement on rules and regulations governing the conference area. It was signed on July 15.

The agreement stipulated the establishment of a neutral zone with a five-mile radius from the center of Kaesong. Each side was to refrain from hostile acts in this zone and all military forces except those performing military police functions would be withdrawn. No armed personnel would be stationed within a half mile of the conference house during daylight hours, and the UN delegation was given unrestricted movement between P'anmunjom and Kaesong without prior notification of the Communists. In addition, the UN liaison officers had already informed their counterparts at the first meeting on July 8 that Communist delegation convoys to and from Kaesong, if marked with white crosses and if the UN Command was given prior notification as to their time and route, would not be attacked.

Although these arrangements were fairly clear and simple, alleged violations were charged almost at once. On July 16, the very next day after the agreements were reached, the Communists claimed that UNC soldiers had fired toward P'anmunjom. Although no one was injured or any damage incurred, the Communists stated that this was an act of armed force within the neutral zone. Investigation by the UN Command showed that some firing in the general area of P'anmunjom had taken place, but there were no evidence that indicated either that the fire had been directed toward the neutral zone or that the UNC forces had done the firing. In any event, the Communists did not pursue the matter any further.

On July 21, the Communists charged that UNC planes had attacked the
Communist delegation’s supply trucks marked with white flags at Hwangju and Sariwon. But since the UNC had been not notified by the Communists of the movement of this convoy, the UN Command refused to assume any responsibility for the damages inflicted. Since the Communists were using the roads between P’yongyang and Kaesong to build up their front-line strength, not all vehicles bearing white markings could be exempted from air attacks.

The above-mentioned two incidents were relatively minor and the Communists did not raise too much protest over them. However, since the Communists were put on the defensive, as the UNC strongly protested against the already mentioned violation of the conference area by a company of fully armed Chinese Communist troops on August 4, the enemy may have decided to launch a counteroffensive by raising a claim about faked incidents.

On August 8, the Communists claimed that UNC planes had assaulted a supply truck marked with a white flag at Sibyon-ri, and about forty UNC troops had blocked the bridge of P’anmunjom and several had fired at unarmed Communist troops. Again, the UNC liaison officers retorted that for the first charge, the prior notification of convoy movement was the only guarantee of immunity. After a thorough investigation of the second charge, Joy found that no UNC units had been in the P’anmunjom area at that time and therefore could not have been responsible for the shooting. On August 13, the Communists again protested that another strafing attack took place in the vicinity of Sibyon-ri, but the UNC rejected it, stating briefly that since no prior notification of the movement had been received, no action on the part of the UNC had been necessary and hence it was not worth considering.

In the face of successive alleged incidents, the liaison officers of both sides met to complement the neutrality agreement, and sought to attain final accord, when several new incidents took place. On August 19, a Chinese military police platoon, which patrolled the village of Songgong-ri in the neutral zone, was
ambushed, and the platoon leader was killed and another soldier wounded. The Communists immediately protested and accused the UN Command of violating the agreement. Despite conflicting testimony by witnesses, an investigation by the UNC confirmed that the patrol had been ambushed, but that no UN or ROK units had been close to Songgong-ri at that time. Since some witnesses stated that several members of the attacking force had worn civilian clothes and had been seen in the area before, the UNC officers assumed that they were partisans friendly to the ROK but acting independently. Needless to say, the Communists did not accept this explanation and made full use of the incident for propaganda purposes.

Before the furor caused by the incident subsided, the Communists again complained that UNC planes had bombarded the conference site of Kaesong at 23:20 on August 22. The UNC liaison officer (Col. Andrew J. Kinney), who was notified of this incident and was requested to make an immediate investigation by the Communists at 23:30, arrived at the site at 01:45 on the 23rd, and despite the darkness and a pouring rain, Kinney and his party inspected the evidence. Although there were several small holes, the so-called bomb fragments were parts of an aircraft oil tank and an engine nacelle. The Communists insisted that one of the bombs had been napalm, but they could not find any badly scorched earth area. After viewing the evidence, Kinney termed the whole affair ‘nonsense.’ Whereupon Colonel Chang, the Communist liaison officer, retorted that ‘all meetings from this time’ were called off.

As the UNC party was driving to P’anmunjom, the Communists liaison officers caught up with them and urged them to return and complete the investigation. Kinney preferred to wait until daylight, but the Communists insisted that new evidence had been discovered. Unwillingly, Kinney returned and was shown two more small holes, several small burned patches, and some pieces of aircraft metal. In one of the holes there was a smell of gasoline and a substance which might have been a low-grade napalm that had not been exploded. When the UN investi-
gators requested that all the evidence remain in place so that it could be inspected by daylight, the Communists refused. They intended to gather it all for analysis and considered the investigation over.

There were many elements in this affair that pointed to a deliberate attempt on the part of the Communists to arrange an incident to suspend the negotiations. In the first place, the Fifth Air Force maintained that it had no planes up in the area. Secondly, the plane that supposedly dropped the bombs had its headlights on, a procedure contrary to all UNC practice. Thirdly, the bomb pattern of the craters was such that, in the opinion of the UNC investigators, no single plane could have made them.\textsuperscript{10} There was a hole nearby about 1 foot deep, 2 feet in diameter...this hole could possibly be the result of a grenade size explosion preset in the ground.\textsuperscript{11} In addition to these technical objections to the evidence, the fact that the Communists hastily gathered the fragments for analysis and that the low-echelon liaison officer quickly called off the meetings made the Communist motives suspect. Ridgway believed that the incident had been arranged to suspend the meeting, imposing the blame on the UNC, and that this decision must have been made in advance at the highest level.

At 11:00 on August 24, in a letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai delivered to General Ridgway through a liaison officer of P’anmunjom, they stated: “the UNC planes deliberately attacked the neutral site of Kaesong to kill the Communist delegations....we strongly protest your acts before all the peoples of the world.” On the 25th General Ridgway retorted “we don’t see the need to discuss your arranged incidents.” He said that if the Communists would wish to resume the conference they broke off, the UNC was ready to sent its delegation.

As General Ridgway saw it, there were three possible reasons for the Communists’ actions:\textsuperscript{12}

First, they wanted an excuse to break off the negotiations, with the blame falling on the UNC.
Second, they wanted to stall in order to better coordinate the timing of the conference talks with the Japanese peace treaty discussion and the Russian peace offensive.

Third, they desired a suspension to strengthen their propaganda position, and to regain the initiative in the negotiations. They were on the defensive since the incident of the violation of the conference area by a company of fully armed Chinese Communist troops on August 4.

In addition to that embarrassment, since the Communists’ demand on the 38th Parallel line was not accepted at the subdelegation level, they needed to suspend the meeting to play for time to work out their new scheme.

Whatever the Communist motivations might have been, the truce talks were adjourned sine die on August 24, 1951 after one and half months of conference following the charges and counter-charges on the arranged incidents by the Communists and their deliberate breaking off the conference.

3. Efforts for the Resumption of Truce Talks

As was mentioned above, on August 24 the Communists unilaterally called off the meeting, protesting the alleged bombing of Kaesong by the UNC planes on the previous day. After that, the truce conference entered a period of indefinite suspension for a month and half after it first opened. In the meantime the Communists continued to raise new charges of UNC violations. They claimed that a UNC plane had dropped a flare in the Kaesong area on August 29; that UNC forces had fired shots against a patrol across the bridge at Panmunjom on August 30; and that UNC planes had bombed Kaesong a second time on September 1. Investigation of these charges by UNC officers confirmed that no UNC planes had committed the air incidents and that partisan forces were proba-
bly responsible for the ground action.

Both Ridgway and Joy thought firmly that the best way to reduce possible further incidents was to change the negotiating site. The former had already proposed a new location in early August and after the rush of incidents during that month, Joy now strongly supported him.

The US government agreed with the idea of changing the conference site, but at this point they did not make it a prerequisite for a resumption of negotiations. If the Communists really intended to break off the negotiations, they could create a situation in which they could call off the talks completely, imposing blame on the UN Command. However, judging from the fact that the Communists continued to claim UNC violations, the UN Command saw the possibility of resuming the conference without a change in site. Although most of their accusations were without substance, they had seized the propaganda initiative and put the UNC on the defensive.

On September 2, the Communists claimed that a UNC plane had violated the Kaesong neutral area at 03:00 on September 1 and dropped two bombs no more than 500-600 meters away from General Nam’s quarters. They also alleged that UNC planes flew over the Kaesong neutral site, making twenty-five sorties during the eight days between August 23 and 30. In this connection, the Communists sent a letter, a part of which read as follows:

Your side must seriously and responsibly make disposition of the series of grave provocative incidents that occurred between 23 August and 1 September, and absolutely guarantee against recurrence of such actions and violations of the Kaesong neutrality agreement, so that the Kaesong Armistice Conference may be reopened.....

In a letter addressed to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai, the UNC com-
mander stated that the UNC had never violated the neutrality agreement, that the Communists had continued to make claims about incidents deliberately arranged by themselves, and requested that an immediate meeting of the liaison officers be held at Panmunjom to discuss a new conference site since the meetings at Kaesong would produce further incidents, which would in turn delay the conference.

The main points of General Ridgway's letter were as follows:

Your message to me, dated 1 Sept 51 and received 2 Sept, is yet another of your false charges in which, without the slightest basis in fact, you have again impugned the good faith of the United Nations forces. The charges you have levied in these alleged incidents are baseless and intentionally false. I have stated, and will again positively state, that our thorough investigations have indicated no instances where forces under my command have violated any of the agreements made by me or my representatives. Therefore, if the incidents did, in fact, occur, they were presumably initiated and perpetrated by your forces in order to provide spurious evidence for false and malevolent accusations against the United Nations Command.

I cannot provide you with guarantees against your own failure to exercise control in an area for which you are responsible. I cannot prevent the occurrence of incidents deliberately and maliciously manufactured by your forces in an area under your control. I previously guaranteed that our forces would not violate the terms of the agreement concerning the Kaesong neutral zone. My forces have scrupulously observed the terms of that agreement. My guarantee remains effective.....

I have repeatedly emphasized that my principal concern is to achieve a just and honorable military armistice. Events of the past weeks have made it plainly evident to me and to the world at large that further use of the present
conference site at Kaesong will inevitably result in additional interruptions on our armistice talks and further delays in reaching agreement. When you decided to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August, I proposed that our liaison officers meet immediately at the bridge at P’amunjom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations can be continued without interruption.\textsuperscript{14}

The UNC was waiting for the Communists’ reply as to the meeting to discuss a new conference cite when “strangely enough.... a real violation of the neutral zone took place.” On September 10 a UNC plane strafed Kaesong through a navigational error. Fortunately no damage resulted, but the Communists entered a formal protest. As soon as the investigation disclosed that a UNC plane had committed the attack, Admiral Joy wrote and apologized for the infraction.\textsuperscript{15}

This letter drew an almost friendly response. In the letter of September 12 and in the names of Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai, the Communists charged that the UNC, in its letter of September 6, had denied the violation of the agreement and provocative acts, and that its proposal of a change in the site of the conference was an attempt to escape its unescapable responsibility for the agreement violation and conference interruption. This letter rejected the UNC position, but at the end it added: “Therefore, we now demand of you once again that you put an end at once to the incessant acts of violations of the agreement and deal with the numerous provocations against which our side has lodged protests. Only by doing so, can the negotiations be resumed on a normal and equal basis. Otherwise, your side will have to bear the entire responsibility for the delay and obstruction in the progress of the negotiations and their consequences.”\textsuperscript{16} This statement at the end of the letter implied that the Communists were ready to resume the conference.

On September 17 General Ridgway, feeling the necessity of reopening the meeting, proposed to the Communists that the liaison officers get together at
P’anmunjom to discuss the conditions of resumption of the conference. He did not mention the change of the conference site. However, Ridgway stressed again at the beginning of his letter that the UNC was not responsible for any of the alleged violations of neutrality except the one which occurred on September 10.\textsuperscript{17}

Two days later (September 19) the Communists sent a reply in the name of Kim and Peng. They first criticized the UNC for not taking the responsibility for the incidents except that of September 10, but proposed that the delegations of both sides immediately resume the conference at Kaesong, so that the conference would not be delayed because of the unsettled incidents. Denying the necessity of a discussion on the conditions for the resumption of the armistice negotiation proposed by the UNC commander, they instead proposed that appropriate machinery be set up to deal with the unsettled incidents and to guarantee the Kaesong zone’s neutrality. They also proposed a meeting of liaison officers of both sides to discuss the date and time for resuming the negotiations at Kaesong.\textsuperscript{18}

General Ridgway was unwilling to reopen the negotiations until there was a definite change in the Communists’ attitude. The Communists not only refused to discuss the change of the conference site but also on the conditions for the resumption of the conference proposed by Ridgway. They instead took the opportunity to discuss the unsettled incidents at the conference. General Ridgway wanted the change in the conference made, and the conditions for the resumption of the conference to be settled at the liaison officers’ meeting, not at the main conference.

After some reconsideration, Ridgway declared on September 23 that the issue of alleged violations of the neutrality of Kaesong was no longer negotiable, and the Communists were responsible for delaying the conference without valid reasons. He also proposed that a meeting of liaison officers be held on September 24 at P’anmunjom to discuss the conditions satisfactory for both sides for the resumption.\textsuperscript{19}
The Communists agreed to the proposal and a meeting of liaison officers opened on September 24, 1951 after a month’s recess. At the conference, however, each side blamed the other side for the suspension of the meeting. The Communists insisted that the meeting should deal with only the date and time for the conference, while the UNC officers demanded that they discuss the conditions necessary for continuing the conference without interruption. When the meeting did not make any progress due to the controversy over items to discuss, on September 27 Ridgway proposed to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai that they relocate the conference site from Kaesong to the area near Songhyun-ri, which was about in the middle of the frontlines.20)

In a letter of October 3, the Communists, however, rejected the idea of relocating of the conference site, demanding that the conference continue at Kaesong, and that a machinery that would guarantee the neutrality of Kaesong be set up. The Communists’ intention was to not give up their advantage since the conference site was under their control. In an attempt to resume the conference as soon as possible, on October 4 General Ridgway sent a message in which he proposed the meeting of the delegations at a site which was located half way between the front-lines of the two sides, and which he could accept. Following continued persuasion on the change of site, the Communists finally accepted the UNC proposal. On October 7, the Communists delivered a letter in which they proposed that “the conference site be moved to P’annmunjom, and both sides assume the responsibility of protecting the conference site....making regulation of expansion of the neutral zone.”21)

Ridgway felt that P’annmunjom satisfied the basic conditions he desired: the equality in delegation movement and the management of the conference site by both sides. On the following day, October 8, he sent a message of acceptance to the Communists. He also expressed his opinion that the area including Kaesong and Munsan would form an enlarged neutral area so that the routes to and from
P'anmunjom of both Kaesong and Munsan would be immune from any hostile acts.

General Ridgway at the same time instructed General Van Fleet, the EUSA commander, "to be ready to take over the high ground east of P'anmunjom as soon as final arrangements for the reopening of negotiations were concluded." This action was aimed to occupy advantageous terrain for the protection of the conference site and for the future settling of the demarcation line. At first, when the UNC proposed Songhyun-ri as the new conference site, Ridgway wanted to occupy the hill mass south of Songhyun-ri, but since P'anmunjom became the new conference site, Kaesong automatically fell into the hands of the enemy.

At last on October 10, 1951, the liaison officers of both sides got together at tents set up at P'anmunjom to discuss the matters related to the opening of the conference. This meeting, however, faced difficulties from the outset.

Although the most important issue of the new conference site was settled, the Communist liaison officers refused to discuss anything but the time and date of the next conference of the delegates. They also insisted that the five mile-neutral ring area of Kaesong be maintained as before. The UNC, on the other hand, wanted to discuss details necessary for the reopening of the conference, and to restrict the neutral zone of Kaesong. The UNC reasoned that since the conference site was removed from Kaesong, the contraction of the neutral area of Kaesong would mean the lessening of the area in which incidents could occur. On October 12 a flight of UNC F-80's passed over the neutral area en route home, and one of them cleared its machine guns. The atmosphere at the liaison officers meeting underwent a sudden change.  

Despite the various hardships, the liaison officers of both sides narrowed the issues in dispute, and on October 22 the liaison officers signed the new security agreement which embodied the features desired by the UN Command for the resumption of the conference. The main contents of the agreement were as fol-
Extracts of the basic agreement

1) The conference site would be named ‘P’anmunjom.’

2) The conference site area was a circular area having a radius of 1,000-yards centered on the conference site. (see the map)

3) No hostile acts of any kind would be allowed at the conference site.

4) Two military police officers and 15 men of each side would be stationed while the delegations were present in the conference site area. During the period when the delegation parties were not present in the conference site areas, one officer and five men from each side would be stationed in the conference site areas. The military police should carry only small arms, namely, pistols, rifles and carbines.

5) Both delegations and their parties would have free access to and free movement within the P’anmunjom conference area.

6) As agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides, the Communists offered to supply the delegation conference tent and joint facilities while the UN Command was to provide flooring, space heating, and lights for the tent. Otherwise each side would take care of its own needs in the conference area.

7) The three mile circle centered at Kaesong and Munsan were neutralized and so was a corridor of 200 meters to either side of the Kaesong-P’anmunjom-Munsan road.

8) The time and date for the resumption of the conference would be determined at the meeting of the liaison officers.

Among the items of understanding, the officers agreed that the UNC would not assume the responsibility for the accidental overflight by its aircraft of
the neutral zone and the acts committed by the irregulars or partisans not under its control. On the other hand, in order to prevent violations of the air space, the UN Command agreed to set up a search light and barrage balloons at P'anmunjom.

On October 22, 1951, both sides signed the agreement on the new conference site, confirming the name of the site and its exact location. On the same day, the liaison officers agreed that the name of the conference site would be P'anmunjom and the exact site would be a 1,000-yard circle around four thatched houses located south of P'anmunjom, which they marked on a map. The original name of this area was Neulmun-ri, but it could not be written in Chinese characters, one of the three official languages of the conference, which were Korean, English, and Chinese. Therefore, they agreed to call it ‘P'anmunjom’, which could be written in Chinese characters. From that time, the small farm village of Neulmun-ri became known widely as P'anmunjom.24)

It was agreed that following the ratification by the head delegates of both sides, conference tents would be set up by the 24th, and the conference of the sub-delegation would be held on the 25th. In the long run, the Communists returned to the conference two months after they broke off the talks unilaterally. During this period, the Communists tried to gain the propaganda initiative by exploiting the arranged incidents as well as accidental ones to criticize the UN Command. Though the Communists failed to alter the UNC position on the 38th Parallel, by agreeing to transfer the conference site to P'anmunjom south of Kaesong, they secured an advantageous position in the subsequent establishment of the demarcation line in western Korea. In the meantime, on the battlefield the UNC forces maintained an advantageous position vis a vis the enemy; they launched an overall offensive by increasing pressure on the enemy on the land and in the air. The UNC also made efforts to improve their line of defense, considering that the current line of contact might become the military demarcation line.
Neutral area: P'anmunjom with a 1,000 yard radius; Kaesong and Munsan with a three mile radius and 400 meter width along the road.
II. Military Pressures: Development of Position Warfare

1. The Military Strategies of Both Sides at the Beginning of the Truce Negotiations

(1) The Communist strategy for recovering their offensive power

The Kaesong truce conference, which had begun on July 10, 1951, did not reach agreement on the agenda until July 26. After that, the conference faced difficulty because the Communists clung to the 38th Parallel, while the UN Command took the battle line at the time of a cease-fire as the military demarcation line. To make the situation worse, on August 23 the Communists unilaterally declared the suspension of the conference, casting a shadow on the prospects of the conference.

The Communists’ objective in the negotiations was not to reach a rapid agreement, but to delay the conference to play for time necessary to allow its forces to recover from the damages suffered during the Spring Offensive and to build up their offensive power to gain military superiority over the UNC forces. With the military superiority they hoped to take advantage either on the battlefield or at the negotiation table. The Chinese official history of ‘Resist America and Assist Korea to Win the war’ clearly shows this goal:

Our forces (CCF) were superior in strength, but not in fire power, and did not possess satisfactory air support. Therefore, since we were unable to launch large-scale offensive operations, we adopted a strategy of defensive operations, conducting protracted warfare on advantageous terrain until the
ratio of military forces of the enemy (UNC forces) and our forces would be
in our favour. This would lead us to a victory or to a situation in which the
enemies, realizing difficulties, would give up and withdraw by themselves.\textsuperscript{25}

In order to carry out their strategy, the Communists took advantage of
the lull on the battlefield created by the negotiations. They organized triple
defense lines with fortified bunkers which could not be destroyed except by direct
hits from artillery and air attacks.\textsuperscript{26} The Communists also moved forward field
and anti-aircraft artillery battalions and other equipment, and taking into account
the Chinese air force support which was expected within two months, accelerated
preparations for a September offensive.

Around July 20, a month after the frontline became stalemated and ten
days after the beginning of the negotiations, the enemy organized the outpost line
of resistance connecting the important terrain features from one to five kilometers
in front of the UNC forces frontline and strongly resisted against the UNC forces
operations. The UN Command concluded that such enemy activities were an
apparent shift from past enemy defensive tactics, which showed that the enemy
had completed the build-up of supplies and was ready to launch an offensive cam-
paign.

In the latter part of July, the Communists not only reacted more aggres-
sively against UNC forces reconnaissance activities but also conducted their own
patrol and probing activities against the major defensive positions of the UNC
forces. Taking advantage of the inclement weather of the rainy season, they
pushed forward their troops and artillery, which conducted reference point firing.
All such enemy activities indicated their readiness to launch an immediate offen-
sive without troop re-deployment. At the beginning of August, such activities of
the enemy accelerated.

In short, for the Communists the truce negotiation was a way to build up
military power and to obtain a victory through a protracted war. An early settlement by negotiation was not what they aimed at, and when the negotiations were delayed, the enemy combat power was increased.

(2) The UNC's strategy for the limited objective attack

1) The summer offensive operations plan

   • Putting on shelf of the large-scale offensive plan

   When the negotiations began, the UNC forces, which wanted to maintain operational initiative, strengthened the defensive capability of the Kansas-Wyoming line against enemy attack. While following closely the progress of the negotiations, Eighth Army developed contingency plans which could meet the changing situations. However, the UNC operations were in fact restricted to the offensives to limited objectives, the purposes of which were to support the conclusion of the truce agreement, to improve their defense line, and to deny the build-up of the enemy offensive powers.

   In early July, following Ridgway’s instruction, General Van Fleet drew up a large-scale offensive plan. It outlined how the UNC forces would slaughter the Communist forces committed to the frontline27) and advance up to the P’yongyang-Wonsan line starting September 1, provided that certain conditions were satisfied. This plan was termed Plan Overwhelming28) in view of its scale.

   General Van fleet thought that the plan might be feasible if there was important deterioration of the enemy forces or a withdrawal to the north, if the mission of the Eighth Army changed from defense to offensive, or if additional forces were allocated to the Eighth Army.

   On 10 July, the Joint Chiefs removed their requirement that Ridgway secure their prior approval of all major ground operations, but the Far East com-
mander took no action on Overwhelming. The rather formidable set of conditions that Van Fleet had attached to the plan, coupled with the initiation of the armistice negotiations, argued for a cautious approach to any large-scale offensive at this time. Ridgway, therefore, decided to observe the course of the peace talks before he acted on Overwhelming.\(^{29}\)

Overwhelming included a landing at Wonsan with simultaneous advance of the UNC troops from the Kansas-Wyoming line. This plan was significant in that it would have been the first overall offensive operation by the UNC forces after the Chinese Communist invasion had been checked. General Chung II Kwon, the then Chief of General Staff, reported with great regrets at a cabinet meeting about the cancellation of the operation:

The Washington authority put a curb on MacArthur’s strategy ‘Advance North’ lest it might alarm Soviet and Communist China, and this time again is restricting Van Fleet’s operations for the truce negotiation. As the unification of Korea was aborted with the rejection of the MacArthur plan, so is the advance up to P’yongyang-Wonsan line because of the restrictions imposed on the Van Fleet plan.\(^{30}\)

- The basic concept of the strategy of limited objective attack

Since General Van Fleet was unable to secure approval on the plan of pushing his army up to the P’yongyang-Wonsan line, his operations were restricted to launching limited attacks. Van Fleet was aware that while the enemy had used the respite on the battlefield to mount combat capabilities and begun to show signs of shifting from defense to offensive, the combat efficiency of the Eighth Army had slipped. Patrol were conducted indifferently and failed to bring in prisoners; gathering intelligence became an increasingly difficult task. Even a stepped up training program was not enough to restore the ability and will of the Eighth
Army to fight.\textsuperscript{31}

Van Fleet assumed that such a situation resulted from operational inactivity and a vague hope that the armistice talks would be successful. He worried about the possible collapse of his troops in the event of enemy attacks.

Therefore, General Van Fleet was determined to conduct limited offensive operations with the aim of disturbing the enemy’s dispositions and sharpening the fighting edge of the Eighth Army troops with particular emphasis on improving the vulnerable points in his defense line. Following this operational concept, he issued an order on July 29 to attack limited objectives, to keep the enemy off balance by penetrating the enemy defense line, and to probe enemy positions through reconnaissance in depth. He gave each corps its main mission. The US I Corps was given the order to conduct a combat reconnaissance in depth around the hill mass near Kijon-ri (CT 1725), and also in the ‘Iron Triangle’ area. The US IX Corps was instructed to continue the current operations, while the US X Corps was to continue its attack on Taeu-san\textsuperscript{32}, and to secure the hill mass extending from Hill 1031 in cooperation with the ROK I Corps, its right adjacent unit. Such were the primary missions given to each corps by Van Fleet.\textsuperscript{33}

This operational order was, however, called off two days later on July 31. Due to the heaviest rain recorded in 30 years, visibility was restricted, the communications were not in good order, the roads became impassable for the troops, and artillery and air support were restricted.

Therefore, this operation was suspended when the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Infantry Division seized the Taeu-san, and was resumed in mid-August when the rainy season was over. In the meantime each corps developed its own operational plans. The basic concept of Army operation was to improve its defense line by eliminating an inverse salient and by seizing terrain features which threatened the lines of communication and the defense of the Kansas line. For these objectives, the operations were to be conducted in three phases.
In the first phase, the US X corps would seize the hill mass north of Punchbowl, in the center of its defense line in the most vulnerable east center region, to eliminate the entrant into its defense line. This operation would be conducted in cooperation with the ROK I Corps and extend the latter’s defense line up to the Nam River. In the second phase, the US IX Corps would occupy Kumsong Basin and thus establish the base to control the ‘Iron Triangle’ and secure the railroad between Ch’orwon and Kimhwa. Finally, The US I Corps would push forward its front line about ten kilometers toward the north and secure the railroad between Yonch’on and Ch’orwon, and eventually connect this line to the Ch’orwon-Kimhwa railroad and utilize the new network, together with the Seoul-Kimhwa route, as its line of communication.

The UN Command embodied the plan to improve the defense line on the strategy of limited objective attack. It re-established importance of the Wyoming line by fortifying it as strongly as the Kansas line, thus making an important improvement in the defense. On July 24, General Van Fleet visited the Headquarters of the US I Corps and defined the operational concept of the Wyoming line in connection with Kansas line as follows:

We occupied Line Wyoming, as the outpost line, to crash and delay the enemy in attack before they reached Line Kansas. This would enable us to prepare better for the defense of Line Kansas and destroy the enemy, once it reached Line Kansas, with minimum damages on our forces. Hence, we never planned Line Wyoming as the main line of resistance nor the main battle area. This policy would apply when the Communists launched a large-scale offensive. However, if the enemy makes a limited offensive, it is my desire that we halt the enemy or at least inflict heavy damages on the enemy
at Line Wyoming. If the Communists launch an attack on Line Wyoming comparable to that of last May, we could stop it there; a limited offensive, not over-all, would be stopped at Line Wyoming.\textsuperscript{34}

According to Van Fleet’s policy, first the Eighth Army would hold the enemy’s limited offensive at Line Wyoming, and second in case of its large-scale offensive, the Army would inflict severe casualties at Wyoming and stop it at Kansas.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, Van Fleet explained the unsuitability of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and emphasized the importance of Line Wyoming. Unless UNC held Wyoming:

1) The enemy could approach the road net in the Hwach’on area and threaten to conduct a flank envelopment of the friendly forces.
2) The enemy could control the Hwach’on Reservoir, which was the source of electricity and drinking water of the Seoul citizens.
3) The enemy could threaten surprise attacks on Seoul along shorten avenue of approach.

In compliance with Van Fleet’s new directive, the Corps in the center area strengthened Line Wyoming. It deployed its main forces along the Wyoming line, while Line Kansas was manned by its reserves, thus forming double (two-fold) defensive lines.

General Van Fleet also took the policy of committing the ROK forces to the offensives upon the limited objectives in order to improve their combat capabilities through real battle. In order to support the policy he also took various actions to improve the training of the ROK forces. On July 16, he met General Lee Chong Ch’an, the Chief of General Staff of the ROK Army, at the Army Headquarters in Taegu and exchanged opinions on the training of the ROK forces.
He praised the improvement which the ROK Forces had made and promised his continued support.\textsuperscript{36} They agreed that 250 junior grade officers would be assigned successively to the Fort Benning Infantry School and Fort Sill Artillery School in the United States.\textsuperscript{37} On the following day, he visited the ROK Army Recruit Training Center on Cheju Island, observed the training, and made suggestions for the improvement of the training. He stressed the importance of one week training in bivouac, and recommended centralizing all ROK training installations. In addition to his interest in the development of the recruit training center and other service schools, he made an important decision on the training at the frontline divisions. In late July, the Field Training Command was set up at the US IX corps and, during the succeeding three months, four training camps, one in each corps area, were established to retrain the ROK Army.\textsuperscript{38} Each ROK division which went into corps reserve was given nine weeks of basic individual up to battalion training at the command. This training contributed greatly to the improvement of ROK forces combat capabilities.

Paired with the ROK government plan of enlarging training installations to strengthen the ROK forces during the lull on the battlefield and Ridgway's conviction that qualified officers and non-commissioned officers were the backbone of strong ROK forces\textsuperscript{39}, Van Fleet made significant contributions to the build up of powerful ROK forces. The concrete results were evident in the successful operations of the ROK forces which took part in the offensive of the limited objectives.\textsuperscript{40}

• Operation Creeper\textsuperscript{41}

The rainy season of July, in which the defensive concept of Line Wyoming had been decided and the training of the ROK forces had been developed, was over. With the beginning of August, as the weather improved, Ridgway resumed the offensive on the limited objectives which had been suspended from
the end of July. On August 14, he instructed the US X Corps to conduct ‘Operation Creeper’, an operational plan which had been developed for the improvement of the corps defense line.

Operation Creeper was a pre-operation before attacking the Punchbowl and its objective was to seize cross compartment J Ridge consisting of Hills of 884, 924, and 1,031, east of the Punchbowl and the Sohwa Valley, secure the maneuver road along the Sohwa Valley, advance forward up to the Nam River, and exercise pressure on the enemy on the Punchbowl from the east. This operations were carried out starting from August 18 in cooperation with the right flank division of the US X Corps and left flank division of the ROK I Corps.

Operation Creeper
Van Fleet also ordered the US 2d Infantry Division to attack Hill 983 (Bloody Ridge) from the west of the Punchbowl in connection with Operation Creeper. Accordingly, the 36th Regiment (of the ROK 5th Division) which was attached to the US 2d Division launched an attack of Hill 983. In order to assist this attack, the ROK 7th Division on the left flank of the US X Corps also attacked Hills 554 and 883 located west of Hill 983. In short Operation Creeper, which was to occupy the northern ridge of the Punchbowl, was extended both to the left and right hill mass of Hill 983.\textsuperscript{42} In compliance with Van Fleet's instruction, the ROK units of the US X Corps were committed to the attack.

- Operations Talons and Apache

On August 27 when Operation Creeper was successfully concluded, but with the US X Corps was still engaged in a fierce battle with the enemy west of the Punchbowl, General Van Fleet reported to General Ridgway at a corps commanders' meeting of the Army Advanced Command Post in Seoul that an operation termed 'Operation Talon' would be launched on September 5.\textsuperscript{43} The main objective of the operation was to push the eastern frontline of the Army forward, 24 kilometers at maximum, and eliminate the inverse salient of the friendly frontline, and destroying the enemy in these areas. Van Fleet explained his operational concept as follow:

1) To occupy Wonsan by a landing operation
2) To advance armored units along the coast road and attack enemy depots south of Wonsan
3) To launch an offensive operation to remove the salient of the frontline in the US X Corps area.

Ridgway disapproved of the landing operation at Wonsan, but Van Fleet
could carry out the other two ground operations. Therefore, Van Fleet’s original plan was readjusted and was named ‘Operation Apache.’ The operational order of ‘Apache’ was delivered to the subordinate units on August 25. The main outline of ‘Apache’, which was to start on September 5, was as follows:\textsuperscript{44}

The objective line of the operation began from the boundary of the US I and IX Corps, which was 6 km east of Ch’orwon, snaked its way to the north-east, passed 4km south of Kumsung, 2km north of Ip’o-ri and reached Malmu-ri (DT 4481) of the east coast.\textsuperscript{45} The US IX, the US X, and the ROK I Corps were to advance up to the target line,\textsuperscript{46} while task forces\textsuperscript{47} composed of one regimental combat team of the ROK 3d Division and one reinforced regiment of the US First Marine Division would advance rapidly along the coast road to seize the objective in the Kubong-ri area (DT 4177) where it would organize the resistance position. The ROK Capital Division would follow the task force up to Songhyun-ri where it would turn westward and occupy Hills 1,092 (DT 3466) and 1,098 (DT 3557) in the east mountainous area (and defeat the enemy in the areas). The ROK 11th Division and the 3d Division (-) would conduct a holding attack south of the Nam River. The US IX Corps would launch an offensive on D-day, while the US X Corps would do so on D plus 2 and secure the target line of Etna. The US I Corps would conduct the current mission.\textsuperscript{48}

Starting from August 29, each corps, in preparation for the coming operations, conducted operations with emphasis on re-deployment of its units.

General Van Fleet, who had received a report that the friendly forces were suffering many casualties due to the enemy’s tough resistance at the battle of Bloody Ridge, anticipated that Operation Apache would bring much greater losses of both men and material on the UNC forces in view of the scale of the operation.
One US marine RCT, one RCT of the ROK 3rd Division, one heavy artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, and one naval gun fire supporting section.
He began to doubt whether the operation was worthwhile in view of such sacrifices and reconsidered the operation.

In the long run, he reported to Ridgway that he had cancelled of Operation Apache on September 5, and instead proposed 'elbowing tactics', which were designed to advance northward and realign the eastern frontline during September but without assigning any target line. As for the 'elbowing tactics', he recommended:

1) ‘Operation Apache’ be cancelled;
2) in lieu of ‘Apache,’ broad authority be given to conduct limited objective attacks on the eastern front;
3) attacks on this front be continued throughout September;
4) an operation be conducted in the US I Corps front in October to secure the Sibyon-ri-Kaesong area;
5) a further action be conducted in November to connect up the rest of the Kimhwa line to the Kojo area by employing an amphibious operation;
6) an RCT from the two American divisions in Japan be attached to EUSA for frontline indoctrination for a period of 30 days. (This latter recommendation, he reasoned, would relieve a frontline RCT for a period in corps reserve.)

On September 8, Van Fleet secured Ridgway's approval for the operation and in turn delivered his instructions to his subordinate units in which he canceled Operation Apache and instead ordered limited objective attacks, reconnaissance in force, and patrolling to balance off and inflict maximum damages on the enemy. Following this plan, in September, a great deal of combat was carried out in the US X Corps area together with the areas to its left adjacent US IX Corps
and right adjacent ROK I Corps.

- Plan Cudgel/Wrangler^{32)\footnote{32) Plan Cudgel/Wrangler}}

In addition to Operation Elbowing, which was to be concluded by the end of September as Van Fleet had reported to Ridgway, the former established two other ambitious operational plans on September 19, when fierce battles were still being fought at the Punchbowl and Heartbreak Ridge. The plans were designed to continue the limited objective attacks in the west and center frontline and would secure railroad communication networks connecting Younch’on, Ch’orwon, and Kimhwa.

The plan termed ‘Cudgel’ was to push the frontline 15 km farther northward beyond Line Wyoming. The objectives of Plan Cudgel were to protect the railroad connecting Younch’on, Ch’orwon, and Kimhwa which had been exposed to enemy artillery fire and attack. It also aimed to destroy the enemy outpost line of resistance located there. The US IX Corps was designated the main attacking unit of the operation while the two left and right adjacent corps were to launch secondary attacks to prevent the enemy from committing its reserves to the main attack area.\footnote{33) Plan Cudgel/Wrangler}

Besides improving communications in central Korea, Van Fleet intended to use the railroad to support a follow-up operation in October which he had named ‘Wrangler.’ The latter was equally ambitious, for it aimed at cutting off the North Korean forces opposing the ROK I and US X Corps on the right flank of the Eighth Army with link-up operation by US IX Corps driving north-east and an amphibious troops at Kojo on the east coast.\footnote{34) One ROK division and US Marine units were to be used for the landing operation.} One ROK division and US Marine units were to be used for the landing operation.

The Eighth Army commander recognized that this operation would be a calculated risk and might lead to a dangerous enemy counter-thrust on the west flank as the amphibious forces tried to link up with the US IX Corps along the
Kumsong-Kojo road. Although Van Fleet asked Ridgway for a quick decision on Cudgel and Wrangler, he himself dropped them within a few days just as he had canceled out Talon earlier in the month.\(^5^5\) Therefore the two operational plans remained just plans.

2) The Autumn Offensive Operation

Since the US X Corps had seized the Punchbowl and the realignment of the eastern frontline was almost completed, General Van Fleet, having analyzed the results of the limited objective attacks, concluded that the summer operations were to be terminated on September 25, and gave an instruction to prepare for the autumn operation.\(^5^6\)

Van Fleet’s guidelines for the autumn operation was, like that of the summer operation, to maintain the initiative on the battlefield. He was determined to keep the enemy off balance, to prevent the enemy’s build up of combat power by conducting reconnaissance in depth, and to prevent his well trained troops from falling in inactivity due to a stalemated war. At a press conference on September 30, he explained the general military situation in Korea, summarized the summer operation, and pointed out the necessity of the limited objective attacks as follow:

The UNC forces concluded the summer operation of ‘the limited objective attack’ as of September 25. This operation was conducted from May 25 to September 25, following the successful spring offensive. As of today the autumn operation is in progress, and I am not in a position to freely define whether the autumn operation will be also a limited objective attack or something different.

My basic mission during the last four months was to destroy the enemy in
order that the Eighth Army would not be destroyed. During this period the
truce conference at Kaesong never gave any guarantee for the early settle-
ment of the cease-fire.

On May 25, 1951, we firmly established ourselves as the expeller of the
invaders, and from that victorious day to September 25, we also successfully
exercised supremacy over the enemy. There were, however, some reasons
that we could not pursue and completely destroy the enemy in the spring
operations. If we had launched all-out offensive, the enemy would have
withdrawn to the sanctuary of Manchuria, and reattacked the UNC forces,
after having restored enormous fighting capabilities. We came to know that it
was to our interest to occupy the middle of the Korean peninsula and inflict
damaged upon the Communists and their line of communication rather than
advancing up to the Yalu in summer where we were obliged to dig in against
enemy attacks.

We are aware of the importance of keeping operations active so that its com-
bat efficiency will not slip. A sit-down army is subject to collapse at the first
sign of enemy effort. An army which neglects to tie its boots cannot keep up
the initiative which is most important for victory in battle. As commander of
the Eighth Army, I couldn’t allow my forces to become soft and dormant.
Therefore, we continued to strike the enemy with limited objective attacks.⁵⁷¹

• Operations of Commando and Polar Line

Based on Van Fleet’s guidelines, the limited objective attacks continued
in the autumn operation. While in the middle east frontline, the ROK 8th and US
2nd Divisions conducted offensives in continuation of the summer operation, the
primary emphasis was placed on improving the frontline of the US I Corps in the
west and that of the US IX Corps in the center. Following the cancellation of
Cudgel and Wrangler, which aimed to improve the frontline and to secure the rail-
road of the Ch’orwon and Kimhwa areas, O’Daniel, the I Corps commander submitted a substitute plan, ‘Operation Commando’, and secured its approval.

The operational concept of Commando, which was similar to those of Cudgel and Wrangler, was designed to push its defense line ten kilometers (in the former plans it was 15 kilometers) northward up to the south of the Yokkok River, and strengthen the corps supply lines. This operation began on October 3 and ended in the latter part of October.

While the operation by the US I Corps was in progress, William H. Hoge, the US IX Corps commander, in compliance with Van Fleet’s directive, made efforts to improve his defensive line and to secure the railroad and route of Ch’orwon and Kimhwa. At the same time, he also conducted limited objective attacks to support the I Corps operation from flank. The operation, which started on the 10th and concluded at the end of October, had the objective of seizing the Kumsong, the enemy’s forward operating area, and the corps successfully secured the Kumsong River (the Nomad line) in the first phase, and Polar Line, the hill mass south of Kumsong, in the second phase.

In the meantime, the US X Corps conducted its autumn operation which was a continuation of the summer operation. While the US 2nd Division occupied Heartbreak Ridge on October 13 and Hill 1220 (Kim Il Sung Ridge) on October 15 by Operation Touchdown, the ROK 8th Division secured Hill 1090 south of Oun-san and the 5th Division, Hill 1211 north of Kach’il-bong. With the conclusion of these operations, the corps pushed northward its defensive line linking T’ongson-gol, Mundung-ri and Punchbowl, thus achieving its objective of defensive line improvement. On the other hand, the ROK I Corps occupied Wolbi-san and advanced up to the Nam River.

The autumn operation ended on October 23, achieving objectives in which the friendly forces improved their defense line, continued to keep the enemy off balance, denied the latter’s build up of offensive capabilities, and main-
tained their excellent combat posture.

In spite of the successful achievement of the autumn operations by the US I and IX Corps, the Ch’orwon and Kimhwa railroad was not completely free from the enemy’s artillery fire, so the Eighth Army drew up a new operation plan to completely secure the railroad. The main point of the plan was that the US I and IX Corps would advance north in the center to secure the new defense line called the Duluth Defense Line. The line ran from Songhyn-ri west of Ch’orwon, passed one kilometer northwest of P’yonggang and reached the Polar Line 4 km southeast of Kumsong. The US Eighth Army also developed a follow-up plan called Operation Sundial in which the IX Corps, once the Kumsong vicinity was secured, would advance northeast and link up at T’ongch’on with the ROK I Corps advancing along the coastline. This operation was to be launched on November 11, but questions were raised as to the merit of the operation. Once the conference at P’anmunjom was resumed on October 25, the UNC force might have to withdraw many kilometers to form the de-militarized zone, and many casualties were anticipated. Accordingly, Ridgway postponed the attack to Duluth Line on October 31 and finally cancelled it on November 11, along with Operation Sundial.583

As mentioned above, against the enemy’s intentional delaying tactics of the truce talks, the UNC conducted limited objective attacks and penetrated the enemy defense position bit by bit, increasing military pressure on the Communists. In consequence, the enemy returned to the conference site, and the UNC suspended the offensive, watching closely the progress of the conference.

2. Removal of the sag in the Punchbowl area

When the truce talks began, the UNC paid great attention to the center frontline of the US X Corps. The corps was then defending the New Kansas line,
which began at the Hwach’on reservoir, veered to the south ridge of the Punchbowl and to the Sanmorikok Mountain. However, due to the Punchbowl, the defense line formed a big inverse salient in the center, thus providing a weak point for the defender. In order to remove the salient, the corps initiated the first phase operation which aimed to occupy the west ridges of the Punchbowl. On July 26, the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division launched an attack and seized Taeusan (Hill 1178) on the 30th after four days’ fierce battle. Taeu-san, situated west of the Punchbowl, was the dominant height and constituted an important foothold for future operations.

However, due to the bad weather of the rainy season, the operation was temporarily suspended until mid-August when the weather improved sufficiently. At this time the US X Corps had under its command the ROK 7th Division deployed north of Hwach’on Reservoir, the US 2nd Division (the French and the Netherlands battalions attached) south of the Punchbowl, the ROK 8th Division defending the Sohwa Valley, and ROK 5th and US 1st Marine Divisions (the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached) in corps reserve. Opposing the corps the North Korea V Corps was in position north of the Hwach’on reservoir, the II Corps was deployed north of the Punchbowl, and the III Corps manned lines in the vicinity of the Nam River.

On August 14, Van Fleet ordered the US X and ROK I Corps to carry out without delay Operation Creeper east of the Punchbowl to mark the beginning of the summer limited objective attacks. At the same time, since Van Fleet also approved the offensive plan drawn up by the X Corps commander to attack Hill 983 (later known as Bloody Ridge) west of the Punchbowl, the corps started the operation to seize the hill mass both east and west of the Punchbowl. Van Fleet allowed them “....flexibility in the time of the attack in order to take advantage of good weather needed for the maximum air effort....” and also instructed them “to carry out his plan to capture Hill 983, utilizing ROK forces in the principal
effort.... "This operation was to be in conjunction with Creeper."\textsuperscript{60)}

Following the operational plan, the US X Corps attacked the hill mass west of the Punchbowl and Hill 1031, the bottom part of J Ridge\textsuperscript{61)} east of the Sohwa Valley and the Punchbowl, while the ROK I Corps attacked Hills 884 and 924 located in the top and stem parts of the J Ridge, in order to support the X Corps operation. Major General Clovis E. Byers, the X Corps commander, considering Operation Creeper the preliminary operation to capture the Punchbowl, the final objective, and in compliance with Van Fleet's instructions, issued an attack order on August 16.

- The Corps would attack Hills 983 and 554, and occupy Hills 965-1031 in cooperation with the ROK I Corps to prepare for the capture of the Punchbowl.
- The ROK 8th Division would seize Hills 965 and 1031 in cooperation with the Capital Division of the ROK I Corps. During this operation, the ROK 5th Division, to which one regiment was to be attached, would defend Line Kansas.
- The US 2nd Division, to which one regiment of the ROK 5th Division was to be attached, would capture Hill 983.
- The ROK 7th Division would seize Hill 554.\textsuperscript{62)}
- The D day and H-hour was 06:30 of August 18.

With the operational order, the US X Corps summer limited objective attack continued. Since the enemy had built up powerful defensive positions, taking advantage of the two months lull on the battlefield, the battle was doomed to be a positional war, the first of its kind in the Korean War.
(1) The Nojonp’yong Battle

- The First Nojonp’yong Battle

The ROK 8th Division, which had relieved the ROK 5th Division on July 20, was defending Kansas Line from Sajimoki in the vicinity of Sohwa to the Sanmorikok-san (1019 meters high), and was opposed by the enemy of the 2nd Division (the 17th Regiment) and the 13th Division (the 19th Regiment) of the NK II Corps, which was occupying a defensive position at Hills 445-1031 around Nojongp’yong.63)

Brigadier General Ch’oi Yong Hee, the 8th Division commander, who had presumed that his objective would be the seizure of Hills 965-1031, drew up his own plan to occupy terrain which would facilitate the attack upon these objectives. While conducting the defense of the Kansas line, he extracted one battalion each from the 16th Regiment on the left flank and the 10th Regiment on the right flank and the Anti-Tank Battalion attached to the 16th Regiment and forwarded them up to the division out-post area in Kajon-ri—Puhu-dong—Kosong-jae. He then ordered these units to launch an attack on August 9 to capture Hills 445-785-1010 of the enemy outpost area.

The 3rd Battalion of the 16th Regiment on the left flank attacked Hills 445 and No-Name Hill, while the Anti-Tank Battalion assaulted Hills 562-785. They captured the hills the following day against the enemy’s stubborn resistance. The 10th Regiment on the right flank committed its 3rd Battalion and seized Hill 1010 on the 10th. The battalion which had pushed back the enemy’s counterattacks was relieved by the 1st Battalion on the 13th.

The enemy, however, taking advantage of unit replacement, made a counterattack during the daytime and recaptured the hill, but on the following day (the 14th) the 1st Battalion reoccupied the hill following several assaults led by its 2nd Company as the main attack and under incessant artillery supporting fire. The
Deployment of the two sides at Nojonp'yong battle
division immediately set up its outpost on those hills and deployed the 21st Regiment in the center of Kansas Line to strengthen the main line of resistance. The Anti-Tank Battalion was also relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment and returned to the division control. With those operations completed, the division secured the hook of the J Ridge in pre-Creeper Operation, and entered the preparation for the attack of Hill 1031, which corresponded to the stem of the J Ridge.

- The Second Nojonp’yong Battle

The ROK 8th Division, which had seized Hills 445-1010, was preparing for future operations when on August 16 it received the order from the corps to attack and occupy Hills 1031 and 965. For this operation, the 27th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division was attached to the 8th Division.

Hill 1031, the highest hill in the corridor ridge composed of Hills 924-884 and extending to the Nam River, was an important terrain feature which commanded the vicinity areas. Hill 965 was a hill of the ridge which stretched westward from Hill 1031, and commanded the vicinity of Ch’ormidong, the valley of the upper part of the Soyang River. Hill 1031 was then occupied by the 19th Regiment of the NK 13th Division, and Hill 965 by the 17th Regiment of the NK 2nd Division.

The division commander, recognizing the important mission of seizing Hill 1031, gave it to the 10th Regiment, and replaced the attached 27th Regiment (-) with the 10th Regiment, which occupied the main line of resistance. After analyzing the terrain, he ordered one battalion of the 21st Regiment deployed in the center to attack Hill 965. The attack of Hills 965 and 1031, the principal focus of Operation Creeper, commenced at 06:00 on August 18 under artillery supporting fire.

The 10th Regiment, which assumed the mission of capturing Hill 1031,
launched an attack with the 3rd Battalion as the main attack in the Kosong-jae area, the 2nd Battalion as the secondary attack from Hill 1056, and the 1st Battalion in regimental reserve. On the first day, the 9th Company of the battalion led the attack, and on the following day, the company and the attached Regimental Reconnaissance Company turned eastward and the 10th and 11th Companies made a frontal attack and advanced up to the assaulting line. The 2nd Battalion, the secondary attack, reoccupied Hill 1010, which the friendly forces had seized in the first Nojongp’yong battle and then withdrawn from for operational reasons, before continuing its advance toward Hill 950, west of Hill 1031.

The two battalions, which reached the assault line after overcoming enemy fire and mine fields, reached the point of close combat, but failed to penetrate the enemy position. However, on August 30, the third day of the attack, in spite of heavy rain, the battalion deployed the 10th Company in the front and the other companies on the left and right flanks and made a simultaneous attack on Hill 1031. The battalions pushed back the enemy’s fierce resistance, and captured the hill. On the same day the 2nd Battalion seized Hill 950, one kilometers west of Hill 1031, and both battalions succeeded in beating back enemy counterattacks which continued from the night to the dawn of the following day.

On the other hand, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment in the center, due to its mission of defending the security position, could commit only one company on the first and second day and from Hill 785 launched attacks on Hill 965 but failed in capturing the objective. The division commander then attached this battalion to the 16th Regiment on the left, which would defend the line of outposts, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment was totally committed to offensive operations. The 3rd Battalion launched an attack with two companies abreast on August 20, but again failed. The enemy hid in shelters on the reverse slope of the hill, but they rushed out and threw grenades as soon as the friendly troops began the assault. Since the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment suffered
serious casualties without achieving its mission, the 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment took the place of the attacking unit on the 21st. As the friendly forces had already occupied Hill 1031 by that time, the division could deliver concentrated fire support to the 16th Regiment starting on the 22nd. In addition, one battalion of the 10th Regiment made a supporting flank attack on Hill 965 from Hill 1031.

On the 22nd, the 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment advanced as far as the military crest of the hill, and on the following day resumed the attack supported by the flank attack by the 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment. The battalion deployed its three companies in front and on both flanks, and without air support due to bad weather it managed to advance in the restricted maneuver space and crept steep rocky terrain into the enemy positions. Following fierce hand-to-hand combat, the battalion seized the objective, but the enemy counterattack at night made the hill fall again into the enemy’s hands. However, on the following day (the 24th) the battalion with the attached reconnaissance company attacked again and recaptured the hill with the support of the 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment, which hit the flank of the hill.

Thus, during the battle from August 18 to 24, the 8th Division completely destroyed two NK regiments and seized Hills 1031 and 965. During the battle, the 10th Regiment made military history by killing 938 and capturing 57 enemy, but also suffered casualties of 90 killed, 536 wounded, and 17 missing. The battle was evidence that victory in the battlefield could be achieved at the cost of precious blood.

With the seizure of Hill 1031 by the ROK 8th Division at dear cost, the US X Corps achieved its objective of occupation of J Ridge. The corps could use the maneuver road of the Sohwa Valley up to Ch’ormi-dong, and in fact it made it hard for the enemy to hold the east edge ridge of the Punchbowl. Later on, the 8th Division gave honorable names to Hill 1031, ‘President Hill’, and Hill 965. ‘Van
Fleet Hill.’

- The Third Nojonp’yong Battle

The 8th Division, following the second Nojonp’yong battle, established its advanced defensive position around Hills 965 and 1031 and increased the depth of the Kansas line. The enemy, on the other hand, replaced the damaged 2nd and 13th Divisions of NK III Corps with the 15th Division, built up defensive positions around Hills 802 and 854, and increased its patrolling activities.

The 8th Division commander, who had been given Hill 854 as the division objective on September 8, based on the army operational guideline of ‘the limited objective attack,’ drew up his own operational plan and secured the corps commander’s approval. This operation was to begin at 06:00 on September 10. Hill 854, which was located at a watershed of the Soyang River and a tributary of the Nam River, constituted important commanding terrain which should be secured in order to extend the defensive line up to south of the Nam River. Since the hill was commanding the northeast area of the Punchbowl, it should be seized for the protection of the north-east flank of the friendly troops fighting around the Punchbowl. Because of the important battle field, the 8th Division was given unprecedented fire support, that is, not only the artillery of the US Ist Marine Division, the division’s left adjacent unit, but also the air strike and the naval gunfire of warships supporting the division from the Eastern Sea.

By the end of August, the ROK I Corps had occupied Hills 924 and 884, north of Hill 1031, which corresponded to the top of the J Ridge, in the J Ridge battle. The 8th Division thus advanced its troops to the south of Hill 884 and occupied the terrain from which it could apply pressure on Hill 854 from both south and east. The division deployed the main forces of the 10th, 21st, and 16th Regiments along the ridge connecting Hills 751—924—1031—965—695—562, and prepared for the attack.
The division drew up an operational plan. The 21st Regiment deployed in the center would be the main attacking unit and seize Hill 854. The 10th Regiment in the north would commit one battalion, occupy No-Name Hill north of Hill 854, and block the enemy retreat route. The 21st Regiment would first capture Hill 578 south of Hill 854 before attacking it. The 16th Regiment’s two battalions would take over the defensive position from the 21st Regiment and the remaining one battalion would support the attack of the latter.

The division launched an attack at 06:00 of September 10. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment, the main attacking unit, secured Hills 578 and B (no-name), the intermediate objectives, and the 2d Battalion attacked Hill 854. The 10th Regiment, the supporting attacking unit, seized Hill A (no-name), north of Hill 854, while the 16th Regiment which had captured Hills 771 and 589 on the previous day (the 9th), secured Hill C (no-name) in the west sector and supported the main attacking unit.

Since on the first day the 21st Regiment, the main attacking unit, secured successfully the intermediate objectives while the supporting units were also in position to support the main attack to the north and south of Hill 854, on the following day the 21st Regiment committed its three battalions to attack Hill 854. The 1st Battalion launched an attack toward the left from Hill B, the 3rd Battalion toward the front from Hill 578, and the 2nd Battalion from the site where it was halted on the previous day. The ROK troops had reached near the crest of the hill, when the enemy counterattacked, and the 1st Battalion began to disperse. The regimental commander assembled the units and established a hasty defensive position around Hills B, 578, and 765.

The division commander, who estimated that one regiment was not enough to seize the hill due to the enemy’s tough resistance, was determined to commit three regiments simultaneously to the hill. On September 12, with the support of air strikes and gunfire from Task Forces 77 and 95 in the Eastern Sea,
two battalions of the 21st Regiment, the main attacking unit, launched a frontal attack abreast, while the 16th and 10th Regiments, while securing Hills A and C, each committed one battalion for the flank attack of the hill. However, in spite of an all-out offensive, the division could not overcome the enemy resistance and had to prepare for the next offensive.

On September 13-14, attacks of the same pattern were repeated. Though the troops reached near the crest of the hill, they were halted because of the enemy’s interlocking fire of automatic weapons. On September 15, the main attack was shifted to the 16th Regiment, which found the same situation. Enemy prisoners stated that the enemy committed to this battle many war veterans with the so-called ‘hero title’ to hold the hill to the last.

On the 16th, the 16th Regiment, the main attacking unit, captured the southeast crest of the six crests of Hill 854, but was pushed back by a enemy counterattack. However, the 10th Regiment, which was operating on the right flank, succeeded in capturing the east crest of Hill 854, while one of its battalions was then holding Hill A north of Hill 854.

On September 17, though the 16th Regiment halted and withdrew due to the enemy sorties from the reverse slope of the hill with hand grenades, the 10th Regiment hit hard the enemy positions with recoilless rifle fire from the position it had secured the previous day. The regiment then under the smoke screen assaulted the enemy positions led by the 2nd Company, and finally succeeded in seizing the main crest of Hill 854. On the following day (the 18th), the 21st Regiment, which had taken over the defense area of the 16th Regiment and had committed one battalion for the attack from the 15th, now committed all of its three battalions for the attack and captured the three crests located southwest of Hill 854. With the seizure of the final northern hill by the 10th Regiment, the division at last completed its mission of capturing Hill 854 after nine days of bloody battle.

The division recorded a war achievement of killing 2,157 enemy and
capturing 163 prisoners, but at the same time suffered heavy casualties of 322 killed, 1,443 wounded, and 115 missing.

Colonel Chun Bu Il (retired at the rank of lieutenant general), the then commander of the 21st Regiment, which had played the principal role in capturing Hill 854, talked later about the battle and heavy casualties as follows:

The enemy situation was not clear and we estimated the enemy force to be one battalion, but it was in fact one regiment. We did not draw up plans to attack enemy bunkers and failed in organizing strong raiding teams. In addition to that, since all the platoon leaders and first sergeants were wounded, units without leaders incurred heavy casualties.

Owing to the dear sacrifices, throughout the first, the second, and the third Nojongp’yong battle, the 8th Division could take the stem and bottom parts of the J Ridge which the corps desired to possess. With the seizure of Hill 854, the division extended its defense line up to the Nam River, and could support the operation of the main attacking unit of the corps attacking the Punchbowl. It also achieved a tactically important mission of securing the road network of the Sohwa Valley.

(2) The Battle of Bloody Ridge

The US 2nd Division, which was the center unit of the US X Corps and was defending the Kansas line, received an order to occupy Hill 983, later known as Bloody Ridge, located west of the Punchbowl, at the time when the ROK 8th Division was in attack on Hill 1031 on August 14.

The Kansas line the US 2nd Division was defending was from Changp’yong-ri to P’yongch’on, deployed the 9th Regiment around the Tumil
II. Military Pressures: Development of Position Warfare

Pass, the 38th Regiment around Piari, and the 23d Regiment on hills south of the Punchbowl. The 38th Regiment set up a patrol basis on Taeu-san with one of its battalions.

Hill 983, which was located three kilometers north from the left front of the division, was the principal crest of an eight kilometer long cross compartment ridge consisting of Hills 731—983—940—773, which ran like a crossbar across the Valleys of Mundung-ri and Sat’ae-ri. Since the terrain constituted a steep slope southward, it was advantageous for the enemy defenders, while the friendly forces were compelled to fight an up-hill battle. In addition, from Hill 983 the enemy could overlook the rear area of the division’s left front. The hill was like a dagger directed at the neck of the division. The purpose of the attack on the hill was to remove the weak point of the friendly forces’ defense line, win a foothold for future attacks, and eliminate enemy threats to the west flank of the division when it attacked the Punchbowl. Since the enemy was well aware of the tactical importance of the hill, it deployed the 1st Regiment of the 12th Division of the V Corps for the defense of the Hill 983, and the 14th Regiment of the 27th Division of the II Corps for the defense of Hills 940-773, that is, the enemy committed two divisions to hold on to the hills. The Communists not only built up hundreds of shelters, which could resist artillery fire, but also constructed fortified positions connected by covered trenches on the reverse slope. They also planted four to five thousand mines in front of their defensive positions and boasted that the defensive position was impregnable.  

- The Battle of the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division

In compliance with Van Fleet’s instruction that the ROK troops should develop faith in their own ability through combat experiences, General Clark L. Ruffner, the US 2nd Division commander, used the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division attached to his division for the attack. On August 16 Ruffner ordered
Colonel Hwang Yup, the 36th Regiment commander, to launch an attack at 06:00 on August 18 to seize Hills 983—940—773. He promised to provide the regiment with fire support of not only corps and division artillery but also air strikes and naval gunfire from the battleship Missouri warship off the east coast.

From August 15, the artillery and air support began, and on the 18th, the D-day of the attack, 126 pieces of the seven artillery battalions laid down concentrated preparation fire on the enemy positions before the 3rd Battalion on the left of the regiment and the 2nd battalion on the right began to advance toward Hill 983 and Hills 940 and 773, respectively, at 06:30.

When the attacking units had reached approximately half way to the crest, they were exposed to fierce enemy artillery fire and then came across a mine field. When enemy fire from shelters stopped the friendly troops’ advance, they immediately entered a hasty defense posture, requested fire support to suppress the enemy fire, to hit the enemy positions hard, and, at the same time, to cleared the mines along the avenue of approach. In the evening, no less than 200 pieces of artillery delivered concentrated fire on the four kilometer wide attacking front, making a record of committing 50 pieces of artillery to every kilometer of the frontline.67)

Due to the bombardment throughout the night, the hill changed characters as broken trees, shattered rocks, and small hills were transformed into flat ground. The enemy shelters were stripped of their camouflage, but the friendly troops were also exposed during the movement.

At dawn on the second day, the friendly forces resumed their attacks. They suppressed the enemy outpost shelters exposed due to bombardment, passed through the demolished mine field, and approached the enemy defensive positions, but when the artillery fire shifted, the enemy who had been waiting in covered trenches on the reverse slope moved quickly into forward positions and resisted stubbornly. The regimental commander, who surmised that it would be
The attack on Bloody Ridge by the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division
difficult to capture the objectives at the same time, decided to capture Hills 940 and 773 first, moved the 1st Battalion in reserve into the right front of the regiment, ordering it to quickly occupy those hills under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion commander.

After the consultation, the commanders of both battalions decided to form teams composed of two companies and ordered the 6th and 7th Companies in the center to attack Hill 940; the 1st and 3rd Companies on the left, Hill 747; and the 2nd and 5th Companies on the right, Hill 773. The 2nd Company which formed an infantry-armor combined team with one platoon of B Company of the US 72nd Tank Battalion, advanced to the Piari Valley and secured a foothold around Piduk Hill for the attack on Hill 773. During the night in the rain, a commando unit from the 5th Company passed around Piduk Hill, which the 2nd Company had secured, moved onto the adverse slope of Hill 773, and assaulted the enemy, throwing hand grenades, under the support of the 2nd Company. At this time the 5th Company(-) concurrently made a frontal attack on the hill together with the 2nd Company, and the companies secured Hill 773 at 02:00 on the 20th, driving off the surprised and terror-stricken enemy.

Encouraged by the seizing of Hill 773, the 1st and 2nd Battalions(-) each organized a team composed of two companies, and the teams launched attacks on Hill 940 from the south and southwest. The teams reached near the crest, but were forced to pull back since they could not suppress the enemy attack, which used both automatic weapons and hand grenades. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion, which had captured the intermediate objective (Hill 731) the previous day, committed the 11th Company in reserve toward the right flank of the enemy and continued the attack on Suri-bong. On the evening of the 21st, the 2nd Battalion commander committed five companies for a simultaneous attack on Hill 940 from three different directions: the south, southwest, and southeast ridges. The 5th Company was left defending Hill 773. Of the assault units, the 6th Company, attacking from the
south, succeeded in dashing into the enemy positions first and was followed by the other companies. At 20:00, the 6th Company finally secured the crest of Hill 940. When it gained the hill, the remaining strength of the company was not more than 20.

On the third day, the 3rd Battalion committed even the reserve company and attacked Hill 983, the main crest, with three companies abreast but could not even reach the assault line. During the night of the 21st, however, the 11th Company swung around Hill 940, which the 2nd Battalion had secured, and at dawn on the 22nd occupied a hill located between Hills 940 and 983 and began to secretly send troops to the reverse slope of Hill 983. Taking advantage of the intervals between supporting fires and shift of fire, the company sent troops in small groups and finally succeeded in infiltrating two squads into the rear of the enemy. The enemy, which was totally occupied with forward defense during the shift of fire, paid little attention to the reverse slope, which was steep and constituted a dead space.

The company commander instructed his men, who had infiltrated into the enemy rear, to attack the hill but to maintain covert activities and not to fire unless enemy troops showed up. At last, the company troops reached the crest of the hill, but the enemy was still totally occupied with the defense of the forward slope. The company, which occupied the hill, shouted loudly “Long live the Republic of Korea.” Surprised by the shouting, the enemy ran toward the flank, and the company finally seized Hill 983 at 11:30 on the 22nd without firing a shot or losing a man. It was the sixth day after the 3rd Battalion had begun the attack.68 The other companies of the 3rd Battalion climbed up, joined the troops around the crest of the hill, and completed the reorganization. Thus, the 36th Regiment completely captured Bloody Ridge and deployed the 3rd Battalion on Hill 983, the 2nd Battalion on Hill 940, and the 1st Battalion on Hill 773, and strengthened their defensive positions against the enemy counterattacks. During the night, the
enemy attempted its first counterattack against Hill 983, but the 3rd Battalion pushed back the counterattack, which lasted until the following day. In order to strengthen the defensive positions of the hills and to eliminate the enemy foothold for its counterattack, the regiment attempted to occupy three hills north of Bloody Ridge. However, it was beyond the regiment’s capability as it had already suffered heavy losses.

At 02:00 on the 26th, Hill 983 was encircled by fresh enemy troops of the 13th Regiment of the 6th Division, which had been in corps reserve. The 3rd Battalion formed a perimeter defense and conducted hand-to-hand fighting, slowly moving back toward the crest, but being unable to withstand the enemy attacks in wave, the battalion retreated from the hill. In short, the battalion gave up the hill, which it had secured with great difficulty. At this time, the 2nd and 1st Battalions were also narrowly holding Hills 940 and 773 against enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion, which had been pushed back from Hill 983, assembled its troops and attempted in vain to recapture the hill.

Around this time, since the US troops had already advanced toward the left flank of Hill 983, the regimental commander decided to withdraw the 3rd Battalion to Hill 940, where it joined with the 2nd Battalion to defend the hill. Thus, on the afternoon of the 26th, Hill 983 fell completely into the hands of the enemy, and the 36th Regiment’s primary concern was to defend Hills 940 and 773. As the situation of the 36th Regiment deteriorated, at 11:00 on the 26th, the US 2nd Infantry Division commander ordered the US 9th Infantry Regiment defending the Kansas line to support the 36th Regiment, and its 2nd Battalion moved to Hill 940 during the night.

The US 2nd Division commander gave the mission of capturing Hill 983 to the 9th Regiment commander in cooperation with the 36th Regiment commander. The 2nd Battalion(-) of the 9th Regiment was preparing for the counterattack when the enemy mounted an attack first on the morning of August 27. The enemy
attacked the 1st Battalion on Hill 773 and at the same time hit Hill 940 from two
directions, from Hill 983 and the front. After the 36th Regiment beat off the
enemy, the 2nd Battalion(-) of the US 9th Regiment began a counterattack to
recapture Hill 983 in the afternoon. The battalion moved forward under artillery
supporting fire and conducted assaults several times, but the increasing casualties
forced the battalion to withdraw to Hill 940. To make the situation worse, the
enemy attacked Hills 940 and 773, and the friendly troops, who could not resist
the repeated enemy attacks throughout the night, were forced to give up those two
hills, which again fell into the hands of the enemy. This meant that the friendly
forces had lost Bloody Ridge five days after they had seized it. A witness from the
2nd Battalion of US 9th Regiment, who took part in the night combat on the 27th,
said that when the 36th Regiment troops were pushed back, they became inter-
ingled with the attacking NK troops and the former retreated in confusion and
panic in which no one could distinguish one Korean army from the others.

- The Battle of the US 2nd Division

In order to recapture Bloody Ridge, the US 2nd Division commander
requested that the ROK 5th Division commander relieve the 36th Regiment,
which was weakened by heavy loss. He then gave the US 9th and newly replaced
ROK 35th Regiments the mission of seizing Hills 940 and 773, respectively. The
H-hour was 09:00 on August 28.

The 35th Regiment mounted an attack at H-hour and captured Hill 773,
which the enemy retook by night counterattack, and the regiment regained it in a
daylight attack on the following day. The US 9th Regiment which attacked Hill
940 on the 28th, was unable to capture it.

On August 28 complying with the corps commander’s policy of broad-
ening the attack, the ROK 5th Division and the US 1st Marine Division in corps
reserve were committed to the frontline. This new policy, which was carried out
from the end of August to the beginning of September, brought about a significant change in the operations and definitively influenced the battle of Bloody Ridge.

To the west of Bloody Ridge the ROK 7th Division captured Hills 901 and 554 on September 2, while to the east of it the ROK 5th Division, which had advanced to the south of the Punchbowl, occupied Sohui-ryong northeast of Kach’il-bong on September 3, took over Kach’il-bong from the US 38th Regiment, and attacked Hill 1211 northwest of it.

Around this time, to the east of the 9th Regiment, the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division was operating. The latter, which was occupying Taeu-san, captured Kach’il-bong, then handed it over to the ROK 5th Division, and seized Hills 666 and 752 at Chin-gogae in the rear of Bloody Ridge. Thus the regiment cut off the enemy reinforcement route to Bloody Ridge from the Piari–Sat’ae-ri Valley. To the west of the 9th Regiment, the 23d Regiment was committed, and it captured Hill 855 north of Hill 983 and south of Tut’ayon on September 5 and completely blocked the enemy reinforcement to Bloody Ridge from Mundung-ri.

While the friendly forces pushed forward to the rear of Bloody Ridge both on the right and left sides, the 9th Regiment continued its attack, recaptured Hill 773 on September 3, and Hill 940 on the following day, and finally occupied Hill 983 (Suri-bong) on September 5.

In fact, when friendly forces reached Hills 940 and 983, the enemy had deserted the hills, and the former occupied the hills without opposition. It was presumed that the enemy had withdrawn from the hills during the night on the 3rd and 5th since the enemy not only suffered heavy casualties in the later battles but also lost to the friendly forces such critical terrain as Tut’ayon and Chin-gogae on both the right and left of Bloody Ridge. Therefore, they were in danger of being encircled with no hope of reinforcement.

As described earlier, the battle of Bloody Ridge, which began on August 18, 1951, ended on September 5, when the 9th Regiment captured Bloody Ridge
(Hills 983-940-773) after a bloody 18-day battle in which the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and then the 9th Regiment of the US 2nd Division were committed, while the adjacent units put pressure on the enemy.

The casualties resulting from the battle were enormous as the name of the ridge implied. Friendly forces suffered 326 killed, 2,032 wounded, and 414 missing, totaling 2,722 casualties, which amounted to the strength of one regiment. Out of the total, the ROK 36th Regiment suffered 132 killed, 816 wounded, and 122 missing, totaling 1,070 men; thus the US forces suffered greater losses than the ROK forces. The enemy’s casualties were presumed to reach more than 15,000 men.\(^69^1\)

This battle was an attack against fortified positions, which had been strongly built up during the previous three months when the frontline was relatively calm. In addition, since the enemy was determined to resist, disregarding its
casualties and refusing to give up even an inch of terrain, the battle became a ground of testifying the fighting will of both sides and brought about enormous casualties.

Colonel Hwang Yup, who then commanded the 36th Regiment, later recalled the tragedy of the battle as follows:

In spite of the supporting fire of the US artillery, many of the enemy’s fortified bunkers were not destroyed, and we were often obliged to rely on human bombs. We suffered more than 1,000 casualties in this battle because of the mine field and close combat. We had to conduct bitter close combat in spite of the fierce friendly bombardment that left hardly any trees or grass on the ground. The gruesome battle continued and the valleys were filled with human blood.\(^{70}\)

On the other hand, Chung Ch’ang Ho, the commander of the 11th Company of the 36th Regiment, which had captured Hill 983 without bloodshed, pointed out that it was essential not to stage passing attacks or piecemeal attacks, but to infiltrate troops from a new and unexpected direction and achieve a surprise attack. Stressing the importance of attacking from a new direction, he expressed hope that the battle would serve as a lesson of bloodless occupation of an invincible fortification.\(^{71}\)

(3) The Battle of the Punchbowl

In August 1951, when the US 2nd Division was fighting an up-hill battle at Bloody Ridge without much progress, the corps commander analyzed the reason for failure allowing the enemy to concentrate its combat power on the ridge. Therefore, he decided to broaden the battle zone and to press the enemy in the
entire corps area in order to cut off the enemy reinforcement to the ridge and to dissipate the enemy’s concentrated fire power. Based on this policy, he set up an operational phase line, Line Hays, which connected Paktal-gogae—Kach’il-bong—Sohui-dong—Songnae-dong, the hills located north of the Punchbowl and about ten kilometers north of the frontline. He then committed the ROK 5th Division and US 1st Marine Division from corps reserve to the frontline and, on August 31, he assigned to each division its objective. The US 1st Marine Division was ordered to attack the Punchbowl while the ROK 5th Division and 8th Division were to attack abreast on the west and east, respectively, with the Marine division.

Receiving the warning order, the US 1st Marine Division (the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached) moved from Hongch’on to P’yongch’on on the 28th, took over a part of the defense areas of the US 2nd and ROK 8th Divisions, and advanced forward to the Kansas line extending from Mandaeri to P’yongch’on, south of the Punchbowl. The division then deployed the ROK 1st and US 7th Marine Regiments to the frontline for the attack and held the remaining two Marine regiments in reserve. The ROK 1st Marine Regiment, which in turn deployed the 1st and 2nd Battalions along ridges south of the Punchbowl and kept the 3d Battalion in reserve, prepared for the attack, performing the mission of defense at the same time.

• The First Phase Operations

The objectives the corps assigned to the division were Hills 1026 and 924 located on the cross compartment ridge north of the Punchbowl and Hills 702-660 northeast of it. Among the division objectives, Hills 1026 and 924 were given to the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and the remaining hills to the US 7th Marine Regiment. The operation plan of the Marine division was that while a part of the troops of Line Kansas attacked the objectives on the phase line, the rest of
The attack on the Punchbowl by the ROK 1st Marine Regiment
the troops would continue to defend the main line of resistance. Around this time the enemy also carried out unit relief: the NK III Corps took over the area of the II Corps and deployed its 1st Division along the defense line north of the Punchbowl.

Receiving the order to capture Hills 1026 and 924, objective 3, Colonel Kim Dae Shik, the 1st Marine Regiment commander, took over the defensive positions south of the Punchbowl on August 30, and issued the following operation order:

The regiment would launch an attack at 06:00 on the 31st to capture Objective 3. The 1st Battalion would seize Hill 1026, and the 3d Battalion, after occupying Hill 924, would support the attack of the 1st Battalion.

Since the space for maneuvering was limited along the ridge extending eastward from the Punchbowl, the commander instructed the 3rd Battalion to lead the attack and occupy Hill 924, while the 1st Battalion, following after the 3rd Battalion, would pass over Hill 924 and attack Hill 1026. According to this plan, the 3rd Battalion, on the day prior to the attack, moved to Hill 793 located about half way to the objective and forwarded an outpost company at Wolsan-ryong to prepare for the attack. The US 7th Marine Regiment on the right front, on the other hand, planned to launch an attack with two battalions abreast; the 3rd Battalion on the left would advance along the extreme east ridge of the Punchbowl to occupy Hill 702, while the 1st Battalion would move along the valley of the Soyang River and seize Hills 516 and 660.

On August 31, 1951, the 3rd Battalion of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment departed Hill 793, joined the outpost company at Wolsan-ryong, and launched an attack against Hill 924. The battalion was within one kilometer of the objective when it met with not only stubborn enemy resistance but also a minefield, and its
advance halted. On this day Colonel Kim, the regimental commander, who was visiting his company, was injured by a mine explosion and was evacuated. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Dong Ha, the Vice Commander took over the command, pulled back the unit to Hill 793 and prepared for an attack on the following day. The US Marine regiment also met stubborn enemy resistance; the 3rd Battalion on the left halted due to strong enemy opposition and a mine field, but the 1st Battalion on the right succeeded in occupying Objective 1, Hills 516-660. On the following day, September 1, the 3rd Battalion resumed the attack on Hill 702 at 09:00, pushed back the strong enemy resistance from fortified bunkers and, following hand-to-hand fighting, seized Hill 702 at 10:55. On the third day of the attack, the battalion captured Hill 602 in front of Hill 702 and occupied the division objectives.

After the US Marine battalion on the right captured Hill 702 on September 1, the ROK Marine regiment drew up a plan to pass through the battalion’s operational area and launch a surprise attack on Hill 924 from the enemy’s flank and rear. However, the enemy resistance in the rear and on the flank was stronger than expected, and fierce combat continued. The regimental commander ordered the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion deployed at Wolsan-ryong to make a frontal attack passing the 10th Company. However, the 1st Company also faced a difficult situation due to stubborn enemy resistance and a mine field. The company organized a raiding unit, which was equipped with flame-throwers for the first time, and when it calmed the enemy machinegun bunkers with the flame-throwers, the troops assaulted the enemy at the same time and occupied Hill 924. The hill, however, fell again into enemy hands as the company, which had suffered heavy losses, was unable to drive off the enemy counterattack.

When the ROK Marine regiment was delayed in achieving its mission, the US 1st Marine Division commander instructed the US 5th Marine Regiment to take over the mission of defending Line Kansas from the ROK 2nd Marine
Battalion so that the latter could join in the attack. On September 2, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment(-), under fire support of artillery and air, launched an attack with the 3rd Marine Battalion (the 9th Company) and 1st Marine Battalion (the 3rd Company) abreast. They passed through a mine field, launched an assault on the enemy positions and at last captured Hill 924. The enemy appeared to have suffered heavy losses from the friendly supporting fire and the attack by the 1st Company. The 3rd Battalion turned over the mission of defense of Hill 924 to the newly committed 2nd Marine Battalion, became reserve, and began reorganization at Wolsan-ryong. On the other hand, the 1st Marine Battalion was to support the 2nd Marine Battalion from Hill 924 when the latter attacked Hill 1026.

On the following day (September 3), in order to increase the combat power of the attacking unit on Hill 1026, the division commander readjusted the boundary so that Hill 924 would be included in the sector of the US 7th Marine Regiment. The ROK 2nd Marine Battalion, which was designated as the attacking unit, repulsed the enemy counterattack on Hill 924 at dawn and launched an attack at 08:00 under the support of artillery and air strikes. The troops advanced as far as 100 meters from the objective, but the increasing casualties resulting from the enemy automatic weapon firing and grenade throwing halted the battalion’s advance. Then the 5th Company, which followed the attacking company, was committed. A rifleman of the 2nd Platoon crept forward, threw a grenade into the automatic weapons bunker, and silenced it. At that moment, the 1st Platoon leader, Lieutenant Son Jin Ch’on, who had led the assaulting team and was already injured in over 50 places from grenade fragments, was determined not to move back before securing the objective. He stood up, raised his bloody right hand, and shouted: ‘the 1st platoon, assault.’ This served as a booster to the men of the platoon, who assaulted, and then the company men joined in the assault. Hill 1026 was thus finally secured.

The 2nd Company pursued the fleeing enemy and even occupied Hill
1055 located some 700m northward. With all these operations completed, the regiment accomplished its mission of securing its objectives. The ROK and US Marine regiments succeeded in securing the Punchbowl after seizing the hill mass north and east of it, but suffered heavy losses. In this operation, since the terrain provided no maneuvering space for frontal attacks, the ROK Marine regiment was obliged to swing around to make a flank attack in a narrow space but captured Hills 1026 (Hill Mao) and 924 (Hill Kim Il Sung), the most important hills in securing the Punchbowl, and honored the name of the ROK Forces.

- The Second Phase Operation

After this battle to secure the Punchbowl, the NK 1st Division, which had been deployed north of the Punchbowl, moved back to Kanmu-bong and deployed the 14th Regiment to build up new defensive positions along Hills 1052-812-749, which extended eastward from Kanmu-bong, while its shattered 3rd Regiment became reserve. In compliance with the limited objective attack policy issued on September 8, the 1st Marine Division resumed an offensive to occupy Hill 749 located on the ridge extending from Kanmu-bong toward the division sector. The hill was tactically important as it could hold in check the enemy around Kanmu-bong and also block the enemy attacks on the Punchbowl.

The division, which had completed the 1st phase operation, and undergone organizational maintenance, resumed its offensive operation. Following repeated fierce battles from September 11 to 20, the division captured Hill 749 and even Hill 812 located some five kilometers north of the Punchbowl. With the occupation of Hill 812 the division completely secured the Punchbowl, and the Punchbowl operation was concluded when the division received another mission from the corps.

Of note in this battle was an emergent air transportation operation conducted by the US Marine 161st Transport Helicopter Squadron on September 13,
1951. The operation, which was named Wind Mill, transported 18,848 pounds of supplies to the battlefield and evacuated the 74 wounded. The same kind of operation was conducted again on September 19, and they were the first helicopter transportation operations ever conducted.

In attacking the Punchbowl, the US Marine division and ROK Marine regiment maneuvered along the road passing the extreme east edge of the Punchbowl and that of the Sohwa Valley. This operation by the Marine division was possible because the adjacent divisions on both sides of the Punchbowl attacked abreast and protected the flanks of the Marine division, and, in particular, because the ROK 8th Division had secured the Sohwa Valley road and ‘J Ridge’ to the east of it in the Nojongp’yon battle.

(4) The Battle of the Kach’il-bong Area

According to the corps commander’s new operational plan, the ROK 5th Division, which had been in corps reserve, was committed to the frontline together with the US 1st Marine Division, and deployed on the left part of Line Kansas south of the Punchbowl on August 28.

Brigadier General Min Ki Shik, the division commander, who took over the Tosol-san—Mandae-ri areas south of the Punchbowl from the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division, deployed the 35th Regiment on the left and 27th Regiment on the right. The 36th Regiment, which had taken part in the battle of Bloody Ridge, became division reserve and entered reorganization at Ch’ang-ri. The division commander, who received the order that at 06:00 on August 29, directed the division to attack the assigned objective (from the ridge northeast of Kach’il-bong to Sohui-ryong) located on the corps phase line, Line Hays. He gave the mission of attack to the 27th Regiment, while the 35th Regiment was instructed to defend the Kansas line and was redeployed for the defense mission.
Battle of the Kach'il-bong
• Advance to Kach’Il-bong—Sohui-ryong

Complying with the order, the 27th Regiment launched an attack at 06:00 on August 29. In close coordination with the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division on its left, the 27th Regiment passed across the hills west of the Punchbowl, occupied successively Hill 792-Oyu-ri-Sangp’yong-Kaeraedok and, on September 3, seized the northeast ridge of Kach’Il-bong and Sohui-ryong, the division objective. On the following day (September 4) due to the readjustment of the boundary with the adjacent US 2nd Division, the ROK 5th Division’s sector was extended two kilometers westward, and the division took over Kach’Il-bong (Hill 1243) from the US 38th Regiment. The division then received the order to attack Hill 1211, located 1.3 kilometers northwest of Hill 1243.

At that time, the Punchbowl was defended by the NK II Corps. Since its east flank was threatened due to an attack on the J Ridge by the ROK 8th Division of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps, the NK II Corps transferred the mission of defense of the east flank to the NK III Corps and concentrated its efforts on the defense of the west flank of the Punchbowl. The 32d Regiment of the NK 27th Division, which had been deployed in front of the ROK 5th Division, retreated after suffering heavy damage inflicted by the US 38th and ROK 27th Regiments and was replaced by the NK 7th Regiment, which built up new defensive positions on Hill 1211.

Hill 1211, the division objective, was one of the hills located on the ridge composed of Taeu-san—Kach’Il-bong—Mae-bong (Hill 1290) and was commanding terrain, which stood aloft in the northwest facing Kach’Il-bong across a big valley. The hill not only overlooked the division defensive positions of Line Hays, but also threatened the east flanks of Bloody Ridge and Hill 931 (later named Heartbreak Ridge) north of it. Therefore, seizing the hill meant completion of the securing of the Punchbowl and the support of the US 2nd Division.
The Attack by the 27th Regiment (September 5-16): The First Seizure of Hill 1211

Upon receiving the order to capture Hill 1211 on September 4, the ROK 5th Division commander, after analyzing the situation, gave the mission to the 27th Regiment, which was then occupying Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong.

The regimental commander, in turn, ordered the 3rd Battalion in reserve to launch an attack at 08:00 on September 5 under the support of the 1st and 2d Battalions deployed at Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong. On the other hand, the 36th Regiment in division reserve advanced as far as Kolmal and was ready to support the 27th Regiment in attack. However, since the 27th Regiment’s attack was halted due to the enemy resistance, the division commander instructed the 35th Regiment in defense of the Kansas line to move forward to Line Hays, leaving one battalion for the defense of the Kansas line. The 27th Regiment and 35th Regiment(-) was ordered to organize defensive positions along Line Hays. At the same time the 27th Regiment on the right was to launch one battalion in an attack on Hill 1211, while one battalion of the 35th Regiment on the left was to occupy Hill ‘A’, one-half kilometer south-west of Hill 1211 to support the 27th Regiment’s attack on Hill 1211.

The division, which had completed deployment of its units according to the plan, launched an attack at 05:00 on September 9. The 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment swung around toward the northeast ridge of Hill 1211 at dawn, and its 5th Company assaulted the hill, supported by the 6th Company, and seized the crest of the hill at 16:15. The battalion pursued the fleeing enemy in the northwest direction of Hill 1211 under the support of the 1st Battalion of the 35th Regiment. The battalion, however, soon found itself in danger of being encircled by the counterattacking enemy, managed to penetrate the enemy encirclement, and set up hasty defensive positions on Hill 1211, but it was again pushed back to the south-west ridge and Kach’il-bong, where the battalion held its troops under control.
Attack plan of Hill 1211
When the 7th Regiment of the NK 27th Division was routed from Hill 1211, the enemy committed the 23rd Regiment of the NK 13th Division and mounted pressure upon the ROK 5th Division. The 5th Division commander immediately moved a battalion of the 35th Regiment, which was defending Line Kansas to Line Hays to strengthen its defense, while a battalion of the 36th Regiment in division reserve took over the defense of Kansas. In order to expedite the building up of the defensive position, one engineer company of the division was attached to each of the two regiments deployed around Kach’il-bong. On September 13 when the ROK 5th Division strengthened defensive positions around Kach’il-bong and was preparing for an attack, the enemy replaced the 13th Division with the 2nd Division, which deployed the 17th Regiment on Hills 1052-1211, the 4th Regiment on Mae-bong (Hill 1290), and the 6th Regiment at Sohwa-ri to increase the depth of the defense and bolster the defensive power in the vicinity of Hill 1211.

In order to capture Hill 1211 before it would be further strengthened by the enemy, the 5th Division commander ordered the 27th Regiment to turn over the defense mission of the right half of Kach’il-bong to the 35th Regiment and to attack Hill 1211 with its three battalions.

With the shift of the artillery fire, the 27th Regiment launched an all-out attack at 04:00 on September 16. The plan was that its 1st Battalion would first seize No-Name Hill located northwest of Hill 1211 and then attack Hill 1211 in cooperation with the 2nd Battalion which would attack the hill from the south and east. The 3rd Battalion would be in reserve. This offensive, however, ended in failure, and the regiment withdrew to the line connecting Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong without even seizing No-Name Hill ‘C’, 0.8 kilometers northwest, or No-Name Hill ‘B’, 0.7 kilometers southeast of Hill 1211.
• The Attack by the 35th Regiment (September 17-19)

The division commander, who decided to relieve the attacking unit, designated the 35th Regiment to attack the hill while the 27th Regiment, which until that time had been the attacking unit, was instructed to defend Line Hays together with the 3rd Battalion of the 36th Regiment.

At 12:00 on September 17, the 35th Regiment launched an attack led by the 2nd Battalion under the support of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. The 2nd Battalion committed its major force to attack Hill 1211 from the south while one company was directed to advance toward No-Name Hill ‘B’. However, this attack also ended in failure, and the units returned to the initial place. On the following day, the 1st Battalion attacked No-Name Hill ‘B’ while the 2nd Battalion launched an offensive to Hill 1211 from the south under the support of the 3rd Battalion. Though several assaults were conducted, they were not successful. During that night one company of the 3rd Battalion, which was designated as an assault unit, moved between No-Name Hill B and Hill 1211 and hit the enemy on the east flank of Hill 1211. Seizing the opportunity, the other two battalions launched the third attack at the same time, but that attack also failed.

Since the objective was not secured in spite of the fact that two regiments were committed one after another, the division commander decided to commit the 36th Regiment in division reserve and made necessary deployment of his units. On the 19th while the 35th Regiment was continuing the attack of Hill 1211, the 36th Regiment moved forward and took over the mission of defense of Line Hays from the 27th Regiment, which in turn withdrew for both the defense of Line Kansas and organizational maintenance.

The 35th Regiment again committed the 1st and 2d Battalions for the attack on No-Name Hill B and Hill 1211, but faced with strong enemy resistance, the battalions repeated the same pattern of halting, withdrawing, and hastily building up a defensive position. Since the enemy’s strong points were not destroyed
The regimental commander and his staff officers discuss the operations at Kach’il-bong

by the division’s organic weapons, such as 105 mm howitzers, and 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles, and since the method of attacking the enemy positions with hand grenades only increased casualties, the division commander asked for corps commander for air strikes against the enemy positions. Immediately, three flights of fighter-bombers flew over and bombarded the objective, making it look like an erupting volcano. With high morale, the 2nd Battalion troops attacked Hill 1211, advanced close to the enemy positions, and made an assault on them. The enemy, however, craftily used the terrain, and in spite of the air bombardment, the enemy’s intensive fire continued amid the smoke. Again the 2nd Battalion’s attack was halted. The 1st Battalion’s attack on No-Name Hill ‘B’ also ended in failure.

* The Attacks by the 35th and 36th Regiments (September 20–22)

On the 20th, the division commander ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment to move to the right front of Line Hays and to defend Kach’il-
bong-Sohui-ryong along with the 3rd Battalion of the 36th Regiment on the left front. He planned to attack the objective with the 35th and 36th Regiments from both the south and north.

On the same day the 35th Regiment attacked the hill from the south, while the 36th Regiment(-) swung around and attacked it from the northeast. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 35th Regiment assaulted the enemy position with the support of the 1st Battalion but were unable to penetrate through the enemy planned fires. The 36th Regiment, on the other hand, ordered the 1st Battalion to move around the northern ridge of Hill 1211, first occupy No-Name Hill ‘C’ and then attack the objective. The 2nd Battalion was to swing around the northeast ridge of Kach’il-bong, occupy the saddle between Hill 1211 and No-Name Hill ‘B’, and then attack the objective. However, both battalions failed in producing a breakthrough of the enemy positions, even though they continued the attack until the 21st. On the same day, the 35th Regiment relieved the attacking units; the 2nd Battalion was to attack Hill 1211, and the 1st Battalion No-Name Hill ‘B’. The 3rd Battalion supported the 2nd Battalion, the main attack force, even though the former was raided by the friendly aircraft by error while moving toward the southwest ridge of the objective. However, the operation of the 2nd Battalion again ended in failure.

On September 22, the division commander, following the corps commander’s guidance, tentatively suspended the operation. He redeployed his units and strengthened his combat power for the new offensive while carrying out the mission of the defense of the Kansas line. According to the division’s new plan, the 27th Regiment(-), which moved to the right front, and the 36th Regiment on the left front carried out the defense of Line Hays, while the 35th Regiment withdrew to Unch’on on the following day and became division reserve.
• The Offensive by the 35th Regiment (September 28)

When the division was undergoing its reorganization for a new offensive, on September 26, the US 2nd Division, which had suffered enormous losses at the Heartbreak Ridge battle, temporarily suspended its offensive and was exploring a new course of action. In short, the full attention of the corps was directed to this area. The corps commander asked the ROK 5th Division commander to seize Hill 1211 by whatever means necessary in order to remove the enemy threat from the east flank, which was one of the factors that made the operation of Heartbreak Ridge difficult.

The division commander planned that the 35th Regiment in division reserve, which had been engaged in organizational maintenance for five days, would launch an offensive at 10:00 on September 28. In keeping with the division commander’s request, at H-one hour six flights of fighter bombers hit the vicinity of Hill 1211 hard for 30 minutes and was followed by corps and division artillery support fire before the regiment began the attack.

The 35th Regiment, which was familiar with the terrain of Hill 1211, gave a number to each of the seven hills stretching toward the southwest, southeast, and northwest from the crest of Hill 1211. The regimental commander’s scheme of maneuver was that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions would attack the objective; the 2nd Battalion on the left would advance along the southwest ridge to Hill 1211 and secure its northwest ridge while the 3rd Battalion on the right would advance along the southeast ridge to Hill 1211 and then occupy its northwest ridge in order to block the enemy counterattack. The 1st Battalion in reserve occupied No-Name Hill behind the 2nd Battalion and was prepared to provide support.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 35th Regiment advanced across the valley and followed the southwest and southeast ridges, respectively, but the enemy resistance was strong. They again requested air support, and the 1st Battalion in reserve and the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment joined in the
attack on the right and left fronts. This attempt again was not able to break through the enemy defense line. On the following day, the 29th, the 1st Battalion was committed to the southwest ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved west of it and all three of the battalions conducted a night attack. Making maximum use of support fire, a special task force led directly by a battalion commander was committed, but in face of the enemy’s automatic weapons and hand grenades, no advance was made except that No-Name Hill ‘A’ was temporarily secured by the friendly troops.

At 01:00 on September 30, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions began a night attack along the southwest ridge and along the southeast ridge of the objective, respectively, and at one time they occupied a hill not more that 300 to 400 meters away from the objective, but again failed in seizing the final objective. However, it was learned from enemy prisoners that the combat power of the 17th Regiment of the NK 2nd Division opposing the regiment was so reduced that it was to be relieved by the 4th Regiment on the following day.

- The Division’s All-out Offensive (October 1–2) and the Second Occupation of Hill 1211

The division commander made up his mind that he would commit all of the division’s forces at a time to capture the objective, taking advantage of the vulnerable time of an enemy unit in a relief. The division commander’s plan of maneuver was that while the 35th Regiment on the left would commit one battalion to check the enemy flank threat from Hill 1052, the other two battalions would attack No-Name Hill ‘C’ on the northwest ridge of Hill 1211, the 36th Regiment on the right would defend Line Hays with one battalion, while the other two battalions would attack Hill 1211 on the right of the 35th Regiment, and the 27th Regiment would commit one battalion to seize No-Name Hill ‘B’ on the southeast ridge of Hill 1211 and support the 36th Regiment in attack.
It was planned that at 11:00 of October 1, the 36th Regiment would commit the 3rd Battalion along the southwest ridge of Hill 1211, while the 2nd Battalion was to support the 27th Regiment attacking No-Name Hill ‘B’ and, in due time, it would join in the attack on Hill 1211 along its east ridge.

Following the artillery support fire, the 3rd Battalion crossed the valley west of Kach’il-bong. At first the 11th and 10th Companies attacked abreast, but as the enemy threat to the flank increased, the battalion commander instructed the 9th and 10th Companies to secure the flank and committed the 11th Company for a frontal attack. The 11th Company led by Lieutenant Chung Ch’ang Ho, the company commander, had reached 50 meters from the enemy position when the latter intensified firing of automatic weapons and throwing of hand grenades.

The 11th Company commander instructed Sergeant Kang, the 1st Platoon leader, to pretend to be readying an assault on the enemy from the front at any moment to fix the enemy and to set up machine guns on the right and left to prevent the enemy from moving to the reverse slope of the hill. The company at the same time fired 60mm mortars toward the enemy rear to cut off enemy reinforcement. When the mortar firing was lifted, the company commander himself led the 3d Platoon and swiftly moved to the reverse slope of the hill. The enemy, which took cover during the mortar firing, realized that the friendly forces had already gotten to the reverse slope, and hastily began to move toward the reverse slope. Without missing this opportunity, Sergeant Kang’s platoon assaulted and instantly got into the enemy positions. The enemy fled in surprise. The company commander and the 3d Platoon troops joined in the assault and secured the crest of Hill 1211. It was around 17:40 on October 1. Sergeant Ko Dae Yong, mortar section leader, continued to fire mortars at the fleeing enemy\(^74\), and soon the 9th and 10th Companies arrived at the hill where they reorganized to prepare against enemy counterattack.

On the same day, the 35th Regiment, which had occupied the southwest
ridge of Hill 1211, also captured No-Name Hill ‘C’ on the northwest ridge, taking advantage of the confusion in the enemy ranks caused by the 36th Regiment’s attack on Hill 1211. Around 07:00 on the following day, however, in the dense fog the enemy counterattack began and the defense position of Hill 1211 was penetrated. Faced with the danger of being encircled, the 3rd Battalion of the 36th Regiment withdrew, abandoning the hill, which had been secured with great difficulty. The 36th Regiment under the support of the division attempted to recapture the hill, but failed.

Around this time on October 3, the division took over the sector of the US 38th Regiment, and since its operational area was thus expanded, it temporarily suspended the attack and redeployed its units. The 35th Regiment on the left of the division deployed along Line Hays from Paktal-gogae to the south ridge of Kach’il-bong, including the former sector of the US 38th Regiment, and opposed the enemy deployed on Hills 841-1052. The 27th Regiment on the right also expanded its areas of responsibility to the southwest ridge of Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong. The 36th Regiment, which was assembled south of Kach’il-bong, the center of the division sector, engaged in maintenance and defended Kach’il-bong at the same time.

- The Offensive by the 27th Regiment (October 8-9) and the Third Occupation of Hill 1211.

Around this time, the enemy in front of the division increased its activities. While reconstructing the damaged shelters of Hill 1211, it infiltrated its reconnaissance units clad in ROK uniforms up to Taeu-san and even captured friendly soldiers. Faced with this situation, the division commander instructed the 36th Regiment to assume the defense of the right front of the division, transferred the 27th Regiment to division reserve and ordered it to prepare for the attack on Hill 1211.
On October 8 the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment launched a frontal attack and the 1st Battalion rushed along the southeast ridge, followed by the 2nd Battalion, while one battalion from each of the 35th and 36th Regiments made a supporting attack along the southwest and southeast ridges of Hill 1211. Following supporting fire, the regiment fired 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles on the enemy positions while its troops began maneuvering. As the 3rd Battalion, the frontal attacking unit, approached the objective, the enemy fire poured on the unit, but threatened by the friendly forces attacking on both ridges, the enemy was compelled to dissipate its fire. Seizing this opportunity, the 3rd Battalion concentrated its attack on the vulnerable enemy positions. Evading the enemy loopholes, the troops dashed into the enemy positions and seized Hill 1211 for the third time.

However, the 1st Battalion and even the 2nd Battalion, which conducted a passing attack through the 1st Battalion, were both halted along the way and unable to reach Hill 1211. Hence, though the 3rd Battalion captured the hill, it was, in fact, encircled by the enemy. The enemy immediately began a counterattack; following the concentrated artillery fire, the main force of the NK 4th Regiment, which had been routed, attacked the hill under the support of the NK 17th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion built up a perimeter defense line around the crest and resisted, requesting artillery fire. However, as the casualties increased and the ammunition ran out, the battalion could not withstand the enemy attacks in wave any longer and withdrew, breaking through the enemy encirclement during the night of October 8-9. The division bolstered the defense of Line Hays, deploying the 35 Regiment on the left, the 36th Regiment on the right, and one battalion of the 27th Regiment in the center while the bulk of the 27th Regiment was underwent reorganization south of Kach’il-bong.

In summary, the 5th Division attempted to capture Hill 1211 from September 5 to October 9, either by committing one regiment after another or three regiments at the same time. The division captured the hill three times but
each time it was forced to withdraw due to enemy counterattacks. In the long run, on October 14 the division concluded its operation around Kach’il-bong by just occupying Hill 841 east of Heartbreak Ridge when the battle of Heartbreak Ridge was almost over. Even though the 5th Division could not seize Hill 1211, it made definitive contributions to the securing of the Punchbowl through the fierce battles it fought and by firmly holding the defense line connecting Paktal-gogae—Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong. It also rendered significant assistance for the battle of Heartbreak Ridge by blocking the enemy threat from the east flank.

On October 20 the 5th Division handed over the battlefield, where it had fought bloody battles for 40 days, to the ROK 3rd Division and moved to the Yangyang area. Later on, other divisions were committed in turn to this battle area, but the line connecting Hill 841—Kach’il-bong—Sohui-ryong, which the 5th Division had secured, became the most forward defense line of the friendly forces thereafter.

(5) The Paeksok-san Battle (Hill 1142)

• The Preliminary Skirmish of the Paeksok-san Battle

On August 18, 1951, when the US X Corps was undertaking Operation Creeper, and the US 2nd Division, the corps’ main effort, launched an offensive at Bloody Ridge as a part of the operation to seize the Punchbowl, the ROK 7th Division was ordered to attack Hill 554 located west of Bloody Ridge in support of the main attack.

At that time the 7th Division deployed the 5th and 8th Regiments along Line Kansas south of Paro-ho (lake) and new Line Kansas north of it, while the 3rd Regiment was forwarded to the Badge line, an outpost line, north of the new Kansas line. Opposed to the division was the enemy’s 32nd Division and a part of the 12th Division of the NK V Corps. The 32nd Division, which set up its tactical
command post at Paeksok-san, built up strong defensive positions along Hills 883-901-554, forwarded its outpost unit on the southern hill, and was conducting patrol activities.

Brigadier General Kim Yong Bae, the ROK 7th Division commander, after analyzing his mission, concluded that in order to seize Hill 554 located on the east flank, the division should first occupy the enemy main line of resistance. In the previous battle, which the division had fought from August 18 to 20, the division captured Hills 883 and 901 and Yangkalrae-gogae (the battle around Tungmae-dong and Songjong-dong), but Hills 883 and 901 were later lost due to an enemy counterattack. Around this time, since the ROK 36th Regiment attached to the US 2nd Division, the right adjacent unit, continued fierce battles gaining and losing Hill 983, the 7th Division put off the attack on Hills 883-901, which were aimed at removing the enemy threat to Bloody Ridge from the west flank. Instead, on August 26 the division captured Hill 536 some two kilometers south of Hill 554, the division’s new objective assigned by the corps.

Around the end of August, since the attack on Bloody Ridge was not going well, the corps commander decided to commit the corps reserve in an effort to disperse enemy support, which was concentrated in this area. He ordered all divisions to mount attacks at the same time. On August 31 the ROK 7th Division began an attack of Hills 901-554 located to the east of the division with the purpose of supporting the US 2nd Division and occupied the hills by September 2.

Once the division had occupied Hills 901-554 early in September, Brigadier General Lee Song Ga, the division commander, on September 7, in compliance with the corps’ operational concept of Operation Elbowing, resumed offensive operations to recapture Hill 883, which it had once occupied but had given up to the enemy. He committed the 5th, 8th, and 3rd Regiments by turn, but as he could not seize the objective because of the enemy’s strong resistance, he committed three regiments at the same time. In this battle the 8th Regiment cap-
tured Hill 743 located in the rear flank of Hill 883 and blocked the enemy reinforcement, and then the 5th Regiment occupied Hill 892 and dissipated and weakened the enemy combat power. Taking this opportunity, on September 18, the 3rd Regiment launched an attack and succeeded in occupying Hill 883 after fierce fighting. Hill 883, which the division seized with much difficulty, was located 2.2 kilometers south of Paekso-san and, together with Hill 901 on the east of Hill 883, it constituted an important foothold for the advance to Paekso-san.

As described earlier, during the battle, which lasted for a month from August 18 to September 18, the ROK 7th Division seized the enemy main line of resistance connecting Hills 892-883-901. The division, which had completed the mission of the secondary attack in the battle of Bloody Ridge, was now ready to capture Paekso-san. During the battle, due to inclement weather, the division was not provided with enough air and artillery support; in spite of that, it attacked the well fortified enemy bunkers. As a result, the division suffered heavy losses, and since the division strength was reduced to 70 percent, and the six heavy mortars went out of order, the division was in urgent need of organizational maintenance.

- The First Battle of Paekso-san

Major General Clovis E. Byers, the corps commander, who recognized the necessity of maintenance of the 7th Division, decided to relieve it with the 8th Division, and the 7th Division became the corps reserve. He then ordered the 8th Division to turn over the mission of defense of the vicinity of Nojonp’yong to the US 1st Marine Division and to be prepared to take over the mission of the 7th Division by September 23.

The general situation of the battlefield at that time was as follows: the US 2nd Division, the main attack unit which had been attacking Heartbreak Ridge for a week, met with the strong enemy resistance and was just repeating battles, winning and losing small pieces of terrain without showing any signs of perma-
nent gain. The division commander wanted to attack Hill 1024 two kilometers southeast of Paeksok-san in order to reduce the enemy strength and to remove the enemy threats to Heartbreak Ridge from the west flank. Upon receiving this report, the corps commander, who felt that, without the capture of Paeksok-san, the occupation of Hill 1024 alone would not serve the purpose of breaking the enemy strength, issued a revised order to the 7th Division to attack Paeksok-san, even though the replacement order had been issued to the division. Accordingly, the 7th Division suspended its preparation for relief and immediately began preparation for an attack on Paeksok-san (Hill 1142).

At this time, the 7th Division deployed all of its three regiments forward; from the left the 5th, 8th, and 3rd Regiments were deployed along the ten kilometer long frontline from Pulmut’o to Kungkol connecting Hills 892-743-883-901. Those were hills which the division had seized in fierce battles. Opposed by the friendly forces were the 32nd Division and a part of the 12th Division of the NK V Corps, which had earlier been forced to withdraw from Hills 883 and 901. This time, however, the enemy was firmly determined to hold Paeksok-san to the last and constructed successive defensive positions on the crest of Paeksok-san and along the two ridges leading to it.

Paeksok-san (Hill 1142), the highest hill in that region, was commanding ground which overlooked not only the Hwach’on Reservoir but also Heartbreak Ridge. If the enemy lost the hill, it would be obliged to withdraw as far south of Oun-san (Hill 1277), and, therefore, Hill 1142 was tactically very important terrain that would play a definitive role in the battles in these areas.

Upon receiving the revised order to attack Paeksok-san, Brigadier General Lee Song Ga, the division commander, after analyzing the area of operation, drew up a scheme of maneuver in which the 8th Regiment, the main attack unit, would attack the objective from Hill 883 along the avenue of approach of the ridge on the left, while the 3rd Regiment would advance from Hill 901 along the
ridge on the right. The 3rd Regiment was to support the 8th Regiment until the 9th Regiment of the US 2nd Division, its right adjacent unit, seized Hill 1024, which was on the avenue of approach of the 3rd Regiment.

On September 24 the 8th Regiment, the main attack unit, attacked Hill 894, which was about 800 meters north of Hill 883, led by the 1st Battalion. On the following day the battalion succeeded in capturing the hill after destroying the enemy weapon emplacements by committing a special attack force and a subsequent assault on the enemy positions by all troops. On the same day (September 25), the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment advanced to the west of the US 2nd Division attacking Hill 1024. The latter seized Hill 1024, the former also captured No-Name Hill west of it. During reorganization on the hill, the 3rd Battalion captured some prisoners, one officer and eight men, who had hidden in a bunker to escape the intensive bombardment of the friendly forces. On September 26 the

*General Kim Yong Bae, the ROK 7th Division commander briefs the Eighth US Army commander on the situation of the Paeksok-san battle.*
division attacked the main crest of Paeksok-san with the 3rd and 8th Regiments. Since the date of relief with the 8th Division was the 28th according to the corps order, the division commander wanted to capture the hill before the relief and turn it over to the relieving unit.

At first, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment passed through the 3rd Battalion, which had captured the western part of Hill 1024, and then seized a ridge, which was 1060 meters high and some 500 meters southeast of Paeksok-san. The battalion continued its advance to the crest, but faced the enemy’s intensive bombardment and withdrew to Ridge 1060. Meanwhile, the 8th Regiment continued its attack on Hill 894, led by the 2nd Battalion under the support of air force and artillery. It succeeded in capturing the enemy positions in depth one by one and finally occupied the left crest of the two crests of the hill.

The battalion was on the way to attack the remaining crest of the hill when the US tank platoon supporting the battalion fired upon the assaulting troops by mistake and caused many casualties. The enemy sensed that the morale of the troops had been lowered by the misdirected firing and immediately launched a counterattack. As a result, the battalion withdrew to the left crest and set up a night defense. Although only half of Paeksok-san was secured on that day (September 26), the capturing of Paeksok-san by the 7th Division was significant.

On the 27th the division was under preparation to attack the remaining crest when the enemy launched a counterattack first. They were troops of the NK 12th Division, which had been relieved at Heartbreak Ridge and was committed to this battle in order to support the 32d Division. Because of the enemy counterattack, the 8th Regiment lost even the left crest. The regiment attempted to regain the crest but the attempt ended in failure. The 3rd Regiment was also attacked by the enemy from Hill 1005, but the 3rd Battalion on the right of the regiment repulsed the enemy after a fierce battle. Around that time, the enemy recaptured Hill 1024, which the US 2nd Division, the right adjacent unit, had occupied, and
the right flank of the regiment was exposed to the enemy. The regiment immediately committed its reserve unit, reoccupied the hill, and turned it over to the US unit. The 7th Division, which turned over the mission of attack of Paeksoe-san to the 8th Division as of 12:00 on September 28, became the reserve of the ROK Army Headquarters, and was assigned to the Field Training Center.

From August 18 the 7th Division took part in the corps offensive operation and, as a secondary attack unit, supported the US 2nd Division in the battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges. Throughout the 40 day offensive operation, the division made military achievement of advancing from Songhyon-ri-Songjongsong to Paeksoe-san. The misdirected fire of the American tanks was obviously one of the reasons that the division could not seize the right crest of Paeksoe-san before leaving the battlefield. However, the unsatisfactory coordination between the 3rd and 8th Regiments at the moment of assault on the final objective and insufficient preparations against enemy counterattack were also reasons to be noted. Besides, the heavy casualties the division had suffered in the previous battles weakened the combat power of the division, and the issuance of the order of relief probably had a negative influence on the combat spirit of the troops.

- The Second Battle of Paeksoe-san

In compliance with the Corps order, the ROK 8th Division transferred the operation area of Nojonpyong to the US 1st Marine Division, the left adjacent unit, and took over the mission of attack of Paeksoe-san from the 7th Division on September 28, 1951. Brigadier General Ch’oi Yong Hee, the division commander, deployed the 21st, 16th, and 10th Regiments along the frontline from Muloku of the Pukhan River (the northern tributary of the Han River) to Kungkol of the Mundung-ri Valley and instructed the 10th Regiment to attack Paeksoe-san. He then allotted Paeksoe-san and the two ridges leading to Paeksoe-san, the avenues of approach, to the sector of the 10th Regiment.
By coincidence, on the same day the 32d Division of the NK V Corps, which had opposed the 7th Division and had been shattered in the previous campaigns, was also relieved by the 12th Division. The 10th Regiment, which was to lead the attack, organized its attack echelon in which the 1st Battalion was on the west, the 2nd Battalion on the east, and the 3rd and attached anti-tank Battalions were placed in regimental reserve. These battalions moved to the line of departure by 06:00 on September 30. The attacking troops passed by the scattered bodies of the friendly troops not yet evacuated and felt that this time too the enemy resistance would be tough. Following 30 minutes of artillery fire, the regiment launched an attack with the 1st Battalion as the main attack.

Amid the enemy firing, the 1st Battalion on the left advanced up the steep slope, making use of objects of concealment, and the two forward companies of the battalion simultaneously assaulted the enemy positions around 09:00. After repeated assaults, the companies finally broke through a corner of the enemy positions and seemed to have secured a foothold for further attack, but due to the enemy-observed firing, they were forced to withdraw out of the reach of the enemy’s hand grenades. The 2nd Battalion on the right advanced along the maneuver route. Although its slope was moderate, the troops were completely exposed to the enemy observed firing from the right part of Paeksok-san, and the advance was difficult. However, in an effort to render assistance to the main attack, the battalion committed the attached Regimental Reconnaissance Company toward the right to open the attacking route, but the company was also halted.

Colonel Chung Kang, the regimental commander, after having supplied food and ammunition by means of the labor corps attached to both battalions, visited the forward area of the 1st Battalion on October 1, explained the importance of the early securing of Paeksok-san to the cadres, including platoon leaders of the battalion, and urged them to capture the objective during the day.
The 1st Battalion, which was instructed on the spot by the regimental commander, took advantage of the dense morning fog, advanced toward the objective, and, following three hours hard fighting, reached the assault line. At this moment the morning fog faded away, and a flight of friendly aircraft flew over and hit Paekson-san. Seizing this opportunity, the troops simultaneously assaulted and captured the left crest of the hill. The 2nd Battalion on the right, however, could not suppress the enemy on Hill 1050 just right of Paekson-san, and its advance was halted. The enemy forces on the right part of Paekson-san who had halted the 2nd Battalion joined together with the enemy who had retreated from the left crest and launched a counterattack. The 1st Battalion was unable to push the enemy back and withdrew from the crest of the hill. It was, in fact, a repetition of the 7th Division’s operation.

The 2nd Battalion commander, who felt a strong sense of responsibility, resumed the attack and succeeded in almost reaching the crest. As the attack of the battalion was proceeding well, the enemy, who felt the threat on the left flank, began to move its units toward the front of the 2nd Battalion.

When the 2nd Battalion drew enemy attention, the 1st Battalion, which had finished reorganization, resumed the attack led by the 1st Company and seized the main crest of the hill. When support fire was shifted and the aircraft hit the enemy on the adverse slope of the hill, the 5th and 6th Companies of the 2nd Battalion also launched assault and captured the right crest of the hill. In this battle, Sergeant Kong Jae Ho, who led the troops with an air-ground signal panel on his back, climbed up the steep and rocky hill alone and silenced the enemy machinegun emplacements and foxholes with grenades and rifle fire. He thus opened the road of attack for the friendly forces.

In this way the 8th Division captured Paekson-san two days after it took over the mission. The occupation of Paekson-san was significant in that the defense line of the 7th and 8th Divisions was advanced ten kilometers northward
from Line Kansas, and the objective assigned by the army and corps was achieved. In addition to that, the enemy’s main line of resistance was pushed back five to ten kilometers northward up to the vicinity of Hill 1220 and Oun-san (1277 meters high). Now, the friendly force could overlook and control the Mundung-ri Valley, and this greatly contributed to the operation of the main attack division.

Later on, the 8th Division received the order from the corps to capture Hills 1050–1220–Oun-san to keep balance in the frontline with the IX Corps on the west and to render flank support to the US 2nd Division’s attack on Heartbreak Ridge on the east. Upon receiving the order, the division drew up a plan to carry out this mission in three phases: in the first phase, it was to occupy Hill 1050 line (three kilometers northwest of Paeksok-san); in the second phase, Hill 1090(west) line; and in the third phase, Hill 1090(north) line (seven kilometers north-west of Paeksok-san). The division began the first phase operation on October 6 and advanced up to the line connecting Hills 1050-762 (Yangvidae) by October 12.

Around this time, however, a big change took place in the enemy camp. The NK V Corps, which continued the retreat from October 10, withdrew completely to the rear and was replaced by the 68th Army of the Chinese 20th Army Group. It crossed over the Yalu on May 21, 1951, was committed to the defense of Wonsan, and when the NK force continued to retreat, it moved to Oun-san-Mundung-ri to halt the advance of the UN forces. The 612th and 611th Regiments of the Chinese 204th Division were committed to the north of Paeksok-san in front of the ROK 8th Division, and the 610th Regiment to Mundung-ri in front of the US 2nd Division. The fresh enemy encountered the friendly forces.

Having achieved the first phase objective by taking advantage of the confusion caused by the enemy units’ relief, the 8th Division immediately began the second phase operation on October 13 and advanced to the line connecting Hill 748-Topimak-Hill 1090(west) by October 15. On the following day the divi-
sion began the third and the last phase operation amid steadily increasing enemy resistance. On October 18 the division took over Hill 1220 which the US 2nd Division had captured and, using it as a foothold, accelerated its attack on the final objective, Hill 1090 (north).

The division, making the best use of the advantage which Hill 1220 offered, attacked and occupied Hill 1090 (south) and Hill 1090 (north) successively by October 28, and secured the line of Hills 319-938-1090 on the east of the Pukhan River.76)

In conclusion, after the occupation of Paeksok-san, the 8th Division secured the defense line connecting Hwapyong-dong—T’ongson-gol—Pau-gol (Am-dong)—Hill 1090 (north) on the riverside of the Pukhan River and then Angol (Nae-dong) on the east, after 23 days of battle from October 6 to 28. The division thus secured a cross compartment of terrain, which was in the south of a huge valley and favorable for defense, and achieved the missions of improving the corps defense line and of supporting the adjacent US 2nd Division’s attack on Heartbreak Ridge.

(6) The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge

- The First Battle (September 13-26)

During the battle of Bloody Ridge, the US 2nd Division committed the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and then the US 9th Regiment, while assigning to the 23rd and 38th Regiments the mission of providing flank support to the attacking regiments. After committing its whole combat power and at the cost of heavy casualties, the division captured the objective on September 5. After this battle, in compliance with the policy of the limited objective attacks and Operation Elbowing issued on September 8, the division was to attack the ridge (later called Heartbreak Ridge)77 composed of Hills 894-931-851 north of Bloody
Ridge.

Different from Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge consisted of three crests which were located one after another from south to north, and if the friendly forces advanced from the south they were to attack the three crests one after another. These hills were not only steep around the crests, but also densely forested, which made the air reconnaissance and observation of the hills difficult.

Of Heartbreak Ridge, the principle hills (894, 931 and 851) and the Mundung-ri Valley were defended by the 6th Division of the NK V Corps, while Hill 871 and the Sat’ae-ri Valley were occupied by the 13th Division of the NK II Corps. While the battle of Bloody Ridge was still underway, the NK 6th Division, which was then in corps reserve, moved to Heartbreak Ridge, constructed defensive positions, and then further fortified the positions as on Bloody Ridge, before the battle of Heartbreak Ridge began. On the right of the NK 6th Division was deployed the NK 12th Division, which had withdrawn from Bloody Ridge, and the division’s sector partially overlapped the ROK 8th Division’s area. On October 10 when the battle of Heartbreak Ridge was still under way, the NK V Corps was relieved by the CCF 68th Army, which committed the 204th Division and one regiment of the 202nd Division to the front.

The occupation of the ridge had the strategic importance of (1) securing maneuvering roads in the Mundung-ri and the Sat’ae-ri Valleys, (2) nullifying the enemy’s important operational area of Mundung-ri, (3) eliminating the weakness of the Kansas line due to the fact that it was observable by the enemy on the ridge, (4) achieving the corps objective to remove the sag of the frontline and pushing the enemy as far north as the line connecting Oun-san (1277)—Mae-bong (1290)—Kanmu-bong (1358).

After the battle of Bloody Ridge, the US 2nd Infantry Division transferred the 9th Infantry Regiment, which had led the battle, to reserve and deployed the 23rd Infantry Regiment on Bloody Ridge. The 38th Infantry Regiment was
then engaged in an offensive operation on Hills 868-702 on the east of the Sat’ae-ri Valley. On September 11, in order to attack Heartbreak Ridge, the division instructed the 9th Regiment to again take over Bloody Ridge and ordered the 23rd Regiment (the French Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment attached) to attack Heartbreak Ridge. The 38th Regiment(-) was placed in division reserve.

The division commander drew up an operational plan in which the 23rd Regiment would first occupy the Sat’ae-ri Valley and Hills 868 and 702 on the east of the valley, which the 38th Regiment had once attacked. Once the hills were seized, the regiment then, using these hills as a foothold, would attack across the Sat’ae-ri road and separate the main Hill 931 from Hill 851 on the north. And while one battalion would hit Hill 851, the rest of the battalions would attack Hill 931 and Hill 894 south of it.

This operational concept was based on the judgement that a simultaneous attack on the objectives from the east was better than a successive attack of the hills from south to north. In addition, once the 23rd Regiment occupied Hill 894 on the south, then the 9th Regiment would capture Hill 724 some two kilometers west of Hill 894 and secure the maneuver road toward Mundung-ri. Based on this plan, prior to attacking Hill 931, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment attacked Hill 702 on September 12 while the attached 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment attacked Hill 868. Both battalions captured the hills, where they made preparations for the attack on Heartbreak Ridge.

The regiment, which had secured a foothold for the attack, drew up an operational plan to the effect that while the 1st Battalion rendered support from Hills 702-660, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions led by the latter would occupy No-Name Hill (850 meters high) located between Hill 931 and Hill 851 on the north. After the occupation of the hill, the 3rd Battalion would attack Hill 851 and the 2nd Battalion Hill 931. The French Battalion was to take over Hill 868, which the
Attack plan of Heartbreak Ridge
3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment had secured, and would provide flank protection.

According to plan, the attack on Heartbreak Ridge began at 06:00 on September 13 following the artillery preparation fire in which 80 pieces of artillery took part. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions began to advance northward along the Samdae-dong-Sat’ae-ri Valley, clearing the mine-field. The two battalions, however, faced stubborn resistance from the enemy, which poured artillery fire on the attacking troops. In spite of considerable losses, the battalions crossed the road south of Sat’ae-ri and established hasty defensive positions at the foot of a ridge stretching eastward from Hill 931. The battalions then attempted to advance further toward Hills 750-850, but were halted around Hill 750, roughly half way to the objective, since not only artillery bombardment but also small arms fire from Hills 931 and 851 was intensive, and the casualties continued to increase. In spite of such an adverse situation, the L Company of the 3rd Battalion continued to advance along the valley and captured Hill 850, the intermediate objective, around sunset. When the company took the hill, the remaining strength of the company on the hill was little more than 30. Since the main element of the battalion was still pinned down around Hill 750 due to enemy artillery fire, the company immediately established a perimeter defense line on Hill 850 and requested that the artillery provide fire support throughout the night to keep off the enemy counterattack. However, since the darkness made the precise direction of artillery fire difficult, and the ammunition ran out, the company entered hand-to-hand fighting with the counterattacking enemy battalion, which made its assault during a break in the artillery fire. The company fought to the last and in the end, more than 30 men, almost all the troops of the company including the company commander, Captain Peter Monfore, died heroic deaths on the hill.

Major General Thomas E. De Shazo, the division commander, who anticipated that the attack on Heartbreak Ridge would be another fierce battle like
that on Bloody Ridge, modified the operation plan and strengthened the attacking power. Since the enemy was concentrating its defensive power on the east slope of the hill, he ordered the 9th Infantry Regiment to attack Hill 894 from the south so that the enemy would be attacked from the two directions of the east and south. On September 14, the two regiments launched attacks. The 23rd Infantry Regiment, like the previous day, committed two battalions, but was unable to advance any further from the hasty defensive position on Hill 750. In order to block the enemy threat from the east, the regimental commander ordered the French Battalion, which had taken over Hill 868 from the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment the previous day, to attack the northern ridge stretching to Hills 841-1052.

Meanwhile, the 9th Regiment began to attack under the support of 155 mm howitzers and 4.2 inch mortars. B Company of the 72nd Tank Battalion also took part in the battle and made a direct hit on the enemy gun emplacements. Around sunset, the regiment succeeded in taking possession of a hill (no name) some 500 meters southwest of Hill 894, the objective.

On the following day (the 15th), the 23rd Regiment was not able to advance any further from around Hill 750. The French Battalion was also unable to seize Hill 841 in spite of the many casualties it suffered. The 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, however, with artillery support, succeeded in capturing Hill 894 with only light casualties and beat back the enemy counterattack at night. In consequence, it was assumed that the NK 6th Division’s main defense efforts were centered on Hill 931, the main crest.

Since the 9th Regiment occupied the southern hill of Heartbreak Ridge, the 23rd Regiment committed all of its three battalions to occupy Hill 931 from the 16th; the 1st Battalion attacked Hill 931 from the south and the 2nd Battalion from the east, while the 3rd Battalion attacked No Name Hill (850 meters high) on the north. In spite of the increasing casualties, none of the battalions could make
any breakthroughs. On the 16th, the NK 6th Division also pulled back its 1st Regiment, which had suffered heavy losses, and replaced it with the 13th Regiment in reserve to bolster the defense of Hill 931.80)

In this whirlpool, on September 20, Major General Robert N. Young was assigned as the new division commander. Around this time, the 23rd Tank Company, at the cost of five tanks, pushed its Sherman tanks as far as Sat’ae-ri with the aid of the French engineer platoon. The tanks supported the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and under the support of the tanks, the 3rd Battalion finally captured Hill 850, the intermediate objective, on the 21st. The seizure of the hill was significant because it separated Hill 851 from Hill 931 and isolated Hill 931 since Hill 894 on the south had already fallen into the friendly force’s hand.

On the following day, September 22, the 23rd Regiment resumed the attack. The plan was that the 1st Battalion would attack Hill 931 from the south under the cover of the French Battalion, and the 2nd Battalion from the north, while the 3rd Battalion was to attack Hill 851 from Hill 850 to contain the enemy on the hill. The 1st Battalion, attacking the objective from the south, after repeated advance and retreat under heavy enemy fire, approached within 10 meters from the enemy positions but failed in breaking through the enemy final fire net and withdrew. The 2nd Battalion attacking from north to south seized No Name Hill (870 meters high) located some 500 meters from the objective and then was halted because of increasing casualties. Air forces joined this combat as two flights of Mustangs continuously hit the enemy on Hills 931 and 851.

On the following day (September 23), while the 23rd Regiment continued its attack on Hill 931, the 9th Regiment assaulted Hill 1024 west of Mundung-ri in an effort to cut off the enemy reinforcement to Heartbreak Ridge from the west. The enemy, who was cut off from the rear and was in danger of being encircled, began to show the signs of weakening. The 1st Battalion, which perceived the signs of the enemy’s faltering, launched a relentless assault on the
enemy and finally occupied Hill 931 around dusk. However, during the night (from the 23rd to 24th), the enemy committed an estimated one regiment size troops from Mundung-ri Valley and counterattacked the hill, following artillery and mortar bombardment. The battalion resisted, but around dawn the hill fell again into the hands of enemy. The 1st Battalion attempted to regain the hill under the support of the 2nd Battalion, which was then operating at the north, but the attempt ended in failure. The enemy element, which had been committed during the night of the 23d to 24th, was the 3rd Regiment of the NK 12th Division, and this showed that the NK V Corps was pouring all its efforts into the defend of the ridge.

Recognizing the weakened attacking power of both the 1st and 2nd Battalions resulting from the casualties, on the 25th, the 23rd Regiment commander decided to commit the French Battalion to attack Hill 931 and moved it to Hill 850. The attached 1st Battalion of the 38th Regiment was committed to the east sector of the regiment where the French Battalion had been deployed. On the same day the 9th Regiment captured Hill 1024 where it killed 115 enemy soldiers, and the ROK 7th Division was also attacking the main crest of Paeksok-san. All such progress rendered important assistance for the attack on Heartbreak Ridge. On the other side, the NK 6th Division withdrew the shattered 13th Regiment to Hill 867 west of Konsol-ri, important terrain for the control of the Mundung-ri Valley, and committed the 15th Regiment and strengthened its defenses.\(^{81}\)

On the morning of September 26, the 23rd Regiment completed its preparations for an attack on Hill 931 with the operational plan that the French Battalion would attack the hill from north to south and the 1st Battalion from south to north, while the 2nd Battalion would provide cover from Hill 850. The 3rd Battalion was to contain the enemy on Hill 851 on the north. The attacking hour was, however, put off until 13:30 of the same day because, when the battalion was about to attack, the enemy mortar shells poured on the French Battalion,
the main attack unit, killing the 2nd Company commander, and an artillery observation officer and damaging the radio of the mortar observer.

It was the 14th day after the operation had begun, and although during those days the friendly forces artillery fired an average of 10,000 rounds of shells a day, the enemy artillery and mortar fire in particular were not suppressed, not to mention the enemy fortified positions undestroyed. Even on this day more than 1,000 rounds of enemy mortar shells fell around Hill 850.

The French Battalion first set up its organic 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles and machine guns in such a way that they could directly support the attacking units, and the 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars were placed to provide close support for the attackers. The battalion then launched an attack, led by the 3rd Company. The 23rd Infantry Regiment Tank Company advanced deep into the Sat’ae-ri Valley and hit the enemy fortified bunkers with its direct fire, but was unable to destroy the enemy mortar and machinegun emplacement positions. Under such supporting fire, the 3rd Company of the French Battalion committed one platoon to attack the objective from the east and another from the west. The former, attacking from the east, climbed the steep slope of the hill and approached close to the enemy positions, but the latter, attacking from the west, met enemy mortar barrage fire and was halted at the half way point. Therefore, the unit attacking from the east made a lone assault on the enemy but the assault ended in failure. The company suffered around one hundred casualties on this day. The 2nd Company, which followed, made the attack through the unit on the west and attempted assaults three times but withdrew faced with the enemy barrage fire composed of automatic weapons and hand grenades. The 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment, which attacked from the south, was also halted, unable to suppress the enemy fire of mortars, hand grenades, and automatic weapons.

The 23rd Regimental commander, who felt that continuation of the same pattern of attacks would be nothing but a ‘suicidal act’, proposed to the division
commander that he broaden the division operation to disperse the concentrated enemy reinforcement and supplies from Mundung-ri to Hill 931. Pointing out that out of 1,670 casualties which the division suffered during the last two weeks, 950 casualties were from the 23rd Regiment, he stated that he could weaken the opposing NK 15th Regiment and seize Heartbreak Ridge only if the enemy reinforcements were cut off.

On September 27, the division commander, accepting the recommendation of the regimental commander and securing the approval of the corps commander, temporarily suspended the Heartbreak Ridge operation with the occupation of Hill 894 and set out to analyze the problems and to work out a new plan.

• The Second Round of the Campaign (October 5 to 13)

The division commander judged the campaign to that point to be a fiasco and pointed out the causes of failure. The reasons were that the troops were committed successively to an area of limited maneuvering space, that the fire support teams were not properly employed, and that the enemy mortars, which caused 85 percent of the friendly casualties, were not neutralized. He instructed his staff to revise the operation plan based on the following operational directives.

First: The division would launch a coordinated offensive with three regiments under the support of division artillery and tanks.
Second: The 72d Tank Battalion would advance up to the Mundung-ri Valley, and the task force of infantry/armor combined arms would move to the Sat’ae-ri Valley so that the tanks could fully support the infantrymen.

The operation order, which was based on the above-mentioned operational directives and named Operation Touchdown,82 was issued on October 2 as follows:
1. The division would launch an attack at 21:00 on October 5, defeat the opposing enemy, and secure by whatever means necessary the line connecting Hills 931-851.

2. The 23rd Regiment (French Battalion attached) would capture Hill 931 and then Hill 851. It would organize an infantry/armor combined arms team, which would be led by the tank company and would suppress the enemy fire around Sat’ae-ri.

3. The 38th Regiment (the Netherlands Battalion attached) would first conduct a feint attack for the 23rd Regiment attacking Hill 931, destroy the enemy deployed on both sides of the Mundung-ri road, and cover the engineer units constructing the route. On order, it would attack and secure Hills 905-974 west of the Mundung-ri road. It was also to defend Line Kansas with one battalion. (Division commander’s prior approval was needed for the use of this battalion for other missions.)

4. The 9th Regiment would occupy Hills 865-1005 on the west flank of the division.

5. The 72nd Tank Battalion would dash toward Mundung-ri upon the construction of the road by the engineer battalion, destroy the enemy fire strong points, and support the attacking units advancing along both sides of the valley.

6. The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion would complete the construction of the attacking route between Kopangsan-ri—Imokjong by October 5. The battalion would get rid of the obstacles beside the road along the Suip River between Imokjong—Konsol-ri as the operation progressed and assure the use of the road for the 72nd Tank Battalion.

The division commander planned to carry out this operation in three phases.
The first phase: The 23rd Regiment, the main attack unit, would occupy Hill 931 through an infantry/armor combined arms operation, while the engineer unit at the same time began the construction of the road between Imokjong—Saekonpaepae.

The second phase: The engineer unit would construct a road between Saekonpaepae—Konsol-ri. The 38th Regiment would seize important terrain on both sides of the road and cover the engineer unit.

The third phase: The 72nd Tank Battalion would dash into Mundung-ri and nullify the enemy rear areas. At the same time the 23rd Regiment would capture Hill 851, while the 38th Regiment would conduct exploitations.

Each element of the division made preparations in compliance with the operational concept. The success of the operation depended on the timely construction of the road. This road which was a lane and twisting, often passed damp areas and was so narrow beneath the deep valley that just a tank’s standstill was enough to block the whole lane. Since the free maneuver of the 60 tanks (M4A3) of the 72nd Tank Battalion was the key factor in deciding the success or failure of the operation, the division commander put stress on the timely construction of the road by the engineer unit. He also ordered the artillery to deploy farther forward to support effectively the regiments.

At 21:30 on October 5, the preparation fire began and a total of 300 pieces of division and corps artilleries hit the enemy positions hard. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing also conducted a night air attack along the Mundung-ri Valley, but the preparatory fires never hit Hill 931. Amid such tremendous bombardment of the Mundung-ri Valley, the 23rd Regiment started moving forward 30 minutes prior to the preparatory fires. The regiment in an attack echelon was led by the 2nd Battalion and followed by the 3rd Battalion in reserve. They continued a non-illuminated, non-supported attack from Hill 894 toward the objective, Hill
931. The French Battalion conducted a feint attack southward to Hill 931 while the 1st Battalion mounted a holding attack toward Hill 851 to the north.

The 2nd Battalion at the head soon received fire from the enemy, but the latter could not pay its full attention to this attack because of the division artillery hitting the enemy mortar and artillery positions and French Battalion conducting a feint attack on the north. Taking advantage of darkness and the enemy looseness, and under the support of the 3rd Battalion, the 2nd Battalion secretly and steadily approached Hill 931. Once the 2nd and 3rd Battalions reached the enemy positions, the battalion troops destroyed the enemy in the bunkers with flame-throwers, hand-grenades, and rifle fire and succeeded in seizing the southern half of Hill 931 around 03:00 on October 6. The battalions then linked up with the French Battalion which climbed the hill from the north around the time of sun-rise. The battalions took complete possession of the hill before noon and achieved the first phase of the operation. The successful operation resulted from the dissipation of the enemy combat power, the well coordinated feint operation, and success in the surprise attack.

Along with the 23rd Regiment’s occupation of Hill 931, the 38th Regiment, the division’s central unit, also occupied Hills 636, 605, and 905 on the west of the road between Saekonpae and Mundung-ri, and the division thus secured complete control of the Mundung-ri road axis by the 10th. Under the cover of the 38th Regiment, the division engineer battalion, which initiated the construction of the road between Saekonpae and Konsol-ri on the 7th, completed it on the 9th. The 9th Regiment first secured Hill 867 on the west of Imokjong and then Hill 1005 on the north-west of Paekskok-san. With the occupation of those hills by the friendly forces, the 23rd Regiment then could attack the remaining Hill 851, free from enemy threat from the west.

On October 10, the third phase of the operation to capture Hill 851 began. On the west of Hill 851, the task force composed of the 72nd Tank
Battalion, the Company L of the 38th Regiment, and a division engineer platoon advanced up to Mundung-ri, while on the east of the hill the task force (Struman TF), composed of a tank company from the 23d Regiment, the infantrymen, and the engineer element of the French Battalion, moved into Sat’ae-ri. The two task forces isolated Hill 851 on either side and were ready to render support to the attacking units of the hill. On the other hand, it was learned that the enemy was also bolstering its defensive positions on Hill 851 at that time.

Around this time, the 204th Division of the CCF 68th Army was on the way to relieve the collapsing divisions of the NK V Corps around Mundung-ri and Heartbreak Ridge. These Chinese troops encountered the 72nd Tank Battalion when the latter was passing through Mundung-ri. The battalion not only immediately inflicted heavy damage on them but also cut off the road which reached westward from Hill 851 and was used for enemy supply and replacement. The enemy seemed to have little idea that the Mundung-ri lane would be opened for tanks. In the history of Resist America and Assist Korea the Chinese Communists described the then situation as follows:

The 68th Army, which was then unfamiliar with the enemy situation, was taking over the defense mission while also resisting enemy attacks. When the friendly forces completed the taking over of the defense mission on the 10th, the enemy had already approached as far as six kilometers to our defense line. From that time on the friendly forces, in order to halt the advance of enemy tanks, established grand-scale anti-tank positions to include the installation of anti-tank obstacles along both sides of the Mundung-ri road. In addition to that, an anti-tank battalion was organized with all of the division anti-tank weapons assembled and took total responsibility for defending against enemy tanks.
At last the 23rd Regiment began its attack of Hill 851. The 1st Battalion led the attack with the support of the French Battalion. The 3rd Battalion on Hill 931 advanced on the west of the 1st Battalion, while the 2nd Battalion seized Hill 520 south of Mundung-ri to cut off the enemy reinforcement and won a foothold for the attack of Hill 851 from the west. The 1st and French Battalions moved little by little toward the crest, destroying enemy bunkers one by one. The NK and Chinese troops did not give up their resistance unless they were either killed or wounded. While the 3rd Battalion was attacking Hill 851 from the west, the French Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion on the night of the 11th, led the attack, and at dawn on October 13 captured the crest of the hill. The French Battalion, while pressing the enemy from the front, sent some of its troops northward under the concealment of darkness, and the latter launched an attack behind the enemy. When the enemy was busy defending the unit attacking from behind, the French main force in the front simultaneously assaulted the enemy positions and seized the crest.

The 38th Regiment, which continued its attack on the west of the division under the support of the Netherlands Battalion, occupied Hill 974 and on October 15 seized even Hill 1220 located between Paeksok-san and Oun-san.

After all of these operations had been completed, the US 2nd Division captured Heartbreak Ridge after a month long bloody battle that began September 13. With the successful completion of the Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges campaigns the division pushed its frontline northward up to the line connecting Hill 1220-Mundung-ri and Kach’il-bong on the west.

As the names implied, the battles of Heartbreak and Bloody Ridges were the most bitter battles fought during the period of the UN Command summer and autumn offensive operations.

The US 2nd Division suffered heavy casualties totaling 3,700 in the battle of Heartbreak Ridge (from September 13 to October 13) just as in the battle of
Bloody Ridge. The total enemy losses of the NK 6th, 12th, and 13th Divisions and the Chinese 204th Division were estimated at 21,000.

With the conclusion of the Heartbreak Ridge battle, the US X Corps secured its frontline connecting Hill 931 (east of the Pukhan River), Hill 1090, Hill 851 (Mundung-ri), Kach’il-bong, and Hill 802 (east of the Soyang River Valley) and achieved the principal objective of the summer and autumn offensive operations of removing the sag in the Punchbowl area.

3. Advance toward the Nam River

At the time that Operation Creeper, an early stage of the summer offensive, was under preparation in the middle of August, the ROK I Corps commander, Major General Paik Sun Yup deployed the Capital Division on the west, the 11th Division in the center, and the 3rd Division on the east and was defending the new Line Kansas from Sanmorikok-san on the east along the Hyangno-bong to Kojin. The ROK I Corps frontline ran in such a way that the eastern part of it protracted about ten kilometers farther north than the west. On August 14 General Paik received an order from the army commander that the ROK I Corps, together with the US X Corps, was to take part in Operation Creeper and seize Hills 924 (seven kilometers northwest of Hyangno-bong) and 884 (three kilometers north of Hill 924), which corresponded to the stem and head of the J Ridge, located in the east of the Sohwa Valley. At that time the ROK 8th Division under the US X Corps, the left adjacent unit of the ROK I Corps, planned to attack Hill 1031, which corresponded to the tail of the J Ridge. Operation Creeper would not only contribute to the army plan to secure the road net of the Sohwa Valley and to encircle the eastern part of the Punchbowl, but also provide the chance of pushing the corps frontline northward as far as the Nam River.

The enemy opposing the corps was the NK III Corps (consisting of the
1st, 15th, and 45th Divisions), which had established its main line of resistance south of the Nam River and north of Hyangno-bong around Hill 884-Wolbi-san. It was determined to fight with its back to the wall. On August 16, the ROK I Corps commander, in compliance with the army commander’s operational concept, ordered the Capital Division to capture Hills 924-751, and the 11th Division to seize Hills 884-591. The attack of these hills, which had been planned on July 27, three weeks before, had been put off due to the rainy season. Now it would be executed.

One of the two battles, that of Hill 884, which the 11th Division fought with great difficulty is worth describing in detail.

(1) The Battle of Hill 884

The 11th Division, which was the center division of the corps, was then defending the frontline from Hill 1079 north of Hyangno-bong (Hill 1293) to Konbong-ryong, across Hyangno-bong, one of the steepest hills of the T’aebaek Mountains. The division established the main line of resistance with the 20th Regiment deployed on Hill 1079 north of Hyangno-bong and the 13th Regiment on Konbong-ryong, while the 9th Regiment, which established advanced positions on Hill 703 and on the west of Konbong-san, was performing the outpost mission. On the other hand the enemy opposing the division was the 45th Division of the NK III Corps, which deployed the 2nd Regiment around Hill 884. The enemy consolidated the defensive positions into a strong point during the last two months, July and August, by planting mines, installing barbed wire, and fortifying the fighting bunkers and trenches.

Hill 884 located south of the Nam River was a commanding ground which not only overlooked deep into the friendly main line of resistance but also controlled route 453, the main enemy supply route from Kosong via Sach’un-ri to
Wont’ong-ri. On the other hand, if the friendly forces took possession of it, it would become critical terrain, which could push the enemy north of the Nam River and overlook not only the Nam River but well beyond the far bank of the river. In addition, the hill, which corresponded to the head of the J Ridge, was strategically important because the hill was, by whatever means necessary, to be secured for the encircling operation of the Punchbowl, which the army was then planning. Therefore, the hill was critical terrain, which would exercise a very important influence on the operations of both sides.

Upon receiving the order from the corps, Brigadier General Oh Duk Joon, the 11th Division commander, decided to attack the hill with the 9th Regiment, while defending the frontline with other regiments. The 9th Regiment’s commander, in turn, established an operational concept that the 1st Battalion, which was deployed forward on Hill 703, would attack Hill 884, while the regimental special assault company would capture Hill 591, thus accomplishing the mission assigned to the division. In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion west of Konbong-san was instructed to consolidate its current defense positions, and to support, on order, the 1st Battalion attacking the objective. The mission of the 3rd Battalion, in regimental reserve, was to protect the division flank and rear and to take over the hill once it was seized by the attacking unit.

At 06:00 on August 18 the 9th Regiment launched an attack and crossed the tributary of the Nam River under the fire support from its division artillery and the UNC naval forces on the east coast. The 1st Battalion attacked Hill 884 from the east with three companies in three directions; the 1st Company in the center and the other two companies from the right and the left. The battalion fought its way to the objective with great difficulty since the hill was steep, and the enemy strongly resisted from well fortified positions. The 1st Company in the center, however, swung around to right, approached the enemy’s left flank, and throwing hand grenades began hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. When the enemy
began to falter, the battalion, seizing upon the opportunity, made simultaneous assaults on the enemy positions and occupied Hill 884 around noon. This was the first occupation of Hill 884.

When the division seized the hill, which was the division and at the same time the corps objective and was also the tactical objective of the army’s strategy, the division received congratulatory messages from the corps commander, Major General Paik Sun Yup (the concurrent representative to the truce talks), General Van Fleet, the Eighth Army commander, and General Lee Jong Ch’an, the Chief of General Staff of the ROK Army. On the same day, the Capital Division on the left also seized Hill 924. All of this victorious news pleased the military leaders, but the joy was premature.

In the last battle, it seemed, the enemy, who was unable to withstand the gunfire of the warships, temporarily withdrew to Hills 591, 602, and 751 around Hill 884 and was looking for the opportunity to launch a counterattack. The regiment tried to send reinforcements to drive off the remaining enemy around the objective and to strengthen the defense of the hill, but failed to commit the troops in time since the regiment could not acquire the needed troops from the thinly manned sectors of the regiment and the division. To make the situation worse, heavy rain with strong wind had fallen that afternoon, and the 1st Battalion was obliged to defend the hill under conditions of poor visibility and restricted fields of fire.

Around sunset, the battalion was obliged to establish a perimeter defense line without reinforcements. Soon, with an artillery bombardment, the enemy, who had withdrawn to the nearby hills, began to counterattack in three echelons, taking advantage of the inclement weather. The battalion did its best but could not resist the enemy attacks in wave and was pushed back to the rear slope of the hill. The battalion commander controlled his troops around in the middle of the hill and prepared for another attack.
In the meantime, the regiment special assault company, which attacked Hill 591, the division objective, two kilometers north of the 1st Battalion, advanced against the enemy resistance, requesting supporting fire, and assaulted the enemy positions three times, but was unable to capture the hill and withdrew.

In the early dawn of the following day (the 19th), the 1st Battalion withdrew around Kankok south of Hill 884, and launched another attack after the artillery and air force had hit the enemy position hard. This time the 1st Company became reserve, and the remaining two companies attacked. The 2nd Company on the right advanced ahead and assaulted the enemy positions. Throwing hand grenades and shouting, the company entered hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy around the crest. At this time, the 3rd Company on the left joined in this combat and drove off the enemy after a fierce battle. Thus, the battalion recaptured the hill. This was its second occupation.

In the rain, the battalion engaged in reorganization and established a perimeter defense line with its three companies. The battalion, however, was operating under extremely adverse conditions of weather, terrain, and supply. Due to stormy weather, hasty establishment of the sheltered positions was not easy, many weapons did not function satisfactorily, and poor visibility made probing the enemy and the evaluation of the situation difficult. Among other things, ammunition and food were at low levels because they had to be supplied over the high and steep Hyangno-bong.

On the 21st the battalion, which had secured the hill, attempted to seize Hill 602 one kilometer west of Hill 884 to deny the foothold of the enemy attack against Hill 884, but failed. The situation worsened about noon when the battalion was attacked in the rain by the enemy around Hill 884 and from Hill 751 south of it. The battle continued for nine hours, and as the time passed, the situation turned unfavorable for the battalion, which was short of ammunition. In addition, the commanders of the battalion, the 2nd, and 3rd Companies were wounded, and one
third of the battalion strength had become casualties. At last around 20:20 hours, the 3rd Company on the left began to collapse under the continuing enemy pressure and again the hill fell into the enemy’s hands.

The battalion, which gave up the hill the second time, assembled the survivors around Kankok where it hastily established defensive positions and set up its observation post on Hill 703.

On the following day (the 22nd), the regimental commander instructed the 1st Battalion to remain where it was positioned and to contain the enemy. At the same time, with the approval of the division commander, he ordered the 2nd Battalion, which was defending the forward defense positions west of Konbongsan, to reinforce the 1st Battalion. He also ordered the 3rd Battalion to continue holding the forward defensive positions on Hills 600 and 703. While the units were being redeployed based on the new plan, the regiment and the division forwarded supplies, but because of bad weather and rugged terrain, the progress of the supplies was slow.

The 2nd Battalion, which conducted a forced march throughout the night, arrived at Hill 703 and then at the tributary of the Nam River on the morning of the 23rd. The tributary was, however, flooded by heavy rains from the prior few days, and the troops were unable to cross the river on foot. The battalion requested the support of the division engineer, who set up a temporary bridge over the river. The battalion troops also used wooden makeshift river-crossing devices and began to cross the river around 22:00 hours. After the river-crossing, the battalion began the preparations for the attack, but because of the arduous activities the two proceeding nights, the troops were worn out.

At dawn on the 24th, all three companies of the 2nd Battalion simultaneously attacked Hill 884. Around 09:30 the 1st Battalion joined in the attack, and the two battalions dashed abreast toward the objective. Fortunately, the weather was fine and the battalions approached close to the enemy positions with close air
Battle of Hill 884
support. The enemy, however, resisted stubbornly, and the battalions continued to fiercely fight the enemy but could not penetrate into the enemy defense line.

When night fell, the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion on the right volunteered to become an assaulting unit and swung a platoon around toward the right flank of the enemy. The platoon raided the flank of the enemy and caused confusion within the enemy troops. Taking advantage of the enemy confusion, the remaining platoons approached the enemy positions along dead space and attacked. At this moment, the two battalions simultaneously dashed into the enemy positions and, beating back the defenders, seized the hill. This constituted the third occupation of Hill 884.

The two battalions immediately entered reorganization to prepare against an enemy counterattack. Around 04:00 of the following day (the 25th), the two battalion size enemy counterattacked, and since the battalions suffered over one hundred casualties (18 killed and 88 wounded), they were again pushed back behind the hill and were forced to give up the hill to the enemy. The regimental commander evacuated the troops in the vicinity of Kankok, ordered them to quickly establish defensive positions, and kept the troops under control.

Since the 9th Regiment suffered heavy losses in the battles during which it captured the hill three times but then gave it up to the enemy each time, the division commander relieved the 9th Regiment with the 20th Regiment, which was ordered to attack the hill at 06:00 on the 27th.

On the following day (the 26th), the 20th Regiment commander ordered the 3rd Battalion on the main line of resistance to move to Hill 703 and to hit the east flank of Hill 884, and the 1st Battalion to move to Hill 751 to attack the west flank of Hill 884. The 2nd Battalion was instructed to stand by on Hill 703 and was to attack Hills 602 and 591 once Hill 884 was seized. The regimental observation post was set up on Hill 1079.

The 20th Regiment, which had moved to the attacking position of each
battalion from the afternoon of the 26th to dawn on the 27th, launched an attack at 06:00 following the preparatory fires of the division and the corps artillery. The 3rd Battalion fought an uphill battle because of the enemy's concentrated resistance and defensive barrages but fought its way step by step and finally captured the northern part of the hill after hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy. During this battle, the battalion suffered casualties of 22 killed and 64 wounded. The 1st Battalion, which began its advance from Hill 751, followed a corridor ridge and almost reached the military crest of the hill. As the troops approached near enemy position, the enemy intensified its resistance, throwing hand grenades, and the battalion was unable to break through the enemy defense line. The battalion commander urged his men to continue the attack, and finally a sector of the enemy defense line began to falter when the 3rd Company, which approached as close as within 30 meters of the enemy positions, fell upon the enemy with loud shouting. At this moment all the battalion's troops dashed into the enemy positions at the same time, and after 30 minutes of fierce fighting, the battalion seized the hill for the fourth time. The 2nd Battalion in regimental reserve also seized Hills 602 and 591, and thus the regiment succeeded in seizing Hill 884 and its vicinity for the fourth time.

The enemy attempted to regain the hill from the following day until early September, but was beaten off by the regiment. With the complete possession of Hill 884, the division forwarded its outpost to the line connecting Hills 884, 591, 600, and Small Kach‘i-bong to the south of the Nam River and accomplished the objective assigned by the corps. The division, however, suffered heavy casualties; in each of the enemy second and third counterattacks, it suffered more than 100 casualties, and in the final battle of the fourth occupation of the hill, it suffered around 200 casualties. Of course, the battle also cost the enemy dearly as it was estimated that the NK 45th Division suffered casualties of 1,252 killed, not including 31 prisoners of war.
Additionally, since the Capital Division occupied Hills 924-751 by August 23, and the 11th Division also seized Hills 884-591 on August 27, the ROK I Corps accomplished its mission of occupying the hills east of the Punchbowl. This operation was conducted as a part of the Eighth Army plan for seizing the Punchbowl.

(2) The Battle of Wolbi-san

After the ROK I Corps had occupied Hills 924 and 884 in the operation from August 18 to 27, the army readjusted the sectors of the subordinate units, and the corps’ sector was narrowed by two kilometers on the west. Accordingly, the corps was to defend Hyangno-bong—Konbong-san—Kach’i-bong—Songhyon-ri (on the east coast) and so deployed its divisions. In other words, the Capital Division transferred the ROK I Corps’ western sector to the US X Corps, moved to the east coast, and was deployed on the main line of resistance together with the 11th Division, while the 3rd Division went into corps reserve. Accordingly, the Capital Division took over the frontline from the 3d Division, which, in turn, moved to Yangyang, where it was assigned to the Field Training Center.

Around this time, the NK Army moved the NK III Corps, which had been deployed on the east coast opposing the ROK I Corps, to the west to replace the NK II Corps, which had suffered heavy damages around the Punchbowl. In the place of the NK III Corps on the east coast the NK VI Corps was committed. This corps had been reorganized on the western front. It was then estimated that the NK VI Corps deployed the 19th Division to the east of the Nam River, the 9th Division along the coastline from Kosong to T’ongch’on, and held the 18th Division in corps reserve.86

The 19th Division of the NK VI Corps, opposing the Capital Division on
the east coast, deployed its main forces in the vicinity of the northwest ridge of Kach’i-san—Wolbi-san—Hill 351. The enemy, which had established a powerful strong point on Wolbi-san, seemed to be particularly determined to halt the friendly forces advance and to use the height as a foothold for a future offensive. During this period, the NK 9th Division, which deployed its elements around Chokbyok-san—Hill 146—Kobong-ri, put its main efforts into the defense of Kosong. It conducted reconnaissance activities to detect the intentions of the ROK I Corps.

The Wolbi-san, 456 meters high, was the highest and most commanding hill in this area. The enemy absolutely needed this hill not only for the defense of the Nam River and Kosong but for future attacks. The hill was also important to the friendly forces in order to secure the Nam River, Kosong, and also to remove the vulnerability caused by enemy’s observation of main positions. Early in October, the ROK I Corps commander ordered the Capital Division to seize Wolbi-san as a part of Operation Elbowing, the operation of limited depth attacks that the Eighth Army then had under way. By capturing Wolbi-san, the corps desired not only to maintain the initiative of the operation but also to push the enemy on the east coast north of the Nam River.

- The Occupation of Wolbi-san and Kosong by the Capital Division

The Capital Division, which moved to the east coast, organized the defense line connecting Hill 554—Kohwang-bong—Hill 36—Kangjong with the 1st and the Cavalry Regiments and held the 26th Regiment in reserve. The Capital Division commander (Brigadier General Song Yo Ch’an) decided to give the mission of attack on Wolbi-san to the Cavalry Regiment, which was then opposing the enemy at Wolbi-san, and ordered the regiment to secure Hill 351 (two kilometers east of Wolbi-san) and Hill 148 (three and a half kilometers south-east of Kosong) as the preliminary operation for the attack on Wolbi-san. From the point of view of terrain features, these hills could serve as footholds for the attack on
The situation map of the Wolbi-san battle

Legend:
- Solid line: Front line of UNC forces as of the 12th
- Dashed line: Direction of reconnaissance
- Double line: Direction of attack

Key Locations:
- Chokbyol-san
- Kosong
- Sangbo
- RCN Cav
- Poun-ri
- East Sea
- Nae Byeok
- Taekang-ri
- Keokwang-bong
- Su-ryong
- Taeun-ri

Scale: 0 km to 1 km
Wolbi-san.

On October 10 with the support of the division artillery and one battery of the US 169th Artillery Battalion, a corps artillery battalion, and warships on the east coast, the Cavalry Regiment dashed forward like surging waves from the line of Kakyongji and Myongho-ri. It advanced seven kilometers by the following day, secured Hills 351-148, and began preparations for the attack on Wolbi-san. The regiment was able to concentrate all of its efforts upon the seizure of the hill since the division commander arranged for the regiment to turn over the defense mission of its sector (Kohwang-bong—Hills 203—Hill 36) to the 2nd Battalion of the 26th Regiment.

The Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Lee Yong, launched an attack on Wolbi-san at 06:00 on October 12. Lee planned that the 2nd Battalion, the main attack, would depart from Hill 148 and first capture Hill 350 on the north of Wolbi-san and then, using it as a foothold, attack Wolbi-san from the north, while the 1st Battalion, the secondary attack, would leave Hill 351 and make a frontal attack on Wolbi-san via Hill 261 to support the main attack.

With preparatory fires, the regiment intended to destroy the enemy positions and obstacles around not only Wolbi-san but also Hills 350 and 261. Smoke shells were also fired upon the two hills and even on Hills 201 and 146 south of Kosong to screen out the enemy observation and to conceal the maneuver of the friendly forces.

The 2nd Battalion, the main attack, seized Hill 350 around 16:00 after a fierce ten-hour battle and attacked Wolbi-san as scheduled. When the enemy was attacked by surprise from behind, it appeared to be shaken. Without missing this opportunity, the leading company of the 2nd Battalion assaulted the enemy, but the enemy regained its defense posture and continued resistance. The battalion failed to seize the objective and withdrew to Hill 350. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, the secondary attack, captured Hill 261 and attempted attacks on Wolbi-
san from the east several times but was halted each time due to the enemy artillery bombardments and defensive fires and withdrew to Hill 261.

On the following day (October 13) amid stormy weather, the regiment resumed the attack and the 2nd Battalion almost reached the vicinity of enemy position, but could not eliminate the enemy, which resisted stubbornly by throwing hand grenades. On the other hand, after hard fighting, the 1st Battalion succeeded in closing upon the enemy positions and broke the enemy when a corner of the enemy position began to collapse. The regiment seemed to have secured the east corner of the hill around 15:00 hours, but at that point the enemy in company strength charged out of its sheltered positions and fierce hand-to-hand fighting followed. Although the battalion was pushed back in the end, it succeeded in killing 355 enemy and capturing 14 prisoners, but it also suffered around 100 casualties, of which 18 were killed and 77 wounded.

After analyzing the battle of the preceding two days, the regimental commander reached the conclusion that without destroying or containing the enemy on Hills 201 and 146 north of Hill 350, not only the regiment could not cut off the enemy reinforcement to Wolbi-san, but also the main attack could not concentrate its efforts for the attack because of the threat from behind. Based on this analysis the regimental commander decided to commit the 3rd Battalion from reserve. Two companies of the 3rd Battalion captured Hill 350 and cut off the enemy reinforcement from Hill 201, and the remaining company together with the Regimental Reconnaissance Company occupied Hill 146 and drove off the enemy counterattack from Chokbyok-san. These companies, however, withdrew to the vicinity of Hill 148 because of the steadily increasing casualties from the intensive enemy artillery bombardment.

Firmly determined to capture the hill, on October 15 the 1st Cavalry Regiment commander conducted an all-out attack with the 3rd Battalion as the main attack, and the remaining battalions as the secondary attacks. Departing from
Hill 350, the 3rd Battalion attacked Wolbi-san from the north, led by the 9th Company, while the 2nd Battalion swung around its main force toward the west to attack Wolbi-san from the west, and the 1st Battalion led by the 2nd Company attacked the east side of Wolbi-san from Hill 261. They launched attacks under the support of artillery and air strikes in the serene autumn weather, which had followed the stormy weather. Consequently, the three companies attacked the objective from different directions under the command of each battalion commander. Mutual support between the attacking companies in each battalion was, however, not possible because of the great distance separating the attacking companies.

The attack echelons were often at the point of being halted because of the stubborn enemy resistance, but the 9th Company, which was fighting an uphill battle because of enemy machinegun positions set up along the avenue of approach, successfully placed friendly artillery fire on the target, nullified the machinegun positions, and dashed onto the crest of the hill. The 7th Company, which moved toward the west, was hit once by the friendly air strike but steadily advanced toward the assault line. The 2nd Company also faced a difficult situation because of the enemy machinegun and small arms fire from the enemy bunkers, but continued its advance up to the assault line with the support of the 1st Company. In this way, those troops who had reached the assault line from three different directions assaulted the enemy when the 7th Company in the west first jumped into the enemy positions and dashed to the crest of Wolbi-san. Finally, each company captured its objective, and Wolbi-san fell into the hands of the friendly forces.

On the same day, the division commander personally climbed up the hill, praised his soldiers, and awarded the decorations to officers and men, while the corps commander cabled to the troops his congratulatory and encouraging message for capturing Wolbi-san, which was the entrance gate to Kosong.
The Cavalry Regiment, which had occupied Wolbi-san, deployed the 3rd Battalion on Wolbi-san and Hill 350 and the 1st Battalion on Hills 339-351 and Tokmuhyon, while the 2nd Battalion was instructed to assemble to the south of Hill 148 to prepare against the enemy counterattack and to get ready to advance toward Kobong-ri—Hill 146.

On the following day, the 16th, the division commander ordered the 26th Regiment, the division reserve, to take over the defensive line of Suryong-Kanjong, the main line of resistance, which the Cavalry Regiment had occupied. The 26th Regiment was to occupy the main line of resistance, linking up with the 1st Regiment on the east, while the Cavalry Regiment was instructed to set up an outpost line around the area which it had just captured. The Cavalry Regiment beat off the enemy counterattack on Wolbi-san around midnight on the 16th-17th.

Estimating that the enemy had suffered such heavy damage that it could not launch an attack without a lengthy period of maintenance, the division commander ordered the Cavalry Regiment to pursue the enemy for exploitation. The regiment resumed the attack and occupied the line connecting Kobong-ri-Hill 146 on the 17th and Hill 201—Chokbyok-san on the 19th, thus driving off all the enemy from the south of the Nam River.

- The 11th Division Loses Wolbi-san

The Capital Division, which had captured Wolbi-san and advanced up to the Nam River, handed it over to the 11th Division, the left adjacent unit on November 16-17. The Capital Division joined the newly activated Paik Field Command, and moved to Honam province in order to liquidate the Communist guerrillas in the rear area. The 11th Division, leaving the 13th and 20th Regiments to continue the current mission of defending the main line of resistance, ordered the 9th Regiment in division reserve to take over the former main line of resistance of the Capital Division. The division, on the other hand, deployed the Anti-
Tank Battalion reinforced with the Division Reconnaissance Company around Wolbi-san and to the south of the Nam River to conduct the outpost mission. In short, one regiment took over the previous one division defense area, while one battalion assumed the outpost mission which had been defended by a regiment. (The Anti-Tank Battalion then lacked two companies.) Thus the defensive strength of this area was seriously reduced. For that reason, on November 16, the army attached the 36th Regiment of the 5th Division to the 11th Division. The 5th Division was in army reserve and was assigned to the Field Training Center.

On the enemy side, the NK 19th Division of the NK VI Corps, which had suffered heavy losses in the battle with the Capital Division, withdrew to the rear area for reorganization and was replaced by the NK 9th Division, which deployed north of the Nam River. The NK 9th Division, which assumed the new operational sector and was looking for the opportunity to attack the friendly outpost area, mounted an attack on Wolbi-san on the 18th, the day after the relief, as presumably the enemy had perceived.

In this battle (the 2nd Wolbi-san battle) the 11th Division lost all the outpost positions, including Wolbi-san and Kuson-bong in front of the 9th Regiment. Even Hill 351 was lost at one time but was recaptured by a counterattack. Wolbi-san was never reoccupied by the friendly forces after its loss. The failure in the battle of Wolbi-san provided the friendly side with certain lessons: the Eighth Army made an inappropriate decision regarding the unit relief, the Anti-Tank Battalion, which was then lacking two companies, had insufficient combat capability to carry out its mission, and the battalion was not vigilant enough to detect the enemy crossing of the Nam River and to prevent the enemy from conducting a surprise attack.

As was mentioned above, the ROK I Corps significantly improved its front by occupying the area south of the Nam River during the summer and autumn campaigns, and the Capital Division, which advanced as far as Kosong
located 80 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel, became the unit which advanced the farthest northward among the UN Forces. However, in the winter operation, the friendly force did not meet the enemy offensive properly on the east coast and had to give up Wolbi-san and all the outpost positions north of Kuson-bong, and this defeat resulted in the lost of Kosong.

4. Securing the Line of Communication between Yonch’on and Ch’orwon

While the US X Corps had improved the defense line by capturing the Punchbowl in the summer limited objective attack and was attacking Heartbreak Ridge as the concluding campaign of the summer operation, the US I Corps (commanded by Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel) on the western front was planning a similar autumn operation and named it Commando.

The purpose of this operation was to push the current corps front line at the mouth of the Han River—Munsan—Yonch’on—Ch’orwon about ten kilometers northward to establish a new defense line. The target line of the operation began with the bank of the Imjin River southeast of Korangp’o—Samich’on near the Sami River—Kowang-san—Marang-san—Keho-dong by the Imjin River—the hill mass south of the Yokkok River—Hills 281 and 395—Ch’utoso northwest of Ch’orwon—Chungga-san—Hill 438—Chongyon-ri, the confluence point of the Hant’an and Namdae Rivers. This line was called the Jamestown line.

The corps commander planned the operation in consideration of the following strategic and tactical advantages; first, to consolidate the current Wyoming line by pushing the defense line northward up to the Yokkok River, second, to protect the communication line of Yonch’on-Ch’orwon from enemy observation and artillery fire, and lift the restrictions of supply relying solely on vehicles in the winter time by opening the railroad between Seoul-Ch’orwon and Ch’orwon-Kimhwa, and third, to preempt any enemy attack and at the same time to prevent
the friendly forces from becoming sluggish.

This operational plan was approved by Van Fleet in September. In order not to make a salient on the right flank of the I Corps, the 25th Division on the left of the US IX Corps, the right adjacent unit of the I Corps, was instructed to join in this operation. On October 2, the corps commander issued an operation order in which he assigned the following mission to each division.87)

1) The ROK 1st Division defending the Imjin River on the left of the corps was to attack and occupy Area Moon (Hills 91 and 146) to the west of P’anpu-ri.

2) The 1st Commonwealth Division was to occupy and defend Hill 187, the area Foster, (the vicinity of Kowang-ri), and Area Moor (the vicinity of Marang-san and Kojan-ri).

3) The US 1st Cavalry Division was to occupy and defend Area Courson (the vicinity of Nulum Hill, Hill 346, and Tokun-dong) and Area Craig (the vicinity of Hill 347 and Karhyon-ri). After the occupation of Craig, the division would be prepared to support the US 3rd Infantry Division, its right adjacent unit in its attack on Objective Butler.

4) The US 3rd Division was to occupy and defend Area Butler (the vicinity of Chungt’o-dong—Tomil-ri—Hill 324-Toksan-ri) and Area Watts (the vicinity of Taema-ri, Hills 281-266, and Chungusong). Objective Butler was to be attacked from both north and south. If it was not feasible, the division was to maneuver one regiment through the 1st Cavalry Division sector, its left adjacent unit, to attack the objective from the west.

The US 25th Infantry Division of the US IX Corps was also instructed to advance the Turkish Brigade halfway between Kimhwa and P’yonggang and to establish defensive positions there.
On the enemy side, opposing the US I Corps were from the left the 65th and 64th Armies of the CCF 19th Army Group. They were deployed along the Imjin River. The 47th Army was deployed around the Yokkok River, and in the Ch’orwon-Kimhwa area the 42d Army and the 9th Army Group’s 26th Army were defending the avenue of approach to P’yonggang. In addition, the NK I Corps was positioned west of the Yesong River; the 63rd Army of the 19th Army Group was deployed south of Namch’onjom; and the 12th, 15th, and 60th Armies of the 3rd Army Group were stationed in the reserve in the area of Ich’on and Koksan. Stubborn enemy resistance was anticipated since the Chinese had not only bolstered their defensive positions during the lull of the frontline, but Peng had also instructed the 19th Army Group to resist the enemy attack with determination to inflict massive losses on the enemy, and to destroy the enemy offensive by conducting counterattacks whenever favourable. In other words, the enemy was determined to hold on to the defense line through a strong defense and repeated counterattacks under the principles of positive defense, continued resistance, repeated seizure of objectives, and destruction of the enemy.

Operation Commando of the US I Corps began at 06:00 on October 3 following preparatory fires for one hour. On the first day, while the ROK 1st Division continued to secure the main defensive positions along the Imjin River, its 15th Regiment on the right occupied the corps objective, Hills 91 and 146 on the west of the Sami River, without enemy opposition. The US 25th Division, too, secured its operational phase line, as the Turkish Brigade captured Hill 372 at Ikili-ri against light enemy resistance, and the 14th Regiment, without the enemy opposition, seized Hill 430 on the north of Chongyon-ri, the east end of Line Jamestown. These two divisions were able to achieve their missions within a short period since they had a short depth and narrow front on the battlefield. In contrast, the other divisions met with strong enemy resistance, and the 1st Cavalry Division in particular encountered stubborn enemy resistance, which resembled the battle.
of Heartbreak Ridge.

On the first day the 5th Cavalry Regiment on the left of the US 1st Cavalry Division (with the Greek and Thai Battalions attached) attacked the intermediate objectives, Hills 222, 272, 346, and 287 of Objective Courson and, after a see-saw battle, occupied Hill 222. It, however, failed to seize Hill 272 even though it attacked the hill six times. The 7th Regiment on the right attempted to capture Hills 347, 313, and 418 south of Objective Craig, with the Greek, 3rd, and 2nd Battalions in front, but they could not make any significant advance because of stubborn enemy resistance. In the battles of the Greek Battalion on Hill 313 and that of the 2nd Battalion on Hill 418, the friendly forces and the enemy in turn took possession of the hills three or four times during the day, but the enemy never gave up the hills. On this day, the friendly artillery fired 15,000 rounds on the enemy positions, and the Chinese also committed the 2nd Artillery Division and employed it to halt the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division.

As for the 1st Commonwealth Division on the left of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 28th Regiment on the right launched an attack first and captured Kojonri-Hill 199, the southern part of Objective Moore, and some elements of the regiment advanced, against strong enemy opposition, half way around between Objectives Foster and Moore.

Since the US 3rd Division, the right adjacent unit of the 1st Cavalry Division, was almost at the point of capturing Objective Watts, the main efforts of the attack were directed to Objective Butler. Since the 7th Regiment in the center, which assumed the mission of capturing Watts, had already secured Hills 395 and 266, and on October 3, the first day of the attack, the attached Division Reconnaissance Company occupied the road intersection point south of Chungusong, only Hill 281 remained to be captured. The 65th Regiment(-) (with the Philippine Battalion attached) on the right of the division advanced some elements as far as Hill 284 in the Ch’orwon plain area and to the vicinity of
Chungga-san, thus occupying the Jamestown Line. On the other hand, the US 15th Regiment on the left occupied Yawol-san (Hill 487) south of Objective Butler without enemy opposition and attacked Ch’ondok-san (Hill 477).

On the following day, October 4, the 1st Cavalry Division fought another hard battle but was unable to make any advance. The 5th Cavalry Regiment repeated the attack on Hill 346 but could not break off the balance of both sides: it gained Hill 272 but lost it again. The 7th Cavalry Regiment, as it had done on the
previous day, attacked Hills 347, 313, and 418, but little advance was made. The Greek Battalion, which attacked Hill 313, suffered particularly heavy casualties day after day, and the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, with the support of a battalion from the 8th Cavalry Regiment, attempted to capture Hill 418, but failed. When the enemy was pushed back from a hill, it committed troops and regained the hill without concern for its own losses. The enemy employed twelve machine guns in a company and stocked large amounts of hand grenades, which they threw at the attackers. It was these grenades which inflicted a great many casualties on the friendly forces. On this day the enemy committed the CCF 140th Division in reserve to reinforce the 139th Division, which had been seriously damaged by the 1st Cavalry Division. This showed that the 1st Cavalry Division was opposed by the main force of the Chinese 47th Army.

On October 5, however, a part of the enemy defense line began to crack. When the Greek Battalion, which attacked Hill 313 in the center of the right front of the 1st Cavalry Division, reached the crest of the hill, the enemy had deserted the hill, leaving 150 dead bodies behind. The Greek Battalion captured 12 prisoners on the hill. In the same way, the battalion occupied Hill 418 on the right without opposition. With all these achievements, on the third day the 7th Cavalry Regiment won a foothold for the attack on Objective Craig, and Hills 347 and 334 were near at hand.

Also on October 4, the Canadian 25th Brigade in the center of the Commonwealth Division seized Hill 187 and hills around Kama-gol, and the 29th Brigade on the left advanced west of Hill 187. Thus, the division completely secured Objective Foster. The 28th Brigade on the right occupied Kowang-san (Hill 355) and Hill 227, located between Objectives Moore and Foster, and captured a southern part of Moore. On the following day, the 5th, the brigade resumed the attack and secured Objective Moore, by capturing Marang-san (Hill 317) and Hill 217 to the southwest of it.
The 15th Infantry Regiment of the US 3rd Infantry Division captured Ch’ondok-san on October 4 as well, but lost it due to the enemy counterattack. The 7th Infantry Regiment, on the other hand, captured Hill 281, thus securing completely objective Watts. The 2nd Battalion of the 65th Regiment intensified its patrol around the Jamestown line, which it had seized the previous day. On October 5, the 15th Regiment captured Ch’ondok-san and on the 6th climbed up Hill 324 without enemy opposition, thus occupying objective Butler.

On October 6, the fourth day of Operation Commando, the 1st Cavalry Division was continuously confronted with the most stubborn enemy resistance, and the fierce battles continued. The 5th Cavalry Regiment sent a reconnaissance patrol to the vicinity of Hill 346, the southern rim of objective Courson around Chokko-ri, but withdrew after meeting a battalion size enemy troops. The 2nd Battalion from the 8th Cavalry Regiment attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment occupied Hill 334 at Karhyon-ri and beat off the enemy counterattacks twice, one during the day and the other at night. The enemy prisoners stated that the enemy had suffered heavy losses on the first day and the food and ammunition had become scarce, and that on that day the enemy had withdrawn five to seven kilometers north of the Yokkok River. On October 7, the fifth day of the operation, since the adjacent divisions on the right and left had already occupied their objectives, the 1st Cavalry Division intensified its attack. The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, under the support of the Greek Battalion, began the attack on Hill 347 at Puhung-ri and captured it around sunset. With the seizure of the hill, the 1st Cavalry Division secured Objective Craig, one of the two division objectives.

The 5th Cavalry Regiment on the left, however, was still in a difficult situation, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment began to support the 5th Regiment; the 1st Battalion of the former took over the mission of the attack of Hill 287, a hill of Objective Courson with the support of the 2nd Battalion. In the evening, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment captured Hill 287 on the northeast of Objective
Courson, and though it was, in fact, the collapse of a sector of the regimental objective, it did not impose a significant adverse influence on the enemy. Merciless firing of artillery, mortars, and tanks was of little use in destroying the enemy defensive structure. Even air attacks inflicted little damage on enemy defense capabilities because it craftily constructed trenches. Accordingly, until October 9, the fierce fighting continued around Hill 346 together with Hills 230 and 272. Finally, on that day the corps decided to conclude Operation Commando, as it had achieved the corps’ objective, even though one objective remained unoccupied.

In spite of the conclusion of the corps’ operation, the 1st Cavalry Division continued the attack on Objective Courson. The successful outcome resulting from the incessant attack of the friendly forces and the exhaustion of men and ammunition on the part of the enemy at last began to appear on October 12. On that night, the enemy gave up Hill 272, and on the following day the 8th Cavalry Regiment occupied the hill without opposition, and it paved the way for the seizure of Hill 346, the last objective. Meanwhile, the Belgium-Luxemburg Battalion, which performed the outpost mission from the 10th on Hill 338 at Hakdang-ri in the 3rd Division sector on the right of the corps, was attacked by the Chinese troops a little past midnight on October 12. The enemy continued to approach the defensive positions despite the final protective fires of the friendly forces, but finally the battalion pushed back the Chinese, thus contributing greatly to the defense of the Jamestown line.

The operation against the final objective, Courson, continued with Plan Polecharge on October 15. According to the plan, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was to take over the Belgium Battalion from the 3rd Division and attack Hill 346 with the support of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, if needed. On the 16th, the 5th Regiment launched an all-out offensive, while the 8th Regiment attacked the eastern part of Hill 346 from Hill 287. On the 18th the enemy, which had resisted stubbornly,
withdrew, and the 5th Regiment occupied Hills 346 and 230. With the subsequent seizure of Hill 262, the regiment completely occupied the enemy's final strong point, Objective Courson. By the 19th, the 1st Cavalry Division occupied all the objectives south of the Yokkok River, and the enemy withdrew north of the rivers.

From October 3 to 19, it was estimated that the CCF had resisted south of the Yokkok River to defend Sakryong, its supply base. In this operation it was analyzed that the CCF, for the first time, had departed from the fluid defense, its basic tactical theory, and adopted the defense in place. The Chinese account of this operation concludes in its war history:

The friendly forces (the CCF) showed stubborn resistance and continued counterattack under the leading principles of 'positive defense, continued resistance, repeated recapturing, and annihilation of the enemy forces.' In every position, recapturing of position took place from several to more than ten times. In certain companies only 10 to 30 men survived, but they never gave up their positions.

The defensive positions on Marang-san were lost and regained five times. One company which defended Hill 217 made use of the tunnel strong points (U type) and beat back the enemy attacks 21 times in one day.

During Operation Commando the casualties of the CCF amounted to 21,000 including 500 prisoners of war, and the combat power of the 47th Army was reduced to half. Enemy casualties of 16,000, which corresponded to 76% of the total losses, were inflicted by the 1st Cavalry Division. The friendly forces also suffered a total of 4,000 casualties either killed or wounded, which included 2,900 casualties in the 1st Cavalry Division.

At the cost of such a huge sacrifice, the friendly forces achieved its objectives and advanced the defensive line up to the Jamestown line. The CCF,
however, repeated its attempts to regain the lost terrain, particularly in the sectors of the 1st Cavalry and the 1st Commonwealth Divisions, and battles, in which the control of the outpost positions changed often, took place several times. During the enemy winter offensive, which began from November, 1951, the CCF 64th Army especially concentrated its offensives on Marang-san and Kowang-san respectively.

After conducting a feint on the positions of the Canadian 25th Brigade on the left of the 1st Commonwealth Division on November 2 and 3, the CCF Brigade its main attack to the 28th Brigade on Marang-san (Hill 315) and Hill 217 on the right of the division in the early morning on the 4th. They launched an attack not only under the support of artillery but also of seven to eight tanks. The friendly forces, too, countered the enemy attack with artillery and air bombardments. The enemy broke through the friendly positions by conducting attacks with human wave tactics. The friendly forces made counterattacks to recapture the hills, but in the end the hills which the friendly forces had seized with such difficulty early in October fell into enemy hands.

On November 17 the CCF also attacked Hill 227 located in the west of Kowang-san at the left extreme of the 28th Brigade. Overwhelmed by the enemy at night, the brigade was pushed back to a saddle between Hill 227 and Kowang-san (Hill 335). Around this time, the adjustment of division boundary and ensuing unit movements were made, and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22e Regiment, the Canadian 25th Brigade took over the above-mentioned saddle while the Kowang-san in the east became the US 3rd Infantry Division’s area of responsibility. Possibly having detected the unit movements, the enemy attacked the Kowang-san on the 23rd, the day following the unit movement. The CCF committed two battalions and pushed back the American troops, which had just taken over the positions. Exploiting this achievement, at 19:20 on the same day, the enemy followed the ridge and dashed upon the saddle which was defended by D Company
of the Canadian Royal 22e Regiment. The company waited, and when the enemy reached near the defense positions, it fired at the same time and beat back the enemy. The enemy, which had failed in the first attack, made its second attack at 21:30 from Hill 227 and penetrated the west corner of the position. In this attack the first echelon of the enemy assault force was equipped with burp guns, the second echelon carried straw carpets to use to cross over the barbed wire, and the third echelon carried bayonets and clubs. The enemy made an assault on the position, blowing trumpets. Even in this turmoil, the company commander, a combat veteran, was not rattled, requested the fire within the penetrated positions, committed his reserve, and drove off the enemy. Owing to the securing of the saddle, the US 3rd Division could recapture Kowang-san on the following day.

Though Marang-san was lost, Kowang-san was secured, and it was so reflected at the military demarcation line talks, which opened later on, and was so decided at the truce talk agreement. Major R’éal Liboiron, the D Company commander of the Canadian Royal 22e Regiment, was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order in recognition of his achievement in this battle.

5. Securing of the Kumsong Area

When the US X and ROK I Corps on the eastern front secured the Punchbowl, and the US I Corps began the operation of forwarding the main line of resistance about ten kilometers northward to secure the axis of Yonch’on-Ch’orwon road and railway on the west, the US IX Corps on the central front commanded by Lieutenant General William M. Hoge also drew up an operational plan and secured the approval of the army commander on October 8. The plan was to advance to Kumsong to improve the corps defense line and also to inflict damage on the enemy in compliance with the army guideline.

At that time the IX Corps deployed the US 25th, ROK 2nd, US 24th and
II. Military Pressures: Development of Position Warfare

ROK 6th Divisions along the main line of resistance, the Wyoming line, which connected Chungsan-ri (northeast of Ch’orwon)—Kimhwa—Chikkun-san (north of Hwach’on)—Paegam-san—the Pukhan River. The US 7th Division(-) was in corps reserve. The corps had advanced to this sector at the end of June after defeating the CCF May Offensive. For four months it built up strong defense positions and prepared for the operation of the army’s limited objective attack.

The enemy opposing the corps was the Chinese 67th Army of the 20th Army Group, which was in a defensive posture, deploying the 200th Division to the north of Chikkun-san, the 199th Division to the north of Paegam-san, and holding the 201 Division in reserve in the vicinity of Kumsong. The 67th Army, which had even undergone mountain training at Yangdok, crossed the Yalu, entered Korea via Sinuiju in the middle of June, and relieved the 27th Army around September 10. Therefore, though the 67th Army lacked battle experience, it enjoyed a high level of personnel strength and new Russian equipment. After taking over the front line, it bolstered its defensive positions and actively conducted reconnaissance activities.

The operational objective of the IX Corps was to seize Kumsong, which was located at the riverside basin of the Kumsong River some twelve kilometers north of the frontline. It was a center of transportation as the roads connecting T’ongch’on—P’yonggang and Wonsan—Hoeyang—Ch’angdo-ri—P’yonggang passed Kumsong and it was also the location of the crossroad of the road leading to Hwach’on. The operation was important strategically because it would not only secure the communication key point but also threaten Osong Mountain (Hill 1,062), thus contributing to the control of the ‘Iron Triangle’ area.

Following the army guideline, the IX Corps commander, who decided to conduct a limited objective attack by phases, planned to push the frontline northward some five kilometers and designated the first phase objective line along Haso-ri—P’ungdong-ri—Chuk-dong—Yomun-ri—the mouth of the Kumsong
River, which was termed the Nomad Line. The corps planned to conduct the operation with three frontline divisions without the US 25th Division on the left of the corps, since it was then performing the mission of supporting operation Commando of the I Corps.

The operation order was issued on October 10, and the US 24th Division in the center was to lead the offensive from Chokkun-san and Chup’a-ryong to Kumsong following the avenue of approach of Route 17 and the ridge extending northward from Chokkun-san. The ROK 2nd and 6th Divisions on the left and right were to conduct a supporting attack toward Oeya-dong and Kyoam-san.

The US 25th Division on the left of the corps was requested by the army commander to conduct the spoiling attack of P’yonggang while supporting the operation of the US I Corps.²²)

Around this time, anticipating the friendly force’s attack of Ch’orwon-Kimhwa, the commander of the CCF issued an order stating that the frontline units should strengthen security, expedite the necessary preparations so that critical points should be defended stubbornly, and should not give them up easily when attacked.²³) This order determined that the battle of this area would be bitter and severe.

The IX Corps launched a simultaneous attack on October 13 as planned, broke through the enemy defense line, advanced five kilometers during three days, and secured the objective line on the 16th. Upon occupying the first phase target line, the Nomad line, the commander decided to advance four kilometers further up to the point three kilometers south of Kumsong and ordered his units to continue the attack from October 17 to occupy the Polar line connecting Haso-ri—Oeya-dong—Ponghwa-san—Kyoam-san—Songdong-ri—the mouth of the Kumsong River. He also ordered that once the Polar line was secured, a strong outpost line of resistance was to be established there, and the contact with the enemy should be maintained through offensive reconnaissance activities.
The operation for the Polar line began on the 17th, and the three divisions secured the objective line on the 21st, making important battlefield gains and suffering considerable casualties. On the 20th, the last day of the operation, an armor task force of the US 24th Division entered Kumsong and took over the town. The enemy, however, did not easily give up its control over the town; it countered the friendly armor by mobilizing its tanks and anti-tank weapons. The friendly tanks withdrew, and from then until the 23rd, the enemy attempted platoon or company size counterattacks, all of which were beaten off.

The CCF war history describes the Kumsong campaign at great length. The CCF made desperate efforts to secure Kumsong; on the 16th, just before the second phase operation of the UNC forces, the CCF 67th Army committed the 201st Division then in reserve to relieve the 199th Division. The CCF also sent forward the 202nd Division (-) of the 68th Army, the Army Group reserve, up to six kilometers north of Kumsong in order to secure Kumsong.94)

‘The Resist America and Assist Korea War’ says Chinese made efforts for the anti-tank defense along Route 17:

During the operation the friendly forces paid much attention to the enemy tanks. The divisions and regiments in the front hastily organized anti-tank units and installed large amounts of anti-tank obstacles along the roads which might be used by the enemy tanks to effectively resist so that the enemy tanks could not dash in. We also destroyed many enemy tanks.95)

In this operation the ROK 2nd and 6th Divisions, overcoming the challenges of a mountainous operational area and the Kumsong-ch’on that flowed through it, defeated the persistent enemy resistance and seized the objectives, keeping pace with the US 24th Division, which maneuvered rapidly along the road axis. On the 23d, the day that the operation was concluded, both divisions
were commended by the army commander for their distinguished achievements.

(1) Advancing Operation to Kimhwa-Kumsong

Early in October 1951, the ROK 2nd Division, the central left unit of the US IX Corps, was defending a main line of resistance consisting of the ridge starting from Songdong (east of Kimhwa)-Pajo-bong—Sungam-gogae to Tumok (west of Chokkun-san). The 31st Regiment on the left of the division was deployed along Hill 457-Songdong-Pangdong, the 32d Regiment on the right along Hills 785-734-Tumok, while the 17th Regiment in division reserve assembled at Kobimok and Mal-gogae. The division headquarters was located at Cheungdong. The division, which had moved to the present area in June, captured Hill 734 in August from the Chinese and defeated the Chinese counterattack in September. Because of the victorious campaign, the morale of the troops was high. The opposing enemy was the 200th Division of the CCF 67th Army, and it deployed its main forces around Kyojon-ri—Pukjong-ryong—Chinhyon-ri—Hill 633 some two kilometers north, and forwarded its security units up to Hill 600 south of Hoeu-Chinryon-ri. The enemy was estimated to be deployed in depth, putting emphasis on the defense of the avenue of approach leading to Kumsong.

On October 10 Brigadier General Ham Byung Sun, the ROK 2nd Division commander, received the order from the corps commander to seize Hasori—Kyojon-ri—Wolbong-san area on the Nomad line, the corps objective line, as the left unit of the corps in the operation of seizing Kumsong. Upon receiving the order, the division commander analyzed the operational area and the enemy situation and established an operational concept and scheme of maneuver, based upon the following factors.

First, the objective area consisted of a series of cross compartments, which
were unfavorable for the attackers, and every hill was strongly fortified, a bee hive of bunkers. Therefore, a concentration of fire on the enemy positions was required, and methods to break through the enemy defense line should be worked out.

Second, because of Osong-san (Hill 1062) located to the west, the attacking unit's flank would be exposed to the enemy; therefore, a way of covering the flank should be worked out.

Third, for unimpeded deployment and operation of the attacking units, the enemy deployed on Hills 600, 633, and 492, stretching deep into the east of the division sector, should be neutralized.

Taking into consideration those factors, the division commander established a scheme of maneuver as follows: the division would advance following the road which ran across the operational area and led from Shinch'on to Hajinhyon, and divide the enemy positions into two parts. Then the main attack unit (the 17th Regiment plus tank company) would attack toward the objective, the Nomad line, while the secondary attack force (the 32d Regiment) would envelop and defeat the enemy on Hills 492 and 600 at Chinhyon-ri. The 31st Regiment in division reserve would defend the main line of resistance with two battalions while the remaining one battalion would follow after the 17th Regiment up to the Hoeu area, then protect the west flank of the division, and provide support to the 17th Regiment in attack.

In order to defeat the enemy at Chinhyon-ri and to camouflage the main attack unit, the secondary attack unit was to launch an attack an hour earlier. In other words while the secondary attack unit would fix and contain the enemy at Chinhyon-ri, the main attack unit would cut the enemy rear and envelop him.

According to this operational concept, at 05:00 on October 13, the 32d Regiment on the right of the division, the secondary attack unit, launched an
attack first. The 2nd Battalion on the left of the regiment attacked Hill 492, while the 3rd Battalion on the right attacked Hill 600. The 2nd Battalion, which had secured Hill 532, the intermediate objective, without much opposition, began to attack the final objective, Hill 492, when the enemy resistance intensified, pouring more than 200 rounds of artillery shells around the battalion, and the enemy artillery fire inflicted considerable casualties on the battalion. After the F-51 fighters and the artillery hit the enemy hard, the regiment resumed the offensive, but this time the enemy committed his reinforcements, and the regiment failed to secure the objective. On the other hand, the 3rd Battalion on the right eliminated the enemy with flame throwers and hand grenades and succeeded in capturing Hill 600 after a battle that lasted eight hours.

The 17th Regiment, the main attack force, which launched an attack one hour later than the secondary attack and went into battle as an infantry/armor task force, aimed to divide the enemy positions into two by occupying Pukjong-ryong and Hill 462.

The 1st Battalion, supported by a tank company(-) of the US 25th Division
division, moved swiftly from Song-dong to Ishil-gol and attacked Pukjong-ryong and Hill 462. The 1st Company of the battalion, with the support of the tanks, destroyed the enemy gun emplacements with flame throwers and 3.5” rockets and captured Pukjong-ryong after a three hour fierce battle. The division’s first attempt to divide the enemy positions was achieved. The 1st Battalion then shifted its attacking direction north of Pukjong-ryong, as the 32nd Regiment attacked the enemy south of it. At this time, the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion was, however, fighting an uphill battle half way up Hill 462. The battalion committed the reserve company and following a ten-minute strafing by one flight of F-51 fighters, the two companies made a coordinated attack and captured the objective. The battalion killed 103 and captured 12 enemies. The 3rd Battalion, the secondary attack, occupied Hill 433 against light enemy resistance and advanced toward
II. Military Pressures: Development of Position Warfare 229

Advancing operation to Kimhwa—Kumsong
Kyojon-ri. Around 02:00 the enemy launched a counterattack against Hill 462, which the friendly forces had captured with great difficulty, and fierce fighting continued until dawn on the same day, the 14th, when the enemy finally withdrew.

The 17th Regiment, which had succeeded in breaking through and dividing the enemy defense line, committed the 2nd Battalion in reserve toward the northeast direction of Pukjong-ryong at dawn on the 14th. With the commitment of the 2nd Battalion the regiment narrowed the front of the main attack and made an all-out attack with three battalions. One battalion each seized Kyojon-ri, Hills 421, and 434 and secured the Nomad line. The 1st Battalion in particular made a memorable attack in the battle of Hill 421. Lieutenant Song Ki Sun, the newly assigned 3rd Platoon leader of the 1st Company, who fought the battle, recalled that though the enemy positions were well fortified and the enemy sent a hail of bullets, the veteran soldiers volunteered to join a special assault group and dashed into the enemy positions. Their deeds certainly deserved admiration, and owing to the courage they displayed, the objective was secured, and a brilliant military achievement was recorded.\(^7\)

On the other hand the 32nd Regiment continued its attack on the ridge (Hill 491), which it had been unable to seize the previous day. The ridge was located northwest of Hills 492 and 600. The 3rd Battalion attacked along the corridor terrain, which stretched northward and was observed by the enemy. Although the enemy was reinforced by its comrades who fought against the US 24th Division, the right adjacent unit, the battalion drove off the enemy after a fierce battle in which it killed 85 and captured 7 prisoners. The 2nd Battalion on the left, attacking Hill 492, killed 41 and captured 17 prisoners in addition to capturing two 60 mm mortars, one rocket, and 51 various types of small arms, but the battle also cost the battalion 84 casualties. Meanwhile, the 31st Regiment on the left of the division continued its mission of defending Kwangsam-ri—Haso-ri.

On the following day, October 15, the division, which had reached the
Nomad line, conducted a pursuit up to Salgu-ri—P’ungdong-ri—Hill 419, one kilometer north of the Nomad line, to deny the expelled enemy the opportunity to establish new blocking positions in front of the defense line and, at the same time, to set up the division’s security positions.

The 2nd Battalion on the right of the 17th Regiment, which was in attack at Hill 419 one kilometer northwest of Wolbong-san, continued the advance and retreat all day long in front of the objective. Finally, one company of the battalion swung around westward, attacked the enemy flank, and captured the objective after a bloody battle. The 1st Battalion on the left occupied No-Name Hill at P’ungdong-ri without difficulty.

The 31st Regiment, deployed its main force along Kwangsam-ri—Hasori, took over the defensive positions at Kyojon-ri to bolster the defense of the east flank of the division, and sent a unit for reconnaissance in force up to Salgujong to search along the Namdae-ch’on. The 32nd Regiment also moved forward and took over the Nomad line from the 17th Regiment. With these activities completed within three days, the division not only secured its operational objectives but also completed deployment of its units for the future operation.

The division, which had secured the Nomad line by October 16, continued its advance to the Polar line on the 17th, complying with the corps operational plan. The division objective on the Polar line was the area connecting Minarigol—Oeya-ri—Hill 522, which was three to five kilometers southwest of Kumsong and was around four kilometers wide.

In consideration of the narrow front of attack and the current deployment of the units, the division commander decided that only one battalion from each of the 17th and 31st Regiments would be committed for the operation, while the 17th and 31st Regiments (-) would occupy Hill 522 and the hills around Oeya-ri respectively. When the objectives were secured, the 17th Regiment was to take them over. On the other hand, it was assumed that the enemy had set up blocking
positions along the Polar line and seemed to be determined to defend Kumsong basin to the last.

The second operation of the division began at 06:00 on October 17. On this day the 1st Battalion to the west of the 31st Regiment first occupied Hill 477, the intermediate objective, and then seized objective Oeya-ri against light opposition. However, the attack on Hill 522, the main objective of the division, was quite a different story and was not easy to seize. After securing the intermediate objective the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Regiment attacked the final objective, committing three companies at the same time, but failed because of the stubborn enemy resistance supported by artillery fire. The battalion also requested artillery fire and attempted a simultaneous assault on the enemy but in vain. In order to overcome the difficult situation, on the following day, October 18, the 3rd Battalion in reserve was committed and conducted a passing attack.

The 3rd Battalion could not make any progress in the attack either at first, but with the attack of the enemy flank and rear by the 10th Company, which swung round, the enemy began to falter, and taking this opportunity, the whole attacking force assaulted the enemy and captured Hill 522.

In this way the ROK 2nd Division, which had reached the Polar line first in the corps sector, assigned the mission of defending the Polar line to the 17th Regiment. The 31st Regiment was instructed to protect the division flank along Namdae-ch’on with primary stress on containing the enemy on Osong-san, while the 32d Regiment continued the occupation of the Nomad line and defended the southwest of Kumsong.

(2) The Battles of the Kumsong River and Kyoam-san

When the corps was advancing toward the Nomad line in October, 1951, the ROK 6th Division on the right of the corps was defending Paegam-san (Hill
The 7th and 2nd Regiments of the division occupied the Ermine line, which connected Hills 1057—782—Susang-ri in the rear of Paegam-san, while the 19th Regiment was defending the division outpost line connecting Hill 819-Sugoji-Hill 760 north of Paegam-san. The division was flanked by the US 24th Division on the left and by the ROK 8th Division on the right.

The enemy opposing the division was the 199th Division of the CCF 67th Army, which established the main line of resistance along Hill 585—Yomun-ri—Hill 529 on the north of the Kumsong River. One regiment of the division was deployed along the line connecting Hill 565—Yonae-gol—Hill 462 to the south of the Kumsong River and set up the security positions there. The enemy was seeking the opportunity to attack the friendly forces.

The operational area, where the two sides opposed each other, was surrounded by rivers on either side since on the west the Kumsong River flowed southward then toward the east across the operational area before joining the Pukhan River (northern tributary of the Han River), which flowed southward on the east. The area, which was mountainous and was characterized by a poor road network and narrow maneuver space, restricted the employment of artillery, the supply support, and the rapid troop movement.

On October 10, 1951, the 6th Division Commander, Brigadier General Chang Do Yong, received the order from the corps commander that the division would launch an attack at 06:00 on October 13 to occupy the Nomad line connecting Chuk-dong-Yomun-ri-mouth of the Kumsong River, and protect the east flank of the corps. The division commander drew up an operational plan taking account of the following terrain features of the operational zone.

1) The attacking unit would be restricted in maneuver and supply because of the Kumsong River and mountainous terrain. In particular, since the unit had to cross the Kumsong River in front of the enemy, the necessary preparations should be made.
2) Although the 21st Regiment of the 8th Division was to attack Hill 938 on the right flank of the division, the necessary measures should be taken to protect the division’s right flank, as it might be exposed to the enemy as the division advanced forward.

3) Once the division crossed the Kumsong River, the artillery support would be suspended temporarily during the forward movement of the artillery battalion. Therefore, measures for uninterrupted fire support should be worked out.

4) Since the enemy had fortified its positions throughout the long period, special warfare such as employment of elite assault groups would be required to destroy the enemy positions.

In consideration of the above factors, the division commander decided to commit the 7th Regiment on the left and the 19th Regiment on the right. He instructed the 7th Regiment, which was positioned at a relatively easy fording site, to occupy Hill 565 and establish a bridgehead on the far bank of the river. The 2nd Regiment and the Division Reconnaissance Company were to defend the present security position and to protect the division’s east flank. Once the main force crossed the river, the artillery unit was to move forward to Shinch’on (seven kilometers northwest of Paegam-san) via Tongmak-dong, and during the movement of the artillery unit the air force was to be asked to provide uninterrupted fire support. The division also coordinated with the US 24th Division, the left adjacent unit, to have priority in using the single road in the sector for its artillery.

It was also planned that one engineer company would directly support the front line regiments to remove the obstacles and to open the maneuver routes for the attacking units, and that all available manpower would be employed to provide the front line regiments with the necessary supply support.

According to the operation order (October 12, 1951) based on the above-
The mentioned concept, the division launched an attack at 06:00 on October 13. The 7th Regiment on the left departed Hill 819 and occupied Hill 565 south of the river. On the following day, it crossed the river at Kwangdaegol, attacked Hill 427 from the northwest, and secured a bridgehead. The 19th Regiment on the right, however, had an uphill battle against the enemy on Hill 462, which fought with its back against the wall supported by a battalion of artillery. Because of the stubborn enemy resistance the regiment could not seize the hill until the following day after bitter fighting in which it suffered 149 casualties and killed 404 enemy and captured 13 prisoners. After all regimental troops crossed the river, on October 14 the 7th Regiment, which had secured the bridgehead, used it as a foothold and occupied Hills 551-552. In this battle the regiment, which suffered casualties of 25 killed and 17 wounded, also killed 374 enemy and captured 44 prisoners.

The 19th Regiment crossed the river from Yangjich’ on to Tungdae-ri at 02:50 on the 15th under the protection of the 1st Battalion, which had occupied Hill 462, and attacked Hills 541-529. On this day the 3rd Battalion on the left seized Hill 541 under the support of the adjacent 7th Regiment, but the 2nd Battalion on the right was unable to capture Hill 529 (Kwanmang-san). Since the hill, which had steep slopes except the north one, was very hard to attack, the regiment committed the 1st Battalion in reserve on Hills 462-324, to attack Hill 529 at night, but the attack also ended in failure.

However, after three days of battle, the division secured the Nomad line, the corps objective. The 7th and 19th Regiments consolidated the positions on the Nomad line and were prepared against enemy counterattacks. The 2nd Regiment in reserve deployed its 3rd Battalion at the defensive positions along the southern bank of the Kumsong River, while it advanced forward the remaining two battalions north of the Nomad line to set up an outpost and conduct reconnaissance activities. Around this time (October 16), the division received an order to occupy the Kyoam-san—Songdong-ri line, defeating the enemy there in accordance with
Battle of the Kumsong River and Kyoam-san

Legend:
- Advance line of the UNC forces
- Attack by the UNC forces (13–15)
- Attack by the UNC forces (16)
- Attack by the UNC forces (20–21)
the corps plan to secure the Polar line.

The division commander believed that the division's mission was, in fact, to occupy Kyoam-san and, considering the narrow division attack front, decided to commit only the 2nd Regiment in reserve to seize Kyoam-san by attacking along the axis of Hill 585—Kyoam-san, while the 7th and 19th Regiments, which had led the operation up to that point, were given the mission to defend the Nomad line.

The 2nd regiment launched an attack at 06:00 on October 17. Since the 2nd and 1st Battalions had advanced toward Hill 585 and Yomun-ri, respectively, on the previous day and were conducting the outpost mission, the regimental commander ordered the 2nd Battalion to launch a frontal attack on Hill 585 and the 1st Battalion to attack the hill from the east rear. On this day the 2nd Battalion continued confused hand-to-hand fighting, suffering casualties of 12 killed and 105 wounded, while the 1st Battalion, which changed the direction of attack from Yomun-ri to Hill 585, encountered a battalion size enemy on the way around Hill 482 and could make little progress. According to the statement of the enemy prisoners, the CCF 67th Army had committed its subordinate 201st Division to these areas on the previous day, and its 602d Regiment had established new blocking positions on Hills 770, 585, 482, and 485, which the 2nd Regiment was to occupy. As Hills 585 and 770 had very steep slopes, and even the reserve unit had been committed, the outlook of the battle was gloomy for the 2nd Regiment. Under such a situation, the division commander committed one battalion of the 19th Regiment to the northeast of Yomun-ri to defeat the enemy on the right front and to support the 2nd Regiment in an attack on Hill 585.

On October 18 the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy of a reinforced battalion strength on Hill 585 and, in spite of its considerable losses, the battalion made little progress. The 1st Battalion, which was making an enveloping attack on Hill 482 from three
directions, committed an assault group at the same time to the enemy’s right rear and succeeded in capturing the hill. Upon capturing the hill, the battalion lost no time in attacking along the east ridge leading to Hill 585, but again the battalion was halted by enemy resistance. The division commander instructed the 7th Regiment to take over Hill 482, which had been captured, so that the 2nd Regiment could concentrate its total effort on the attack on Hill 585. Around the same time, the 19th Regiment (the 2nd Battalion) secured the ridge between Yongho-dong and Yomun-ri located on the right front of the division and carried out the mission of protecting the right flank of the division.

On October 19, the 2nd Regiment turned over the position along the southern bank of the Kumsong River to the Division Reconnaissance Company and moved its 3rd Battalion to Chipshil-ri to commit it to the attack on Hill 585. On October 19, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd regiment committed three companies in stead of two as it had the previous day and swung them around toward the west of Hill 585 to attack the flank of the enemy. At that time the 3d Battalion, which had moved to Chipshil-ri, hit the east flank of the enemy position. The enemy began to falter, and seizing this opportunity, the other battalions dashed upon the enemy from both sides and captured the hill after fierce close combat. Prior to this final battle, the 1st Battalion had committed an assaulting group which exploded the enemy gun emplacement positions. The battalion moved a company eastward to capture Hill 488 located on the right edge of Hill 585, but it failed. In such a deadlock, the 3d Battalion in reserve was committed and hit the left shoulder of Hill 488 hard, and when one portion of the enemy position began to collapse, the two battalions jointly attacked and seized the hill. After the seizure of the hill, the 1st Battalion destroyed the remaining enemy and pursued the fleeing enemy while the 3rd Battalion supported the 2nd Battalion on Hill 585.

In this battle the regiment was able to secure the objective due to the timely commitment of the reserve in the right direction. However, this bitter battle
cost both the friendly forces and the enemy heavy casualties, and Captain Song Ki Duk, the then 2nd Battalion commander, recalled the battle: "In this battle 50% of the battalion strength was lost, and the battalion commander himself was wounded and evacuated."\(98\)

Upon securing the intermediate objective, the division commander decided to occupy Kyoam-san and the Polar line with the 2nd Regiment as the main attack and the 19th Regiment as the secondary. The 7th Regiment was instructed to defend the Nomad line.

On October 20 the 2nd Regiment launched an attack with the 1st and 3rd Battalions in forward echelons and the 2nd Battalion on Hill 585 in reserve. It was planned that the 3rd Battalion was to depart from Hill 585, cross the Sungsan Valley and attack Kyoam-san, following the ridge extending southward from it. The 1st Battalion was to depart Hill 488, swing around following the corridor ridge extending northward to the east of Kyoam-san, and hit the east flank of the hill. Strong Chinese resistance, however, halted the 1st Battalion around No-Name Hill, a critical terrain feature, located about one kilometer north. The 3rd Battalion then turned its direction of advance and made a pincer attack on the hill from the west, cutting off the enemy reinforcement and retreat.

Finally, the 1st Battalion made a frontal assault on the enemy and captured the hill, killing 87 enemy and capturing 14 prisoners. In this way the 2nd Regiment secured the second objective leading to Kyoam-san after the seizure of Hill 585. On the morning of the 21st the regiment launched an attack on Kyoam-san as scheduled. The 3rd Battalion advanced across the Songsan-ri Valley, while the 1st Battalion climbed up the steep slope to attack Hill 770 from the east. However, the nearer the troops approached the summit of Kyoam-san, the steeper the slope became with the accumulated rocks, and the maneuvering of the friendly forces became increasingly difficult. In spite of such hardship, the 3rd Battalion continued its attack, requesting supporting fire. Faced with the enemy artillery
bombardment, machinegun fire, and throwing of hand grenades, the battalion did not have a chance to launch an assault. However, when the 1st Battalion attacking the hill from the east assaulted the enemy, it caused confusion in the enemy positions. Seizing upon this opportunity, both battalions assaulted the enemy and finally captured the hill, Kyoam-san following fierce fighting. On the other hand, the 19th Regiment on the right had already secured the target line the previous day with little enemy resistance, and deployed its troops along the line connecting Hills 485-529.

As was described earlier, following the eight day bloody battle from October 13 to 21, the 6th Division moved from Paegam-san, crossed the Kumsong River, captured Kyoam-san, and secured the Polar line, which allowed the friendly forces to control Kumsong. Later on Colonel Song Dae Hu, the then 2nd Regimental commander, recalled that the tactic of committing rangers proved effective in destroying the enemy pill boxes of Kyoam-san, while suppressing enemy fire with 57mm recoilless guns, flame throwers, and 60mm mortars. Likewise, Captain Kim Myong Ik, the 3rd Battalion commander of the 19th Regiment, stated that the flame throwers, which were newly supplied, played an important role in destroying the enemy loopholes and the rocky caves in which the enemy troops had hidden and allowed the friendly troops to break through the enemy defense line. This experience showed that the coordinated employment of hand grenades and other close combat weapons proved to be very effective in attacking the enemy pill boxes, and it was a valuable lesson learned in this costly battle.

With the conclusion of this battle, as had been expected, a sag was formed in the frontline between the east front of the US IX and X Corps. In order to remove the sag, the ROK 6th Division of the US IX Corps turned over the Kyoam-san area to the US 24th Division in late October and moved to the west bank of the Pukhan River. In mid-November the division attacked and seized Hill
949, which presented a dignified figure on the east of the sag. In this battle the 21st Regiment, the west front regiment of the ROK 8th Division of the US X Corps, the right adjacent unit, was attached to the 6th Division. With the completion of the battle, the Gary line connecting Yongho-dong—Hills 949—973—Sokjang-dong was secured and the frontline between the two corps was straightened in a tactical sense.

The conclusion of the Polar line operation on October 23 by the US IX Corps meant the end of the UN Forces summer and autumn operations, which had begun in late July. In the Kumsong battle, the friendly forces suffered considerable losses in attacking the enemy’s well prepared and fortified positions, but the CCF also suffered heavy casualties and that was why the 67th Army was relieved by the 12th Army on November 7 and became the reserve, as was later learned in their war history. During this period, United Nations Command not only improved its front line but also achieved its strategic objective of posing military pressure on the enemy so that the latter would come back to the truce talks, which had been suspended. In particular, in the limited objective attacks, the ROK Army played a leading role and not only contributed to the improvement of the defense line but also enhanced its war capabilities and war leadership.
III. The Agreement on the Military Demarcation Line at P’anmunjom

1. Mutual Consent to the Basic Principle of the Line of Contact

On October 25, 1951, the truce talks resumed in a large tent set up at P’anmunjom. On that morning, at the 27th session of the plenary meeting, the newly assigned representatives of both sides were introduced, and they agreed on setting up the joint office for the liaison officers of both sides. The functions of the joint office were to supervise the implementation of the security arrangement drawn up by the liaison officers and to jointly investigate the violations of arrangement when reported.100 In the afternoon they began to discuss Item 2 of the agenda, the military demarcation line.

At the plenary meeting on the 25th, new faces showed up. On the Communist side, CCF General Pyon Ch’ang Mu who replaced Teng Hua, and NK Major General Chung Doo Hwan who replaced Chang Pyong San, and on the UNC side Major General Lee Hyung Koon, who replaced General Paik Sun Yup attended the conference.101

During the previous meeting from July 26 to August 24, both sides had argued over the demarcation line but ended the negotiations without results. However, at the resumed meeting both sides showed considerable flexibility in contrast with the previous stubbornness, indicating the possibility of compromise. The Communists stated that they were ready to discuss lines other than the 38th Parallel, while the UNC also implied that the current line already reflected the effects of the UNC air and naval forces.

On the other hand, the UNC had already prepared a plan to set up a four-
mile demilitarized zone along the line of contact before the suspension of the negotiations and had developed the plan in a concrete way during the recess in the negotiation talks, to present it when the conference would resume.

At the joint subcommittee meeting on October 25, each side asked the other side to present its new plan, and the UNC presented its plan first. The military demarcation line which the UNC proposed on the map started from the mouth of the Yesong River in the west, followed the river 12.8 kilometers, then turned toward the northeast, ran eastward, passed 6.4 kilometers north of Kaesong, passed Kuhwa-ri, veered northeast, passed 6.4 kilometers south of P’yonggang and about 24 kilometers north of the Hwach’on Reservoir, and reached the east coast 18.4 kilometers southeast of Kosong.\(^{102}\)

Major General Henry J. Hodes explained that the demarcation line was drawn based on the current frontline, but took into consideration that the UN Forces would withdraw from Kumsong and the east coast, while the Communists also would withdraw from Kaesong in order to set up a safer frontline for both sides.

*The tents set up at P’anmunjom for the truce talks*
On the following day the Communists, as was expected, refused the UNC proposal and presented their plan more favorable to them. The Communist plan was that they would concede to the UNC the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas, which were difficult for the UNC to defend, and instead take Ch’orwon, Kimhwa, Bloody Ridge, and Heartbreak Ridge, and the Punchbowl. The demarcation line which Lee Sang Cho presented on the map started at about the 38th Parallel line of the Yellow Sea, crossed the Ongjin Peninsula, passed the field just north of the Han River, southwest of Ch’ilun-dong, west of Chomgong-ri, southwest of Wondong-ri, and reached Ch’odo-ri of Kojin-myon on the east coast.\textsuperscript{103} The Communists not mentioning the 38th Parallel suggested the feasibility of negotiation, but if the Communists’ plan was to be accepted, the UNC should withdraw 15 miles at maximum along about 100 miles of the central and eastern front, and, moreover, Kaesong would fall into the enemy’s territory. Therefore, the UNC could not accept the Communists’ plan. The Communists said that they were not merchants and would not bargain, but from that time on both sides began bargaining on the demarcation line, and the key issue was how to deal with Kaesong.

Kaesong was a critical point for the UNC in order to defend the enemy avenue of approach to Seoul, while for the Communists it constituted a good foothold to attack Seoul for their strategy of communization of the Korean peninsula. In fact, Kaesong was important to both sides not only from the point of view of military strategy, but it was also important politically and psychologically to the people of the Republic of Korea because Kaesong had been the capital of the old Korean kingdom for a long time. The occupation of Kaesong, therefore, was significant beyond its territorial size. The government of the Republic of Korea strongly insisted on the occupation of Kaesong indicating that it had been south of the 38th Parallel, and the Korean representative of the truce talks, demanded it at the conference as well.\textsuperscript{104} At first, the Communists agreed to the bargain of drawing direct lines of the central and eastern frontline, but when the UNC persistently
demanded Kaesong, the Communists no longer showed any interest in the bargain.

Hodes insisted on the withdrawal of the Communists from Kaesong and reasoned that if the conference had not been held in Kaesong, the UNC would have occupied it. Once the agreement was signed, the UN Forces would withdraw from the coast islands, which the UN Forces were occupying, so it would be reasonable compensation for the Communists to concede Kaesong. 105)

The discussion continued without any results being achieved until October 31 when the Communists presented a proposal to establish a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone along the current line of contact, asserting that it was the best and final proposal. The Communists' attitude was interpreted to indicate that they had given up their original demand of establishing the demarcation line along the 38th Parallel and would accept the UNC's realistic proposal of the line of contact, but that they would also insist on securing the Kaesong area.

The UNC commander felt that in the best possible case the UNC proposed line drawn on the map would be accepted by the Communists with minor changes. In the UNC proposal Kaesong and Songak-san were included in the south portion of the demarcation line. Although the Communists were strongly opposed to it, since they accepted the principle of the line of contact, on November 11 the UNC commander instructed his delegation to negotiate with the Communists to include Kaesong in a neutral area as the best alternative plan. The final alternative was that the UNC would concede Kaesong on the condition that the Communists would agree on the adjustment of the demarcation line in the central and eastern frontline and the establishment of a UNC outpost on the main line of resistance around the west bank of the Imjin River. During the two days that followed, the UNC delegation persisted in discussions to persuade the Communists, but the latter were determined not to give up Kaesong.

On November 4, Ridgway and Joy came to the conclusion that there was
no other alternative than to accept the demarcation line based on the present line of contact with minor adjustments.

Thus, the demarcation line was decided based on the line of contact; thus, the Communists abandoned their initial demand of returning to the 38th Parallel while the UNC conceded its demand of reflecting the effects of the UNC naval and air forces. This decision, however, was a definitive turning point because it meant that Kaesong was lost.

In summary, the Communists had selected the conference site at Kaesong, which was located a little north of the line of contact, and made it a neutral site. The Communists then, taking advantage of the fact that the conference site was under their control, fabricated neutrality violations by the UN Forces, accused the UNC of the violations, and pushed the UNC into a passive posture by delaying or suspending the truce talks. The UNC, which was busy denying the Communists' accusations, proposed the relocation of the conference site to Songhyon-ri, which was half way from the front-lines of both sides. The Communists agreed, and P'anmunjom, located on the line of contact, became the new conference site. After the Communists gave up their initial plan of setting the demarcation line along the 38th Parallel, they made a cooperative proposal to make the demarcation line along the line of contact. Although the Korean government voiced strong objection, faced with growing sentiments for an early settlement to the Korean War both in the United States and in the international community, the UNC accepted the compromise proposal and concluded the phase of settling the demarcation line. However, the UNC conceded one of the most crucial issues of the truce talks, the Kaesong problem. If all the verbal maneuvering conducted by the Communists up to that point was their strategy to secure Kaesong, it could be said that the UNC was taken in by and made a party to the Communists' scheme.
2. Dispute over the Time to Decide the Line of Contact

After the UNC decided to accept the Communists’ proposal on October 31, 1951, that the demarcation line would be the current line of contact with a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone, Hodes held an internal coordination process for days and presented it at the subcommittee conference on November 5. The main points were as follows:

The UNC agreed on the demarcation line with a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone along the line of contact, but since it was decided that the hostilities would continue during the period of the negotiations, the final demarcation line would be the line of contact at the time of the signing of the agreement. Therefore, the final agreement on Item 2 would be reserved until all the problems concerning the cease-fire were agreed upon and definitively settled. The UNC suggested to open the staff officer meeting composed of three representatives of each side to work out the details of the already agreed demarcation line. It then proposed to discuss the next item.106

The Communists began to raise a great many questions about the UNC suggestion, and when they learned that even Kaesong would not be excluded from the future readjustment, they immediately went on the offensive toward the UNC. The Communists requested that Item 2 should be agreed on immediately and settled prior to the discussion of other items. Insisting that to leave the problem unsettled until the signing of the cease-fire was against the agreement, the Communists demanded that the current line of contact should be the military demarcation line. General Hodes, however, countered the Communist demand, saying that the current line of contact meant nothing if the cease-fire was not realized immediately. Therefore, both sides should agree upon the new demarcation
line which would reflect the changes of the battlefield.

Vice Admiral Joy, the head of the UNC delegation, surmised that the Communists’ idea was to make the demarcation line which would be worked out at that time, the final one, not a provisional one, so he decided the Communists’ proposal should be rejected. The problem of the demarcation line again became a hot issue.

In short, both sides agreed upon the principle that the demarcation line would be the line of contact with a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone, but about the timing of finalizing the line, the two sides differed; the Communists demanded that it should be the line at the time of negotiations, while the UNC insisted it should be the line at the time of the signing of the agreement. The demands of both sides were closely related with strategies of the war and cease-fire talks, and neither side could easily concede.

If the current line of contact was to be adopted, the Communists would be in an advantageous position since they would not only have secured Kaesong, but they would also be able to negotiate the remaining items, taking as much time as they wished. The UNC, on the contrary, would not only have given up Kaesong, but its military pressure on the ground would also be of little use even if the Communists used delaying tactics on the remaining items. If the Communists’ demand were accepted, it would be, in fact, a cease-fire, and it was more than obvious that the UNC would be placed in a disadvantageous position in the post cease-fire negotiation; therefore, General Ridgway insisted, without flexibility, on the principle that the demarcation line should be the line of contact on the day when the agreement would be signed.

The JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) of the United States, however, was not in a position to fully support Ridgway’s demand. Although the JCS understood Ridgway’s cease-fire strategy, it was also apprehensive that if the truce talks dragged on too long, the Americans and the international community, which had
no knowledge of the detailed problems such as Kaesong and the timing of making the line of contact the demarcation line, might make feel that while the Communists conceded their demand of the 38th Parallel, the UNC was delaying the cease-fire because of issues of little importance. The JCS was also apprehensive for another important reason. It feared that the Communists, who had made a significant concession, might return to their original demand of the 38th Parallel if they felt that their position was being strongly rejected.

Based on such apprehensions the US JCS took the position that the UNC would accept the current line of contact as the demarcation line, but if the other issues could not be settled during a reasonable time, for example, within a month or so, the demarcation line would be decided anew. The JCS secured the approval of the Department of State and the President of the United States and instructed Ridgway to expedite the negotiations on this basis November 14th.\(^{107}\)

General Ridgway immediately protested strongly and requested the reconsideration of the instruction. He said that if UNC would accept the current line of contact under any conditions of readjustment of the demarcation line or requirements connected with completion of the other Agenda items, the Communists certainly would delay the possibility of concluding the honorable signing of the agreement by increasing their uncompromising demands. Ridgway, who had not known that the instruction was approved by the President, received the order to accept the Communists’ proposal with a grace period of one month. He so instructed to the UNC representatives at the truce talks.\(^{108}\)

The military leaders in Washington thought that although they accepted the Communists’ proposal for an early settlement of the agreement, since the UNC could maintain not only the Kansas but also the Wyoming lines, the acceptance of the Communist proposal could not be considered a concession on the part of the UNC. They also expected that the one month grace period for the agreement would compel the Communists to expedite the negotiations. They farther
instructed Ridgway not to lessen the military pressure on the enemy but, in fact, imposed restrictions on the ground military operations by indicating that any change in the line of contact in favor of the UN Forces during the next one month was not advisable. They indicated, however, that the air and naval forces should carry out their missions as usual, notwithstanding this agreement.

On November 17, the UNC delegation presented the following proposition with the purpose of an early settlement of Item 2 and prevention of delay on the agreement on the part of the Communists.\(^{(109)}\)

The UNC, the NK and the CCF delegations

a. would confirm the agreement that the hostilities would continue until the cease-fire.

b. would agree to accept the line of contact prepared at the subcommittee meeting as a provisional one and to set up a two-kilometer wide demilitarized zone on each side.

c. would agree that the above provisional demarcation line and demilitarized zone would be effective only when the cease-fire agreement would be signed at the plenary meeting within one month after signing of this agreement.

d. would agree that in case the cease-fire agreement would not be signed within one month, the representative of the subcommittee would jointly draw the new line of contact of that time and adopt it again as the new provisional line of contact.

Following many questions and thoughtful consideration for days about the provisions of the UNC proposal, the Communists showed signs of satisfaction in general, but instead of accepting the UNC proposal, they demanded that the line of contact should not be changed even if other items were not settled within
one month. The UNC delegation flatly refused, and, finally, on November 23 at the subdelegation meeting both sides agreed to present the proposal to the plenary meeting.

3. Agreement on Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

As the principle of establishing the demarcation line and demilitarized zone was agreed upon at the subcommittee meeting on November 23, the staff officers of both sides, putting their heads together, began to work out the exact location of the line of contact on a map. Meanwhile, the delegation of the joint subcommittee prepared the following proposal to present to the plenary meeting. 110

1) Both sides would accept the principle that the line of contact would be the demarcation line, and at the time indicated in the cease-fire agreement, both sides would withdraw two kilometers from the line of contact and establish the demilitarized zone.

2) According to the principles described in article one above, the joint subcommittee would determine the current line of contact and confirm it to be the middle line of the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone. The delegations of both sides would approve the agreement on the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and their exact location at the plenary meeting. If the cease-fire agreement should be signed within one month from that day, the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone would remain unchanged even if there should be real changes in them due to the contact of the two sides.

3) Considering that the hostilities would continue until the time the cease-fire agreement would be signed, if the signing of the cease-fire agreement should not be realized within one month from the date when both sides
approved the agreement on the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and exact location of them at the plenary meeting, the sub-committee would revise the demarcation line and demilitarized zone according to the changes in the line of contact just before the signing of the cease-fire agreement. The revised demarcation line should coincide with the line of contact just before the signing of the cease-fire agreement and would be valid as the demarcation line throughout the period of the cease-fire.

On November 26 the staff officers completed the work of locating the line of contact, which had begun on the 23rd. They concluded the line of contact work by marking their work on two maps and signing each map.

The line of contact the staff officers prepared at that time was as follows:

The line started from the point three miles south of the mouth of the Nam River (Nangang), passed the center of Kamho, ran westward, reached one half mile southeast of Wolbi-san, ran toward the south, passed Toksan-ri, Shindae-ri, Sabi-ri, Shinhung-ri, and Nolmok. It then veered toward the north along the Soyang River, curved toward the west, departed from the Soyang River at 2.5 miles from the point it joined the river to turn toward the southwest, and reached Kach’il-bong. It then ran toward the west to Sat’ae-ri, Konhwa-ri and then northward to Songjong. The line continued to run westward, crossed the Pukhan River (the northern tributary of the Han River) just north of Oun-ri, passed Kumsong located at the riverside of the Kumsong River, and crossed Hant’an River at Kumgog-ri northwest of Kimhwa. It ran westward to Sangga-san, Kwanp’o-dong, and Sanmyong-ri, and reached Songhyon in the southwest. From there the line ran toward the north to cross the Yokkok River, passed Songhyon-ri, and reached the Imjin
Provisional demarcation line (27 Nov. 1951)
River at Kyeho-dong. The line, which then passed Kigol-ri and Ch’ongjong-ri, extended about 16 miles to reach the eastern edge of the demilitarized zone of the P’anmunjom. From there, the line made an abrupt curve southward and ended at the mouth of the Imjin River, 7 kilometers north of Munsan-ri.

On November 27, 1951, after the joint subcommittee met, the delegation of each side officially signed the agreement of Item 2 at the main conference and thus confirmed the plan of establishing the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, which had been such a turbulent issue. The demarcation line extended 237 kilometers from the mouth of the Imjin River on the west coast to Kamho south of the mouth of the Nam River on the east coast, and the demilitarized zone was set up four kilometers wide, two kilometers on each side, along the demarcation line.

The agenda of the truce talks had been agreed to on July 26, 1951, and Item 2 of the agenda came to be settled after four months of negotiations, during which time the negotiators even changed the site of the conference from Kaesong to P’anmunjom. During this period they conducted verbal battles at the conference site and heated war on the battlefield. In the negotiations, the UNC succeeded in carrying out its goal that the line of contact should be the basis for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone. However, the UNC permitted the selection of Kaesong as the neutral site from the outset of the truce talks and, in consequence, the town could not be secured and became the definitive weak point in the defense of Seoul, the capital of Korea.

Major General Lee Hyung Koon (retired as general), who was a member of the truce talk delegation, recalled that upon his appointment as a delegate to the truce talks, he received a secret order from Syngman Rhee, the President of Korea, to reoccupy Kaesong, and when he adamantly and continually insisted on the reoccupation of Kaesong in order to accomplish the secret order, Joy showed
his irritation. Here is how Lee recalled the situation.

Joy: How can we occupy a terrain which we lost in the war on the table? Isn’t it common sense that a soldier should know? The Communists will not give it up even if we negotiated with them for ten years. The UN Forces cannot wait for ten years. Please, give it up. 112)

Lee: I am a soldier of the Republic of Korea. Even though you say so, I cannot give up Kaesong. I will not exclude the conduct of military operations to recapture it. (But I could not say that I had been so ordered by President Rhee.)

In consequence, the UNC, which was well aware that the Communists would not concede Kaesong through negotiation alone, and that if the UNC should resume military operations for it, the cease-fire conference itself would be jeopardized, was obliged to conclude the provisional agreement on the demarcation line without occupation of Kaesong.
Notes

1. The Communist forces crossed the 38th parallel southward when they first crossed it for invasion, then for Chinese New Year Offensive, and later for the Spring Offensive. The UN forces crossed it when they pursued the enemy northward.


7. US Department of State, *Ibid.*, p. 801; In Walter G. Hermes’ *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, it was recorded as 2 hours 10 minutes, but herein the editor chose the source listed above.


9. US Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 848. The date of the incident varies between the 22nd and the 23rd. However, the editor followed the source cited above.


13. US Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 873-875. This letter was delivered to the liaison officers of the UNC in P’annunjom at 19:00 on September 2. It was written in Chinese and addressed to General Ridgway from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, dated September 1.


22. Walter G. Hermes, *op. cit.*, p. 46. A 12-year old boy died and his 2-year old brother was injured. The UNC admitted its responsibility and conveyed deep regret for it.


26. At that time the UN forces believed that even an 8-inch gun could not destroy the enemy’s fortified trenches.


32. EUSAK, *Command Report* (July 1951), p. 69. On July 26 the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division, the US X Corps commenced to attack Taeu Mt. (Hill 1178), a critical terrain on the ridgeline west of the Punchbowl. This was conducted upon the instruction of the Commanding General of the EUSA on July 21 to plan the operation for a future attack at the Punchbowl.


37. *Ibid.*, p. 64; Robert K. Sawyer, *KMAG in Peace and War*, Washington, D.C.: US Army (1962), pp. 180. In the agreement between Generals Lee and Ridgway, the figure was 200 to 400; however, 250 (150 to Fort Benning and 100 to Fort Sill) were actually sent in a series.


41. The offensive operation for that summer was based on the concept of limited offensive, attacking well fortified enemy positions. Thus, the name of this
operation was given, implying that ‘creeping’ maneuver was thought to be the only means of occupying the objectives.


43. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80. This operation was named after ‘Talons’ at first, but renamed after ‘Apache’


47. Special Task Force Able was composed of one regiment of the ROK 3rd Division, one RCT of the US 1st Marine Division, one 155 mm howitzer artillery battalion (-), one heavy artillery battalion, an element of engineer troops, and a naval gun-fire support team.


52. Notes for the Korean readers on the labels of operation plans such as ‘Cudgel’ and ‘Wrangler.’


59. Punchbowl is a basin about 15kms north of Inje, located between the Satae-ri valley on the west and the valley of the Soyang River on the east. It is a basin
centered in Unjon-dong of Haean-myon, Yanggu-gun with a diameter of ten kilometers surrounded by Hills 1026 and 924 on the north, Kachil-bong (1242) and Taeu Mt. (1178) on the west, and Talsan-ryong, Hills 795 and 908 on the east. It was a striking resemblance to a punch bowl with protruding peaks and passes on its perimeter.


61. The ridgeline occupied by the enemy then, linking Hills 591, 884, 924, 1031, 991, 981 and 840 was in the shape of a J. Thus, it was labelled J-Ridge.

62. In support of the US 2nd Division attacking Hill 983, the ROK 7th Division attacked Hill 554 on the west of Hill 983.

63. The NKPA 2nd Division was composed of the 4th, 6th, and 17th Regiments. The NKPA 13th Division consisted of the 19th, 2nd, and 23rd Regiments.


65. In the battles at Hill 983, the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and the 9th Regiment of the US 2nd Division as well shed substantial amounts of blood from August to September of 1951. The correspondents of the Stars & Stripes labelled the hill ‘Bloody Ridge’ in their reports.


67. Ibid., p. 580.


71. Chung Ch’ang Ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89.

72. The ROK 1st Marine Regiment labelled Hill 1026 ‘Hill Mao Tse Tung’ and Hill 924 ‘Hill Kim Il Sung’ in order to increase their fighting spirit in light of
difficulties anticipated in occupying their objectives and to emphasize that their mission should be accomplished by any means.

73. As the Regimental Commander of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment Col. Kim Dae Shik was wounded and evacuated, Lt. Col. Kim Dong Ha, the deputy, commanded the operation from the 1st of September.

74. Chung Ch’ang Ho, _op. cit._, pp. 160-163.

75. There are three 1090 hills along the ridgeline from Paeksok and Oun Mts. Thus, the one nearest to Oun Mt. was labelled Hill 1090 (N), the one south of it was named Hill 1090 (S), and the other down south on the west of Hill 1220 was called Hill 1090 (W). Hill 1220 was occupied by the US 2nd Division as a part of offensive operation for Heartbreak Ridge on October 15, and then was transferred to the ROK 8th Division. Later the hill served as a stepping stone for Hill 1090.

76. Hill 938 (DT 016414) in Tongson-gol was coded either as 931 or 938 in military atlases and books of military history. However, it was labelled 938 herein.

77. The correspondents witnessing hosts of casualties labelled it ‘Heartbreak Ridge.’ Refer to Walter G. Hermes, _op. cit._, p. 86.


79. (1) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), _op. cit._, pp. 191-192. During October 8-10, 1951 the CPVA 68th Army was committed to the eastern bank of the Pukhan River and the Mundung-ri valley, and the Chinese relieved the NKPA 5th Corps which deteriorated with the loss of combat capabilities.

(2) Walter G. Hermes, _op. cit._, p. 98.


82. This operation order was named ‘Touch Down’, implying the concept of
maneuver in operation with the analogy of a touch-down in a rugby game.

83. Korea Institute of Military History, *op. cit.*, p. 49. The NK V Corps suffered heavy losses up to mid-October 1951 and was relieved by the CPVA 68th Army. The NK forces moved to the Kowon, Yonghung, and Hamhung area, refurbished, and assumed the duty of coastal defense.

84. With an adjustment of corps’ sector boundary, Hill 1220 was passed over to the ROK 8th Division as of October 18.

85. Hill 751 along with Hill 924 in enemy hands were the objectives for the ROK Capital Division; however, the division concluded its operation by seizing the objectives by August 23, 1951.


87. EUSAk, *Command Report* (October 1951), p. 33; Foster (CT1414-1618-1717-1615); Moore (CT1721-1823-2123-2121); Courson (CT2631-2226-2127-2430); Craig (CT2733-2934-2932-2732); Butler (CT3235-3337-3536-3435); Watts (CT3438-3739-3837-3637).


89. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 189.


91. This defense line was a part of Line Wyoming for the army; however, it was called Line Ermine for the corps’ objective for its advancing operation.

92. EUSAk, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

93. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 191.


96. The ROK divisions were not equipped with tanks at that time.


98. Interview with Song Ki Duk collected by Korea Institute of Military History
(August 20, 1993).


100. US Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 1061. The Joint Office was an organization fixing details in accordance with the general agreement, supervising the implementation of the agreement, conducting joint investigation on violations, and consulting administrative issues.

101. Paik Sun Yup, *The ROK Army and Me as a Soldier*, Seoul: Daeryook (1989) p. 215; Lee Hyung Koon, *A Single Minded Life of Service Number One*, Seoul: Joong-ang Ilbo (1993), PP. 69-70. The formal term of delegates was counted on the basis of the date the credential was presented to the plenary session regardless of the date of replacement of the delegates. Thus, it was officially recorded that Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup was relieved as of October 24 and Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon succeeded his predecessor as of October 25 even though General Paik left his post on September 2. At that time, General Paik rushed back to his post of commanding general of the ROK I Corps when battle was intensified on the eastern front since he had been holding two posts. In this process the new delegate was appointed without prior consultation either with the president, minister of defense or chief of staff, causing ripples.


103. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

104. Lee Hyung Koon, *op. cit.*, p. 70. Upon his assignment as Korean delegate to truce talks, General Lee Hyung Koon visited President Syngman Rhee. President Rhee told General Lee that Kaesong should be retrieved by any means. Rhee said with emphasis, “Kaesong is our old capital and has a reputation for its products of ginseng and rice. Even conceding part of the eastern frontline, we must recover Kaesong.”

106. William H. Vatcher, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

107. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 65


111. ROK Army G-2, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

Chapter Three  A Momentary Lull in the Military Situation and Stalemate of the Truce Negotiations

I. The Strategy of Positive Defense and a Lull in Military Operations

1. Building Trenches along the Defensive Line

(1) A Positive Defense Strategy

The ROK and UN Forces forced the Communist Forces to withdraw their claims for a ceasefire along the 38th Parallel. After verbal attacks on each other for four months, they agreed to establish the Military Demarcation Line along the line of contact. Due to this agreement, both ground forces paid attention to the progress of ceasefire talks, confronting each other along the line of contact, stretching from the mouth of the Imjin River, 11 kilometers west of the Munsan, west of Panmunjom, north of Saknyong, northwest of Ch’orwon, north of Kimhwa, Oun-ri, Mundung-ri, and to 6km southeast of Kosong, for a total length of 237km.1)

At the end of 1951, the two sides positioned their troops as follows: The friendly forces established the main line of resistance along a line southwest of Kaesong, then north of Ch’orwon by employing the US I Corps of five divisions (the ROK 1st Division, the 1st Commonwealth Division, the US 3rd Infantry Division, the US 25th Infantry Division, and the ROK 9th Division). The US IX Corps on the west-central front, with its four divisions, the US 2nd Infantry Division, the ROK 2nd Division, the US 24th Infantry Division, and the ROK 6th
Division, established the defense line along Pyonggyang-Kumsong-Hwachon. The US X Corps on the central-east front, with three divisions under control (the ROK 7th Division, the US 7th Infantry Division., and the US 1st Marine Division.) was responsible for the main line of resistance from Kwandae-ri, Hyon-ri, and Tokgok, to Nojonp'yong.

The ROK I Corps (ROK 5th and 11th Divisions) was responsible for the eastern area along the Eastern Sea coast from Shintan-ri on the shore of the Namgang to Kosong (south of Kamho). In the rear area, the Paik Field Command led by Gen. Paik Sun Yup was operating against the enemy remnants and guerrilla forces, employing the ROK 8th and Capital Divisions. The total forces deployed on the frontline were fourteen divisions under four corps.²⁰

The enemy, on the other hand, deployed the NK 40th Brigade in the west coast area and from its right to the west front area, the CCF 65th, 63rd, 64th, and 39th Armies; the CCF 42nd, 26th and 12th Armies on the west-central frontline; in the central-east area, the CCF 68th Army and the NK 2nd Corps with the 13rd and 27th Divisions; in east frontline, the NK 3rd Corps with the 45th, 15th and 1st Divisions; in the east coast NK 1st Corps with 47th Division. The total enemy forces deployed in front were twenty four divisions in eight CCF Armies and the six NK divisions in three NK Corps.²¹

After the ceasefire talks began, both enemy and friendly forces, concentrated their efforts on establishing a relative superiority of strength, but six months later, by the end of 1951, the Communists Forces had suffered great losses during battle. They numbered only 642,000 CCF troops and 225,000 NK troops. Compared to the enemy, the ROK had ten divisions, a total of 470,000 troops. The complete UN Forces had a total of 800,000 troops, including seven US divisions and a Commonwealth division, which totaled 330,000 troops. Out of the total, 250,000 troops were deployed at the frontline and 550,000 were in the rear area.⁴⁰

The Communist Forces, not only strengthened their manpower, but also
The UN Forces are taking cover in concentration of the 82mm mortar fire of the Chinese Communist Forces.

strengthened their artillery fire power enormously. They deployed 710 artillery pieces forward at the beginning of 1952, and their gunnery had also been improved remarkably. Their artillery fire gradually became more precise and the skill in concentrating the fire eight or ten artillery pieces simultaneously, shifting their firing positions, was very much improved. This expertise made the counter-battery efforts of the UN Forces very difficult. In addition to this, the enemy had reinforced its ground forces enough to deploy three armored divisions armed with tanks and self-propelled artillery and had also deployed 1,250 airplanes in Manchuria. However, the UN Forces kept up their overwhelming supremacy in artillery fire power over the Communist Forces. When the Communist Forces artillery threatened the defensive positions of the UN Forces, the UN Forces reinforced their heavy artillery, 155mm and 8-inch howitzers, and mainly employed them for close fire support of the infantry.

The provisional agreement of a ceasefire line suspended a local but fierce scramble for defensive positions on the part of each side since the ceasefire negotiation began, and in the frontline went into a momentary lull. As a result of
the frontline situation, the friendly forces which held the initiative in ground operations, entered a new phase of confrontation. To strengthen their positions and to establish advanced positions, the friendly then launched offensive defense operations.

The ROK and UN Forces judged that the Communist Forces would join the ceasefire talks and the frequency and scale of the ground operations would largely depend on the developments of the truce talks. The friendly forces set up a strategy to force the enemy to accept its conditions by forced military actions in case the negotiations deadlocked on important issues. The UN Forces, on the basis of a so called positive defensive operational concept, kept up pressure on the enemy by conducting continuous assaults on a limited objectives and frustrated the enemies own assault plans by forcing it to exhaust its combat capability.79

On the other hand, the enemy tried to draw out the negotiations, desperately attempted to recover its superiority in power and strengthened its defense positions day by day. The enemy tried to lower the morale of the UN Forces and restore a part of its lost position, as well as take the initiative in the ceasefire talks by displaying its military power. Toward that purpose, the enemy set up an operational plan to conduct an assault on salients or vulnerable parts of positions of the UN Forces.⑧

There were two reasons that the two sides suspended large scale assault operations. First, if they conducted large scale assault operations, it might produce a breakoff in negotiations at the moment that a provisional military demarcation line for an early ceasefire was agreed on. Second, if either side conducted a large scale assault against the other side's strong defensive positions, it might result in greater loss than gain.⑨ It was estimated that a total assault operation to destroy the enemy would not only result in huge damage in battle power but would also create an obstruction to the atmosphere of negotiation.

On the other hand, soon after the problem of the Military Demarcation
Line had been settled, 8th Army Commander General Van Fleet made it clear to his subordinate units that hostile action would continue until an armistice agreement was signed. The US Eighth Army should show its intention to comply with the agreement on Item 2, and prepare for an assault operation if negotiations were unreasonably delayed.

Such an assault operation would constitute a limited counterattack operation to recapture the critical terrain features lost to the enemy and to avoid unnecessary losses of materiel and personnel. When this instruction was disseminated to his subordinate units, some of Van Fleet’s commanders hesitated to risk an operation by employing their units.\(^{10}\)

Accordingly, the decision on a provisional military demarcation line on 27 November 1951, suspended a local but fierce scramble for positions and the situation of frontline went into a momentary lull. Both sides concentrated on consolidation of their positions and maintenance rather than combat operations at the stabilized frontline. They conducted frequent probing operations and small size outpost raids in the areas between outpost units and covering forces deployed to maintain contact with each other.\(^{11}\)

(2) Building Trenches along the Defensive Line

The ROK and UN Forces strengthened their posture of defense by establishing strong defensive positions. The Communist Forces also improved their defense positions by steadily strengthening their manpower and equipment. At the time, the two sides had different characteristics in their defensive lines related to their defense positions.

The Communist Forces had been able to construct their positions only at night because of air bombardment and artillery fire by the UN Forces, but once the tentative ceasefire line had been set up, the Communist Forces could concen-
trate their effort on the construction of positions both day and night. They con-
structed a fortress stronger than the French Maginot Line and the German Western
defensive barriers during World War II. The enemy, to overcome its inferiority of
fire power, constructed underground tunnels and trenches to accommodate all troops
within the reverse slopes of the mountains. In some areas they built underground
forts in rear areas and their positions were connected from the Western Sea coast
to the Eastern Sea coast. Trenches two meters deep, from the tops of the hills,
dug out like cobwebs, were connected through reverse slopes to the underground
tunnels which seemed to be supply depots or kitchens and also to the foot of the
mountain in the rear area. From a bird’s eye view, they seemed to from huge 20 or
30 km wide ants nests.

The Communist Chinese officially published history, reported that “the
CCF constructed 7,789 trenches, 198.7km long, 750,000 covered shelters, and
covered and uncovered foxholes, 3,420km long. The NK forces dug out 1,730
trenches, 88.3km long, about 30,000 various kinds of shelters, and 260km long
foxholes.”

The enemy utilized lumber, rocks, and sand - whatever they could find - to protect their troops from fire. For example, when the ROK 5th Division had captured Kachil-bong, it found an enemy mess hall for a whole platoon in the enemy position.

The enemy usually dug foxholes as soon as they had captured hills. They continued to construct bunkers from the tops of hills where they could watch the friendly forces all around the hills. The Communist Forces, to protect their fixed defense positions from the UN Forces’ hail of air and heavy artillery bombardments, accommodated their troops and equipment in strong underground foxholes far more elaborate than the UN Forces’ positions. They dug from the back side of the mountain through to the front and constructed trench networks and various gun mounts in all directions and made whole mountains into huge covered
defense positions. They hid artillery guns and tanks underground and when they needed to fire, dragged them near to the mouths of tunnels and fired.\textsuperscript{18} They set up barbed wire fences in multiple belts around their positions and also laid many land mines in front of the positions. In addition to this, they were ready to lay mines in case of retreating, preparing holes for mines in front of the second defensive line to make provision for a collapse of the first defensive line. The structure of the enemy defense positions was designed to be strong enough to stand up against air and artillery assaults.\textsuperscript{19}

The Communist Forces mainly constructed such underground fortifications during the first year after the combat went into a lull and the truce talks began. They reinforced their defense power by earning time with the stratagem of the truce talks.\textsuperscript{20} The 15th volume of a work by Mao Tse Tung stated: “All the divisions had cellars to stock provisions for three months and even auditoriums so that the soldiers living there were very comfortable.” In the North Korean official history, the defense positions were described as follows:\textsuperscript{21}

All along the frontline, strong defense positions were established based upon tunnels, and the tactically important hills and points were especially fortified. Making the most of the characteristics of the mountainous area of our land, the tunnel type defense systems which consisted of tunnel type structures with various scopes connected by foxholes and trenches were completed, and eventually the North Korean combat troops could increase their solidity of defense to expel enemy assaults effectively at their defensive frontline. They also stored supplies not only for combat but also for daily life and were ready to fight independently for a long time even under conditions imposed by the enemy.

The enemy also fortified underground defensive positions along the
coastlines. They constructed a seacoast defense line along the East and West coasts where possible enemy landing operations were expected, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people and, around the defense positions, deployed forces for rapid commitment. The defensive positions along the sea coast line were fortified underground, and many uncovered foxholes were ready in the rear area of the coast line. Barbed wire fences were also set up, and mines were laid along the coast line.23

On the other side, the UN Forces, though not as strong as the Communist Forces, established a defense line similar to the trench lines of World War I. The UN Forces established the main line of resistance (MLR) along the forward slope for maximum effectiveness of their superiority in fire power.

Along the MLR they constructed fighting foxholes and weapons bunkers for machine guns, connected by trenches. Around the tops of key terrain, bunker type command and observation bunkers were constructed. The positions and bunkers were well camouflaged, and various kinds of obstacles were set up in front of them. Those field fortifications were established to sustain enough troops to stop small assault operations by the Communist Forces.

In front of the MLR, the friendly forces set up outposts, taking advantage of terrain features, to protect the MLR but as alternate positions were not built in the rear area, the depth of defense positions was thinner than that of the Communist Forces. To supplement the thinner defense, the friendly forces employed a series of patrol bases.

In 1951, the severe winter weather was less of a problem for the UN Forces than the Communist Forces. In the cold wind, the UN Forces deployed in the south were in a better situation than the Communist Forces positioned on the northern slopes. The UN Forces had enough supplies, heaters, and cold weather clothing for winterization.

On the contrary, the Communist Forces did not have enough supplies or
heating apparatus, and had to stay in shaded areas all day long shivering with cold. However, the Communist Forces held up in the cold winter weather with less physical difficulty than the UN Forces. The UN Forces even with better supplies, suffered from frostbite and so had to change their ambush patrols and frontline units frequently. It was noted in the US official history: “The grounds on which the communist forces could endure the cold were their inborn adaptability, spirit to overcome poverty and shortage, and strict discipline.”

All the defense positions of the MLR from the east to the west coast were connected by trench lines in depth, and became stronger day by day; consequently, it was really difficult to break in or occupy any part of them without the willingness on the part of the opposing forces to endure greater losses and sacrifices than the same operation required in 1951.

Accordingly, both parties gave up large scale, all-out offensives which could have caused heavy bloodshed. The passive concept of ‘Live and Let Live’ prevailed on the front line, and this gradually reduced the losses of the UN Forces. However, the enemy, which had recovered the balance of power, began to put heavy pressure on the UN Forces’ defensive line again.

Under the conditions of both peace talks and military operations, neither side could force the other side to withdraw, and a long, tiresome stabilized campaign dragged on. Unless there was an early termination of the fighting through negotiation with the frontline settled, the situation could become a long war of attrition. Even though the period agreed on terms of a tentative cease fire had passed, the conference had made no further progress.

2. Development of Reconnaissance Operations

For each side, it was very important to collect information on the other side in order to hold the initiative and conduct the defense. Toward this end,
reconnaissance operations and tactical operations of the outposts were important ground operations and both sides strengthened their reconnaissance patrols, in particular, and also conducted limited offensive combat patrols.

The reconnaissance patrols were employed mainly to detect the enemy defense positions or activities, and the combat patrols mainly to capture enemy prisoners of war through ambushes and surprise attacks. The enemy also conducted reconnaissance operations.

The patrol activities were conducted mainly at night along stabilized frontline; accordingly, the units set up various obstacles such as barbed wire fences, mines, illumination devices, booby traps, napalms and white phosphorus mines, and reinforced protection facilities. The troops strengthened local security and went out for patrols along the barbed wire fences.

In some areas, the patrol teams had small collisions with the enemy, and sometimes the combat developed into artillery fire exchanges for several hours. As the troops of both sides were protected in covered positions, the battles caused almost no casualties, but after artillery fire exchanges, both sides had to repeatedly check their equipment and repair disconnected telephone lines.

The patrols of the Communist Forces, usually platoon and company strength, but rarely of battalion size, operated in the night against the defensive lines of the ROK and UN Forces to avoid friendly air observation and bombardment. For example, the CCF 12th Army, deployed in the eastern area of Kumsong, executed 805 patrols from early November, 1951, to late January, 1952, that is, twelve patrols on average were in operation per day.

Compared with the enemy, the ROK and UN Forces organized company or battalion sized combat patrols and operated reconnaissance in force against enemy positions, and local attacks for harassment. The forward regiments deployed on MLR reinforced patrol activities to block enemy night infiltration beforehand. The ROK and UN Forces committed reconnaissance patrols sixty
eight times to the frontline from November 29-31, 1951. And during the month of December, all the units of the Eighth Army conducted reconnaissance patrols 247 times. Engagements between the patrols of the two sides sometimes would develop into fierce battles competing for control of strategically and tactically critical terrains, but usually the operational area was limited in location.

Through those reconnaissance actions, the UN Forces were able to control advantageous terrain features in front of the main defensive positions and strengthen outposts. Eventually, whenever the opportunity arose, they could force the enemy into a battle of attrition and bloodshed. During the deadlock situation, combat patrol operations were the best means of combat training and through these operations the soldiers’ morale, lowered by long term field duty, would be raised and the recruits, replaced from the rear area, would have an opportunity to gain confidence in real combat. It was the most effective way of training the soldiers to a high level of combat skill in a short period of time. There were also no more effective means to build up courage than night time reconnaissance.

In addition to this, the ROK and UN Forces, through combat patrol and local operations, captured as many enemy POWs as possible to gain information about the enemy circumstances. Capturing prisoners through patrols was the best way to stay aware of the enemy’s activities. The UN Forces promoted reconnaissance activities by rewarding the soldiers who had captured prisoners with special leaves. One of the ways to capture a prisoner was to cut off the enemy telephone line and lie in wait nearby and capture the enemy soldiers when they came to repair the lines.

Usually a friendly forces engagement with the enemy inflicted losses on the enemy, frequently by rifle fire, but rarely could an enemy be captured alive, and the Communist Forces faced a similar situation. The ROK and UN Forces regularly sent out one patrol team and two or three ambushes from each regiment every night. The patrol teams were sent out after training in night ambush skills,
marksmanship, and combat rehearsals.\textsuperscript{(60)}

However, a patrol operation did not usually attain the desired goal. The main reason for this was that the enemy did not move carelessly or actively, and the friendly soldiers conducted the patrol operations as routine operations. Some of the patrol teams were successful in capturing prisoners, but in most cases, they simply inflicted damage on the enemy. Accordingly, it was significant that, even though the ROK and UN Forces could not often attain the desired goal of capturing prisoners and getting information about the enemy situation, the patrols provided the soldiers, who had grown relaxed and lethargic on the stabilized front line, with precious combat experience and training as well as a degree of battle tension.

3. Combat at Outpost Line

(1) The Winter Operations in 1951

In late 1951, the frontline situation was such that while the UN Command had endeavored to terminate the war without further expansion, the enemy continuously reinforced its strength and had eventually established a balance of power.

In January 1952, the 8th US Army advanced heavy artillery and tanks of the US I Corps to the top of a hill and they directed fire against the fortified enemy positions on the slope of a mountain. The ROK 5th Division replaced the ROK 11th Division of the ROK I Corps and the ROK 3rd Division took over the positions of the 6th Division, attached to the US IX Corps. The US 45th Infantry Division and the US 40th Infantry Division took over the positions of the US 1st Cavalry Division and the US 24th Division which replaced the two new divisions in Japan as theater reserve.
General Van Fleet, on 2 February set up an operational plan entitled ‘Big Stick’ and recommended it to General Ridgway. The main point of the operational plan, which was to be carried out on 5 April, was that the frontline of the US I Corps would be moved north to the Yesong River line and the US 1st Marine Division would conduct a feigned landing operation on the Eastern Sea coast. General Van Fleet estimated the loss of roughly 11,000 troops for the operation, and in case the plan would not be approved because of the estimated loss, prepared an alternate plan named ‘Home Coming’ and submitted it on the 22nd. The differences between the second plan and the first one were that the D-day for the ‘Home Coming’ operation was to be 1 April, only ROK Forces would participate in the operation, and there would be no feigned landing operation.\(^{37}\)

The above mentioned operational plans were not acceptable because Ridgway’s operational guideline was that “the ground operations should be limited to the reconnaissance and counter attack necessary to maintain safety and security for the friendly frontline.”

On the other hand, the 8th Army in early February executed a deception operation called ‘Clam Up’ to stop the routine patrols carried out by the units. The operation was called ‘Silent Operation’, and the intent was to suspend all contact with the enemy and trick them into believing that all friendly units had withdrawn, and lure the enemy into the open and destroy them by counterattack.\(^{38}\)

Due to the operational guidelines of the Eighth Army, the offensive action at the frontline after the long stabilized situation was a struggle for objectives near the important hills around the outposts, usually by small units combat below regimental size. The battle for possession of the outposts sometimes seemed like momentary lull in fighting at the front.\(^{39}\)

The combat at outpost positions, during this period was divided into two phases, the winter operation of 1951-1952 and the spring operation of 1952. The important battles follow.
I. The Strategy of Positive Defense and a Lull in Military Operations

1) The Battle near Tumae-ri

This battle was the typical struggle for an outpost between the ROK 1st Division and the Chinese Communist Forces from 23 December 1951 to 8 January 1952. At the time, the ROK 1st Division faced the enemy, along the northern bank of the Imjin River along Sa-ch’on, Paeghak-san, and the Samich’on, deploying 1st Regiment on the left front, the 12th Regiment south of the Tumae-ri on the right front, and the 15th Regiment (-) as reserve.

The enemy in front of the division was the 188th Division of the CCF 63rd Army, which had set up its CP in Masan-dong, deployed its main forces along Yongho-san and Manghoe-san, and advanced its security forces past Pigi-san and Taedok-san, who watched out for the movement of the friendly forces. The Chinese strengthened their defensive positions day and night. The enemy forces were estimated at around 7,500 troops. A 120 mm artillery battalion, a 105mm artillery battery, and a tank platoon were positioned around the front and rear areas.

The ROK 12th Regiment, including the attached 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment, deployed with its 1st and 3rd Battalions forward. The 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion (reserve), deployed to defend an outpost near Tumae-ri.

The 523rd Regiment of the CCF 188th Division at 16:00 on 28 December commenced an attack from 300 meters in front of Helmet Hill, which a detachment of the 5th Company defended, to Hill 104 and around Tumae-ri Hill with signal flares and artillery fire. The 17th Artillery Battalion concentrated pre-planned barrage fire and the US 999th Artillery Battalion began colted Hills Helmet and 89, also defended by a detachment of the 5th Company, and fighting took place in front of the positions. The detachment on Helmet Hill managed to block the first wave of the enemy attack and then withdrew in echelon to No
Combat near Tumae-ri Hill

Name Hill, 300 meters behind Helmet Hill. The detachment on Hill 89 withdrew to Tamae-ri on order. The two forward Platoons concentrated their fire against the enemy from their new defensive positions, calling in friendly artillery fire.

During the fire-fight, all the covered positions were destroyed, and the enemy penetrated into the defense positions; consequently, both Platoons withdrew to Hill 104. The F-51 fighter-bombers' heavy air strikes, requested by the regiment, and artillery fire were concentrated on the enemy around Tumae-ri and Hill No Name.
At 18:00 the enemy began an attack along both the left and right ridges under the cover of tank fire. The 5th Company concentrated suppressive direct fire with supporting artillery fire against the enemy, but could not stop an enemy penetration, since the Chinese outnumbered the friendly forces. The company managed to throw the enemy back, conducting a fierce counterattack with grenades.

On the 29th, the regimental commander made a decision to reoccupy the lost outpost hills for a future operation and ordered the hills recaptured by a counterattack. Due to the order, the 2nd Battalion committed its 6th Company to No Name Hill and its 7th Company to Tumae-ri Hill, respectively.

At 06:30, the 6th and 7th Companies took positions on a line of departure and then rushed toward the objectives. At 09:20 the 7th Company pressed the enemy, advancing to within 100m of Tumae-ri Hill. Despite a difficult fight, the 7th Company’s 2nd Platoon advanced to 50 meters of its objective which the main forces of the company rushed to the east enemy positions and, finally, at 10:10 recaptured the enemy positions with a hand grenade attack.

The enemy conducted counterattacks repeatedly, but the company managed to block the enemy approach by concentrating fire against them. However, the company’s combat power rapidly diminished due to a lack of ammunition and growing fatigue, and, therefore, it had to retreat at 14:30.

Meanwhile, the 6th Company, which had dashed to No Name Hill, tried to bypass and attack from the flank, taking into account the steep terrain. The main force of the company, after concentrating artillery fire around the hill, advanced to the line of assault and engaged in fierce fighting with an enemy platoon. While the main force was engaged in a bloody fight with the enemy, the 3rd Platoon bypassed the objective to the right flank and rushed into the enemy positions. At the same time, the main force conducted an assault to the front and finally recaptured the hill. However, the 6th Company faced an enemy counterattack and repulsed the enemy by committing the elements of the company headquarters
and a part of the weapon’s platoon, but it was in danger of an enemy break-through.

The regimental commander, who had observed the Chinese counterattack on both of his companies, judged that it would be very difficult to capture the objective against the growing Chinese resistance and decided to capture the objective after reorganizing his attack. Due to his decision, the 6th Company took Hill 104, and the 7th Company deployed on his right while the 5th Company returned to the main position to prepare to attack again.

On the 30th, the battalion commander committed his 5th Company for a counterattack supported by fire from the 17th Artillery Battalion. The van of the company advanced to within 30 meters of the enemy, but was demoralized by the concentrated enemy fire.

The battalion commander concentrated 81mm mortar fire on the enemy position to save the situation. The assault of the company did not progress, and a confused fight took place, but at 13:00 the company rushed into the enemy position. The company commander called in artillery fire on the enemy strong points one by one to suppress them and let the 3rd Platoon conduct close assault on a flank of the enemy.

Consequently, the company which had seized the tactical initiative, at 14:00 mobilized all available fire power, assaulted the enemy positions, and routed the enemy with handgrenades and automatic weapons’ fire. The company suffered the loss of 17 killed and 41 wounded in this assault, but the enemy company was almost annihilated, and only about ten narrowly escaped.

The company, soon after occupation of the hill, requested reinforcements from the battalion and devoted itself to reorganization of the positions. However, before acquiring reinforcements from the battalion, the company faced an enemy counterattack along both the right and left ridges with a concentration of 100 rounds of tank and direct weapons’ fire. The company, even though caught in a
difficult combat situation, once again fought off the Chinese with artillery fire support, but finally had abandoned the hill to the enemy and retreated as ordered to a rear slope of the Hill 104. The company could not hold the hill but the enemy had 300 KIA, compared to 23 ROK deaths.\textsuperscript{41)} The combat near Tumae-ri continued until early in 1952. The division commander insisted that Tumae-ri Hill was critical commanding ground which would be an advance base for a future assault operation and had to be taken. He ordered the 12th Regiment to recapture it.

The order for the mission was given to the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment. On January 3, 1952, at 08:00, the 3rd Battalion commenced an attack toward the enemy under cover of eighteen of 105mm howitzers, six 155mm howitzers, six of 4.2 inch mortars, and four fighter-bomber strikes on the flank of the hill.

The battalion’s forward 10th and 11th Companies, with a attached tank platoon, advanced along the right and left ridges, respectively. The left front 10th Company rushed toward No Name Hill and, suffering seven casualties, advanced to within 30m of the enemy. At the time, the special assault force, organized by Sergeant Kim Hak Myong and five others of the 1st Platoon, succeeded in destroying the enemy weapon’s position. Eventually the main force of the company assaulted the enemy and occupied the objective at 13:10, killing forty seven and capturing three. However, the company, which had encountered enemy counterattacks continuously and managed to force back the enemy many times with fire from the 17th Artillery Battalion, had to retreat in the face of an attack by two enemy companies.

On the other hand, the right front company, after destroying the enemy positions by tank fire, conducted an assault with its 3rd Platoon which bypassed the east slope to rush into the enemy position. At the same time, the main force of the company assaulted the enemy. The company, however, encountered an enemy
counterattack immediately and though it did its best to block the enemy, carrying out hand-to-hand fighting in the position, at 14:00 it lost the position in order to save the troops.

The division studied the causes of the failure of its counterattack operations and the situation of the enemy positions. The commander issued an order to the 15th Regiment to assault the enemy position again. At dawn on January 5th, the regiment commenced an attack with its 1st Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right.

The 3rd Battalion deployed its 11th and 9th Companies forward and the 10th Company as the follow-up element. Both companies requested artillery concentrations on the reverse slope of the objective, and the 11th Company occupied Hill 89 after a fierce battle and continued an assault toward Tumae-ri Hill from its rear. The 2nd Platoon raider squad had opened up a route of advance, and the company rushed into the enemy position and recaptured the objective. The 10th Company rapidly shifted its direction of attack and destroyed an enemy platoon and succeeded in recapturing Hills 122 and 148.

In the meantime, the left forward 1st Battalion routed the enemy with its 2nd and 3rd Companies attacking side by side. Both companies encountered enemy automatic weapons fire from a salient on the east slope, and their assault halted, but the 2nd Company resumed an attack with artillery support and reached within 20 meters of the enemy position and captured No Name Hill after conducting bloody combat against the enemy.

However, the enemy, despite concentrations of fire of the 17th Artillery Battalion and the artillery of the US I Corps, concentrated its strength on Tumae-ri Hill and conducted a counterattack. The 3rd Battalion made every effort to expel the enemy, concentrating all available fire power, but Hill 89 position collapsed and Tumae-ri Hill was also lost. On the next day, 6 January, the regimental commander had the 1st Battalion re-attack Tumae-ri Hill and fierce fighting ensued,
but the attack was repulsed by strong enemy resistance and fire-fights went on throughout the day. The 15th Regimental Commander did his best to recapture the objective three times, dealing the enemy crushing blows, but the enemy continued to resist. The regimental commander determined that the reason that the enemy was able to resist the ROK assault was that the enemy committed massive counterattack forces with strong artillery support. He issued an order to the 3rd Battalion to recapture the objective, assisted by counter-battery fire.\footnote{42}

The 3rd Battalion commenced an assault after having suppressed the enemy fire on Taedok-san and Tumae-ri with heavy artillery barrages. The 10th Company rushed to the enemy position under cover of tank fire, and the commando group also suppressed enemy weapons positions. Eventually the company, conducting an all-out assault, recaptured Tumae-ri Hill at 11:00. However, the enemy executed a counterattack just as it had the day before. Two enemy companies launched a counter attack, and three companies followed up the main assault. The battalion did its best to hold the positions for an hour.

Judging that the main reason of losing hills was due to enemy’s flanking fire from Hill No Name southwest of Hill Tumae-ri in spite of heavy losses imposed on the enemy, the division commander ordered to secure this hill first of all. Thus, the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment started to attack Hill No Name. The battalion succeeded in occupying the hill in the afternoon in dashing to the hill while harassing the enemy with commando forces which had infiltrated into both sides of the enemy. But the battalion could not block enemy counterattack even with strong fire support of the division. The enemy continued counterattacks even suffering heavy losses.

Then the division commander ordered to occupy Hills No Name and Tumae-ri with the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment. However, those recaptured hills were lost again upon immediate enemy counterattacks as before.
By order of the corps, the division suspended the operation on the 8th. Through the operation, the division, though it lost Tumae-ri Hill, had inflicted serious losses on the enemy. During the operation the division killed 1,611 enemy and captured four POWs, but also suffered friendly losses of 129 killed, 585 wounded, and two missing. The division pulled the 15th Regiment back to its original position along the southern bank of the Imjin River and deployed the 12th Regiment to establish new outpost positions around Hill 104 and to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations.43)

2) The Combat around Christmas Hill (1090)

The Christmas Hill combat was a fierce battle that developed sometime around 25 December 1951 and was initiated by an assault of the CCF 204th Division north of Oun-ri to No Name Hill near an outpost on Hill 1090 (north) in the northern most sector of the ROK 7th Division. Later it was named the Christmas Hill.44) The hill was located on the ridgeline linking Oun-san and Paeksok-san. The two sides conducted a prolonged bloody struggle for the hill that became a clash of wills between the two sides in their determination not to retreat any farther from the present main line of resistance.

The CCF 204th Division deployed the 612th Regiment along Hill 890, Hill 1218, and Hill 984, mainly around Oun-san. After the ROK 7th Division had taken over the area from the ROK 8th Division in mid-November 1951, it skirmished with the CCF 204th Division.

On December 24, the 3rd Regiment of the 7th Division, which was blocking the enemy’s main route of approach, expected the enemy would assault Hill 1090, so it strengthened its patrol activities to interdict the enemy. Despite a limited field of observation because of a heavy snowstorm, the regiment held its position. Around 17:40, about twenty-man enemy patrol had been operating a
Combat near Christmas Hill
scouting activity in front of No Name Hill B to encounter outpost platoon of ROK 7th Division, and the Chinese scout team suddenly withdrew. In a moment, the enemy preparation fire of about 400 rounds of 120mm and 82mm mortars hit, and a battalion-sized enemy force commenced its attack.

The enemy enveloped the outpost positions from left and right, and eventually recaptured No Name Hill B and tried to conduct a surprise attack on Hill 1090 (north), but the enemy was driven back to No Name Hill B with heavy losses by a counterattack of the 3rd Company, defending Hill 1090. The 1st battalion executed assaults four times to occupy No Name Hill B throughout the day, but had to retreat due to strong enemy resistance.

On 09:00, 26 December, the 1st Company, whose attack passing through the 3rd Company, battled back and forth with the enemy and managed to capture the hill at 14:30. However, it lost the hill again to an enemy night assault at 19:35.45)

On the next day, the 27th, the friendly forces occupied No Name Hill again by a strong attack, but two enemy companies, which seemed to be reinforcements, carried out a surprise attack at 18:30, and the friendly forces had to retreat again because of a lack of ammunition. At 06:00 on the 28th, the 1st Company again attacked the enemy, conducting hand-to-hand combat and eventually succeeded in capturing the top of No Name Hill at 09:50.46)

Following these battles, in early 1952, small size clashes took place several times around Christmas Hill, but, for the most part, a momentary lull in fighting was maintained. On 11 February, there was once again a fight to capture the hill (the second battle for Christmas Hill). The friendly forces, according to a so-called Clam Up, that is a silent operation concept, gave priority to capturing POWs as a main objective, and luring the enemy into the outpost to destroy them. At that time, as a unit relief, the 2nd Company of the 3rd Regiment was deployed on No Name Hill A and a platoon of the 2nd Company on Hill B as an outpost
The 2nd Company, on 11 February, had left Christmas Hill empty and was waiting for the enemy to approach. Around midnight, two enemy squads approached the security posts of the 2nd Battalion at the center-front of the 5th Regiment, the Nae-dong Valley right forward of the division, directing threatening fire. With no reaction from the friendly unit, the enemy went to the north.

At 01:35 on the 12th, the two enemy battalions attempted to infiltrate into the Am-dong Valley, the boundary line of the right forward 3rd Battalion, but the enemy touched a trip wire of mines which had been set up by ROK security forces when they had retreated from their posts to the main positions, and withdrew, thinking they were in a minefield. With a reinforcement of one company at 20:30, the enemy tried to recapture No Name Hill at 21:15. When the enemy approached close enough to throw handgrenades, the company, taking advantage of a good chance to destroy the enemy, concentrated all of its fire power and 81mm mortar fire from the battalion, and managed to repulse the enemy.

At 02:25 on the 13th, a company-sized enemy force commenced an assault to recapture No Name Hill under supporting mortar fire. However, the friendly company was able to defend its position through fierce fighting. The enemy again committed a platoon-sized reinforcement, but had to retreat.

The ROK 3rd regiment had repulsed the enemy several times and succeeded in taking Christmas Hill, which would have an influence on setting up MLR of both sides at the armistice talks. During the first battle, the 3rd Regiment inflicted losses of 172 enemy KIA and 5 POWs, but also lost 22 KIA, 109 WIA, and 21 MIA. For the second battle, the regiment killed 40 enemy and suffered 9 KIA and 9 WIA. Nevertheless, the regiment failed to capture the enemy POWs as planned.

At the time, the Netherlands battalion, which had been attached to the US 2nd Infantry Division on the mideast front to capture enemy POWs, attacked
the CCF outpost on Star Hill (Hill 430), which was located 10 kilometers south of P'yonggang. The Colombian Battalion, attached to the US 7th Infantry Division, conducted a surprise attack on the enemy outpost on Hill 400 in the Kimhwa area to destroy its defense positions.\textsuperscript{48}"

(2) The Spring Operation in 1952

The US Eighth Army Commander, General James A. Van Fleet, on 1 April, established two operational plans for two limited offensive operations. The first one ‘Chop Stick Six’ was an operation in which a reinforced ROK division would advance from the front line of the US IX Corps to the P’yonggang and would develop a new front line on the Kumsong-P’yonggang line. ‘Chop Stick Sixteen’ was an operation in which the ROK I Corps would advance as far as the mouth of the Nam River (Kosong) and move the present frontline forward to the Nam River line. The two limited offensive plans were to be achieved with strong air and artillery support and would also require additional training efforts.\textsuperscript{49}"

The UN Forces Commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway, did not agree to ‘Chop Stick Six’ because the terrain features of the objective line were not suitable for defense, but he did agree to ‘Chop Stick Sixteen’ with the condition that the US Forces would not be employed for the operation.

Though it was a limited operation as approved, the situation at the front line seemed about to become active temporarily; however, the plan was postponed indefinitely on the April 29 by General Van Fleet, who thought a military operation should be avoided so as not to upset the ceasefire talks. On April 28 the representative of the UN Command had offered a package proposal after negotiations had made no progress that winter.

After the package proposal was offered, the armistice talks remained idle during April and May, and at the front only small reconnaissance operations were
carried out. On 10 June, General Van Fleet proposed an offensive operation similar to ‘Chop Stick Six’, “to have the ROK forces advance from the IX Corps front line to a new line north of the P’yonggang, eventually to occupy the Iron Triangle completely”, and recommended it to the UN Forces commander. However, this plan was also turned down by the UN commander because the operation would negatively influence truce negotiations and would probably result in heavy losses rather than real military advantages.\textsuperscript{50}

Accordingly, the situation of the front line in the spring of 1952 was that the friendly forces maintained contact with the enemy through patrols and raids, avoiding large scale offensive operations.\textsuperscript{51} The confrontation of the two sides was similar to that of late 1951, but the defense positions of both sides were strengthened, and on the friendly forces’ critical points of the combat outpost line and the MLR, small sized offensive and defensive engagements were the focus of operations. Typical combat situations at outpost positions during this period were as follows.

1) Combat near the Sach’on River

Turning into 1952, the ROK and UN Forces in light of the on-going truce negotiations, redeployed units all along the front line and began to reorganize the personnel and equipment with an emphasis on the defense of Seoul. On March 17, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, which was defending the Punchbowl on the mideast front, together with the US 1st Marine Division, moved to the western front line and took over the MLR along the Imjin River, the S’achon area, along the Han River, and around the Western Sea coast, and defended the enemy’s main route of approach to Seoul along the Kaesong-Seoul road.

The 1st Marine Regiment, which took over the defensive positions east of the Sach’on River from the ROK 15th Regiment, deployed its 3rd Battalion on
the left front, its 1st Battalion on the right front, and its 2nd Battalion as reserve and connected with an adjacent US 1st Armored Amphibious Battalion on the left and the US 5th Marine Regiment on the right. Most of the area of the regiment was an open area exposed to the enemy, except an area composed of small hills along the Sach’on River, the peak of which was Hill 155 near Paikyon-ri. Accordingly, the regiment, after taking over the positions, stressed night patrolling
and strengthened the positions to make provision for a surprise enemy attack.

The enemy facing the regiment was the CCF 195th Division of the 65th Army, of which the 584th Regiment was deployed on the right front, the 583rd Regiment on the left front, and the 585th Regiment as reserve, occupying the massive hills of Tokmul-san, Ch’onsan-san, and Kunchang-san west of the Sach’on River, respectively. These hills dominated the friendly outposts east of the river and the open area around the MLR.

The terrain was composed of cross-compartments and favored the enemy defense. While the truce talks were going on, the enemy, mobilizing its rich manpower, strengthened its armaments and developed all positions to strong points. After unit relief, the enemy, which had been conducting night raids together with artillery fire, on 1 April at 22:00 carried out surprise attack with two battalions crossing the Sach’on River near the battalion sector boundary, supported by intense artillery fire. The enemy artillery fire was well-aimed and destroyed a part of the defensive positions and even threatened the regimental command post. An enemy company was also approaching the 1st Company, 1st Battalion at its left flank.

The 1st Company, concentrating all its fire power under cover of 155mm artillery fire support, managed to drive off the enemy, which infiltrated into the left rear area. In front of the 3rd Company, at 22:40 an enemy infiltration was detected by the explosion of a mine, and a fierce exchange of fire took place. The battalion commander shifted fire to the 3rd Company area and blocked the important infiltration route of the rear area with a part of his troops.

In the meantime, the 10th Company in the 3rd Battalion area, engaged an enemy probe. Soon after its ambush team retreated, the enemy commenced an assault on the 2nd Platoon and headquarters area. The 1st and 3rd Platoons organized a ‘fire sack’ to interdict the enemy follow-up units; however, at 24:00 the enemy main forces had already rushed into the front of the 2nd Platoon and com-
pany headquarters. The company fought a see-saw battle for two hours with concentration of fire power on the rushing enemy. However, the friendly artillery positions were destroyed and the company was pushed back and forced to retreat to a rear edge of Hill 87. At that point, the reserve 2nd Battalion remained available for reinforcement.

When a segment of the 1st and 10th companies’ positions fell into enemy hands, due to a surprise enemy attack, the regimental commander ordered the 2nd Battalion a counterattack to recover the lost MLR. When the 2nd Battalion got to the line of departure, the situation had already greatly changed. A counterattack by the 1st and 3rd Battalions was already under way. Both battalions concentrated artillery fire on the expected enemy route of retreat in front of the MLR and along the bank of the Sach’on River, and successively the 1st and 10th Companies launched an assault to repulse the enemy. The enemy, encountering an unexpected counterattack, began to withdraw in confusion. Both companies began to destroy the enemy, scattering to the right and left, and recovered the MLR and outpost positions.

In this battle, the enemy suffered great losses and its patrol and raiding activities were remarkably reduced and weakened. In contrast to the enemy’s losses, the regiment attacked the enemy outposts several times and won tactical victories. During the night of April 5th, two platoons of the 10th Company, with a detailed artillery support plan, launched a surprise attack on the enemy outposts, which lost twelve KIA, dealt a heavy blow to the enemy, and eventually secured a firm initiative for the outpost operations.

After that, surprise attack operations on outposts of both sides went on repeatedly and on 18 May, the Philippine 19th Battalion Combat Team, which had been attached to the US 45th Infantry Division was attacked by a CCF regiment on Arsenal and Eerie Hills north of the Yonch’on, but succeeded in defending the hill in close combat.
2) The Hill 575 Battle

A battle was conducted at an outpost by the ROK 6th Division on the mideastern front around the same period as the Sach'on battle. On 28 March 1952, the 6th Division took over the MLR on Line Missouri along Bongwha-san (477) north of the Kumsong-ch'on, Sach’on-ri, Kyeam, Hill 442, Kyoam-san (770), Hill 765, and Hill 690, which the US 40th Infantry Division had been defending, with the 2nd and 7th Regiments on the left and right forward, respectively, and the 19th Regiment as reserve in Chook-dong.

The division, as the left forward unit of the ROK II Corps was connected with the US 40th Infantry Division of the US IX Corps on the left and with the Capital Division on the right. The 6th Division, in defense of the MLR, strengthened outpost positions and focused on the patrol and ambush actions to frustrate the enemy’s plans. The division commander, Major General Paik In Yup, stressed strengthening the main positions and outpost positions including Hill 575 in front of the 7th Regiment, and maintaining continuous contact with the enemy.

The enemy confronting the division was a part of the 31st and 35th Divisions of the CCF 12th Army, the total strength of which was 6,000 troops with a direct support of the 32nd Artillery Division and the 406th Artillery Regiment. It was estimated that the enemy would focus on the defense of its positions, conducting local raids on an outpost, probably Hill 575. Hill 575 was a critical point jutting out to the north from the MLR along Hill 765 and Hill 690, which would command an area around the Yulsa-ri and Ssangryong-dong to control enemy reconnaissance patrols and direct artillery fire.

Beginning on the morning of 16 April, enemy harassing fire continued throughout the day, and in the evening. The enemy fire all at once concentrated on Hill 575, defended by the 6th Company. Hill 575 was instantly engulfed in flames and an advanced sentry post observed two enemy companies approaching in open
Combat at Hill 575
order across the ground. The enemy tried to capture Hill 575 by surprise attack, conducting a fixing attacks on Hills 690 and 649 to cut off friendly reinforcement.

The 7th Regiment Commander at once requested suppressive fire against the enemy artillery and interdiction fire of the ROK 27th and the US 300th Artillery Battalions. The 2nd Battalion commander ordered the 5th Company and the Reconnaissance Company of the regiment to cover a flank of Hill 575 and be ready for reinforcement, concentrating the 81mm mortar fire of the 8th Company and the attached 4.2 mortar on Hill 575.

The 6th Company deployed its platoons that were waiting for night patrol and ambushes. The enemy’s continuous artillery fire destroyed the foxholes and trenches. At that point, friendly 105mm artillery batteries concentrated fire on the open ground near Yulkog, the northern slope, and valley of Hill 575. At 19:50, the enemy, making its way through concentrated fire, mounted both envelopments and the penetration attacks. Under cover of barrage fire of artillery, explosion of mines, and its own final protective fire, the 6th Company managed to drive back the enemy. The enemy main forces had rushed to the front, with one unit blocking reinforcement by a reconnaissance company of the regiment on the right adjacent front. The Chinese tried to penetrate the left forward position of the 1st Platoon along the northern ridge.

The 1st Platoon, under cover of flanking fire from the Regimental Reconnaissance Company, tried to destroy the enemy in front of the positions by containing the bypassing enemy, concentrating fire power such as 57mm recoilless rifles, 2.36 rockets, and machine guns. One enemy group, however, rushed to the northern ridge throwing hand grenades, and a squad broke into the position. The platoon went ahead with close combat and with concentration of all-out fire power on the enemy, and eventually the enemy, exposed in the fire sack on the open ground, retreated, leaving behind about twenty dead.

Soon after, the enemy launched an assault again with concentration of
direct weapons, mortar and machine gun fire. The 27th Artillery Battalion directed barrage fire almost on the top of the outpost, and offensive and defensive battles raged on. Around midnight, a Chinese unit rushed to the front and fierce close combat ensued. The enemy concentrated its gun and machinegun fire and another segment of enemy rushed in throwing hand grenades along the northwest ridge and infiltrated into a position. The first platoon engaged in fierce and bloody fighting finally ousted the enemy from its penetration. In this battle, the platoon leader, who bravely took lead in the fighting, died a heroic death for his country.

The enemy again began all-out assaults from both northwestern and northeastern ridges, and the company commander shifted the defense to all-around defense centering on the top of the hill and concentrated all available fire on the enemy position. Two reinforced enemy companies came close to the forward position by enveloping on three sides and throwing hand grenades. The company, under the leadership of the company commander engaged in bloody combat with rifles and hand grenades, and fierce fighting with bayonets was also conducted. The company commander, First Lieutenant Kim Chi Yong, was shot through, the abdomen, but he urged the soldiers to fight vigorously. The company, feeling a sense of unity, at last repulsed the enemy attack in waves, and the enemy began to retreat.

While the company was reorganizing, strengthening its positions, the battalion commander issued an order to recover the position by a counterattack with its gaining momentum. The acting company commander committed the 2nd and 3rd Platoons for a counterattack, calling in artillery fire to the northwestern ridge. When the company rushed the northwestern ridge, it encountered an enemy counterattack, and offensive and defensive battles ensued. At this juncture, the 2nd Platoon leader, who was throwing a hand grenade at an enemy position, died a heroic death. On a narrow ridge, the company, engulfed in enemy fire, could not capture the enemy position and retreated to a position near the top of the hill,
which had been established by the 1st Platoon.

The 6th Company, despite suffering numerous casualties and exhaustion during fifteen hours of fierce combat, fought courageously to block the enemy in front of the position. At this battle, the company was able to defend its position tenaciously, killing 100 enemy soldiers; however, it also lost 24 KIA, including two platoon leaders, and 74 WIA.  

3) Combat on Hill 662

The combat for Hill 662 was a fight at an outpost position, which was conducted by the ROK 3rd Division during an operation in front of Hill 949 on the mid-eastern front line according to the Clam-Up operational concept in early 1952.

The 3rd Division (Brigadier General Paik Nam Kwon), after taking over a mission from the ROK 6th Division, was defending the front line establishing the MLR between the Pukhan River and Sokchang-ri with Hill 949 as its center along the Gary Line, as the right front of the US IX Corps. The 23rd Regiment was deployed in the mid-forward area of the division, establishing the MLR along Hill 949 and Hill 739. The 9th and 10th Companies of its 3rd Battalion organized outpost positions on No Name Hill (550) and Hill 662, located on the most important route of approach to the MLR in the division zone.

The enemy in front was the 104th Regiment of the CCF 35th Division of the 15th Army and the 607th and 609th Regiments of the 203rd Division of the 68th Army, which had established strong points along the Choape-ri-a loop of the Pukhan River-Hill 679-Hill 674-Songjong-Am-ri.

The regiment (Col. Lee Kwang Shik) issued an operational order based on the concept of luring the enemy to its destruction and capturing POWs. In accordance with this plan at 04:00 on 10 February, the 9th Company handed over
the outpost positions on Hill 662 and No Name Hill to the reconnaissance company of the regiment. The 10th Company, pretended to have withdrawn completely. Both companies on the outpost positions maintained complete silence and camouflage in order to lure enemy patrols, but there was no indication of the enemy. However, on the night of the 14th, enemy movement began to be detected.

At 01:50 on 15 February, an enemy platoon approached the front of the Second Platoon on the right of the reconnaissance company. The platoon lured the enemy as close as possible and opened intense fire and set off mines. The enemy was dispersed immediately and ran away. The platoon tried to pursue the enemy, but two enemy companies, which had infiltrated bypassing northwest of the hill, fired a volley to stop the pursuit.

At 02:25 the enemy launched an all-out attack, pouring artillery fire on the hill. The enemy artillery fire destroyed or exposed positions and left a great many casualties. A platoon-sized enemy unit, which had broken into a sector boundary with the 10th Company with artillery fire, threatened the left flank of the reconnaissance company, and two reinforced enemy platoons, infiltrating to the front, tried another penetration. Two other platoons, infiltrating into a northeastern ridge, attacked the 2nd Platoon of the reconnaissance company on both flanks. At 03:25 the company, being attacked from three sides, concentrated its fire to block the strong enemy assault, but a position of the 2nd Platoon was put in danger. When a machine gunner and his assistant were killed in action, the platoon leader rushed to a gun position and fired a machine gun at random, but as a result of a Chinese handgrenade, he died a heroic death. Though a section of foxholes of the platoon had collapsed, it did its best to block the enemy by throwing hand grenades and engaging in close combat, but a part of the enemy, which had attacked the front of the company, threatened the right flank of the platoon, forcing the platoon to retreat.

The enemy main forces, which had blocked the west flank, assaulted
toward the east. The company, which was absolutely inferior in strength and which was pressed by the rushing enemy from all directions, began to retreat to Hill 748, breaking through the enemy envelopment at 05:30. Thus the operation aimed at capturing enemy POWs by luring the enemy patrol ended in failure, due to an unexpected enemy assault and surrendered the important outpost position of Hill 662 to the enemy.

On the other hand, the 10th Company, which had established an outpost position on No Name Hill southwest of Hill 662, had made provision for an enemy assault. At 01:50, a squad of the enemy approached the position through a northwestern ridge. Soon after that, two Chinese platoon launched an assault on the front of the company. The company lured the enemy close to within 50 meters of the position and concentrated fire on the enemy, exploding mines. The enemy ran away in confusion, but after a while a part of the enemy, under cover of mortar fire support, bypassed the position to threaten the left flank. The enemy conducted an assault on the company by encircling it from three directions.

It was certain that the enemy intention was to capture Hill 662 from the reconnaissance company while holding the 10th Company in envelopment. The 10th Company commander ordered his reserve, the 2nd Platoon, to execute a counterattack against the enemy which had penetrated his right flank. The platoon conducted an all-out assault, but receiving enemy fire from three directions, had to fight a fierce battle but inconclusive.

At that point, having received a report that the reconnaissance company had lost the hill, the regimental commander ordered the 3rd Battalion to recapture Hill 662. The 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion was ordered to recapture the hill. At 09:30 the 9th Company advanced near the position of the 10th Company and at 14:00, under a covering fire of the 10th Company, began an all-out assault. The main forces of the company, with its 1st Platoon swinging eastward, rushed to Hill 662 along northeastern ridge of No Name Hill.
The enemy resisted, firing 57mm guns and machine guns at random, but it was suppressed by the massive fire of the 11th Artillery Battalion. The company executed an assault at once, throwing handgrenades and conducting hand-to-hand fighting. At 17:05, it took the hill at last. The company reorganized its position and made provision, for enemy counterattacks. The regiment, placed three-belted barbed wire fences and 500 mines with the support of the engineer company. After that, the enemy seemed to have given up capturing the position and shifted to a passive patrol operation.\(^{59}\)

The outpost operations from the winter of 1951 to the spring of 1952, from various points of view, seemed not to have progressed from the outpost operations of World War II, but rather had gone backward to the type of operation on the western front during World War I. The static situations, defense in depth surrounded by barbed wire fences and complicated trenches, machinegun dominance, the importance of artillery and mortar fire, and continuous patrols and surprise attacks, all of these were similar to the tactics of World War I.

Of course, there were also many differences, for instance, the development of airplanes, the prohibition against the use of poisonous gas, and the invention of DDT, which reduced contagious diseases.\(^{60}\) Another important difference was that neither side had transferred from a position warfare because of the relative balance of a military power between the two sides. Both sides chose a battle of position because they wanted to achieve a cease fire by concluding negotiations rather than by military means. Thus, they restrained themselves from advancing forward beyond the present front line.

However, for the troops, a position warfare was much more painful than a mobile battle. In general, the usual combat training was primarily directed toward mobile battles, so the soldiers could not easily adapt to the unfamiliar battle of position warfare. Also psychologically, sitting still in position was more nerve wracking and tiring than moving in battle. However, the position warfare
did not mean that the troops sat all day long in one position simply shooting or firing artillery. Whenever they had time, they strengthened the positions and operated reconnaissance patrols in forward areas and whenever there was unusual enemy movement, the friendly troops conducted limited maneuver assaults or used artillery fire.\(^{41}\)

The UN Forces, to resolve the problem of the battle of position warfare, adopted a frequent unit relief system. After late 1951, the UN Forces had fixed the duty term of the troops at nine months at the front line and 18 months in the rear area, and when a term ended, was a change of duty.\(^{62}\)

From November 1951 to April 1952, some surprise assaults took place for ground operations, but there was not much change in the defense position of either side. The Communist Forces mainly stuck to position during the day and carried out operations at night; on the contrary, the UN Forces were active in the daytime, and as the ground operations were going to fade away, importance was placed on air battles.\(^{63}\)

As the war moved into a state, the number of casualties was reduced remarkably. According to an estimate of the UN Command, the enemy casualties were 80,000 in October 1951; in November, 50,000; from December to January 1952, 20,000; and every month after that the number was reduced by 11,000 to 13,000 until April. The number of casualties of the UN Forces was 20,000 in October, 11,000 in November, 3,000 each in December and January, and from February to April, every month showed a reduction of more than 2,500.\(^{64}\) The friendly forces held the military initiative in outpost operations, but an extension of the position warfare over a long period put the friendly forces at a disadvantage not only from the military point of view but also in negotiations.\(^{65}\)

4. Anti-Guerrilla Operations
(1) The Red Guerrilla Activities in Rear Areas

In late 1951, the red guerrillas, conducting operations in rear areas joined the remnants of the NK Forces whose routes of retreat had been cut off by the UN Forces’ counter offensive. Together with local partisans in the Honam and Yongnam provinces, they reorganized gradually as fighting units and cut off UN forces lines of communication and threatened the combat service support facilities.

The guerrillas were almost destroyed by pacification operations of three ROK divisions (the 11th, 8th, and 2nd Divisions) from October 1950 to May 1951; however, some guerrillas escaped into the mountains and waited a chance to rebuild their forces.66)

The ROKA Headquarters estimated that the total number of guerrilla forces in the Honam area was about 4,000. Among them, the best organized forces were the original Southern Army’s remnants of the 81st and 92nd Divisions, the 57th Division under the Kyongsangnam-do Communist Party, and the divisions under command of the Chollabuk-do Communist Party. They were composed of survivors of the Yo-Soon rebellion and stragglers from the NKA combat units.67)

Organization of ‘Nam bu’ Army

![Graph of 'Nam bu' Army Organization]

Legend:  
- : Guerrilla Division  
- : Under-Division size Guerrilla Command  
‘Nam bu’ : South area  
Ch’ung nam-do  
Ch’ung buk-do  
Kyong nam-do  
Kyong buk-do
The red guerrillas in the central Chiri Mountains had established their base camps around steep mountain areas, such as Paegun-san, Togyu-san, Hoemun-san, Songni-san, Pulkap-san, Paega-san, and Hwahak-san. They committed acts of war such as cutting off lines of communication of the ROK and UN Forces, plundering rations, attacking police substations, staging surprise attacks on vehicles, cutting off signal lines, and committing acts of murder and arson.

The guerrillas in groups assaulted small towns, police stations and occupied villages, stealing civilians’ food and kidnapping the people, and engaged in acts of cruelty without hesitation. The guerrillas finally expanded their operations to military targets, destroying railroads, assaulting military trains, and looting weapons and military supplies from camps and convoys.

They infested the Unbong, Koksong, and Hadong area near Chiri-san where they threaten innocent people, and careless military personnel. Their activities not only threatened the military operations but also disturbed and frightened civilians and lowered the morale of the nation. 68)

(2) The Pacification Operation

The ROKA Headquarters planned to organize a task force with two divisions to destroy the guerrillas in the Honam area in order to protect military facilities and maintain public peace and order. The plan was agreed on between the UN Forces and the ROK government in accordance with the following evaluation of the situation.

First, it would be possible to redeploy two divisions from the front line. If friendly forces did not launch an offensive, there would be no change in the forward balance of forces. Second, the most favorable season for subduing guerrillas in the mountain areas was the winter when food and forest camou-
flage became more limited. Third, it was desirable to retrain the ROK Forces with real, but more risk-free combat experience.  

Accordingly, the Paik Field Command was established on November 25th 1951, with the ROK I Corps Commander, Major General Paik Sun Yup, as commander. The Capital Division, the 8th Division, the Southwestern Area Combat Command, and the police forces were attached to the command. The Paik Command moved to Chonju and took over the operational mission of subduing guerrillas in the southwestern provinces from the Southwestern Area Combat Command (Brigadier General Kim Yong Bae) on 26 November and assumed command of the Southwestern Area Combat Command units. The ROKA Headquarters, to reinforce Task force Paik, moved the Capital Division (Brigadier General Song Yo Ch’an) and the 8th Division (Brigadier General Ch’oi Young Hee) to the Honam area from the Sokch’o and Ch’unch’on areas and ordered Operational Plan #26 into effect. (16 November 1951). To execute the order, General Paik decided to employ the six regiments of both divisions as task forces. Local security units, regional regiments in reserve, and police forces attached to the Southwestern Area Command, assumed missions as blocking forces and the garrisons for strong points, potential targets.

Operational Plan #26
1. The Paik Field Command
a. On D-day, H-hour, launch an attack and conduct operations according to the following four phases.

1) The 1st Phase Operation: Conduct assaults on the enemy strong base camps, the Chiri Mountain area, with all forces. The completion day of the operation should be December 10th.

2) The 2nd Phase Operation: Conduct assaults on two areas simultaneous-
I. The Strategy of Positive Defense and a Lull in Military Operations

ly and commit some units against the base camps of the guerrillas in the Chonbuk area and another part to strong points in the Kyongnam area. The completion day of the operation was to be December 30th.

3) The 3rd Phase Operation: The first and second operational phases areas should be assessed and enemy remnants mopped up. The completion day for the operation should be 10 January.

4) The 4th Phase Operation: A part of the units should move to any other areas where the surviving guerrillas have concentrated and destroy them.

b. All the units should be ready to be committed anywhere, including forward areas.

2. The Southwestern Area Combat Commander will hand over his command to the Paik Field Commander and will be under his operational control until detached.

3. The Taebaek Mountain Area Combat Command
a. Continue the present mission and block the Punggi-Sangju and the Ch’ungju-Sangju lines.

b. On order, be ready to support the Paik Command within twenty-four hours.

4. The Director General of the National Police
a. Continue the present mission and block the Ch’ungju-Taejon-Chonju, and Ch’onan-Kangnyong lines.

b. On order, be ready to support the Paik Command within twenty-four hours.

5. Coordination Instruction
a. The operation should be conducted under strict control and the units
should be employed in three distinct roles: the task forces, the blocking forces, and the garrisons for strong points. The task forces should be operated to fix and destroy the enemy; the blocking forces should be deployed in enough depth to interdict the enemy routes of retreat and to support the task forces.
b. If the base camps of the guerrillas are wiped out, the task forces should be ready to maneuver rapidly to other areas to destroy the dispersed guerrillas, taking advantage of their maneuverability.
c. In each phase of the operation, the blocking forces should quickly follow up the task forces and prevent the guerrillas from reorganizing.

The Paik Field Command (Task Force Paik), in accordance with an order of the ROKA Headquarters, decided to employ six regiments of both divisions as task forces, and the security forces attached to the Southwestern Area Combat Command, regiments in reserve and police forces as blocking forces and garrison for strong points. Meanwhile the ROK government proclaimed martial law in the southwestern area as of December 1 as a preparatory measure for the pacification campaign. In addition, civilian movement was controlled and telephone network between villages was curtailed. Thus, the Paik Command started the pacification operation on December 2.\textsuperscript{74)}

This operation was conducted in four phases under strict control of the headquarters, and the forces committed were divided into the task forces, the blocking forces, and strong point garrisons. The task forces should concentrate on the destruction of the guerrilla main forces, and the blocking forces should be deployed in enough depth to cut off the enemy route of retreat and to support the task forces.
1) The 1st Phase Operation (2 December-14 December 1951)

In the 1st phase operation, the Paik Command deployed the Capital Division south of Chiri-san and the 8th Division north of Chiri-san and employed them as task forces to envelop the Chiri-san area on a large scale. Other units were employed as blocking forces and garrisons for strong points. The friendly forces, reducing their encirclement, destroyed enemy base camps in one continuous operation and searched out enemy remnants through repeated sweeping operations.

From the first day of the assault, the Capital Division, in coordination with the 8th Division, compressed the guerrilla camps. Its subordinate three regiments advanced to the the Kugok-san, Naede-ri, Hill 984, Hyongje-bong, Songjong-ri, and Pa’do-ri line. On the next day, the Cavalry Regiment concentrated its effort in searching the enemy sanctuaries, and the 26th Regiment advanced to Mukkye-ri (Chongam-myon), Unsu-ri (Hwakye-myon) and at Tungch’on-ri
pursued the enemy. The 1st Regiment isolated 300 enemy forces south of Purdang village and destroyed them.

Successively, on the 4th and 5th, it launched on all-out offensive. The Cavalry Regiment advanced to Korim-Saesuk, Pobkye Temple-Hill 1398, and in a two day battle killed 34 enemy and captured 510 POWs. On its way to Taesong-ri, the 26th Regiment, deployed in the middle of the division, killed 72 and captured 79 guerrillas, while conducting a sweeping operation along the boundary lines of Sanch’ong and Hadong counties.
The Capital Division, from the 2nd to the 6th, completed the first half of the first phase operation, and from the 7th went into the second half of the operation. The second half of the operation involved searching for the enemy in the divisional areas of responsibility until the 14th.

The 8th Division, on the first day of its offensive operation, occupied the phase line along Ch’onma-san, Hill 650, Hill 734, Tokchu-san, Sambong-san, Hill 380, and Wang-san. The attached 110th Regiment(-), and the 107th Regiment(-), both regional defense units, blocked an enemy route of retreat in coordination with an offensive by the task forces of the division. On the next day, the division again began an offensive to the phase line and reduced the encircled area. The division then completed the first half of the operation successfully by occupying the final objectives, Pyokso Pass, Hill 1248, Hill 1134, and Hill 1806. From the 7th, the division went into the second half of the operation and continued the search for dispersed guerrillas and searched by-passed enemy groups, marching in reverse.

The Southwestern Area Combat Command moved its attached 203rd Police Regiment(-) from Sunch’on to Hwakyejang to occupy blocking positions, and the rest of the units were to secure areas important to guerrilla activity. The pacification units carried out a leaflet drop and ground and air broadcasting as a means of psychological warfare.

During the 1st phase operation the Paik Field Command achieved impressive results: 1,715 KIA, 1,710 POW, 132 defectors, 509 rifles, 86 automatic weapons, 676 hand grenades, 769 bags of rice, and 416 bags of unhusked rice. The rest of the enemy abandoned favorable terrain features and secret shelters around Chiri Mountain, and scattered to avoid the pacification forces.  

2) The Second Phase Operation (16 December 1951 ~ 4 January 1952)
It was decided that in order to destroy the surviving guerrillas base camps, the second phase would be divided into a first half (December 19~28, 1951), which would be an enveloping attack of the new enemy base camps and a second half (December 30, 1951~January 5, 1952), which would be a search and destroy operation against the remnants of the guerrillas. The Capital Division, the 8th Division, and the Southwestern Area Combat Command were to carry out operations independently as regional groups.76)

For the second phase operation, the direction of advance was changed to the mountains with the main objective of Chonju. From 19 December to 4 January, the ROK 8th Division and the Capital Division went up and down the hills and tried to trap guerrillas hiding in the steep terrain.

The Capital Division, on 15 December handed over its mission to the Southwestern Area Combat Command, and moved to Unchang-san northeast of Chonju. The division, at 06:00 on the 19th, formed an enveloping net with its three regiments, but the guerrillas had already escaped to a main peak of Unchang-san, and the enveloping forces destroyed sixty-two enemy bases without contact and advanced to the creast of Unchang-san. On the next day, the division began an all-out assault and searched the mountain and destroyed the groups of fleeing partisans. A part of the enemy groups again escaped to Changan-san, and the division committed forces to this area and conducted a suppression operation until the 28th.

The division, which had launched the second half of the operation, located a part of the enemy attempting to establish new bases in Samdo-bong. It then deployed its Cavalry Regiment in Muju, the 1st Regiment in Koch’ang, and the 26th Regiment in Hamyang and conducted an all-out offensive from three directions. Searching main peaks in the area, the division found the guerrilla main forces and attacked them with good results. The division successively pursued the escaping enemy remnants to destroy them in Hwangsook-san.
The 8th Division completed a tactical deployment to annihilate the enemy hiding in and around Hoemun-san, Changgun-bong, Shinsun-bong, and Naejang-san southwest of the Noryong Mountains. At 06:00 on the 19th, the divi-
sion began an attack from the Imsil-Sunch’ang line with its nine battalions all committed to assigned objectives. The main forces of the division destroyed enemy shelters near Hoemun-san and advanced to a line along Chongsong-ri, Kump’yong, and Chayang-ri. The 10th Regiment carried out a sweep operation around Changgun-bong, Sannae-myon, and Pokhung-myon, and conducted an assault on the important enemy strong points at Sinsun-bong, Naejang-san, and Paekyang-san.

The division resumed the second half operation on 30 December, having the 10th Regiment stay behind around Hoemun-san to root out the enemy hiding in sanctuaries. Two regiments and other units attached encircled Paeka-san. The units, by regional groups, which had enveloped the enemy by compressing an enveloping net, continued the searching operation from January 3rd to 5th.

The Southwestern Area Combat Command destroyed more guerrilla, who had attempted to reassemble around Chiri Mountain, and searched their important base camps. The 3rd Battalion of the 110th Reserve Regiment, destroyed the enemy on Hill 1585 east of the Panya-bong on the 19th, and the 2nd Battalion of the 200th Police Regiment executed a pacification operation in Korim. The 2nd Battalion of the 110th Reserve Regiment engaged 200 guerrillas near Korim for four hours and destroyed them completely. From the 16th, the Southwestern Area Combat Command, fixed 200 guerrillas in Chunwang-bong and annihilated them in combined operations with the 26th Regiment of the Capital Division. It also carried out a blocking mission in the Chiri-san area during the second half of the operation. The Paik Field Command, from commencement of the operation until late December, achieved war results of more than 4,000 KIA and about 4,000 POW.\(^77\)

3) The 3rd Phase Operation (January 4～31, 1952)
The guerrillas in the Honam region, who had suffered the collapse of their chain of command and the destruction of their bases by the subduing operations of the Paik Field Command, intended to again infiltrated the Chiri Mountain area, terrain so favorable for guerrilla activities. The Paik Field Command set up an operational plan to commit all its forces at the same time to the Chiri-san, Paegun-san, and Tokyu-san to destroy guerilla remnants.

According to the plan, the Capital Division was to employ a surrounding attack on Chiri-san and Paegun-san, successively, and a part of its units were destroy the enemy around Changan-san, P’algong-san, and Ch’onwang-san. From the 12th, the division began an offensive operation and searched the line along Samjeong-ri, Ch’onwang-bong, Korim, Nokodan, and Panya-bong, the central area of Chiri-san. It repeated searching operations until the 22nd. The division then, from 24th, began a pacification operation on the Paekun-san area where about 350 guerrillas were assembled. As soon as the division reached the objective on the 27th, it destroyed the enemy by repeated deliberate searching operations. During the 3rd Phase Operation, the division accounted for 1,867 enemy KIA and 1,155 POW, but also suffered casualties of 68 KIA and 96 WIA.

The 8th Division deployed its units in five areas: Hoemun-san (the 10th Regiment), Shinsun-bong (the 16th Regiment), Paega-san (the 21st Regiment), Hwahak-san (the 107th Reserve Regiment), and Chokye-san (the 205th Police Regiment). The division conducted an all-out offensive from the 4th to the 8th to destroy the enemy and continued a suppression operation in the area until late January.

The 9th Security Battalion, attached to the Southwestern Area Combat Command, mopped up the guerrillas around Taebul-san on the 12th, also blocking the enemy route of retreat from Unjang-san. The 203rd Police Regiment repeated a searching operation, encircling Togyu Mountain. And the 18th Police Combat Battalion, securing a supply route between Muju and Yongdong, blocked the
enemy route of retreat. The Paik Command, during the 3rd Phase Operation, killed or captured most of the enemy forces in the area.

4) The 4th Phase Operation (February 4 ~ March 14, 1952)

The Paik Command together with the 8th Division was waiting to return to the frontline in compliance with Operational Order No. 271 (January 20, 1952) from the ROKA Headquarters. Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup (promoted on January 12, 1952) handed over command to the Capital Division during the 4th Phase Operation (February 4 ~ March, 14 1952 and also known as Operation Rat Killer) while the 8th Division had returned to the front line on February 5th and Paik’s headquarters on February 6th.

The Capital Division continued searching operations in the Paega-san, Mohu-san, and Chokye-san area as had planned. The division had deployed the 1st Regiment north of Chokye-san, and the 26th Regiment south of Chokye-san, and on the 4th conducted a surprise assault on Chokye-san. Both regiments occupied the objective by an assault on both flanks and continued searching around Chokye-san until the 7th. The police battalion, deployed at Paega-san and the Chonnam Police Battalion, deployed at Mohu-san, executed pacification operations, cutting off the enemy route of escape.

The Southwestern Area Combat Command carried out operations around Tokyu-san, Changan-san, and Ch’onhwang-san. The Police Chiri-san Area Combat Command, with its 205th Police Regiment as the main force, destroyed guerrillas in the Chiri-san and Paegun-san area east of Hamyang and Sunch’on. The newly founded police unit, under the command of Police Colonel Son Kye Ch’an, carried out a suppression operation to destroy the guerrillas in the Hoemun-san area along the Chonju, Imsil, Namwon, Tamyang, and Chongup line by employing both the Ch’ilbo and Kyerim Police Battalions.791
After this operation, on 14 March, the Capital Division handed over its mission to the commander of the Southwestern Area Command and returned to the front line, and the Paik Command had accomplished all of its missions as planned. During the operations from the 1st to the 4th phase, the Paik Command inflicted 16,000 enemy including KIAs, POWs, and defectors, and more than 3,000 weapons.\(^{80}\)

The ROK Army, after the foundation of the Paik Command in Chonju on November 25th, 1951, carried out operations to subdue guerrillas from early December to March 14th of next year, and destroyed the guerrilla main forces of the Southern Army. The Paik Command, in accordance with the plan of the ROK Army Headquarters, handed over its mission to the Capital Division and moved to Ch’unch’on to be attached to the US IX Corps. The command was dismantled and, on April 5, 1952, the ROK II Corps was founded on the basis of the Paik’s headquarters, with the Capital, 3rd, and 6th Divisions and took over a corps sector in the Kumsong area.

5. Interdiction in the Enemy Rear Area

Since the ground operation had slowed and the truce negotiations had stalled, the ROK and UN Forces, expected the air forces to take the lead in holding the initiative. It was a natural expectation, considering of the front line situation. The UN naval and air forces, which had secured command of the sea and air, were remarkably active in striking the enemy as hard as ever. The navy strengthened its shore bombardment forces off both coasts areas, totally blocking the Eastern and Western Seas. The air forces concentrated all their fire power on the enemy line of communications to interrupt the enemy reinforcement and resupply as much as possible.\(^{81}\)

The objective of the interdiction operations for the rear area was to
destroy the important enemy supply facilities and the transportation network so as to isolate enemy units in the frontline. Some senior officers hoped air attacks would bring an early settlement of the truce negotiations. Accordingly, the interdiction was basically a defensive operation to prevent the enemy from storing ammunition and supplies for an all-out offensive rather than support for friendly offensive operations.\(^{83}\)

Operation Strangle, which was carried out from August of 1951 to the spring of 1952, was a typical interdiction operation to separate the enemy main force at the front from supply sources in the rear areas. The operation was conducted by the ROK air force, the US 5th Air Force, US Navy carrier air groups, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and some allied squadrons. These air forces struck bridges, river banks, crossroads, stations, vehicles, and trains mainly around the important roads and railways.\(^{83}\)

The bombers of the UN air forces flew deep into the enemy rear areas day and night despite enemy interceptors and anti-aircraft fire, and bombed airfields to paralyze enemy air operations. They also harassed the enemy rear area combat powers by intercept bombardment on railroads, important supply lines, and maneuver routes.\(^{84}\)

Generally, UN air operations placed more weight on strategic bombardment and interception rather than close air support. Thus, during the November to April period, the Far East Air Forces averaged over 9,000 sorties a month on interdiction and armored reconnaissance missions while close air support sorties varied from 339 to 2,461 a month.\(^{85}\)

At the beginning of 1952, the UN air forces repeatedly bombed important enemy railways every eight hours to destroy even the railroadbed completely, drove off enemy airplanes with their own effective F-86s and continued to bomb on the same objectives.\(^{86}\)

In February of the same year, as the Communist Forces had transferred
their anti-air defense forces from the front line to the protection of the railways, the UN air forces first suppressed the enemy anti-aircraft guns with jet fighters, and then the bombers struck the railroads.871

However, the efficiency of interdiction operations decreased rapidly with
the onset of the thawing season. As the spring weather was so variable, the UN air forces bombing of enemy railroads was remarkably reduced, and the enemy gained time needed for repairing the railroads. Accordingly, in March 1952, the UN air forces changed their tactics to a large, concentrated air strikes, based on naval aviation concepts. The operation was to paralyze the enemy railway supplies by concentrating continuous destructive power of the air forces on a certain sector of enemy railroads for twenty-four hours.

The UN air forces, from March 25 to 26, concentrated bombardment on the railroad between Chongju and Sinuiju, but was not as effective as expected. Three hundred seven fighter- bombers, 161 fighters and 8 B-26 bombers struck the enemy railroads, but the enemy was able to restore raid traffic in six days.\(^{88}\)

In air raid operations on the railroads using the saturation tactics, the UN air forces had an efficiency problem because of the lack of pilot skill necessary to continue air raids at night and in bad weather conditions, and there was also a shortage of airplanes available for bombing many objectives simultaneously. Thus, the efficiency of the air operations was limited. In late April, the intercept operation had made no progress. The losses of the UN air forces increased gradually and the operational efficiency decreased because the enemy anti-air fire net was systematic and well arranged.\(^{89}\)

In contrast to the UN air forces, the number of enemy airplanes gradually increased, and they attacked the ROK and UN airplanes in interception operations. The enemy usually employed sixty to eighty MIG-15 fighters flying in formation over the Sup’ung Dam in mass, and all at once attack the friendly F-86 fighters when they would fly into an air corridor of the MIG fighters. The enemy air force also conducted attacks in which eight or nine MIG fighters would assault one F-86 fighter. In December 1951, however, thirty-one MIG-15s were shot down by F-86 fighters and the enemy switched over to active assault tactics from January, 1952. The enemy planes normally flew north of the Ch’ongch’on River
at high and low altitudes and a part of them would challenge the F-86s in interception operations, and the other fighters would assault the bombers. There were eight enemy air assaults in January, 1952, six in February, eight in March, nine in April, and twenty-five in May.90)

At that time, the ROK Air Force was remarkably active supporting the UN air forces, which were operating to intercept the rear area. The ROK Air Force, which had moved forward to the Kangnung air base, joined the interception operation in the Wonsan-Hwangju area from late December, 1951 until March of the next year. For the operation, the ROK Air Force made sorties every day to bomb important enemy military facilities, including railroads and supply lines. The ROK Air Force during the period from December 3, 1951 to March 26, 1952, destroyed 327 railroad tracks, 405 military buildings, 105 artillery positions, 123 supply dumps, 3 ammunition dumps, 94 bunkers, 15 bridges, and 6 railroad lines and lost 3 F-51 fighter bombers.

The 10th Combat Flight Squadron of the 1st Wing played an especially heroic role in destroying the Sungho bridge near P’yongyang, which the UN air forces had failed to cut off in spite of having made 500 sorties. On January 15, 1952, two formations of six F-51 fighters, which had taken off from the Kangnung air base, flew at very low altitude over the enemy ground anti-aircraft fire and succeeded in destroying two spans of the Sungho bridge.91)

Navy warships also bombarded from the sea in support of the intercept operations of the air force. During periods of bad weather in which air flight was impossible, navy destroyers bombarded the sea coast railways with 5 inch guns. The bombardment from the sea could not cut off a railway completely, but a continuous harassing bombardment could block the enemy somewhat. The cruiser St. Paul and three destroyers bombarded the Ch’ongjin area with 8 and 5-inch guns whenever necessary. The bombardment not only destroyed enemy facilities, but also greatly supported interception operations.92)
Carrier planes also joined in the intercept bombardment. The navy jet fighters had enormous destructive power against railroads, and it took the enemy more than three days to repair the damage after an attack. Prior to the use of the navy jet fighters, it had usually taken only one day for restoration. In January, the Essex and two other aircraft carriers devoted themselves to destroying the railroads and concentrated bombardments on an area 1,500-5,000m long. The aircraft carriers’ operations were not directed to precise point objectives like those of the air force, but were effective for precise carpet bombing mainly aimed at important facilities. Accordingly, whole areas were destroyed and some places were abandoned, left without being restored for as long as ten days. Like a limited objective on the ground, if a point objective was attacked, the enemy would be able to take countermeasures, but if an objective was a large area, counter measures would be difficult to take.\textsuperscript{93}

The operation to block the rear area was very effective operationally, but could not completely stop the enemy shipment of equipment and supplies. At night the enemy vehicles moved southward to the front line along cut-off railroad and supply routes. The enemy endeavored to restore the railroads as quickly as possible, and an air observer’s photographs indicated that a destroyed railroad could be restored within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{94}

The Communist Forces did their best to restore railroads by operating day and night, using three railway repair organizations, each of them consisting of 7,700 technicians. When the damage to the enemy railroads increased, North Korea deployed more than 500,000 personnel, including three regular brigades, along the railroads at all times for reconstruction missions. In each area 50 people were deployed and a look out team composed of 10 persons guarded every 6 km of railroad.\textsuperscript{95}

When piers of a bridge were bombed, the enemy utilized mobile piers every night for its railroads. The enemy maintained supply lines by restoring the
destroyed facilities, roads, and railroads or by constructing new ones, taking advantage of darkness or bad weather. As a result, the enemy infantry at the front line was able to get essential supplies as well as winter clothes. The enemy recognized this was a war of national survival.\(^\text{96}\)

The CCF usually hid supply trains in tunnels during the day for protection from the UN air force’s bombardment. The trains moved at night. Ammunition and fuel trains, especially, were put in the center of tunnels so that if the UN airplanes hit a tunnel, the entrance alone would be blocked. The UN Forces strategic bombardment was successful only in limiting the volume of enemy supplies and in delaying the delivery of supplies, thus reducing the frequency and scale of the enemy offensive. However, this was not a decisive means of terminating the war.\(^\text{97}\)

The Chinese official history notes that “the Chinese air forces, anti-aircraft artillery, engineer, and rear area service elements, in close cooperation with each other, managed to prevent the UN Forces from achieving its desired objective even though these elements suffered from the UN air forces interdiction operation.”\(^\text{98}\)

Nevertheless, air interdiction had a significant influence on the whole war effort. The Eighth Army commander commented that: “If the UN Forces had not executed an interdiction operation, the enemy would have constructed many more railway stations in Sibyon-ri or north of the P’yonggang and would have poured more artillery shells on our heads. The air campaign could not stop the enemy supply, but there is no doubt that it played an important role in weakening the enemy combat capability.\(^\text{99}\)

Thus the operation to isolate the rear areas contributed to taking the initiative of operation while the ground operation was in momentary lull after the reopening of the armistice talks. The operation also played a decisive role in destroying the enemy’s capacity for logistic support and sending reinforcements to
the front. Air power discouraged enemy from launching large scale offensive operations.

II. Stagnation of the Truce Negotiations

1. Negotiation for ‘Concrete Arrangements for Cease-fire and Armistice’

   (1) The Basis of Negotiations and Proposals of Both Sides

   Agenda Item 3, the details of the truce, involved questions as to how the two sides could execute a cease fire and secure conditions for the prevention of a recurrence of war. At issue, too, was the organization should be established to supervise the implementation of the agreed on conditions.

   The dispute over Agenda Item 3 between the UN Command and the Communist Forces had been going on since before the two sides reached an agreement on a provisional demarcation line. After the demarcation line problem was settled on November 27, 1951, agenda Item 3 was brought up and proved to be a problem.\(^{(100)}\)

   The Communist Forces representative Nam Il proposed that if the following five fundamentals concerning Agenda Item 3 were accepted, the matter could be settled easily.

   1) All fighting cease as soon as the armistice was signed.
   2) All armed forces leave the DMZ within three days of the signing.
   3) All armed forces withdraw within five days from rear areas, including islands and waters, to their own side of the demarcation line.
4) No armed forces enter or use armed force against the DMZ.

5) Both sides designate an equal number of members for an armistice commission that would “be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements and the supervision and implementation of the armistice agreement.”

After hearing the proposal, the chief representative of the UN Forces, Admiral Joy, indicated that it was important that both sides adopt a plan to reduce the possibility of recurrence of hostilities and insisted that definite items to ensure this goal be included. The UN Command reminded the Communist Forces of the contents of Agenda Item 3 and indicated that the suspension of fire and the structure, function, and right of a supervising organization should be a fundamental consideration. The UN Command insisted on the following seven principals:

1) There shall be a cease fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.

2) There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.

3) There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.

4) The military armistice commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the armistice commission.

5) There shall be a withdrawal of forces of each side, air, ground, and naval, regular and irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.

6) There shall be no armed forces in the demilitarized zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.
7) The military commanders shall administer their portion of the demilitarized zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

**Comparison of the Proposals of the Two Sides on Agenda Item 3.**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal of the UN Forces</th>
<th>Proposal of the Communist Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. To be effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, all the units should observe the agreement.</td>
<td>1. To cease all the hostile activities on the day of the signing of the agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. To establish the joint supervisory commission composed of the same number of representatives of both sides.</td>
<td>2. Appointment of the same number of representatives from each side for the joint armistice commission to be responsible for the joint supervision.</td>
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<td>3. To prohibit augmentation of military power after the agreement.</td>
<td>3. All armed units should withdraw from the opponent’s rear area, islands, and the sea area after the agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. To secure free operation of the Military Armistice Commission for a supervisory function.</td>
<td>4. All armed units should withdraw from the demilitarized zone within three days after the agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. All the military forces should withdraw from the area controlled by the opponent.</td>
<td>5. A prohibition on entrance by armed units in to the demilitarized zone and military action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. To prohibit the armed units from staying in the demilitarized zone except as agreed by both sides.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. The military commanders of both sides control their own areas in the demilitarized zone.</td>
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After the proposals of the UN Command were submitted, the representatives of both sides studied the proposals. Nam II concentrated on the proposals of the UN Command to limit augmentation of supplies, equipment, and facilities, and to permit a supervisory team to have free activity in all of Korea.\textsuperscript{104}

The Communist Forces insisted at a conference on the 28th that a necessary condition for a final and peaceful solution of the Korean problem was the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and made it clear that they would not accept any limit on the restoration of North Korean facilities, especially airfields.\textsuperscript{105}

The UN Command rejected the demands, pointing out that to make withdrawal of foreign troops a subject of discussion would not be proper and insisted that the Communist side should withdraw the demand, and indicated that the five proposals of the Communists placed too many limits on the so-called ‘bridge to peace,’ a phrase which the Communists had previously used. The UN Command explained its seven proposals in greater detail and stressed that a prohibition of reinforcements of the armed forces was the most important factor in reaching an armistice agreement from the viewpoint of the UN Command.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus, the focus of the demands of each side became clear. For the Communist side, it was the withdrawal of all foreign troops; for the UN Command, it was a prohibition on reinforcement of the military forces and the right of surveillance. The opposition of the UN Command to the strengthening of military facilities fundamentally meant construction or restoration of airports, that is, the UN Command intended to maintain air supremacy during the truce period. Accordingly, Agenda Item 3, which contained the third proposal of the UN Command to prohibit augmentation of military strength and the fourth proposal to secure free operation of the Military Armistice Commission for a supervisory function, was to influence the negotiation significantly.
(2) A Prohibition on Military Reinforcement and Surveillance

The head representative of the UN Command, Vice Admiral Joy, in a keynote speech at the 32nd Truce Negotiation Conference on 1 December, again addressed the repeated Communist insistence on a withdrawal of foreign troops. Reiterating that the issue was not an appropriate subject for the truce talks, Joy stressed that setting up a means to limit military reinforcements was an essential problem for reaching a truce. The UN Command clearly insisted on its position, issuing the following statement despite the Communist Forces’ persistent opposition:

1) During the truce period, neither side will reinforce the military forces or military personnel in Korea.
2) Both sides will not augment the military equipment or materiel higher than the level at the moment when the armistice agreement is announced.
3) The two sides together will set up a Military Armistice Commission consisting of personnel of both sides to supervise the observance of the articles of the armistice agreement. The Commission and the Joint Supervisory Team can pass freely through the whole of the Korean peninsula and have authority to conduct surveillance for all ground, sea and air entrances, and the important center of transport according to an agreement between the two sides. The Commission has a right to conduct joint aerial surveillance and photographic reconnaissance and joint surveillance of the demilitarized zone.
4) The issue of the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Korea is outside the domain of the truce talks, and it should be finally settled by the relevant governments.¹⁰⁷
The Communist Forces, refusing the UN Command’s demands, still strongly insisted that they should have the right to set up additional airports and to reinforce military strength during the armistice period, and that there should be a withdrawal of the UN Forces. The two sides waged a war of words in opposition to each other’s proposals in a week. The Communist side charged that the proposal of the UN Command was intended to interrupt the reconstruction and restoration of North Korea and intervened in domestic affairs.\(^{(08)}\)

On December 3rd, the Communists made a concession for the first time and agreed to negotiate the problem. The Communist Forces proposed two more conditions in addition to the five conditions which they had proposed a week earlier. The two additional conditions were:

1) To facilitate political discussion and stabilize the situation of a ceasefire, the two sides should suspend bringing in troops and equipment without exception.

2) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be established to investigate the entrance and exit of areas outside the demilitarized zone, independently from the Military Armistice Committee.\(^{(09)}\)

The new proposal of the Communist Forces put the representatives of the UN Command on the defensive because the UN Command was not yet ready for complete limitation of all units and equipment or an invitation to the neutral nations for supervision. The UN Command needed time to ascertain the enemy’s motives and to receive instructions from the government; consequently, it proposed handing over the problems to a subcommittee for detailed discussion.\(^{(10)}\) In response to this proposal, the Communist Forces declared that they would not oppose the idea if the seven principles which they had earlier proposed were accepted first. On the following day, 4 December, at the 35th Armistice meeting,
the Communist side accepted the UN Command's proposal to hand over Agenda Item 3 to a subcommittee, for discussion, and eventually the subcommittee held a meeting.\textsuperscript{111)}

In the afternoon at the meeting of subcommittee members, the Communist side, answering the questions of the UN Command, insisted that there would be no rotation of personnel or replenishment of the equipment, and restoration of facilities were internal affairs and that there could be no interference with the reconstruction of facilities in North Korea. The Communists proposed operating the Supervisory Commission separately at ports agreed by both sides, indicating that they had not sufficiently studied the concept of the organization of the Supervisory Commission and of the utilization of the neutral nations.\textsuperscript{112)}

At the subcommittee meeting on 5 December, the Communist Forces made it clear that the mission and authority of the Military Armistice Committee should be limited to within the demilitarized zone only and that neutral nations that had not dispatched combat troops to Korea (for example, Czechoslovakia and Poland) should be considered for membership on the Commission. In addition to these countries, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark were also eligible to be neutral nations even though they had provided limited medical support to the UN Forces.\textsuperscript{113)}

The UN Command, on 6 December, proposed the below eight items as revision of the seven items, which the Communist Forces had proposed, taking into account the views of and issues brought up by both sides up to that point.

Most of the proposals of the UN Command were agreed to and the UN Command adopted the terminology of the Communist side in an effort to gain acceptance from the Communists. However, the Item 6 concerning limitation and the Item 7 concerning surveillance, on which the UN Command could not concede, were left the same as in the original draft. For Item 7, comprehensive inspection proposed was withdrawn, but a provision for aerial inspection
Revised Proposal of the UN Command and the Response of the Communist Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revised proposal of the UN Forces</th>
<th>Response of the Communist Forces</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. All the military forces should cease hostilities within 24 hours from the moment the Armistice Agreement became valid.</td>
<td>1. accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All the armed forces of both sides should withdraw within 72 hours from the moment of the validity of the Armistice Agreement from the demilitarized zone.</td>
<td>2. accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. All the armed Forces in unilateral control should withdraw within 5 days from the validity of the agreement from the area controlled by the other side.</td>
<td>3. All the UN Forces have to withdraw from the islands along the shore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No armed unit can enter the demilitarized zone except police armed units, on which both sides have agreed, and in the zone no military activity can be conducted.</td>
<td>4. accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The both sides should appoint the same number of personnel to organize the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for the joint mission of supervising observance of all areas of the armistice agreement.</td>
<td>5. agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To assure stability of the armistice, the neither side should reinforce units, personnel, or equipment, and neither side should reconstruct or restore military facilities to a higher level than the level at the moment of the effectuation of the armistice agreement. (article of limitation)</td>
<td>6. opposed After the effectuation of the agreement, no entry of any personnel, units or materials was authorized. To limit the reconstruction and restoration of military facilities is interference in internal affairs. We do not want forced armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1) The Military Armistice Commission and the Joint Investigation Team have the right to supervise the important line of communications and army, navy, and air entry ports agreed by both sides throughout all of Korea. 2) The Military Armistice Commission has the right to joint aerial photographic reconnaissance in the air of all Korea. 3) The Military Armistice Commission has the authority to supervise the demilitarized zone completely.</td>
<td>7. The distinction between the Neutral Nations supervisory Commission and the Armistice Commision was not mentioned. In the rear area the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is to supervise the entry ports. The sphere of action of the Commission must be enlarged. The aerial inspection is an interference in the internal affairs. We do not want an armistice under surveillance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The military Armistice Commission can not be effective until it will be organized with necessary personnel and be ready to implement its function</td>
<td>8. agreed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
remained.

The Communist Forces, however, strongly rejected the limitation and surveillance items, insisting that UN Command was attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another independent nation. The Communists would make no concession on this point and proposed a practical conference to discuss the problems of participation of the neutral nations and the islands along the coast.

Through continuous meetings, on 7 December, the issues included in Agenda 3 were reduced to four issues. First, there should be no entry of new units; second, construction of facilities, particularly airports should be prohibited; third, command of the islands along the coast should be adjusted; fourth, formation of a supervisory team and its relation to the Military Armistice Commission should be established.\(^{14}\)

While the UN Forces were waiting for instructions on negotiations, they established their position in order to seize the initiative in the negotiations. They adhered to their position on Item 1 but accepted the proposals of the Communists on Items 3 and 4, and on Item 2, they withdrew their opposition to restoration of all facilities except airfields.\(^{15}\) At last, on December 11, the following instructions came from Washington:

1) As the problem of relief and replacement of personnel is crucial, the UN Command cannot change its stand on limitation.
2) On the problem of restoring facilities, some concession can be made, but if the airfield problem should become a final obstacle to the armistice, the UN Command should again ask for government instruction.
3) At the final stage, the UN Forces could withdraw from the islands above the demarcation line.
4) Use of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission could be agreed to, but bilateral agreement is necessary for selection of the neutral nations,
and the Supervisory Commission should be under the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission and the Supervisory Commission should be responsible for the Military Armistise Commission.\textsuperscript{160}

In accordance with the instructions, on the following day, the UN Command, proposed an overall revision for the unsettled issues of Agenda Item 3. "The UN Command agrees with the concepts that the UN Forces are to withdraw from the islands on the coast and the territorial waters north of the demarcation line, and that the neutral nations, agreed on by both sides, are to provide personnel for the Supervisory Commission. On the other hand, the Communist Forces should approve relief of personnel and supplementation of equipment and agree that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. The proposal of the UN Command to prohibit construction and restoration of airfields is not negotiable."\textsuperscript{117}

With continued negotiations, the two sides made a little progress since the Communist side approved a plan to allow 5,000 replacements a month and operation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, but by the middle of December, the two sides had not been able to reach an agreement on the problems of the relief of personnel, supplementation of equipment, construction and restoration of airfields, and ground and aerial surveillance.

The deadline date (30-day) for an agreement on the military demarcation line was drawing near and the Agenda Item 3 negotiations still faced difficulty, so the UN Forces Commander issued an appraisal of the situation and decided he needed a short postponement of the negotiations. General Ridgway asked for instructions from the government. At the time, the authorities in Washington felt that a political conference after the armistice would not be successful, and accordingly, that the armistice would be the only agreement. On 19 December,
Washington issued new instructions:

Regarding disputes over problems, you should try to remain flexible and if the Communist Forces make any new proposals, you should try to reach agreement. We don’t want a suspension of the negotiations, and if the talks were to be suspended, we should be able to show objectively that the Communists were entirely responsible for it.\textsuperscript{188}

As the thirty-day deadline date for the negotiations was approaching, on 20 December, the day after it received new instructions, the UN Command proposed organizing a Staff Officers Meeting to settle the issues of Agenda Item 3 and to facilitate the conference. The Communist Forces accepted the proposal and suggested if the UN Command agreed that it would not limit the construction and restoration of the airfields, that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would supervise only a limited zone, and that UNC would withdraw the request for aerial surveillance, they would consider UNC proposal to replace personnel and equipment.\textsuperscript{199}

A partial limitation on the construction of airfields, securing of free surveillance activities, and the necessity for aerial surveillance were reaffirmed in instructions on December 19. The UN Command would not accede to the Communists’ demands on the issues. At a result disputed the issues of Agenda Item 3 were almost solved as a result of many conferences, including the staff officers’ meetings at an end of the temporary armistice period on 27 December 1951, but a few problems remained unsettled.

(3) Reservation of the Airfield Problem

Among the unsettled problems of Agenda Item 3 was the construction
Differences in Viewpoints between the both sides.\textsuperscript{120}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pending Case</th>
<th>Demands of Each Side</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The relief of personnel and supplementation of equipment</td>
<td>1. The relief of personnel and supplementary supply of equipment should be authorized without limitation from the level at the moment of the effectuation of the armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ground and aerial surveillance</td>
<td>1. The ground surveillance should be done freely at the entry port and traffic centers. 2. The surveillance team should be under the Military Armistice Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction and restoration of airfield</td>
<td>To ensure the armistice, both sides should maintain the airfields at the present conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The position of the coastal islands</td>
<td>Troops withdraw from the islands north of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and restoration of airfields. The UN Command maintained a strong position against construction and repair of airfields, and the Communist Forces opposed the restriction stipulating that it was an interference in domestic affairs.

On 29 December the UN Command proposed that if Communists accepted the rest of the proposals of the UN Command without any revisions, the UN Command would give up the aerial surveillance demand. The UN Command proposed a compromise on other problems to induce the enemy to concede on the
airfield problem. The Communist side indicated that the proposal seemed to have
advanced a step forward, but there had been no fundamental change, only a sur-
face concession. The negotiations went on in subcommittee and also in a staff
officers meeting, but there was no progress.\textsuperscript{121)}

After repeated conferences, on the following day, the 30th, the
Communist Forces, indicating that the proposal of the UN Command was a step
forward, accepted only the concession of the UN Command, but strongly refused
to budge on the airfield problem. The year had passed with many meetings but no
progress, marking of time with repeated criticism and counter-criticism, but also
with attempts at persuasion on the part of the UN Forces side and rejection on the
part of the Communist side on the airfield problem.\textsuperscript{122)}

In the five months and twenty days since the armistice talks had begun,
of the four issues on the agenda only the issue of the military demarcation line
was settled. Actually, the military demarcation was subject to further negotiation,
so no issue had been concluded. As the year 1952 began, the two sides were pass-
ing time idly at P'anmunjom, exchanging words every day without making any
progress. Whenever the UN Command brought up the airfield issue, the
Communist Forces would not even respond, insisting that it was “an interference
in internal affairs and a violation of sovereignty.”

On 9 January, the Communist Forces offered a partial revision of the
proposal put forth by the UN Command on 29 December. First, it included
replacement of personnel, weapons, and ammunition except fighter planes, and
second, it put the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission under the control of
the Military Armistice Committee.\textsuperscript{123)} However, the Communist Forces did not
mention the aerial surveillance problem or the restoration of airfields. The propos-
al included a concession on minor problems, but since the important obstacle, the
airfield issue, was not resolved, the UN Command rejected the revised proposal.\textsuperscript{124)}

In sum the Communist Forces had made a concession on the ground sur-
veillance issue and the relief of personnel issue, and the UN Command compromised on the aerial surveillance issue; thus, two disputed issues on Agenda Item 3 were finally concluded, but there was a deadlock on the issue of airfields.\textsuperscript{125}

On 10 January, the UN Forces Commander received instructions from the US government stating: “If the issue of the airfields was the only obstacle to the armistice, we would make a concession on it, but the discussion of the airfield problem should be postponed until the other issues in Agenda items 3, 4, and 5 have been agreed upon.” Due to the instructions, the UN Command altered its negotiating strategy and decided to first discuss the matters on which there were only small differences of opinion, postponing discussion of the airfield problem until later.\textsuperscript{126}

Finally, on 25 January 1952, the UN Command proposed giving staff officers of the two sides the job of solving the pending issues on agenda item 3 except the airfield issue and of drafting a document on the frame work of the provisional agreement reached. Unexpectedly, on 27 January, the Communist Forces agreed to the proposal and the subcommittee went into recess.\textsuperscript{127}

At the first meeting on 27 January 1952, the staff officers of the UN Command submitted a draft agreement, declaring its position on the pending problems including the airfield problem. The draft of the UN Command would have permitted relief of 75,000 personnel monthly and establishment of ten entry ports in South Korea and twelve in North Korea. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was authorized freedom of activity for supervisory purposes.\textsuperscript{128}

Unexpectedly, the Communist Forces seemed inclined to accept the proposal of the UN Command. The staff officers of the UN Command felt that most of the enemy proposals for revision were fairly minor but concerning the relief of troops, the difference between the 75,000 of the UN Command and the 5,000 of the Communists Forces presented too wide a gap for agreement.

Some problems developed over the five coastal islands, which located
south of the 38th Parallel and occupied by the UN Forces but belonged to the west and north of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do. There was disagreement over the status of the coastal islands, as to whether or not it should be based on the extension line of the Military Demarcation Line.

The Korean delegate, Major General Yu Jai Heung, in light of the Communist Forces insistence that the territorial waters limit be set at twelve miles, asked for the opinion of the ROK Chief of Naval Operations Admiral, Son Won Il, and decided to set the limit of the territorial waters at three miles. General Yu recommended that the UN Command set the limit for the territorial waters at three miles and hold the strategic islands south of the 38th Parallel along the Western Sea coast. The UN Command accepted the recommendation and proposed this to the Communist Forces. The Communist side, also taking into account the fact that the UN Forces had secured command of the sea north of the 38th Parallel and occupied several important islands off North Korea, agreed to the proposal without amendment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the five coastal islands belonged to the UN Forces.

As a result, during the week of meetings of the staff officers, the only issues agreed on were that the number of Joint observer team under control of the Military Armistice Commission should be reduced from fifteen to ten and that five Western Sea offshore islands should be under the supervision of the UN Forces.

(4) The Issue of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

The beginning of February 1952 ushered in another problem with Agenda Item 3 in addition to the issues of airfields and relief of personnel: the membership of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

On 1 February, both sides agreed to name the supervisory organization
‘The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.’ The UN Command nominated three neutral nations (Switzerland, Sweden and Norway), and the Communist side insisted on appointing Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. The UN Command rejected Russia and offered to drop Norway, but the Communist Forces insisted on including Russia. The UN Command stood against the enemy’s insistence.

At the time, the definition of a neutral nation was a nation which had not joined in the Korean War. The Communist Forces took advantage of the fact that the UN Command could not submit practical evidence of Russian participation in the war. The UN Command did not want Russia to be involved in activities south of the Military Demarcation Line after the armistice, and verbal offense and defense went on between the two sides on this issue.\(^{130}\)

In other discussions on Agenda Item 3, the relief of personnel was agreed on in February and set at a maximum of 35,000 and, on 15 March, it was agreed that the number of entry ports under surveillance should be 5 for each side.\(^{131}\) Thus, there was some progress made, but there seemed to be no possibility of reaching an agreement on the airfield restoration problem or the structure of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

2. Negotiations on the Exchange of POWs

(1) The Proposals and Points of Dispute of the Both Sides

Negotiations on the exchange of POWs (Agenda Item 4) commenced on 11 December when negotiations on Agenda Item 3 had been turned over to the subcommittee.

At the very beginning of the talks, the Communist Forces proposed as a main point of the negotiations that all the POWs of both sides should be released and repatriated soon after the signing of an armistice agreement. The UN
Command, wanting an early exchange of POWs on a fair and reasonable basis, requested an exchange of the lists of POWs conducted by representatives of the International Red Cross based on visits to the POW camps, as first step toward resolving the issue.\textsuperscript{132)}

On the surface, the problem of the prisoners of war seemed to be comparatively simple. Since the opening sentence of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, agreed to by both sides, clearly stated: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after a cessation of hostilities,” there seemed to be no points of dispute. World War II had added a new chapter to the handling of prisoners of war when the Soviet Union retained large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners for a long period after the war to assist in the rehabilitation of the USSR. To prevent a recurrence of such action, the delegates to the Geneva Conference in 1949 strengthened the article dealing with repatriation, but in their zeal to protect the rights of each prisoner to return home swiftly, the delegates ignored the other side of the coin. They failed to incorporate provisions to cover the possible exceptions\textsuperscript{133)}: those prisoners who might not want to go back home because they wanted to evade responsibility for the lost war, those who had fallen out of sympathy with their national regimes, and those who preferred the ways of their captors. These possible exceptions formed the basis for dispute on Agenda Item 4.\textsuperscript{134)}

The omission of rules to cover exceptional cases became apparent when considering prisoners of the Korean War. Many of the NKPA prisoners captured by the UN Forces did not want repatriation. They included former ROK soldiers who had been forced into the North Korean People’s Army and then taken prisoner by the ROK Army, and Chinese prisoners of war, many of whom were members of the Nationalist army who wanted to live in the ROK and Free China, respectively.

During the interrogation of prisoners, one prisoner stated: “We were
The communist prisoners who did not want to be repatriated constructed a statue of the Goddess of Liberty in the camp as a symbol of a will of liberty,

ROKA soldiers who were captured by the North Korean Army and incorporated into the People's Army by force. There is no reason we should be sent to North Korea.” The statement created a problem. In light of these unusual situations,
the UN Command decided to adopt the principle of voluntary repatriation, to make every effort to see that the prisoners of the UN Forces retained by the Communist Forces should be repatriated safely, and to insist on a one-for-one exchange. However, the Communist Forces, on the basis of the literal terms of the Convention, insisted on forced repatriation and an all-for-all exchange.\textsuperscript{136}

Among the prisoners, many thousands were afraid of forced repatriation to North Korea or Communist China. According to the Convention, the prisoners should have been handed over to the Communists whatever the prisoners’ wishes. The problem for the UN Command was how to comply with the wishes of the prisoners themselves and treat them humanely, and also comply with the terms of the Geneva Convention.

On 15 December, at the continued Joint Subcommittee meeting, the UN Command, requested information about the prisoners of war, including 1) the identification of prisoners by nation (the name lists), 2) the locations of the prison camps, and 3) the number of the prisoners in each camp. The UN Command also asked for permission for members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to enter the camps.\textsuperscript{137} However, the Communist Forces insisted on discussing only the all-for-all exchange issue at the negotiations.

While they were discussing the issue, for the first time there seemed to be a vague possibility of progress in the matter of prisoners. The Communists agreed to furnish POW data and other items on 18 December, and the exchange of the name lists took place on the same day. A four-day recess followed to allow both sides to check the information carefully.\textsuperscript{138}

For the UN Command, the list submitted by the enemy proved to be a dramatic disappointment. The lists submitted by the Communists varied greatly from what the UN Command had expected. Their lists showed that the Communist Forces held only 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 UN personnel (including 3,198 American soldiers), for a total of 11,559 prisoners.\textsuperscript{139} During the
first month of the war, the Communists had reported via news releases and radio broadcasts, the capture of over 65,000 prisoners. Since the ROK Army carried over 88,000 men missing in action and the United States over 11,500 in the same category, the discrepancy was shocking.

The list of POWs that the UNC furnished to the Communists showed a total of 132,474 men: 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Chinese, and 16,243 former South Koreans. The Communists, however, had 188,000 men listed as missing. Since the UN Command lists contained only about 132,000 prisoners of war, the

The Details of the UN Forces Prisoners Submitted By the Communists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of POW</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of POW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>7,142</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL : 11,559**

Communists were not satisfied with the UN lists. After a four day recess, when the joint subcommittee meeting resumed on 22 December, the enemy charged that there were shortages of 44,259 names on one list and 1,456 on another. The UN Command explained that the bulk of the shortage was accounted for by former residents of the Republic of Korea who had been caught in the flow of War or had been impressed into North Korean Armed Forces. Prisoners in these categories had been separated from those who had voluntarily joined the North Korean Army and 37,000 were reclassified as civilian internees. The UN Command went on that it was in the process of screening another 16,000 detainees who had proven to be ROK citizens and those people would not be repa-
triated either.\textsuperscript{[42]} The position of the ROK government was that “the former ROKA soldiers and residents whom the North Koreans had forced to join the Communist Armed Forces should be released and not be repatriated, and also all civilians kidnapped by the Communists should be returned” to the ROK. This message from the ROK government was handed to the UN Command.\textsuperscript{[43]}

Thus, neither side was satisfied with the lists of POWs it received, and the disappointment and distrust on the part of both sides made the POW problem a very difficult one.

The Communists immediately disputed the explanation of the UN Command. They insisted that the criterion for repatriation was not the residence of the POWs, but the military units in which they served. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention stated that those who were not enrolled military members should be classified as POWs if they accompanied a military unit and fell into enemy hands. The claim of the Communists was in accordance with the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{[44]}

The UN Command disputed the Communists’ claim by asking: “Is it right to exchange the 11,000 prisoners whom the Communists detained, for the 132,000 detained by the UN Forces? You had clearly insisted that reinforcement of military strength should not take place after the armistice agreement when we discussed Agenda Item 3, but if we exchange the POWs all-for-all, you would be reinforced by the equivalent ten divisions. You also announced at the beginning stages of the war that you held more than 65,000 POWs, when you were winning and now on the lists you have only about 7,000. How can you explain the this huge difference?” The UN Command demanded an answer.\textsuperscript{[45]}

On 24 December the same argument continued. The Communists rejected the exchange of sick prisoners, but agreed on a letter exchange between prisoners and their families, and handed over the letter of captured Major General William Dean, the former 24th infantry Division Commander, to his family. The letter of General Dean initiated the exchange of letters for the POWs. The
Communists furnished their reply to the request of the UN Forces Commander on the 21st for visits by International Red Cross representatives to the prisoner camps. They rejected the request, indicating that the Communist Forces were treating the prisoners in a humanitarian way so that it was not necessary to visit the camps.

The meetings went on every day, including Christmas Day of 1951, and the two sides exchanged criticism with each other. On 26 December they reached the climax of their dispute. Ridgway criticized the all-for-all exchange proposal of the Communists, calling it fraudulent and unreasonable because the enemy proposal meant a release of 130,000 enemy prisoners compared to only 12,000 UN Forces' prisoners. The enemy requested the repatriation of the 44,000 ROK residents whose names had been dropped from the list furnished to the International Red Cross, and on 18 December demanded an explanation from the UN side for the discrepancies in the numbers on the list furnished them.

Meanwhile, the temporary cease fire for thirty days provided the enemy with time for reinforcement of its armaments. The completely exhausted enemy was able to rearrange its combat power for one month and was ready even to conduct offensive operations. Thus the negotiations for the prisoners went on with disagreements on the number of the prisoners and the process of repatriation until the end of 1951.

(2) Voluntary and Enforced Repatriation

At the outset of 1952, the UN Command approached the negotiations more positively. The UN Command proposed to solve the problem of retained civilians, including it in Agenda Item 4, and the proposal was accepted by the Communists in principle. It was based on the concept that the retained civilians should have a new life wherever they wanted (the ROK or North Korea) when the
armistice agreement became effective.

This issue was more political than military, and the Communist Forces did not pay much attention to it. On January 2, the encouraged UN Command offered its package proposal to the Communists to integrate the civilian repatriation with the exchange of POWs in a declaration of release. The main focus was the voluntary repatriation of both POWs and civilians. The declaration included several points.

The prisoners would decide for themselves to go back to their original units or to join opposing units after release. Voluntary repatriation was the principle to be followed, and this would apply to the civilian prisoners based on humanitarian considerations. The proper organization to ascertain the wishes of the prisoners when released would be the International Committee of the Red Cross. Likewise, POWs who wished to go back to their own forces would not be utilized for reinforcements during the armistice. An exchange of the same number, one to one, should be implemented. The rest of the prisoners who wished to go back to their own countries should declare that they would not engage in hostile action again against the country which had detained them. Those who did not wish to be repatriated to their own country should also declare that they would not take up arms again. There could be no fair and equal repatriation other than on these terms.

The Communists’ response to the proposal of the UN Command was critical, stating that the exchange of prisoners should not be a trading of slaves and that the 20th century was not a savage era of slavery.

At that time, the Foreign Minister Byon Yong T’ae sent a letter to the UN Command: “We strongly oppose the forced repatriation of the prisoners from the ROK and China. As for the North Korean prisoners, only brain-washed
Communists and sympathizers who do not wish to switch over should be repatriated."^152^)

The representatives of the two sides talked back and forth for a week about voluntary or forced repatriation, but could not reach a conclusion. The UN Command on 8 January offered a more concrete proposal to address the complaint of the Communists that the first suggestion of the UN Command had been vague in certain points. In other words, even after one-for-one repatriation had taken place, if the prisoners who remained under UN supervision wished to be repatriated, they should be sent immediately.\(^{53}\) However, there was no fundamental difference between the proposals, and the new proposal was not beneficial to the Communists. The Communist Forces continuously criticized the UN Command, stating that the position of the UN Command was against the Geneva Convention. Its intention was to utilize the prisoners as hostages for the repatriation of the civilians.\(^{54}\)

Thus the conference was deadlocked for six months until the middle of January, 1952, on two of the five items. The negotiators agreed on a few minor items, but on the restoration of airfields and repatriation of POWs, both sides were unyielding and the issues seemed to be non-negotiable.\(^{55}\)

The Communist Forces’ reason for insisting upon the all-for-all exchange of POWs was that if voluntary repatriation according to individual wishes were decided on, it was clear that many of the Communist prisoners would refuse repatriation. Knowing they could get political sanctuary, some of the North Korean soldiers at the front might surrender to the UN Forces. Furthermore, if the prisoners who remained on the UN Forces side, disclosed the inside facts of Communist plans and practices, the Communists would be greatly embarrassed.\(^{56}\)

The Communists advocated an interpretation of the Geneva Convention for their own sake, and the UN Command stood against it, indicating that there were no definite regulations for the proportion or the method of repatriation. The
armistice conference room was a place of debate over an authoritative interpretation of the Geneva Convention with delegates of both sides absorbed in the study of the Convention every day.

Under these circumstances, the Communists took an initiative in the talks, taking advantage of the difference in the lists provided by the UN Command. The Communist Forces requested the addition of prisoner rank and unit identification to the first list of the POWs. They wanted to have the list of 1,456, which had not been included in the original list but shown in a numerical recapitulation of POWs. The Communists also wanted the names of the 44,000 prisoners who had not been included on the list of the UN Command, but were included on the list of names they had picked up from the list offered by the Geneva Convention.¹⁵⁷)

On 28 January, the UN Command made a new list and furnished it to the Communist Forces. In the new data, a total of 132,080 prisoners were identified. It included 20,720 Chinese prisoners and 111,360 North Korean prisoners. The new list contained 394 fewer prisoners than the list furnished earlier. The UN Command explained that the 394 prisoners were the detained civilians who were later sent to civilian detainee camps.

The UN Command was ready with the list of the 44,000 civilian prisoners but demanded to exchange it for the list of more than 65,000 prisoners which the Communists had already announced publicly.¹⁵⁸) The Communists ignored the demand.

On this day, the UN Command, based on the ‘January 2nd proposal’ and ‘the spirit of voluntary repatriation’ proposed ‘the draft of the agreement of prisoners’ consisting of fourteen items on which the two sides had approached agreement. The Communists at first rejected the proposal. However, after receiving the new list of POWs and a draft of an agreement from the UN Command, the Communists began to show signs of accepting the agreement. On 3 February, the
Communist Forces offered an alternative proposal which met most of the proposals of the UN Command except for the voluntary repatriation issue. The proposal, of course, requested the all-for-all exchange of POWs. However, on the issues of exchanged prisoners not engaging in combat actions, visits of the International Red Cross delegates, including the North Korean and Communist Chinese delegates, to the POW camps, and the formation of a Repatriation Committee for POWs and civilians produced signs of compromise.

The UN Command felt that the Communists were being cooperative and tried to clear up some of the details first and to put aside the manner of exchange for later discussion. The UN Command suggested that the prohibition of participation of prisoners in combat activities should not apply to civilians and should be limited to the Korean War. The Communists agreed. Upon reaching agreement on the detailed issues, on and after 6 February the two sides held a Joint Staff Officers’ meetings to prepare the agreement on the POWs.

They reached agreement on the minor points of negotiation in a few days. At the meeting on 13 February, the Communist Forces acknowledged that the two sides had no fundamental differences on Agenda Item 4. As to the method of repatriation, the ROK government expressed its clear opposition to compulsory repatriation to General Ridgway.

The draft submitted by the Communists included more concessions. It stipulated clearly that the team composed of Red Cross members from the belligerent nations could visit the POW camps to take care of the prisoners and assist in the repatriation. The manner of repatriation remained unsettled. The Communist Forces insisted that if the UN Command did not concede the manner of repatriation, no agreement could be reached.

After initial work on drafting an agreement, the matter was turned over to a subcommittee on 29 February. However, negotiations on the prisoners became even more difficult when the UN Command was investigating the civilian
and voluntary repatriation prisoners in the Koje island camp, where the pro-
Communist prisoners started a riot on 17 February. The Communists took advan-
tage of this situation at the negotiating table.\(^{164}\)

The prisoner issues, after running into repeated difficulty, finally reached
agreement at the end of the February, 1952, except for the manner of repatriation,
voluntary or forced. The method of exchange of prisoners became the most dis-
puted point of the armistice talks. No one foresaw that the final agreement would
not be reached for eighteen more months.

3. Agreement on ‘the Recommendations to the Governments of the Countries
Concerned on Both Sides’

While discussing the item 5 of the agenda on ‘the proposal to the rele-
vant governments of both sides,’ the Communists persistently requested inclusion
of the problem of the withdrawal of the foreign troops, and the UN Command pre-
sented a competing proposition that the fifth item, the proposal to the relevant
governments of both sides, was a political issue and should be discussed at a politi-
cal conference after the armistice was affected.

This agenda had been once discussed along with Agenda item 3. How-
ever, after the UNC submitted a draft of items 3 and 4, and proposed to discuss
item 5 and the remaining issues on January 31, 1952. The Communists accepted
this proposal on February 3 and thus, substantive discussions started.\(^{165}\) The UN
Command proposed that withdrawal of foreign troops, an obstacle to armistice
negotiation and the pending issues to be dealt at the political conference.
However, the UNC held its position not to discuss the specifics on participants,
functions, format and others of the political conference outside military matters.

On the other hand, the Communists interpreted it as including political
issues in the wording of ‘recommendations of related governments’. They had
intention to utilize the political conference as a stepping stone for unification on their own terms after the withdrawal of the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula in the future.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus, item 5 was discussed at the plenary meeting on February 6.\textsuperscript{107} The Communists proposed that within three months after the armistice was signed, each side should appoint representatives consisting of Communist Chinese and North Koreans on the one hand, and the governments of the countries concerned of the UN on the other hand to hold a political conference for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. As for the topics to be discussed the Communists suggested the following three: 1) withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; 2) specific recommendations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and, 3) other problems related to peace in Korea.\textsuperscript{108}

The UN Command made a counterproposal at the main conference on 9 February:

in order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides recommend to the governments of the countries concerned of both sides (North Korea and Communist China for the Communist side; the UN and Republic of Korea for the other side) that within three months after the armistice agreement was signed and became effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides should be held to settle the following issues through negotiation: 1. withdrawal of non-Korean troops from Korea; 2. a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and 3. other Korean questions related to peace.

The proposals of both sides seemed to be much alike, but the UN Command clearly identified the Republic of Korea as the representative to the conference, and that the conference should deal only with Korean issues. The Communist Forces, on the following day, objected to the revised proposal of the
UN Command and insisted that not only Korean problems, but also other issues related to the Far East should be discussed.\textsuperscript{169}

The essence of the problem for both sides was whether to discuss only issues directly related to the Korean peace, as insisted on by the UN Command, or “the other issues related to the Korean peace” as insisted on by the Communists. The USA intended to limit the sphere of the political conference to the Korean peninsula and the Communists intended include all issues related to Korean peace.

During the discussion of the selection of the participating nations, the Communist Forces suggested North Korea and Communist China, but unexpectedly did not include the USSR; however; they ignored the proposal to include the ROK and opposed inclusion of the UN, insisting that not all UN member nations were war participants.\textsuperscript{170}

As the Communists opposed the proposal of the UN Command for the participation of the UN in the political conference after armistice, Admiral Joy responded to the Communists, reminding them that Communist China had insisted that the “Chinese Forces in Korea were volunteer forces.” Admiral Joy insisted that “China had no basis on which to join the political conference.”\textsuperscript{171}

The Communist delegates walked out of the conference room, declaring an indefinite recess, but they then brought forth a revised proposal on 16 February: “In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level be held by representatives appointed to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”\textsuperscript{172}

Admiral Joy informed the UN Command that the Communists statement afforded the wide latitude desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should be
accepted. With the understanding that ‘foreign’ meant non-Korean forces and that ‘etc.’ did not pertain to matters outside of Korea, the UN Command accepted the Communist version in toto on 17 February.\textsuperscript{173} Agenda 5, was specified as the Item 60 of Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement.\textsuperscript{174}

It had only taken eleven days to reach an agreement on Item 5, the shortest negotiation up to that point. Perhaps because of its vagueness, both sides easily accepted the noncommittal statement since in essence it settled nothing and promised little. If it later became inconvenient or unnecessary, it could be ignored.

III. Striving for a Package Settlement

In early March, 1952, the armistice conference became deadlocked due to the airfield issue and the formation of neutral nations observer teams in Item 3 and the issue of POWs in Item 4. As the negotiations ground to a standstill on both Items 3 and 4, Admiral Joy and the staff took stock of the over-all truce situation and concluded that there were two promising methods of obtaining a satisfactory armistice with the enemy.

The more drastic solution entailed the presentation of a complete armistice document incorporating some concessions to the enemy along with an ultimatum.\textsuperscript{175} Either the Communists would have to accept the agreement within a stated time limit or the negotiations would be terminated and hostilities resumed.\textsuperscript{176}

The second solution present a comprehensive proposal for armistice agreement without an open ultimatum. It was to notify the enemy of the UNC’s final proposal and to demand the enemy for acceptance, considering only minor changes in wording.
The first solution would require high level government decision and could be a burden to UNC to increase the intensity of the war if the ultimatum was turned down, but it considered to be the best option for a quick and favorable settlement.

The UN Command’s plan was to present one of the alternatives to the Communists and then to adjourn the plenary sessions, to reject further negotiations, and to press them for acceptance. Although there would be no breaking off the negotiations since the liaison officers would be available for consultation, “the UN Command’s position would not be altered nor any further concessions made.”

In brief, at this important moment of the armistice negotiations, the UNC tried to turn the strategy of negotiation by advocating the threat of force or showing inflexible front on the major issues in order to produce an armistice.

The two courses suggested the same goal: the ultimatum. The chief difference was that the alternative course had no time limit. Either one would bring unfavorable reaction from the UN Command because there existed a possibility of breaking off the negotiation and this would contradict the US JCS instructions. The US Government did not want to suggest drastic measure, the ultimatum to the Communists or to incorporate the meaning of ultimatum within the package settlement. General Ridgway pointed out that both of the suggested courses were ultimatums, and he did not think that the time was ripe for either open or implied ultimatums as yet.\(^{177}\)

Ridgway sent off a frank appraisal of the situation to the JCS. “Neither he nor his staff knew whether the Communists wanted an armistice or not, or how they really felt on the current issues, and it was clear that the enemy attitude was becoming more arrogant and obdurate and that the position of the UNC delegates was deteriorating daily.” He urged that as many of the UN participants in the Korean War as possible should declare they backed the UN Command’s stand.\(^{178}\)

He strongly recommended that the issue of Soviet membership on the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission must be removed before the other two important issues, voluntary repatriation and airfield rehabilitation could be resolved on the basis of a trade in a single package.\(^{179}\)

Due to the recommendation of the UN Forces Commander, the policy-making authorities in Washington studied the measures, the JCS taking a key role, and on 14 March fixed the policy to settle the issues of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, repatriation of POWs, and airfields in a single package.

However, the UN Command planned to offer a complete document incorporating the three solutions without an ultimatum to the Communists. Ridgway indicated that this would be his final proposal and that there would be no alternate. This would force the Communists to make a choice to accept or reject the proposal. President Truman then issued a statement of agreement with the plan of the UNC, forcing the Communists to accept it. The plan was fundamentally the same as the alternative plan of Joy, which had intended to replace the threat of force with a high level political declaration.\(^{180}\)

The United States and its allies were in the position of opposing the reinstitution of military action; however, they believed that the package settlement would be the only solution to break the deadlock of the armistice negotiations.\(^{181}\)

The next day, the JCS issued instructions to Ridgway to be prepared to implement the plan, stressing that the package approach would have greater impact on the enemy position and, if the negotiations broke off, the UN Forces would receive favorable international opinion and support.\(^{182}\)

The UN Command proposed to the enemy a staff officers meeting to ascertain the enemy position about the POW issue. The enemy agreed and, on 16 March, the staff officers met to discuss Item 4.\(^{183}\) They were in conference for almost a week, and there were increasing signs that the Communist position was shifting. They hinted on the 22nd of March that there might be ‘special cases’ among the prisoners that could be given special consideration, and they might be
willing to allow the POW lists to be adjusted. They also intimated that the initiation of closed, executive sessions might promote freer conversation and practical development.\textsuperscript{184}

On 25 March, the staff officers went into closed session. The UN Command tried to determine the extent of the possibility of revision of the list at which the enemy had hinted. A few days later, the UN Command promised to repatriate all prisoners, excluding those who physically resisted repatriation. The Communist Forces also accepted the proposal that the reclassified 44,000 former residents of the Republic of Korea should be repatriated voluntarily.

The Communists further agreed also to apply the same principle to the 16,000 prisoners who had been former residents of South Korea of the 132,000 military prisoners retained by the UN Forces. However, the Communists stated that it was not possible to even consider that the Communist Chinese prisoners held by the UN Forces should not be repatriated.

During debate on 1 April, the UN Command made a serious tactical error. When the enemy asked how many prisoners should be repatriated, the UN Command, based on guesswork, estimated about 116,000 prisoners. This figure was 132,000 prisoners minus 16,000 prisoners who were former residents of the Republic of Korea; therefore, it constituted the total number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners. The Communists, who preferred the higher number, suggested that both sides immediately check their lists and defer the debate on principles until this was completed. On 4 April, both sides agreed on a recess until the UN Command could give a more accurate number of the prisoners.\textsuperscript{185} The enemy attitude suggested that they would reach an agreement if more than 100,000 prisoners were to be repatriated.

The UN Command undertook the necessary classification work of the prisoners based on the ‘Scatter Operation.’ They screened 106,376 prisoners from April 8 to 13 and found that only 31,231 wanted to be repatriated. Taking into
account the number who refused to even be interviewed, only 70,000 were estimated to want repatriation. This number was much smaller than the 116,000, which the UN Command had suggested at the closed door conference.\textsuperscript{186}

The staff officers of the UN Command, at the meeting on 19 April, suggested that 70,000 was good figure for repatriation, and the Communists strongly protested that “this was not acceptable” and “this had completely overthrown the basis of negotiations.” And the negotiations were suspended and the meeting closed on 25 April.

The UN Command decided to set forth the package settlement proposal at the plenary session. On 28 April, at the plenary session, the chief delegate of the UN Command explained the UNC point of view in detail on the three pending issues: the restoration of airfields, the exchange of prisoners and the formation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and offered the following package settlement proposal:\textsuperscript{187}

1) The UN Command agrees to the demand of the Communist Forces that no restriction be imposed on the construction or restoration of airfields. However, I must make it absolutely clear that our acceptance of your position regarding airfields is contingent upon your acceptance of our positions regarding prisoners of war and the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

2) The 12,000 prisoners of our forces detained by the Communists should be exchanged for the 70,000 prisoners detained in our camp who are not opposed to repatriation.

3) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will be formed by four neutral nations on which the two sides agree.\textsuperscript{188}

This was the final plan which the negotiating delegates and political
authorities had developed through weeks of discussion. The UN Command delegate submitted the armistice agreement draft, adding the issues agreed to up to the that point to the package settlement plan.

The meeting next resumed on 2 May, at the request of the Communists. General Nam II rejected the proposal of the UN Command, but ended his statement with the suggestion of an important concession. He suggested that the Communists were willing to accept the proposal of the UN Command, giving up his insistence on involving the Soviet Union in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, but with the precondition of exchanging the 132,000 prisoners held by the UN Forces for the 12,000 allied prisoners.

The UN Command stressed that it set forth the package to be accepted, not to discuss the individual issues to be negotiated. The issues for negotiation were actually narrowed to one with the repatriation issue the only remaining obstacle to agreement. The two sides could not agree on the issue.

The UN Command insisted that the prisoners should be repatriated, but only those prisoners who wished to be repatriated. The Communist Forces strongly argued against the UN Command position, stating that the repatriating of prisoners on the basis of individual choice departed from precedents and would be a violation of the prisoner's rights and even the prisoners who were opposed to repatriation had to be repatriated.

Each side, paying attention to the opposite view point, clung to its own position. The UN Command insisted that forced repatriation was morally wrong, and the Communists intended to take advantage of the riot which had arisen in the prisoner camps.

The UN Command continued the conference only in order not to be blamed for being responsible for breaking off negotiations and to put the enemy in a defensive position. The UNC also tried to persuade the enemy of the rightness of the UN Command’s position. As the prisoner issue had remained unresolved
for a long time, international interest was focused on it.

The prisoner issue was also connected to the political position of both sides. On the assumption that military operations would not produce victory in the war, the disposition of the prisoner issue was not just a disputed point, but a way to win a political victory.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{IV. Incidents in the POW Camps}

\textbf{1. North Korea’s Maneuvering and POWs’ Uprising}

While the negotiations were going on at P’anmunjom, as 1952 approached, an incident took place at the Koje-do POW camp that damaged the position of the UN Command.

From the initial stages of the war, riots, demonstrations, and violence had taken place in the POW camp, but they had not developed into a serious problem. However with the entry of Communist China into the war, the situation had changed. When the UN Forces withdrew from North Korea, the prisoners were housed near Pusan.\textsuperscript{194} At the time (1 January 1951) the number of prisoners had reached 137,000. This created not only a problem of security, but also a potential threat for the main sea supply and reinforcement route and the logistic operations near the important Pusan port.

The UN Command, in order not to disrupt the operation, decided to isolate the prisoners of war in Koje-do, an island off the southern coast of Korea. However, the size of the island was only 240 square kilometers, and there was little land available on the island for the construction of accommodations for the prisoners. On the island, there already lived more than 200,000 residents and
refugees.\textsuperscript{195}

In January 1951, four sites for the camps were selected and barbed-wire fences were set up around them. Each enclosure was subdivided into eight compounds, for a total of 32 compounds, and at the end of the month, 50,000 prisoners were moved to Koje-do. Originally intended to hold 700-1,200 men apiece, the compounds were soon jammed with five times their capacity.\textsuperscript{196}

Accordingly, the possibility of incidents was increased by the overcrowded conditions in the camp. In addition, there were not enough men on hand to guard the prisoners nor were the guards adequately trained for their mission. In autumn of 1951, the 130,000 North Korean and 20,000 Chinese Communist prisoners, for a total of 150,000 prisoners were moved to the Koje-do Prisoner Camp.

There had been numerous indications of potential danger. Tensions grew between the ROK security troops and the prisoners; however, a more fundamental cause was that the prisoners were divided into two groups, pro-Communist prisoners and anti-Communist prisoners and the two factions vied for leadership. The commander of the 2nd Logistic Command in charge of the Koje-do prison camp, estimating that there were too few security troops, recommended an increase in the number of US troops. Eventually, in December, 1951, the security troops reached 9,000, including US troops, but the situation at the prison camp had worsened.\textsuperscript{197}

The pro-and anti-Communists were accommodated separately, and interviews to determine the number of prisoners who wanted voluntary repatriation were being conducted. In November and December, 1951, over 37,000 prisoners had been screened, and in January and February 1952, the interviews continued except for 5,600 prisoners in the 62nd Compound who violently rejected an interview\textsuperscript{198}. Here the pro-Communist prisoners had firm control and refused to permit the team to enter.

On 18 February, when the investigation team entered Compound 62, the
prisoners attacked the team and one American soldier was killed and 38 wounded. Fifty-five prisoners were killed immediately, and twenty two more died in the hospital, with over 140 other casualties.\textsuperscript{199}

The Communist delegate protested at P’anmunjom on 23 February, “It was a bloody incident in which many of our prisoners were brutally killed.” On 20 February, the Eighth Army Commander General James A. Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd as commandant of the camp to tighten up discipline, but the riots and incidents continued.\textsuperscript{200}

On 13 March, as an anti-Communist and security guard detail passed a hostile compound, ardent Communists stoned the detail. The guards rashly retaliated with gunfire, and twelve prisoners were killed and twenty-six were wounded.

Despite the incidents, the prisoner camp authority could not control the prisoners properly because of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention was designed primarily to protect the rights of the prisoners. It completely failed to foresee the development of hard core, organized prisoner groups such as those that sprang up on Koje-do in 1951-52 or to provide protection for the captor nation in dealing with stubborn resistance. In their zeal to defend the prisoners from hardship, injustice, and brutality, the writers of the Geneva Convention regulations spelled out in detail the privileges of the prisoners and restrictions upon the detaining nations, but evidently did not visualize a situation in which prisoners would organize and present an active threat to the captor nation.\textsuperscript{201}

From North Korea, agents were sent to the frontlines and instructed to allow themselves to be captured so that they could infiltrate the prison camps. They were mainly elements of the Political Preservation Bureau of the North Korean Forces, and they had two missions: first, to infiltrate into the camp and lead other prisoners in subversive activities, and second, to provide P’anmunjom with the information.\textsuperscript{202} Working through refugees, civilians, and local guerrillas, the agents were able to keep in touch with their headquarters.
After the agents had been infiltrated into the camps, they organized the pro-Communist groups, and the hospital compound became a clearing house for information and was one of the centers of Communist resistance. Although the agents wielded the actual power in the compounds, they usually concealed themselves behind the nominal commanders and operated carefully to cloak their identities.203)

The top leader of the pro-Communist prisoners was Colonel Lee Hak Koo of the 66 Officers Camp. It was later revealed that he was captured intentionally to become a leader of the prisoners. At the time, the UN Command grouped the camp in a brigade unit and a camp, composed of 5,000-10,000 prisoners, was organized into battalion, company, platoon and squad. Under the brigade commander, there was a deputy commander and a secretary, and in the battalion there was a clerk to deal with the administrative affairs. To maintain discipline in the camp, the supervisory team for a police mission was organized. Lee Hak-Koo concealed himself behind the nominal commanders and operated to control the prisoners in keeping with secret orders from the North Korean authorities.204)

While the pro-Communist prisoners enlarged and strengthened their organization in the camp, the anti-Communist prisoners stood against them. Naturally, there were bloody clashes between them. The security guards did not enter the compound at night, so the clashes usually took place at night and developed into beatings and murders.205)

In the prison camp, information and education programs and vocational and technical skills programs to help prisoners after their release were instituted. For the Communists, the orientation courses became the chief target of criticism and abuse; but they accepted the instruction in metal working and soon began to produce weapons of all varieties. The supplies for the prisoners were very good, and the pro-Communist prisoners sold them away to make money and purchased materials to produce weapons.206)
2. The Kidnapping of the Commandant of the Koje Island POW Camp

On 6 May, members of prisoners from Compound 76 asked to see the military police battalion commander (Ltc. Wilbur R. Raven). The prisoners told Raven that guards had beaten members of their compound group and searched them for contraband. When he promised to investigate the charges, they seemed to be satisfied, but asked to see Brig. General Francis T. Dodd on the next day to discuss matters of importance. The prisoners indicated that they would be willing to let themselves be listed and fingerprinted if Dodd would come and talk to them.\(^{207}\)

Shortly after 1400 on 7 May, Dodd arrived. While Dodd and the prisoners were talking, the prisoners drew closer to Dodd as if to finish their discussion. Suddenly, they leapt forward and began to drag Dodd into the Compound. Dodd was hauled quickly inside the compound. The trap had been shrewdly baited for kidnapping Dodd. In the meantime, word of the capture of Dodd had passed swiftly back to Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount, the commanding general of the 2nd Logistical Command, and through him to Van Fleet. Van Fleet immediately instructed Yount not to use force to affect Dodd’s release unless the 8th Army approved such action. Yount attempted to persuade the Communists to release Dodd.\(^{208}\)

Upon Dodd’s recommendation, representatives from all the other compounds were brought to compound 76 for a meeting to work out the demands that would be submitted to the UN Command. The following day the prisoners presented Dodd with a list of their demands. The chief demand of the prisoners during the early phase concerned the formation of an association of the prisoners with telephone facilities between the compounds, and recognition by the UNC.\(^{209}\)

From the US I Corps, Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge of the camp and get Dodd out. The first official written demands were to be delivered to Compound 76 asking that Dodd be freed immediately.\(^{210}\) Colson remained firm and deployed armed vehicles around the camp.
On May 10, General Colson also set up a plan to suppress Compound 76 by force.211)

However, the prisoners directed an attack against UNC prisoner policy and offered the following bold demands:

1. Immediate cessation of barbarous behavior, insults, torture, threats, confinement, mass murder, gun and machinegun shooting, use of poison gas, germ warfare, and use of prisoners as experimentation subjects for A-Bomb testing. Guarantee of POWs’ human rights and individual life with international law as the basis.

2. Immediate cessation of the illegal and unreasonable so-called volunteer repatriation of NKPA and CPVA POWs.

3. Immediate cessation of the forcible investigation (screening).

4. Immediate recognition of the POW Representative Group (Commission) consisted of NPKA and CPVA POWs, and close cooperation with it on the part of your command. This representative group will return Brig. Gen. Dodd, USA, to your hands after we receive a satisfactory declaration to resolve the above items by your command. We will wait for your warm and sincere reply.212)

Ridgway and Van Fleet encountered increasing difficulty in finding out what was going on. When news of the four demands got back to UNC headquarters, Ridgway attempted to forestall Colson’s reply, but too late. He realized the propaganda value of any admission of the prisoners’ charges and rapidly delivered a strong warning message to General Van Fleet, pointing out that incalculable damage might be done to the UN Command cause from the standpoint of world opinion if Colson accepted the prisoners demand to admit the use of poison gas and germ warfare. Ridgway did not know what was going on in the camp, but he
stressed that if the situation had not improved by the morning of 11 May, Colson should take all measures necessary to subdue the prisoners.\textsuperscript{213)}

However, two prices of information gave Brig. Gen. Colson pause. A disturbing report from his intelligence officer indicated that the other compounds were ready to stage a mass breakout as soon as he launched his attack and, as if to substantiate this item, the native villages near the compound were deserted. He approved the POW Representative Group, but the repatriation problem was not within his power. He sent his reply to the delegate of the prisoners, saying that he could assure in the future the POWs could expect humane treatment in the camp, but regarding voluntary repatriation of North Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army POWs, that was a matter which was being discussed at P’anmunjom and he had no control over it. He approved the organization of the POW representative group.\textsuperscript{214)}

The pro-Communist prisoners refused to accept the response or release Dodd, insisting that Colson’s reply was noncommittal. At that point, Dodd phoned Colson and presented the prisoners’ case. He argued that there had been incidents in the past when prisoners had been killed and Colson’s reply simply denied everything. Most of the difficulties stemmed from semantics, Dodd admitted, but until those were cleared up, the Communists would not free him. Dodd passed on the prisoners’ and his own suggestions for preparation of Colson’s reply in an acceptable form and then offered to write in the changes that prisoners considered mandatory. Colson agreed and attempted to meet their demands. He sent the following letter:

1. With reference to your item 1, I do admit that there have been instances of bloodshed where many POWs have been killed and wounded by UN Forces. I can assure you that in the future the POWs can expect humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of international law. I
will do all within my power to eliminate further violence and bloodshed. If such incidents happen in the future, I will be responsible.

2. Reference your item 2 regarding voluntary repatriation of Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army POW, that is a matter which is being discussed at Panmunjom. I have no control or influence over the decisions at the peace conference.

3. Regarding your item 3 pertaining to forcible investigation (screening), I can inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening or any rearming of POWs in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal screening.

4. Reference your item 4, we approve the organization of a POW representative group or commission consisting of Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army POW, according to the details agreed to by Gen. Dodd and approved by me.\textsuperscript{215}

The pro-Communist prisoners released General Dodd on 10 May. After General Dodd was released, General Clark,\textsuperscript{216} the successor to General Ridgway, denied the letter's validity on the ground that it was obtained in response to the Communist forcible demands.\textsuperscript{217} He indicated that the prisoners had been murdered during a riot agitated by their own leaders and organization, and that International Red Cross members and press people could visit the compound freely.\textsuperscript{218}

General Clark dismissed General Colson and appointed Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, assistant division commander of the 2nd Infantry Division as the new commander of Koje-do. General Clark ordered reinforcement of the security guards of the camp, on 20 May sent the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. The garrison's total strength reached 14,820 men.\textsuperscript{219}

At this juncture, the Dodd incident and Colson letter supplied the enemy
with fresh ammunition for its assault and propaganda at the truce negotiation. On 9 May, General Nam II launched the following broadside. "The unshakable fact is that public confessions by the commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp indicate that you have engaged in an endless series of bloodshedding incidents which you justificated by your so-called screening to detain the prisoners forcibly." On the next day, Nam II again criticized that "the UN Command is intentionally taking brutal measures to detain our prisoners."

However, such an accusation of the Communists was false propaganda clearly aimed at delaying the armistice conference. The UN Command, different from the Communist propaganda, concentrated its effort on treating the prisoners well and respecting the human rights of the prisoners, to the extent of giving better supplies to the prisoners than to the ROK security guards.

But the prisoners rioted continuously, controlled by the infiltrated NKPA political officers, with the intention of supporting the Communists at the conference and weakening the position of the UN Command. Accordingly, the package proposal submitted by the UN Command on 28 April seemed to have no possibility of being accepted, confronted with the prisoner incidents.

V. Argument over Biological Warfare

While the armistice conference was going on, the Communists exploited the prisoner incident for political propaganda and endeavored to put the UN Command in an awkward position by claiming that the UN Forces had conducted microbiological warfare in Manchuria and North Korea.

Such a propaganda assault had been begun in May, 1951 by the North Korean Foreign Minister, Pak Hon Yong, when he said that "Americans sprayed a
smallpox virus in a North Korean area.”\textsuperscript{223} The problem eventually prompted international attention at the February 2nd, 1952 UN General Assembly held in Paris when the Russian Ambassador Jacob L. Malik announced that the UN Forces had used toxic gases during the Korean War, repeating the false charges of North Korea.\textsuperscript{223} Immediately thereafter Moscow radio insisted that the UNC infiltrated its agents into North Korean territory and sprayed poison into wells and spread smallpox, and typhoid.\textsuperscript{224}

In late February, P’yongyang and Peking broadcast that America, between 28 January and 17 February, had systematically dropped germbombs containing a large amount of bacteria on North Korea. The denouncement was reported in Communist newspapers throughout the whole world. The newspapers stated that the American Forces launched the germ-shells and dropped infected flies, snails, and rodents from airplanes. The UN Command disseminated bulletins that stated the Communist propaganda was false.\textsuperscript{225}

At that time in 1951, contagious diseases such as typhoid, cholera, typhus fever, and smallpox were rampant in North Korea.\textsuperscript{226} It was clear that the Communists intended to lay the blame on the UN Forces, insisting that the contagious diseases were the outcome of the UN Forces’ germ warfare.

The UN Command held a press conference on 6 March and strongly denied the false germ warfare propaganda with a statement that the Communists put a photo in newspapers with a caption that it showed a UN Forces’ airplane spraying the flies in north P’yongyang which could survive in snowy weather without presenting any clear evidence of germ warfare.

However, the Communists intensified up their propaganda assaults in March and April, declaring that the UN Forces dropped beetles, rats, spiders, fleas, and rodents infected with bacteria.\textsuperscript{227} A Peking radio broadcast on 7 March reported that an American airplane between 28 February and 5 March dropped bugs and harmful insects on Korea to spread contagious disease. The Prime
Minister of Communist China, Chou En Lai, released a warning broadcast the next day against the USA. He stated that the US was entirely responsible for its invasion of Chinese territory, conduct of germ warfare, and the thoughtless massacre of the Chinese people by bombing and strafing from airplanes.289)

General Ridgway noted that the enemy propaganda about germ warfare had been initiated as general propaganda on March 4, but had shifted into a concrete charge. He suggested three possible motives for the vitriolic propaganda. First, the enemy had probably invented the false propaganda to influence the native people and international opinion. Second, the enemy might have wanted to put up a smoke screen to prevent the people from knowing that the contagious diseases were being spread due to poor hygiene. Third, the enemy might be establishing justification for the conduct of microbiological warfare when it decided such warefare appeared advantageous.290)

In March 1952, at the meeting of the executive committee of the World Peace Conference, which was held in the capital of Norway, the delegates of the Communist China and North Korea proposed to the committee the organization of an investigation team composed of scientists who would go to Manchuria and North Korea to find the truth. According to their proposal, an investigation team, composed of pro-Communist members, went but it could find no clear material evidence.

However, on 14 March, Russian Ambassador to the UN Malik released a declaration accusing the USA of germ warfare, and the Communist Chinese Press, Shinhwasa, on 20 March printed a photo, which it insisted was evidence of germ warfare.

The photo showed a handful of sick insects, which it said America had dropped, but what they called a bacteria bomb had been drawn by hand. Scientists and professional specialists on military affairs refuted the Communists' claim as completely fraudulent, noting that the germ bomb was, in fact, the same type of
bomb used by the US Airforce to drop propaganda leaflets on North Korea.\textsuperscript{230)}

The UN Command denied that the Communists’ claim was true, stating it was groundless and without evidence. The UN war participant nations also agreed that the Communist Forces had conducted groundless propaganda. Nevertheless, as some of the Asian countries seemed to be disturbed by the continuous Communist propaganda, the UN Command proposed to request that the International Red Cross investigate. However, the Communists rejected the proposal saying that the International Red Cross was under the influence of America. As the Communists continued their insistence on germ warfare, the ROK Foreign Minister Byon Yong T’ae issued a declaration as follows:\textsuperscript{231)}

\begin{quote}
Recently the Communists have been spreading propaganda that the UN Forces conducted germ warfare.\textemdash{} The real motive of the propaganda was that contagious disease had spread in North Korea and they had no way to cope with the disease because of a shortage of medicine and medical facilities, and the North Korean people were complaining about this. The Communists put the blame on others.\textemdash{} What is the reason that the Communists stopped a fair and just investigation of the International Red Cross?
\end{quote}

In April, the International Red Cross requested permission to investigate the matters related to the complaints by Red China and North Korea in their lands, but permission was denied. The enemy enlarged its struggle, insisting that America had experimented on prisoners in Koje-do camp with germ warfare weapons.\textsuperscript{232)} At the beginning of May, the Communists made two American pilots who had been shot down the previous January confess to having dropped a germ bomb in North Korea. The UN Command retorted back with a statement that the Communists had dictated the confession to the American prisoners and forced
them to sign under threat.

The Communists could not keep up the propaganda related to biological warfare any longer without a clear explanation of the situation and material evidence, and so the enemy propaganda finally died down. However, as the prisoner riots increased, the Communists again made use of the germ warfare accusation as material for their propaganda. On 15 May, the Communist chief delegate insisted that the UN forces had sprayed bacteria in the P’yongyang and Soncho’n areas and that the Communist Chinese soldiers had become infected. General Clark countered that the Communists might be attempting to cover their plans to use microbiological warfare in Korea.

As the UN Command failed to break the bluff of the Communists, US delegate to the UN, Ernest Gross, on 18 June, presented a resolution calling for formation of a team composed of International Red Cross members and international scientists to investigate the charge of germ warfare and report to the Security Council of the UN. The resolution was defeated by a Russian veto.

Communist China organized the International Scientific Committee for investigation of the germ warfare charges and published a report after a fact finding investigation in July 1952. Fifty cases were recorded in the report of the pro-Communist committee. However, the committee had prepared the report on the basis of germ warfare evidence presented by Chinese Communist scientists, so the credibility of the report was doubtful. The evidence presented by the committee was that the epidemic disease prevention team, backed by Russian technical support, had sprinkled beforehand and they guided the investigation team to the spot.

Thus, in the summer of 1952, the Communists tried to make germ warfare into the most important political issue and put the UN Command at a disadvantage. Their propaganda insisted that even influenza was caused by the germs spread by the UNC. Such germ warfare propaganda of the enemy, with the pas-
sage of the summer of 1952, went up in smoke without the support of world opinion and with a resumption of the UN Forces air bombardment.

Consequently, the Communists’ insistence on the use of biological warfare by the UN Forces, was merely an attempt to shift the responsibility for the contagious disease which prevailed in their countries onto germ warfare conducted by the UN Forces. This was done both to strengthen the Communists’ control of their own people and as a form of psychological warfare to put the UN Forces into a difficult position at the armistice conference, still in progress. But as a result the Communists’ propaganda plot failed without showing any material evidence.
Notes


12. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 127. The Chinese official history described that “squad-size units smaller than company level combining reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance, ambush and counter ambush, surprise and counter surprise attacks covered the efforts of the main forces in consolidating posi-
tions by causing commotions in the UN positions.” Refer to Korea Institute of Military History, *op. cit.*, p. 65.


15. Korea Institute of Military History (ed. & trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 64.

16. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.


18. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 127.


23. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 129.


30. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 135.


33. Department of Military History, Korea Military Academy, *op. cit.*, p. 578.


44. The ROK 7th Division occupying the main line of resistance connecting Hills 938, 1090 (southern side), 1220, and 905, was facing the enemy holding the line of Amdong-Hill 1090 (northern side).


48. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *A Summary of the Korean
51. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 135.
63. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, Seoul: (1968), p. 139.
67. Ibid., p. 184.


69. Ibid., p. 143.


73. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

74. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 132.

75. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-200; ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 132.


77. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 132.


79. Ibid., pp. 215-217.

80. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of Korean War*, Seoul: MND, (1989), p. 142. According to the Interview by Brig. Gen. Ch’oi Young Hee, commanding general of the ROK 8th Division, it was thanks to the enormous efforts his division made in winning civilians’ sympathy that a large number of NKPA guerilla troops defected and that not a single raid occurred against the division. Also refer to Ahn Yong Hyon, *Untold Stories of the Korean War, Vol. IV*, Seoul: Kyongin Munhwasa (1992), p. 120.


82. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 127.

83. Department of Military History, Korea Military Academy, *op. cit.*, p. 579.

84. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
86. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 146.
87. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 141.
88. Ibid., p. 141.
89. Ibid., p. 141.
90. ROK JCS, The History of the Korean War, Seoul: JCS (1984), pp. 900-904. Not withstanding these enemy operations, the enemy was suffering heavier losses than the friendly forces. In April, 44 MIG-15 fighters were shot down, and 32 of them were downed in May 1952. On the other hand, the UNC lost only 8 fighter bombers during the period of January-June 1951.
91. Ibid., pp. 874-879. On that day six F-51 fighter bombers poured 12 bombs, 20 rockets, and 4,700 rounds of machine-gun fire on targets, completely destroying two spans and smashing two other spans of the railroad bridge. They also succeeded in destroying 6 artillery positions, one supply pool and three bunkers, and reducing one building to ashes. Interview by Colonel Kim Shin, commander, 10th Combat Wing in War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The History of the Korean War, Vol. VII, Seoul: (1974), p. 695.
92. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 127.
94. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 146.
95. ROK Army HQ (trans.), Truce Tent and Fighting Front Seoul: (1968), p. 141.
99. General Van Fleet’s letter of March 19, 1952 in ROKA HQ (trans.), The
100. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), Ibid., p. 141.
102. Ibid., p. 1188; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 95.
104. ROK Army (trans.), op. cit., p. 93.
105. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 95.
108. Ibid., p. 154; ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 93.
110. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 93.
111. Ibid., p. 94.
112. Ibid., p. 94.
114. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 97.
115. Ibid., p. 97-98.
116. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND The Armistice History of Korea War, p. 159.
117. Ibid., p. 160.
118. Ibid., p. 163.
119. Ibid., p. 165.
120. Ibid., p. 165.
121. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 104.
122. Ibid., p. 104.
124. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 108.
127. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 109. The purpose of the staff officer meeting was to finalize the terms of agreement, to check personnel replacement and equipment supplement, to designate ports of entry, to discuss the composition of the neutral nation supervisory teams and ways and means for supervision, procedures for withdrawing troops from the coastal islands, and so on.
128. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
130. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., pp. 149-153.
131. For the Communist side, Shinuiju, Ch’ongjin, Manp’ojin, Hungnam, and Shinanju were designated as ports of entry under supervision; for the UNC side, Pusan, Inchon, Kangnung, Kunsan, and Taegu were designated.
132. Ibid., p. 126. The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva issued messages to the belligerents that it would serve in the Republic of Korea upon the outbreak of the Korean War. It also carried the US guarantee to comply with the humanitarian principle, especially, Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention regardless of propriety of law upon discrepancy between the agreement to be made on sick and wounded POWs and the Geneva Convention.


135. ROKA HQ (trans.), *op cit.*, Vol. X, p. 196. The UNC blamed the Communists for taking a large number of the ROK POWs to Manchuria in the period of September-October of 1950. These prisoners were assigned to the NKPA VI, VII, and VIII Corps after undergoing a course of political indoctrination. These enemy units had more than 30% of their manpower by the ROK POWs collected; they were forced to fight against their former comrades-in-arms of the UN forces. During December 1950-August 1951, the ROK prisoners were assigned in NKPA II, III, and V Corps. Refer to Msg, CINCFE 64762 to DA for JCS, 5 Mar. 52, DA IN 112454.

136. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 128.


139. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 129; ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 104.

140. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of Korean War*, p. 175. Three Japanese was later identified as an American citizen.


143. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 197.
144. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
Korean War*, p. 176.
145. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 105; War History Compilation Commit-
146. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
Korean War*, p. 178.
147. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 131.
The position of the UN on those reclassified as ROK citizens was to a certain
extent uncomfortable. The complete list of such citizens that the CINCUNC
submitted to Washington requesting that it be delivered to the ICRC in
Geneva, was not, in fact, passed on to the ICRC by the US State Department
by December 26, 1951. Therefore, the enemy had not been informed official-
ly that the reclassified ROK citizens were excluded from the POW list when
the discussion on them started.
148. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
Korean War*, p. 179; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND
(trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 132.
149. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 106.
150. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
151. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 134.
153. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of
Korean War*, pp. 181-182.
154. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.* , p. 139.
155. It was related to postponing the discussion on the issue of airfield (Clause 3
on the agenda) and to proposing to proceed with the discussion of other
issues. General Ridgway suspected that the Communists would not accept
his proposal; however, in the optimistic expectation that the enemy might comply with it, General Ridgeway thought it was important that the UNC immediately change its stance of seeking agreements on other items on the agenda. CINCFE CX 61505 to DA for JCS, Jan 52, DA IN 19740.


157. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*., p. 154.


159. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*., p. 155.


164. *Ibid.*., p. 170. This clause was based on the daily reports on negotiation submitted to US JCS by CINCFE.

165. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The Armistice History of Korean War*, p. 187. Prior to the opening of the plenary meeting on Article 5 as its agenda, the JCS briefed General Ridgway on the merits of the UN Commission compared to the Political Conference as follows: first, the UN Commission could avoid the danger of including other agenda items in addition to the Korean question; second, it could vest the efforts of the UN with greater flexibility. Refer to Msg, JCS 900323 to CINCFE, 2 Feb. 52.

166. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*., p. 114.

167. *Ibid.*., p. 115. There were replacements in the UNC delegation at that time. Harrison relieved Ferenbaugh, and Yu Jae Hung replaced Lee Hyung Koon.

168. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*., p. 145; ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*., p. 115.


176. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 163.


186. The CINCUNC’S concern about the figure of 70,000 POWs was manifested when he told the JCS on 17 April that “every conceivable effort is being made in order to return the maximum number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to the communist camp without enforcing repatriation. *Ibid.*, p. 538.


194. Prisoner camps were installed in Pusan, Seoul, Inch’on, Suwon, Wonju, Nonsan, Iri, Kwangju, Yongch’on, and Masan; in addition, temporary camps were set up elsewhere throughout the nation.
195. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 167.
199. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 162.
201. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 168.
203. Mark W. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51. The UNC had sufficient evidence that the riots and disturbances at Koje and other POW camps were manipulated by the Communist high command. Their instructions were conveyed to the POW camps through well-trained espionage agents.
205. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
207. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 174.
op. cit., p. 191.

213. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND(trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 191; on this action, General Ridgway, in his writing, said, “the prisoners of war were ultimately my concern, although the authority to deal with them had been delegated to the army commander. His was the primary responsibility and I soon had to remind him of the need to meet it.” Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, New York: Doubleday(1967), pp. 210-213.

214. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 177.


216. With the retirement of Marshall Eisenhower from the commander in chief, NATO, in order to run in the presidential race as the Republican candidate in November 1952, General Ridgway was appointed to succeed him; in turn, General Clark replaced General Ridgway. Clark had served as Commanding General of the Fifth and Fifteenth Armies during World War II, accumulating sufficient experience on the field and in the negotiations vis-a-vis the USSR in the peace treaty for Austria representing US Secretary of State Marshall in the postwar period. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 179; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 190.

217. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND(trans), *op. cit.*, p. 192. General Ridgway used to wear several hats as the Commanding General of the US Far East Command, the Far East Army Command, and the Ryukyu Islands Command; however, with the signing of the peace treaty with Japan on April 28, 1952, the office of Supreme Commander in Chief of Allied Forces was relinquished.


221. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 193.
223. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 225.
225. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 226.
228. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 226.
238. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
I. Military Situation on the Second Anniversary of the War

During the summer of 1952, United Nations Command and the Communist forces engaged in a tense confrontation across the whole front line, but neither side intended to launch an all-out attack. With the truce negotiations still in progress and with each side attempting to gain more favorable terms in a ceasefire, both sides concentrated upon building their fighting power while closely watching the progress of the truce talks.

Meanwhile in early June, the ROK Army and the UN Forces undertook a limited offensive called ‘Operation Counter’ along the front of the US I Corps in the western sector. As a result, the US 45th Infantry Division captured a series of enemy outposts set up on eleven different heights in front of the Division. Included in these critical objectives were White Horse Hill (395 m), Arrowhead Hill (281 m) and T-Bone Hill (290 m) north of Yokkok-ch’on; and Porkchop Hill (255 m) and Old Baldy Hill (266 m) along the ridges south of Yokkok-ch’on. With strengthened outposts situated on more advantageous terrain, the UNC forces could thus maintain a deeper defensive zone against possible enemy attacks.

As enemy counterattacks followed, however, the struggle for these outposts continued and eventually led to a war for the outposts along the whole front. But the prime objective of these battles for each side was to secure and strengthen
the outposts most favorable to its own defense. There was no expectation of signific-
ificant change of the main line of resistance on the part of either side.

The general troop dispositions of both sides in the latter half of 1952 were as follows. In early July, the US I Corps on the western front line held four divisions under its operational control: the US 1st Marine Division (with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached), the British 1st Commonwealth Division, the US 3rd Infantry Division, and the US 2nd Infantry Division. These divisions defended the main line of resistance from the coast of the Western Sea (Yellow Sea) south-
west of Kaesong to the area northwest of Ch’orwon, generally following the ridges drained by the Imjin River.

On the central front line, the US IX Corps defended the Kumsong area employing four divisions: the ROK 9th Division, the US 7th Infantry Division, the ROK 2nd Division, and the US 40th Infantry Division (reserve). The main line of resistance in the Hwach’on area east of Kumsong was defended by the ROK II Corps, which controlled 3 ROK divisions: the 6th Division, the Capital Division, and the 3rd Division.

On the mid-eastern front line, the US X Corps defended the area north of Yanggu with four divisions: the ROK 7th Division, the US 25th Infantry Division, the ROK 8th Division, and the US 45th Infantry Division (reserve). The eastern end of the front line, reaching the Eastern Sea, was in the charge of the ROK I Corps with two divisions, the 11th and 5th Divisions. Thus, the strength employed in the whole front line area totalled five corps with seventeen divisions.¹) (The ROK 1st Division was engaged in anti-guerrilla operations in the rear area between 6 July and 1 August 1952.)

In the meantime, there was some transfer of units. On 27 September, the ROK 8th Division under the control of the US X Corps switched its mission with the US 45th Infantry Division (reserve) and went into formal divisional training. On October 2, the ROK 1st Division under the control of the US I Corps relieved
the US 3rd Infantry Division and was committed to the front line defense. And on October 25, the US 40th Infantry Division of the US X Corps took over the place of the US 25th Infantry Division, which in turn assumed a reserve mission.\textsuperscript{2)}

As for the enemy forces in early July, the CCF 65th, 63rd, 40th, and 39th Armies faced the friendly forces on the western front. North of the mid-western front line was the sector of the CCF 39th, 38th, and 15th Armies, while to the north of the mid-eastern front line were the CCF 68th Army and the 13th and 27th Divisions, NK II Corps. Deployed on the eastern front were four North Korean divisions, the 45th, 15th, and 1st Divisions of the III Corps and the 47th Division of the I Corps.

Thus, the enemy forces committed to the front line totalled thirty three divisions: twenty four divisions of eight CCF armies and nine divisions of three NK corps. In the rear area, there were ten divisions: nine divisions of three CCF armies and one NK division. In addition, eleven more corps including five NK corps and six Chinese armies were deployed for the defense of the rear areas along the eastern and western sea coasts.\textsuperscript{3)}

In August, the NK II Corps moved to the rear area when the operational area of the NK III Corps was extended westward.\textsuperscript{4)} Thus, there were ten enemy corps in the rear area by this time: the NK II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII Corps and the CCF 42nd, 64th, 47th, and 26th Armies. These units were engaged in troop reorganization and training.\textsuperscript{5)} According to an information analysis of the ROK Army, the CCF 42nd Army had not taken serious losses and was engaged in recruit training and coastal defense after moving to the east coast.\textsuperscript{6)}

In September through October, the CCF 23rd, 46th, and 24th Armies crossed the Chinese-Korean border and took over the operational areas of the CCF 38th, 40th, and 15th Armies, respectively, relieving them and assuming new defense missions. Meanwhile, the CCF 12th Army moved to the east coast in order to reinforce the strength of the coastal defense units.
1. Military Reinforcement of the Communist Forces

Although the front lapsed into minimal action, the Communists reinforced their forces every day. As of early July in 1952, the strength of the enemy totaled 910,000 men with the Chinese forces 630,000 strong and North Korean forces 280,000 strong. By September, the total strength of the enemy had increased to 1,008,900 men. In short, the enemy maintained a force almost one million strong, although it had taken serious losses in battles since the truce talks first began ten months before. This meant that the enemy was concentrating on a large-scale military build-up while preserving the illusory atmosphere of the truce talks. In October, the enemy again took losses that cut its estimated strength from 1,008,900 to 972,000. As the ground fighting tapered off in November, however, the enemy total began to climb slowly once again.

The large-scale build-up of the Communist forces came not only in their troop strength but in their artillery fire power. This was proven by the fact that the number of enemy shells of all calibers that fell in friendly positions increased significantly. In April, 1952, the enemy employed 710 field guns in the frontline area, but the number of guns increased to 884 by late June. The enemy also improved its gunnery markedly and even fired guns frequently, which changed firing positions as well as targets. This made the friendly forces' counterbattery activities more difficult. As for the enemy artillery delivery capability, it rose from 8,000 rounds to 43,000 rounds a day. By the end of 1952, the Soviet Union had provided the guns and equipment for ten antiaircraft artillery battalions. However, in their overall artillery fire power, the UNC Forces remained overwhelmingly superior to the enemy. In addition to the strengthening of its artillery, the enemy could afford to deploy in the front line area two Chinese armored divisions, one North Korean armored division, and two mechanized divisions, equipped with a total of 520 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The enemy air strength, too, underwent a similar phase of transformation, rising from 500 to 1,250 aircraft. Jet fighters, especially, increased from 450 to 800, not counting those 400 fighters deployed in Manchuria. In 1952, the number of the enemy air divisions increased from two to four and one bomber division was newly organized. Thus, at least in the air of North Korea, the enemy now actively began to challenge the friendly bomber fleets.\(^{11}\)

The growth of the air forces confirmed that Mao Tse Tung had given the highest priority to strengthening the air power. Mao sent to Stalin the following urgent telegram after he received it from Kim Il Sung:

We should not limit the radius of our air operations to the Yalu River. It is essential to extend the radius at least to the vicinity of P’yongyang. At the same time, we must try every means available to strengthen the defense of both military and industrial facilities in the capital city. We ought to commit our night bomber formations deep into the enemy rear area so that they can destroy enemy facilities such as air fields, supply depots, assembly areas, and so on. We also need to wage air fighting more resolutely.\(^{12}\)

Having received this telegram, Stalin made allowances for the difficult situation in North Korea and was determined to accept most of the requests made by Kim Il Sung. Taking advantage of the long period of fairly static operations, the enemy could also improve his logistical positions greatly. An ROK Army intelligence report stated that the enemy supply status, despite continued UNC air and naval attacks, was better than at any other time since the Chinese communist intervention in Korea.\(^{13}\)

Supplies for the North Korean Army came from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Mongolia, Hungary, and other Soviet satellite countries. Fuel also came from the Soviet Union, but the supply was insufficient. Of all the shortages of
equipment, the enemy suffered most from an insufficiency of communication equipment. This was evident in a telegram Kim Il Sung sent to Stalin. Kim said:

At present, Communist Forces are suffering extreme shortage of communication equipment. Recently, the Soviet Union and China have not supplied additional communication equipment at all, and we can hardly get any more equipment from any other sources.\[14\]

As for the staple and supplementary food supply of the enemy, it was not bad, with 800 to 1,000 grams being available for each person a day.\[15\] So, it was estimated that the enemy food supply was sufficient for large-scale ground operations for five to ten consecutive days.

Thus, in 1952, the Communists engaged in a continuous large-scale military build-up in troop strength, fire power, air capability, and fixed and fortified defensive positions. However, there was no sign in the front line area that the enemy was preparing for an all-out attack. In fact, although the enemy had substantially built-up its power, the Communist forces were not sufficient for an immediate large-scale offensive. Rather, as they would certainly reject the truce conditions suggested by the UNC, the Communists preferred to concentrate on the military build-up for a later offensive.

2. Reorganization of the UN Forces’ War Potential and Improvement of the ROK Army’s Fighting Power

Early in 1952, the prospect of an eventual ceasefire, followed by the departure of the UN Forces from Korea, encouraged the Korean government to examine the feasibility of strengthening the ROK armed forces for the defense of the country after an armistice. On 5 April 1952, the ROK II Corps was reestab-
lished, and the Korean government planned to double the size of the ROK Army, from ten to twenty divisions. This plan needed US assistance and was forwarded to the US government for its review.\(^{(6)}\)

The UN representative in Korea also passed to the US government a request that the United States arm and equip ten additional ROK divisions, to be commanded by the CINCUNC.\(^{(7)}\) A year before, on 24 April 1951, President Rhee had transmitted a similar request to President Truman. The implementation of the plan, however, had to be delayed as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to the plan.

In the meantime, General Van Fleet, the commander of the US 8th Army, came to support the plan to strengthen the ROK Army, and General Clark, who became the new CINCUNC in May, 1952, decided to carry forward the plan with

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*President Syngman Rhee and General Van Fleet Attending the Reactivation Ceremony of ROK II Corps*
enthusiasm. At last, the plan had begun to take on reality. Immediately after assuming his new position, General Clark stressed the need of expanding the ROK Army.

As Commander of the US Forces in the Far East, I was first briefed on the general condition of the ROK Army and think that we must strengthen it to the highest degree.... I also believe that, as long as the military technical know-how and equipment of the ROK Armed Forces are available, both ROK Navy and Air Force should be expanded as well.  

General Clark thus recommended that the ceiling of the ROK Army be raised to the figure that would be required for a twenty-division army, which he estimated to be about 655,000. In this connection, General Clark added that the proposal for expanding the ROK Army was made purely on the basis of military necessity, regardless of Korea’s ability or disability to support and develop her own armed forces independently.  

In relation to the expansion of the ROK Army, General Clark thought it proper to raise its ceiling of 250,000 to 363,000 men. With this plan in mind, on 19 June, he requested that he immediately be granted authorization to bring 92,100 reinforcement personnel as well as 19,458 to form six light infantry regiments that would reinforce security duties of the Korean National Police.

Four days later, however, after discussing the conditions on the front line with General Van Fleet, General Clark followed up with another request. He wanted to add two more divisions and to increase its total strength from 363,000 to 415,046. Pointing out that the UN Forces were short of defensive troops, he stressed that expanding the ROK Army was the only way to provide sufficient UNC reserve forces.

By this time, the Korean government, too, had tried to discuss the prob-
lem of developing the ROK Armed Forces with the US government. On 18 June, the Korean Ambassador to the United States, Yang You Ch’an, urged the US Department of Defense and Congress to adopt a ‘three-year plan for building up the ROK Air Force.’ The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing Ambassador Yang’s proposal, favorably considered expanding the ROK Navy and Air Force while holding to the current authorized strength of ten-division ROK Army.\(^{21}\)

When US Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, visited Korea on 17 July, however, the need for expanding the ROK Army, which had been so strongly urged by the US 8th Army and the US Far East Command, began to draw attention again. After the plan to create two more ROK divisions was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins announced that every effort must be made to expand the ROK Army as requested by Far East Command.\(^{22}\)

Meanwhile, the ROK Army and the US 8th Army agreed to seek a further increase in KATUSA strength to a total ceiling of 27,000. These were to be distributed among the UNC units: 2,500 men to each of the six US Army divisions, one US Marine division, and one British Commonwealth division; and another 7,000 would be placed in various combat support units.\(^{23}\)

At the same time, the ROK Army was working on an independent plan of its own to recruit men in order to create new divisions. In mid-September, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed both General Clark’s recommendation covering the expansion of the ROK Army and Ambassador Yang’s suggestion to enlarge the ROK Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff determined to hold firm for the time being to its earlier position to maintain the ROK Air Force as it was. The following week, however, the JCS approved General Clark’s plan for increasing the ROK Army, Marines, and the KATUSAs, raising the troop ceiling for the ROK Army and Marines to 463,000. The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was forwarded to the US Department of Defense for review in late September, and its recommendation was as follows:
Despite the logistical complexity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considers it essential to expand the ROK Armed Forces. Therefore, we recommend that the Department of Defense approve US support for creating two additional ROK Army divisions plus six separate regiments and raising the total ceiling of the ROK Army and Marines to 463,000.\(^{24}\)

The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was forwarded to the White House, and on 30 October, it was finally approved by President Truman.\(^{25}\) To supply and equip the expanded ROK forces, US Forces reserve stocks were to be reallocated, and some items would be withdrawn from the US Forces stationed in Europe. In late October, 1952, the Republic of Korea and the United States agreed to raise the ceiling of the ROK Army of 250,000 to a total of 463,000. In late November, 1952, additional ROK divisions began to be organized.\(^{26}\)

At that time, the ROK Air Force of 4,000 men had seventeen F-51s, plus twenty-nine other types of aircraft—light reconnaissance, cargo and training.\(^{27}\) The ROK Navy had 16,000 men and fifty vessels—patrol boats, mine sweepers, and amphibious harbor craft. On 1 October 1952, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and other support units were combined into the 1st Marine Regimental Combat Team. Besides, the Island Command was gradually developed into a regiment-sized unit.\(^{28}\)

In accordance with the ROK Army expansion plan, the organization of the two additional divisions—the 12th and 15th Divisions—and six separate regiments began in late October. As a result, the 12th Division and three separate regiments (the 53rd, 55th and 56th) were newly created for field operations in late December, and the 15th Division and the other three separate regiments (the 57th, 58th and 59th) would be committed to front line duties no later than the end of January the following year.\(^{29}\)

The ROK Army had already established three light infantry regiments
(the 37th, 38th and 39th) on 28 April 1952. The 38th and 39th Regiments were
given security duties for the prisoner camps immediately after their creation,
while the 37th Regiment, as a separate unit, was used as a reserve of the US IX
Corps. On 13 June, three more ROK Army regiments (the 50th, 51st, and 52nd)
with the same function and duties as those of the above-mentioned units were
organized. The 50th Regiment was committed to anti-guerrilla operations in the
Hamyang district while the 51st and 52nd Regiments as separate units were
attached to the US I Corps and the ROK II Corps, respectively, to receive battle-
field training in the rear area.

As the plan to create two additional ROK Army divisions was finally
approved on 30 October, the ROK Army reorganized the six light infantry regi-
ments into heavily equipped regiments on 8 November.\footnote{30} On the same day, the
ROK Army activated the 12th and 15th Division Headquarters as well as six other
light infantry regiments—the 53rd, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, and 59th at Yangyang
Temporarily, the first three regiments were attached to the 12th Division and the
other three to the 15th Division for field training.\footnote{31}

The 37th, 51st and 52nd Regiments, transformed into heavily equipped
regiments became organic units of the 12th Division on 10 December 1952. Then,
after completing its training under the control of the US IX Corps, the 12th
Division was placed under the command of the US X Corps and took over the
position of the US 40th Division on 27 December. Meanwhile, with the 38th, 39th
and 50th Regiments assigned to it, the 15th Division was reorganized. The six
light infantry regiments, which had been activated on 8 November, were used as
skeleton regiments of other ROK Army divisions created later.\footnote{32}

General Clark, however, considered the twelve-division ROK Army as
nothing but makeshift. Thus, on 1 November, only a day after the plan of creating
two additional ROK divisions was approved, he recommended to the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff another plan of a twenty-division ROK Army. The gist of his rec-
ommendation was as follows:33)

(1) The ROK Army shall have been expanded to twenty divisions by August, 1953.
(2) Four more corps headquarters shall be added to the existing two corps headquarters, and the newly created divisions shall be placed under the control of these six corps.
(3) Each of the newly organized divisions shall be deployed for combat duties after a sixteen-week unit training, and the last division to be created shall be fully ready for its combat duties by the end of 1953.
(4) Every time the organization of two new ROK Army divisions is completed, one UNC division shall be converted to a reserve. This will make it possible for the UNC divisions to complete the transfer of their whole missions to the ROK Army divisions by May 1953.
(5) If this project is fully materialized as scheduled, the US Army can afford to relocate four of its divisions and two corps headquarters by the middle of 1954.

The final decision of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether or not it should approve General Clark’s proposal, however, was to be carried over to the following year. But it was to this proposal that the ROK Army owed its large-scale expansion under US assistance.

Around this time, the ultimate goal of the expansion of the ROK Army envisioned by the UNC was an “ROK capability to man the entire battle line in Korea just as soon as the trained manpower, leadership, and equipment could be generated.”34)

There was also a remarkable growth in the ROK artillery. Previously, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had argued that the rough terrain, lack of roads, and
resupply problems as well as the dearth of trained artillery men and unavailability of equipment had precluded expanding the ROK artillery. Thus, only one 105-mm. howitzer battalion had been authorized for each ROK infantry division as opposed to the three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions in each US infantry division. On 27 May 1952, however, the UN Command finally approved a full complement of three 105-mm. howitzer battalions and one 155-mm. howitzer battalion for each ROK division.

Accordingly, on 16 June, four separate artillery battalions (the 91st, 92nd, 93rd and 95th) were newly created in addition to the existing four separate 155-mm. howitzer battalions (the 96th, 97th, 98th and 99th) that had been organized in the previous year. In addition, from January on, the ROK Army accelerated the creation of twelve artillery groups (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 15th) consisted of 2 105-mm. howitzers. The full complement of these artillery groups was completed at the end of December, 1952.35)

The newly activated 155-mm. separate howitzer battalions and field artillery groups were subordinated to the ROK divisions for combat support after they completed their RSOP training in the US 5th Field Artillery Groups. Thus, each ROK infantry division that used to have only one 105-mm. howitzer battalion would now be supported by three 105-mm. howitzer battalions and one 155-mm. howitzer battalion.36)

While strengthening its artillery fire power, the ROK Army also expanded its armored forces. In 1951, only two ROK tank companies were operational, but in 1952, there were six ROK tank companies operating in the line.37)
II. Breakdown of the Negotiations for the Exchange of POWs

1. Strategies of Both Sides and Alternative Measures

(1) Communist Strategies and Alternative Measures

As the rainy season began in July, 1952, the front on the whole experienced a lull. Early in September, however, military activities increased along the line. In October, as the truce talks at P’anmunjom stagnated over the issue of exchange of prisoners, the UNC Forces began the large-scale strategic bombing of the electric power plants at the Suiho, Pujon, and Changjin Reservoirs located in the enemy rear area.\(^38\)

The enemy tried to take retaliatory measures by using ground forces against the UNC air assaults, concentrating its attacks on the northward perimeter of the central front line where Capitol Hill, Finger Ridge, White Horse Hill, and Sniper Ridge were located.\(^39\) The enemy’s intention was well expressed in the following telegram Mao Tse Tung sent to Stalin around this time.

We believe it inevitable for us to launch aggressive armed operations against the enemy in a protracted war. If we did not demonstrate any intention of aggressive movement and held to a passive defensive posture, the enemy would overlook our potential and continue air-bombings in order to accelerate its military pressure on us.\(^40\)

The Communists’ attempt to launch aggressive operations, of course, supported their demands in the truce talks and preempted the military operations
II. Breakdown of the Negotiations for the Exchange of POWs 407

of the UNC Forces. In particular, the primary object of the Communists was to capture major strategic points on the central front line. This would enable them to gain advantage over the friendly forces’ main line of resistance and build up new positions more favorable for their next all-out offensive.

To attain this object, the enemy committed its elite troops to the front of the ROK II Corps and the US IX Corps. The enemy deployed four divisions especially along Sniper Ridge and watched for a chance to attack the friendly forces’ main line of resistance in the Iron Triangle area.41)

At the same time, the enemy placed its prisoner camps near P’yongyang and along the Yalu River in order to discourage UNC air attacks at major strategic objects. The enemy also judged that the UNC Forces would not deliver air attacks at the Suiho power plant because the plant itself was located on the Korean-Manchurian border and was placed under the joint control of North Korea and China.

As for the prisoner-of-war issues, the Communists insisted that the incidents at the UNC prison camps were caused by the UNC plan to force the detention of the Communist prisoners of war. The Communists claimed that the incidents reflected the atrocities and maltreatment committed by the UN Command. They stuck to their request of an immediate repatriation of all Communist prisoners.

In searching for a ceasefire, the UNC and Communist negotiating trains still remained at odds over the disposition of prisoners of war. The UN Command was determined that no prisoner would be forced to return to Communist rule against his will. By the end of June 1952, the UN Command had completed interviewing Communist prisoners and found that approximately 49% of them, or 83,722 out of 169,944, were willing to be repatriated. It was hoped that this figure, when given to the enemy in place of the earlier estimate which had been given of 70,000, might induce it to accept a prisoners-of-war exchange pact pro-
posed by the UN Command.\textsuperscript{32)}

While the screening of the prisoners was in process, there were hints that Communist China might be softening its stand, expressing a willingness to consider two alternative solutions. The first of these would be to settle on the basis of a round figure of 20,000 Chinese and 90,000 North Koreans to be repatriated-or even a total of 100,000 on condition that 20,000 Chinese were included.

The second alternative would require an agreement in principle by the UN Command that all prisoners might be repatriated at the conclusion of a ceasefire. Those who elected not to return home, however, would be brought to P’anmunjom and interviewed there by a committee consisting of neutral states, plus Red Cross representatives from both sides. To be repatriated or not would be decided after this interview.

Chinese Premier Chou En Lai apparently considered the first alternative the more acceptable. But, from the UNC point of view, the second alternative was preferable. After all, the number of Communist prisoners who expressed willingness to be repatriated was less than one third of the number mentioned by Premier Chou.

In the meantime, there were hints that the Chinese, using the Indian government as an intermediary, were attempting to bring about a solution in Korea through circuitous diplomatic processes. Therefore, the United States let it be known to the Indian government via the British Foreign Office that the US government was interested in Chou’s second alternative.\textsuperscript{43)}

According to an Indian report made after more talks between Chinese and Indian officials took place, the Chinese were waiting to see if their proposals on ‘reclassification’ of the prisoners of war were accepted by the UN Command. This statement was interpreted by the US government to mean that the Chinese wanted some solution similar to Chou’s second alternative.

On 14 July, however, when pressed by the British Foreign Office to clar-
ify their proposals, the Chinese informed the Indian government that they were interested only in the first alternative and would not negotiate on the basis of the second alternative. Thus, the UN Command saw nothing to do but to await the outcome of further negotiations at P’anmunjom.44)

Concurrently on 27 June 1952, at an informal meeting with the US representative in the UN Security Council, a Soviet official suggested that the two sides find a formula that would allow each to apply its own interpretation of the Geneva Convention. This would mean acceptance in principle of general repatriation, coupled with an understanding that difficulties in applying the principle would be taken into account and that a group consisting of representatives from various national Red Cross societies would supervise the application. At this meeting, the Soviet official stated that the USSR really wanted a ceasefire in Korea.45) The US Department of State felt that this proposal was similar to Premier Chou’s second alternative, but decided not to pursue this matter further at that moment in order to prevent crossing wires with the Indian-Chinese channel.

After that channel proved useless, however, prudent attempts to follow up the Soviet proposal failed; the Soviet Union refused to talk further with the United States on this matter. Accordingly, the US Department of State asked US Ambassador George Kennan in Moscow about the advisability of opening a discussion of the POW question with the Soviet Union through formal diplomatic channels. The United States would propose that the UN Command would exchange the 83,000 Communist POWs who had elected repatriation for the 12,000 UN POWs held by the Communists; the remaining enemy prisoners would be brought to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and interviewed again under the supervision of India or other neutral countries, to give them a further chance to be repatriated if they wanted.

This proposal, however, met with opposition from General Clark, who had no doubt that the Soviet Union was exercising its influence over the Korean
War but believed that a diplomatic appeal to the Soviet leaders would only be construed as a sign of weakness on the part of the UN Command. He insisted that the UN Command must take a firm stand and take strong measures in opposing the enemy. Thus, the negotiations at P’anmunjom went round and round, getting nowhere. General Clark said:

We [must] be firm on the battlefield, with continued emphasis on aerial attack of North Korean military targets, firm in our statements and firm in our actions at P’anmunjom, and ... this firmness [must] be fully supported by appropriate statements and actions taken at governmental level both by ourselves and more particularly by our allies.  

(2) UNC Strategies and Alternative Measures

As the truce talks were stalled over the issue of prisoner exchange, General Van Fleet, the commander of the US 8th Army, recommended to General Clark a limited objective attack on the central front line in late June 1952. The aim of the attack was to advance to new positions on the Duluth Defense Line set up north of P’yonggang. That is, the attack was to secure control of all the Iron Triangle area and destroy the enemy mass of troops and stockpiles in the vicinity of P’yonggang. General Van Fleet’s recommendation, however, met with little enthusiasm from General Clark, who listed the following disadvantages of the attack: the possibility of adverse effects upon the truce negotiations; the numbers of friendly casualties involved in attacking fortified enemy lines; and the lack of UNC reserves available if and when a heavy enemy counterattack followed. The same plan of attack had already been made six months earlier only to be cancelled.

The UN Command believed, however, that military pressure was the
only means to force the Communists to negotiate with them. Thus, as proposed by the CINCUNC, it was decided to press on with large-scale air attacks on enemy targets. The logical basis of this decision was that if the attacks were to be carried out mainly by air bombings, relatively fewer friendly casualties were expected.

By that time, considering negative political effects, the UN Command had not attacked the dam at the Suiho Reservoir and its power plant. Likewise, air attacks around P’yonngyang had been withheld for a year since the truce talks first began.⁴⁸ Therefore, the decision to attack these two target areas reflected not only a change in military tactics on the part of the UN Command. It was also full of political implications. It seemed that if the Communists were going to procrastinate or renounce the truce talks, the UN Command might even dare to attack mainland China.

The first attack of the UNC aircrafts on North Korean hydroelectric power plants began on 23 June 1952. In the meantime, General William K. Harrison had made a statement, conciliatory in tone, in a plenary session at P’anmunjom on 1 July. He pointed out that both sides desired peace and had agreed on every article of the draft armistice except Article 51 on the issue of prisoner exchange. He read Article 51:

All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be affected in conformity with the lists which have been exchanged and checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement.⁴⁹

This proposal was no more than a reaffirmation of the one submitted by the UN Command earlier in April. This time, however, the Communists reacted
favorably to this proposal. They suggested as follows:

(1) All prisoners of war shall be reclassified in accordance with their nationalities and home of origin.

(2) The lists of the POWs shall be checked again and new lists shall be made out to facilitate the speedy repatriation of the POWs.

(3) We agree with the UN Command in principle that the Koreans who had lived in South Korea before the war and had been conscripted by the North Korean Army and taken prisoners by the UNC Forces shall not be returned to North Korea, but shall remain in South Korea. However, the prisoners of foreign nationalities, whether they are UNC prisoners or Chinese prisoners, must be repatriated to their home lands.\(^{50}\)

As the Communists revealed a great change in their attitude toward the prisoner issues, Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, the senior delegate of the UNC delegation, sent an optimistic report to General Clark. General Harrison declared that the Communists accepted not only the principle but wording of Article 51. In an executive session on 4 July, however, it became evident that General Harrison had misjudged the situation.\(^{51}\)

The phrase “all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side,” as used in Article 51, was interpreted by the UNC side to mean prisoners remaining after the lists had been purged of those who had indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation. For the Communists, however, the phrase meant all those named in the lists exchanged on 18 December 1951, excluding only those who had lived below the 38th Parallel before the war.\(^{52}\) "The Communists demanded an enforced repatriation of all Chinese prisoners, including those still forcibly resisting repatriation, men who said they would rather die than live in disgrace under Communist rule."
At the meeting on 6 July, the Communists raised the issue of the number of prisoners, making it clear that they expected all those in UNC custody to be on the ‘reclassified’ lists. In particular, all of the 20,000 Chinese prisoners must be included in those lists. Nam II said: “If the checked lists produced by your side present a figure close to reality and include 20,000 prisoners of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, the issue of the repatriation of POWs will be settled.” To this, General Harrison replied, “the UN Command would not force anyone physically to return to your control.”

The next day, General Clark told the US Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Communists had raised the question of numbers of prisoners. He proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize the UNC delegation to submit a revised estimate of those to be repatriated and those to be released in South Korea. The total would be 121,000, consisting of 82,900 classified for repatriation as a result of the final screening (76,500 North Koreans and 6,400 Chinese) and 38,100 who had been South Korean residents before the war, of whom 11,700 were POWs and the remaining 26,400 were civilian internees already being released. General Clark would ask for a similar accounting of UNC prisoners.

In the executive session on 8 July, the UN Command tried in vain to escape the stalemated truce talks. However, both sides were waging a war of words without accomplishing anything. Nam II even denounced the UN Command for killing two Communist prisoners and injuring eight at Koje-do UNC prison camps.

On 15 July, Mao Tse Tung stated in a secret telegram to Stalin: “In case the enemy does not make concessions or renounces the negotiation, we must continue the war. The enemy will then try to look for a way to change the situation, realizing that it is difficult to settle the questions through a war.” Thus, the Communists assumed that if they maintained a firm stand, the UN Command would probably make concessions.
Afterwards, the cold war between both sides at the truce talks was approaching its climax. Formerly, both sides would go into a recess after mutual suggestions and agreement; but now either side was apt to declare a recess unilaterally and leave. Thus, the negotiations at P’anmunjom only revealed fundamental differences in positions of the two sides, and the unproductive disputes over the POWs brought an agreement no closer. It seemed the truce talks were being heading toward a catastrophe.

2. Negotiations for Optional Proposals and Indefinite Recess

In August, 1952, the now-meaningless talks continued, the negotiations characterized by little progress and frequent recesses. In particular, both sides refused to budge from the original stands they had maintained since April over the matters of war prisoners. Meanwhile, the UN Command did not give up hope of getting something accomplished, but the number of casualties on the front line kept increasing every day.

In August, the two sides met four times: on the 3rd, 11th, 19th, and 27th. Each time, however, the UNC delegation, after listening to a propaganda harangue by the Communists, requested a one-week recess, to which the Communists reluctantly agreed. The mood surrounding the truce talks was as dark as ever.57

Around this time, a Sino-Soviet conference was going on in Moscow, and considering the significance of the Moscow conference, President Truman postponed the issuance of a special announcement on truce negotiations which had been making no progress. The US State and Defense Departments were seeking a breakthrough by approving the UNC proposal that it would release those prisoners classified as South Korean civilian internees.

In the meantime, as the Communists kept finding fault with the UNC side at P’anmunjom, the head of the UNC delegation urged them again to cooper-
ate in bringing the issue of war prisoners to a settlement. \(^{58}\)

The head of the UNC delegation, after reviewing all that had happened in August and September, came to the conclusion that now was the time for the UN Command to offer every possible alternative and propose final terms of agreement. If the Communists refused the new terms of agreement, the UN Command would select one alternative: either to invoke an indefinite recess or renounce the negotiations. \(^{59}\) President Truman sent directions to General Clark that if the Communists failed to accept the UNC offer, an indefinite recess should be invoked by the UN Command. It would be essential that the military pressure on the enemy should not be lessened.

On the other hand, Stalin emphasized in a secret telegram to Mao Tse Tung that he was opposed to the US proposal and that it would be necessary to try to get the following terms of agreement accepted by the UN Command:

1. Both sides would stop military actions at once on land, on sea, and in the air.
2. All prisoners of war would be repatriated in accordance with international norms.
3. All foreign troops in Korea including the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army would be evacuated from Korea in two to three months. Afterwards, the Koreans themselves would reconcile their own questions on the basis of the principles of the unification of Korea under the observation of a committee consisting of those countries participating in the war plus some of those not involved in it. \(^{60}\)

While both sides were extremely anxious over the issue of the exchange of war prisoners, the UNC headquarters officially announced that 11,000 South Koreans who had been improperly classified as war prisoners were now in the
civilian internee category, and that their release would begin about 1 October and take about six weeks to complete.\textsuperscript{61)}

On 28 September, just five months after the UNC package proposal of April had been delivered, General Harrison opened the session at P’anmunjom with a long restatement of the previous plans brought forward by the UN Command in order to break the POW deadlock. He then proposed the following new alternatives:\textsuperscript{62)}

(1) Alternative 1: As soon as the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, all prisoners under the control of both sides will be given an opportunity to be released and repatriated. The release and repatriation of the prisoners will be started in accordance with Article 3 of the Armistice Agreement (draft). Both sides will be considered to have met their obligation of releasing and repatriating the prisoners by bringing them to a place in the demilitarized zone designated and agreed upon by both sides. There, the names of the prisoners on the lists agreed upon by both sides will be identified and checked off in the presence of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, and joint military teams. They will then be considered as fully repatriated in accordance with the Agreement. If a prisoner states at this time that he desires to return to the side that had detained him, however, he will be freed at once to do so. Such a prisoner will be placed under the control of the side of his choice, and the side that controls him will offer means of transporting him from the DMZ to a place of control in the Korean peninsula. In that case, he will not assume a prisoner’s status but a civilian one, and will not be employed again in acts of war in the Korean conflict as specified by Article 52 of the Armistice Agreement (draft).

(2) Alternative 2: As soon as the Armistice Agreement becomes effective,
all prisoners desiring repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners refusing to be repatriated, however, will be delivered in small groups to a place in the DMZ designated and agreed upon by both sides, where they will be freed from military control. There, they will be interviewed by representatives of countries or troops not participating in the war. These nonrepatriates will have a right to be delivered to the side of their choice as they desired in the interview. This will be done with or without military representation and under the observation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams.

(3) Alternative 3: As soon as the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, all prisoners wishing repatriation will be exchanged immediately. If logistic capabilities permit, all nonrepatriates will be delivered in several groups to a place in the DMZ designated and agreed upon by both sides, where they will be freed from military control. Then, without questioning, interviewing, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. If the Communists wish, this plan can also be carried out under the observation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint military supervisory teams, or representatives of the Red Cross of both sides.

Immediately after suggesting these alternatives, General Harrison proposed a ten-day recess until 8 October to give the Communists time to consider the new choice. All of the alternatives were based on a humanistic principle of free choice on the part of each prisoner, and the UN Command believed that whatever alternative the enemy chose, there was some room left to continue the truce negotiation.

Compared with earlier UNC proposals, the new alternatives reflected the
maximum concession to the Communists and were the final offer of the UNC side. In the meeting of 8 October, however, the enemy expressed disappointment and said: “Although you seem to have proposed new alternatives, you have only used different forms and ways to decorate the unreasonable demand your side has persistently insisted upon.” The Communists would continue to demand the principle of full forcible repatriation upon which they had insisted since the past January.\(^5\)

As the UNC proposals were rejected by the Communists at the meeting on 8 October, General Harrison declared an indefinite recess. Now the UN Command had no further proposals to make, and it was a matter of ‘fish or cut bait’ on the part of the Communist side. So long as the UN Command opposed any forcible repatriation and the enemy insisted on full repatriation, compromise appeared impossible without one side conceding political defeat. Thus, on 9 October, as the negotiations virtually came to a halt, the Communists shifted the responsibility over to the UNC side, declaring through broadcasts that the UN Command had intentionally broken off the negotiations.\(^6\)

The truce talks, in fact, had reached an impasse over the issue of the prisoner exchange on which both sides had wasted much of their energy and time. It was fifteen months after the talks had first begun and about six months after the UN Command had submitted the package proposal on 28 April 1952. The talks went into indefinite recess, not to be resumed until six months later on 25 April 1953.

3. UN Efforts for Settlement

As the negotiations ended with an indefinite recess, despite the UNC package proposal and new alternatives, the most important task remaining for the UNC side in the fall and winter of 1952 was to find a feasible way to resume the
deadlocked talks. The Korean government maintained its previous standpoint that negotiation with the Communists was “a meaningless job producing nothing but a chance for the enemy to strengthen its troops and weapons.” Further, in October, the anti-armistice demonstrations in South Korea became more spirited and vehement. On 25 October, a great many students held a massive demonstration in Pusan, shouting “No Armistice without Unification!” Eventually, the flames of anti-armistice resistance enveloped the whole country.651

While blaming the UNC side for the deadlock of the truce talks and the alleged neutrality violations around P’anmunjom, the Communists strengthened their political propaganda in relation to the riot incident at the UNC prison camps. Operating within a rigid set of restrictions, the UN Command thus attempted to apply military pressure against the enemy to induce concessions. But this did not
produce any noticeable results. At the same time, the liaison officers from both sides continued to meet at P’anmunjom during the recess period, but this also did nothing to change the situation.66)

Subsequently, the arena of the truce talks was moved to the United Nations. The UN Command decided to seek a point of agreement by introducing the issue of the Korean conflict on the agenda of the UN General Assembly on 14 October 1952. Originally, the Western allies were against the idea of discussing the Korean issues in the United Nations for fear that the Communists might make use of the case for political purposes. However, there seemed to be little hope of reaching an early peace settlement although there remained only one issue to be resolved the exchange of war prisoners. Thus, the United States and the United Kingdom changed their attitudes and agreed to move the place of negotiation to the United Nations in order to apply political pressure against the enemy.

Earlier in mid-September 1952, the Communists sensed that the UN Command wanted to transfer the Korean issues to the United Nations. To be prepared for this, they checked the political positions of such countries as Mexico, India, and Burma and decided to veto whatever proposal the countries made in favor of the UNC position.67)

At that time, the members of the United Nations were divided into three groups: the western group of United States allies that included the sixteen countries participating in the Korean War; the Soviet-led Eastern bloc consisting of the Communist satellite countries; and a group of neutral nations in Asia and the Arab world. Dissatisfied with such a distribution of countries, the Soviet Union insisted that the United Nations was so organized from the first as to center around the United States and function only to support US policies. Thus, when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vyshinsky made a speech in the United Nations harshly denouncing the United States as the manipulator of the breakdown of truce negotiations, it was evident that the arena of propaganda warfare had been moved
from P’anjumunjom to the UN General Assembly.

On 24 October, US Secretary of State Acheson addressed the UN Political Committee, stressing that the UN Command was ready to reconvene the meetings at P’anjumunjom whenever the Communists were willing to accept the fundamental principle of nonforcible repatriation of the prisoners. He enlisted the support of twenty countries of the Western allies, including the United Kingdom, and made a joint proposal that the Soviet Union and Communist China accept a ceasefire based on the principle of no forced repatriation. He presented to the United Nations a resolution, the gist of which follows:68

1. We fully support the unsparing effort the United States has made to accomplish a ceasefire in Korea.

2. We request that the General Assembly maintain the principle of free choice in the matter of each prisoner’s repatriation.

3. We request that the United Nations urge Communist China and North Korea to accept a ceasefire that would end the futile bloodshed.

The Soviet Union opposed the joint resolution, however. In the General Assembly on 10 November, Soviet representative Vyshinsky made a counterproposal of three principles:69

1. An eleven-country committee should be organized by those countries ‘immediately concerned with the war’ as well as those not immediately concerned with it.

2. This committee is to supervise and direct the resolution of all the issues relating to the war.

3. This committee is to be assigned the task of repatriating war prisoners based on the principle of forcible repatriation.
Further, Vyshinsky roundly denounced the US-sponsored principle of free choice of repatriation as the main cause of the deadlock of the truce talks and the protraction of the war.

While the debates over the US-sponsored joint resolution and the Soviet counterproposal were going on, other suggestions were brought forth. One of these was the Canadian proposal that the nonrepatriate problem be left to later negotiations. Mexico made another suggestion that the nonrepatriates be provided with a temporary refuge where their problems would be settled. What particularly interested the General Assembly, however, was the Indian proposal. On 17 November, Indian Ambassador V. K. K. Menon, after negotiating with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and tapping the opinion of Communist China, proposed the following resolution:70

(1) A repatriation commission, composed of four neutral states—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden—would be set up.

(2) All the prisoners would be sent to the repatriation commission located in the demilitarized zone.

(3) No force should be used to prevent or effect the return of the prisoners to their homelands.

(4) Deadlocks in the repatriation commission would be resolved by an umpire. In case the four members of the repatriation commission could not agree on the interpretation of the repatriation agreement, the umpire named by the members of the commisson or the General Assembly would make an authoritative interpretation.

(5) The prisoners wishing to return home would be allowed to do so.

(6) Each side of the parties involved in the war would 'explain' to its prisoners their rights to be repatriated.

(7) Nonrepatriates expressing no desire to return home even after ninety days
from the time the ceasefire agreement was reached would be turned over
to a political conference.

The US official reaction to the Indian resolution, however, was quick
and not favorable. The United States pointed out that the duties and responsibili-
ties of the repatriation commission were vague and that the time limit of ninety
days was too long for an interrogation period. Besides, the United States opposed
“turning over the nonrepatriates to a political conference.”71) The Indian resolu-
tion, however, received extensive support, particularly from the United Kingdom,
Canada, and France.

Thus, in the UN Political Committee, the United States had to be cau-
tious in expressing its objection to the Indian resolution. The US position was that
the Indian resolution could not be accepted unless it was revised to include an
explicit guarantee of no forced repatriation. That is, the United States might
accept the Indian resolution only if it specified some concrete procedures that
would prevent forcible repatriation.

The Indian representative then made a revised proposal that “if the polit-
ical conference did not settle the nonrepatriate problem in thirty days, the prison-
ers would be turned over to the United Nations.” But the Soviet Union refused to
accept the revised Indian proposal by stating as usual that the only feasible way of
accomplishing a ceasefire in Korea was to turn over the prisoner issue to the
eleven-country committee.

The United States, however, decided to support the revised Indian pro-
posal, withdrawing the US-sponsored joint resolution. Eventually when it came to
vote on 3 December, the United Nations voted down the Soviet proposal, 40 - 5,
and adopted the Indian proposal, 54 - 5. The final resolution of the UN General
Assembly was as follows:72)
(1) There would be set up a repatriation commission consisting of four countries designated by Article 37 of the Truce Agreement (draft)- Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden.

(2) The release and exchange of the prisoners would be carried out in accordance with the Geneva Convention of March 12, 1949 concerning the treatment of war prisoners, established international practice or principles, and appropriate articles of the ceasefire agreement.

(3) No force would be used to prevent or effect the repatriation of the prisoners; and in no case would they be abused, treated with violence, or treated inhumanly.

(4) All prisoners detained by each side would be freed from military control and accommodation and would be brought to a place of prisoner exchange in the demilitarized zone, where they would be turned over to the repatriation commission in numbers mutually agreed upon by both sides.

(5) The classification of prisoners based on nationality and domicile as proposed in a letter of Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai on 16 October would be carried out at once.

(6) After the above-mentioned classification was completed, the prisoners would freely return to their homelands at once, and both sides concerned would provide conveyance for their free return.

(7) Each side would have the freedom of explaining to its prisoners the details of the repatriation agreement, particularly the individual prisoner's freedom of choosing whether to be repatriated or not.

(8) The Red Cross of each side would have the right to assist the repatriation commission and make contact with the prisoners.

(9) Each prisoner would be given the right to recommend to the repatriation commission or inform it of anything related to his fate and would be pro-
vided with conveyance for exercising such a right.

(10) Despite the details stipulated by Article 3 above, the provisions of this repatriation agreement should not be interpreted as impairing the rights of the repatriation commission.

(11) This repatriation agreement should be known to every prisoner.

(12) In carrying out its duties and responsibilities, the repatriation commission would have the right to request rightful assistance from the countries immediately concerned with the war, the governments of the delegates of the repatriation commission, and the member countries of the United Nations.

(13) In case the opinions of the commission members clashed, the commission would operate under majority rule; but when the majority rule could not be applied, Article 132 of the Geneva Convention would be applied, or an umpire appointed in accordance with the provisions of the following articles would have the right of decision.

(14) An umpire should be selected and appointed by the repatriation commission; but if an umpire is not appointed within three weeks after the first meeting of the commission, the selection and appointment process would be turned over to the UN General Assembly.

(15) The repatriation commission would select a person who would carry out his duties as an umpire together with the agency and the supervisory group that would assume the responsibilities of the commission after a ceasefire agreement was signed.

(16) When both sides agreed with a repatriation agreement and an umpire has been appointed, the draft of the ceasefire agreement would be considered effective.

(17) If a prisoner still had not been repatriated according to this proposal ninety days after the signing of a ceasefire agreement, the final date of
his detention and the problems of his fate would be turned over to a political conference as stipulated by Article 60 of the draft of ceasefire agreement. If his fate still had not been determined even thirty days after the first political conference, all the responsibilities for protecting him and other ensuing duties would be turned over to the United Nations, which would then handle the matter according to international laws.

Following the resolution of the UN General Assembly, a letter requesting North Korea and Communist China to accept the UN resolution was mailed together with a message from Chairman Lester B. Pearson. However, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En Lai rejected this request on 14 December, and again on 17 December, North Korean Foreign Minister Park Hun Young rejected it. They stated that “the principle of free choice of repatriation was against the Geneva Convention and international laws, and further that, since the United Nations was one of the parties immediately concerned with the war, the Communists would not accept the UN resolution.” As the Communists thus ignored the power of the United Nations, all the hopes anchored on the Indian proposal evaporated.

Around this time, frequent incidents were occurring at the UNC prison camps in the rear area. One of the worst trouble spots was Pongam-do, not far from Koje-do, where Communist prisoners rose in riot ordered by Nam II on 14 December 1952. When the melee was over, 85 prisoners lay dead and 113 were seriously wounded. The next day, the Communists denounced the UNC side at P’anmunjom by stating that “the UN Command had massacred the Communist prisoners” and that “behind such behavior of the UN Command lay a secret intention of escalating the Korean War.” Andrei Gromyko, Soviet representative to the United Nations, submitted to Chairman Pearson a resolution requesting that the United Nations investigate the Pongam-do incident. The UN Steering
Committee adopted the resolution and placed it on the agenda of the General Assembly. On 22 December, however, the Soviet resolution was voted down, 45 - 5 with 10 abstentions.

While the issue of ceasefire in Korea was facing rough going in the United Nations owing to the confrontation between the Western allies and the Communists, an ardent wish for a ceasefire was growing rapidly in the international community. In the meantime, the Presidential election campaign started in the United States, and the settlement of the Korean problem became the major issue of the election campaign.

The Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, made a favorable impression on the voters by announcing that "the war in Asia should be fought by the Asians themselves." Eisenhower promised that if he were elected he would double the ROK Army from ten to twenty divisions so that US forces could be released. Thus, in order to carry out his election pledge after he was elected,
Eisenhower visited Korea trying to find a solution to the Korean problem.  
Eisenhower judged that no persuasion whatever would induce the Communists to assume a stance of negotiation and that only power and action would make them come to terms. This meant that the new US government would give up the appeasement policy of the Truman Administration and instead adopt a more aggressive and firm anti-Communist policy in pursuing the settlement of the Korean War.

III. Ground Operations: Intensifying the Fight for Critical Hills

1. The Contest for Outpost Positions along the Imjin River and Yokkok-ch’on

In mid-July 1952, Lt. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, the commander of the US I Corps in the western front, was assigned the 2nd Infantry Division from the US IX Corps while the command of the 45th Infantry Division was shifted to the US X Corps. Thus, the US I Corps was in charge of the line from the mouth of the Imjin River to Ch’orwon plains, employing the US 1st Marine Division (with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached), the British 1st Commonwealth Division, the US 3rd Infantry Division, and the US 2nd Infantry Division.

Deployed on the US I Corps front were six CCF armies: the 65th Army in Kaesong, 40th Army in Kuhwa-ri, 39th Army in Saknyong, 38th Army in Majang-ri, 60th Army in Koksan, and 63rd Army in Paech’on. The last two armies were reserves.

While undertaking outpost defensive operations, the enemy had planned to take an offensive in the fall. In accordance with the tactical counter- offensive
plans prepared by the Chinese-North Korean Combined Forces Command against the local offensives of the UNC Forces, the enemy launched an attack on 18 September. The first phase of the enemy offensive would rage from 18 September through 5 October and the second phase from 6 October through 31 October.

Up to the previous month, the 45th Infantry Division of the US I Corps had undertaken the so-called Plan Counter, capturing a group of hills of importance along the Yokkok-ch’on valley west of Ch’orwon. An immediate enemy counterattack followed, however, and the struggle for the hills continued. The US 1st Marine Division fought at Bunker Hill, the US 2nd Infantry Division in the Old Baldy area, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment over the outposts along the Sach’on River, and the ROK 1st Division fought for Tessie and Nickie Hills and later for the Betty and Nori Hill complex.

Fierce battles in the areas of Old Baldy, Porkchop, and T-Bone Hills continued all during the summer after the commitment of the US 2nd Infantry Division in mid-July. In particular, Porkchop Hill (234 m), defended by the Thailand Battalion, attached to the US 2nd Division, was attacked by two CCF regiments from 1 through 11 November before they were finally repulsed. The Thais’ valor in the battle of Porkchop Hill earned it the honorable nickname ‘Little Tigers.’

In the Imjin River sector, on the other hand, a lull had continued up to July because of the rainy season. When the rainy season ended, however, the battles for the outpost hills intensified again. In August, the US 1st Marine Division fought desperately against an enemy attack and succeeded in securing Bunker Hill. In September, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment rushed into a series of fierce battles along the Sach’on River valley. The battle was still going on when the regiment was reorganized as a combat team in early October. The fighting lasted one more month until early November.

Meanwhile, the Canadian 25th Brigade, defending the Kowang-san (355
m) area north of the Imjin River, briefly faced a crisis when attacked by large CCF troops. However, the Brigade mounted a timely counterattack with a shock troop and threw back the Chinese forces. The enemy on the other hand succeeded in wresting Outpost Kelly from the US 3rd Infantry Division, which, afterwards, was relieved by the ROK 1st Division, the US I Corps reserve.

The enemy then launched the second phase of its all-out attacks, the ‘October Offensive.’ At this juncture, the French battalion on Arrowhead Hill (281 m) and the ROK 9th Division on the adjacent White Horse Hill fought saggerely against the attacks by the CCF 38th Army. Meanwhile, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment engaged in two fierce fights with the enemy, one in the vicinity of Koyangdae and the other in the Sach’ on River valley.

In November, a lull settled over the entire US I Corps front. Afterwards, in early December, the enemy attacked the ROK 1st Division battalions defending Nori and Betty Hills. But the division hung on tenaciously, frustrating the repeated enemy attempts to capture the hills. However, as most of the battles during this period were struggles for outpost positions, the main positions of the US I Corps remained relatively stationary.

(1) The Battle for Bunker Hill

In early July 1952, the US 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. John T. Selden, was defending the Kimpo—P’ anmunjom—Sami-ch’ on line on the western front of the US I Corps. By early August, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment had been deployed to a fixed position along the Sach’ on-gang—P’anmunjom line while three other US Marine regiments were periodically rotating positions with each other along the P’anmunjom—Sami-ch’ on line on the central and eastern fronts. Thus when the contest for Bunker Hill began, three regiments were deployed on the division front: the ROK 1st Marine Regiment on the
left, the US 1st Marine Regiment at the center, and the US 5th Marine Regiment on the right. With the US 7th Marine Regiment in reserve, the division was facing the CCF 40th and 65th Armies.82)

Most of the hills along the divisional main line of resistance were about 150 meters high and thus easily observable from Daedok-san (236 m) hill complex occupied by the enemy. Among the low-lying hills in the division sector, however, was Paeghak-san (229 m), which was a relatively higher spot of importance five kilometers southeast of P'anmunjom.

In order to defend Paeghak-san, it was necessary to establish a chain of strong outposts across its front, and naturally the enemy concentrated its main effort against it. In the 5.5 kilometer-long sector between Taedok-san and Paeghak-san lay three outpost positions of the US 1st Marine Regiment: Bunker Hill (122 m), Hill 58, and Hill 56. A fierce struggle for these hills was inevitable.

Opposing the US 1st Marine Division from east to west were the 352nd and 354th Regiments, 118th Division (commanded by Deng Yue), CCF 40th Army. The enemy division occupied a group of hills along the Hill 207—Manghae-san—Daedok-san line. To the west, it joined the flank of the 180th Regiment, 194th Division, CCF 65th Army. Taking advantage of the period of limited attacks by the UNC Forces, the enemy had restocked its frontline units with ammunition and supplies. Thus, with its morale and fighting power steadily growing, the enemy gradually shifted its tactics to the active defense in early August, trying to probe for soft spots in the UNC lines.83)

At 01:00 on 9 August, the enemy launched a surprise attack on the outposts of the US 1st Marine Regiment. With the single stroke of a platoon in strength, the enemy swept across Hill 58 which was a squad outpost of E Company, 2nd Battalion, and, without delay, rushed toward the regimental main line of resistance. Then the 2nd Battalion requested an artillery barrage to drive back the enemy while E Company made a counterattack. E Company organized a
counterattack platoon at once and, following the preparatory fires, launched an assault at 04:00. The counterattack, however, was hindered by disadvantageous terrain and poor fields of fire.

Again at about 10:00, a reinforced platoon of A Company, 1st Battalion, with the support of one platoon from E Company, executed a second counterattack working its way directly to the south of the enemy positions. After repeated advances and retreats, the attacking platoon finally succeeded in recapturing the lost outposts from the enemy at 11:00. However, the joy of victory did not last long. Having received a violent storm of enemy artillery fire before friendly reinforcements arrived, the platoon had to retreat to the main line of resistance.

Thus, Colonel Walter F. Layer, the regimental commander, ordered C Company, 1st Battalion, to capture Hill 58. At 22:45, C Company began to advance by stealth to the right flank of the enemy for a surprise attack, and at 01:05 it rushed the enemy positions. After hand-to-hand combat with the enemy resisting in the last ditch, C Company captured its objective. But again, the attack met the same fate as its predecessor. The enemy’s reinforced counterattack in company strength forced C Company to withdraw to the main line of resistance.⁸⁴

As Hill 58 was easily observed by the enemy, the US 1st Marine Regiment received a discouraging setback every time it attempted to capture the hill during the three engagements. In particular, the Marines suffered a great number of casualties (270 total) due to enemy artillery fire.

Eventually, Colonel Layer concluded that Hill 58 was of little tactical value because its unfavorable terrain, and its location would make it difficult to keep a long hold on it even if it could be captured. Colonel Layer, therefore, drew up another attack plan. He decided to secure a new outpost on Bunker Hill (122 m), which lay one kilometer southwest of Hill 58.

On 11 August, B Company made a surprise attack on Hill 122 under the command of the 2nd Battalion commander, with D Company executing a feint
operation against Hill 58. While the leading platoon rushed toward the crest of Hill 122 to break the enemy resistance, another platoon routed the enemy defending the right slope of the hill. Tanks supported both attacks.

At 02:30 the next day, the leading platoon of B Company finally captured the crest of Hill 122, and, aided by the Korean Service Corps personnel attached to the platoon, consolidated the trenches. At about 15:00, however, heavy concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire destroyed the platoon positions and forced the platoon to fall back with many casualties to the eastern slope of the hill.
Several hours later around 19:00, two enemy companies resumed the attack on B Company. As the situation became urgent, the 3rd Battalion commander ordered I Company to support B Company, which finally repulsed the attackers.\textsuperscript{85} In the fighting that day, the friendly forces suffered heavy losses, 34 dead and 29 wounded, but the timely introduction of fresh troops at every critical moment made the final defeat of the enemy possible.

In order to defend Bunker Hill effectively, the US 1st Marine Division deployed a reconnaissance platoon on Hill 124 one kilometer southwest of Hill 122 while committing the total strength of the division replacement battalion into the 1st Regiment sector. Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, were also attached to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, and all sorts of guns and mortars in the 1st Regiment would provide covering fire for the defense of Hill 122. By this time, the Korean Service Corps personnel attached to the battalion had been mobilized for carrying materials up to the hills and constructing the trenches.\textsuperscript{86}

The enemy, on the other hand, had been considering a retaliatory attack. About midnight of 13 August, the outpost on Hill 48A of F Company, 2nd Battalion, east of Bunker Hill, was first subjected to enemy artillery and mortar concentration and then to an assault by troops rushing toward the main line of resistance. But the US Marines tenaciously hung onto their position and drove back the attackers attempting to break through the main line of resistance. Meanwhile, the F Company commander committed a platoon to Hill 48A and repulsed the enemy that surrounded the hill.

Around 01:30, however, the enemy renewed its attack. An estimated enemy battalion mounted an assault on I Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment. After the enemy artillery fire was laid on the company position, I Company on the sloping ground southwest of Bunker Hill stubbornly fought a close fight with the enemy advancing toward the central and right side of the position. But as time went on the situation went from bad to worse.
At this juncture, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, reinforced I Company on Bunker Hill by dispatching an element of I Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment which had been attached to his battalion. In addition, General Selden, the division commander, ordered a company from the 5th Regiment to reinforce F Company and committed G Company to Bunker Hill. As the battle reached a decisive stage, the situation took a favorable turn, and the enemy was quickly put to rout. Particularly effective damage on the enemy in this battle was inflicted by the fire support units. The 11th Marines, the division artillery regiment, covered the defense of the position, employing nine rocket launchers and four howitzer battalions. Tank forces concentrated their fire on the attackers approaching the position.

About noon on the same day, H Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, received an order to take over Hill 122 and began to relieve the units defending the hill. At the same time, other reinforcements from the 7th Regiment returned to their original positions in the afternoon. It was reported that, despite its losses during the battles on that day, 31 killed and 254 wounded, the 1st Regiment had exacted a heavy toll from the enemy, more than 470 killed and 625 wounded.87

With the approach of darkness, the enemy mounted a series of counterattacks on Bunker Hill and the 3rd Battalion outposts 700 meters east of P’anmunjom. H Company, with the support of coordinated protective fire, checked the advance of an estimated reinforced enemy company. The enemy, however, immediately resumed its attack, attempting to make a turning movement to the east of Hill 122, only to be caught by the illumination fires and timely artillery barrage of the defenders. The enemy was almost completely annihilated.

In the early dawn of the next day, an enemy platoon made another assault on Hill 122, opening up its machine gun fire from the northwest of Outpost 58A. After repelling the attack instantly, the 3rd Battalion commander strengthened the defense of the hill with a platoon from A Company of the 1st
Again at 01:00 on 15 August, the Marines defending the left end of Hill 122 repulsed a small-scale enemy attack. The fight, however, soon extended to the whole neighborhood of Hill 124-122 complex. H Company, quickly detecting the enemy’s attempt to make a surprise attack by turning around Bunker Hill, requested the urgent support of tank gun fire and artillery barrage.

The enemy persisted in its attack trying to break through the friendly line of defense. The Marines, however, would not give in, finally subduing the enemy with overwhelming firepower at about 04:00. In the morning, H Company was relieved by B Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, and came back to the main line of resistance.

Undaunted, the enemy committed another battalion in a converging attack from the north of Hill 122 at about midnight of 16 August. B Company faced a crisis when penetrated at a sector of its defense line by the enemy’s ‘human-wave’ attack. Reinforced by I Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, however, B Company hung on stubbornly, even fighting hand to hand with the Chinese assault groups before the enemy was finally forced to withdraw at 03:15.88)

In the bloody battles of Bunker Hill during 8-16 August, the enemy attacked the hill seven times. But the US 1st Marine Division withstood the determined drive of the enemy and succeeded in defending its outposts and main positions. The division committed the reserves of its direct control as well as those of the 7th Regiment to the defense of the 1st Regiment sector which received concentrated enemy attacks. In addition to the timely reinforcement at crucial moments, the regiment received outstanding support from the artillery and Marine air units, which backed up the regiment in defeating the persistent and successive enemy attacks. The battles of Bunker Hill were waged mostly around low-lying outpost hills. However, considering the casualties inflicted on the enemy, 570
killed and 1,500 wounded, and the sacrifice of the marines, 92 dead and 529 injured, it is easily conceivable how desperate the battles were, especially in a small battlefield.  

(2) The Sach’on River Battles

While the US 1st Marine Division was engaged in battles in the Imjin River area east of P’anmunjom, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment became embroiled in another fierce struggle for the second time since April.

Since mid-March, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, as the left flank unit of the US 1st Marine Division, had been in charge of the Kimpo peninsula and the eleven-kilometer main line of resistance from the mouth of the Imjin River to P’anmunjom corridor. The regiment deployed two battalions to the east of Sach’on River and kept one battalion in reserve. In the Kimpo peninsula, on the other hand, another battalion was deployed.

Opposing the 1st ROK Marine Regiment across Sach’on River was the CCF 65th Army, deploying the 194th Division (582nd Regiment) in front of the right-front ROK battalion and the 195th Division (584th Regiment) in front of the left-front ROK battalion. Between the two enemy divisions, Ch’ondok-san (203 m) dominated the sector, and the enemy kept the 193rd Division in reserve to the northwest of Kaesong.

Except for the area of Hill 155, the sector east of the Sach’on River occupied by the ROK 1st Marine Regiment was an open vale of dry land and paddy fields and low-lying hillocks under 50 meters in height. The position taken by the regiment had the Imjin River behind the troops. The west bank of Sach’on-gang occupied by the enemy, on the other hand, was a hill complex including Yoni-san (241 m), Kunjang-san (278 m), Ch’ondok-san (203 m), and Dungmul-san (288 m). Lying parallel to the front line between the two sides and dominating
Battle along Sach’on River
the entire friendly position, this hill complex provided the enemy with a terrain favorable for its defense.

In July-August, the Imjin River flooded, and the Sach’on River also became difficult to cross. The muddy areas along the river valleys restricted the freedom of military maneuver. Thus, during this period, both sides engaged only in artillery warfare. When the weather and terrain conditions became favorable for action in September, however, both sides broke the lull of the front line. Surprise raids were exchanged every day and reconnaissance under powerful fire support often led to skirmishes between them.

When Sach’on River became fordable in late August, Brig. Gen. Kim Suk Bum, the commander of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, ordered some of the elements in the main line of resistance to reinforce the regimental outposts. At 18:00 on 6 September, enemy artillery concentrations began to fall on the battalion outposts. At the same time, an estimated reinforced enemy company enveloped the 10th Company outpost located in Masan-dong after crossing Sach’on River by surprise.923

Lying close to the crossing point of Sach’on-gang, the 10th Company outpost was within one kilometer of the enemy positions and 2.5 kilometers of the regiment’s main line of resistance. The enemy units that invaded the 10th Company that day were elements from the 2nd Battalion of the CCF 582nd Regiment, which had been confronting the 3rd Battalion of the friendly regiment.

At first, the enemy artillery fire set in to harass the regimental main line of resistance as well as the 10th Company command post and the battalion observation post. Shortly thereafter, enemy tanks and self-propelled artillery appeared on the opposite side of Sach’on-gang and covered the units crossing the river. Since the friendly outposts were dominated by the enemy at close range, the 10th Company constructed in double structure all the weapons shelters, foxholes, and emplacements so as to endure the enemy artillery fire.
As the enemy crossed the river and encircled Position 36 (to be called 'Honbi Hill' later) defended by the 2nd Platoon, the 10th Company commander evacuated several pairs of ambush sentries including the pair at the river-crossing point. At the same time, he requested artillery support and ordered his men to hold out on the position. Shortly thereafter, an enemy group rushed into the trenches and the two sides threw hand grenades at each other and closed in for a hand-to-hand fight. As the enemy, superior in number, succeeded in advancing to a corner of the defense position, the 10th Company commander urgently requested artillery fire within his own company position.\textsuperscript{93}

In no time, a shower of proximity fuze shells poured on the position. Then, the enemy, which seemed to have seized the position, began to run about in utter confusion quickly suffering a heavy toll of casualties. Turning the tide, the marines, who had been hiding in the underground bunkers with overhead protection, rushed to the surface and beat off the disorganized enemy.\textsuperscript{94}

Having been frustrated in its continued attempts to capture Position 36 after a series of wave-like attacks, the enemy shifted its assault to Position 37 of the 1st Platoon. Every time the enemy appeared in front of the defense line, however, the 1st Platoon checked the enemy advance with its final protective fires and attacked its assembly area and avenues of approach with artillery fire. Eventually, the enemy appeared to give up the attempt to capture Position 37 and began to scatter, with its fighting potential having been considerably depleted in the battles waged thus far.

The enemy soon showed signs of withdrawing as its plans to capture the two positions faltered. At this point, the regimental commander ordered the 9th Company to attack the enemy remnants still surrounding Position 37 and to secure a route to Position 36. Meanwhile, providing fire support of 155-mm. howitzers, the US 1st Marine Division ordered the regiment to hold the two positions to the last. If the two positions fell to the enemy, the main line of resistance would be in
danger and would have to be withdrawn to the Imjin River. Such a retreat would cause a serious effect on the operations of the adjacent units.\textsuperscript{95)}

When the marines on the Positions 36 and 37 were hanging on desper-ately, around 03:00 on 7 September, the 9th Company commander began a counterattack with a platoon supported by a tank platoon to Position 36. The attacking troops advanced down to the front of Position 36, mopping up the remaining enemy and firing shots on those streaming back in a disorganized retreat toward the shore of Sach’on-gang.\textsuperscript{96)} Thereafter, Hill 36 began to be called ‘Honbi Hill’. The literal meaning of the Korean word ‘Honbi’ is the hill ‘frightened the enemy out of its wits.’

Soon after the marines repelled the enemy from Position 36, the 11th Company relieved the 10th Company, which had suffered considerable losses in defending the position. By way of precaution against a renewal of the enemy attack, the 11th Company reinforced its position by rebuilding outposts and placing obstacles along the anticipated avenues of approach.

In fact, the enemy had been making an elaborate plan to resume its attack, even staging a surprise attack during the daytime. At 18:00 on 9 September, the expected enemy attack of a battalion in strength began. Earlier at 15:00 on the same day, the enemy had made a demonstration by having a small group of units cross the Sach’on River in front of Honbi Hill (Position 36). Then at 18:30, the enemy laid artillery fire on the friendly main line of resistance. At the same time, two enemy companies supported by tank gun fire, mounted wave-like attacks on all four outposts (Positions 37, 36, 33, and 31) in order to cover up its main effort on Position 36.\textsuperscript{97)}

Thereupon, the regiment cancelled its plan for a nighttime surprise attack. Instead, it reinforced the defensive strength of the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion, in turn, ordered the 9th and 10th Companies to cover the flanks of the battalion and fire volleys at the enemy approaching the 11th Company position.
Shortly afterwards, the enemy closed in upon the defenders desperately, directing its main attack toward Position 36.

At 19:30, with shells raining on the defending marines, the reinforced enemy rushed up to Position 36. Soon a fierce dogfight broke out under the day-like flares illuminating the position. The enemy troops that had crossed the Sach’ on River continued to be reinforced despite friendly artillery fire. They enveloped Position 36 on all sides and delivered a series of wave-like attacks on it. As the position almost fell into the enemy’s hands, the fighting became a confrontation between the marines inside the underground bunkers and the enemy outside.

As a last resort, proximity-fuzed shells began to pour on the position once more. Then, the enemy who almost took possession of Position 36 dispersed with a great many casualties. However, a group of reinforced enemy troops pressed hard again upon a corner of the defense line, destroying the bunkers within the position.98

Without delay, the battalion commander organized a counterattack force and dispatched it to Position 36. At 01:00 on the 20th, the counterattack force under artillery fire support closed upon the enemy troops surrounding the outer sector of the position and finally forced them to retreat to the riverside.

As the crossing point of the Sach’ on River had become unpassable after a while by friendly artillery fire, the enemy reorganized its troops and, under artillery support, launched a second attack on Position 36. The attack was too sudden for the defenders to rearrange their line of battle. Thus, even the eight hours of the marines’ bloody resistance that ensued could not prevent them from giving up their position in the end. At this juncture, the marines laid artillery concentration on the crossing point of the Sach’ on River. Meanwhile US Marine fighter-bombers were interdicting enemy reinforcements by striking hard blows on the enemy assembly areas.99
Now it was time for the marines to react again with determination. At 10:00 on the same day, the regimental commander ordered the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, to counterattack and recapture the lost position under the support of two tank platoons. Soon, 105-mm. howitzer, 4.2 inch mortar and tank gun fire concentrations began on and around Position 36. At the same time, the 9th Company launched an infantry-tank combined attack led by a tank platoon. Braving the storm of the enemy’s defensive fire concentration, the combined attackers succeeded in advancing to the front of Position 36.

In the meantime, the fighter-bombers providing close air support to the 9th Company interdicted enemy reinforcements and silenced their artillery by attacking their positions and river-crossing points twice with napalm and variable-time-fuze bombs. The tanks at the forefront of the attacking force, on the other hand, devastated the enemy position, effectively suppressing its tank and artillery fire.

At 14:00, the attacking force gained a final victory, surging upon the enemy defense line over the barbed wire entanglements, shouting battle cries and recapturing Hill 36 at last. Thus, in the end, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment frustrated the repeated, wave-like enemy drives to secure a complete command of the outposts of importance along the Sach’on River valley. At the same time, the enemy’s attempt to threaten the friendly divisional main line of resistance behind those outposts ended in failure.

Subsequently in October, both sides resumed position warfare over the outposts of importance. The enemy made large-scale autumn offensives twice, only to be defeated each time. During the first battle that lasted six consecutive days from 2 October, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment annihilated a large enemy force, checking its offensive in a short time before it reached the outpost defense line. Again on the 31st, the regiment endured unprecedentedly violent enemy artillery concentrations, and a sector of the defensive outpost was taken by the
attacking force. At this crucial moment, however, the regiment launched a determined counterattack and stubbornly fought back and drove the enemy off. During the battles, the enemy suffered casualties of about 1,550 killed while the ROK Marines’ loss totaled 66 dead and 262 wounded.

The Changdan-gun area immediately north of the Imjin River was a place of strategic importance both to the friendly forces and the enemy. The ROK 1st Marine Regiment, maintaining important outposts in this area, was able to control State Road No. 1 connecting Seoul and Kaesong. In addition, the final line of contact of the troops of the both sides at the moment of ceasefire would become the military demarcation line. Then, Changdan-gun area itself would become an outpost for the defense of Seoul.

To the enemy, on the other hand, the control of Changdan-gun meant securing a stepping stone needed in advancing at least to the Imjin River. Thus, the bloody struggles for the outposts in this area were an inevitable consequence.

(3) Battles around Old Baldy

The US 2nd Infantry Division, formerly the reserve of the US IX Corps, was later attached to the US I Corps. On 17 July 1952, the 2nd Division began to relieve the US 45th Division in its defense sector on the right I Corps front in the Tokundong-Hill 281 area south of Yokkok-ch’on.

The 2nd Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. David L. Ruffner, placed the 23rd Regiment (with the French Battalion attached) on the left front east of Yokkok-ch’on and deployed the 9th Regiment (with the Thailand Battalion attached) on the right front around Ch’ondok-san east of Tonggwang-ri. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment and the Dutch Battalion were in reserve.¹⁰²

During the campaign called ‘Plan Counter’ in June, the US 45th Infantry Division had repulsed the enemy on the southern shore of Yokkok-ch’on, securing
outposts favorable for the defense of the area. Since then, however, there had been incessant enemy counterattacks to regain the lost outposts.\textsuperscript{103} Almost every day, the both sides went into heated offensive and defensive battles around such hills as Old Baldy (266 m), Porkchop (255 m), and Eerie (183 m). Old Baldy, in particular, was of great importance to both sides since it was located immediately south of Yokkok-ch’on and dominated the whole surrounding area to the north, west, and south.\textsuperscript{104}

Opposing the US 2nd Infantry Division from east to west, on the other hand, were the 338th and 339th Regiments, 113rd Division, CCF 38th Army (commanded by Jiang Yong Hui); 350th and 349th Regiments, 117th Division, CCF 39th Army; and the 344th Regiment, 115th Division, CCF 39th Army. The other components of the 113th, 117th, and 115th Divisions were in reserve, as was the 116th Division, CCF 39th Army. The enemy had over ten artillery battalions in direct or general support roles.\textsuperscript{105} Occupying commanding ground north of Yokkok-ch’on, the enemy units had a great terrain advantage.

On the night of 17 July, seizing the occasion of the relief of the US 45th Infantry Division, the enemy mounted an attack against Old Baldy after intense preparatory fire. Old Baldy was an outpost of the 23rd Regiment, where F Company was relieving another company which had been defending the position.\textsuperscript{106}

At 22:50, a battalion-sized enemy force, supported by uninterrupted artillery fire, began to press the 23rd Regiment outposts. While F Company was fighting desperately on the hill, the 2nd Battalion commander ordered E Company to support F Company. When E Company arrived at the hill the next day, however, the crest of the hill had already been taken by the enemy. Instantly, E Company launched a counterattack and had a bitter struggle. Up the hill and down the hill went friendly and hostile forces as they wrestled for control before the 2nd Battalion was finally forced to disengage at 15:00.
The commander of the 23rd Regiment then committed the 3rd Battalion to another counterattack against Old Baldy. At 16:55, K Company supported by tanks launched an attack together with E and F Companies. This time again, however, the attack met with failure under the torrential enemy artillery concentrations.

On the night of the same day, the 23rd Regiment committed a new assault group of a battalion size to a counterattack. But the attack was delayed as it encountered stubborn enemy resistance. To make matters worse, the rain turned the battleground into a morass, and the attacking force stalled in the mud. B Company, in particular, was forced to fall back as casualties cut its strength to twenty-some men.\(^{107}\)

The next morning, I and L Companies resumed their counterattacks several times, only to be frustrated each time by enemy artillery concentrations which inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. On that day, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 38th Regiment, US 2nd Infantry Division stationed in Inchon, moved to the Chongok area and there finished relieving the US 45th Infantry Division.

Despite repeated failure, the 23rd Regiment continued to attempt to capture Old Baldy, but the heavy rain flooded the streams and rivers and swept away bridges. The roads were blocked or washed away by landslides. Thus, the regiment waited while the rain continued, with an element of the regiment having won a foothold on the southeast slope of the hill.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, newly selected as the attack force, relieved the 3rd Battalion. In spite of seven consecutive days of heavy rain, the 1st Battalion in the rear position devoted its main efforts on the rehearsal of a counterattack plan called ‘Little Joe’. This operation would receive direct support from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, B Company of the Division Engineer Battalion, and tank and heavy mortar companies. In addition, the plan provided such countermeasures as division air reconnaissance, special communications support, and
supply measures feeding battle lines.\textsuperscript{108}

At last the rain abated at 22:00 on 31 July, and the 1st Battalion launched its long-awaited attack. A and C Companies advanced toward the objective keeping abreast of each other. Disregarding the enemy artillery and mortar concentrations, the two companies passed through the fire and pressed the enemy defense line from left and right.\textsuperscript{109} By 04:25 the next morning, the attacking forces had fought their way to the crest, where they hurled numerous hand grenades and, after bitter hand-to-hand combat, smashed the last-ditch resistance of the enemy. As the men of the two companies joined hands on the crest of the hill at 09:10, ten consecutive days of the bloody struggle for Old Baldy ended in victory for the American forces again.

To prepare for the customary enemy counterattack, the 23rd Regiment under daytime air support now concentrated its main effort on digging trenches, laying mines, and constructing communications networks. Thereafter, the US 2nd Infantry Division went on strengthening its hold on Old Baldy, defeating the enemy’s intermittent raids and carrying out small-scale search and reconnaissance operations.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{(4) Koyangdae-Imjin River Battle}

On 1 October 1952 when the battle for Old Baldy was still in a state of remission, the US I Corps rotated some of its elements. The ROK 1st Division, the reserve of the corps, relieved the US 3rd Infantry Division on the central front. Positioned abreast of the British 1st Commonwealth Division on the left and the US 2nd Infantry Division on the right, the ROK 1st Division was defending its main line of resistance that ranged from the eastern and western shores of the Imjin River to the southern shore of the Yokkok-ch’on.

Brig. Gen. Park Im Hang, the commander of the ROK 1st Division.
deployed the 15th Regiment on the left front and the 12th Regiment on the right front. The 11th Regiment was placed in reserve. The main position of the 1st Division was located along the defense line called ‘Jamestown’ adjoining Shinch’on village west of the Imjin River, Hill 264 east of the Imjin River, Kojak-dong village, Eumji-ch’on village south of Yokkok-ch’on, and Yangji-ch’on village. The division maintained its outposts on Tessie Hill (150 m), Nickie Hill (130 m), Little Nori Hill (Sonori Hill: 110 m), Hill 199, Hill 250, and Hill 168. After two months of training, the combat competence of the ROK 1st Division was high, and the soldiers’ morale was excellent.111)

The divisional zone of operation consisted of low-lying hills, mostly 200 to 300 meters high. Thus, not only a portion of the division main line of resistance but all the lookout posts were dominated by the enemy positions. Moreover, the Imjin River that joins Yokkok-ch’on and meanders in an ‘S’-shape from north to south split the 15th Regiment sector of operation into two. Therefore, the terrain of the regimental sector was disadvantageous to the friendly forces. In particular, it was difficult to maintain the outposts on Tessie, Nickie, and Nori Hills. They were much lower than Maryang-san (315 m), held by the enemy. In addition, the 15th Regiment outposts were hindered by having the Imjin River flowing behind them.

During the operation period, the weather continued to be clear. However, observation and air support were often restricted by dense fog at dawn. Meanwhile, two platoons from the regimental reconnaissance company, which was attached to the 15th Regiment, strengthened the outposts on two vulnerable hills: Tessie and Nickie. The 15th Regiment was supported by A and B Batteries of the 17th Artillery Battalion, the US 58th and 9th Artillery Battalions, A Company of the US 72nd Tank Battalion, and a platoon of the 3rd Engineer Company. Supplies to the regiment were satisfactory.

Opposing the ROK 15th Regiment was the 116th Division (commanded
by Zhang Feng), CCF 39th Army (commanded by Zhong Wei). The 116th Division was organized mostly from former Chinese Nationalist army personnel who had surrendered to the Communist Chinese Army. These soldiers had a great deal of experience in military training and combat, and they were veteran fighters on the mountainous terrain. On account of the incessant UNC air bombings and artillery fire, however, they were demoralized and suffering from lack of supplies.\(^{112}\)

On 6 October 1952, six days after the ROK 1st Division assumed its new mission, the CCF 116th Division launched an offensive. At 19:55, after fierce artillery fire was laid on the ROK 1st Division area, the 2nd Battalion, the reserve of the CCF 348th Regiment, mounted an attack on Tessie and Nickie Hills, which were the outposts of the 3rd Battalion(Regiment RCN Co. attached), ROK 15th Regiment. The attacking forces were divided into two two-company-sized units. Each unit attacked each of the two hills, and at 20:15 gained access to a point within fifty meters of the hills.\(^{113}\)

The outpost platoons of the Regimental Reconnaissance Company tried to check the enemy well before it advanced to the hills. The platoons were incapable of doing so, however, as most of the defensive barbed wire, mines and trenches were destroyed by the enemy preparatory fire. The platoons, clinging to the trenches, could not even request fire support since communications had been cut off by the enemy artillery fire.\(^{114}\)

As the outpost platoons retreated into a cave, the enemy urged them to surrender, shooting PPSh41 burp guns (Soviet-made submachine guns). At 21:50, two enemy platoons enveloped the friendly position by going around to its left and right. At the same time, the enemy blocked the withdrawal routes of the outpost platoons, which were hanging on to their positions. They asked for a final defense fire but were soon in great danger of being defeated.\(^{115}\)

At that time, the regimental commander, deciding that the outposts had
been captured by the enemy, mounted a counterattack against the two hills at 08:20 the next day (7 October). The attack was made by a platoon from the regimental reconnaissance company and two platoons from the divisional reconnaissance company.

The regimental reconnaissance platoon worked its way up to Tessie Hill while the two divisional reconnaissance platoons advanced to Nickie Hill. When they reached points 80% up the hills, they made a final dash at the enemy, only to be forced back by its stubborn resistance.\(^{116}\)

Meanwhile, the division commander attached the 10th Company, 11th Regiment, to the 15th Regiment. The commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Regiment, in turn, had the attached 10th Company from the 11th Regiment relieve the 10th Company of his own battalion. He then attacked Nickie Hill with an attached platoon, and Tessie Hill with two attached platoons. At 15:10, the platoon attacking Nickie Hill was joined by two platoons from the divisional reconnaissance company on its way to the objective. Together, they advanced to a point near the enemy position. The other two platoons, on the other hand, were joined by a regimental reconnaissance platoon. In a combined effort, they made a concerted attack upon Tessie Hill.

The counterattack forces were supported by the artillery and F-80 fighter-bombers as well as 4.2-inch mortars of the regimental weapons company. The attack, however, failed again at its final stage due to the last-ditch resistance of the enemy grenadiers. Falling back to a rallying point, the 10th Company prepared itself for another counterattack. Meanwhile, the divisional and regimental reconnaissance companies withdrew to the rear to reorganize.

Before daybreak on 8 October, the main force of the 10th Company resumed the attack on Nickie Hill. The surprise attack launched at 03:00, however, was not successful. Thus, supported by tanks and air force as well as artillery, the 10th Company mounted another attack on Nickie Hill, only to be driven back
Battle at Koyangdae and Its Vicinity
one more time by the enemy's defensive fire concentrations.¹¹⁷)

Since the repeated struggles for the two hills had come to nothing, General Park, the division commander, attached the 3rd Battalion, 11th Regiment, to the 15th Regiment and ordered it to carry out a concentrated counterattack. The commander of the 3rd Battalion, 15th Regiment, handed over his defense position to the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment and had the 9th and 11th Companies of his battalion assemble at the southern tip of Hill 209.¹¹⁸)

The commander of the 15th Regiment was determined to recapture Nickie and Tessie Hills by whatever means necessary. He ordered the 3rd Battalion to attack Nickie Hill with a main force while making a feint against Tessie Hill with one company under concentrated artillery support. The H-hour was 01:00 on 9 October. It did not take the 11th Company long to capture Hill 105 and shift its attack to Tessie Hill while the 9th and 10th Companies speedily advanced to Nickie Hill. The attacking forces, however, bogged down for a while under the strong enemy resistance. It was not until 12:00 that the attack was resumed, only after the division commander urged his subordinates to press the enemy harder.

The main attacking force launched an assault supported by F-80 fighter-bomber strikes and artillery preparatory fires, with all the tanks of A Company, US 72nd Tank Battalion, concentrating their gun fire on Nickie Hill. The assault ended in failure again, however. The attacking force made six assaults immediately in front of the enemy position, only to fall back each time. The enemy fire within its own position was violent and indiscriminate, and its resistance with automatic weapons and hand grenades was too stubborn and desperate to subdue.¹¹⁹)

At 16:30, the US I Corps commander, visiting the ROK 1st Division, was briefed about the situation of the battle line. Judging that there was nothing progressing except the mounting list of casualties, he ordered the 1st Division to “stop counterattacking for the time being and secure outposts along the final line
of advance presently reached.” In accordance with this order, the division began to reorganize the outposts at the frontmost line of advance.\textsuperscript{120}

Thus, despite three consecutive days of bloody battles, the 15th Regiment failed to recapture the lost outposts on Tessie and Nickie Hills. With the two hills being under the enemy’s control, the regiment newly established its outposts along the Hill 105-Betty Hill line about 500 meters south of Tessie and Nickie.\textsuperscript{121}

Afterwards, the ROK 1st Division waited for a chance to counterattack while concentrating on taking war prisoners, one of the operational objectives of the US I Corps. On 22 October, the I Corps ordered that the 1st Division’s zone of operation be moved a little toward the west. Availing itself of this opportunity, the 1st Division committed the 11th Regiment to the left front and placed the 15th Regiment in reserve. At the same time, the division corrected one of its vulnerabilities by newly setting up the regimental boundaries right along the Imjin River. Earlier, the river had crossed the regimental defense area from north to south splitting the 15th Regiment into two. In the meantime, the 51st Regiment was attached to the 1st Division and assumed responsibilities for defending the flanks and the rear of the division and its main supply routes.

As November set in, the 1st Division aggressively carried out operations of capturing war prisoners and destroying enemy outposts. On the 11th, the 15th Regiment ended its reserve role and relieved the right front regiment. By this time, the enemy elements had also been rotated. Opposing the ROK 1st Division were the 140th and 141st Divisions, CCF 47th Army with the 139th Division in reserve.\textsuperscript{122}

The 15th Regiment-now the left front unit of the 1st Division-set up its outposts along the Hill 105-Betty Hill-Sonori (Little Nori) Hill line and frequently performed combat reconnaissance activities. Sonori Hill, in particular, was vulnerable. The Imjin River flowed behind it, and it was exposed to the enemy on three
sides. Therefore, it was very difficult to maintain the position as well as to get supplies and combat service support.\(^{123}\)

With the onset of the Korean winter, the enemy broke the lull of the front line. At 01:00 on 11 December, closely following the preparatory fire, a regiment-sized enemy force launched an attack on the front of the 15th Regiment. The enemy directed its main attack toward Sonori and Betty Hills, threatening the friendly main line of resistance.\(^{124}\)

A CCF battalion tried to break through the defense line of the 9th Company on Sonori Hill by mounting massive attacks on both flanks of the Company. At the same time, another element of a CCF battalion was enveloping the hill from its rear slope. In the end, the 9th Company, outnumbered by the surging human waves of Chinese soldiers, gave up Sonori Hill. The 7th Company on Betty Hill, however, tenaciously hung on and fought back and drove the attackers off at last.\(^{125}\)

After the battles were over, the commander of the 15th Regiment decided that the enemy’s ultimate aim was not to launch an all-out attack but to capture the outposts favorable for later campaigns. Thus, the regimental commander ordered the 3rd Battalion to counterattack Sonori Hill at 08:00 with the support of the reconnaissance company, 11th Regiment, which was in division reserve. Just thirty meters short of the hostile position, however, the attack bogged down under showers of enemy hand grenades and automatic rifle fire. The 3rd Battalion, having rallied, resumed its attack and captured the hill, but an enemy counterattack forced the 3rd Battalion to give up the hill again.

When a counterattack by the 15th Regiment failed, the division commander committed the reserve 11th Regiment to action. He emphasized that Sonori Hill must be recaptured by whatever means because its loss in the previous battle endangered the division main line of resistance.\(^{126}\)

The 2nd Battalion was the first to attack the hill. However, the attack
failed, and now the attack mission was assigned to the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion commander explained his plan of attack in the presence of the commanding generals of the ROK 1st Division and the US I Corps. It was pointed out that a large-scale commitment of troops to a narrow and confined sector of operation must be avoided. The commander also stressed the need of capturing Big Nori Hill (Daeori Hill) as well as Little Nori Hill. If Big Nori could be won, the defense of Little Nori south of it would be further consolidated.

The 3rd Battalion would first launch a reinforced company-level drive as a main effort against Little and Big Nori Hills. Then it would increase the attacking force as circumstances dictated. Shortly before the attack began, twelve artillery battalions poured a continuous hail of shells on Little Nori, and six UNC B-26’s dropped over one hundred fragmentary bombs on the hill.\(^{127}\)

On the afternoon of the 12th, the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 11th Regiment, launched an attack against Little Nori Hill. The enemy waited until the attack force advanced two-thirds up the hill, then hurled hand grenades and loosed withering artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. While the 9th Company was thus pinned down by the enemy, who refused to be budged, another company attacking Big Nori Hill succeeded in capturing it by having a platoon maneuver round the hill under cover of a tank platoon.\(^{128}\) According to the testimony of the then-division intelligence officer, the US I Corps commander, observing the attack on Big Nori Hill, was deeply impressed and kept uttering exclamations of admiration.\(^ {129}\) Not a long time had passed, however, before Big Nori fell under the enemy’s control again.

The next day, the 3rd Battalion committed the 11th and 10th Companies to Little and Big Nori Hills, respectively. A fighter-bomber formation dropped bombs on the hills for forty minutes, soon followed by preparatory fire of about one hundred artillery guns.

The 3rd Battalion launched its attack at 09:30. The 11th Company
attacking Little Nori temporarily bogged down short of the crest. After an element of the 11th Company hit the flank and rear of the enemy, however, the hill was finally captured.\textsuperscript{130} The 10th Company, which attacked Big Nori, withdrew at that time after suffering heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{131}

The division commander, observing the progress of the battle, determined that it would cost too much to capture Big Nori Hill. Thus, he ordered the attacking force to withdraw and consolidate the defense of Little Nori Hill captured through a long bloody struggle.\textsuperscript{132}

During the engagement on Little and Big Nori Hills, the ROK 1st Division suffered a great many casualties. However, the 420th Regiment, CCF 140 Division left the front because of the heavy casualties it took in the battle and low morale. As the 420th Regiment was placed in reserve, the CCF 139th Division was newly deployed on the line in front of the ROK 1st Division.

2. Battles in the Ch’orwon-Kimhwa Area (Operation Showdown)

On the western central front line in mid-July, the US IX Corps deployed three divisions on its front: the ROK 9th, ROK 7th, and US 2nd Infantry Divisions. The US 40th Infantry Division was placed in reserve. Opposing the IX Corps were the CCF 15th and 38th Armies. Throughout the summer of 1952, however, no significant encounters occurred between the two sides.

In September, indications that the North Korean and Chinese Armies would soon attack the friendly outposts became apparent. Thus, the ROK and UNC forces began to take a limited but aggressive posture against the enemy initiative. Inevitably, fierce outpost-hill battles followed, and the contest reached its climax in early October.

On the left front of the IX Corps, the ROK 9th Division was embroiled in a bloody struggle for White Horse Hill on 6 October. On the same day, the
French Battalion, attached to the US 2nd Infantry Division adjacent to the left flank of the IX Corps, was attacked by a Chinese regiment. The French Battalion astride Arrowhead Hill held firm and defeated the attackers, even waging fierce close combat under fire support.133 On the right front of the IX Corps, on the other hand, to check and counter enemy attack on White Horse Hill, on 14 October, the ROK 2nd Division and the US 7th Division opened a preemptive strike against Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill north of Kimhwa.

(1) The Battle for White Horse Hill

The contest for White Horse Hill began on 6 October 1952 with the CCF 38th Army attacking the ROK 9th Division, defending the hill north of Ch’orwon. The hill changed hands seven times before the Chinese were finally defeated after ten days of bloody struggle.

The ROK 9th Division on the left front of the US IX Corps had been defending the Ch’orwon plains for a year since 17 October 1951. The plains stretched for eleven kilometers between Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) to the west and Choongang-ri to the east.

As for the enemy disposition, the 340th and 342th Regiments, 114th Division, CCF 38th Army (commanded by Jiang Yong Hui), opposed the ROK 9th Division. In front of the US 2nd Infantry Division adjacent to the left flank of the US IX Corps was the CCF 113rd Division, while the CCF 112nd Division was placed in reserve in the vicinity of Sujongdok-san. The enemy was supposed to be equipped with old Japanese-style long-barreled rifles, Soviet-made PPSh41 burp guns, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, and mortars. Enemy supplies and morale seemed to be in good shape.

The 9th Division main line of resistance, for the most part, lay on a wide open area of the Ch’orwon Plains. Only the western tip of the line in the vicinity
III. Ground Operations: Intensifying the Fight for Critical Hills

of Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) consisting of a low-lying hill mass extending in a northwest-southeast direction for about three kilometers. The enemy, however, was in control of other higher hills including Hyosung-san (619 m). Overlooked by the enemy position, the whole defensive sector of the 9th Division was thus geographically vulnerable. In particular, the Pongnae-ho Reservoir in the enemy area located five kilometers north of the main line of resistance could have a serious influence on the military operation. If the enemy opened the floodgates of the reservoir, the water level of the Yokkok-ch’on, which ran across the Ch’orwon plains, might rise sufficiently to flood the whole 9th Division sector.

As of 22 September, the ROK 9th Division under Maj. Gen. Kim Jong Oh deployed the 30th Regiment on the left front and the 29th Regiment on the right. The 28th Regiment, plus one battalion, was placed in ready reserve. The attached 51st Regiment, on the other hand, were employed as separate battalions to defend the main line of resistance. The defense of White Horse Hill was in charge of the 30th Regiment, which deployed the 1st Battalion on Hill 395, the 2nd Battalion on and around Choongma-san, and the 3rd Battalion on the southern shore of Yokkok-ch’on.¹³⁴)

General Kim concluded that the enemy intended to capture Hill 395 as the first step of a large-scale offensive in the future. Gaining the hill would make possible control of a vast open area of the Ch’orwon plains. If this occurred, the enemy would secure a strategic advantage and seriously threaten the friendly forces on the central front line. General Kim was determined to strengthen the defense of the 9th Division.¹³⁵)

During the period of the battles for White Horse Hill, the weather was generally clear. Nighttime observation was also satisfactory because of the relatively bright moonlight. The clear weather provided the friendly forces with favorable conditions for air support.

Signs of an imminent enemy offensive began to appear along the whole
front line around this time. On 3 October when the 9th Division was strengthening reconnaissance and security activities, General Kim learned through the interrogation of a Chinese deserter that the CCF 114th Division planned to attack White Horse Hill between 4 and 6 October. Since other intelligence sources supported the deserter’s story, the 9th Division doubled the defense force of Hill 395 to two battalions. In addition, a regiment was held in ready reserve for counterattacks against the enemy, and reconnaissance activities were further strengthened.

On the morning of 6 October, the enemy began its advance on White Horse Hill, flooding the Yokkok-ch'on by destroying the dam-levee of Pongnaeho Reservoir. At 19:15, the 114th Division, CCF 38th Army, moved up to Hill 395, defended by the 30th Regiment. The CCF 340th Regiment committed a battalion to the northern end of the White Horse Hill complex while committing another battalion to the crest of the hill. The enemy tried three times to break through the regimental defense line. Each time, however, it was hurled back, suffering an estimated 1,500 casualties the first night.136)

That night, just before the attack on Hill 395, the enemy launched a large-scale offensive in the adjacent US 2nd Infantry Division sector. The attack was made against the French Battalion astride Arrowhead Hill (281 m) three kilometers southwest of Hill 395. It was a diversionary attack to conceal the main attack on White Horse Hill. The men of the French Battalion held firm on the hill. Under cover of fire support, they fought in close combat and inflicted heavy casualties upon the attackers.

The following night, the enemy resumed the attack against Hill 395. Enveloping the outposts of the 30th Regiment, two Chinese battalions pressed on and forced the elements of the 30th Regiment to withdraw from the peak. Two hours after the loss of the crest, however, the 28th Regiment mounted a counterattack that swept the enemy off the hill. Having recaptured the hill, the 28th Regiment concentrated its effort on consolidating the position in anticipation of an
Battle of White Horse Hill
enemy counterattack.\footnote{137}

At dawn on 8 October with the hill shrouded by a dense fog, the enemy launched a fifth attack. As the attacks in the preceding days had not been successful, the enemy had assembled fresh troops from the reserve units. This time, the 334th Regiment, 112nd Division, CCF 38th Army, relieved the depleted Chinese forces around White Horse Hill.

The elements of the 28th Regiment were unable to resist effectively. Because of the heavy fog, they could not receive sufficient artillery and air support and lost the main peak of the hill at 08:10. Now the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Regiment moved up the hill at 17:00 delivering a counterattack which met with strong resistance. After eight hours of fierce struggle, the 3rd Battalion succeeded in recapturing the main peak of the hill at 23:05.

During the bloody battles which had swung back and forth five times up to that point, however, the ROK 28th and 30th Regiments suffered such a heavy loss of personnel that they had to be reorganized completely. It was judged from the enemy prisoners’ statement, on the other hand, that the enemy would continue its offensive for the time being. Thus, General Kim committed the attached 51st
Regiment to the defense of the division right front, placing the 29th Regiment in reserve to be used later for an attack on White Horse Hill.\textsuperscript{138}

A little after midnight on 8 October, the enemy resumed sending masses of infantry to take the objective. The human waves of the enemy troops kept surging upwards for three hours. In the end at 03:00, the main peak of the hill and a portion of the ridge to the right of the peak fell into the enemy’s hands one more time.

Early in the morning, the 9th Division called in 17,700 rounds of artillery fire on the crest of the hill occupied by the enemy. In addition, the tactical air force dropped bombs over enemy concentrations and positions. After this preparatory fire, the 29th Regiment mounted a nighttime counterattack against the enemy.\textsuperscript{139} Around midnight of the 10th, the 29th Regiment reported that it was again in possession of the main peak of the hill.

The enemy, however, was also determined not to give up White Horse Hill. Before daybreak of the 10th, the enemy forces began to crawl toward the peak like a swarm of ants. Both sides hurled numerous hand grenades, and bitter hand-to-hand fighting broke out at about 04:00. The 1st Battalion of the 29th Regiment resisted stubbornly, but was forced to withdraw to a nearby ridge. After being reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, however, the 1st Battalion mounted a timely counterattack against the lost peak and regained it at 06:30.\textsuperscript{140}

By nightfall on the 11th, however, the hill had fallen into the enemy’s hands once more. On the morning of the 12th, the 30th Regiment passed through the dug-in 29th Regiment and recaptured the hill, only to surrender it to an immediate enemy counterattack. Afterwards, the 28th Regiment moved up through the 30th Regiment and pressed the assault. The bitter hand-to-hand battle continued until 15 October when the 30th Regiment finally drove the enemy off the hill.\textsuperscript{141}

Subsequently, exploiting the victory of the 30th Regiment, the 29th Regiment attacked and captured the enemy outposts on Camel Back Hill north of
Hill 395. In a state of near collapse, the CCF 38th Army was thought to have disengaged its subordinate divisions one by one from the line. The French Battalion on Arrowhead Hill west of Hill 395, on the other hand, suffered a great many casualties. The French hung on to their position, however, interdicting the enemy threat to the left flank of Hill 395 and thus contributing a great deal to its defense by the 9th Division.

During the ten-day contest from 6 to 15 October, the ROK 9th Division was attacked twelve times by the CCF 38th Army. The enemy, however, failed to budge the 9th Division. Hill 395 had changed hands seven times before it finally fell under the control of the 9th Division. By the time these encounters were over, the shell-pocked surface of Hill 395 had been completely stripped off, with the bare hill suggesting the shape of a white horse lying down to rest. Thus, the proud name of White Horse Hill replaced Hill 395 and became the 9th Division’s nickname.

It was estimated that the CCF 38th Army had committed seven of its nine regiments to the White Horse battle and suffered close to 10,000 casualties, including war prisoners, as against the friendly losses of approximately 3,500 soldiers. Throughout the battle, the timely commitment of reserve troops by General Kim Jong Oh to both offense and defense operations sparked the fighting spirit of the 9th Division. Periodic rotation of units also kept troops at the front fresh and prevented battle losses from seriously affecting morale. In addition, the division was always backed up by outstanding fire support from artillery, armor, and air units. Thus, even during the periods of worst crisis, the officers and men of the 9th Division withstood the determined drive of the enemy and maintained their firm resolution to capture and hold the objective.\footnote{142}

In the final analysis, a combination of the factors mentioned thus far enabled the 9th Division to defend White Horse Hill to the last, frustrating the enemy’s strategic design to secure control of all of the Iron Triangle.
(2) Operation Showdown on Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill

On the right of the ROK 9th Division, which had successfully defended Ch’orwon, were the US 7th and ROK 2nd Divisions defending Kimhwa. The US 7th Infantry Division main line of resistance ranged from Jungga-san east of the Ch’orwon Plains to Hagam-ryong Pass north of Kimhwa. The ROK 2nd Division was in charge of the line ranging from Hagam-ryong Pass to a northeastward village, Haso-ri.

The two friendly divisions were opposed by the 45th Division, CCF 15th Army occupying Osong-san (1,062 m). The CCF 45th Division maintained its outposts on a hill mass that extended from Osong-san to Kimhwa. Among these outposts, those on Triangle Hill (598 m) west of Sanggam-ryong Pass and on Sniper Ridge (580 m) east of Sanggam-ryong were only 200 meters away from the US 7th and ROK 2nd Division outposts. Dominating the friendly positions, the enemy outposts threatened the defense of Kimhwa.

The offensive actions of the enemy had continued since the summer of 1952. In late September, indications that the enemy was seizing the initiative along the whole front became more apparent. Under these circumstances, it began to carry out preemptive strikes against the friendly outposts. The attack by the enemy on White Horse Hill in the western sector of the US IX Corps was a part of this offensive.

In order to take the initiative by small offensive actions which would put the enemy on the defensive and reverse the situation, General Van Fleet, the US 8th Army commander, planned a limited objective attack on the US IX Corps front. He recommended to General Clark the adoption of the IX Corps attack plan that was designed to improve the defense line north of Kimhwa.

If all went according to plan, two battalions, one from a UNC unit and the other from an ROK unit, would attack and capture the enemy outposts on
Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge in the vicinity of Osong-san, respectively. Counting on maximum IX Corps fire power and maximum close air support, the operation would take only five days. The operation was named Showdown since the UN Command was ‘showing its power’ by executing offensive operations. Showdown was to be carried out after General Clark approved the plan on 8 October, the same day the truce negotiation at P’anmunjom had broken off.\footnote{143}

The next day, the US IX Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Reubin E. Jenkins, issued a IX Corps operation order. According to the order, one battalion from the US 7th Infantry Division and another from the ROK 2nd Division would capture Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, respectively, and build up the defense against the enemy counterattack. General Jenkins urged his troops to make full preparations for Showdown.\footnote{144}

The ROK 2nd Division had been defending the Kimhwa area since it moved there and took the US 40th Infantry Division sector on 29 June 1952.\footnote{145} The ROK 2nd Division deployed the 32nd, 31st, and 17th Regiments on the main line of resistance organized along a series of ridges north of Namdae-ch’ön. The 32nd Regiment was positioned to the south of Sniper Ridge, and the 37th Light Infantry Regiment(Attached) was placed in reserve. The US 7th Division, on the other hand, organized its main line of resistance on a hill mass that extended southward from Sobang-san (717 m) and Osong-san (1,062 m) on the left and right sides of the Hant’an River. Compared with the enemy position, however, both divisions were at a topographical disadvantage. Opposing the friendly forces were the 44th and 45th Divisions, CCF 15th Army (commanded by Qin Qi Wei), one of the Chinese elite armies. Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge were defended by the CCF 135th and 133rd Regiments, CCF 45th Division, respectively.\footnote{146}

Sniper Ridge, located 500 meters from the ROK 2nd Division main line of resistance, extended from north to south for 500 meters and was about 580 meters high. The ridge consisted of the south peak (Peak A), the north peak (Peak
Y), and Rocky Ridge extending eastward.

Triangle Hill was a V-shaped hill mass with its apex (598 m) at the south. At the right end of the V, 800 meters northeastward from the apex, lay Jane Russell Hill, and on the left arm, 900 meters northwestward from the apex, was Pike's Peak. The resemblance of this V-shaped hill mass to a triangle led to the designation of the area as Triangle Hill. Between Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge was a pass called Sanggam-ryong.\textsuperscript{147}

At 05:00 on 14 October, the ROK 2nd Division and the US 7th Infantry Division launched an attack against Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill. Two hundred eighty guns and howitzers of the sixteen artillery battalions subordinate to the US IX Corps simultaneously opened preparatory fire. At the same time, UNC close air support began. Not only Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge but Osong-san behind them seemed to collapse all of a sudden as they were enveloped by the flashes of artillery fire and the air was rent by the cannons’ roar.\textsuperscript{148}

Because of the demands of the battle for White Horse Hill that broke out before Operation Showdown, however, much of the preparatory air strikes and artillery support had to be curtailed and shifted to the 9th Division front. Thus, Operation Showdown which was originally estimated to take only five days, was not expected to go as planned.

The 3rd Battalion, the reserve of the 32nd Regiment on the left front of the ROK 2nd Division, commanded by Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, advanced to Sniper Ridge. The 9th and 10th Companies were the attacking forces and the 11th Company served a supporting force in the rear. Passing through the enemy barrage, the attacking forces reached Maebong and Rocky Ridge around 06:00. There they met fierce enemy resistance, which they finally subdued. Peak Y, the main objective on Sniper Ridge, was captured at 15:20.

That night, however, the 3rd Battalion was counterattacked by the 133rd Regiment, CCF 45th Division. Suffering a great number of casualties after a bitter
Battle of Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge
hand-to-hand fight, the 3rd Battalion withdrew from the hill. By this time, ele-
ments of the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj.
Gen. Wayne C. Smith, had advanced to the outlying enemy trenches of Jane
Russell Hill and Hill 598. The attacking forces met stubborn enemy resistance,
however, and had to fall back to the main line of resistance. The Chinese troops
defending Sniper Ridge resisted fiercely, hurling countless hand grenades and
blasting the attackers with small arms, shaped charges, and torpedoes. Determined
to hang on to the hill at any cost, the enemy madly waged tunnel and trench war-
fare, disregarding the mixed shower of friendly and hostile shells.

Immediately after the attack by the 3rd Battalion failed, General Chung
Il Kwon ordered the 2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment, to recapture Sniper Ridge. On
15 October, the 2nd Battalion accomplished its mission, but an enemy counterat-
tack soon forced it to withdraw from the ridge. The next day, on 16 October, a
combined force of the 2nd Battalion, ROK 17th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion,
ROK 32nd Regiment, mounted a joint attack against the ridge and captured it.
They even repelled an enemy counterattack that followed. The combined force,
however, faced a series of tenacious counterattacks by the CCF 133rd and 134th
Regiments for three days before it lost Sniper Ridge again and withdrew to its
original position on 19 October.

The elements of the US 7th Infantry Division that attacked the Triangle
Hill complex captured its apex, Hill 598, on 16 October. Then, the Americans
advanced farther to Pike's Peak and after a fierce battle drove the enemy off the
peak. On the 19th, however, the enemy made a desperate counterattack and recap-
tured the peak.149

Not a day passed after 20 October without a fierce struggle between both
sides. In the meantime, the ROK 2nd Division did its utmost to hang on to Sniper
Ridge rotating its units at proper intervals. On the 23rd, the CCF 45th Division
attacked Triangle Hill from Pike's Peak. At this juncture, the 32nd Regiment of
the US 7th Infantry Division and the Ethiopian battalion attached to the 32nd frustrated the enemy attempt to approach the western slope of the hill occupied by the 32nd. This contributed a great deal to the defense of Triangle Hill.\textsuperscript{150}

On 25 October, the ROK 2nd Division took over the US 7th Infantry Division’s positions on Triangle Hill. Thus, the ROK 2nd Division was engaged in operations on both Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill simultaneously.\textsuperscript{151} To carry out its new missions, the 2nd Division moved its reserve, the 37th Light Infantry Regiment, to Oeya-dong east of the main line of resistance while committing the 31st Regiment defending Oeya-dong to the defense of Triangle Hill.

After taking over Triangle Hill, the 31st Regiment was embroiled in a bitter contest for the hill that swung back and forth several times. On 30 October, however, the 31st Regiment fell back from the hill in the face of a decisive large-scale enemy attack and withdrew to the Kyeung-san area south of Triangle Hill.

On the previous day, the CCF 45th Division had been relieved by the CCF 29th Division, which was committed to the battle for Sniper Ridge. As of 31 October, the US IX Corps attached the 30th Regiment of the ROK 9th Division to the ROK 2nd Division and assigned it the task of taking Triangle Hill. From 1 November on, the 30th Regiment mounted attacks on the hill time and again, only to fail and each time suffering numerous casualties.\textsuperscript{152}

As the casualty lists mounted, the corps commander, General Jenkins, ordered his units on 5 November to suspend further attacks on Triangle Hill. He felt that only the casualty lists had increased since the beginning of Operation Showdown. In addition, he feared that the security of Sniper Ridge would possibly be jeopardized.\textsuperscript{153}

Accordingly, the ROK 2nd Division concentrated its effort on the defense of Sniper Ridge while the enemy forces were also funneled to this area. Thus, the situation now took on a new aspect; the ultimate outcome of Operation Showdown would be decided by the battle for Sniper Ridge. For the time being,
however, both sides suspended full-scale offensive operations. Instead, they focused on routine patrolling and reconnaissance activities.

The action picked up on 11 November. The 17th Regiment holding Hill A was relieved and went into a reserve position while the 32nd Regiment was committed to the defense of Sniper Ridge. On the same day, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd received a large-scale attack by the enemy and lost Hill A. Several attempts to recapture the hill also ended in failure. According to information obtained later, the 31st Division, CCF 12th Army, had moved to Sniper Ridge on 9 November, after the battle for Triangle Hill was over, and joined in the CCF 29th Division.

As a series of counterattacks on Hill A failed, General Chung Il Kwon assigned the mission of defending the main line of resistance to the 32nd Regiment, committing the 17th Regiment to an attack mission. The 1st Battalion instantly launched an attack. With the supporting fire and manpower being concentrated on Hill A, the 1st Battalion fought determinedly. Making dashing assaults upon the enemy trenches for two hours, the 1st Battalion finally captured the hill and, following up the victory, attacked Rocky Ridge and took possession of it in one stroke.

It did not take the enemy long to counterattack. At 22:00 on the 13th, an enemy force of two battalions launched an attack on Hill A after heavy preparatory fires. The 1st Battalion of the 17th Regiment resisted desperately for an hour and a half. However, the defense line was breached around midnight, and the hostile and friendly troops could not be distinguished from each other in utter confusion. Soon, the defending troops got separated and had to withdraw from the hill.

The 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, immediately launched a counterattack on Hill A and captured it, but it failed to gain possession of Rocky Ridge because of tenacious enemy resistance. Then, the task of attacking Rocky Ridge was assigned to the 2nd Battalion. At 07:00 on 17 November, the 2nd Battalion
attacked Rocky Ridge with the support of the ROK 1st Field Artillery Group. The ridge was captured after a two-hour fierce battle. Thus, both Hill A and Rocky Ridge beside it finally came under complete control of the 17th Regiment.\footnote{157}

Afterwards, the ROK 2nd Division defended its position to the last against the enemy counterattacks that continued until 25 November. On that day, the 2nd Division was relieved by the 9th Division and placed in reserve for organizational refitting.\footnote{158} Now the 9th Division main line of resistance was firmly set up forward along the line connecting major hills on Sniper Ridge and the adjacent Rocky Ridge.

During the forty-two days of hard fighting on Sniper Ridge, the enemy suffered a heavy toll of lives with 3,772 killed, 11,023 estimated dead, and 72 taken prisoner. The CCF 45th and 31st Divisions withdrew to the rear of Osongsan for reorganization and maintenance. On 1 December, the CCF 29th Division handed over its combat mission for Sniper Ridge to the 34th Division, CCF 12th Army and went into reconstitution. The ROK 2nd Division, too, suffered a great many casualties with 1,096 killed, 3,496 wounded, and 97 missing.\footnote{159}

The battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge were the last offensive operations undertaken by the US 8th Army in 1952. According to the original plan of the operations, only two battalions, one from the US 7th Infantry Division and the other from the ROK 2nd Division, would successfully complete the mission in five days. It was a grave miscalculation, however. The battles drew in almost all elements of the US 7th and ROK 2nd Divisions and lasted 42 days.

The battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, indeed, were the biggest and bloodiest contests of the year. The CCF 15th Army that opposed the friendly forces was so determined to resist that the US IX Corps made no progress at all on Triangle Hill and gave it up in the end. Thus, after 42 days of bloody fighting, the friendly forces controlled the southern portion of Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill.\footnote{160}
Because of the victory on Sniper Ridge, however, the UNC and ROK Forces were able to secure advantageous outposts on the line, demoralizing the enemy, and again seizing the initiative along the whole front line. The victory also contributed a great deal to establishing a favorable political position in the truce talks.

3. Battles in the Vicinity of Kumsong-Ch’on

For more than a year after the truce negotiations first began, the talks hardly progressed at all as they were stranded on the issue of repatriating war prisoners. Meanwhile, the enemy continuously tried to deliver strong local attacks on the UNC Forces, hoping that military success would give it an advantage in the truce talks.

It was around this time that the ROK II Corps (commanded first by Lt. Gen. Paik Sun Yup and later, from 23 July on, by Lt. Gen. Yu Jae Hung) was reestablished in Hwach’on on 5 April 1952. The II Corps took over the US IX Corps sector ranging from Kumsong to the eastern vicinity of the Pukhan River. The ROK II Corps was reinforced by three units: the ROK 6th, Capital, and 3rd Divisions. The ROK II Corps main line of resistance was built up on a line passing through Ponghwa-san three kilometers south of Kumsong, Kyoam-san, Hill 663, Oun-ri east of the Pukhan River, Hill 949, Hill 973, and Tongson-kol. This line had been secured by the ROK forces mostly during the period of their limited objective attacks in the autumn of 1951.

The primary stress in the II Corps operational concept was laid on the complete control of Kumsong. To accomplish this, major hills along the main line of resistance had to be held. These hills dominated Roads 17 and 103 and the avenue of approach from Hill 949 to the Pukhan River. In case the enemy attacked, these roads and avenues would be blocked and the enemy would be
defeated well before its arrival at the main line of resistance. In no case would the II Corps retreat even an inch from the line.

Opposing the ROK II Corps were the CCF 12th Army and a part of the CCF 68th Army. The 12th Army, which had relieved the CCF 67th Army, deployed the CCF 31st Division in front of the ROK 6th Division north of Kumsong. The 35th Division, CCF 12th Army, was deployed along the Yulsa-ri (Hill 672)—Hill 747—Chwasu-dong (Hill 748) line north of the ROK Capital Division sector. The CCF 34th Division was placed in reserve in Ch’angdo-ri. The CCF 68th Army east of the 12th Army was in charge of the line between Oun-ri and Mundung-ri east of the Pukhan River, deploying the CCF 203rd Division in front of the ROK 3rd Division.

The two opponents faced each other in quiet state that had been maintained since the commitment of the ROK II Corps to the defense of the Kumsong area. In the meantime, both sides concentrated their efforts on consolidating positions and carrying out reconnaissance activities. On 10 June, however, the II Corps commander ordered his subordinate divisions to launch limited objective attacks aimed at reconnoitering the enemy movements, destroying his positions, and lowering enemy morale. Thus, action began to pick up again, over the strategic outposts in particular. Named ‘Back Shot’ operation, each of these attacks employed a unit not exceeding a battalion in strength. Back Shot was soon followed by the summer and fall offensives of the enemy.

Consequently in the second half of 1952, the whole II Corps front was drawn into a fierce contest for the outpost positions. Of all the battles in this period, the most bitter were fought for Capitol Hill which was the Capital Division outpost, Toksuri Hill (Eagle Hill: Hill 572) which was the 3rd Division outpost north of Hill 949, P’iui Hill (Bloody Hill: Hill 748), and Hills A and B on the 6th Division front two kilometers east of Kumsong.
(1) Battles for Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge

As of 16 June 1952, the ROK II Corps boundary was readjusted. Accordingly, the Capital Division as the central division of the II Corps established its main line of resistance along the line passing through Hill 765 east of Kyoam-san, Hill 610, Hill 663, and Oun-ri east of the Pukhan River. To the north of this line were the divisional outposts on Hill 575, Finger Ridge (extending northeastward for one kilometer from Hill 690), Capitol Hill (Hill 610 located 500 meters north of Hill 663), etc. The boundary line between the two forward units, the 1st and 26th Regiments, passed through Yoho Pass and Yomun-ri from north to south. The 1st Cavalry Regiment was placed in reserve.

Opposing the Capital Division was the 35th Division, CCF 12th Army, defending a series of strongpoints on Hill 572, Hill 495, Hill 594, Hill 747, Hill 714, Hill 748, and Hill 472. The CCF 35th Division was noted for its combat experiences and was especially capable in guerrilla warfare in the mountain areas. Most of the enemy positions were fortified caves, and it was estimated that the Chinese had laid up supplies for a month in the vicinity of the front line. In addition, an individual enemy soldier would receive combat rations for five to six days at a time so that he would be able to fight continuously for a given period of time without any resupply of food.1623

Under these circumstances, friendly and hostile forces were facing each other across a series of cross-compartmental valleys passing through Yulsa-ri, Ssangryong-dong, Yoho Pass, Chwasu-dong, and the Pukhan River. The enemy, however, maintained two advance outpost positions well beyond these valleys southward, one at the northern foot of Finger Ridge and the other on Hill 621 south of Yoho Pass. To the friendly forces, the former seemed to be a thorn sticking in the finger and the latter a dagger pointing at the throat.

Having received the order of Operation Back Shot, the Capital Division
commander, Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch’an, came up with a plan to eliminate the two most threatening enemy outposts. According to the plan, at 01:00 on 8 July, a battalion from the 1st Regiment would attack the northern foot of Finger Ridge, and a battalion from the 26th Regiment would strike Hill 621. At the end of June, the plan was approved by the corps commander.  

At 01:00 on 8 July after preparatory fire, the 2nd Battalion(-), 26th Regiment, launched an attack on Hill 621. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, was advancing toward the enemy outpost at the northern foot of Finger Ridge. While a misty, drizzling rain provided the attacking forces with favorable conditions for concealment, it also made it difficult to detect the enemy situation.

The 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd Platoon of the 7th Company leading the attack, crushed light enemy resistance and gained control of the 621 Hill crest for a while, only to fall back after an enemy counterattack from the northwest. Attacking the northern slope of Finger Ridge, on the other hand, the 3rd Battalion swept over three heights—Hill A, Hill B, and Hill C, consecutively, while the Division Artillery was silencing strongpoints of the enemy direct-firing guns. The 9th Company in the forefront of the attack, however, gave up Hill C. It had no time to organize its defense position before it received enemy artillery counterattacking fire coming from two directions.

At 21:00 the next day, the 11th and 10th Companies, occupying Hills A and B, were also counterattacked, and bitter hand-to-hand struggles broke out on both hills. The 3rd Battalion commander was determined to defend at least Hill A to the last. At dawn the next morning, however, he had no choice but to withdraw from the hill because of the overwhelming enemy forces.

After the limited objective attacks to capture the enemy outposts on Finger Ridge and Capitol Hill failed, a lack of combat on the front line continued to early August. At the end of July, the Capital Division placed the 1st Regiment
Battles in the vicinity of Kumsong-ch'ŏn

III. Ground Operations: Intensifying the Fight for Critical Hills 477
in reserve, consolidating the positions with the Cavalry and 26th Regiments deployed along the main line of resistance.

On the night of 5 August, the enemy broke the lull on the line and resumed the attack on Capitol Hill. At 20:00, the enemy laid preparatory fire concentration on the Capital Division main line of resistance. Then it opened up a route of attack by setting off the mines and napalm bombs laid in front of the friendly positions. At 23:30, as had been expected, a company-sized enemy force began to advance toward the northern slope of Capitol Hill.\textsuperscript{167}

The 11th Company, 26th Regiment, repulsed the enemy twice in front of the company position. The outpost platoon on Capitol Hill, however, could not stand the enemy artillery fire and withdrew to the company main position on Hill 663. Driving on without stop, the enemy pressed hard on Hill 663.\textsuperscript{168}

From 6 to 8 August, control of Capitol Hill seesawed back and forth several times. Brig. Gen. Lee Yong Moon, the division commander (position assumed on 9 July), determined that Capitol Hill was too close to the main line of resistance. Thus, he attached the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, to the 26th Regiment in order to reinforce the main positions. Capitol Hill was captured on the 6th. As the hill was lost to the enemy again on the 7th, the commander of the 26th Regiment committed the attached 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, to a counterattack on the hill and recaptured it.\textsuperscript{169} As outlined thus far, advance and retreat repeated on Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge until mid-August. Then the line came to a standstill as both sides broke off the attack.

On 6 September, the enemy resumed the offensive. At 19:00, after fierce preparatory fires that lasted ten minutes, an enemy company attacked Capitol Hill. Immediately following the attack, another enemy force estimated at a battalion made full-scale assaults from the valleys on the left and right sides of the hill.\textsuperscript{170}

The 5th Company, 26th Regiment, was determined to fight to the last. However, suffering a great deal of damage caused by the enemy artillery fire and
unable to overcome its inferiority in strength, the 5th Company gave up the hill. In the meantime, all of the 1st Platoon personnel including the platoon leader, 2nd Lieutenant Hong Ch’ang Won, lost their lives. A counterattack was made by the 10th Company at 20:50. The company attempted six times to regain possession of the hill, only to fail each time.\(^{71}\)

At this point, the mission of retaking the hill was assigned to the 1st Regiment. At 20:00 on 9 September, the 5th and 6th Companies under cover of close air support and corps artillery fire launched an attack against Capitol Hill. Three hours later, the hill was captured. Afterwards, the enemy sought to fight its way back to the hill top, but the 1st Regiment refused to be dislodged again.\(^{72}\)

On Finger Ridge, the ROK Cavalry Regiment was also embroiled in another bitter struggle. At 18:40 on 6 September, the same day the enemy launched an attack on Capitol Hill, intense enemy preparatory fires fell on Finger Ridge, occupied by the 5th Company, and on Hill 575, defended by the 6th Company. Both Finger Ridge and Hill 575 were soon attacked by enemy companies. The position of the outpost platoon on Finger Ridge was overrun by the enemy at 21:05, and only several survivors of the platoon returned alive to the main position.\(^{73}\)

Within half an hour, the Cavalry Regiment struck back but had to withdraw as the enemy on Finger Ridge increased its defending forces. The regiment counterattacked five more times in vain. At 03:35 on 14 September, however, the 9th and 10th Companies finally succeeded in retaking the ridge after mounting seven more counterattacks on the enemy. Afterwards, until 20 September, the Cavalry Regiment drove back the enemy counterattacks several times and defended the position to the death. During the two-week bitter fighting that began on 6 September, the enemy suffered a great loss with 2,406 killed as against 455 killed, 1,419 wounded, and 61 missing for the Cavalry Regiment.\(^{74}\)

The enemy attacked Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge one more time on 6
October. The attack lasted four days before it was finally repulsed at. The Cavalry Regiment lost Hill 575 on the 8th, however, and could not regain it. Thereafter, the Capital Division shifted its operational objective from offensive to defensive, concentrating its effort on reinforcing the defensive positions and strengthening its security.\textsuperscript{175}

In sum, fighting bitterly for four months with the CCF 35th Division, the ROK Capital Division held on to Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge but lost Hill 575. Following the ROK II Corps order No. 42 dated 25 October, the Capital Division handed over its main line of resistance to the 8th Division and assumed the position of the US 8th Army reserve. The CCF 35th Division, on the other hand, won Hill 575. However, its strength was depleted to a half after it failed in the two operations for Finger Ridge and Capitol Hill. In late October, the CCF 35th Division handed over its mission to a subordinate division of the CCF 67th Army.\textsuperscript{176}

On 11-12 June when the Capital Division was struggling bitterly for Finger Ridge and Capitol Hill, the adjacent 2nd Regiment (commanded by Colonel Song Dae Hoo) of the 6th Division (under the command of Brig. Gen. Paik In Yup) captured two CCF 31st Division outposts, Hill A and Hill B, 2.5 kilometers and 2 kilometers east of Kumsong, respectively. The 6th Division established two general outposts on these two anonymous hills. When the enemy was controlling Hills A and B, it was also able to control the area east of Kumsong and Road 17, both of which were dominated by the two hills. In addition, the hills would be a stepping stone for later offensive operations by the enemy. As the hills were taken by the 6th Division, however, the enemy was unable to control Kumsong completely as it could not transport personnel and materiel safely from its rear area to Kumsong by way of Road 17. With secure of the two hills, the 6th Division could extend the depth of its security zone.

Afterwards, the enemy counterattacked several times, attempting to
II. Ground Operations: Intensifying the Fight for Critical Hills

retake the two hills. The 6th Division firmly held on, however, and continued to secure the two general outposts established there.

(2) Battles for Toksuri Hill and P’iui Hill

To the right of the ROK Capital Division was the ROK 3rd Division defending the areas east of the Pukhan River: Oun-ri, Songjong, and T’ongson-kol. The 3rd Division main line of resistance passed through Hills 440, 949, 973, and 780. Beyond these hills, a number of divisional outposts were set up.

By the time the enemy began to launch a fall offensive in September 1952, the 3rd Division was employing the 22nd Regiment on the left front and the 23rd Regiment on the right, holding the 18th Regiment in reserve. The 22nd Regiment was defending the area east of the Pukhan River. This area was the central region of the divisional defense sector including Hill 949, which was considered to be the main objective of the enemy attack. In order to give an early warning against enemy attack and check its advance to Hill 949 and other areas east of the Pukhan River, the regiment maintained two outposts far enough to the north on Hill 572 (Toksuri Hill: hill of eagle) in Oun-ri and on Hill 748 (P’iui Hill: hill of blood) north of Hill 949. In case the two outposts were attacked, the 18th Regiment would be committed to a counterattack supported by eighteen 155-mm. howitzers, plus eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, which would lay fire on the two outposts.\(^{177}\)

As September set in, the enemy’s scheme of attack began to be detected. Meanwhile, the neighboring Capital Division west of the upper stream of the Pukhan River was involved in a fierce struggle for Capitol Hill. With the situation on the adjacent front line growing increasingly urgent, the battle clouds began to hang over the 3rd Division front. Thus, the 22nd Regiment defending Hill 949 consolidated the position while concentrating its effort on reconnaissance activi-
ties to detect the enemy next movements.

Opposing the ROK 3rd Division was the 203rd Division, CCF 68th Army, whose main positions were built up on the cross-compartmental ridge and hill mass north of the Oun-ri–Songjong-Am-dong line. The enemy outposts were placed very close to the friendly outpost line.

The enemy had been preparing for an attack against Hill 949 in the central part of the 3rd Division main position. If the enemy could capture this hill, it would provide favorable conditions for its later offensive. Before taking Hill 949, however, it was essential for the enemy to take Toksuri Hill and P’iuii Hill first, because these two hills stood in route of approach to Hill 949. Thus, the enemy plan of fire support, with seventy-seven guns including thirty-five 122-mm. and 105-mm. grenade-launching howitzers, was focused on the two outpost hills.\(^{178}\)

At 22:00 on 28 September, the enemy opened the attack with a signal of six rounds of red smoke shells. The CCF 203rd Division laid unusually intense artillery fire concentrations on the 7th Company (defending Toksuri Hill) and the 2nd Company (defending P’iuii Hill) as well as on the divisional main line of resistance. In an instant, all communication networks between the 7th and 2nd Companies and the battalion headquarters were cut off and paralyzed by the enemy artillery fire.\(^{179}\)

Losing no time, an enemy infantry battalion attacked Toksuri Hill while another battalion struck P’iuii Hill. Having expected the enemy attack, the 7th and 2nd Companies boldly lured the attackers up to 30 meters before the company positions and hung on tenaciously. As the fighting progressed, however, the situation began to go against the defenders, and the regimental commander hastily committed the 6th Company to Toksuri Hill and the 1st Company to P’iuii Hill.\(^{180}\)

The progress of the battle for the outposts became intense after midnight on the 28th. It was estimated that the enemy had intended to commit the main force of the CCF 203rd Division to a frontal attack on the ROK 22nd Regiment. If
the enemy could capture the dominant hill mass including Hill 949 on the friendly main line of resistance, it would then gain complete control of the upper Pukhan River valley.

At dawn on the 29th, the 7th Company defending Toksuri Hill was reinforced by the 6th Company and stubbornly resisted the enemy attack. However, the enemy pressure became more intense moment by moment and, in the end, the 7th Company had to withdraw to the south of the hill. The 2nd Company astride P’iuii Hill was reinforced by the 1st Company at 06:15. The 2nd Company hung on until enemy reinforcements enveloped the left flank of P’iuii Hill and forced the 2nd Company to give up the hill.\textsuperscript{181}

At this juncture, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Paik Nam Kwon, was determined to check the enemy advance before the outpost defense line. He ordered the 18th Regiment, which had been standing by, to launch a counterattack. At 05:00, the 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment, began to move toward Toksuri Hill while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were advancing to P’iuii Hill. Judging that a corner of the corps main line of resistance was in critical condition, the corps commander committed a tank platoon from the 52nd Tank Company, attached to the 6th Division, to the defense of the 22nd Regiment main line of resistance at 12:00 on the 29th.

The 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment, managed to advance almost to the top of Toksuri Hill. However, because of a fierce enemy defensive barrage which did not even discriminate between the hostile and friendly forces, the 1st Battalion could not move further and suffered numerous casualties. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion also bogged down on the southwest slope of Hill 748. A UNC F-86 fighter-bomber formation struck the enemy assembly area with napalm bombs and machine gun fire. But, despite the friendly forces’ massive interdiction fires, the enemy continued to increase the defending forces on the rear slope of the hill.\textsuperscript{182}

Thus, the division commander decided to deepen his defense zone in
front of the main line of resistance while massing the troops of counterattack on Hill 748. He ordered the 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment, which was counterattacking Hill 572 to shift its attack to Hill 748. At the same time, he designated the 3rd Battalion, which had been in a stand-by posture, as the main force that would counterattack Hill 748.

At 01:00 on 1 October, the 2nd Battalion, 18th Regiment, passed through the enemy artillery concentration and advanced to 80% up the Hill 748. There, they kept pushing on, and within 40 meters of the enemy position, made a concerted final assault and captured the peak. The possession of the peak was only momentary, however. An enemy counterattack followed immediately and the 2nd Battalion had to withdraw from the hill.

Then, the elements of the 3rd Battalion making up the main force launched another counterattack to recapture the hill. They advanced to 80% up the hill again, suppressing the enemy defense fire coming from both of its flanks. The resistance was so tenacious, however, that the attack was bogged down and the attackers withdrew to the ridges south and east of Hill 748.183)

As the counterattack by the 18th Regiment had failed, the division commander designated the 3rd Battalion, 18th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 22nd Regiment, as the main force and committed them to another counterattack. The 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment, was placed in reserve and was ordered to follow the attack which was to be launched at dawn the following day.184)

The counterattack of the 3rd battalion, 18th Regiment that began at 04:00 on 2 October failed again. Then, at 17:20, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Regiment, advanced forward passing through the 3rd Battalion’s forward edge of battle area. Each company of the 1st Battalion braved death under enemy fire concentration and closed in upon the enemy position within a distance of hand-grenade range.185)

Elements of the 1st Battalion made a concerted final assault upon the enemy position, neutralizing the strongpoints of its automatic weapons with hand
grenades. The battalion commander believed that previous counterattacks had failed partly because they had not destroyed the bunkers with enemy automatic weapons. Thus, before launching a final assault upon the enemy position, he organized a task force of a platoon, which advanced to a place fifty meters within the enemy position and destroyed its strongpoints.

Then the 1st Battalion made a final assault and captured the main peak of Hill 748 at 19:45. After the hill was captured, the division commander reinforced the 1st Battalion, 22nd Regiment, with the 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment in reserve. The enemy returned to the hill and attacked it several times. However, under cover of strong fire support, the two battalions stubbornly fought off the enemy and held the hill.\(^{185}\)

During the five-day battle for the two outposts, the enemy suffered a heavy toll of casualties, 664 killed and 161 estimated dead as opposed to 109 killed and 384 wounded for the ROK 3rd Division. However, the 3rd Division gave up Hill 572 in the early stage of the five-day battle although it finally gained possession of Hill 748.\(^{187}\) Situated at the end of a ridge occupied by the enemy, the conditions at Hill 572 were unfavorable for the friendly forces in terms of supply and reinforcement. Additionally, the hill was not of great tactical importance to the defense of the 3rd Division. The loss of the hill, however, would affect the UNC position at the truce talks and the demarcation of the boundary between the both sides at the time of the ceasefire.\(^{188}\)

4. Melee between the Valleys of the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers

In the summer of 1952, the US X Corps front ranged from T'ongson-kol east of the Pukhan River to the Soyang River valley. Included in the X Corps main line of resistance were Hill 1090, Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 812, and Hill 854, where fierce battles had broken out many times before. The X Corps deployed the ROK
7th Division on the left front, the US 25th Infantry Division in the center, and the ROK 8th Division on the right front. On 18 July, the US 45th Infantry Division (with the Philippine battalion attached), US I Corps, was attached to the US X Corps and was placed in reserve temporarily in the vicinity of Yanggu. Then on 25 September, the US 45th Infantry Division relieved the ROK 8th Division on the right front of the X Corps.\textsuperscript{109}

Meanwhile, shortly before it was relieved by the US 45th Infantry Division, the ROK 8th Division repulsed the Chinese forces that attacked the division outposts on Hills 812 and 854. Again on 25 December, a little before the US 45th Infantry Division was relieved by the newly organized ROK 12th Division, the North Korean forces attempted in vain to attack and penetrate into 45th Division front.

At the center of the X Corps front, the US 25th Infantry Division was relieved by the US 40th Infantry Division, which in November had defeated the NK forces that attacked Hill 851 at the northernmost tip of Heartbreak Ridge. The ROK 7th Division defending the left front of the X Corps, on the other hand, was attacked by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Hill 1090 in mid-October and lost Christmas Hill. As on other parts of the front line, however, the X Corps’ main position on the whole remained as before with no conspicuous changes.

\textbf{(1) Battles in the Vicinity of Hill 1090}

The ROK 7th Division was defending the left front of the US X Corps ranging from T’ongson-kol east of the Pukhan River to Hill 1220 and Nae-dong. Since the bitter fighting in the vicinity of Hill 1090 in mid-February 1952, the division had been concentrating its efforts on search and reconnaissance. In mid-July, the division was assigned supplementary recruits and equipment in accordance with an ROK Army reorganization program. When the reorganization was
Battle of Hill 1090
completed, the 7th Division consisted mainly of combat units, deploying the 3rd Regiment on the left front, the 8th Regiment on the right, and the 5th Regiment in a reserve position. Hill 1090 (north) was defended by the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment.\footnote{90}

Expecting that the enemy would resume his attack on Hill 1090 before long, the 3rd Regiment concentrated its effort on building strong outpost positions and laying mines in front of them. Equipment and supplies of the regiment were satisfactory and troop morale was high.

Opposite the 3rd Regiment was the 202nd Division, CCF 68th Army, defending its main line of resistance along Hills 890, 918, 1218, 984, and Oun-san (1277 m), with the last one being the principal axis of the enemy defense position. Directly to the north of Hill 1090 was deployed the CCF 604th Regiment looking out for an opportunity to attack in their fall offensive.\footnote{91}

The operational areas of both sides consisted of rugged mountain ranges between the Pukhan River and Suip-ch’on. These areas formed a corridor starting at Oun-san in the north and extending to Hill 1220 in the south. The corridor was divided into north and south by a large valley stretching over Solgunemi, Pau-kol, and Nae-dong. The two sides were facing each other across this valley. Hill 1090 (North) was a spur jutting out toward the north from the middle of the ridge divided into two by the valley.\footnote{92}

With the approach of darkness on 6 October, a fierce battle broke out as the CCF 604th Regiment, opposing the ROK 3rd Regiment, mounted a surprise attack on the outpost of the 9th Company. After intense preparatory fire, the enemy captured Christmas Hill 300 meters north of Hill 1090 at 22:00 and rushed to Hill 1090 along its narrow approach on the ridge.\footnote{93}

The 9th Company lured the enemy within very close range of the company position and repelled it with napalm mines and hand grenades. The battalion commander judged that the enemy intention was not to take a full-scale offensive
but to win possession of Christmas Hill, so he ordered the 11th Company in reserve to reinforce the 9th Company and requested artillery fire support.

Before dawn the next day, the enemy resumed its attack in a dense fog. Probably because the avenue of approach to Hill 1090 was very narrow, the attacking forces approached the 9th Company position in single file, with the leading platoon being followed by another. The 16th Field Artillery Battalion laid down a heavy barrage on the approaching enemy while the 9th Company was focusing all of its fire power on the attackers. The enemy was checked and repulsed in front of Hill 1090 (North).

Having watched the progress of battle carefully, the battalion commander committed the 11th Company to a counterattack on Christmas Hill. The attack failed, however, because of numerical inferiority and geographical disadvantage. Hereupon, the regimental commander decided to concentrate his efforts on holding Hill 1090. He anticipated that the enemy would try to weaken the elements of the 3rd Regiment one by one first and then capture Hill 1090, the principal axis of the regimental defense position.

At 20:00 on the 13th, intense enemy preparatory fire fell on Hill 1090 and its vicinity. Then, under cover of violent artillery fire support, a battalion-sized enemy force made a frontal attack on the 3rd Battalion. By this time, the 10th Company, astride the main peak of Hill 1090, and the 9th Company, deployed on a ridge north of the main peak, were reinforcing their positions.

The 3rd Battalion instantly reacted to the enemy attack by pouring heavy fire in front of its position. Forcing its way through the defensive fire net, however, the enemy approached the left flank of the 9th Company. Soon, a hand-grenade battle broke out, and final defensive fires were requested. In the end, around 00:10, the 9th Company, supported by the artillery and reinforcing fire of the 11th Company, beat off the continuous and persistent enemy assaults. At this juncture, the division artillery laid fire concentration on the scattered enemy troops retreat-
ing toward Hill 1277.\textsuperscript{196}

By succeeding in the defense of Hill 1090 (North), a point of tactical importance to the regimental main position, the 3rd Regiment was able to securely hold the barrier to the defense of the divisional main line of resistance. After the battle was over, the 7th Division further reinforced Hill 1090 and other outposts by setting barbed-wire entanglements and laying antipersonnel and napalm mines.\textsuperscript{197}

(2) Battles for Hill 854 and Hill 812

In September 1952, exactly a year after it fought for Hill 854, the ROK 8th Division was attacked once again by the North Korean forces. While mopping up the Communist guerrillas in Chonju district after the battle for Paeksok-san, the division had been attached to the US X Corps on the front line in March 1952. Then the division took over the responsibility of the US 1st Marine Division on the right front of the X Corps and began to defend Hills 854 and 812 north of Nojonp’yon.\textsuperscript{198}

Afterwards, up until August 1952, the 8th Division carried out small-scale scoutings and reconnaissance to detect the enemy situation. Meanwhile, under cover of close air support from the US 5th Air Force and bombardment of naval guns of the US 7th Fleet, the 8th Division artillery continued its fire support discharging a daily average of 1,000 rounds.

The 8th Division sector of operation was divided into two by the Soyang River, which branched off into the shape of a ‘Y’ near Hwanggi. The hostile and friendly forces were facing each other across these two river branches. Flowing northeastward in the eastern half of the division sector was the Nam River, which provided the division with advantageous terrain for defense. In the upper Soyang River valley, however, the enemy was occupying a ridge starting at Mu-san (1320
m) and Kanmu-bong and extending toward the 8th Division defense sector. The ridge dominated the forward zone of the division sector and the main supply route passing through Ch’olmi-dong, Sohwa, and Inje. This geographical configuration was unfavorable for the defense of the 8th Division.

Making use of the terrain, the NK 45th Division opposite the ROK 8th
Division set up its main line of resistance along the Hill 1052-Hill 802 line. Also taking advantage of the lull on the line during the truce talk period, the enemy further reinforced its positions. An intelligence report on the enemy situation predicted that it might launch a large-scale offensive in mid-September. In that case, its primary objectives would be Hills 854 and 812.  

Brig. Gen. Kim Ik Lyul, the commander of the ROK 8th Division, deployed the 16th and 10th Regiments on the main line of resistance while placing the 21st Regiment in reserve. General Kim was particularly concerned to further strengthen the defense position continuously. By September, as a result, the 8th Division defense position had been conspicuously reinforced.

The North Korean forces launched their attack at 18:00 on 21 September, just a day before the 8th Division handed over its defensive responsibilities to the US 45th Infantry Division, the US X Corps reserve. Possibly, the enemy chose the date of 21 September as D-Day to exploit the vulnerability of a change-of-position period.

After three hours of preparatory fire, two enemy battalions assaulted upon Hill 812 at 21:10. Later at 22:40, an enemy regiment attacked nearby Hill 854. The 8th Division staff analyzed the difference of the time the enemy launched the two separate attacks and the strength of force it employed for each attack. The analysis led to the conclusion that the enemy was concentrating its main effort on Hill 854 while mounting a feint attack on Hill 812.

The 1st Battalion on the left front of the 10th Regiment deployed the 2nd Company on Hill 854 in the center, the 3rd Company on Hill 705 on the right, and the 1st Company and the regimental reconnaissance company (-) on the left. The Chinese forces massed for a series of frontal attacks on the 2nd Company. The bloody battle had lasted three hours by the time the 1st Battalion received an emergency order to withdraw from the crest of Hill 854. The battalion hastily set up its position on a ridge southeast of the crest.
As a part of a secondary attack, the enemy committed two companies to attack the 3rd Company on Hill 705. The enemy infiltrated the friendly defense zone by following a valley which was the boundary of the 3rd and 2nd Companies. A bitter struggle continued until midnight, and then fierce hand-to-hand combat broke out. The 3rd Company fought fiercely before it finally took back the penetrated portion of the defense position and drove the enemy off the hill completely.

The enemy opposite the 16th Regiment, launched an attack against the 1st Battalion on Hill 812 at 22:10, half an hour before the attack on Hill 854 began. First, the enemy committed a battalion, which was soon followed by two more battalions. The enemy did not seem to intend to break the 1st Battalion defense line, however. Rather, it appeared to entice the supporting fire of the division to Hill 812 so as to make it easier to forward its main effort to Hill 854.

Based on the enemy situation and terrain around Hill 812, however, artillery concentrations had already been planned along the anticipated enemy approaches to the hill. As planned, interdiction fires were laid on those hill approaches. In addition, a platoon from the US 254th Tank Battalion and gunfire from the US 7th Fleet on the East Coast reinforced the artillery fire on the enemy attacking Hill 812.

Around this time, the 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment, fell back in front of the enemy and lost Hill 854 at 03:30 on 22 September. The 1st Battalion was immediately given massive protective fire support from its own heavy weapons company, a tank platoon, and a 4.2-inch mortar company from the US 2nd Mortar Battalion. This counterattacking fire frustrated the enemy intention to enlarge the breakthrough made by a victory over Hill 854. Having received a determined pincher attack and concentration of fire by the friendly forces, the enemy was forced at last to fall back to a hastily organized position on the hill.

As the enemy attempt to enlarge the breakthrough was blocked, the 2nd
Battalion, 10th Regiment, made a counterattack, with close air support and gun fire from the US 7th Fleet putting up a covering barrage on the northern slope of Hill 854. For half an hour before the counterattack was launched, large-scale preparatory fire was poured on the enemy by seven supporting artillery battalions including the US 145th Artillery Battalion, the US 245th Tank Battalion, and fighter-bombers of the US 5th Air Force and warships of the 7th Fleet. 205)

The 2nd Battalion, which left the line of departure, had to climb a cliff of the objective hill. Despite such unfavorable terrain conditions, the 2nd Battalion kept on chasing the fleeing enemy and exploiting the success. When the reconquest of the hill was completed, the battalion reorganized the defense of the hill in preparation for the enemy counterattack. 206)

Elements of the US 7th Fleet on the East Coast and the US X Corps Artillery concentrated their entire fire power on the attack against Hill 854. This enabled the ROK 8th Division to minimize its loss and damage in capturing the objective. Afterwards, on 25 September, the 8th Division handed over responsibility for the defense sector to the US 45th Infantry Division and went into unit training and refitting. 207)

5. Scramble for the South Shore of the Nam River

The ROK 5th Division was attached to the ROK I Corps in early January 1952. Since that time, the I Corps main position south of the Nam River had been defended by the 11th and 5th Divisions, which were opposed by the 47th and 9th Divisions, NK I Corps. The ROK 11th Division was in charge of the Sach’on-ri-Hill 554 line along the Nam River on the left front of the ROK I Corps. Meanwhile, the ROK 5th Division was defending the Hill 554-Kamho line on the right front of the I Corps south of Kosong.

By and large, a lull was maintained on the 11th Division front because
the Nam River flowed across this area as a natural obstacle between the two sides. The enemy opposite the 5th Division, however, was occupying Wolbi-san south of Kosong, watching for a chance to attack the division main line of resistance as well as its outposts such as Hill 351 south of Wolbi-san.

On 27 May, the 27th Regiment ceased to be an ROK Army reserve and returned to the 5th Division commanded by Brig. Gen. Chang Ch’ang Kook. In early July, General Chang relocated his units. He deployed the 36th Regiment on the left front and the 35th Regiment on the right. The 27th Regiment was reserved. In order to strengthen the defense power of the outpost, the 35th Regiment deployed two battalions, the 1st and 3rd, on Hill 351 while placing the 2nd Battalion only on the main line of resistance. The 5th Division was superior in fire power to the enemy since it would be supported by its own organic artillery battalion and heavy mortar company, ROK I Corps Artillery, the US 7th Fleet, and the US 5th Air Force.

As for the enemy, the NK 9th Division deployed the 86th Regiment in front of the ROK 35th Regiment while the NK 47th Division disposed the 2nd Regiment in front of the ROK 36th Regiment. The enemy regiments frequently carried out small-scale patrols and reconnaissance, gradually increasing the amount of supplies transported to the front. These and other enemy activities were signs that it would soon launch an offensive operation.

The operational area of the ROK I Corps jutted out northward along the east coast to Kosong. The I Corps main line of resistance, however, was set up along a series of ridges ranging from Hill 351 in the north to Hill 554 in the south. The I Corps defense line was also protected by the Nam River flowing between the two sides. Thus, the overall geographical condition of the area was favorable for the defense of the I Corps.

The enemy position, on the other hand, was taken up with the Nam River south of Kosong flowing behind the troops. However, the enemy enjoyed
the local advantage of observation since it was holding Wolbi-san, which dominated the friendly areas.

Except for some rainfall, the weather was clear on the whole throughout the period of the battle. However, the dense morning fog peculiar to the east coast area often made observation impossible. The fog provided a condition favorable for surprise attacks but unfavorable for artillery and air support.

Before attacking Hill 351, elite troops selected from the 86th Regiment, NK 9th Division, received special training for a long period. On 6 July, the special troops passed through Wolbi-san and established their positions on a hill between Wolbi-san and Hill 351. For three days, assisted by a patrol party and an engineer unit, they intensified reconnaissance activities, removing mines and obstacles between Hill 351 and the hill.  

At 22:00 on 10 July, after a large-scale preparatory fire concentration, the special elite assault force of battalion size from the NK 86th Regiment launched an attack against the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, on Hill 351. The enemy enveloped the 9th Company by surprise and penetrated a portion of the company position.

The next day, the 5th Division commander attached the division reconnaissance company and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, to the 35th Regiment. He ordered the commander of the 35th Regiment to counterattack at once with a battalion. The 35th Regiment committed the attached 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, to the main line of resistance. At 14:15 on 11 July, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment on there took roundabout routes in two directions, east and west, along the ridges of Hill 351 and advanced to the enemy position passing through its defensive barrage. The attack failed, however, because of the concentration of enemy automatic weapons fire and other flanking fires against the battalion. Several additional attacks by the 3rd Battalion that immediately followed met the same fate.
Battle of Hills 351
The next day, the division commander ordered the reserve 27th Regiment to relieve the 35th Regiment and recapture the objective. The 27th, however, could not break through the enemy fire barrage, either. Despite the attacks which were resumed five times, the 27th made no progress at all, and suffered a great many casualties.\textsuperscript{212)\\nMaking allowances for the condition of the 27th Regiment, the division commander assigned the attack mission again to the 35th Regiment. Acutely feeling the responsibility for having lost Hill 351 on the previous day, the regimental commander was determined to recapture the hill. At 20:30 on 13 July, he committed the 2nd Battalion to a counterattack on Hill 351.\textsuperscript{213)\\nBefore launching a counterattack, the 35th Regiment made a demonstration to deceive the enemy. From 20:00 hours on, ten motortrucks repeatedly went to and from the foot of Hill 351. The trucks went to the hill with their headlights on and returned with the lights off. The purpose of this truck demonstration was to discourage the enemy by hinting that there would be a large-scale attack on the hill. At the same time, it was hoped that the enemy would mistake the truck movement for a sign that the 35th Regiment was now preparing for an attack to be launched somewhat later in the early dawn.\textsuperscript{214)\\nThe 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion would take a roundabout route to the east and make an assault on the eastern flank of the enemy. The 7th Company was committed to the western hill slope and would arrive at the line of departure by 22:00. The 6th Company would advance in the center to the enemy position following the attacks made by the other two companies. Before and after the attack began, fighter-bombers from the US 5th Air Force swooped over the hill, pounding enemy supply routes. Meanwhile, warships of the US 7th Fleet raised the morale of the 2nd Battalion men by continuously bombarding the hill crest from stations in the Eastern Sea.\textsuperscript{215)\\nUnder cover of night, the 5th Company kept advancing along the eastern
ridge of the hill. Having a gentle grade, this ridge had been thought to be an easy route to follow to the final assault line. On the contrary, however, the ridge turned out to be a very difficult route because of the craters made by air attacks and artillery fires in the previous battles. Moreover, the area between the final assault line and the enemy position had a steep grade. Therefore, even if an attack was to be made at night, it was inevitable that it would be slow and open to enemy artillery fire.

Taking account of the unfavorable terrain, the 5th Company committed a special task force to neutralize the enemy machine gun position first. Then a full-scale attack followed. Having seized the eastern side of Hill 351 completely at 23:30, the 5th Company followed up the victory. They chased the enemy and dashed toward the hill crest.²¹⁶)

The 7th Company on the left front followed the western ridge of the hill. Unlike the eastern ridge, the western ridge had a steep grade. In some places, there were even inaccessible precipices. Antipersonnel mines and machine guns on the avenues of approach also made the advance of the attackers more difficult. Thus, the company commander placed experienced veteran soldiers at the head of the troops and had them lead the way for the company.

By the time the 7th Company was ready for a final assault after climbing a steep cliff, the 5th Company on the other side of the hill had already launched a final assault roaring a battle cry. The 7th Company, too, launched an assault at once. Having lost the will to fight, the enemy also lost the main peak of the hill as it was crushed between the 5th and 7th Companies.²¹⁷)

The bitter three-day battle for Hill 351 was indeed a struggle that literally dyed the hill with blood. During the battle, the enemy suffered a heavy toll of casualties with 445 killed as against 68 killed and 467 wounded for the ROK 5th Division. After retaking the hill, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, committed an engineer company to fixing positions and communication trenches and laying
mines and barbed wire entanglements.

Afterwards, the 5th Division repulsed a couple of small-scale enemy attacks before it received a full-scale attack and withdrew from the hill on 9 November. The 5th Division, however, did not let the enemy take time to reorganize the defense of the retaken hill. A resolute counterattack was made immediately and the hill came under the control of the 5th Division once again.218)

IV. Air and Naval Pressure Operations

With the launching of Operation Creeper in the second half of 1951, the UNC Forces began limited objective attacks on the ground. Inaugurated at the same time was an air interdiction program which emphasized attacking enemy lines of communications. Later, this rear area interdiction underwent a change of name from Strangle to Saturate and continued until the first half of 1952.

Under these circumstances, the UN Command offered a ‘package proposal’ in April 1952 in order to reach an early agreement on a cease fire. Yet the positions taken by the two sides over the matter of war prisoners as the main issue of the truce talks were so far apart that it was impossible to reach an agreement.

At this juncture, there was a noteworthy change in the UNC air-combat operations policy. Repeated and intensified air blows on decisive strategic objectives in North Korea were to be maintained to influence the Communists to agree to a truce. “The only way to give maximum military pressure at a minimum sacrifice,” said General Clark, “is air power.”219)

General Otto P. Weyland, the commander of the US Far East Air Forces, also said that there had been a significant shift in the combat operations policy. “The scope of the interdiction operations,” explained General Weyland, “was broadened so as to include the destruction of both principal and complex targets as
well as target systems."  It was a change of policy at a strategic level.

In the second half of 1952, the UNC Air Force established a new concept of the air pressure operation in order to carry out a decisive role in attaining military objectives. This concept differed from those of the air tactics and strategies employed during World War II. The objectives of the air pressure suggested by the US Far East Air Forces were as follows:

(1) To maintain air supremacy by waging antiaircraft operations and destroying enemy air fields.

(2) To destroy or damage enemy supplies, equipment, facilities, and personnel.

(3) To delay the transportation of enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel.

(4) To provide close air support for the ground forces.

The new air pressure concept had as its main purposes maintaining air supremacy, forcing the enemy to suffer maximum losses, and weakening enemy threats on the friendly ground forces. In other words, continuous air strikes against enemy supplies, equipment, facilities, and personnel would force it to pay a great price for its war effort. It was also hoped that attacking the same targets every day would exact a psychological toll on the enemy.

Based on the new air strategy, the UN Command planned a combined operation of navy, air force, and Marine aircraft groups for large-scale attacks on the power plants in North Korea. The air strikes on North Korean power plants initiated on 23 June 1952 were the largest ones conducted since the outbreak of the war. A combined special task force organized by over 500 aircraft from the US 5th Air Force, 7th Fleet, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing launched attacks on the hydroelectric power plants of the Suiho, Pujon, Ch’angjin, and Hoch’on
Reservoirs. This large-scale air operation attacking the four power plants at the same time was the first to mobilize the entirety of the air strength available in Korea.

In the Suiho attack on the 23rd, over 180 Sabrejets (F-86s) from the US 4th and 52nd Fighter-Interceptor Air Wings patrolled the air corridor of MiG jet fighters in order to provide overhead cover for the bombers. In addition, Panther jet fighters (F-9Fs) from the carriers Princeton, Philippine Sea, and Boxer (the flagship of the US 7th Fleet) hit the enemy antiaircraft gun positions along the shore of the Yalu River.

At the same time, about seventy-two Navy dive bombers (F-4Us and F-9Fs) dropped their bombs on the massive plant building and transformers. As soon as the Navy bombers completed their mission, 120 Thunderjets (F-84s) and Shooting Stars (F-80s) from the US 5th Air Force followed and precision-bombed the same targets with high explosive bombs and rockets. In this attack, important power plant facilities including huge transformers and generators were severely damaged.

The UNC naval and air forces also attacked other power plants in the northeastern region of North Korea. The plant at the Hoch’on Reservoir was attacked by the Navy planes because it could be easily approached from the carriers. The fighter-bombers from the US 5th Air Force, on the other hand, struck the plants at the Pujon and Ch’angjin Reservoirs, inflicting a great deal of damage on their buildings and transformers. In this operation, all planes returned safely except five Navy planes shot down by the enemy antiaircraft guns.

The UN Command considered it necessary to make repeated and systematic attacks on the North Korean power plants in order to destroy them completely. Thus, on 24, 26, and 27 June, the UNC planes dealt fatal blows to the three hydroelectric power plants in the northeastern region.

The Suiho power plant was again a target for an air raid for a second
time on 12 September. Thirty-one medium bombers (B-29s) from the US 307th and 98th Fighter Bomber Wings and the 19th Fighter Bomber Squadron participated in saturation bombing on the plant. Meanwhile, B-26 light bombers (nighttime infiltration planes) continuously patrolled over the objective area.\textsuperscript{227)

As most of the power plants were paralyzed by the UNC planes, North Korea had to rely on foreign assistance for a speedy restoration of the destroyed facilities. North Korea urgently requested the Soviet Union to supply by 15 November equipment such as sixty transformers for a total capacity of 1.22 million kilowatts.\textsuperscript{228)

On 15 February 1953, four months after the second air attack on the Suiho power plant, it was subjected to a third air raid because it seemed to be getting back into operation. This marked the complete destruction of the North Korean electric power generating system.

Meanwhile, in early July 1952, the UN Command decided to launch a large-scale bombing operation against P’yongyang in order to maximize the psychological effect upon the Communists. The air raid on P’yongyang was a joint operation of the US 5th Air Force, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and carrier aircraft from the 7th Fleet.

Ninety-one planes from the UNC carriers Princeton and Bon Homme Richard bombed the enemy capital under cover of the US 5th Air Force most of the time. In the attack, US Air Force Thunderjets carried out preemptive strikes against enemy antiaircraft guns. Then followed the Navy attack bombers-AD Skyraiders and F-4U Corsairs—which dropped their bombs on the enemy facilities.\textsuperscript{229)

The carrier-borne planes made sorties at Yo-do Island near the port of Wonsan. Included in their target groups southeast of P’yongyang were the ammunition supply points, transportation units, NK Army Headquarters and barracks buildings, factories, locomotive maintenance shops, etc. Other targets were
assigned to the US 5th Air Force, US Marine Aircraft Group, Australian fighters, and planes from the carrier Ocean of Task Force 95, US 7th Fleet. The activities of the UNC air forces aimed at preparing for encounters with Soviet MIG fighters and providing antiaircraft suppression in order to make possible the bombing by the carrier-borne aircraft.\(^{230}\)

During the massive air raid on P'yongyang on 11 July, 822 planes from the US 5th Air Force and 7th Fleet vectored in three waves to hit the targets. On the night of the 11th, fifty-four B-29 medium bombers participated in Shoran bombing on eight military targets. In this attack, the UNC air forces lost one air force F-84 fighter and two navy planes. However, such complex targets as enemy supply depots, factories, billeting areas, railway centers, antiaircraft gun positions, etc. suffered a great deal of damage from the bombs dropped on the capital. A photographic reconnaissance report showed that at least three of the twenty-nine targets were destroyed completely and all other target areas except two were seriously damaged.\(^{231}\)

In the course of eleven hours on 11 July, 1,500 buildings were leveled and 900 others damaged by the 1,400 tons of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm, most of which hit their targets. North Korea harshly denounced the attack but was severely wounded psychologically.\(^{232}\)

On 4 August, the US Far East Air Forces launched an attack on P'yongyang for a second time. Two hundred eighty-four 5th Air Force fighter-bombers hit NK Army Headquarters east of P'yongyang. Destroyed and killed in this air raid were eighty buildings, one fuel dump, antiaircraft gun positions, and lots of enemy military personnel. Then came a third huge effort against the city on 29 August. A total of 1,080 US air force and naval fighters plus thirty-six ROK F-51 fighter-bombers made another three-wave assault on forty-five military target areas inflicting heavy blows on thirty-one targets.

After the three massive air raids that blanketed P'yongyang, said a US
Far East Air Forces intelligence report, it would be impossible to rebuild the ruined city quickly. However, the UNC Forces continued precision bombings on special targets in the city.\(^{233}\)

The UNC naval forces, on the other hand, also provided important support by shelling the enemy from the sea on a large scale. On 5 July, the battleship Iowa of Task Force 77 pounded the port of Wonsan for seven hours, destroying enemy coast-batteries and other major facilities. Again on 15 July, the US destroyer Orleck of Task Force 95 attacked an enemy supply train running from Yangdo to Ch’ongyang and destroyed fifteen cars. In July, the UNC naval forces destroyed a total of twenty-eight cars of enemy trains along the east coast.\(^{234}\)

On 1 September, the US 7th Fleet carriers Essex, Princeton, and Boxer mounted 144 fighter-bomber sorties against the oil refinery at Aoji, the largest oil supply base in North Korea which was just twelve kilometers from the Soviet border. A month later, on 8 October, eighty-nine fighter-bombers from three 7th Fleet carriers and ten Far East Air Forces B-29 bombers hit enemy antiaircraft gun positions, railroads, communication networks, troops, supply facilities, etc. in the Kowon area thirty kilometers north of Wonsan.\(^{235}\)

Again on 17 November, carrier-borne fighter-bombers from Task Force 77, US 7th Fleet, dropped their bombs on the railroad facilities, factories, and mines along the shore of Ch’ongjin, a northeastern port city. At the same time, the battleship Missouri and the cruiser Helena joined the bombarding of the Ch’ongjin city five times. During the naval surface operations in the second half of 1952, however, the UNC destroyers Thompson, Searce, and Bataan were attacked by the enemy.\(^{236}\)

In the meantime, as the battles on the ground became intense during the latter half of 1952, the UNC navy and air force also made efforts to afford the ground forces support. The US Far East Air Forces, US Marine Aircraft Group, ROK Air Force, and other UNC air units flew about 2,000 close air support sorties
every month for the ground forces operation.

The US 5th Air Force, in particular, mounted 2,217 fighter sorties in close air support of Operation Showdown carried out by the US 7th and ROK 2nd Infantry Divisions. This was almost half of a total of 4,488 close air support sorties made by UNC aircraft in October 1952.\textsuperscript{237}
Notes

7. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.


17. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND(trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 214.


23. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 22. According to the US JCS’ memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated September 26, 1952, the total number of KATUSAs had averaged approximately 13,000 per month since the program began.


25. *Ibid.*, p. 265 & 557. Although the expansion plan of the ROK forces had not been submitted to the US Congress, it was announced that the US Army was
providing the ROK forces with US equipment and it approved the requests of funds to supplement the equipment handed over to the ROK forces. Therefore, it was assumed that the Congress tacitly approved the expansion plan.


27. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 220. On June 18, 1952, the ROK Air Force deactivated the 2nd Air Reconnaissance Wing and activated the 15th Aviation Training Wing to take charge of pilot training.

28. Ibid., p. 83.

29. The ROK 12th Division was activated with the 37th, 51st, & 52nd Regiments on MND General Order (Army) No. 207 (November 8, 1952). The ROK 15th Division was activated with the 38th, 39th, & 50th Regiments on MND General Order (Army) No. 207 (November 8, 1952).

30. ROK MND, General Order (Army) No. 227 (Nov. 8, 1952).


32. Ibid., pp. 22-23.


34. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 339.

35. Ibid., p. 76.


37. Ibid., p. 60.

38. The Dam with its six generators was one of the largest in the Far East and was providing a large amount of electricity to the Communist war machinery in Manchuria; however, the UNC refrained from bombing it until June 23, 1952 as it was located close to the Manchurian border. Mark W. Clark, From the


41. Ibid., p. 158. According to the secret telegraph sent to Mao Tse Tung by Kim Il Sung at 12:00 on July 16, 1952: “It is essential to launch a few attacks locally in front in order to impose pressure on the enemy when the ground forces commence military action.”

42. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 273.

43. Ibid., pp. 274-275.

44. Ibid., pp. 274-275.

45. Ibid., p. 275.

46. Ibid., p. 277.

47. Ibid., p. 277.


49. Ibid., p. 253.

50. Ibid., p. 253.

51. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 281.

52. Ibid., pp. 281-282.

53. Ibid., pp. 281-282.

54. Ibid., p. 282.


57. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The Armistice History of


60. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.), op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 164. In his message on Sep. 17, 1952 to Mao Tse Tung, Stalin stated that the Government of the USSR had no intention to meddle in the proposal of detaining 20% of POWs temporarily and repatriating the rest; Stalin left the issue entirely in Chinese hands.


63. Lee Won Bok, op. cit., p. 39.


68. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 247; The text of the American proposal dated Oct. 22, 1952, Draft Resolution on Korea, US State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXVII, p. 680. The US proposal of Oct. 24, 1952 was approved by twenty member nations of the UN; thus, it was called 'the 21 Nation Proposal.'

69. Vishinsky vaguely referred to the composition of the Korean Committee
“the government of these nations including, without fail, the ones bordering Korea and the rest of the government.” At the 7th Political Committee of the UN, for the first time he called it the Korean Committee to be composed of the US, Great Britain, France, the USSR, Communist China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, North and South Koreas. Yang Dae Hyun, *Historical Testimony: Untold Story of Armistice Conference*, Seoul: Hyungsol Publishers (1993), p. 260.


71. On November 2, 1952, the Indian government conveyed the official letter in order to detect the real intention of the Chinese government. The gist of the message was “ban on the use of coercion at the time of repatriation, establishment of NNRC, and provision of opportunities for the POWs to express their intention before they decided their course.” But the Chinese government was mute on this proposal. Yang Dae Hyon, *op. cit.*, 258.


74. The Pogamdo incident was the revolt which occurred in six camps interning 3,600 prisoners out of the total 9,000 prisoners on the island. The Communists exploited it fully to their advantage, and even the International Committee of the Red Cross criticized that the UN’s control of the POWs had been too severe. Lee Won Bok, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

75. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

76. Lee Won Bok, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
84. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 212.
88. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 213.
89. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. 610.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 503-504. On the night of the 6th, the regiment issued the order to the 3rd Battalion to conduct a reconnaissance patrol in order to capture prisoners. The ROK MC 8089th Unit, *Operation Plan, No. 18* (12:00, Sept. 5, 1952).
98. Ibid., p. 510.
100. Ibid., pp. 514-515.
101. Ibid., pp. 515-516.

102. On the early morning of July 19, 1952, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 38th Regiment, the US 2nd Division assembled to Shindap-ri and Chongok areas from Inch'on led by the 3rd Battalion. This completed the relief-in-position on the front.

103. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., pp. 204-205; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 589.
105. ROK Army HQs (trans.), op. cit., p. 205.
106. Ibid., pp. 210-211.
108. Ibid., p. 592.
109. ROK Army HQs (trans.), op. cit., p. 211.
110. Ibid., pp. 211-212; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. 592-594.
111. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. 448-449; ROK 1st Division, Operation Order, No. 84 (06:00, Oct. 1, 1952). Upon the ROKA HQ’s Operation Order, No. 196 (Aug. 1, 1952), the division was released from its attachment to the South Area Security Command, was assigned as reserve to the US I Corps, and assumed the operation mission of the US 3rd Division on October 1.

112. Ibid., p. 449.
113. Ibid., p. 452.
114. Interview with Staff Sgt. Song Tae Ho of Reconnaissance Co., 15th Regiment. Ibid., p. 466.
115. Ibid., pp. 453-454.
116. Ibid., p. 454.
118. Ibid., p. 491. Interview with Lt. Col. Choi Il Young, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 11th Regiment.
119. Ibid., pp. 460-461.
120. Ibid., pp. 463-464.
121. Ibid., p. 465.
124. Ibid., p. 473; ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 268.
126. ROK 1st Division, Operation Order, No. 89 (12:00, December 11, 1952).
127. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., pp. 268-269; Interview with Lt. Col. Choi Il Young, the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment in War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 491.
128. Ibid., p. 483.
129. Ibid., pp. 484-487.
130. Ibid., pp. 488-489.
131. Pfc. Park Kwan Wook was awarded a US Silver Star Medal on the recommendation of the US I Corps commanding general. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 269; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. 489-490. The 11th Regiment won in this battle, killing about 350 and an additional 255 estimated; however, the regiment also suffered the loss of 145 killed and 412 injured.
132. Ibid., pp. 490-492.


137. Ibid., pp. 76-82.


139. ROK 9th Division, *Operation Order, No. 87* (07:00, October 9, 1952)


141. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND Ibid., pp. 192-213. President Rhee accompanied by General Van Fleet, Commanding General of EUSA, visited the division and praised their endeavor in the battle of White Horse Ridge.


143. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *Battle at Sniper Ridge*,


149. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., pp. 315-316.


November 18, 1952).


160. The US IX Corps issued *Operation Order, No. 33* (17:00, November 18, 1952), and replaced the ROK 2nd Division with the ROK 9th Division as of 06:00, November 25.


172. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-196; *Battle at Capitol Hill & Finger Ridge*, pp. 107-109. The next day, on September 14, 1952, Minister of Defense, Shin Tae Young issued a statement praising the achievement in battle by the division which read “...the courageous fighting demonstrated by the Capital Division in the
defense of the Capitol Hill was the essence of unyielding tradition and the Hwarang spirit. Their achievement will be remembered forever…”


179. ROKA HQ, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.


188. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-132.


194. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
195. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
196. Ibid., pp. 101-106.
197. Ibid., p. 106.
198. Ibid., p. 85.
201. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
203. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 90.
204. Ibid., p. 90; Korea Institute of Military History, op. cit., pp. 126-128.
207. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
208. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
211. Ibid., p. 41.
213. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
214. Ibid., pp. 50-52; ROKA HQ, op. cit., p. 22.
216. ROKA HQ, op. cit., p. 23.
217. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. 53-55;
ROKA HQ, op. cit., p. 23.


219. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 229.


222. With the commitment of his navy aircraft in bombing North Korean power plants, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark of the US 7th Fleet allowed the navy's dive-bombers and fighters to combine with the bomber group of the 5th Air Force. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 229.

223. ROK JCS, op. cit., p. 913.

224. Ibid., pp. 912-916.


228. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.), op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 153. Approval by Soviet Cabinet on July 13, 1952: The USSR had East Germany provide North Korea with electrical generating equipment that North Korea asked for.


230. ROKAF HQ (trans.), Ibid., pp. 151-152. The raid on refinery facilities was conducted with the special approval by US JCS; however, the JCS emphasized that the general policy banning targets within a twelve mile range of the Soviet border was still valid. War History Compilation Committee, ROK


Chapter Five  The Communist Forces’ Last Offensive and Signing of the Truce

I. Change in the International Situation and Indications of a Truce

Even though both the UN Command and Communists had been caught in a stalemate with the problems of a truce, especially the repatriation of prisoners, the expectations for a cease-fire rose in the international community. On December 13, 1952, the Executive Committee of the International Committee of the Red Cross passed a resolution by 15 to 2 calling for an immediate ceasefire in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The contents of this resolution were to be presented to the UN General Assembly, which reviewed the problems related to the exchange of sick and injured prisoners in conformity with the Geneva Convention.

Newly-elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had pledged in the election campaign to seek an early conclusion of the Korean War, exerted pressure on Communist China indirectly with his decision to end the US naval presence in the Straits of Taiwan, revealed in his State of the Union message to Congress on February 2, 1953. With the shift in US policy away from a neutral stance toward Taiwan, Communist China no longer could concentrate its military capabilities on the Korean front and ignore the military threat from the Nationalist China of Chiang Kai Shek. Communist China had to carry a substantial burden militarily and psychologically thereafter. ¹ This US policy had a tremendous effect on the strategies of the Communist camp.
Under these circumstances, an incident occurred which could provide a turning point in the armistice negotiations. Soviet Premier Joseph V. Stalin suddenly died of a cerebral hemorrhage on March 5, 1953. Stalin’s death brought a dramatic shift in international relations and the Korean War. After his death, the internal political situation did not allow his successors to follow his policy. Stalin’s successor, Georgi M. Malenkov and his junta, assumed power on March 5, implying a policy change to a new track. With the emergence of a host of new figures on the stage of Soviet politics, the UNC needed time to evaluate them. The US and its allies cautiously waited for clues for the direction that the Malenkov regime intended to take.

According to secret diplomatic documents, the Soviet government conveyed to China and North Korea its position on March 19 “that it had decided to conclude the Korean War by adjusting the line pursued so far to the current political situation and that cease-fire coincided with the basic understanding, especially, of North Korean and Chinese peoples as well as of all the peoples of the world.” In addition, the Soviet Union admitted on March 21 through a Moscow broadcast for the first time that the United States and Great Britain as members of the Allied Nations had taken part in concluding World War II.

Furthermore, the Soviet government implied that it would take a leading role in negotiations for the release of the British diplomats and missionaries detained in North Korea, and gave a fairly moderate response on the issue of recognizing West Germany in the context of the European defense community treaty. Thus, the environment was ripe for immediate pursuit of armistice whenever North Korea and Communist China, the belligerents of the war, wanted to end the fighting.

According to secret telegrams between North Korea and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung of North Korea noted that “the time has come for us to take an initiative in concluding the Korean War and achieving peace,” revealing his
intention to follow the new Soviet line. Thus, the UNC might hope for successful talks in view of the changed stance of the Communist camp.

II. Exchange of Wounded and Sick POWs

Taking into account the resolution by the International Red Cross, General Mark W. Clark, CINCUNC, sent a letter on February 22, 1953 through the liaison officers at P'anmunjom to the Communists, proposing an immediate exchange of the sick and injured prisoners in keeping with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

The Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies, in a resolution adopted in Geneva, Switzerland, on 13 December 1952, called on both sides in the Korean conflict as a gesture of good will to take immediate action in implementing the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with appropriate Articles of the Geneva Convention.

As has been repeatedly stated to you in the course of negotiations at P'anmunjom, the United Nations Command has from the very beginning adhered scrupulously to the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention and in particular has been prepared to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in regard to the sick and wounded prisoners in its custody. The United Nations Command remains ready immediately to repatriate those seriously sick and wounded captured personnel who are fit to travel in accordance with provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

I wish to be informed whether you are prepared for your part to proceed immediately with the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured
personnel of the United Nations Command who are in your hands. The
United Nations Command liaison officers will be prepared to meet your liai-
on officers to make the necessary arrangements for impartial verification of
the condition and for the mutual exchange of such seriously sick and wound-
ed in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva
Convention.⁶)

The Communists gave no response for awhile; however, the death of
Stalin, who had exercised absolute power, had a direct effect on the enemy’s
stance in armistice negotiations. The Soviet politburo recommended the following
position on General Clark’s proposal to North Korea and Communist China: in
replying positively to the proposal on the exchange of the sick and wounded pris-
oners, China should emphasize the fact that chances for concluding truce negotia-
tions were at hand, and Kim Il Sung of North Korea was to issue a statement sup-
porting the Chinese message.⁷)

On March 28, 1953, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai replied in writing
to Clark’s request: they were perfectly willing to exchange the sick and injured
prisoners of war at any time, either prior to the conclusion of armistice or before
resuming truce talks:

Since your side now expresses readiness to apply the provisions of the
Geneva Convention to sick and injured prisoners of war in custody of both
sides, our side, as an expression of the similar intent, fully agrees to your
side’s proposal to exchange sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides
during the period of hostilities. This proposal should be dealt with in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.
At the same time, we consider that the reasonable settlement of the question
of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of both sides during the period of
hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing. Therefore, our side proposes that the delegates for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the negotiations at P’anmunjom.  

The Communists responded by proposing to reconvene the armistice conference in addition to approving the exchange of the sick and injured prisoners. On March 30 Premier Chou En Lai of Communist China, broadcasting over Radio Peking on behalf of the North Korean Government as well as his own, approved the limited exchange of prisoners and urged that it be extended to accomplish a settlement of the war. Chou said:

A reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war clearly has a very significant bearing upon the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. It is, therefore, our view that the time should be considered ripe for settling the entire question of prisoners of war in order to insure the cessation of hostilities in Korea and to conclude the armistice agreement.... [Delegations should] immediately start negotiations on the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, and should proceed to seek an overall settlement of the question of prisoners of war.  

The Chinese statement contained a clear concession from its previous stance. The next day North Korea also issued a formal statement supporting the Chinese message as had been recommended by the Soviet Union. On the same day the UN General Assembly aired its hope for concluding an early armistice in Korea through negotiation in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations.
The US JCS also judged that the Communists’ consent to resumption of truce talks implied their willingness to comply with the UNC’s position.\textsuperscript{10}

As the hope for resuming armistice negotiations rose, General Clark of the UNC at the liaison officers’ meeting on March 30, 1953 proposed to the Communists reconvening of the armistice conference at P’anmunjom and negotiation of exchange of the sick and injured prisoners as follows:\textsuperscript{11}

1) I express our satisfaction upon the receipt of your reply of March 28 to my letter dated February 22, 1953. I propose to your side that a high-rank\-ing liaison officer group, led by an army general or navy admiral, make necessary detailed arrangements for the exchange of these captured personnel and meet at P’anmunjom as soon as possible.

2) I agree with your statement that your side hopes the exchange of sick and wounded under the situation of on-going hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly, I will be prepared to instruct my Liaison Group as a second order of business to meet your Liaison Group to arrange for a resumption of armistice negotiations.

3) I request your side to notify us immediately of your decision on the timing of the liaison officers’ meeting that our side proposed to discuss repatria- tion of the seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war.

On April 1, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, through Moscow radio, broadcast a statement supporting the positions of North Korea and Chinese Communists and offering to cooperate in carrying out truce talks. The gist of his message was as follows:

The statement made by Kim Il Sung, the supreme commander of the NKPA,
and Peng Teh Huai, the commander of the CPVA, to the letter of March 28 by Mark W. Clark, CINCUNC, proposing the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners was released. Both governments of the DPRK and PRC stated their agreement to the proposal on the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners and expressed their intent to seek for an early solution of the issue of all prisoners and to reach at an agreement to conclude the Korean War. The government of the USSR recognizes the entire fairness of the proposal made by the PRC and DPRK and thus, is willing to cooperate in the implementation of the proposal. When the official representatives of the PRC and DPRK are included in the United Nations, the UN would be able to contribute more to the armistice of the Korean war.12)

The following day (April 2), the Communists responded to the letter of the Commander in Chief of the UNC proposing an immediate meeting of liaison officers with a letter containing the following message:

We agree to your proposal and are willing to reconvene the liaison officers session at P’anmunjom on April 6, 1953 in order to negotiate in advance the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners and to fix the date for resumption of the plenary session of truce talks.13)

Accordingly, liaison officers of both sides resumed the meeting at P’anmunjom. Admiral John C. Daniel and General Lee Sang Cho, leading the liaison officers groups, gathered at P’anmunjom on April 6 and held the first conference for the exchange of sick and injured prisoners. Admiral Daniel presented the UNC proposal that the UNC was ready to start immediate construction of the facilities necessary for the delivery and receipt of the sick and wounded at P’anmunjom and to begin delivery of 500 prisoners a day within seven days of
agreement on procedures. Lee pointed out that the Communists wanted to repatriate all sick and injured eligible under Articles 109 and 110\(^{14}\) of the Geneva Convention.\(^{15}\)

At the first meeting, the UNC side proposed to exchange the sick and wounded POWs in proportion to the total number of prisoners while the Communists, accepting the UNC proposal in principle, proposed to exchange by nationalities along the line of Article 110 of the Geneva Convention.

At the resumption of the meeting the next day, the UNC side proposed to exchange the lists of prisoners’ nationalities and names to be repatriated and to appoint liaison officers to discuss administrative details. The proposals presented on April 18 by both sides on the numbers of prisoners for exchange were as follows:

The Communists informed the UNC that the number of the sick and wounded POWs eligible for repatriation was about 600 including about 450 ROK and 150 non-ROK prisoners.

The UNC delegate called the figure incredibly small in light of the total number of all prisoners that the Communists implied they held. Thus, the UNC side asked them to reconsider the number of prisoners for repatriation and to be more liberal in their classification of the sick and wounded. The UNC presented to the Communists a list of about 700 Chinese and approximately 5,100 North Korean sick and wounded prisoners ready for repatriation.\(^{16}\)

Subsequently, the UNC got a disappointing proposal from the Communists to exchange 600 sick and wounded out of about 12,000 total POWs; on the other hand, the Communists appeared to be very satisfied with the UNC proposal of about 5,800 sick and wounded for repatriation out of 132,000 total prisoners held by the UNC.
In this mood the meeting continued, and on April 9 both sides concluded the general discussion on the principles for repatriating the sick and wounded and began to discuss specific details. They agreed to increase the security guards at P'anmunjom to 30 on both sides during the period of repatriation and to move the prisoners to the conference area in convoys of five vehicles over the routes that were clearly marked out. Thus, both sides finally signed the agreement on the exchange of the sick and wounded on April 11 and got prepared for implementation. The gist of agreements made on that day were as follows:

The repatriation of the sick and wounded POWs would commence at P'anmunjom within 10 days after signing the agreement. The Communist side is to repatriate about 100 prisoners per day, and the UNC side to deliver about 500 sick and wounded to the Communists a day in groups of 25 at a time. The prisoners are to be handed over along with the lists of name, rank,
and the POW number or service number of each prisoner arranged by nationality. During the period of repatriation the safety of all the railroads and vehicles carrying the sick and wounded to Kaesong and Munsan is guaranteed, and transits of free passage leading to P’anmunjom are observed in accordance with the conditions specified.\(^{18}\)

According to Little Switch, as the exchange was dubbed by the UN Command, the repatriation of the sick and wounded was to commence by April 20 and to conclude within 20 days. The UNC immediately started to move Communist prisoners from Koje-do and elsewhere to P’anmunjom.

Assuming that the Communists were holding additional POWs for repatriation, the UNC proposed adding 550 more to their list in the expectation that the Communists would comply by repatriating more UNC prisoners. On the other hand, the Communists agreed to additional repatriation on April 23. However, they abruptly changed their stance, announcing that they had concluded their repatriation.

### Repatriation of Sick and Wounded POWs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Released by UNC</th>
<th>No. of POWs</th>
<th>Released by Communists</th>
<th>No. of POWs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Koreans</td>
<td>5,194</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese (CCF)</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian internees</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,670</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>684</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Faced with the enemy’s unyielding stand, the UNC finished delivering the last group of Communists on May 3. Thus, the UNC had relieved itself of 6,670 POWs, including 5,194 North Korean, 1,030 Chinese, and 446 civilian
internees. In return the enemy delivered to UNC side 684 POWs, including 471 ROK, 149 American, 32 British, 15 Turkish, 6 Colombian, 5 Australian, 2 Canadian, and 1 Greek, South African, Filipino, and Polish soldier each.\(^{(9)}\)

### III. Agreement on the Exchange of POWs and Release of Anti-Communist POWs

#### 1. Conclusion of the Agreement of POW Exchange

Going into the year of 1953, there were tremendous changes in international politics. Leaders of the US and USSR were replaced, and the enemy supreme command demonstrated a rather flexible posture in armistice negotiations. If the Communists’ flexible attitude was a sign of concession in the prisoner issue, it was still to be tested in the negotiations to come. The UNC continued its efforts to resume the plenary session as it pursued negotiations for the repatriation of the sick and wounded. The principles that the UNC had adhered thus far in negotiations of the prisoner exchange were the following:

1) Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites would be acceptable as a neutral nation. General Clark was directed to press for Switzerland or Sweden in that order. Failing in these he would ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further instructions;

2) The neutral state must accept custody of the POWs in Korea. Physical movement of non-repatriates from Korea could not be considered;

3) Non-repatriates would be held by the neutral state only for a specified time. General Clark was to press for 60 days, but might agree to 90 days;
4) Safeguards must be established to prevent force or coercion against non-
repatriates;
5) If a non-repatriate changed his mind, the neutral state must repatriate him
promptly;
6) The neutral state would be the final authority on whether or not a prisoner
desired repatriation; and,
7) The non-repatriates would be set free at the expiration of the agreed time
limit with arrangements made by the neutral state.\(^{20}\)

On March 3, Chou En Lai, making one step back from his former stance
on coercive repatriation, proposed as follows: "...Both sides should undertake to
repatriate immediately all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon
repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state."\(^{21}\)
His proposal was quickly seconded by Kim Il Sung the following day. When Nam
II presented the Communists’ position to the UN side on April 9, the brightest
hope of settling the Korean War appeared to be at hand with the conclusion of
repatriating the sick and wounded:

It is precisely on the basis of this principle of repatriation of all prisoners of
war that our side firmly maintains that the detaining side should ensure that
no coercive means whatsoever be employed against all the prisoners of war
in its custody to obstruct their returning home… The Korean [north] and
Chinese side does not acknowledge that there are prisoners of war who are
allegedly unwilling to be repatriated; therefore, the question of the so called
‘forced repatriation’ or ‘repatriation by force’ does not exist at all, and we
have always opposed this assertion. Based on this stand of ours, our side
maintains that those captured personnel of our side who are filled with
apprehensions and are afraid to return home as a result of having been sub-
jected to intimidation and oppression, should be handed over to a neutral
state, and through explanations given by our side, gradually freed from
apprehensions... 22)

Without rejecting the Communists' proposal, the UNC examined unclear
issues in detail such as the definition of neutral nations, the location of POW
delivery, the scope of interviewer teams, decisions of final destinations for non-
repatriates, and so on. 23) On April 17, the senior delegate of the UNC delivered to
the Communists a letter clarifying the UNC's basic position on resuming the
meeting. The gist of it was as follows:

1) I am authorized to instruct the UNC's team of liaison officers to discuss
matters relevant to resuming the plenary meetings;

2) The UNC expects your side either to accept our proposal or present a new
constructive alternative; and,

3) In light of the statements made by the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En
Lai and North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung, the UNC believes that agree-
ments listed below would facilitate a speedy solution on the POW issue:
   a. Neutral nations should be ones such as Switzerland, traditionally recog-
nized as appropriate in dealing in such matters;
   b. Those prisoners not repatriated directly should be accommodated in
camps on the Korean Peninsula under the control of neutral nations;
   c. Neutral nations should prepare to allow the prisoners interned in their
camps to make decisions freely in about 60 days and to implement
those decisions thereafter.

4) The UNC considers it appropriate to adjourn the plenary again in case
both sides fail to reach an agreement for a prolonged duration at the ple-
nary attended by all the delegates. 24)
In order to maintain the initiative, the UN Command insisted that the Communists be ready to either accept the UNC’s earlier plan or to offer a constructive one of their own and proposed to choose Switzerland as a neutral state to take custody of the non-repatriates in Korea itself. On the other hand, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution initiated by the Brazilian delegate by a vote of 60-0 that the issue of the Korean armistice be dealt with at P’anmunjom without being submitted to the General Assembly.26)

Admiral Daniel of the UNC proposed to resume the plenary sessions on April 23; however, the Communist delegates chose to have it on April 25 and again postponed it until April 26. With the resumption of the first plenary meetings in six months, P’anmunjom regained its vigor. At the first session the senior delegate of the Communists presented a six-article proposal covering the main contents of Chou En Lai’s statement of March 30 as follows:

1) Within two months after the armistice agreement became effective, both sides would repatriate all the prisoners desiring to return home;
2) During the following month all non-repatriates would be sent to a neutral state and turned over to its jurisdiction;
3) Then, for a period of six months, the nations to which the nonrepatriates belonged should have the opportunity and facilities to talk to and persuade them to come back;
4) All prisoners changing their minds during this time would be repatriated;
5) Disposition of any prisoners remaining in the hands of the neutral state at the end of the six-month persuasion period would be decided by the political conference provided for in the armistice agreement; and,
6) All expenses of the nonrepatriates in the neutral state would be borne by the nation to which the prisoners belonged.27)
This Communist proposal ignored the conditions set forth in Harrison’s letter. The proposals of the two sides contradicted each other in the selection of neutrals, location of prisoners’ camps, protection and access period for prisoners, and disposition of remaining nonrepatriates after expiration of neutral custody. The UNC took the position that there was no reason to transport the prisoners to a neutral nation in order to allow belligerents’ access to prisoners for persuasion, and that a more reasonable limit should be set for the process such as 60 days. Thus, the UNC rejected the Communist proposal of transporting prisoners to a neutral nation.28)

Then the Communists on April 29 betrayed their preference for the first time by stating that neutral nations should be Asian, but declined to specify the names. Nam Il also revealed that the six-month period might be ‘discussed’ in light of the UNC objections to its length. However, Harrison made his position clear that no counterproposal could be made until the neutral nation was selected.

At a May 2 meeting, Nam Il offered the names of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan as suitable Asian neutrals. The UNC preferred Switzerland or Sweden; however, the UNC side decided to ask the Communists if they were prepared to accept any one of these Asian neutrals, and if the answer was affirmative, the UNC would then nominate Pakistan. In addition, the UNC made its position clear that no consideration would be given to moving prisoners to a neutral country but it considered a concession to the four-month access period.

On May 4, Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, the chief delegate of the UNC, proposed Pakistan as a neutral nation, which was approved by the UN General Assembly.29) The Communist delegation ignored the nomination and proposed the following eight-point proposal on prisoner issues on May 7 after a few days of fruitless efforts:
1) Within two months after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation to the side to which the prisoners of war belong, in accordance with the related provisions of Paragraph 51, Article 3 of the Armistice Agreement and in conformity with the final name lists exchanged and checked by both sides.

2) In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, both sides agree that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be established, to be composed of an equal number of representatives appointed respectively by five nations, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, the four nations provided for in Paragraph 37, Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement, and India as agreed upon by both sides.

3) All prisoners of war of both sides, with the exception of those prisoners of war who shall be directly repatriated as provided for in Paragraph 1 of this proposal, shall be released from the military control and custody of the detaining side at the original places of detention and be handed over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, provided for in Paragraph 2 of this proposal, which shall receive them and take them into custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall have the authority to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction. In order to ensure the effective execution of this authority, the member nations of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall each provide an equal number of armed forces.

4) The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody those prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within the time limit of four
months after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send personnel to the original places of detention of these prisoners of war to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations so as to eliminate their apprehensions and to inform them of all matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full right to return home to lead a peaceful life.

5) Within four months after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission receives and takes into custody the prisoners of war, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and the detaining side shall not offer any obstruction. The administrative details for the repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be settled through consultation between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the two sides.

6) If, at the expiration of the time limit of four months as provided in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, their disposition shall be submitted for settlement through consultation with the Political Conference as provided in Paragraph 60, Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement.

7) All the expenditures of the prisoners of war during the period in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, including their traveling expenses in returning to their fatherlands, shall be borne by the nations to which they belong.

8) The terms of this proposal and arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all prisoners of war. 30)
The Communists’ eight-point proposal abandoned their demand that nonrepatriates be transported out of Korea and accepted a period of four months rather than six for access to nonrepatriates; however, it demanded that the remaining nonrepatriates be subject to disposition by a political conference after the four-month limit expired.

On May 9 General Harrison raised questions on the problems of dealing with the remaining nonrepatriates even after the disposition by the political conference, operational procedures of the neutral repatriate commission, and so on. The Communists responded by insisting that as all prisoners would return home, there would be no problem of remaining prisoners and that the neutral repatriation commission could resolve all the issues by majority vote. On May 10, the UN side decided internally that the Communists’ proposal would be accepted for negotiations if suitably modified. The required modifications were as follows:

1) The five-nation commission would operate on a basis of unanimity except on procedural matters (so that the principle of non-forcible repatriation could not be overridden in the commission by India aligning with Poland and Czechoslovakia);
2) If the political conference did not decide on prisoners within 30 days, prisoners would be released and given civilian status;
3) The commission must take custody of non-repatriates at places designated by the detaining power; and,
4) India would provide all armed forces and operating personnel to assist the commission and provide the chairman of the commission, who would also be its executive agent.32

But this alternative had to be revised partly upon strong opposition by the ROK Government.33 As the proposal was to have Soviet satellite nations super-
vise and manage POWs, Kal Hong Ki, the official government spokesman, fiercely rejected the proposal, noting that those satellite nations could not maintain a neutral position in dealing with nonrepatriates. On May 12, President Syngman Rhee also protested in strong terms to General Clark that those Korean nonrepatriates could not be delivered to a group of countries, especially to the countries controlled by the Communists, and, furthermore, India could not be considered neutral.

In his response, General Clark revised in part the proposal that all Korean nonrepatriates be released immediately upon the execution of the armistice agreement. On May 13 General Harrison presented to the Communists the following newly revised counterproposal:

1) The Communists requested that all nonrepatriate prisoners be delivered to the NNRC; however, the UNC demanded that the Chinese nonrepatriates be delivered to the NNRC while the Korean nonrepatriates be released as free citizens to choose either North Korea or the Republic of Korea for residence at their own will upon concluding armistice;

2) The Communists proposed that all five nations of the NNRC (India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden) provide an equal number of security troops for POWs, but the UNC proposed that only India supply its forces; and,

3) The Communists’ proposal remain ambiguous as to the final disposal of POWs: the UNC proposed that more specific and clear procedures be stipulated on securing political asylum.  

The Communist delegate Nam Il rejected it, charging it as ‘a backward step and another effort at forced retention.’ General Harrison requested a four-day recess in order to resume talks in an improved setting, but it was postponed again
till May 25. Meanwhile, military and political leaders in the Far East and Washington were preparing the UNC’s final proposal on repatriation of the POWs. General Clark set up plans to expand air operations, to remove Kaesong’s immunity, and to engage in localized ground operations in the Kaesong area later on in case the enemy did not accept the final terms and another long recess set in.

The basic position of the US was that it did not want to have the negotiations drag on without results. On May 23 decision-makers in Washington communicated a resolution reflecting their ultimate position through the JCS to the Commanding General of the UNC. At that time the JCS had set up a plan to accept the military measures proposed by General Clark, to authorize him to notify the enemy nullifying all the agreements of truce talks on the sanctuary area, and to release all nonrepatriate prisoners if the Communists declined to accept our proposal without submitting any constructive alternative.$^{35}$

Worried that the concessions contained in the final position would disappoint the ROK government, the US JCS had General Clark and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs meet with President Syngman Rhee to inform and persuade him. The UNC’s final proposal contained the conditions that coincided with the Indian resolution. Thus, it was expected that the Communists would accept the proposal. The main contents were as follows: $^{36}$

1) The United States would accept a five-nation custodial organization subject to condition that all armed forces and operating personnel be provided exclusively by India;

2) Upon the effective date of the armistice, non-repatriated Koreans would be turned over to the custodial commission in the same manner as the Chinese (In other words, the Koreans would not be released, as originally contemplated);

3) The commission would act on a basis of majority vote(another important
concession in what had been the US position); and,

4) The terms of entrusted authority on the custodial body must retain all provisions needed to assure that the Communists could not use threats or coercion against prisoners in neutral custody. These included:

a. Limitation of the number of staff assistants allowed to the member nations of the custodial commission (except India);

b. A similar limitation on the number of representatives of the belligerent countries who were allowed to see prisoners;

c. Requirement that all interviews with POWs be in the presence of representatives of each member nation of the commission;

d. Validation, by a majority vote of commission members, of all certificates submitted by POWs indicating desire to be repatriated;

e. Access to the entire operation by representatives of the press;

f. Limitation of the period of access to 90 days; and,

g. Disposition of the remaining non-repatriates by the political conference (to be accepted as a last resort). However, the conference must dispose of them within 120 days after they had first been turned over to the custodial commission (that is, the conference would be allowed 30 days in addition to the 90 days allowed the commission). Otherwise, the matter would be referred to the UN General Assembly with the commission retaining custody until the Assembly reached a decision.\(^7\)

This UNC proposal seemed on the surface to hold fast to the principle of free repatriation; however, it encompassed the Communists’ eight-point general proposal. On May 25, General Harrison, at the plenary session in P’anmunjom, proposed to have a closed session, and the Communist delegate Nam Il consented to it.

The UNC delegation conveyed to the Communists its final proposal, and
the Communists requested a one-week recess to review it. Their request for a recess without rejecting it considerably encouraged the UNC delegates.

In order to emphasize the importance attached to this offer, General Clark sent a letter to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai on May 27. After strongly urging them to accept the terms proposed by the UNC as a just solution to the prisoner question. Clark finished his note warning: “I believe you are aware that it is not our purpose to engage in prolonged and fruitless repetition of arguments. It is our earnest hope that you will give urgent and most serious consideration to our delegation’s alternative proposals regarding the sole issue on which an armistice still depends. If your governments’ stated desire for an armistice is in good faith, you are urged to take advantage of the present opportunity.”

At the same time, the US JCS was examining NSC 147, a course of action to be adopted if negotiation failed. It was a study of various options to expand the war in order to force a conclusion of the conflict, and was classified as top secret in order to guarantee maximum effects in surprise and shock of all necessary operations including “strategic and tactical operations of nuclear weapons.”

Meanwhile, the ROK government expressed its strong opposition to the UNC’s proposal of May 25, and stated that the ROK forces would withdraw from the control of the UNC and would continue to fight for the unification of Korea rather than accept the armistice agreement under these conditions. The ROK government was opposed to it for the following reasons: that there was no prior consultation on this proposal with the ROK government, that Indian forces were to be invited to Korean territory, and that the nonrepatriates would be handed over to the NNRC to be hounded into changing their minds by the Communists instead of releasing them immediately. On the day the final proposal of May 25 was presented to the plenary session, the ROK delegate protested in strong terms and withdrew from the meeting in acute distress from the rejection of the ROK gov-
ernment’s position.

The plenary meetings would resume on June 4. What Nam II proposed was basically the same as the UNC, although the Communists revised one clause. Nam II said, “we basically agree to your proposal presented on May 25,” and then delivered a full text of the prisoner repatriation agreement. There was a difference in one clause between the proposals of the two sides. It did not assign any role for the UN General Assembly on nonrepatriates, and it noted that those nonrepatriates not disposed at the political conference would be set free.

On June 7 the staff officers were assigned to straighten out the final details of the terms of reference for handling prisoners. As the remaining differences were minor and both sides were in favor of a quick solution, the details were quickly settled and were submitted for the signature of the chief delegates on June 8.41 After one and a half years of negotiation, the prolonged debate on the repatriation of nonrepatriates came to a close. The main contents of the repatriation agreement on nonrepatriates were as follows:42

Chapter 1. General

Article 1. In order to insure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of P’anmunjom and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the
Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanation and interviews.

Article 2. Armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty each. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

Article 3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation.

Chapter 2. Custody of Prisoners of War

Article 4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and in all cases, within sixty days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

Article 5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed
forces of India.

Chapter 3. Explanation

Article 8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations to explain to prisoners their rights. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven per thousand prisoners of war; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five.

Chapter 4. Disposition of Prisoners of War

Article 10. Once an application is made by a prisoner of war requesting repatriation, it shall be determined by majority vote the validity of such application by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies.

Article 11. At the expiration of ninety days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty days during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status for whom no disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty days.

The UNC had gained the confidence of the anti-communist nonrepatriates and won a psychological victory, and the concept of no forcible repatriation later became a part of the body of international law.

Among the matters to be settled prior to the conclusion of truce talks were activation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and renegotiation of the military demarcation line reflecting changes in the military situation since November 1951.44

As the war neared a cease fire, the focus of attention shifted to the final negotiations in mid-June. However, right before concluding the issue, the unexpected release of most of the anti-communist Korean prisoners loomed as a major road block to the armistice agreement.

2. Release of Anti-Communist Prisoners of War

Even before the start of the armistice negotiations, President Syngman Rhee firmly expressed his position stating that “any of the so-called peace proposals with conditions dividing this nation cannot be accepted.” As to the repatriation of the POWs, Rhee had maintained his position: “the anti-Communist nonrepatriates should be released upon the armistice agreement. No anti-Communist prisoner should be delivered to the repatriation commission composed of Soviet satellites or pro-Communist nations.” Rhee endeavored to accomplish these goals.

However, cease-fire talks progressed in ways of rejecting the ROK government’s position, and on 8 June 1953 the delegates of the UNC and Communists signed the agreement on exchange of POWs with the ROK delegate absent in
III. Agreement on the Exchange of POWs and Release of Anti-Communist POWs

protest.

On that day General Clark called on President Rhee to report the signing of the agreement and asked the President to cooperate in concluding armistice negotiations. But the President was at that moment already taking some action quietly to express his opposition to armistice.

On June 6, two days before Clark's visit, the President called the Provost Marshal Lt. Gen. Won Yong Duk to the presidential palace and told him: "the truce talks at P'anmunjon are progressing against our will; furthermore, those anti-communist prisoners refusing to go back to the north are to be delivered to the hands of Indian troops to be screened for repatriation. This cannot be done. Can you think of any good ideas?" Rhee instructed Won to examine this matter.45)

President Rhee made the decision to release the anti-Communist prisoners after seriously taking into account the following elements: the ideological factor that the anti-Communist POWs could not be handed over to the Communist camp; grasp the chance to the diplomatic initiative away from the ROK; Koreans' will for the unification of a free Korea; national rage against armistice negotiations that neglected the ROK position; and the nonrepatriates' ardent wishes and their pleas conveyed in various forms.46) Upon instruction to review the plan from the president, the Provost Marshal identified the following points as huddles:

1) With the transfer of operational control of the ROK forces to the CINCUNC, the release of POWs could not be implemented legally even under a presidential order;

2) Even with the legal procedure ignored, it would be difficult to release POWs without consent and cooperation of the US troops who were in charge of the prisoner camps;

3) Even with the order from the president, the operation could not be conducted along the normal command channel since the minister of defense
and army chief of staff were excluded; and

4) Since there was no legal basis for the Provost Marshal to command military police of each services, it would be difficult for him to mobilize the ROKA military police forces on guarding POW camp even with instructions from the army chief of staff. [47]

Notwithstanding these problems, General Won Yong Duk took notice of the provisions in the preamble of the Geneva Convention that “the exchange of POWs is not obligatory” and that “the custody of POWs belongs to the sovereignty of that nation holding them” and interpreted that the ROK could exercise its territorial sovereignty as a belligerent in the war even with the transfer of operational control on the ROK forces to the CINCUNC.

On the very day the agreement on prisoner exchange was signed (July 8), the general reported back to the president and President Rhee ordered the general promptly that “from now on all the military police forces of the ROK Army, Navy, and Air Force are under your command,” and on the spot issued a written order on the release of anti-Communist prisoners.

Thus, only General Won, Minister of Home Affairs Chin Hun Shik, ROK delegate Maj. General Choi Duk Shin, and Minister of Information Kal Hong Ki were informed of the order on the release. The Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff were excluded. [48]

Since the beginning of June, the US JCS had been receiving daily reports on the Korean situation, including information on prisoners provided by the commanding general of Korean Communication Zone (KCOMZ), Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren. These reports noted the general danger of some violent action among the anti-Communist prisoners, but failed to warn specifically that an action was imminent. On the contrary, CINCUNC reported on June 8 that “there were no indications of organized plans for mass breakout.” [49]
In the beginning of June, rallies opposing the armistice were held throughout the nation as the progress in truce talks was evident. The Korean opposition embarrassed the US but the US did not delay the progress of the negotiations. On June 7 the ROK issued a state of emergency for the whole nation, and ordered the immediate return of all ROK officers from the United States including General Paik Sun Yup who was on a visit. The ROK also recalled its delegate from the UNC Armistice delegation.\textsuperscript{501}

On June 9, the ROK Provost Marshal summoned Brig. Gen. Suk Ju Am,
the Army Provost Marshal, Colonel Song Hyo Soon, the deputy, Colonel Hong Ku Pyo, G-3, and others, and briefed them on the order of the prisoner release, and discussed the plan in detail. At this meeting, the decision was made “to have the Army MP Security Forces seize the camps by force and release the anti-Communist prisoners.”

At the second meeting on June 13, General Won canceled the original plan for security reasons, revised it as ‘release by surprise’, and then set up the operation order, by changing the D-day H-hour from 24:00 June 15 to 24:00 June 18. General Won selected emissaries for each region and dispatched them to Kwangju, Masan, Pusan, Yongchon, and Nonsan to pass the order.\textsuperscript{51} The historical moment was approaching for 36,000 anti-Communist prisoners to be embraced by the free republic.

At about 01:30 of June 18, the first operation report reached General Won. It was from the camps in the Pusan area, informing him of the success in operation. Immediately thereafter a series of success reports arrived at his headquarters. But the attempt at Yongch’on camp was detected by the US troops before the operation got started. Thus, a total of 27,388 prisoners escaped from camps and were set free from Pusan, Kwangju, Nonsan, Masan, Yongch’on, Pup’yong, and Taegu.

At 04:00 of that day, General Won reported the success of the operation to the president, met Minister of Information Kal Hong Ki for consultation, and then dashed to the radio station. He broadcast his statement on the release of anti-Communist prisoners on the air at 06:00 addressed to the whole nation as follows: \textsuperscript{52}

At 24:00 on June 18, 1953 I ordered all the commanding officers of my command to take over the POW camps accommodating Korean patriots. I issued the order for the maintenance of consecrated sovereignty of our fatherland and in accordance with Article 12 of the general provisions of the
Geneva Convention, the international law. I dare to implement it in response to the burning desire of the national spirit. I am confident that it will consequently contribute to the national interest of the member nations of the United Nations, and declare within and without that it is a solemn exercise of civil liberties of the Korean nation in achieving unification even in dreams by advancing to the north. It is desired that international pledges be implemented rigorously and a thorough review on the measures to crush Communist aggression be made upon observing Koreans’ desperate action squarely.

Now I appeal to the patriotic nation including those troops, police officers, youth organizations, and citizens in the vicinity of those POW camps to render their ardent support to the military police forces under my command in performing their duties, and wish all the nation to refresh our resolution in keeping strict order and in doing our best to make our actions long remembered in the world history as endeavors for preserving freedom and securing anticommunism-free peace by resolutely implementing the iron will of the Korean nation at this time of national crisis.

Meanwhile, phone calls were pouring in at the residence of the ROK Army Chief of Staff General Paik Sun Yup in Taegu at about 02:00 of June 18. The first call was from Maj. Gen. Herren of the KCOMZ, protesting forcefully that the ROK security troops had deserted their posts and requesting the escapees be rounded up for US custody. Next came strong protests in a series from Maj. Gen. Gordon Rogers, Chief of KMAG, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the Commanding General of the EUSA, and CINCUNC. Upon receiving the report on these phone protests from General Paik, President Rhee immediately called the CINCUNC, and informed him that the anti-Communist prisoners were set free under his own order and that he was going to make a statement that morning.\textsuperscript{53}} Having
confirmed that most of these anti-Communist prisoners had succeeded in escaping, President Syngman Rhee issued the following statement that morning:

According to the Geneva Convention and also to the principles of human rights, the anti-Communist war prisoners should have been released long before this. Most of the United Nations authorities with whom I have spoken about our desire to release these prisoners are with us in sympathy and principle. But due to the international complications we have been unjustly holding these people too long.

Now the United Nations agreement with the Communists is making the complications worse than ever, which will lead to a serious consequence and result in something to the satisfaction of our enemy and misunderstanding among our own people.

In order to avoid the grave consequences which might result, I have ordered on my own responsibility the release of the anti-Communist Korean prisoners on this day, June 18th, 1953. The reason that I did this without full consultation with the United Nations Command and other authorities concerned is too obvious to explain. The governors and police officers in the various provinces have been instructed to take care of these released war prisoners to their best ability. We trust all our people and our friends will cooperate in this so that there will be no unnecessary misunderstanding anywhere.54)

Upon the release of the anti-Communist prisoners, the US expressed its most serious concern. President Eisenhower and his advisors were seriously concerned over the action of the ROK government.55) Considering the adverse effects of this incident on truce talks, General Clark immediately released a statement stressing the evidence of the ROK Government’s collusion and making it clear that
US personnel at the camps had endeavored to prevent the escape but in vain: 56)

Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 militantly anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war broke out of the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Kwangju, Korea. Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea now make it clear that the action had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at top levels in the Korean government and that outside assistance was furnished the POWs in their mass breakout. ROKA security units assigned as guards at the POW camps did little to prevent the breakouts and there is every evidence of actual collusion between the ROK guards and the prisoners. US personnel at these non-repatriate camps, limited in each case to the camp commander and a few administrative personnel, exerted every effort to prevent today’s mass breakouts, but in the face of collusion between the ROKA guards and the prisoners, their efforts were largely unavailing. The large quantities of non-toxic irritants employed proved ineffective because of the great number of prisoners involved in the night time breakouts. Nine prisoners were killed and 16 injured by rifle fire. There were no casualties among U.S. personnel. As of one o’clock this afternoon, 976 escapees have been recovered. ROKA security guard units which have left their posts at non-repatriate camps are being replaced by U.S. troops.

On the other hand, the ROK people greeted the escapees warmly, providing them with food and shelter and even treating them as heroes. Government organs as well as citizens gave them clothing and hid them in civilian dwellings; thus, the US endeavors to round them up ended with disappointing results. The number released from each camp is shown in the chart below:
Figures of Anti-Communist POWs Interned & Released (as of July 2, 1953)\(^{77}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of POW Camps</th>
<th>Total No. POWs</th>
<th>No of POWs Released</th>
<th>No. of Dead</th>
<th>Number of remaining Interees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Camp in Koje</td>
<td>3,065</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Camp in Kayari</td>
<td>4,027</td>
<td>4,027</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Camp in Kwangju</td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Camp in Nonsan</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Camp in Masan</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Camp in Yongch’on</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Camp in Pup’yong</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Camp in Taegu</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35,698</td>
<td>35,698</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first enemy reaction appeared on the following morning of June 19. They called off a meeting of interpreters and another of staff officers in charge of detailed work on the DMZ. When the plenary conference reconvened on June 20, the enemy delegation presented the following letter by Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai charging that the UNC had deliberately connived with the Rhee ‘clique’ in releasing the prisoners: \(^{58}\)

Is the United Nations Command able to control the South Korean government and Army? If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee Clique? If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea? If it is included, then your side must be responsible for recovering immediately all 25,952… prisoners and must give assurance that similar incidents will not recur in the future.\(^{59}\)
Meanwhile, on June 20 President Rhee sent a letter to General Clark, emphasizing his conviction that the political conference to be held in the future would prove to be useless and it was self-evident that unification not accomplished in the war could not be achieved in the political conference. Rhee said that he was confident that political negotiations with the Communists, as had taken place in the past, could not succeed.

In the concluding part of his letter, Rhee emphasized that ROK’s release of anti-Communist prisoners was not to be identified with the idea of pulling out his forces from the UN Command. Rhee assured Clark that when such action became inevitable, the issue would be discussed in advance.\(^{50}\)

The incident of prisoner release might be interpreted as clear evidence that President Rhee could commit any kind of action independently. It also implied that even though the ROK forces and military facilities were under the operational control of CINCUNC, the ROK president in all probability could disrupt any agreement concluded between the UNC and the Communists once he was determined to do so. Although the truce talks progressed against the wishes of the ROK people, setting free the prisoners demonstrated the strong spirit of independence of a nation conducting the war with the support of a superpower.\(^{51}\)

**IV. The Government’s for Anti-Truce Policy and the Korean and American Conference**

1. Anti-Truce Movements of the Government and the Korean People

As the UNC neared the final stages of concluding the cease-fire negotiations with the Communist forces, the UNC’s relation with the ROK deteriorated. The ROK government consistently had held fast to its position opposing the
cease-fire negotiation ever since the initial proposals for negotiations. President Syngman Rhee stated clearly that he would never agree to the armistice agreement unless the following conditions were satisfied:

1) withdrawal of all Chinese Communist forces from Korea;
2) disarming of North Korean Communist forces;
3) clear stipulation that no “third power” could assist the North Koreans in any international conference considering any phase of the Korean problem; and
4) full recognition and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the ROK.62)

As the progress in armistice negotiations became imminent, the tone of ROK’s public statements became fiercer, and consequently anti-armistice demonstrations and mass rallies spread nationwide.

Having assessed the grave impact of determined ROK opposition to the armistice negotiations,63) General Clark forwarded to Washington on April 16 a joint assessment of the ROK situation prepared by the US Ambassador and the Commanding General of the KCOMZ as follows:

Clear and unequivocal ROK opposition to the armistice stemmed from: 1) a strong desire for national unification; 2) memory of the 1950 aggression from the north; 3) recognition of Russo-Chinese power and political pressure; and 4) fear that US support would not be forthcoming in a future aggression. If President Rhee believed he could achieve his long-range objectives by using his forces independently, he would do so. He is dangerous because of his general unpredictability and his tendency to act on occasion “without adequate prior consideration of the consequences.” The situa-
tion is urgent, but Rhee might be pacified by assurance of a bilateral US-ROK security pact, which he seems to desire, perhaps combined with promises that the United States would supply postwar economic aid, support ROK participation in the political conference, and continue to seek Korean unification by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{64}

By then, in his press conference on April 11, President Rhee expressed his determination that “we oppose truce talks and we will advance to the north with the ROK forces alone,” and the National Assembly of the ROK also adopted a resolution against an armistice and for advance to the north on April 21.\textsuperscript{65}

Three days later President Rhee informed President Eisenhower that if the UNC agreed to allow Chinese Communist forces to remain south of the Yalu, he would withdraw his forces from the UN Command. He emphasized that “he would fight on alone if he had to.”\textsuperscript{66}

On April 27 General Clark called on President Syngman Rhee to discuss the pending problems. A critical issue raised in this meeting was simultaneous withdrawal of the UN and Chinese Communist forces from the peninsula. President Rhee demanded a security guarantee such as a US commitment to a security pact with the ROK, US guarantee for assistance in case of an invasion by the USSR, continued naval blockade and air cover until peace is secured, and the US support for strengthening the ROK forces before the UN forces could withdraw from Korea.\textsuperscript{67}

In addition, the focus of President Rhee’s objection was the stationing of troops of Communist countries and of India on Korean soil. In fact, the ROK member of the UNC delegation tendered a plan of his own specifying that Switzerland would chair the repatriation commission and would furnish all of the custodial forces, which would be restricted to the island of Cheju-do.\textsuperscript{68}

On May 8, President Rhee expressed his determination to General Clark,
who had made a return visit to him: "There is no change in my opposition to the armistice, and in case Indian forces are to enter into Korea, I will order the release of nonrepatriate prisoners."\(^{69}\)

On the other hand, the United States wanted an early cease-fire. On the morning of May 25, General Clark and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs visited President Rhee and described the final version of the terms on the nonrepatriates to be offered the enemy. They tried to persuade President Rhee by suggesting the US would guarantee political, economic, and military support if he cooperated in carrying out the armistice agreement.\(^{70}\)

After listening to the US envoys, President Rhee’s first comment was, "You can withdraw all UN Forces… We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us. We made our mistake perhaps in the beginning in relying upon a democracy to assist us. Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstances.\(^{71}\)

The final proposal of the UNC shocked the ROK government and the people, causing a fierce reaction.\(^{72}\) First of all, the ROK delegate declined to attend the truce talk. His absence, representing the official stance of the ROK, implied its strong reaction turning down the proposal presented by the UNC. Having refused to attend the conference, the ROK delegate made a request in a letter delivered to the UNC senior delegate. The letter was prepared in serious consultation with the ROK government and military leaders in advance:

I have consistently expressed what the Korean people have thought of and sought in the truce talks. However, I am utterly disappointed to know that our claim has not been reflected at all in the proposal of May 25.

\* Opinions on the general issues:

1) The primary concession made in the UNC’s proposal on May 13 is
withdrawal of its proposal for releasing the anti-Communist Korean POWs who refuse to be repatriated;

2) The second concession is the extension of management period and the transfer of those nonrepatriates to the political conference and the United Nations;

3) The principle of the majority vote is favorable only to the Communists.

- Opinions on POWs’ decision-making:

4) An unknown number of pro-Communist Indian forces along with elements of Czechoslovakia and Poland which are considered to be Soviet satellites are to enter into our territory and are to have guarantee on their extraterritorial rights;

5) In addition to their military forces, more than 150 agents from the Communist side are to enter into the territory of the Republic of Korea and to enjoy the freedom to act as they wish; and,

6) It seems appropriate in principle to inform the POWs of the whole articles of the armistice agreement; however, we cannot expect young POWs to fight to the last minute against persuasions and threats to be conducted by the Communist political agents.

- Conclusion:

The UN’s proposal made on May 25 signifies its surrender to the Communists’ call for forced repatriation. It is my regret that not a single word reflecting views and recommendations of the ROK people could be found in the new proposal.

- Recommendations:

It is recommended that prior good faith consultations be made with allies in preparing a new proposal to be presented to the Communists after June 1, 1953; that is, to write the new proposal with sufficient consultations with the Republic of Korea, an ally of the United States.\(^7\)
Thus, the ROK government made it clear that the ROK would continue to fight by itself if necessary for unification; however, the situation did not allow the ROK government to reverse the firm stance of the US government to conclude the Korean War with an armistice. But the ROK government conveyed a clear message to the US that the US should be ready to accept an unexpected situation if an armistice were signed without the ROK’s consent. Taking into consideration the probable contingencies, the delegates of the UNC took security measures internally to prevent classified information on truce talks from leaking to the ROK delegate.  

Meanwhile, the UNC drew up Plan EVERREADY, which envisioned three contingency situations in preparation for the possible ROK forces withdrawal from the UNC. On May 22, General Clark sent a report to Washington in which a plan was set for each of the three contingency situations as follows:  

Condition 1. ROK forces are not responsive to the UNC directives: Preparation begins for withdrawal of US/UN forces to protect vital areas and installations around major cities; naval and air forces will go on alert; the level of supply in forward areas will be reduced; and intelligence coverage of the ROK government and Army will be increased.  

Condition 2. ROK forces take independent operations: Some of the forces will be withdrawn in order to protect military installations; nonessential installations will be closed; ROK security units will be disarmed and relieved; strong security will be set up at all vital installations and communication centers, and the movement of civilians will be restricted.  

Condition 3. ROK forces and populace become openly hostile to the UN forces: The UN forces and dependable ROK forces will be withdrawn from defensive positions.
Under any of these contingencies, other measures such as proclamation of martial law in the name of the UN, seizure of dissident military and civilian leaders, and proclamation of a military government were planned. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve the part of the plan for a military government but authorized Clark to take preliminary measures to insure the integrity of his forces if any action by the ROK government should cause a grave emergency.  

Regardless of the opposition by the ROK government, the UNC continued negotiations based on the proposal of May 25, and on June 6 President Rhee issued the following statement, calling the proposal ‘unacceptable’ and demanding simultaneous withdrawal of the UN and Communist forces from Korea on the condition that a ROK-US mutual defense pact was concluded first:

The government of the Republic of Korea presents an alternative proposal since the new proposal of the UNC is unacceptable for the ROK. Prior to the implementation of simultaneous withdrawal of the UN and the Communist forces from Korea, a ROK-US mutual defense treaty should be concluded under the following conditions:

1) Upon an invasion on the Korean Peninsula by one or several nations, the United States and the Republic of Korea immediately and automatically assume common defense;

2) The United States provides the Republic of Korea with a sufficient amount of weapons, ammunition, and logistical support in order to enhance the defense capabilities of the ROK forces so that participation of US citizens in the ground warfare would not be required; and

3) The US naval and air forces should continuously be stationed to support ROK defense capabilities and thus to discourage another Communist invasion.
President Rhee insisted in his message that the defense pact should be signed before the simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula; he also emphasized that continued US military assistance, a guarantee of prompt and automatic commitment upon Communists’ reinvansion, and continued presence of the US naval and air forces in the present positions as a deterrent against an enemy new offensive should be stipulated in clear terms.  

Friction continued between the ROK and US governments. On the day President Rhee issued his statement, the CINCUNC delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, expressing his intention to negotiate a mutual defense pact and promising economic assistance containing the following messages:

1) The United States as a member of the United Nations would continue to seek, by peaceful means, the unification of Korea, making this ‘our central objective’ in the post-armistice political conference, and would consult the ROK government prior to opening and during the sessions of the conference;  

2) The US would negotiate, “promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice”, a mutual defense treaty like those with the Philippines, and with Australia-New Zealand; and  

3) The US would continue economic aid to the war-stricken Republic of Korea in order to rehabilitate its industry and agriculture with the budget approved by the Congress.

In other words, the US promised to take the following steps: 1) continue to seek, by peaceful means, the unification of Korea, making this ‘our central objective’ in the political conference; 2) negotiate, “promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice,” a mutual defense treaty like those with the
Philippines and with Australia-New Zealand; and, 3) continue economic aid after the war.\(^79\)

But President Rhee was aware that the armistice was to be concluded soon and decided that a measure of pressure was necessary. Rhee replied to Clark's proposal: "Too late. Korea cannot survive if Chinese Communists remain on Korean soil."\(^80\)

President Rhee had already been considering the release of the anti-Communist prisoners since June 6. He proclaimed an extraordinary state of emergency, ordered the immediate return of all ROK officers from the United States, and recalled the ROK delegate from the UNC Armistice delegation, confirming his stance of opposing the armistice.\(^81\)

On June 7 General Clark tried to persuade President Rhee, but Rhee replied: "the ROK government will never accept the present armistice terms, but will fight on even if it means suicide, and hereafter I will feel free to take whatever steps I consider appropriate." Clark later recalled Rhee's stubborn position at this meeting: .

President Rhee said he would not permit any Indian troops on ROK soil as neutrals or anything else. He said that rather than countenance the presence of Indian troops in his country he might, on his own, release the nonrepatriates "without involving the UN Command." This was the first positive storm warning of what was to come.\(^82\)

On June 8, the agreement on POW repatriation was signed regardless of the expectation of the ROK people. The conclusion of the prisoner repatriation agreement heralded an agreement on an armistice. The anti-armistice demonstrations were at their peak among the Koreans, who had shed the most blood, but whose wishes were neglected.
The symptoms of unprecedented anti-American emotion spread nationwide in the Republic, and anti-armistice demonstrations grew in frequency and scope as well. To cope with this situation, the United States raised the issue of suspending the ROK forces expansion plan on one hand and continued its endeavor to persuade the ROK government on the other.\(^{83}\)

On June 12, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to President Rhee and invited him to Washington for a meeting with President Eisenhower, ostensibly for concerting plans for the political conference. Rhee expressed his gratitude for the invitation but replied that he was unable to leave at that time and countered with an invitation to Dulles to come over to Korea. Dulles declined the invitation since he was faced the many demands of his office. Thus, Dulles proposed to send Walter S. Robertson, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, to clear up the ‘misunderstanding as to our post-armistice policies.’\(^{84}\)

On June 17, President Rhee welcomed this option and sent the following letter in reply to President Eisenhower’s letter:

\[\text{…Mr. President, you will easily imagine what a hard situation we confront. We committed everything including our armed forces, to the United Nations action in Korea, incurring frightful losses in manpower as well as material destruction, in the sole belief that we and our friends had the selfsame objectives of unifying sundered Korea and punishing the Communist aggressors. Now the United Nations seems to stop short of its original aims, and to come to terms with aggressors which we cannot accept, not because we have never been consulted but because those terms would mean sure death for the Korean nation. Moreover, the United Nations is now putting pressure on us in cooperating with it, and is joining hands, it seems, with the enemy in this matter of armistice terms.}\]
President Syngman Rhee’s stance opposing armistice was based on his goal of reuniting the Korean nation. He believed that to maintain the legacy of division left by superpower politics would only prolong the suffering of the Korean nation and repeat the tragedy of ideological confrontation and the war between the south and the north. Thus, it was unacceptable. That is, with the perception that a divided nation, a lesser state in world would not be left to the mercy of world politics, that might bring on danger of losing its survival, without guarantees on its future security, Rhee commenced his anti-armistice campaign.

2. The Korean and American Conference

As the relationship between the ROK and US was deteriorating, the US was examining positive alternatives in order to persuade the ROK government while the ROK government was deploying an anti-armistice campaign after the release of anti-Communist prisoners. President Rhee pressured the UNC through diverse means. The Korean workers at Pusan and Inch’on harbors suspended their work in support of the UN forces, and large scale demonstrations increased across the nation.

Thus, Eisenhower decided to dispatch Assistant Secretary of State Robertson immediately to Seoul, and Robertson along with General Collins left for Korea carrying the letter of Secretary of State Dulles insisting that the ROK could not afford to exercise the right to endanger the armistice.

The party led by Special Envoy Robertson arrived in Tokyo on June 24, 1953. They were immediately greeted by General Clark of the UNC, Ambassadors Briggs resident in Seoul and Murphy resident in Tokyo. At the meeting, they reached a consensus that an early armistice agreement was desirable. They unanimously recommended to tell President Rhee that the UN would withdraw from Korea if he continued to be uncooperative, and the US president
consented to this position.\textsuperscript{86)}

Special Envoy Robertson arrived in Seoul on June 25. At the airport he announced that the purpose of his visit as to discuss with the ROK government various issues related to the armistice agreement, the exchange of prisoners, and the political conference in the future. The next day Robertson as US Presidential Envoy and his party met President Rhee for a conference. After a heated argument between the two parties, President Rhee implied that he could accept the armistice agreement, subject to four conditions:

1) The remaining anti-Communist Korean prisoners would be moved to the DMZ to be taken over by the NNRC;
2) A time limit of 90 days would be placed upon the political conference;
3) The United States would provide economic aid to the ROK and would continue assistance in building up the ROK Army to 20 divisions; and
4) The United States would at once guarantee a mutual defense pact.\textsuperscript{87)}

These stipulations were quickly referred to Washington, and on June 27 President Eisenhower replied to President Rhee:

1) If logistically feasible, the remaining Korean non-repatriates would be moved to the DMZ. Chinese nonrepatriates would be turned over to the NNRC on Cheju Island;
2) The United States could not impose a unilateral time limit upon the political conference, but would be willing to consider withdrawing at the end of 90 days, in concert with the ROK, if it was clear that no progress was being made;
3) The United States would furnish economic aid and assist in reaching the twenty-division goal; and
4) The United States would be willing to negotiate a mutual defense treaty, similar to that with the Philippines, but the President could not ‘guarantee’ it since the consent of the US Senate would be required.\(^{88}\)

The US side demanded that the ROK government accept the authority of the UNC to conduct or conclude hostilities; it must observe the armistice agreed between the UNC and the Communists; and it must leave its forces under the operational control of the UNC until an agreement was reached by mutual consent.

The ROK was satisfied with the US proposal in general, but added a new clause in its aide-memoire the next day suggesting that the ROK forces remain under the operational control of the UNC under the condition that a mutual defense treaty be concluded prior to the armistice agreement. Otherwise the ROK would resume fighting in case the political conference failed, especially if the CPVA did not withdraw from North Korea, and if the UNC did not cooperate and support the efforts of the ROK government in fulfilling our common cause by a victory in war.\(^{89}\)

The US negotiators were angered by the conditions suggested by the ROK and rejected them. They concluded that the only way to change President Rhee’s conception was to implement the US decision on armistice; thus, they decided that General Clark should send a reply to the Communists proposing the resumption of talks. Ambassador Robertson should notify President Rhee that the US would be on its way to armistice.

President Rhee wanted an American commitment to continue the war until the unification of the peninsula in case the political conference failed, but Robertson was not authorized to make such a pledge. After consultation with the Secretary of State, the US envoy wrote an aide-memoire on July 2 and delivered it to President Rhee the next day as follows:
1) To conclude a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the existing one with the Philippine Republic, negotiations could begin at once, but ratification must wait the advice and consent of the US Senate;

2) To aid the ROK in building and maintaining its armed forces for defense against attack, at a level of about 20 divisions, together with naval and air forces. This promise was subject to congressional authorization and appropriation;

3) To begin an integrated program of economic assistance to help the ROK improve its standard of living, sustain its armed forces, and progress toward economic self-sufficiency, subject again to Congressional approval;

4) To confer with President Rhee, after signing of the armistice, on common objectives at the political conference; and

5) To agree that the political conference should seek promptly and vigorously to obtain a unified Korea and the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces. If after 90 days the conference proved fruitless and the Communists were exploiting it for propaganda purposes or to embarrass the ROK, the United States would be prepared, with the ROK, to withdraw from the conference and to consult regarding further measures aimed at the unification of Korea.901

Ambassador Robertson, of course, could not pledge automatic renewal of military action in case of a failure of the armistice agreement as the US president had not committed to it; rather, he presented to President Rhee a revised draft of the mutual defense treaty. The ROK side wanted to postpone signing the armistice agreement until the defense pact was concluded, but Robertson just said that he would do his best.

President Rhee responded: “we are very near to an agreement not to
obstruct the armistice, provided the US definitely pledges to resume fighting with us, in case of a failure of the political conference, until the unification of Korea is accomplished.” Rhee did not insist on withdrawal of Chinese forces prior to an armistice and agreed to cooperate in moving POWs to the DMZ so as to obviate entry of the NNRC into ROK territory. However, he demanded a new mutual defense treaty containing the following in exchange for his acceptance of the US proposal:

1) The ROK and the US recognize ROK’s sovereignty over the territory south of the Tumen and Yalu Rivers, an extension to the original territory of the Republic of Korea;

2) In order to accomplish the goal of this treaty, mutual assistance is to continue, and if considered desirable, the US will establish ground, naval and air bases on the peninsula and on islands in the vicinity; and,

3) Upon military invasion upon one party, the other party commits forces immediately and automatically; the scope of invasion applies not only to the peninsula but also its islands, armed forces, vessels and airplanes as well.91)

There were substantial differences between the ROK draft of the mutual defense treaty and that of the US. President Rhee, continuing to criticize the US aide-memoire of July 2, conveyed his reply containing his position to Robertson on July 7. In it, he pronounced Point 1 acceptable despite the uncertainty of Senate ratification; Points 2 and 3, regarding military and economic assistance were in accord with earlier agreements, though the target for ultimate ROKA expansion should, in his opinion, be flexible instead of being fixed at 20 divisions. Point 4, on postwar objectives, was also acceptable. As for Point 5 on the political conference, Rhee accepted the US proposal to withdraw if it failed. However, he
insisted that the US should either join in a renewed conflict or, at least, provide “moral and material support to the ROK in resuming a military conflict aimed at unifying the country.\textsuperscript{92}

In his message sent to President Rhee, Secretary Dulles went about as far as was legally possible in guaranteeing the mutual security treaty. Dulles stated that the US was ready to negotiate the treaty without waiting for the political conference and would seek ‘prompt ratification.’ Special Envoy Robertson passed this letter to President Syngman Rhee on July 8. President Rhee denied any intention of removing ROK forces from the UNC and denied that he had intended to refuse to withdraw ROK troops from the DMZ after armistice.\textsuperscript{93}

The climax of the Rhee-Robertson negotiations came on July 9. President Rhee promised in a private meeting that they were nearing an agreement, that he would accept the armistice, and that he would leave ROK troops under the UNC without specifying a time limit.\textsuperscript{94}

The second meeting was devoted to the question of the movement of nonrepatriate prisoners. General Clark reaffirmed his willingness to transport both Korean and Chinese nonrepatriates to the DMZ, despite enormous logistical problems in doing so, and expressed his belief that the enemy delegation would also agree to the proposal. President Rhee reiterated his position that no Indian troops would be allowed to enter South Korea; however, General Clark decided that they could be flown directly into the DMZ.\textsuperscript{95}

After this conference July 9, President Syngman Rhee passed to Ambassador Robertson a letter lucidly paraphrasing his commitments made that day along with a revised draft of a mutual defense treaty. In this letter Rhee summarized the progress of the truce talks so far and noted his government’s agreement to an armistice under the following conditions: \textsuperscript{96}

To abandon the demand that Chinese troops withdraw and that Korea be uni-
fied before an armistice was signed; to accept a three month period of activity for nonrepatriate POWs (instead of demanding that they be released at once); to cooperate with the UNC in transporting these prisoners to the DMZ. The two latter concessions, however, were subject to an understanding that no foreign troops (from India or any other country) would be landed in South Korea and that after three months of questioning and screening, all Korean POWs who so desired would be released south of the DMZ and all Chinese who refused repatriation would be transported to Taiwan.

President Rhee expressed his understanding of the problems of getting the mutual defense pact ratified and agreed that ratification at the next session of Congress would suffice. Rhee said “we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under the armistice are detrimental to our survival.” He also added: “we will endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in the political and peaceful achievement of reunification of our nation, which is our most fundamental national objective and necessity.”

On July 11, 1953, President Rhee and Ambassador Robertson had a final conference and released the agreement in the following terms the next day:

1) The ROK and the US agree to conclude the mutual defense pact after signing the armistice agreement. For this, Secretary of State Dulles persuades US Senators to respond favorably to the pact;

2) The US provides the ROK with long-term economic assistance along with a single package of $200 million. In addition, the CINCUNC provides ROK people with ten million pounds of food equivalent to $950,000;

3) In case the political conference fails in producing concrete results in 90 days, the ROK and the US withdraw from the conference and discuss a future course of action for unification of Korea;
4) The ROK forces are strengthened to twenty divisions as planned and its naval and air forces are expanded accordingly; and
5) Prior to the political conference, a high-level ROK-US talk is held to discuss all aspects of common objectives.98)

On July 12, Robertson’s party left Seoul for home. In Seoul and Washington, the two countries simultaneously released a communiqué stressing that the Rhee-Robertson talks had reached an agreement on arrangements for a truce in Korea, for handling of the prisoners, and for future collaboration.

Thus, the UNC was concentrating on preparations for the final phase of the negotiation. Still the UNC was concerned with a few obstacles anticipated such as the Chinese final offensive, pressure of the Communist delegates demanding guarantees on compliance with agreement by the ROK, and difficulties with the ROK in clarifying problems remaining not specified in the Rhee-Robertson agreement.

V. Final Military Operations

1. Military Situation on the Third Anniversary of the War

In early 1953 a lull came to the frontline even with the truce talks suspended. Rebuilding and manning the front after the fierce fighting for hills that had continued up to the end of 1952, both sides searched for new military operations that might create some advantage over the other even with the expectation for an early settlement of the prisoner issues, still the main obstacle to armistice talks. Both sides were also intent on securing more advantageous defense posi-
tions before armistice and concluding the war with some political and psychological gains.

In this context, the Communists augmented their defense capabilities and concentrated on accumulating offensive capabilities until March 1953, and commenced the summer offensive, the so-called ‘final offensive’ prior to the truce even though the plenary conference for armistice negotiations resumed after six months on April 26, encouraged by the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, which had begun on April 20. On the other hand, the UNC assumed a defensive posture planning no offensive operations that might jeopardize an early conclusion of the war. As the Communists delayed the progress in armistice negotiations and continuously strengthened their military capabilities, the UNC responded resolutely with military actions. First, the US started to implement the expansion program of the ROK forces to twenty divisions, and the CINCUNC recommended to his superiors an extended war plan, including bombing Manchuria. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration, examined multiple pressure strategies, including use of nuclear weapons.

This plan of the UNC worked. With the third anniversary of the war approaching, the Communists, at the junction of a limited and extended war, accepted ‘the final proposal of May 25’ leading to the dramatic settlement on the POW agenda, and to the signing of the armistice agreement, but only after the enemy mounted a final offensive.

(1) Pressure Strategy of the UNC

As 1953 began, the CINCUNC transferred his strategy from attack on limited objectives to extended war and heightened air pressure operations as the enemy’s military capability was growing. The strategy of attacking limited targets had failed to coerce the enemy to the table for truce talks. The extended war strat-
egy reflected a change to replace the strategy of the former administration, a process underway since the start of the Eisenhower administration on January 21.

The old US policy on Korea adopted on December 20, 1951 as NSC 118/2 stated as a minimum US objective in Korea “a settlement of the conflict that would not jeopardize the position of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union, Taiwan, or the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the UN.” A satisfactory armistice arrangement should guarantee the ROK government control of the area with defensible boundaries south of the 38th parallel, building sufficient power in the ROK forces to enable them to repel any renewed aggression from North Korea, and then the gradual withdrawal of all non-Korean troops. Should the armistice fail, the US would prepare for the possibility of an extended war, increase the scale of military operations to the extent of forces available, and remove restrictions against military advances into North Korea. However, bombing Chinese air bases was set aside as requiring the authorization of the president, and a naval blockade of China was also set aside for review.99

The gist of the old US policy was to pursue armistice along the existing line of contact a little north of the 38th Parallel, and in case of a failure, to advance to the north with the extension of the war to Manchuria or mainland China set aside for review.

However, President-elect Eisenhower visited the frontline in Korea during the period of December 2-5, 1952 in search of an early honorable end to the war as he had pledged in his campaign. After the visit he said, “small attacks on small hills would not end the war.” Convinced of the futility of more ground assaults, he preferred to choose and apply a new policy.100

Thus, the US began, from February 1953, to actively search for a new Korean policy, especially for an early conclusion of the Korean conflict. Meanwhile, the enemy carried out a reinforcement along the frontline that caused considerable alarm to General Clark, who alerted the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
February 11, 1953. It was the day Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor replaced General Van Fleet as the commanding general of the Eighth US Army. General Clark reported that from one to three additional CPVA armies had entered Korea (in reality four additional armies were committed by the end of March) and that the enemy's growing air capabilities, especially those fighters based in Manchuria (CCF, Russians, and NK forces), were posing a threat to the UN forces. Clark expressed his grave concern in the following words: "It is now disclosed clearly that the enemy blatantly used Kaesong as a major advance military base. They were using it to stage and resupply its forces on the entire western front. A large concentration of troops, supplies, artillery and armor, and even command posts of several Chinese armies were located in the sanctuary area."\(^{(1)}\)

With the changing enemy situation, General Clark pointed out that he had serious doubts about the feasibility of OPLAN 8-52, which was then four months old, and consulted the JCS on counter measures. This was an ambitious plan to conclude the war by pressing the enemy to comply with the armistice terms of the UNC through the following extended campaign:

1) Drive the current frontline up to the line of P’yongyang-Wonsan;
2) Bomb mainland China including Manchuria;
3) Set up a naval blockade on China; and,
4) Carefully examine removal of restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons.\(^{(2)}\)

In his situation report on the growing enemy threat, General Clark emphasized that all the units under his command should be maintained at full strength in terms of personnel, equipment, and supplies at all times to insure a strong defensive capability. Since the UN forces including the US troops could not be augmented in terms of personnel, General Clark strongly recommended the
expansion of the ROK forces into twenty divisions, which was approved on April 22. It was a practical solution to the problems of strengthening the combat capabilities of the UN forces and deterring renewed aggression from the north even after armistice. Furthermore, the expansion of the ROK forces should have been implemented prior to the armistice since the importation of additional heavy equipment would be impossible under the arrangement of the armistice.

Accordingly the ROK III Corps was reactivated on May 1, 1953, and the 26th and 27th Divisions were activated on June 18. Thus, the ROK forces had the strength of three corps and eighteen divisions with the addition of eight new divisions on the third anniversary of the war.

As to an enemy air threat, General Clark was not authorized to bomb Manchuria by the JCS; rather, he was informed that he had to request permission in case it was necessary to bomb enemy air bases outside the peninsula, but only if a large-scale enemy air attack threatened the safety of the UN forces. Concerning the threat from the Kaesong area, the JCS authorized Clark to counterattack in case a division-scale offensive was clearly staged from the Kaesong sanctuary, which would be interpreted as violation of the safety arrangements.

The enemy air threat and its abuse of the Kaesong sanctuary attracted President Eisenhower's attention, and were seriously discussed at the NSC upon presidential directive. Simultaneously in search for a countermeasure to the enemy's military threat, the new administration formulated NSC 147 on April 2, 1953 to replace NSC 118/2 as a plausible policy to conclude the Korean War. It was reviewed by the president and the NSC in April and May. This was the American policy alternative proposed for official government decision in order to achieve a desirable result in the war by expanding the war militarily.

As originally proposed by the JCS on March 27, 1953, the memorandum outlined six alternatives: three of them (A, B, & C) were measures confining the war to the peninsula, and the other three (D, E, & F) extended the war to mainland
China. The main contents were as follows:

Course A: Continue military pressure on the enemy at the present level, while building up the ROK forces.

Course B: Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action.

Course C: Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea (P’yongyang-Wonsan).

Course D: Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and if required, increase ground operations in Korea.
Course E: Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea in addition to taking ‘Course D.’

Course F: Undertake a coordinated, large scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against China to wipe out Communist forces from the Korean peninsula.

The courses of action of NSC 147 had been continuously examined by NSC and JCS, and at last on May 20 the JCS decided to choose a combination of Course D, E, and F in case the armistice negotiations should break down at the last moment. The courses of action chosen appear below: 104)

Extend and intensify military action against the enemy, to include air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria. Launch a coordinat-ed offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea and to be prepared for further operations as required in order to:

a. Destroy effective Communist military power in Korea.
b. Reduce the enemy’s capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East.
c. Increase possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on US-UN.terms.
d. Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing respon-sibility for operations in Korea.

With this course of action, the troop requirements of CINCUNC OPLAN 8-52 had to be revised and the use of nuclear weapons in that plan had to be reviewed. Thus, CINCUNC, CINCPAC, and COMSAC were all notified of the course and General Clark started to revise his OPLAN 8-52 in coordination with these Commanders in Chief.
The fact that the use of nuclear weapons was examined in drawing CINCUNC OPLAN 8-52 and NCS 147 deserves further analysis. From the early stage of the invasion by North Korea in July 1950, the United States reviewed the use of nuclear weapons, drafted an operation plan for nuclear weapons after the Chinese intervention, and even conducted an exercise, but never actually used nuclear weapons.

According to ‘Atomic Target Analysis’ of the Far East Command dated September 15, 1950 (Top Secret), the US Far East Command chose the P’yonggang area 10 kilometers north of the contact line as a nuclear target and reviewed in detail the plan for a hypothetical nuclear strike. At that time, enemy units, artillery positions, supply dumps for oil and ammunition, and air strips were concentrated in P’yonggang, posing a serious threat to the defense of Ch’orwon-Kimhwa in the central front of the ROK forces.

When the Communists continued to delay the truce talks, the operation using nuclear weapons was again examined as a countermeasure by the new administration. It was raised at the NSC on February 11, 1953 as President Eisenhower himself expressed his view of using atomic weapons at Kaesong. Taking advantage of the neutral area, the enemy concentrated large troops and supplies in this area, and General Clark called this area ‘chock full of enemy troops and material’. He thought that an enemy offensive launched from this springboard could be fatal to the defense of Seoul. After this move by the enemy, the use of atomic weapons been seriously considered as a measure for concluding the war while the Planning Committee of the NSC was preparing NSC 147 in March-April 1953.

In this course of events, President Eisenhower employed diplomacy, with subtle hints to China of the possible use of nuclear weapons, in order to break the deadlock at P’anmunjom. In addition, through the press release of the discussions on NSC 147, the warning message that President Eisenhower was
A hypothetical target under consideration by US Far East Command for attack with atomic Weapons: plan to strike with 40KT atomic bomb on GZ selected 2.5km northwest of P’yongyang
considering the use of dire means to end the war in Korea leaked to China and the USSR.

These Eisenhower tactics on the use of nuclear weapons, together with the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, eventually contributed to promoting the truce talks instead of escalating the Korean War.\footnote{108}

As Eisenhower said later on to his assistant Sherman Adams, it was the “danger of an atomic war that brought the armistice agreement in July 1953.”\footnote{109} This is one evidence that nuclear strategy performed a decisive role in leading to signing the armistice. Eisenhower emphasized it in his memoire as follows:

The lack of progress in the long-stalemated talks—they were then recessed—and the nearly stalemated war both demanded, in my opinion, definite measures on our part to put an end to these intolerable conditions. Our possibility was to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean peninsula. We would not be limited by any world-wide gentleman’s agreement. In India and in the Formosa Straits area, and at the truce negotiation at P’anmunjom, we dropped the word, discreetly, of our intention. We felt quite sure it would reach Soviet and Chinese Communist ears. Soon the prospects for armistice negotiation seemed to improve.\footnote{110}

In order to achieve an early armistice, the UNC intensified pressure on the enemy not only with the ‘nuclear threat’ but also with Operation Air Pressure, hitting reservoirs in North Korea. With air superiority secured and the enemy aircraft tied up north of the Ch’ongch’on River, the UN air forces bombed major reservoirs of North Korea in the months of May and Jun after hitting the Sup’ung
Power Plant third time in February 1953 as a part of Operation Air Pressure. This option had been reserved as it could devastate North Korean agricultural economy; however, it was chosen as a final alternative to facilitate the enemy’s acceptance of armistice arrangements since the destruction of these facilities could have important effects on military operations and in breaking the enemy’s will to fight.

Thus, the UN air forces continued to destroy the Chasan Reservoir during May 15-16, 1953 creating a flood sweeping away three rail bridges on the line of Kunuri, Sunch’on, and P’yongyang and cutting off the enemy’s line of communications. On May 21 and 29, they bombed the Kwonga Reservoir. Having suffered heavy flood damage from the destruction of the Chasan Reservoir, the enemy started to discharge the water contained in the other dams; thus, the destruction of reservoirs thereafter could not have substantial effects. But the Operation Air Pressure making destruction of the Sup’ung Dam and the reservoirs imposed a heavy blow on the enemy economically, militarily, and psychologically. ‘Nuclear threat’ and ‘air pressure’ functioned as important elements in bringing the enemy to terms of agreement.

(2) CCF’s Strategy of Summer Offensive

Communist China forecast that the UNC would expand the war upon the inauguration of President Eisenhower in January 1953 since he had been the general of the army who commanded the Allied forces in Europe during World War II. The Communists believed that the discussions in the inner circles of the United States tilted toward an extended war after Eisenhower’s visit to Korea in 1952. The CCF presumed, “the UNC would choose a measure as most effective combining a frontal attack with landing operations on both coasts of the peninsula employing its superior naval and air capabilities since the UNC was well aware that the UNC’s traditional frontal attack against consolidated Communists’ posi-
tions would be very costly.” Thus, the Communist forces decided to strengthen their coastal defenses, especially the western coast, preparing for counter-landing operations as their top priority, complemented by their traditional operations of delaying tactics and positive defense.\(^\text{112}\)

In accordance with this strategic estimate and later planning, the Chinese relocated troops to reinforcing defense positions in the coastal areas of east and west with emphasis on countering landing and airborne attacks. They committed additional troops to the peninsula on the following scale by the end of March: four armies, including the 1st, 16th, and 54th Armies and 130th, the reorganized 33rd, and 138th Divisions, one tank division, and eight artillery regiments. The Chinese set up separate combined command posts in the east and the west to take charge of these troops. Furthermore, the CCF committed five railroad engineering divisions and 5,000 railroad workers in rehabilitating and repairing the rail system.\(^\text{113}\) The Communists completed their defensive system along the frontline and the coasts by building double defense lines with the depth of 10 kilometers along both coasts, mobilizing a labor commitment of sixty million man-days in total (half a million men daily) for four months by the end of April. The enemy had already stockpiled ammunition and food in excess of their goals by the end of February, securing food rations for 120 days.\(^\text{114}\)

By the time they got prepared for the counter-landing operations in April 1953, the enemy’s total strength was 1,800,000: 1,350,000 Chinese consisting of nineteen armies and 450,000 North Koreans of six corps. Their manpower and firepower were significantly augmented, positions were solid, supplies were abundant, and their morale was high. Only seven armies and one division newly committed (the 1st, 16th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 46th, 54th Armies & 33rd Division) lacked experience in offensive operations against fortified positions.\(^\text{115}\)

With their combat capabilities strengthened and their positions solidified, the Communists started to launch selective attacks at small objectives along
the whole frontline from the latter part of March to the beginning of April.\textsuperscript{116} They finally decided to commence summer offensive, that is, an all-area counteroffensive on May 5.\textsuperscript{117} The offensive is summarized below:

The purpose of this offensive is “to destroy the enemy forces, to have our troops trained and experienced, and to support the negotiation at P’anmunjom. In addition, it is to improve our present defense posture significantly.” Depending upon the enemy deployment, targets of our attacks are the US forces in the west and the ROK forces in the east… A measure combining integration and dispersion is chosen for this counteroffensive and is conducted in three phases. Operation for each phase is 10 days with 5 days of rest thereafter … The counteroffensive is to commence in early June and to conclude in early July. All preparations must be done by the end of May.

Contrary to the UNC’s estimate that the purpose of the Communists’ summer offensive was a means of pressure to block the ROK’s determination to oppose the armistice, it was intended to achieve multiple purposes of training its troops, supporting the armistice negotiation, and improving its defense line.

The Communists selected fifty-six objectives for attacks ranging from platoon to battalion positions of the UNC forces, and they collected information on the deployment of the UNC troops, fire arms, and the state of position build-up in detail through reconnaissance on the objectives and interrogation of prisoners, and then conducted combat drill repeatedly. They prepared the offensive meticulously, digging tunnels for their assault positions 200 meters in front of the objectives and setting up concealed ambush fox-holes in covered terrain.\textsuperscript{118}

While the preparations for the offensive were still in progress, Peng Teh Huai, the commanding general of the Chinese forces, amended the original plan
and ordered his troops that were ready to attack promptly UNC company-size positions. It was designed to coordinate closely with the negotiations on POWs and to camouflage the enemy's planned scheme of the campaign.

Thus, the summer offensive commenced earlier and continued for 76 days covering May 13-July 27, 1953 in three phases, with an expanding scale and growing intensity as time went by. In this offensive, the CCF was committed on the largest scale on all fronts along with North Korean forces, and the main forces of the CCF aimed at the Kumsong bulge on the axis of Kumsong-Hwach'on defended by the ROK II Corps.

Then, this offensive was labelled the 'CCF's Final Offensive', 'the Battle at Kumsong Bulge', or 'the Kumsong Battle'; on the other hand, referring to the third-phase battle alone, it was called 'Final Offensive', 'the Offensive of July 13', or 'the Battle of July 13' based on the start-day for the most intense third phase, July 13. Taking the whole summer offensive as the final offensive, the Chinese concept described in their documents, the final offensive was classified into three stages. 119)

2. Last Chinese Offensive; the First Stage: Outpost Action

(1) Transfer from Defensive to Offensive

The CCF had already transferred from defensive to offensive in March, although they conducted their summer offensive during the period of May-July 1953. They concentrated on strengthening their combat capabilities and their positional build-up in January and February, and launched limited in scale but fierce assaults at the outpost positions of the UNC on the western front taking advantage of the weather favorable for their operations in March. The CPVA attacked the outpost of the US 2nd Infantry Division on 'The Hook', a low hill near
## Chinese Final Offensive, 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages*</th>
<th>Period*</th>
<th>Forces Committed*</th>
<th>Direction of Main Attack**</th>
<th>Remarks**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Stage</td>
<td>May 13-26 1953</td>
<td>23rd, 24th, 67th &amp; 60th Army</td>
<td>Outposts of the Kumsong bulge</td>
<td>Outpost Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Stage</td>
<td>May 27-June 23 1953</td>
<td>46th, 1st, 23rd, 24th 67th, 60th Armies plus NK forces</td>
<td>Right of the Kumsong bulge</td>
<td>June Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Stage</td>
<td>June 24-July 27, 1953</td>
<td>46th, 1st, 23rd, 16th 24th, 68th, 54th, 60th &amp; 21st Armies plus NK forces</td>
<td>All areas of the Kumsong bulge</td>
<td>July Offensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The CCF armies were in general composed of three divisions, and were similar in size to ROKA corps.

2. Those with single asterisks were quoted directly from Chinese writing, *CPVA’s History of Resist America and Assist Korea War*, Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co. (1988); those with double asterisks include the author’s analysis.

Samich’on, on March 3 and again tried it in late March but were repulsed. On March 17, the Chinese launched an attack at Hill 355 (Little Gibraltar) on the main defense line of the US 2nd Infantry Division. The US 9th Regiment stuck to its trenches, suffering about 100 casualties.

On March 23, the Chinese attacked outposts Old Baldy (Hill 266) and Porkchop (Hill 234) on the southern bank of the Yokkok-ch’on which were defended by the US 7th Infantry Division. At that time, the Colombian battalion attached to the US 7th Division at Old Baldy and the 3rd Battalion of the US 31st Regiment at Porkchop got prepared, anticipating the enemy attack. However, the outpost company of the Colombian battalion on Old Baldy was caught by the
enemy attack of one-battalion size in the middle of relief-of-position so it suffered heavy losses by enemy artillery fire, which lasted for a few days. Simultaneously, Porkchop suffered a two-company size attack.

Caught by surprise their pants down, Companies A and B of the Colombian battalion set the troops in order and engaged in a hand-to-hand combat but had to pull out, overwhelmed by the enemy. The division tried to recapture it, committing its reserve on March 24 and 25, but failed. On the same night Old Baldy was lost, the American troops at Porkchop were also forced to retreat but recaptured the hill by firing variable-time-fused shells continuously at the hill and then by committing the reserve company at dawn. Maj. Gen. Arthur Trudeau, the new commanding general of the division, tried to prepare a counterattack for a few days and to recapture Old Baldy; however, the commanding general of the corps turned it down saying there was no need to stick to the outpost position without much tactical value at the sacrifice of more valuable human lives. Thus Hill Old Baldy fell into the hands of the enemy. In this battle at Old Baldy, the Colombian battalion suffered the loss of 95 dead, 97 wounded, and 30 missing; the US 7th Division had the loss of around 300 dead, wounded, or missing in these final battles for Old Baldy and Porkchop. The Chinese loss was estimated to be around 600 to 800.

In late March, battles as fierce as that for Old Baldy developed at Hills Vegas (Hill 157), Reno (Hill 148), and Carson (unknown) sixteen kilometers northeast of P’anmunjom, the outpost positions of the 5th Regiment of the US 1st Marine Division. The Chinese attacked these outposts and occupied Vegas and Reno after fierce close combat on March 26. On that night, the 5th Marine Regiment dispatched reinforcements immediately to the scene in order to recapture them but failed due to intensive fire of enemy artillery, mortars, and small arms. On the 27th the Marines launched a counterattack with one battalion (reinforced) but failed. They tried the second counterattack on the 28th after hitting the
enemy positions with all the fire available. The marines gave up Reno and concentrated on Vegas with a force of two battalions and recaptured it. Thereafter, they continued to hold it, repelling an enemy counterattack of a few battalions. In this battle, the enemy casualties were estimated to be around 1,300; the US Marines suffered the loss of 118 dead, 801 wounded, and 98 missing. Vegas was secured in a blood bath. It was a battle fought not for the tactical value of the hill itself but for testing the will and capabilities for defense of the other party.

(2) The First Phase of the Final Offensive: Outpost Battles

The CCF’s attacks at outposts began again in mid-May after the battle at Vegas in late March and the thawing season of April. The attacks in March presaged the Communist offensive by gauging the combat capabilities of the friendly forces; the attacks in May as the first phase operations of their summer offensive were also outpost battles, but intended to lead to the second and third phase operations. The probing operation of March was mainly confined to the US I Corps on the western front while attacks in May were directed to the US IX, ROK II, and US X Corps on the central and central eastern front, especially concentrating along the Kumsong bulge.

By the time the enemy started the summer offensive, the frontline followed a trace connecting the mouth of the Han River, Changdan, P’anmunjom, Suoksi, Hill White Horse of Ch’orwon, Sniper Ridge of Kimhwa, the southern end of Kumsong, Kyoam-san, Kwanmang-san, Hill 949, Naegok, two kilometers north of Hwanggi, the Nam River, and Kamho on the East Coast. Since the frontline north of Hwach’on of the central front created a salient toward Kumsong, this part was labelled the Kumsong bulge.

This bulge connected Sniper Ridge at Kimhwa, Chungch’i-ryong and Hoe-gogae south of Kumsong, Kyoam-san, Finger Ridge, Hills Capitol, 949, 973
and 883, with a width of forty kilometers and protruding northward ten kilometers in length compared to the adjacent frontline. Kumsong was close to the apex of this bulge.

Having been secured by the friendly forces during the spring offensive of 1951, this area was defended in fierce engagements again in the enemy’s autumn offensive as the name of this area signifies. The ROK II Corps was deployed from the southern end of Kumsong to Hill 883, and a part of the ROK 9th Division and Capital Division of the US IX Corps was positioned west of Hoe-gogae in Kumsong. At the start of the enemy summer offensive, the ROK II Corps deployed the 6th Division along the axis of Hoe-gogae and Koam-san, the main avenue of approach (route 17), the 8th Division along the axis of Finger Ridge, Hill Capitol, and the Pukhan River (Route 103), and, further to the east, the 5th Division along the line linking Hills 949, 973, and 883, and had the 3rd Division as reserve. On the left of the ROK II Corps, the Capital Division was positioned along the line of Hoe-gogae and Haso-ri (axis of Routes 117 & 119), and the 9th Division farther to the west defended Sniper Ridge. On the east of the II Corps, the ROK 20th Division attached to the US X Corps occupied the main line of resistance to the east.\(^{20}\)

On the other hand, the CCF deployed the 67th Army (199th, 200th, & 201th Divisions) and the 60th Army (181th, 179th, & 180th Divisions) of the 20th Army Group in front of the ROK II Corps, the Capital and 20th Divisions which were positioned along the Kumsong bulge; and the 72nd Division of the 24th Army, the CCF 9th Army Group, deployed against the ROK 9th Division.\(^{21}\) The CCF 23rd Army positioned along the Yokkok River northwest of Ch’orwon.

On May 12 the CCF commenced its attack on the Kumsong bulge by committing the 180th Division of the 60th Army in the assault at the outpost of the ROK 5th Division at Texas (Hill 689), and the next day extended its attack at all the outposts in front of the Kumsong bulge. However, this first phase attack
was confined to outposts, small objectives maneuvered by a company or less, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat period</th>
<th>Name of combat</th>
<th>Units engaged</th>
<th>Combat zone</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 12-17, 1953</td>
<td>Texas Hill (Hill 689)</td>
<td>180th Div.</td>
<td>5th Div.</td>
<td>1.5 km north of Hill 973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12-17, 1953</td>
<td>Obong Ridgeline</td>
<td>180th Div.</td>
<td>5th Div.</td>
<td>1.5 km north of Hill 973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13-15, 1953</td>
<td>Samgakbong</td>
<td>181st Div.</td>
<td>5th Div.</td>
<td>4 km northwest of Hill 949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13-17, 1953</td>
<td>Majehyong (Hill 271)</td>
<td>201st Div.</td>
<td>8th Div.</td>
<td>West bank of the Pukhan R. (Kwaho-ri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14-16, 1953</td>
<td>Saetbyol (Hill 470)</td>
<td>199th Div.</td>
<td>Cap. Div.</td>
<td>7 kms southwest of Kumsong (Chikmok-dong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-19, 1953</td>
<td>Sniper Ridge</td>
<td>72nd Div.</td>
<td>9th Div.</td>
<td>3.5 kms north of Kimhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23-24, 1953</td>
<td>Hoe-gogae</td>
<td>199th Div.</td>
<td>Cap. Div.</td>
<td>4 kms southwest of Kumsong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aimed at supporting the truce talks, which had resumed on April 28. This first phase attack also served to camouflage the plan of the main offensive when the Chinese were not ready to launch the main attack of the summer offensive.\(^{122}\) The ROK II Corps, the 9th and Capital Divisions repulsed most of these attacks suffering heavy losses, but the 8th Division lost its outpost at Majehyong.

The enemy attacked Hill 689 as a prelude to the first phase of the summer offensive because that outpost performed an important role for Hill 973, a critical spot on the friendly main line of resistance. There had been fierce contests for this hill during the period of April 2-12 before the ROK 5th Division took over
this main line of resistance. At that time the ROK 3rd Division had operated the outpost with one platoon of the 18th Regiment. The 542th Regiment of the CCF 181th Division attacked it. It changed hands eight times; but the Chinese at last recaptured it.

The Majehyong outpost (Hill 271) for the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division was lost. On May 13 under the attack of the CCF 201st Division, ROK troops had to retreat from the post, and then counterattacked four times until May 17, but failed. In this blood bath, the ROK suffered the loss of 181 dead, 262 wounded, 23 missing; 789 Chinese were killed (among who were 431 estimated dead) and 10 were captured.

In addition, there were seven other major battles for outposted hills during the same period listed in the chart below.\textsuperscript{1231} The chart shows that the first phase of the Chinese summer offensive was concentrated on the area of Kwaho-ri and Hill 973, the confluence of the Pukhan and Kumsong Rivers, and suggested that the second phase of the offensive was to focus on this area.

3. Last Chinese Offensive; the Second Stage: June Offensive

(1) Policy of Offensive Operation

The day after they concluded the first phase offensive, the CCF shifted to the second phase (June offensive) on May 27. The basic concept of the enemy’s second phase offensive was to extend the objectives to battalion positions based on the experiences gained in the first phase operations. They would conduct offensive operations along the whole frontline. Thus, this offensive turned out to be the largest in scale since the spring offensive of 1951. The 23rd and 24th Armies of the CCF 9th Army Group and the 60th and 67th Armies of the 20th Army Group deployed and participated in the first phase offensive, and the 1st and 46th Armies
the 19th Army Group pinned down the US I Corps on the western front. In addition, North Korean forces deployed on the eastern front also joined in the offen-
Accordingly, in addition to the attack upon the ROK outposts of the Kumsong bulge on May 27, the Communists assaulted the outposts of the US I Corps at a hill mass of Nevada and Hook on the western front, Hills 854 and 812 on the right of the US X Corps on the central eastern front, and Hill 351 of the ROK I Corps on the eastern coast. The flames of battle spread all over the frontline.

Meanwhile, ‘the final proposal of May 25’ presented by the UNC was close to resolution at P’anmunjom. It was a compromise to solve the prisoner issue with the condition that the principle of repatriating prisoners according to their own free will was to be observed but even anti-Communist prisoners were to be delivered to the NNRC. It conflicted with the position of the ROK government that was opposed to armistice in principle as prolonging the division of Korea and to delivering the anti-Communist prisoners to the NNRC. Thus, this proposal ignited statements and demonstrations on the theme of ‘no armistice’ and ‘advance to the north.’

In this evolving situation, the Chinese Commander in Chief Peng Teh Huai stated on June 1, in the early stage of the second phase, that the original policy of attacking all the UN forces, including the US troops, was changed to attacking the ROK forces as the main target. According to the Chinese accounts, the reasons for the change in policy was “...based on the situation mentioned above, in order to further promote the progress in armistice talks and to coordinate operations in this theater of war more closely and strategically, and to gain battle experiences for the newly committed troops to Korea.”

Following this change in policy, they readjusted their troop deployments by committing less-experienced troops to the frontline: the 16th Army was attached to the 9th Army Group and took over the defense mission of one division of the 23rd and 24th Armies, and the 21st Army moved to the Koksan area and
was put into reserve for the CCF frontline. Thus, the Chinese combat capabilities on the central front and the left-wing forces of the Kumsong bulge were enhanced to a great extent.

Each army group adjusted its operations plan according to the changes in the operational directives and in organization of its forces. On June 4, the 20th Army Group, forces of the main attack, held its operations conference and examined its counteroffensive plan thoroughly. This army group was to attack the ROK 8th and 5th Divisions on both sides of the Pukhan River concentrating all the capabilities of its 60th and 67th Armies; it also prepared for a counterattack by forces exceeding the scale of two divisions. This army group, with additional artillery support, went through one week of preparations and was ready to launch the main offensive starting from June 10.\(^{127}\)

(2) Battles at Outpost Hills

Prior to the main attack on the right of the Kumsong bulge on June 10, the Communists launched scheduled attacks on May 27 on all fronts, mainly at the ROK outposts. This pattern was interpreted as a preparation and as feint attack or maneuver in support of the main attack.

During the period of May 27-June 4, the 200th and 201st Divisions of the 67th Army, the 20th Army Group, the main attack, launched attacks at the outpost of the ROK 6th Division at Hill B(Hill Stone) and at those of the Capital Division at Finger Ridge and Hill Capitol, and occupied Hill Stone and Hill Orchid at the end of Finger Ridge. At the same time, the 181st Division of the CCF 60th Army attacked the outposts of the ROK 5th Division at Hill P’iui(Blood), M1 Ridge, and Tukyon-bong in front of Hill 949. All of these attacks were repulsed.

By that time a bloody battle developed at the outpost on the southern
bank of the Yokkok-ch’on on the western front upon the attack by the CPVA 19th Army Group, especially at Nevada Complex. On the night of May 28, the 120th Division of the CCF 46th Army assaulted and occupied the outposts of the Turkish brigade attached to the US 25th Division at Hill Nevada complex consisting of Hills Vegas, Elko, and Carson, under intense artillery support. These outposts were of a platoon-size except the one at Vegas positioned by one company. Thereafter, the Turkish brigade launched counterattacks and recaptured Vegas after it changed hands five times by the evening of the next day (29th). But Carson slipped into the hands of the enemy. Hill Elco narrowly escaped the enemy hands for a while, was transferred to the US forces, and finally taken by the enemy. In this process, both sides suffered heavy losses. As the Chinese forces, which was not concerned with the loss of human lives continued their attacks, division commander, Major General Samuel T. Williams ordered withdrawal from Vegas, leaving all the hill mass to the enemy, judging that the outpost at Vegas was not tactically worth securing at the expense of further human lives. In this battle of two days, the Turkish brigade killed and wounded about 3,000 and captured five and had its loss of 151 killed, 239 wounded, and 2 missing.

At the same time, the 133rd Division of the CCF 46th Army attacked Hook (Hill 150), defended by the 1st Commonwealth Division on the right of Hill Nevada complex. This hill had witnessed frequent engagements. On the evening of the 28th, the Chinese attacked this hill three times under the heaviest artillery fire support that the British troops had ever experienced. The British resisted fiercely, even engaging in combat within their position, and the enemy retreated leaving behind 170 corpses.\(^{128}\)

Meanwhile, the NK III Corps on the central eastern front commenced attack at Hills 812 and 854, both shoulders on the avenue of approach leading to the upper stream of the Soyang River in Diamond Mountain and Sohwa in the area of the US X Corps. The attacks started on June 1, 1953. A few days later the
CPVA did the same on the western front.

At that time, the ROK 12th Division was defending that avenue of approach. Activated on November 8, 1952, the division deployed for the first time on the frontline in the area of Hills 812 and 854. It positioned all three regiments on the front and by the time the operation started, the division had made the following deployment: the 37th Regiment at Hill 812 on the left of the Sohwa valley, the 51st Regiment at Hill 854 on the right of the Sohwa valley, and the 52nd Regiment on the right front south of the Nam River. Located under enemy surveillance on the ridge stretching from Kanmu-bong and Hill 1052, Hill 812 had a disadvantaged defense. On the other hand, Hill 854 had the divide of the Soyang and the Nam Rivers in between and held defensive advantages against the enemy attack. These two hills were spots of tactical importance on both shoulders defending the avenue of approach linking Diamond Mountain-Sohwa-Wont’ong; thus, there had been contests for these hills several times.

The NK III Corps confronting the ROK 12th Division commenced preparatory fires concentrating at Hills 812 and 854 from 16:00 on June 1, and then had the 45th Division, its reserve, attack at 22:00, passing through the NKPA 1st Division deployed at the front. Prior to that, North Koreans attacked Hills No Name (later named Ssangyong) one kilometer east of Hill 812 and 854 and engaged in fierce fighting; then, they poured 1,000 shells at Hill 812 around midnight and assaulted it by surprise. The 11th Company of the 37th Regiment resituated with final deterrence fire under the support of the US tank guns, but upon the enemy’s surprise attack at night, it had to fight at close quarters and to request fire-in-position after covering themselves in a covered trench.

On the first day of this battle, the ROK forces succeeded in defending Hills Ssangyong and 854 which the enemy attacked first, but lost Hill 812. At 01:00 on the 2nd, the 1st Battalion, the reserve, under the command of Lt. Col. Park Chung In recaptured the hill in a counterattack and returned it to its original
Battle of Hills 812 - 854

Mu-san ▲ 1320

Ku dol

Nam River

Kang-ak

Samje-ryong ▲ 556

Kosong Pass

Dalsan-ryong

Pohu-ri

Nojoep'yong

Puho-ri

Kajon-ri

Dong-ri

Sonjii

Songnae-ri

Sohwachi'on

So hwach'on

Ch'olmi-dong

Songnae-ri

Suangyong ▲ 375

Suangyong ▲ 812

951

751

52

51

1190

1052

51

905

562

589

595

951

P'yongch'on

P'yongch'on

Samnovogok-san ▲ 1019

Samnovogok-san ▲ 1019

Pyon-dong

Tongnye-dong

So hwachi'on

1056

65

1031

96

98
position after handing it over to the 11th Company, as the regimental commander wanted to restore his reserve. But the 11th Company lost it again upon the enemy’s counterattack before the company organized its position. From dawn till dusk of the 2nd, the 1st Battalion with its commander in the forefront conducted counterattacks several times till dusk under air and artillery support; however, the battalion failed to recapture it in the face of fierce enemy resistance entrenched in the cave. It also incurred heavy losses from enemy support fire from Hill 1054 and their artillery fire.

Later, the 37th Regiment tried a third counterattack supported by the division reserve, which consisted of the division reconnaissance company and the 5th Company of the 52nd Regiment, but it ended in vain. Thereafter, the division deployed the 3rd Regiment (−) attached to it on the right front and prepared a counterattack with the 52nd Regiment, which was relieved; however, right before the division commenced the counterattack on June 5, it was postponed by the corps commander. The directive was based on the judgment and direction of the Eight US Army Command that it was unnecessary to shed more blood and anger the enemy when the agreement on prisoners was imminent. (It was signed on June 8.)

On that night, the NK forces launched an attack again at Hill No Name to right of Hill 812 held by the 10th Company of the 37th Regiment, occupied it, and began to exploit the breakthrough. Capt. Yoon Kil Byung, the company commander, requested fire-in-position and a counterattack, resisted in his bunker to the last minute, and finally committed suicide. The 37th Regiment had the 2nd Battalion of the 52nd Regiment attached to it counterattack, but failed.

The commanding general of the division consolidated the defense of the area around Hills 812 and No Name by deploying the reserve 52nd Regiment in the sector of the 37th Regiment. He assigned the right half of the sector including Hill No Name for the 52nd Regiment, by dividing the responsible area. The 52nd Regiment under the command of Colonel Chang Ho Kang, assumed the area
including Hill No Name, counterattacked the hill on June 18, and recaptured it against an enemy that resisted to the last minute. Thereafter ‘Hill No Name’ was renamed ‘Hill Ssangyong.’

Consequently, the 12th Division defended Hill 854 east of the Sohwa valley, lost Hill 812, and recaptured Hill Ssangyong in the enemy’s last offensive (June offensive). But Hill Ssangyong was lost in the enemy’s July offensive. Recalling the battle, Major Park Wan Shik was vexed to admit that the loss of Hill 812 on the first day of the enemy attack was due to careless security that allowed the enemy to mount a surprise attack.\(^{129}\) Lt. Col. Park Chung In, who successfully led the first counterattack, believed that his frequent visits to the frontline areas, accompanied by his company commanders, to get familiar with the terrain and study of the plan for counterattack were of great help later on. In his memoir, he described an episode very typical of combat hysteria:
In a check up of the rifles of my men after recapturing Hill 812, I was stunned to find out that those who fired their rifles in the battle was only 51%. The rest of them just followed others, caught in fear. ... He knew soldiers caught in combat hysteria who threw handgrenades without pulling out the safety pins, and told his men as follows: “Killed in action on the battlefield is not death in vain but a death for the nation and the people. Therefore, those killed in action are consecrated at the National Cemetery to be remembered by the people forever.” He wrote that his endeavor to help his men overcome war-phobia and establish the philosophy on life and death contributed to maximizing combat capabilities in attacks. 130

The next target that the NK forces concentrated on prior to their main offensive in June was Hill 351 on the east coast. The hill along with Wolbi-san witnessed continuing contests as it changed hands from the Capital Division, which occupied it in the spring offensive of 1951, to the 11th and then the 15th Divisions. Wolbi-san slipped into enemy hands, but Hill 351 was secured while the 11th Division was in charge of this area; then, the area was transferred to the 15th Division in January 1953. This division was activated on November 8, 1952, went through organization and courses of unit training, and was deployed on the east coast. By the time the battle started, it had the 39th and 38th Regiments along the line of Hill 554 on the southern bank of the Nam River-Hill 339-Hill 351-and Kamho on the front, with the 50th Regiment in reserve. It faced the 3rd and 7th Divisions of the NK VII Corps. At that time, Hill 351 had an organized position connecting tunneled bunkers, shelters for each squad, and trenches connecting them.

Around midnight on June 2, 1953, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment the NK 7th Division approached Hill 351 via the front and flank of ROK troop’s position under the unprecedented level of the fire support. According
to the accounts from prisoners captured in this battle, the NK battalion was committed after conducting a two-month exercise for the attack in a terrain similar to Hill 351. The 9th Company of the 38th Regiment on defending the hill became engaged in hand-to-hand combat and requested fire-in-position after covering its troops in its tunneled position at 01:30.

The 38th Regiment tried to support Hill 351 with a part of its troops, but was discouraged by enemy artillery fire; it launched another counterattack at 03:20 on June 3 with the attachment of the 1st Battalion of the 50th Regiment. It was 26 hours after the enemy captured the position. The 1st Battalion counterattacked under the support of the division artillery and even air support of a B-29 squadron, but it was after the enemy had already occupied the fortified positions except the cave. Thus, the battalion had to retreat with heavy casualties.

The 1st Battalion of the 50th Regiment concluded reorganization and conducted a counterattack at 14:30 on June 3 while the guns and carrier fighters from the Task Forces 77th and 95, in addition to the supporting artillery poured heavy fire at Wolbi-san, Hill 351, and Hill Mass of 148 and 187, which threatened Hill 351. Following the special instructions of the commanding general of the corps, Lt. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, all the commanders up to the battalion level led the troops from the front. But as they crossed the open terrain without any concealment, they suffered heavy casualties, and were caught in confusion when all soldiers tried to evacuate the wounded; thus, they had to withdraw to the line of departure.

At 07:00 on June 4, the 1st Battalion of the 50th Regiment, augmented by replacements, attacked in silence under the cover of dense fog. Reaching the enemy position, the assault team of each company destroyed the heavy weapons emplacements, and then soldiers of the companies dashed to the top. As the enemy rolled down hand-grenades and supporting fire from Hills 148 and 187 at the rear flank of Hill 351 poured down on them, the ROK soldiers had to pull
back from near to the crest as the new replacements retreated downhill in panic.

While the counterattack by the 1st Battalion of the 50th Regiment was going on, the commander and some men of the 9th Company were still fighting from their cave position. Upon the permission of the division commander, the regiment commander ordered the company to withdraw at 19:00 on June 3, and the company retreated to Hill 339 in the south taking the advantage of fire-in-position. Some of them returned in one week; all the troops of the company returned except eleven soldiers.

The division commander, Brig. Gen. Lee Jong Suk, determined to secure the hill, assigned division G-3 Lt. Col. Hahn Sung Ryol as acting regimental commander at 10:00 June 4 and assigned him the mission recapturing Hill 351. At 01:00 on June 5, the new regimental commander decided to conduct a night attack with the 1st Battalion of the 50th Regiment attached and the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion stealthily advanced to the assault line and dashed toward the enemy position; however, upon intense enemy fire-in-position and fire from the flank, the 3rd Battalion had to retreat on the verge of grabbing the objective, due to heavy casualties.

The two counterattacks launched by the 3rd Battalion later that day also turned out to be futile. Having failed to recapture Hill 351 by committing the division reserve and only causing heavy casualties, the division commander stopped counterattacks and deployed the 38th Regiment along the ridge south of Hill 351 and had the 50th Division back to division reserve for reorganization. In this battle, during the period of June 2-5, the two ROK regiments (38th & 50th) suffered the total loss of 770 including 222 dead, 537 wounded, and 11 missing; the enemy suffered higher losses. Both sides suffered too much. Looking at the incredible losses, which reflected the will to fight in order not to lose even a single inch of land prior to armistice, the people and soldiers of the Republic of Korea are struck with solemnity by the fact that so much blood was shed for the current cease-fire
line.

Later on with the attachment of the 63rd Regiment of the 21st Division as of June 6, the division assigned the attached regiment on the left front of the division and relieved the 39th Regiment as its reserve where the regiment conducted rehearsals for another counterattack. The attack failed, however, in a similar fashion as the counterattack of the 38th Regiment. Thus, the division gave up recapturing the outpost at Hill 351, consolidated the depth of the defense area on its right front, and improved defensive posture with emphasis on Hill 339. The hill, however, fell in the enemy’s July offensive right before the conclusion of armistice; thus, Hills 351 and 339 slipped into enemy hands.

(3) Battles at Hills 949 · 973 · 883

While the CCF and NK forces were launching reconnaissance-in-force attacks at the ROK II Corps’ outposts in the Kumsong bulge after May 27, 1953, they also attacked with little concern for losses at Hills Nevada, 812, and 351, for which both sides had contested, on the western and eastern front and occupied them in early June. Meanwhile, the CCF 20th Army Group, the main attack force for the second stage of the final offensive, completed its preparations and then attacked the main line of resistance at the confluence of the Pukhan River and Kumsong-ch’on on June 10 as scheduled.

The 20th Army Group committed its 60th Army to attack Hills 949, 973, and 883 on the main line resistance of the ROK 5th Division and the 67th Army to attack Finger Ridge and Hill Capitol in the ROK 8th Division sector on the western bank of the Pukhan River. It kept the 68th Army as reserve in Sep’o-ri ready to support the other armies at the front. At that time, the ROK 5th Division was in defense of the main line of resistance consisting of Hills 949, 973, and 883 from the junction of the Pukhan River and Kumsong-ch’on to T’ongson-gol in the east.
As the ROK division was positioned with an unfordable river at their back, it could hardly contemplate retreat. This hill mass had been in United Nations Command hands since the spring offensive of 1951.

Brig. Gen. Ch’oi Hong Hee, the commanding general of the 5th Division that replaced the ROK 3rd Division, faced the enemy with its 36th Regiment (+) deployed from Hills 548 to 949 (Wudu-san) on the left half of its main line of resistance and deployed the 27th Regiment along the line of Hills 973 and 883 on the right sector. The two frontline regiments maintained small outposts at Samgak-bong, Dukyong-bong, Hills Blood (748) and Texas (679), Obong, and Victory Ridges. The 35th Regiment (-), the division reserve, positioned one battalion each at Nalguntuh and Hwangbyon-dong.

The rough track explored along the eastern bank of the Pukhan River was the only main supply route; to the north of Nalguntuh, there were a bridge for pedestrians and another temporary bridge covered of steel sheets for vehicles. In addition, there was a cable car set up in order to facilitate supply between the river bank and Hill 629. Also, a bridge was installed for operational purposes between Hu-dong and Hwangbyong-dong and the 901st Pontoon Bridge Company was in support of the division.

On the other hand, the CCF 60th Army confronting the ROK 5th Division had its 181st Division as the main attack toward Hill 973 and the 180th Division as secondary attack, but it also planned to have the attached 33rd Division conduct a diversionary attack at the ROK 20th Division of the US X Corps on its right flank. The 179th Division remained in reserve.\(^{131}\) Prior to their attack, Chinese divisions made thorough preparations by pulling back the assault forces to the rear area and conducted a rehearsal for the attack. The Chinese planned to infiltrate six companies and two platoons into a ‘clandestine ambush area’ in front of and to both of the flanks of the ROK positions on D-1 in order to achieve surprise and to minimize losses.\(^{132}\)
Thoroughly prepared, the CCF 60th Army commenced its attack in several echelons and in diverse directions at dusk on June 10, 1953. The grand operation called ‘the Chinese June Offensive’ started to roll.

The 181st Division, the main attack, assembled in the vicinity of Songjong and Kabau-gol on the afternoon of that day, deployed on both sides of Obong Ridge with the sunset, and started to attack Hill 973 as its main objective. As deception measures, the enemy committed one company-size troops to attack the north of Hill 949 of the 36th Regiment on the left front to hold the ROK forces. Then, the enemy attacked the outpost company in front of Hill 973,
employing forces of one regiment-size at 21:00 after firing 10,000 rounds of artillery fire starting from 20:00.\textsuperscript{134}

Overwhelmed by the surging enemy attack, the sound-detecting crews, ambush teams, and small-scale outpost forces had to retreat to the main position, requesting fire support at 21:15. In this turmoil, the wire nets of the 27th Regiment between battalions and between battalions and their frontline companies were almost all broken by the enemy’s concentrated fire. As radio equipment of the ROK forces were in poor condition, it was very difficult to command the troops.

Breaking through the outposts, the Chinese under the support of its artillery fire dashed to Hill 973, which was occupied by the 3rd Company and Hill 883 defended by the 6th Company of the 27th Regiment. Two enemy battalions attacked Hill 883. The 11th Artillery Battalion of the division fired time-on-target on the enemy approach; however, the Chinese continued to attack toward the main line of resistance during intervals of allied artillery fire. At around 23:00 parts of the two hills, the core of the main line of resistance, were penetrated.

With the armistice near at hand, the main line of resistance as well as outposts were defended with the concept of defense-in-position: however, with the wide battle frontage, they could not afford to deploy more than one company at these critical hills, and that one company could not withstand successive waves of attack by the enemy regiment. Hill 973 was lost at 23:40 and Hill 883 ten minutes later fell into enemy hands.

With the breakthrough on the main line of resistance, the commander of the 27th Regiment tried to seal off the penetration with the forces on both sides and to set up a line of resistance by collecting the troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, which had been penetrated. At the time, the front of the 36th Regiment on the left flank and of the 62nd Regiment of the 20th Division on the right were still quiet.
After reviewing the situation on his visit to the command post of the 27th Regiment, the commanding general of the division decided to launch a counterattack immediately with the division reserve. According to the order for a counterattack issued at 01:00 on June 11, the 35th Regiment (-), the division reserve, was to recapture Hill 973 and the 27th Regiment with the companies of the division and of the 35th Regiment Reconnaissance Company attached to it was to occupy Hill 883.

Accordingly the 27th Regiment, still in the process of collecting its troops, committed the 2nd Battalion (-) to counterattack at Hill 883 at 04:30 and engaged at once in close combat, exchanging hand-grenades next to enemy trenches. But failing to penetrate the enemy’s final defensive fires, they retreated and built a position-in-haste. Judging that it would be difficult to recapture Hill 883 with the 2nd Battalion, the commander of the 27th Regiment at 07:30 ordered his troops to reorganize, maintaining the current line of contact.

Having been briefed about the situation of the 5th Division, the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, issued an oral order at 03:00 to attach the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd Division, the corps reserve, to the 5th Division and to recapture the area taken. With the 22nd Regiment attached, the Commanding General of the 5th Division revised the existing counterattack plan and had the 35th Regiment (-), assembling in Pokdoshi, attack Hill 973 and the 22nd Regiment, assembling in Hwangbyong-dong, recapture Hill 883.

The 35th Regiment had to counterattack with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions as the 1st Battalion was attached to the 36th Regiment and manned the main line of resistance on the left. At 08:10 the 2nd Battalion started from Hwangbyong-dong, maneuvered along the ridge on the northeast, and at 07:30 the 3rd Battalion passed by Hill 805 at the east end of the position of the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment, and both battalions attacked Hill 973 in the east. In the beginning it seemed hopeless as both battalions suffered under the enemy artillery fire and
resistance; however, the 7th Company, the reserve of the 2nd Battalion, was com-
mittet at 15:40, attacked with ferocity through both forward companies, and suc-
ceeded in recapturing Hill 973 with difficulty. With the rest of the troops that fol-
lowed the company, they crushed the remaining enemy forces and in that process
caught one Chinese prisoner.

The prisoner belonged to the 543rd Regiment of the CCF 181st Division,
which had just relieved the 541st Regiment on Hill 973 and was preparing to
attack. The Chinese tactical practice was to relieve the unit that occupied the
objective with a new unit carrying a lot of supplies and ammunition. This routine
practice in this battle was once again confirmed by the prisoner.

After occupying the hill, the 2nd Battalion tried to contact the 3rd
Battalion but due to the strong resistance by the enemy occupying ‘Satanic
Protruding Ridge’ 500 meters west of Hill 973, it failed to do so. At 18:50 about
three hours after it occupied the hill, the 2nd Battalion was counterattacked on
both sides with heavy artillery fire, engaged in a fierce battle for 30 minutes, and
had to pull out from the main peak with a breakthrough on its defense line. It set
up a position-in-haste and got ready for an enemy night attack. By that time, upon
the oral order of the division commander to each regiment to cease attack and to
revert to night defense, the commander of the 35th Regiment set up a line of resis-
tance 500 meters up on the reverse slope of Hill 973 with the 3rd Battalion of the
27th Regiment attached. His own 3rd and 2nd Battalions manned the rest of the
line and tied into line to the 27th Regiment(-) on the reverse slope of Hill 883 to
its right.

Meanwhile, the 22nd Regiment assembled in Hwangbyong-dong across
the Pukhan River after sunrise on the 11th. When it was corps reserve, Colonel
Ch’oi Byong Soon had recently assumed the command and found the regiment
low in combat capability with two battalion commanders, seven company com-
manders, and one-third of the enlisted men and NCOs on leave.
The regimental commander dispatched the reconnaissance company to the area of the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment in order to ascertain the enemy situation and set up a plan for maneuver to recapture Hill 883 with its 3rd and 1st Battalions on the front and the 2nd Battalion as reserve. The two battalions commenced their attack at 11:30 and had a fierce encounter with the enemy. With drizzling weather, they could not expect air support. In this assault, which started at around 15:00, the attacking forces lost one third of their manpower to the enemy’s showers of hand-grenades and machinegun fire. At 19:00 the regiment ceased the attack and reverted to night defense.

While the 35th and 22nd Regiments were conducting counterattacks at Hills 973 and 883, the 27th Regiment collected survivors and built a line of resistance in the rear of Hill 973 with 1st Battalion and led the stragglers of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to the units holding both the shoulders of their breakthrough. These patchwork units were supposed to halt the exploitation of the breakthrough and to support the counterattacking forces.

On June 11, the 5th Division, with its first counterattack stopped, busily prepared the counterattack planned for the next day. The division commenced its second counterattack with its 35th and 22nd Regiments at 04:00 on the 12th in spite of the heavy losses it had already suffered, delayed supply support, severe limitations on maneuver, and the absence of air support due to bad weather.

The 35th Regiment commenced attack with its 2nd and 3rd Battalions as it had done the day before, and the 3rd Battalion started from Hill 805, occupied ‘Satanic Protruding Ridge’ at 09:40 after a fierce engagement, and succeeded in advancing to 500 meters in front of Hill 973. The 2nd Battalion, which attacked Hill 973 along the northeast ridge, was blocked in the middle. As the 35th Regiment faltered in its attack, the enemy committed two battalions toward the 2nd Battalion and a part of its forces on the sector boundaries between the 35th and 22nd Regiments. The Chinese commander launched an offensive by maneu-
vering his main forces deployed at Hill 973.

Under this situation, the 2nd Battalion pulled back southward and the 3rd Battalion withdrew toward Hill 805. The regimental commander had these battalions build up a line of resistance and employed the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment (attached) to prevent the enemy from exploiting the breakthrough toward Hill 949. The 22nd Regiment, which conducted a counterattack at the same time, planned to have the 1st Battalion contain the enemy south of Hill 883, the 3rd Battalion attack along the ridge stretched southwest, and the 2nd Battalion, the reserve, detour west of the 3rd Battalion, occupy Hill No Name between Hills 973 and 883 in order to isolate Hill 883 and to occupy it. Thus, the success of the 22nd Regiment in its counteroffensive was dependent on that of the 2nd Battalion in securing Hill No Name.

The 2nd Battalion left the line of departure at 04:00, arrived at Hill No Name, and launched repeated assaults; however, unable to overcome the resistance of the enemy’s augmented battalion, and with the enemy at Hill 973 exploiting a breakthrough toward Hill 883, it was forced to retreat. The 3rd Battalion, which advanced from the southwest approached up to 200 meters from Hill 883, tried assaults repeatedly, but was crushed in the enemy’s counterattack. At around 11:00 the regiment regained the control of its troops on the line of resistance of the day before.

In the midst of attack on that day, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, the commanding general of the corps, and Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth Army, visited the temporary division CP in Sudong-ri. At the briefing, General Taylor asked the division commander what he had in mind. The division commander expressed his determination to recover his original positions by whatever means. The division issued its third order at 13:30 on the 12th with the additional support of one US heavy mortar battalion and after redeploying the support units.
The 22nd Regiment placed the 2nd Battalion as reserve, which had lost half of its manpower in the battle of that morning, and committed the other battalions in the counterattack. The 1st Battalion in front of Hill 883 and the 3rd Battalion, advancing to the line of assault from the ridge in the southwest, started the assault but lost their ‘death-defying teams’ who spearheaded the assault to CCF’s machineguns net and showers of hand-grenades. As one enemy battalion tried to envelope the 3rd Battalion northwest of Hill 883, the regiment reverted to hasty defense to get prepared for enemy attack. At 15:10, upon the division order to cease attacking, the 22nd Regiment withdrew to the line of resistance prior to attack under artillery fire support and reorganized.

Meanwhile the 35th Regiment was still in the state of unfinished reorganization by the commencement of the third attack. The regimental commander decided to have the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment (attached to the 35th Regiment) in defense of Hill 949 attack after being relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment by 17:00 of that day. Prior to that, the division commander concluded that the counterattack by the 22nd and 35th Regiments was beyond their capabilities and decided to counterattack with the 36th Regiment, which had not been attacked by the enemy on a large scale; thus, he ordered both regiments to cease counterattack and for the 27th Regiment to assume positions on the left of the division sector. Accordingly, the counterattack by the 35th Regiment was cancelled automatically.

- Collapse of the Division’s Line of Resistance

Starting from 04:00 on June 13, the 27th Regiment moved forward and took over the position of the 36th Regiment by 16:00 under sporadic enemy artillery fire. The 36th Regiment assembled in Hwangbyong-dong, deployed its battalions along the line of departure at dusk for attacks at Hills 973 and 883, and got prepared for the attack at dawn the next day.
However, the CCF attempted to break through at the center and then on the left front of the 22nd Regiment with a preemptive assault at 02:00 on the 14th. In this maelstrom the 6th Company was surrounded by the enemy. With artillery support based on precise observation after dawn, the 22nd Regiment managed to save the 6th Company, but had to withdraw to the ridge about 1 to 1.3 kilometers south of Hill 883 by around 10:30 and set up a line of resistance. According to the prisoner captured that day, he was assigned to the 181st Division, and a reinforcing unit that had arrived in the enemy rear and was preparing for a hasty attack. Furthermore, the prisoner captured by the 27th Regiment on the left front that morning confessed that he belonged to the 609th Regiment of the 203rd Division, confirming the commitment of new Chinese forces. 135

Faced with a worsening situation, the division commander changed his decision, called off the counterattack, and held fast to the existing line of contact. He deployed the 36th Regiment that had been preparing the counterattack along the second line linking Pokdoshi and Nulwugol right behind the frontline 27th, 35th, and 22nd Regiments in order to consolidate a defense in depth. The three regiments except the 36th Regiment suffered from hunger as they had missed more than three meals, and were totally exhausted as they were unable to get any sleep with incessant Chinese attacks every night. They were also extremely low in morale with the loss of so many comrades-in-arms. Still the dedicated efforts of the laborers carrying food and ammunition and evacuating wounded in this rugged mountainous terrain contributed to boosting the morale of the soldiers.

The Chinese started to attack along the entire front of the ROK 5th Division, committing on the left front the overwhelming strength of the 180th Division and the reinforced 609th Regiment of the 203rd Division at 18:00 on the 14th. The line of resistance for the 27th Regiment on the left (Hills 548 - 739) of the division crumbled upon the attack by two enemy regiments, destroying the communications and driving the troops into confusion and disarray toward the
bridge installed temporarily over the Pukhan River. Upon the attack of five CCF battalions on the 22nd Regiment on the right front (Hills 973-883), the regiment held fast even under pressure in the beginning, but lost its line of resistance to repeated waves of attacks after 20:00. Upon the attack by five CCF battalions on its 1st Battalion, the 35th Regiment in the central front (Hills 949-805) began to collapse a complete breakthrough around 23:40 after one hour and 20 minutes into engagement with the enemy. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion at Hill 805 with penetrations on the 1st Battalion and 22nd Regiment on both of its flanks was isolated among the enemy. In the process of escaping the siege, it suffered heavy losses, including the commander of the 9th Company, who was killed in action.

As the situation disintegrated into confusion, the division stopped its counterattack. Generak Ch’oi ordered the 36th Regiment, which had organized the line of resistance, to move near to the bridge over the Pukhan River, build a bridgehead, and cover the division’s withdrawal. At 23:00 on the 14th, the division’s frontline was completely broken, and the ROK troops rushed into the Hwangbyong-dong valley, chased all night by the Chinese. The division commander had the cable car installed at Hill 629 blown off and had his commander of the engineering battalion thoroughly prepared the explosion on the bridge over the Pukhan River. Around mid-night the situation of the division deteriorated beyond recovery.

- Withdrawal to Line Iceland

Judging that his division on the right front would be unable to maintain its position on Line Missouri, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, the commanding general of the II Corps, had the ROK 5th Division withdraw to Line Iceland linking the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River and occupy the line connecting Yangji-ch’on (Hill 462), Hudong, and Nulwugol (Hill 748) in the south. The commanding general of the 5th Division issued the order to withdraw to the new defense line as of
00:50 on the 15th, and deployed the 27th Regiment in Yangji-ch’on (Hill 462-Hudong) on the western bank of the Pukhan River, the 36th Regiment along the line linking Hwangbyong-dong (Hill 319) and Nulwugol (Hill 748), and the 35th Regiment in Kundol and Kamwoo-ri as reserve. The 22nd Regiment withdrew to the western bank of the Pukhan River and prepared to report back to its own division.

Following the instruction of the corps and the order of the division, each regiment retreated to the new position at night, and the 1103rd Field Engineer Brigade blew up the bridge installed for operational purposes between northeast of Nalguntuh and Hudong over the Pukhan River during the hours of 02:00-03:00. The explosion frightened the ROK soldiers. Those soldiers that reached the river after the explosion in disarray while chased by the Chinese had to swim or ford it using some sort of buoy. Since it was impossible to withdraw heavy equipment across the river, all the mortars of the US heavy mortar battalion, which was supporting the ROK forces, were destroyed. It seemed like a repetition of blowing up the bridge on the Han River at the start of the war. Having gone through confusion and crises, the division recovered enough stability to establish a new defense line by 07:00 on June 15. With skies clearing that day, the UNC air forces hit hard on the Chinese positions and troops with an unprecedented 2,143 sorties, the most ever recorded since the start of the war. The air attacks contributed greatly to deterring the enemy from exploiting the breakthrough with an aggressive pursuit.

(4) Battles at Hills 1090 and M1

While the main forces of the CCF 60th Army were concentrating their attacks at the hill mass of 949, 973, and 883 of the ROK 5th Division on the right of the Kumsong bulge on June 10, the attached CCF 33rd Division attacked Hills 938 and M1 around Hill 1090 east of the right shoulder of the defense line held by
the ROK 20th Division.

The ROK 20th Division was activated on February 9, 1953, and was in defense of a sector of the frontline taken over from the 7th Division on May 15. The division had the 62nd and 61st Regiments at the front and the 69th Regiment as reserve at the start of the June offensive.

The frontline of the division sector had witnessed incessant fights since the friendly forces occupied it in its spring offensive in 1951. In this area, Hill 938 was tactically important on the ridge connecting Hills 883 and 1220, and Hill 1090 (north) was a spot of critical importance on the ridge linking Oun-san, Hill 1220, and Paeksok-san. Hill M1 was an unknown hill on the ridge east of Hill 1090 (north). At that time Hill 938 was organized on the main line of resistance, but Hills 1090 (north) and M1 were outposts manned by one company each; however, Hill M1, especially, was terrain that could not tactically accommodate forces larger than one company. Its low elevation, compared to the main lines of resistance of both sides, made it vulnerable to observe.

Led by preparation fire after sunset on July 10, the CCF 33rd Division attacked Hill M1, drove the 6th Company of the 61st Regiment off the hill, and occupied its crest. The 5th Company deployed on the main line of resistance conducted a counterattack at 06:00 on the 11th, but was unable to overcome the enemy resistance; it was too late as the enemy had already consolidated their position. The regiment conducted another counterattack with the 1st Battalion, its reserve, the next day at 03:00 (the 12th) with its 2nd and 3rd Companies.

It was a rainy night, which made it difficult to maneuver, the bad visibility due to fog and battle smoke. Thus, each soldier of the attacking echelon was equipped with a light carbine and twenty hand-grenades; however, the 3rd Company that attacked the hilltop failed to break into the enemy position and took heavy casualties from enemy fire and hand-grenades. The heroic and courageous Pfc. Han Yong T'aek, who broke one corner of the enemy position by throwing
hand-grenades and conducting hand-to-hand fighting, rekindled the fighting spirit of the company, which dashed forward and occupied the objective. Pfc. Han was awarded the Hwarang Medal for killing seven and capturing two in this battle. But the company lost the battle soon thereafter in the enemy’s counterattack preceded by artillery fire.

At 03:00 on the 13th, the 1st Company recaptured the hill, but was driven back by an enemy counterattack. The company conducted another counterattack with the artillery support from the II Corps and the division artillery and recaptured the hill. Without let up, the enemy hidden on the reverse slope of the hill surged to the top, and grabbed it in hand-to-hand fighting. The ROK company commander was seriously injured.

Utterly frustrated by the failures of the 1st and 3rd Companies in securing this hill and the heavy losses incurred, the battalion commander led the 2nd Company in another counterattack. The 2nd Company commenced the attack at 14:00 on the 13th. It requested artillery fire support for 30 minutes when it met showers of enemy fire and hand-grenades half way to the hilltop. It crawled near to the top with the help of a rolling barrage by the artillery and finally occupied it.

By this time, as they had suffered heavy casualties and had exhausted their hand-grenades against the enemy’s wave upon wave of counterattacks starting from 01:00 on the 14th, the battalion commander had to retreat from the hill, fighting back tears. His troops, augmented by the reconnaissance company of the division, recaptured the hill in a counterattack; however, the hill slipped back into the hands of the enemy with a later counterattack preceded by artillery fire.

While Hill M1 changed hands repeatedly, the Chinese started to attack at Hills 938 and 1090, opening a new phase by extending the battle to the whole division front. Brig. General Song Suk Ha, the division commander, attached the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Regiment, the reserve, to the 61st Regiment and the reconnaissance company of the division to the 62nd Regiment, augmenting the
combat capabilities of the frontline regiments.

Later, the 61st Regiment repeated its counterattack by relieving its 1st Battalion, which had attacked Hill M1 with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions in turn, to recapture the hill.

The 62nd Regiment had a fierce engagement on the night of the 14th with the enemy as they started to attack at Hills 1090 (north) and 938 preceded by artillery fire on both flanks of the regiment. The enemy conducted concentrated
attacks on the 3rd Company on Hill 1090 and the 2nd Company deployed to the west of the hill as if intending to take Hill 1090. Upon this attack, a part of the company’s position west of the hill was penetrated, but recovered the next day with its own counterattack in desperate fighting. On the evening of the 15th, the 3rd Company with reserve attached (1 platoon) fought hand-to-hand and even called for artillery fire-in-position, but had to retreat from Hill 1090 (north). Then, the battalion tried another counterattack committing the 2nd Company, which had a relief-in-position with the 1st Company, but failed; furthermore, the enemy that secured Hill 1090 was now tempted to exploit the breakthrough. The battalion stopped it, but the situation further deteriorated.

On the 16th, the 1st Company also lost its position. From the afternoon into the night, the 3rd Company counterattacked Hill 1090 and recaptured it in four hours of bloody fighting but lost it to the enemy’s continued attacks on both flanks of the company. But Hill 938 was recaptured on the 15th.

As the enemy occupied Hills 949, 973, and 883 of the ROK 5th Division and increased pressure on the side Hills 1090 and 1220, the commanding general of the US X Corps assigned the 8th Regiment of the 7th Division, the corps reserve, to take over the area of Hill 938, the left front of the 62nd Regiment, in order to augment the defense of this new salient area.

Taking over the positions of the 8th Regiment, the 62nd Regiment relieved the 3rd Battalion with the 1st Battalion that was in defense south of Hill 1090 (north) and conducted an operation to recapture Hill 1090 from the 17th. On the early morning of that day, the 3rd Battalion recaptured Hill 1090 (north) by maneuvering its 10th and 11th Companies on both flanks of the enemy and conducting a desperate battle. In this fight, the regiment confirmed 94 enemy troops dead; it was the greatest result in battle since the regiment joined the war. But on the afternoon of that day, upon enemy attacks on three fronts, it was forced to retreat with heavy casualties and to cover a blocking position facing the enemy.
north of Hill 1090 (south).

On the early morning of June 18, the 62nd Regiment attacked again to recapture Hill 1090 (northern side) employing its three battalions and the 10th Company of the 61st Regiment attached to it. On that night prior to the attack, both sides exchanged artillery fire, showering shells on this area. The 3rd Battalion which had failed in the first counterattack, assigned the 10th Company as an assault unit at the front of the attack and recovered Hill 1090 (north) after a fierce battle.

In this process, the ranger team led by Cpl. Song Kap Sung blew up the enemy’s machine-gun position that threatened their approach to the intermediate objective. He killed six enemy soldiers by himself and opened the way to the objective. He was promoted and awarded a US Silver Star.

After recapturing the hill, the 62nd Regiment transferred this sector to the 5th Regiment of the 7th Division on the 18th and 19th and moved to Pungsan-ri. From June 19th, the 7th Division along the line linking Hills 938 and 1090 (north), and the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division at Hill M1 continued engagements with the CCF. As the 61st Regiment exhausted its combat capabilities in repeated contests for Hill M1 by committing its three battalions in turns for ten days, the 20th Division had the regiment relieved by the 60th Regiment between the 21st and 22nd. Even after the relief-in-position, the competition for grabbing Hill M1 continued in the same fashion.

Up to the transfer of this defense area to the other unit on the 22nd, the 61st Regiment repeated bloody encounters as the area changed hands sixteen times. After repeated contests for the hill by the 60th Regiment, the 20th Division transferred this area of responsibility to the US 45th Infantry Division on the 4th of July and moved to the frontline in the Punchbowl area.

In the June offensive, the enemy concentrated its attack at the ROK 5th Division at the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge while a part of their forces
attacked toward Hill 1090 and Paeok-san; however, they ended up occupying Hill M1 without causing any change on the frontline upon the resistance of the 20th and 7th Divisions. Among the battlefields in this area, Hill M1 was the one that saw the most repeated fierce engagements, although the hill did not bear any significant tactical importance at all. It was a contest of invincible wills not to lose a single inch of land, as the signing of the agreement on the exchange of prisoners and the conclusion of armistice agreement was near at hand. Although it was newly activated, the 20th Division made substantial contributions in deterring the enemy offensive in defense of the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge as well as of its own front.

(5) Contest at Hill Capitol and Finger Ridge

When the enemy offensive was directed on the Kumsong bulge in June 1953, the ROK 8th Division was defending the main line of resistance at the Kumsong bulge north of Kumsong-ch’on along the line linking Hill 765 east of Kyoam-san, Hill 690 south of Finger Ridge, Hill 663 south of Hill Capitol, and Karach’i on the bank of the Pukhan River, as the central front of the ROK II Corps. On its left was the 6th Division and on the right, the 5th Division.

At that time the 8th Division had its 16th Regiment on the left front encompassing Finger Ridge, the 21st Regiment on its right front around Hill Capitol, and the 10th Regiment as reserve in the Kwangdae-gol area. The enemy forces confronting them were identified as the 201st Division of the CCF 67th Army, but it was later learned that the 200th and 201st Divisions that actually attacked them.136

The enemy continued to attack tenaciously at outposts on the front of the 8th Division from mid-May to June 4, and then a lull was sustained for a while. When the enemy made a breakthrough on the front of the 5th Division on its right
on June 10, the enemy poured 1,300 rounds of shells (1,000 more than routine firing) on the front of the 8th division. About 800 out of the total were concentrated around Hill Capitol. Judging that the enemy attack was imminent, the division
commander Brig. General Lee Myong Jae encouraged each regiment to get thoroughly prepared. The enemy launched an attack on a large scale starting at 22:00 on June 12. At that time, the enemy made a complete breakthrough on the main line of resistance of the 5th Division on the right linking Hills 973 and 883. Firing all the available arms including 60mm to 120mm caliber mortars and field artillery, three enemy regiments focused their attack at the outpost at Chwasudong and the main line of resistance of the 21st Regiment on the right front of the division.

- Loss of Hill Capitol

At Hill Capitol (610), the 11th Company(-) of the 21 Regiment was deployed, and one of its platoons took its position at Hill 663 on the main line of resistance at that time. Hill Capitol was nothing more than an ordinary outpost in terms of its location and size. However, this outpost had been a site for decisive battles testing the will to fight for both the friendly and enemy forces ever since the enemy offensive of October 1952. Thus, Hill Capitol was recognized as a hill that could not be lost at any cost, and tunnel positions were dug out at the hill just as on the main line of resistance. But under surveillance from Hills 714 and 748 on the enemy main line of resistance, it was impossible to conduct any activity not seen by the enemy such as augmenting its position or forwarding supplies to its troops in daylight.

Sensing the start of the enemy’s all-out offensive upon the situation report from the outpost, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment immediately dispatched the 10th Company to Hill 663. The enemy simultaneously attacked the outpost at Hill Capitol and the positions on the main line of resistance. One enemy battalion(-) attacked the front of Hill Capitol and two battalions attacked on both sides of Hill 663. Moments later, Captain Chon Ho Ch‘ul, commander of the 11th Company reported, “Four enemy companies broke into our
position, engaged in fist-to-fist fighting, request fire-in-position!” Then wire communication was cut off. At the same time, the commander of the 10th Company upon arrival at Hill 663, made a report “that the enemy had penetrated our position. It would be difficult to hold the position, which was crumbling under enemy artillery fire and heavy rain.” The commander of the 3rd Battalion emphasized that Hills Capitol and 663 should be secured by any means.

Around midnight of that day, the 1st Company on the right of the 3rd Battalion had a breakthrough on its position, and the 7th Company on the left of the front was engaged in fierce fighting in its position. The regiment requested the 12th Artillery Group and the corps artillery to provide a TOT fire, hitting hard on the enemy. The enemy’s offensive faltered for a while, but at 00:50 of the 13th, they exerted pressure on Hill 663 and on the position of the company on the right front and penetrated into the position of Hill Capitol and started to destroy the covered shelters. The battalion commander reported the loss of the hill. Most the soldiers of the 11th company(-) were killed in action within position, and the company commander and his headquarters groups, who resisted to the last minute, were captured. The tunnel position at Hill Capitol which was evaluated as the best construction among all the positions on the frontline was completely taken in three hours by an overwhelming number of enemy; however, it was analyzed that lack of experience in tactics utilizing tunnel position was more reasonable for the loss of the hill than sheer numbers.

Right after the loss of Hill Capitol, Hill 663 was also involved in fighting within the position. Some of the soldiers with shellshock deserted the battle field. The company commander fainted in the fox hole during the enemy’s hand-grenade attack, was captured by the enemy, rolled down a slope, narrowly escaped, and returned alive.

The CCF established a breakthrough on the right front of the 8th Division by occupying Hills Capitol and 663 and the positions on both sides of
them, committing five battalions in four hours after they began the attack. The division commander immediately ordered the 10th Regiment(-), the reserve, to recapture Hill 663 and the position of the 1st Battalion on the right. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Regiment launched a counterattack at Hill 663 after dawn on the 13th and the position of the 1st Company on the right, occupied parts of them, and continued their attack. But upon stubborn enemy resistance, the division’s counterattack failed, and the 1st Battalion occupied a position-in-haste on the reverse slope at around 11:00, and the 2nd Battalion was blocked by around 16:15.

- Contest for Finger Ridge

Taking the initiative in grabbing Hill Capitol on the 13th, the CCF attacked Finger Ridge, held by the 16th Regiment, that evening. Finger Ridge is a part of the ridgeline extending from Kyoam-san eastward for 2.5 kilometers from which the finger-shaped ridge stretches northeast. This ridgeline linked Hill 690 located on the main line of resistance, Hill 730 (highest peak) in the center of the ridgeline, and Hill 710 (Finger Hill).

At that time the 16th Regiment deployed the 3rd Battalion on the left front, the 1st Battalion on the right, the attached 3rd Battalion of the 10th Regiment on the Finger Ridge in the center, and the 2nd Battalion(-), the reserve, in the rear of Finger Ridge in order to provide depth in defense. The commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 10th Regiment built a protruding defense position on the Hill 690 by deploying the 3rd Company of the 16th Regiment and the 9th Company of the 10th Regiment. He had the 11th Company deployed at the peak(Hill 730), and one platoon of the 10th Company at Finger Hill(710); as the enemy set up an outpost at Hill Orchid 200 meters apart from Finger Ridge, the two sides confronted each other face to face. Preparing for the enemy attack from Hill 575, he augmented the outpost line by deploying the reconnaissance company
of the division and one platoon of the 10th Company on the left front of Finger Ridge.

Engagements in this area started when the Chinese, infiltrating from Hill 575, attacked the position of the reconnaissance company at 21:25 on the 13th. Forces from Hill Orchid attacked the outpost at Finger Hill fifteen minutes later. At around 22:00, enemy forces of one-battalion strength advanced to the right flank of Finger Ridge, hit hard the right flank of the 11th Company at Hill 730 (the highest peak), and another company attacked on both sides of Hill 690 located on the main line of resistance. As if repeating what had happened at Hill Capitol, the enemy dashed into the position, engaged in close combat in the trenches, and then ended with friendly request of fire-in-position. After two hours of engagement, the outpost of the reconnaissance company was lost at 23:00, to be followed by Finger Hill at 23:10, and the outpost at the highest peak at 02:00 on the 14th. But the 9th Company of 10th Regiment repulsed the enemy attacking Hill 690 and secured its main line of resistance.

The 16th Regiment conducted a counterattack at 03:40 on the 14th, by committing the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion deployed forward on the back slope of Hill 690 with the hill as a springboard, but failed. Thus the regiment was deprived of Finger Ridge that night. The same night the Chinese forces turned their main attack toward the right side of Finger Ridge and tried to exploit the breakthrough already established at Hill Capitol up to Finger Ridge. The regiment set up a blocking line by transferring the 2nd Battalion(-) to this area and strengthened its depth of defense against the enemy breakthrough.

- Transfer to the New Line of Defense (Line Iceland)

With dawn on the 14th, the enemy shifted attack from the area of Finger Ridge to that of Hill Capitol. The enemy surged toward the blocking line on the right front established by the 21st Regiment and the 10th Regiment(-), reserved
for counterattack. The 21st Regiment stood firm during the daylight but disaster occurred that night. On that evening the CCF penetrated the reconnaissance company and increased pressure by committing one battalion-size troops on each of the ROK battalions, which were composed of diverse elements. The blocking line crumbled, and the blocking units dispersed in smaller groups. Destroying the right front of the division, the enemy advanced to Line Iceland on that night.

With its right front crumpled, the commanding general of the ROK II Corps issued an order at 00:50 of the 15th to the 21st Regiment of the 8th Division and the 5th Division to give up the current blocking line and to occupy Line Iceland, the new main line of resistance, linking Finger Ridge and Hill 462 on the southern bank of the Pukhan River. Concurrently, the corps commander committed the 3rd Division, the corps reserve, to the left of the 5th Division and had the division take over the area of the regiment of the 8th Division on its right front in order to cover the withdrawal of the frontline forces.

With the ROK 3rd Division (attached to the II Corps) committed, the Eighth US Army adjusted the areas of responsibility for the ROK II and the US X Corps by reducing the burden of defense for the II Corps. The sector for the US X Corps was extended to the eastern bank of the Pukhan River and the ROK 5th Division was detached to the US X Corps. Accordingly, the ROK 3rd Division took over the main line of resistance on the western bank of the Pukhan River defended by the ROK 5th Division while this division reorganized in the area of east Pukhan River previously held by the 36th Regiment. In addition, General Taylor pulled out the 11th Division from the ROK I Corps and transferred it as reserve for the ROK II Corps as of June 16.

From the 15th, the ROK 7th Division, the reserve of the US X Corps, was committed to the frontline, taking over the main line of resistance linking Hills 938 and 1220 from the 62nd Regiment on the left front of the 20th Division. These adjustments were made in order to augment the defense capabilities in this
area since enemy attacks on the front of the 20th Division were on the rise and the area was vulnerable to enemy flank attacks as the 8th, 3rd, and 5th Divisions were transferred to line Iceland, the new Line of defense. Thus, the defense on the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge, the confluence of the Pukhan River and Kumsong-ch’on where the main forces of the CCF June offensive fell, was strengthened.

During the period of June 15-16, the enemy attack on the front of the 8th Division gradually subsided. Friendly artillery fire and air bombardment continued while the friendly forces built the new defense line. The supporting fires dampened the enemy offensive, and the ROK II Corps restored stability on the frontline by June 18. In the June offensive conducted for nine days, the ROK II Corps had to retreat four kilometers on the thirteen-kilometer front, losing Hill Mass of 949, 973, and 883 on the east bank and Hill Capitol on the west bank of the Pukhan River. They lost the hills that they had gained after severe battles in the autumn offensive of 1951. In this battle the ROK suffered about 7,300 casualties, and the enemy lost about 13,000, including 6,064 confirmed dead, 26 prisoners, and 7,200 estimated dead or wounded.
4. Last Chinese Offensive: the Third Stage; July Offensive

(1) Enemy’s Plan for Attacks and Friendly Deployment

The Chinese June offensive was blocked on Line Iceland, newly set up along the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River on the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge; however, fighting dragged on until early July in some areas including Hill Sunwoo. According to CPVA’s History of Resist America and Assist Korea War, the enemy concluded its June offensive by June 23 and started preparations for the July offensive, to begin on July 13.

The July offensive was based on Mao Tse Tung’s directive issued on June 19 to wage a new offensive on the ROK forces in order to put pressure militarily on the ROK government to comply with the armistice agreement. The enemy’s propaganda effect of the battlefield victories in June had faded with President Syngman Rhee’s release of the anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war on June 18, and at the same time to grab initiative in battle as well as on the negotiating table with truce at hand. Upon receipt of this directive, Peng Teh Huai postponed the signing of the armistice agreement and received the approval for his proposal to attack the ROK troops. He decided to commence ‘the third summer offensive operations’ around July 10.\textsuperscript{137}

The Chinese took as their objective the destruction of the four ROK divisions (Capital, 6th, 8th, & 3rd Divisions) deployed along the Kumsong bulge for the following reasons: 1) it was easy to attack as that part of the frontline still a salient; 2) they had familiarized themselves with the terrain through the first series of attacks on the outposts and the June offensive; and, 3) they were well aware of vulnerabilities of the ROK defense line. But it was felt that the most decisive reason for the enemy to concentrate their attacks continuously on this bulge was their strategy to improve their defense line and to recapture the hydroelectric power
plant at Hwach’on.

Upon issuing directives on the final offensive, Peng Teh Huai strengthened the combat capabilities of the 20th Army Group (54th, 60th, 67th & 68th Armies) by attaching the 21st Army to it and assigning tank, artillery, engineer, and other branch units for its support. With this augmentation, the 20th Army Group was estimated to have superiority of 3:1 in manpower and of 1.7:1 in firepower to the ROK forces with more than 1,100 pieces of artillery above the size of 82mm mortars (44.4 pieces per kilometer) and 20 tanks deployed in front of the Kumsong area.¹³⁸

The commanding general of the 20th Army Group completed the plan for the war zone by July 6 and issued an attack order on July 10. According to this plan, the five Chinese armies were to envelope and destroy the ROK forces at the Kumsong bulge with three operational groups (west, center, and east) and in the following stages from three directions:

In the first stage, straighten up the frontline, by attacking and destroying the enemy in Isil-dong, Pukchong-ryong, and Paeson-gol southwest of Kumsong and north of Kumsong-ch’on. In the second stage, depending upon the situation thereafter, advance to Samch’on-bong, Chokgun-san, Changgo-bong, Hukunto-ryong, and Paekam-san. When the operation succeeds, get prepared to repulse the enemy’s counterattack by destroying a large number of enemy forces again.

The West Group (68th Army minus the 202nd Division but with 130th Division, 54th Army) would start from Oeya-dong and Hoe-gogae on the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge and attack the enemy north of Isil-dong, Pukchong-ryong, Wolbong-san and Kaeya-ri in the first stage. In the second stage, attack the enemy west and northwest of Paeson-gol in coordination with the Center Group.
The Center Group (67th Army; 135th Division, 54th Army; and one regiment of the 202nd Division, 68th Army) would attack from the line of Kwandae-ri and Kyoam-san, advance to Tongsan-ri and Sangsan-ri, and destroy the enemy in that area. In the second stage, attack the enemy west and northwest of Paeson-gol in coordination with the East and West Groups. The East Group [60th Army; the 21st Army(-); 33rd Division; and the 605th Reg., 68th Army] would attack from Songsil-ri and Yongho-dong, rapidly expand its attack toward Kwangdae-gol and Sehyon-ri, occupy the bridge and ferry site at Kumsong-ch’on, and interdict enemy counterattack and reinforcement by securing the route between Kumsong and Hwach’on. In the second stage, it would destroy the enemy at Paeson-gol in coordination with the West and Center Groups. The 21st Army would take over the defense mission east of the Pukhan River from the 60th Army. Concentrate on defense, and actively contain the enemy.\(^{139}\)

In short, this plan was to employ the East and West Groups in breaking through the shoulders of the bulge, and then to encircle and destroy the ROK forces in the center of the breakthrough in coordination with the Center Group.

The commanding general of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army planned to have the 24th Army of the 9th Army Group on the left attack and destroy the 26th Regiment on the left front of the Capital Division along the line of Yangji and Haengjong, which would block friendly reinforcements from Kimhwa by controlling the route between Sanggujong and Hagujong. This operation supported the operations of the 20th Army Group, the main attack. Commencement of attack was set for the evening of July 13. The Chinese committed thirteen divisions out of the fifteen divisions of the five armies under the command of the 20th Army Group in the ‘July 13 Offensive,’ and held the remaining two divisions as reserve and employed one army (24th Army) separate-
ly as secondary attack. In addition, the 9th Army Group (16th and 24th Armies) joined the attacking forces in Ch’orwon and Kimhwa on the central front, the 19th Army Group (46th & 1st Armies) on the western front, and two North Korean corps (III & VII Corps) on the eastern front east of Mundung-ri. It was to be on a scale comparable to that of the Spring Offensive of 1951. ¹⁴⁰

Meanwhile, based on information on the movement of the enemy troops, the UNC was expecting an enemy offensive and decided that the main attack would be directed toward the Hwach’on Reservoir. However, with limitations on observation due to bad weather and the complete stealth of the Chinese movement, the UNC failed to make an accurate assessment of the scale of attacking forces and of stockpiling of supplies. Accordingly the commanding general of the Eighth US Army issued a warning to corps commanders to strengthen their defense posture in anticipation of enemy attacks and to conduct troop redeployment with special attention to improving the right defense line for the ROK II Corps, which had been compromised in the Chinese June Offensive.

The Eighth US Army recalled the 5th Division, which had completed its reorganization, to the ROK II Corps on June 26, and the commanding general of the US X Corps had the US 45th Infantry Division, defending Mundung-ri, take over the defense area of the right wing regiment of the ROK 7th Division; thus, the defense capabilities of the 7th Division were enhanced with its frontal area shortened. The US X Corps held the US 5th Regimental Combat Team attached from the US IX Corps in corps reserve. Notwithstanding the impending armistice agreement, the Eighth US Army redeployed the US 24th infantry Division, which had been reorganizing in Japan, to Korea during the period of July 3-12 and assigned it to the defense of the rear areas and the security of the remaining prisoner camps in light of the uncertain situation.

Thus, the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge around the sector boundary between the ROK II and the US X Corps was substantially strengthened, and
seven ROK divisions were deployed in the Kumsong bulge, including a part of the 9th Division and Capital Division under the US IX Corps, the 6th, 8th, 3rd, and
5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps, and the ROK 7th Division under the US X Corps. The ROK 11th Division assembled in Hwach’on area as reserve.

(2) Secondary and Feint Attacks

Prior to their attacks on the Kumsong bulge, the Communists conducted probing attacks in this area and secondary and feint attacks in other areas. The Chinese Communists alerted the II Corps by again attacking Hills Advance-to-North and Sniper west of Kimhwa in the 9th Division sector on June 24 and 25 at the left end of the bulge and Hill 529 (Kwanmang-san) at Yongho-dong of the 3rd Division at the right end of the bulge the next day.

By that time the corps was expecting an enemy attack around June 25, and was alert and ready for combat. At Hill Advance-to-North, the CCF 70th Division of the 24th Army retreated, leaving behind about 700 estimated corpses, after failing in its attempt to breakthrough on the main line of resistance against strong resistance from the 28th Regiment, 9th Division. At Sniper Ridge the 29th Regiment of the 9th Division lost one outpost (Hill X) defended by one platoon, but at another outpost (Hill A) it succeeded in defending the position, suffering the loss of about 240 troops, dampening the enemy’s will to fight.

There was also a fierce battle at Kwanmang-san. Protruding at the junction of the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River, the mountain was critical terrain for the friendly forces in defense of the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge. On the other hand, it was a point of importance for the enemy as an advance base for crossing the Kumsong-ch’on. On the night of June 25, the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, defending the left front of the 3rd Division, was attacked by the 604th Regiment of the CCF 68th Army in the midst of a heavy shower after the enemy’s fierce artillery fire.\(^{141}\) The battalion desperately tried to repulse the enemy by requesting final protective fire but lost its hill in the face of Chinese human-wave
tactics in the early morning of June 26. Following the loss of the hill, upon the order of the corps, the 3rd Division transferred its front on the southern bank of the Pukhan River to the 5th Division and conducted counterattacks seven times by committing the 22nd and 23rd Regiments in turn, the division reserve. This continued until July 3, but the division failed to recover the hill. The Chinese stubbornly held fast to it, paying a heavy cost. At this small hill, the 3rd Division had lost of 1,776 troops and the Chinese were estimated to have suffered 2,962 casualties.

On June 26, the 189th Division, CCF 60th Army employed one regiment in attacking the positions of the 36th Regiment, ROK 5th Division on the eastern bank of the Pukhan River, and another regiment in attacking Hill 938 of the 8th Regiment, 7th Division under the command of the US X Corps on the right side of the 36th Regiment. The Chinese increased pressure on these positions by committing an overwhelming number of troops under the support of field artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, the 36th Regiment had to pull back 1.3 kilometers and blocked the enemy along the next ridge line, and the 7th Division lost Hill 938.

Hill 938 had been secured since June 16 of the last June offensive when the 7th Division took it over from the 20th Division, and it was the center of defense for the 8th Regiment on the left front of the division as a springboard leading to Hill 1220, the most critical terrain in this area. (The defense center for the 5th Regiment on the right front was Hill 1220.) Major Sunwoo Yong, commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Regiment, ordered barrage fire and conducted close combat, engaging the enemy which had been attacking after concentrated firing since 21:45, June 26. With its wire communication cut off, the battalion commander encouraged his men in the frontline companies retreating to the battalion CP: “Do not retreat, and hold fast to the current frontline!” However, Major Sunwoo was killed in action by a enemy hand grenade while dashing to the battalion CP, and his battalion, unable to block the ensuing attacks, finally had to
leave Hill 938.

The 8th Regiment conducted its counterattacks three times on June 27, but failed. Maj. Gen. Kim Yong Bae, the division commander, committed the 3rd Regiment, which returned from the corps reserve, in counterattack but failed; then, he had the 8th Regiment counterattack in turn with a change of mission with the 3rd Regiment. Thus, Hill 938 was once recaptured but was lost again in the enemy’s concentrated artillery fire and continued attacks. As casualties rose in these engagements, Lt. Gen. Isaac D. White, the corps commander, stopped the counterattacks on July 1 in order to prevent further loss of manpower. In this battle, the 7th Division suffered the loss of 1,347 KIA, WIA and MIAs, and the enemy’s loss was estimated to be 1,323. Later this hill was named Hill Sunwoo in commemoration of the battalion commander killed in action.

As the decisive cause of the loss of this hill, Colonel Lee Byung Hyung (Lt. Gen. retired), a regimental commander at that time, recalled that the communications failures rendered the battalion commander unable to grasp situation of his companies, and a vacancy in command was accidentally created when the regimental commander, having suffered insomnia due to battle fatigue, temporarily delegated his command to the deputy division commander and stayed at the regimental rear CP. He emphasized that command and communications are critical on the battlefield.¹⁴²)

In addition to attacks on both shoulders of the Kumsong bulge, the Communists also conducted attacks at the outposts around Yokkok-ch’ on of the US I Corps area on the western front about the same time. These were the hill masses that had witnessed repeated contests since they were secured in fierce battles of Operation Commando in October 1951 and Operation Counter in June 1952. To be more specific, the Chinese forces attacked Hill Queen (250) and Hill Park (199), the outpost of the ROK 1st Division, during the period of June 25-29 1953, and attacked Hill Porkchop (234) of the US 7th Infantry Division and Hill
Arrowhead (281) of the ROK 2nd Division.

Among them, Hill Queen (250) and Hill Park (199) were located at Kyeho-dong and Chong-dong, just south of the junction of the Imjin River and Yokkkok-ch’on. By the time of this engagement, the 1st ROK Division had the Imjin River in its center, establishing the main line of resistance with the 11th Regiment on its left (west of Kowang-san-Hill Nori) and the 15th Regiment on the right (Chungsa-ri-Ochoksan-ri) and kept the 12th Regiment as reserve. The division faced the Chinese 1st Division, 1st Army of the 19th Army Group. At 22:00, June 25, the Chinese division commenced attack on five outposts including Hills Queen, Park, 1, 3, and Mike of the regiment on the right and Hill Nori of the regiment on the left after intensive artillery barrages. The Chinese committed one regiment at Hills 1, Park, and 3 near the Imjin River, one battalion to Hills Queen and Mike, and one company toward Hill Nori. The enemy’s main attack was toward Hill Park, the secondary attack toward Hill Queen, and a feint was at Hill Nori.

On that day the ROK division was engaged, it was holding a target contest, an event to sharpen their resolve for unification by destroying Communists and strengthening security posture. In this battle the division fought to secure outposts, deploying the one ROK marine regiment (-) attached to it on its left front and with two regiments as reserve. After repeated counterattacks by the regiment and the division, the ROK forces secured Hill Park on June 29 but they suffered in the contest for Hill Queen.

Upon the direction by Maj. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, the corps commander, the division pulled out from these hills and took a defensive posture on the main line of resistance. The corps commander concluded that it was not desirable to shed more blood for those outposts, which would be inside the DMZ, with armistice at hand.

On the night of July 6 one week after the battles at Hills Queen and Park
lapsed into a lull, the US 7th Infantry Division on the right front of the US I Corps was defending Hill Porkchop (234) that the Chinese attacked. This hill was an independent hill located at Hasa-gol immediately north of the tributary to the Yokkok-ch’on, well remembered as an outpost where a fierce battle was held in the western front along with Hill Old baldy (266) that had slipped into enemy hands the previous March. On that night, troops of the 67th Division of the CCF 23rd Army climbed Hill Porkchop, which was isolated from the friendly front, and occupied the right end of the hill unopposed. The 17th Regiment in defense of this hill immediately augmented its defense of the outpost with two additional companies. Thereafter, both sides repeated counterattacks for the contest of this hill for four days. As if determined not to retreat regardless of the cost, the Chinese committed three regiments in turn at this hill.

On July 10, General Taylor, the commanding general of the Eighth US Army, decided to withdraw from this hill, as had been done on Hill Old baldy the previous March, after conferring with General Clarke, the corps commander, and Maj. Gen. Trudeau, the division commander, at the forward CP of the US 7th Infantry Division, and concluded that Chinese disregard for casualties and their obvious intent to hold onto Porkchop outweighed the UNC’s tactical value of the hill. Thus, Hill Porkchop, which had been secured at the sacrifice of so many soldiers since Operation Counter, slipped into the enemy’s hands.

By the time combat started at Hill Porkchop on July 6, the ROK 2nd Division was also engaged in a fierce battle at Hill Arrowhead (281) upon attack by the 73rd Division, CPVA 23rd Army. This hill, captured in Operation Commando, was critical terrain along with Hill White Horse (395), located on the northern bank of the Yokkok-ch’on. The 2nd Division had been guarding this area for six months since it was deployed in the Ch’orwon area (Hill 281—Chunggang-ri) on December 29 of the previous year. When the Chinese 73rd Division attacked two outposts at Hill Arrow-head on June 29 and 30, the division repulsed
the enemy attack.

The CCF 73rd Division, which suffered the loss of 401 troops in this battle, again committed one battalion on July 6, passed through the 69th Division at the front, and attacked Hill 281. As the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment guarding this area had lost two outposts, the ROK forces conducted counterattacks and recaptured them in a battle that lasted for more than 30 hours. On the night of July 8, the enemy attacked again, firing about 6,500 rounds of artillery and mortar. As one of its outposts was taken, the division conducted counterattacks employing all its available units in turn, finally recaptured it, and held fast to Hill Arrowhead. In this battle for a small outpost, the friendly forces suffered the loss of about 500 and the enemy’s loss was estimated to be about 750 casualties. In testimony later by Major Ahn Ik Sup (on December 10, 1965), the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, and Captain Pyun Il Hyun (on May 30, 1967), regimental S-3, they pointed out the problems in the ‘field fortifications’ at these hills, which had covered bunkers, in the following terms: 1) lack of activism in operations; 2) absence of smooth infantry-artillery cooperation; 3) malfunctions in communication between bunkers; and, 4) bunkers not designed to fight effectively against the enemy within the position. They testified that these limitations of the bunkers allowed the enemy to grab the positions without much difficulty. Thus, there were reviews on ‘bunker operations’ and afterwards bunkers were utilized only as temporary shelters in case of enemy artillery fire, not fighting positions.

At the time the Chinese main attack of the July Offensive on the Kumsong bulge started on July 13, the 1st Division, CCF 1st Army attacked Hill Betty near Koyangdae on the western bank of the Imjin River, the outpost of the 11th Regiment, ROK 1st Division. Hill Betty was an unknown hill at the lower end of Hill Nicky on the ridge line east of Maryang-san (315), and was a low hill consisting of three tops of around 120-150 meters high across the Imjin River southwest of Hill Park.
One platoon of the 7th Company of the 1st Regiment performing the outpost mission at the hill suffered heavy casualties in the enemy attack and was replaced by the 2nd Platoon (led by 2nd Lt. Kim Man Sul) of the 6th Company on July 15. While the 2nd Platoon was engaged with the enemy already occupying western part of this hill on the one hand and was reinforcing its position on the other, it was attacked by one-battalion scale troops that night. The platoon, relying on covered positions, repulsed the enemy’s continued attacks and secured the outpost fighting hand-to-hand and requesting fire-within-the position throughout the night.

In this battle the enemy suffered casualties of 764, including an estimated 450 killed or wounded. Only twelve soldiers of the platoon including 2nd Lt. Kim Man Sul survived. For his performance in battle, the platoon leader was awarded the Taeguk Order of Military Merit and the US Distinguished Service Cross. Many other soldiers were also cited with medals of military merit.

(3) Battle at the Kumsong Bulge (Battle of July 13)

Following Chinese secondary and feint attacks at outposts on both shoulders of the Kumsong salient and along the Imjin River and Yokkok-ch’on, the main attack was directed to the Kimsong salient by the evening of July 13. By committing the East and West Operational Groups to break through the Capital and 3rd Divisions (including the left wing of the 5th Division) and by employing almost simultaneously the Center Group in pressuring the front of the 6th and 8th Divisions, the Chinese intended to interdict the route of retreat for the ROK forces, surround and destroy them on the salient. Thus, the ROK Capital Division under the command of the US IX Corps and ROK II Corps deployed on the Kumsong bulge had a major encounter with the Chinese forces. Below is the description of battles in terms of three areas: the left and right shoulders and the
Battle for the ROK Capital Division on the Left Shoulder of Kumsong Salient
forefront of the salient.

1) Collapse on the Left Shoulder of the Kumsong Bulge

The Capital Division was guarding the left shoulder of the Kumsong salient. The division deployed the 26th and 1st Regiments (with 3rd Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment attached) along the main line of resistance from Haso-ri and Hoe-gogae, and had the 1st Cavalry Regiment(-) as reserve. The special features in defense position of the Capital Division were: 1) the 26th Regiment organized its position on the northern bank of the Namdae-ch’on in order to be linked to the defense position of Sniper Ridge with the adjacent unit on its left, 2) the 1st Regiment set up its position on the southern bank of the creek, and 3) as the sector for the regiments was extensive, they organized bunkered strong points by company and set up obstacles such as mine fields and entangled wire in-between.

At 21:00, July 13, the 204th and 203rd Divisions, 68th Army and 130th Division, 54th Army under the Chinese West Operational Group concentrated their pressure on the 26th Regiment, and commenced attack on all fronts of the ROK division under intense artillery support. The division knew that enemy attack was imminent through interrogation of a prisoner on the 11th. This prisoner was captured while he was setting up dugouts necessary for immediate assault along with a shift of preparatory fire. After approaching close to the opposing side’ main line of resistance, the Chinese would take shelter from their preparatory fire in these dugouts. His testimony that these dugouts were stealthily set up in several locations near to their objectives for attack revealed the enemy’s imminent assault at the friendly forces main positions after the enemy’s preparatory fires.

- Collapse of the Main Line of Resistance

Following the preparation fires, the Chinese attacked the area of the 26th
Regiment, and upon reception of the regimental report that a “flood of enemy forces is surging toward us,” the division concluded that its main attack was on the left front, and gave priority in fire support to the 26th Regiment. But after 30 minutes, the enemy shifted its fire toward the 1st Regiment, committing their main attack toward Chungch’i-ryong and Hoe-gogae. While attacking the ROK positions with forces of a company or a battalion scale, the Chinese directed their main forces through the obstacle areas installed between strong points. By utilizing the disadvantages of bunker tactics of the ROK forces, that is, taking cover in bunkers upon enemy attack and responding with fire-within-the position, the enemy drove the ROK forces into bunkers by attacking its positions with small-scale forces and then committed its main forces into the gaps between the ROK positions. While the forward troops were requesting fire-within-the position from cover, the frontline positions in the center and on the left of the 1st Regiment were occupied by the Chinese forces around 23:00, and the main enemy forces advanced along the space between the ROK battalions, penetrated into the area for battalion OPs and the reserve battalion on the second line of defense. The battalion commander tried to support the frontline companies with reserve forces, but had to pull back due to lack of manpower and a meeting engagement with the Chinese forces which had already penetrated deep into friendly territory.

The commander of the 1st Regiment moved the 3rd Battalion(-) of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the reserve, to the blocking position (Hills 522-512) in the rear of the 1st Battalion in order to block the enemy breakthrough on the approach to Chungch’i-ryong at 21:50 while combat for the frontline battalions was in progress. But upon encountering the enemy, which had already penetrated the frontline battalion, Major Lee Joon Hwa, the battalion commander, was killed in action, and the 9th Company headed for Hill 512, was completely destroyed. Receiving the report that the enemy forces were surging in six columns along the road in the gaps to the 1st Battalion on his left at about 23:30, the commander of
the 2nd Battalion at Hoe-gogae requested action by the regimental commander, but could not get any support since the reserve of the regiment had already been committed. After midnight, enemy echelons strengthened to the scale of a regiment each destroyed the battalion positions on both flanks, and at 03:00 on July 14, the battalion OP was also attacked. At the same time, the enemy attacked the OP of the 1st Battalion in front of Chungch’i-ryong with sachel charges, frightening away the members of the OP including the battalion commander toward the regimental CP and breaking up the battalion. But thanks to the high cliff on the southern bank of the Namdae-ch’on, which constituted a formidable barrier to the enemy, the 3rd Battalion on the left front was able to repel the enemy infantry in spite of intense artillery fire.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 26th Regiment on the left front of the division received a concentrated enemy attack. In an hour of continuing artillery fire that commenced around 21:00, one enemy regiment attacked the front of the 1st Battalion and penetrated the main line of resistance around 23:00. Then the friendly fire for defense shifted to fire-within-the position. Around that time, following the corps’ adjustment of sector boundaries, the commander of the 26th Regiment transferred the 1st Battalion’s position on the left front to the 9th Division on its left and had the 3rd Battalion, which was moving to take over the left front of the 1st Battalion, support that battalion instead of taking over the position. He also had the 2nd Battalion, the reserve, support the same battalion.145) But those two battalions, on their way to the area of the 1st Battalion’s battle ran into the Chinese forces that had already made a breakthrough, and retreated in disarray toward the south of the Namdae-ch’on. By that time all the members the 2nd Platoon, including its leader 2nd Lt. Hwang Shin Joo, at the outpost of the 1st Company on the left edge of the 1st Battalion had fought to the death when encircled. At around 04:00 the battalion OP was neutralized by the enemy’s hand grenade attack, and the commander of the heavy weapons company was killed and
all the members of the US artillery and liaison team were wounded. With its three battalions barely escaping Chinese encirclement that night, the 26th Regiment retreated in haste toward the south of the Namdae-ch‘on.

By midnight on the 13th, positions of the frontline battalions of the Capital Division were taken, and at 03:00 to 04:00 on the 14th, its main line of resistance crumbled with the OPs of the frontline battalions under enemy siege.

- The CP of the 1st Regiment under Assault

Upon receipt of the situation report that the position of the 1st Regiment became threatened around 23:30 on 13 July and request for support from Colonel Ch’oi Se In, commander of the 1st Regiment, Brig. Gen. Ch’oi Ch’ang Un, the commanding general of the division, decided to conduct a counterattack, concluding that the enemy’s main attack was directed toward Chikmok-dong–Ich’on-dong–Kanjinhyon. The commanding general of the division ordered Colonel Yuk Kun Soo, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the division reserve, to move one battalion to the Ich’on-dong area to support the 1st Regiment and to have another battalion get prepared to support the 26th Regiment.¹⁴⁶ He also sent Colonel Im Ick Soon, the deputy division commander, to the Forward CP of the 1st Regiment to make adjustments to the counterattack plan.

Having ordered the 2nd Battalion to move to Ich’on-dong along the route of Chekung-dong—Bang-dong—Pukjong-ryong, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment arrived at the CP of the 1st Regiment at Ich’on-dong and consulted with Ch’oi Se In, the commander of the 1st Regiment, on the plan for counterattack. However, Colonel Ch’oi insisted on a frontal counterattack while Colonel Yuk advocated a counterattack on the right flank of the enemy; thus, they were unable to agree upon the plan for counterattack. Upon the arrival of the convoy of the 2nd Battalion, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment finally moved the battalion from Ich’on-dong toward Wolbong-ni in the area of the adja-
cent 6th Division in order to counterattack the enemy on its right flank. Then with intervention by the deputy commanding general of the division, who had just arrived at the regimental CP, the plan suggested by the commander of the 1st regiment was adopted; thus, the battalion which was heading for Wolbong-ri turned back to Ich'on-dong. The commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, concluding that the chances for counterattack were over, decided to deploy his battalion on both sides of the bridge on the road one kilometer north of the position line of headquarters and its service company of the 1st Regiment which waited for the arrival of the battalion.

There had been a report that the Chinese troops were marching in six columns on this very route. Thus, the Chinese forces on a large scale were marching southward while the ROK 2nd Battalion was moving northward on the same track. Upon arrival of the 8th Company of the 1st Cavalry Regiment at around 04:00, the regimental commander led the reconnaissance party to the position of the battalion, and subsequently the 7th Company arrived in a truck convoy. Having arrived there in advance, the Chinese forces encircled the ROK 1st Regiment CP at Ich'on-dong, penetrated the position line of the regimental headquarters and its service company, and waged a surprise assault on the CP and the forces of the 1st Cavalry Regiment. The CP of the 10th Artillery Battalion was also overrun. In total disarray, the members of the regimental CP including the commander, his deputy, and S-3 escaped the rout; however, the deputy commanding general of the division was captured, and the artillery commander and his deputy, who ran artillery operations were killed in action.

In this situation, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment was killed in action while he managed to deploy the company that arrived first in formation and controlled the commander of the 2nd Battalion, who arrived later, to lead the 5th and 6th Companies out of enemy encirclement. Having suffered heavy losses, the 2nd Battalion narrowly escaped the trap and had the troops in position at Hill
462 on the right of Route 119 in the 6th Division area at around 08:00.

Unable to assess the situation of the 1st Regiment accurately, the commanding general of the division ordered the 1st Battalion of the 1st Cavalry, the reserve, with attached the 59th Tank Company to support the 26th Regiment at 02:00 on the 14th. Still, the commanding general thought that the 26th Regiment was endangered, due to a grossly exaggerated situation report sent by the regiment to force increased support. Sensing the ominous situation of the 1st Regiment with its communications cut off, the commanding general changed the mission of the reserve forces already out to support the 26th Regiment to head for the 1st Regiment at around 04:00. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Regiment moving along Route 117A arrived at Kanjinhyon after 06:00. Realizing that the 1st Regiment had suffered a defeat, the battalion commander deployed his forces north of Pukjong-ryong, and covered the retreating forces. Under the cover provided by the 1st Battalion, the remnants of the 1st and the 1st Cavalry Regiments assembled near Sungam-gogae and reorganized. A large number of troops were still trapped in the frontline area, but the 26th Regiment withdrew without considerable losses and reorganized south of Bang-dong.

- Blocking Enemy Breakthrough

While the 1st Battalion (led by Lt. Col. Yoon Hung Jong) of the 1st Cavalry Regiment was securing a blocking line and covering the withdrawing units, the commanding general of the Capital Division requested the support of one regiment from Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, the corps commander, who visited the headquarters of the division at 06:00 on the 14th in order to set up the second blocking line along Shinch’on and Kanjinhyon south of Route 117A in order to block the enemy breakthrough and to reorganize its forces. In response to the request, the commanding general of the corps ordered the commanding general of the US 3rd Infantry Division, the corps reserve, to commit the 15th Infantry(with
Greek battalion attached) to setting up the second blocking line and then to take over the defensive mission of the Capital Division south of this line by 12:00.

At around 10:00 on the same day, General Maxwell D. Taylor of the Eighth US Army visited the CP of the Capital Division, was briefed, and emphasized that no further enemy breakthroughs should be allowed. He told the corps commander to take all necessary measures in order to secure Route 117A. By the time the US 15th Infantry had established the second blocking line along the ridge line south of route 117A during 12:00-17:00 on the 14th, the commanding general of the Capital Division committed the 26th Regiment just reorganized and the 1st Regiment (with 1st Cavalry Regiment, NCO Training Corps, & 59th Tank Company attached) in attack to secure the ridge line north of Route 117A. Their mission was to establish a new main line of resistance and also to rescue the troops of the division left behind. From early morning the 1st Regiment employed the 1st Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Regiment to secure Pukjong-ryong by attacking the right half of the ridge line north of Route 117A, and the 26th Regiment attacked the left half of it at night; however, both the regiments had to pull back to their starting positions upon Chinese counterattack. These attacks, however, blocked the Chinese offensive, secured the commitment of the US 15th Infantry to this area, and rescued a part of the entrapped friendly troops.

The commanding general of the Capital Division set 12:30 of the 15th as H-Hour for a coordinated attack with both regiments. At 08:00, however, the commanding generals of the corps with the US 3rd Infantry Division came to the division CP and told the division to transfer its front to the US 3rd Infantry Division by 12:00, to assemble in the vicinity of Iltong, and to reorganize its forces. The division commander recommended that the transfer be made after it conducted the planned attack. His recommendation was approved by the corps commander. At 12:30 the division began a coordinated attack with both of its regiments with concentrated fire support from air and artillery of the ROK and the US forces. Around
15:00 the ROK infantry occupied the ridge line north of Route 117A.

On that day, the US 3rd Infantry Division was fully occupied in setting up the main line of resistance along the ridge line south of Route 117A. With the Chinese attack that night, the Capital Division abandoned the ridge line that it had occupied, retreated to the rear area of the US 3rd Infantry Division, and ceased operations.

In a battle that lasted for two full days (July 13-15), the Capital Division lost its main line of resistance at the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge, transferred its mission of defense to the US 3rd Infantry Division, which established a blocking line along the ridge line south of Route 117A, and reorganized its forces upon transfer to the corps reserve. During this period, there was confusion in the command system of the division when its operational command and signal system became paralyzed. When the OP of the frontline battalion was attacked, the CP of the 1st Regiment was under fire, too, nullifying the command function temporarily, and the commander of the reserve regiment was killed in action. Failure to employ the division reserve under strict orders and the decision of the commanding general of the division resulted in confusion in employing the reserve forces. However, securing Pukjong-ryong at the decisive moment, the last battalion of the reserve forces along with straggling troops, was able to block the enemy forces north of Route 117A.

In addition to protecting the right flank of the US IX Corps and covering the left of the ROK II, the Capital Division provided the corps reserve in its area with a chance to block the enemy penetration. The division was pushed out of the salient upon attacks by four Chinese divisions; however, the division’s merit in blocking enemy forces along the ridge line north of Route 117A was praised by the corps commander.\(^{147}\)

2) Collapse on the Right Shoulder of the Kumsong Bulge
The ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions defended the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge. The 3rd Division was in charge of the north of the Kumsong-ch’on from the left of Finger Ridge to Tungdae-ri, and the 5th Division on the right set up defense positions on the western and eastern banks of the Pukhan River along the line of Yangji-ch’on, Nalguntuh, Hudong, and Hill 748. The 3rd Division at that time deployed the 22nd and 23rd Regiments at the front and had the 18th Regiment as a reserve; the 5th Division deployed the 35th Regiment on the western bank of the Pukhan River and the 36th Regiment on the eastern bank of the river, and had the 27th Regiment as reserve with its one battalion on the eastern bank of the river. The enemy’s attack on the right shoulder was directed to the area of the 3rd Division near to the Kumsong-ch’on where it was fordable and to a part of the left area of the 5th Division.

- Crisis on the Main Line of Resistance of the 3rd Division

The CCF 60th Army had occupied Kwanmang-san from June 25 to July 3, and thereafter, their reconnaissance activities were concentrated upon the area of the 23rd Regiment on the right of the division. Along with the increased reconnaissance activities of the enemy, southward movement of the enemy forces, estimated to be two regiments, in the regimental sector and the appearance of an enemy convoying suspected of being loaded with supplies for the frontline indicated that the grand offensive was imminent. Moreover, the morale of the 3rd Division was low, having suffered heavy losses in the battle at Kwanmang-san.

At 21:00 on July 13, simultaneously with their attack on the left shoulder, the Chinese concentrated heavy artillery fire in the area of the 3rd Division. Soon the local security troops of the frontline regiments engaged the enemy in the area of Songdong-ri and Yongho-dong, and the division artillery commenced its fire support. The commander of the 23rd Regiment maneuvered his 2nd Battalion, the reserve, into the rear area of the 1st Battalion to get prepared for contingency
Battle for the ROK 3rd Division on the Right Shoulder of Kumsong Salient
with the expectation that the enemy’s main attack would be directed toward the area of the 1st Battalion, defending the route connecting Yoho-gogae and the Pyulwoo area.

At 22:00, the enemy attacked the 22nd Regiment on the left front with two battalions, contrary to his expectation. The enemy committed only one company into the area of the 23rd Regiment. Conducting a diversionary attack in the area of the 23rd Regiment, the enemy intended to make a breakthrough against the 3rd Battalion on the right front of the 22nd Regiment on the one hand, and to envelope the left flank of the Kumsong bulge of the 5th Division, adjoining on the right. This advance would interdict the rear of the 23rd Regiment and encircle it.

At around 22:00, the Chinese forces attacked the area of the 2nd Battalion on the left front of the 22nd Regiment with forces of one-company scale and the area of the 3rd Battalion on the right front with two battalions. Caught by surprise by the strong enemy attack preceded by fierce artillery fire, the ROK forces were unable to conduct long-range and short-range defensive fire and final protective fire on order. The battalion resisted with final blocking fire followed by fire-within-the position; however, one company position on the front gave way to enemy forces reinforced to the size of one regiment around midnight, and Hill 485, the most critical terrain in this area, was taken. By this time all signal communication including wire and radios were cut off between the battalion and companies, rendering them unable to assess the situation. Wire communication linking battalions and the regiment was also disconnected. The 1st Battalion, which had marched to the area of the 3rd Battalion for a counterattack, was attacked by the enemy by surprise and scattered. Moments later the OP of the 1st Battalion, located at the same position with the regimental OP, was assaulted. After engagement with the enemy, they had to pull back.

Around midnight, the 2nd Battalion on the left front of the 22nd Regiment was holding its position in isolation, for the 3rd Battalion on the right
front had a complete penetration of its position and was unable to get artillery support due to the cut-off of communications. It started to retreat in disarray toward the regiment CP.

Meanwhile, in the area of the 23rd Regiment at around 22:15, the part of the enemy forces that had infiltrated through the area of the 5th Division adjoining on the left started from Hill 324 at Yangji-ch’on, crossed the Kumsong-ch’on, arrived at Tungdae-ri, overran down the position of the 4.2-inch heavy mortars supporting the frontline companies, and then attacked the regiment CP by surprise, thus creating confusion in the regiment rear. At the same time on the front, enemy forces passed through the line of the friendly outposts and attacked the main line of resistance of the 1st Battalion on the left front. At around 23:00, the enemy attacked the main line of resistance of the 3rd Battalion on the right front, while driving the 9th Company positioned toward Kwanmang-san into isolation.

After midnight, the commander of the 3rd Battalion tried to withdraw the 9th Company to safety under the support of 81mm mortar fire, but that support was impossible with the mortar position under attack and the communications cut-off. As the rear area dissolved into chaos, the commander of the regiment judging that the enemy’s main attack was directed to that area, selected one company out of the 2nd Battalion, the reserve, which was deployed to area of the 1st Battalion and ordered it to sweep the enemy forces and secure the rear area.

At around 02:00, the Chinese announced their offensive with blaring flutes and clanging metal gongs, followed by artillery fire. The enemy appeared to have committed small scale troops toward Yongho-dong and Songsil-ri of the 1st Battalion, a critical line for the division; the enemy’s main forces attacked along Yongho-dong to Tungdae-ri of the 3rd Battalion. But the 3rd Battalion held fast to the defense line by fighting continuously with the support of the tank platoon and exploding napalm mines installed on its main line of resistance.
• Failure of Division Counterattack

After a comprehensive review of the situation up until 22:00 on the 13th, Maj. Gen. Lim Sun Ha, the commanding general of the 3rd Division, concluded that the enemy’s main attack was directed to the area of the left front, contrary to expectation, and issued an alert order to the division reserve for counterattack. At 02:00 on the 14th, upon the division order for counterattack to recapture Hill 485, Colonel Park Kyong Won, commander of the 18th Regiment, deployed the 1st Battalion at Hill 551 in order to set up the second blocking line, and had the 2nd and 3rd Battalions maneuver to both sides of Hill 551 and advance toward Yomun-ri. However, the 3rd Battalion, which maneuvered to the right of the hill, encountered enemy forces, which had already infiltrated the rear, and halted there. Then the regiment commander recommended that the division commander block the advancing enemy by linking with the 1st Battalion rather than counterattack. But the division commander insisted upon the recapture of Hill 485. Disengaging with the enemy and detouring, the 3rd Battalion made a rendezvous with the 2nd Battalion at Yomun-ri at around 07:00.

By the time the 18th Regiment (-) was deploying to attack Hill 485, confusion increased arising as its troops intermingled with those of the 22th Regiment under heavy enemy artillery fire. They then saw large enemy forces, considered the main attack, moving southward by turning east around Hill 485, and the 1st Battalion in the rear was engaged with the attacking enemy forces. Judging that the regiment was on the verge of encirclement, the regimental commander requested that the division commander cancel the counterattack so he could withdraw. He got the division commander’s approval to do so.

Upon the attack by three Chinese divisions, the ROK 3rd Division had a penetration on its left front in the early morning of the 14th. Its main line of resistance on the right front was maintained but its rear was threatened by the enemy forces that made a breakthrough on the right flank and infiltrated into the rear, and
its plans for counterattack was frustrated. Then the division commander issued the following directives in a plan to take up a position with the river behind his troops. He shifted the missions among his regiments:

1) The 18th Regiment changes mission with the 22nd Regiment, occupy and secure the line linking Hills 509 and 552 (but the change of mission for the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Regiment will be directed later on);
2) The 23rd Regiment makes a phased withdrawal from the current frontline, continues to defend the right front area extending to Tungdae-ri in conjunction with the 18th Regiment and in addition takes charge of the security on the eastern flank of the division; and,
3) The 22nd Regiment secures the line connecting Hills 509, 434 and 472 on the north bank of the Kumsong-ch’ on and sets up a new defense line.

Following these directives, each regiment tried to disengage from the enemy and to establish defense positions by transferring to new defense lines. But due to the attack by the Chinese forces which had already infiltrated, it was impossible to build positions, and the regiments were forced to disperse again. At around 08:30, the 18th Regiment on the left front found enemy forces of one-battalion size advancing southward along the sector boundary with the 8th Division adjoined on the left and repelled them, requesting artillery and air support; however, the enemy forces reinforced to the level of two battalions advanced south to the rear in the east later on. Simultaneously the 23rd Regiment on the right front was attacked by two enemy regiments; then, under pressure which did not allow it to rally its soldiers, the ROK troops started to cross the Kumsong-ch’ on in disarray. Thus, the second line of defense originally planned on the northern bank of the Kumsong-ch’ on crumbled.

With the deteriorating situation, the artillery battalion positioned near
Sosung-dong providing direct support to the regiment moved to the secondary position near Ch’u-dong from 0900 to 11:00. The infantry had to suffer further without artillery support for the time being.

By that time, the division received an order of the corps: “ Occupy a new line of defense near Yonaegok on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on by 14:00 on the 14th.” Accordingly, the 18th Regiment occupied a new position by 13:20; however, the 22nd and 23rd Regiments, under enemy artillery fire, could not collect their troops south of their new positions.

The 2nd Battalion led by Lt. Col. Kwon Ik Kom of the 22nd Regiment, isolated on the left front, held fast to his position while engaged with the Chinese forces on the afternoon of the 14th. With ammunition and food supplies exhausted, however, the battalion had to break through the enemy encirclement and return to the friendly camp by detouring through the area of the 8th Division on the left.

- Withdrawal of the 5th Division from the Confluence of the Kumsong-ch’ on & Pukhan River

While the main forces of the CCF 60th Army attacked the ROK 3rd Division on the night of July 13, a part of the Chinese forces infiltrated into the confluence of the Kumsong-ch’ on and Pukhan River, attacked the 23rd Regiment command post and its supporting units located in the rear of the Regiment in surprise, and tried to encircle the 3rd Division. As the defense line of the 3rd Division started to crumble with the success of the Chinese enveloping maneuver, the enemy, taking the advantage of initiative, launched attacks on the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment of the 5th Division deployed at the salient on the eastern bank of the Kumsong-ch’ on at 00:45 on July 14.

At that time, the 1st Battalion deployed the 3rd and 2nd Companies at Hills 324 and 462 at the confluence and the bulge; the attached 9th Company held the southern bank of the Pukhan River to the east; and the 1st Company, the
reserve, occupied Hill 689 in the rear of the 2nd Company. Enemy artillery shells fell in all division areas but were much heavier in the vicinity of Yangji-ch’on. The enemy forces to the front of the 3rd Company were reinforced to one battalion level, and two enemy companies attacked the 2nd Company. The 5th Division concluded that the enemy would attack via the fordable confluence of the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River at Paegam-san in light of the enemy’s concentrated fire and the pattern of its infiltration.

Maj. Gen. Kim Jong Kap, the division commander, intended to concentrate fire of the division and the supporting US artillery on the approaching enemy; however, enemy forces reinforced to two battalions attacked the positions of the 3rd and 2nd Companies and another battalion crossed the river starting from around 02:00. The regimental commander deployed the 3rd Battalion(-1), the reserve, to the line of Hill 780 and Nalguntuh in the rear of the 1st Battalion, reinforcing the depth of its defense and getting prepared for the enemy’s advance to the south along the axis of Route 103. But around 08:00, the 1st Battalion lost Hill 462, the nucleus of its defense, in the face of the enemy’s ‘human-wave tactics’ and pulled back to the ridge south of Yangji-ch’on where it set up a hasty defense.

As the front line position of the 1st Battalion, the 35th Regiment was lost, the commanding general of the 5th Division was busy setting up countermeasures. He was concerned that after crossing the Kumsong-ch’on, the enemy’s main forces might advance southward through the left rear of the division to Paegamsan where no ROK forces were deployed. Upon getting the approval of the corps commander, the division commander had the 27th Regiment (-1), the reserve, deployed at Udun-gol south of Chup’a-ryong move to Pasu-gol west of Paegamsan at 08:20 and got prepared for the enemy advance, by transferring the reconnaissance company attached to the 36th Regiment to the east of Paegamsan.

The 3rd Division on the right end of the Kumsong bulge had its main
line of resistance broken by the attack of a Chinese army (3 divisions) on the night of July 13, and tried to set up a new line of defense on the southern bank across the Kumsong-ch’on the next morning. However, with its troops already scattered by the time of fording and under continuing enemy pressure and artillery fire, the division had difficulty in collecting its troops and organizing its positions.

Furthermore, the unit on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on of the 5th Division on the right of the 3rd Division also lost Hills 324 and 462, the criti-
cal terrain in its area, and had withdrawn to the south of Yangji-ch’on preparing for an enemy breakthrough along the axis of Paegam-san and Route 103. It was in an extremely vulnerable situation with its rear totally unattended. Thus, the right shoulder of the Kumsong bulge was crumbling.

3) Battle at the Forefront of the Kumsong Bulge

The Chinese Communist forces succeeded in advancing to the rear of the units at the forefront by making breakthroughs on both shoulders of the Kumsong salient. The forefront was a line linking the south of Kumsong, Kyoam-san, Finger Ridge, and Hill 612. The 6th Division was in defense of a portion of this line extending from east of Hoe-gogae to south of Kumsong and to Kyoam-san. The 8th Division was in charge of the area east of it through Hill 690 at the junction with Finger Ridge and to Hill 612. Along with their attack on both shoulders of the bulge, the enemy pressured the forefront with ‘human-wave tactics’ by committing overwhelming forces of more than four divisions. The contest on the forefront was to be determined in battles at Kyoam-san and Finger Ridge. The ROK 6th and 8th Divisions were forced to retreat south of the Kumsong-ch’on with the loss of these two hills and deterioration of the adjoining sector on both sides.

- Battle for the 6th Division near Kyoam-san

The 6th Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Paik In Yup, had the 7th Regiment in defense of Hoe-gogae and Sach’on-ri, the 19th Regiment in charge of Sach’on-ri and Kyoam-san, and the 2nd Regiment in reserve defending the left half of the forefront area. As indications of a new enemy offensive became evident in the beginning of July and Chinese reconnaissance activities in the outpost area at Kyoam-san increased in frequency, the division attached the 3rd
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, a reserve battalion, to the 19th Regiment and reinforced defense capabilities at Kyoam-san.

As it became crystal-clear that the enemy's grand offensive was imminent, the division committed the whole 2nd Regiment, its reserve, to the Kyoam-san area, and adjusted its sector boundary in order to block the enemy's main approach with the 19th Regiment to defend the axis of Route 17 on the west and the 2nd Regiment to take charge of Kyoam-san. In addition, the 9th Regiment of the 11th Division, the corps reserve, was attached to the division by the order of the corps in consideration of the extensive front of the division, and the division deployed the regiment at the front south of Kumsong. Thus, the 6th Division encountered the offensive of July 13 without a division reserve while its main line of resistance was manned with four regiments.

At 21:00 on July 13, the enemy's attack started at the outpost of Kyoam-san. At that time the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment was defending Kyoam-san, and three companies of the 2nd Battalion manned outposts along the ridges of the mountain stretching northward. In the early evening, the enemy exerted pressure on the 7th Company positioned at the forefront, destroyed the guard post of the 6th Company at around 21:00, and in an hour attacked the 6th and 5th Companies with a force of two battalions. Upon the attack by the enemy forces, reinforced to four battalions, the 6th Company was engaged in combat within-the position. Around midnight, the enemy forces that bypassed outposts began to attack the main position at Kyoam-san. That night the 6th Company repelled the aggressors by requesting fire-within-the position six times; however, in the ensuing combat all the officers and men, including Captain Kim Kyo Su, the company commander, were killed in action, except for ten soldiers who managed to escape on the morning of the 14th. Unable to get support after its SCR-609 radio was destroyed and with hand grenades exhausted, the 5th Company also pulled back to the rear early that morning. While the 5th and 6th Companies held and fixed the enemy
forces for about nine hours of self-sacrifice, the division was able to withdraw its supporting units safely. In addition, the adjoining forces also developed withdrawal operations smoothly. Captain Kim Kyo Su was later awarded the Taeguk medal posthumously for valor in battle.

With a penetration created at the division outpost, enemy forces attacked the main line of resistance toward Ha-gogae on the left, Nung-dong in the center, and Kyoam-san on the right. Then, the first breakthrough was made on the main
line of resistance in the center of the 19th Regiment guarding Route 17. Committing four battalions, the enemy occupied two company outposts of the 19th Regiment, which extended three kilometers southeast of Kumsong, before sunrise. Moving along a tributary of the Kumsong-ch’on, one enemy battalion infiltrated into the rear flank of the 2nd Battalion positioned on Route 17 and struck it from both front and rear. The 1st and 2nd Battalions shifted to all-around defense and resisted, but pressured by the enemy’s human-wave tactics, they had to abandon their main line of resistance and withdrew at 08:20 under the cover of the reserve battalion that occupied a blocking position. They defended the west of Kyoam-san for awhile, then crossed the Kumsong-ch’on, and collected their troops at Nodong-ri.

On the night of the 13th, the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment on the division left, which had taken over the position on the left front of the 7th Regiment north of Ha-gogae, managed to hold the main line of resistance against the enemy’s continued attacks throughout the night. But from 02:30 on the 14th, enemy forces infiltrated along the sector boundary with the Capital Division and attacked the flank of the 3rd Battalion deployed at the secondary position in front of Ha-gogae. With the passage of time, the enemy’s penetration into the rear flank was expanded. The regiment commander reinforced the defense on the western flank by shifting the 1st Battalion from Wolbong-ri to Ha-gogae and Wolbong-san.

Around 09:00, enemy forces appeared at Wolbong-san in the rear of the regiment. The CP and its support facilities of the 3rd Battalion in the Ha-gogae area were attacked by surprise, and one hour later the regiment CP at Chukdae-ri was also attacked by surprise. At 11:00, the regiment got approval for a withdrawal and set up a blocking line linking Chinhyon-ri and Samhyon in conjunction with the Capital Division on its left.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment on the main position at Kyoam-san encountered the enemy’s attack after the regiment out post became
encircled by the enemy. The 3rd Company deployed south of the regiment outpost became surrounded and the battalion main body deployed on the mountain encountered the enemy's attack-in-wave and suffered at midnight. The battalion continued fighting within its position until dawn of the 14th. The enemy's assault and the friendly fire-within-the position were repeated until sunrise. That morning the enemy forces were reinforced to ten battalions. There were no ROK reserve forces from the regiment or division available to counter the growing enemy forces. With its flanks exposed when the 19th Regiment on its left withdrew, the 3rd Battalion had to pull out to the west of Kyoam-san and deployed around the outer circle. Under the enemy's concentrated and successive waves of attack, positions outside Kyoam-san fell one after the another, and at 08:20 the 2nd Regiment shifted to perimeter defense around Kyoam-san. At that time the positions at Kyoam-san were attacked by a Chinese force of two battalions that occupied Hill 765 in the area of the 8th Division on its right.

Finally the route of retreat for the 2nd Regiment at Kyoam-san was interdicted by the Chinese forces, who advanced toward the 19th Regiment on the left and the 8th Division on the right. Upon approval by the division commander, the regimental commander left Kyoam-san between 10:30 and 11:00, withdrew across the Kumsong-ch'on, and collected the scattered troops at Nodong-ri at 12:50. Prior to that, the 7th Regiment pulled back the 1st Battalion, which occupied a position at the front to Nodong-ri, and the regiment (-) occupied a blocking line connecting Hill 729 south of the Kumsong-ch'on, Paesun-gol, and Hill 371 south of Kun-gol and covered the withdrawal of the front line units. On the morning of the 14th under the cover of the 9th Regiment and 7th Regiment(-), which set up a blocking line linking Chinhyon-ri, Samhyon, Paeson-gol and Kun-gol, the 6th Division crossed the Kumsong-ch'on and busily collected its troops.

- Battle for the 8th Division at Finger Ridge

The 8th Division was guarding the left half of the forefront of the
Kumsong bulge. The division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Song Yo Ch’an, deployed the 10th Regiment along the line of Hill 765 at the east end of Kyoam-san and Hill 690, the apex of Finger Ridge. The 16th Regiment held Hill 612, and the 21st Regiment served as reserve. At around 22:00 on the 13th, the Chinese conducted heavy preparatory fires in front of the division, cutting off most of its phone lines and causing problems for its command. As had done before, enemy forces swiftly moved to the line of assault in-between the preparation fires, and then with the shift in fire assaulted the friendly forces before they were prepared to fight. That evening was no exception. With shift fire, the enemy attacked the outpost in front of Finger Ridge manned by the 1st Platoon of 2nd. Lt. Chun Yong Soo, 10th Company, 10th Regiment. The platoon repelled the attackers the whole night with hand-to-hand combat and fire-within-the position. On the morning of the 14th, one-third of the platoon had been killed, but the Chinese had also left a host of corpses around the wire entanglements in addition to ten prisoners. With their retreat blocked by enemy forces that approached by another route, the survivors of the platoon desperately tried to escape for two days. In this battle, with communications cut off and thus unable to receive orders for withdrawal, most of the troops of the other outposts fought in similar circumstances; some were captured, and others later escaped by evasion.

While the outposts were engaged with the enemy, enemy forces that detoured around these posts attacked the main line of resistance, and Hill 690 at Finger Ridge was taken at around 23:30. Furthermore, upon a surprise attack at the OP of the 10th Regiment located near Hill 765, the command element retreated with the regiment commander, S-3, and other headquarters personnel wounded. In addition, Hill 765, the peak in the division front, was lost at 01:30 of the 14th. However, the 10th Regiment conducted a counterattack employing the reserve, the 2nd Battalion, and recaptured Hill 765, and thus recovered all of its main line of resistance with the support of all the corps artillery available.
Battle for the ROK 8th Division on the Edge of the Salient
The 16th Regiment on the right front deployed the 3rd Battalion (with reconnaissance company attached) on the main line of resistance, deployed the 1st Battalion to the outposts, and kept the 2nd Battalion in reserve. Following preparatory fires, the Chinese forces attacked the outposts and on the main line of resistance almost simultaneously. Around midnight, the 3rd Battalion requested fire-within-the position, and the outpost battalion lost a part of its position, but the 16th Regiment succeeded in repulsing an enemy attack by dawn of the 14th. Because of the deteriorating situation of the 10th Regiment, the 16th Regiment was ordered by the division not to employ its own reserve; still, it was able to repel the Chinese attack.

After sunrise, there was a lull in the area of the 16th Regiment of the 8th Division; however, as enemy forces were observed even in Yomun-ri and Chipsil-ri of the 3rd Division area adjoining on its right, the area of the reserve regiment of the 8th Division was exposed to the danger of attack on its flank. The commander of the 16th Regiment reinforced the security on the rear flank by pulling out the outpost battalion to the south of the main line of resistance. Then at around 11:00 on the 14th, the commanding general of the 8th division received an order from the commanding general of the corps to organize a new line of defense along the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on by 15:00 that afternoon.

By the time the division started its withdrawal upon the order of the corps commander, the situation in the rear areas turned grave as there were indications that enemy forces which had made a breakthrough in the 3rd Division area were dashing to the Pyulwoo District in order to cut off Route 17. At 08:40, enemy forces appeared in Chipsil-ri, were sighted at Hill 535 by the time all-out withdrawal of the division started, and then threatened the division’s withdrawal by occupying Hill 504, a critical commanding ground in the rear of the reserve regiment. Hill 504 was important terrain located on the route for mobile forces from Yomun-ri and Chipsil-ri to the Pyulwoo District, and also was commanding
ground east of the division rear. Under this crisis situation, the 10th Regiment withdrew first under the cover of the reserve forces of the 16th Regiment on the right, and then the 16th Regiment withdrew to the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on under the cover of the 21st Regiment, the division reserve. The 10th Regiment headed for Chup’a-ri and the 16th Regiment assembled at Pamsong-gol to set up a blocking line at Hill 596. The 21st Regiment continued a covering operation until the front line regiments completed their withdrawal, and then at around 18:00 crossed the Kumsong-ch’on and moved southward to Chup’a-ryong to secure it.

Meanwhile, the 16th Regiment assembling at Pamsong-gol was caught in an enemy surprise attack while the troops were having their evening meal, and were scattered; thus, it had to retreat to Sabang-gori, unable to move to Hill 596 and to set up a new defense line on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on as planned.

4) Construction of a New Main Line of Resistance

Although General Taylor, the commanding general of the Eighth US Army, was not able to assess the situation accurately on the Kumsong salient due to lack of reports, he was seriously concerned, deducing that on the night of July 13 the six CCF divisions had made a breakthrough on both shoulders of the Kumsong bulge and penetrated deep into the friendly positions. Not wanting those ROK forces at the salient to fall into Chinese double envelopment, the general ordered at 06:00 on the 14th the ROK forces (Capital, 6th, 8th, 3rd, & 5th Divisions) to withdraw to the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on, the base line of the salient, and to set up a new defense line, with the exception that the Capital Division should secure Route 117A and set up a new defense line in front of the route. Accordingly, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, commanding general of the II Corps,
issued an operation order at 11:00 on the 14th to set up a new defense line on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on.

However, meeting ensuing enemy pursuit forces as they withdrew along Route 117A and the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on, and thus unable to withdraw in an orderly manner, the Capital Division and the divisions of the II Corps failed to establish a new defense line on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on. The Capital Division under the command of Brig. Gen. Ch’oi Cha’ng Un tried to grab the ridge north of Route 117A and then retreated while the 65th Regiment of the US 3rd Division was deployed along the ridge south of the route and was setting up a blocking line. Only the 9th Regiment attached to the 6th Division led by Maj. Gen. Paik In Yup, established a blocking line linking Chinhyon-ri and Samhyon; the 2nd and 19th Regiments collected troops at Nodong-ri and were assembling at Chup’a-ri. The 7th Regiment that covered the front line regiments along Paeson-gol and Kun-gol also withdrew to Chup’a-ri via Ch’u-dong of Korishil, swept off by the waves of the retreating front line regiments. The 8th Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Song Yo Ch’an was also withdrawing toward Chup’a-ryong, and its 16th Regiment was scattered and then collected at Puch’on-ni south of Sabang-gori after failing to occupy a blocking position at Hil 596.

The situation of the 3rd Division joining with the 8th Division on its left was not much different. Maj. Gen. Lim Sun Ha, the commanding general of the 3rd Division planned to have the 18th Regiment, which had suffered the fewest losses, set up a defense line along the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on near Yonae-gok, and to transfer the 22nd and 23rd Regiments to division reserve in order to have them occupy blocking positions south of it later on, and thus, to complete the adjustment on its front line. But only the 18th Regiment reached its new position after crossing the Kumsong-ch’on; the 22nd and 23rd Regiments were scattered by enemy artillery fire. Thus, the 3rd Division could not establish
positions on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on and had to pass through Sosong-dong and Hukunto-ryong, and collected its troops at Tongmak-dong east of Chupa-ri.

Prior to this development, the 5th Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Kim Chong Kap, deployed at the confluence of the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River on the right end of the Kumsong bulge, but the Chinese broke through a part of its left front. At that time, the division was taking measures to block enemy forces advancing along Route 103 into the ridges of Paekam-san. In short, following the order of the corps commander issued at 11:00 on the 14th, the 6th, 8th, and 3rd Divisions of the ROK II Corps withdrew to the Kumsong-ch’on; however, under close pursuit by Chinese forces and confusion caused in the process of pulling out, they failed to set a new line of defense, line Iceland, linking Samhyon, the Kumsong-ch’on, and the Pukhan River.

The Chinese continued to attack, and the enemy that pursued the 3rd Division advanced along Naesongdong-ri and Hukunto-ryong, and hastened their pursuit toward Paegam-san as their objective. Then, the ROK II Corps gave up its defense of the Kumsong-ch’on and exerted all its efforts to block the enemy along the line of Chihyon-ri, Hill 633, Chup’a-ri, Paegam-san, and Sopaegam-san. As the situation turned critical, the commanding general of the Eighth Army airlifted the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team from Japan to Korea to take over a part of the front of the 9th Division and thus to reinforce the left of the Capital Division. In addition, he had the US 3rd Infantry Division take over the defensive area of the Capital Division and transferred the Capital Division to corps reserve. Furthermore, he took measures to improve the combat capabilities of the ROK II Corps in order to block an enemy breakthrough by attaching the ROK 11th Division, the army reserve, to the II Corps, and transferred the ROK 7th Division from under the command of the US X Corps to the II Corps and deployed it at Nogok.  

(483)
The commander of the II Corps rearranged the front line by replacing the 6th Division at the front with the 11th Division, by having the 8th and 5th Divisions each take over a half of the defense area of the 3rd Division, and by transferring the 6th and 3rd Divisions to reserve. As a result, the 11th Division confronted the enemy along the line of Chihyon-ri and Chup’a-ri, the 8th Division along the line of Chup’a-ri and the western end of Paegam-san, the 5th Division along the line of Paegam-san, Hills 1051 and 876, and the 6th and 3rd Divisions as reserve were deployed on Line Wyoming, reorganizing their troops and reinforcing depth in defense.  

Under continuing pressure of the Chinese forces, however, the 5th Division lost Paegam-san at 18:20 on the 15th, pulled out from Paegam-san and Hill 1051, and set up a defense line linking Sudong-ryong south of Paegam-san
and a hill mass south of Kodun-gol and Susang-ri. Consequently, by the evening of July 15, the II Corps blocked the enemy offensive on the new main line of resistance connecting Chinhyon-ri, Samhyon, Chup’a-ri, Sudong-ryong, Kodungol, Kobiun-ri, Chunsok, and Hill 748 north of Line Wyoming, linking Samch’on-bong, Chokgun-san, Chup’a-ryong, Hills 1048 and 782, and Kanundae at the northern end of Chaean-san.

5) Counteroffensive by the ROK II Corps

As the ROK II Corps had blocked the enemy with its new defense line in front of Line Wyoming on July 15, the Eighth Army commander ordered the corps to secure the Kumsong-ch’on by conducting a counteroffensive operation on the 16th. After the Chinese forces occupied Paegam-san, the CCF divisions had reached the limit of their offensive capabilities due to their personnel losses and delayed resupply, caused by the floods. It appeared that they were engaged in consolidating a defense line and in reorganizing their troops, including the disposal of casualties.

Having decided to shift the three divisions confronting the enemy at the front to counteroffensive, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, the II Corps commander, issued an attack order at 12:00 on the 15th in order to occupy a new defense line. Accordingly, the 11th Division on the left front was to occupy the line of Hill 633 at Chinhyon-ri and Hill 602 at Samhyon, the 6th Division in the center to secure the Kumsong-ch’on from Pyulwoo and to Sungdong-ri, and the 5th Division to restore the southwestern area of the Pukhan River lost in the Chinese offensive of July 13.

Since the 9th Regiment already held Hill 633 at Chinhyon-ri by the time it fell back attached to the 6th Division, the 11th Division led by Brig. Gen. Lim Boo T’aek planned to occupy Hill 602 at Samhyon by committing the 13th
Regiment on the right front and then secure Hills 425 and 406. The 20th Regiment (-) was to follow as reserve.

The 13th Regiment was to attack Hill 602 with the 2nd Battalion, Hills 425 and 406 west of Route 17 with the 1st Battalion, and Hill No Name between Hills 602 and 425 with the 3rd Battalion. Commencing its attack at 16:00 on July 15, the 2nd Battalion of the regiment occupied Hill 700, which was to serve as foothold for later attacking Hill 602, and then tried an attack on Hill 602, but the 2nd Battalion encountered fierce resistance by the Chinese forces which had already set up their position. At 06:00 on the 16th, the 3rd Battalion started to attack Hill No Name east of Hill 602 via Hill 700. After the 3rd Battalion occupied Hill No Name in the afternoon that day, the 2nd Battalion commenced a night attack at 23:00 and occupied Hill 602 at 04:00 on the 17th. On the same day, the 1st Battalion occupied Hill 425.

Meanwhile the 9th Regiment on the left, with one battalion of the division reserve attached, occupied Hill 462 west of Hill 633 and linked up with the US 3rd Infantry Division. However, upon an enemy attack at night, the 13th Regiment secured Hill 425 but lost Hill 602 at 02:00 on the 18th. The regiment conducted a counterattack with the 3rd Battalion, 20th Regiment attached to it as the reserve, but failed to recapture the hill. On the 19th, the division transferred the 13th Regiment, which had suffered heavy losses in battle to reserve, and conducted an attack on Hill 602, committing the 20th Regiment.

Under the air support of the US 5th Air Force and fire support of the division artillery and the US 461st Heavy Mortar Battalion, the 20th Regiment (-1) occupied Hill 602 after conducting assaults five times with two battalions attacking abreast. Casualties for these two battalions were beyond imagination; by the time they occupied the hill, the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion had only eight soldiers, including the company commander, and the 3rd Battalion also suffered 42 killed and 249 wounded. But with an enemy counterattack, Hill 602 was lost
Counteroffensive Operation Order of the ROK II Corps

The ROK II Corps
So†'ogomi Hwach'on, Kangwon
151200 July 1953

Classification: Top Secret
Op Order No. 6

REFERENCES: South Korea 1:25,000

1. a. Refer to recent periodical operation report.
   b. Refer to recent periodical intelligence report.

2. a. Corps immediately occupy and defend MLR designated by OPORD No. 5 with partial changes on task organization.
   b. Refer to OPORD overlay, Annex No. 1.

3. a. 5th Div
   (1) command 27th Reg, Reg(-) attached to 3d Div according to Open Dir No. 62 151030 July 1953.
   (2) take over and assume part of right wing of 3d Div area 151030 July 1953.
   (3) occupy and defend MLR immediately.

   b. 8th Div
   (1) command 7th Reg, 6th Division 150800 July 1953.
   (2) take over and assume part of left wing of 3d Div area 151030 July 1953.
   (3) occupy and defend MLR immediately.

   c. 3d Inf Div
   (1) transfer Div area to 5th Div and 8th Div 151030 July 1953 …. (omitted below)

By command of Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon (signed)

DISTRIBUTION: ROKA HQ, (2); each Div, 5th Arty Gp., 1st Tk Bn, 1103d Field Engr Gp,
G1, G2, G4, AG, Engr, Sig, (1); two copies for keeping.
again along with Hill 552 west of Hill 602, which the 9th Regiment occupied to assist the attack at Hill 602 at 03:25 on the 20th. Subsequently the division did not recapture these hills.

On the other hand, the objective for the 8th Division was the Kumsong-ch’on, but the main obstacle in approaching it was Hill 851, Hukunto-ryong. It was judged that once the hill was occupied, it would not be difficult to occupy the objective as the hill masses in front would be commanded from that hill. Maj. Gen. Song Yo Ch’an, the division commander, assigned the mission to occupy Hukunto-ryong to the 21st Regiment deployed at Tongmak-gol.

The commander of the 21st Regiment decided to have the 2nd Battalion occupy Hill 851, the 3rd Battalion occupy Hill 682 west of Hill 851, and the 1st Battalion secure Hill 406, which controlled Route 17 west of this hill. Then he commenced a night attack at 19:00 on July 15 starting from positions in front of Line Wyoming as Hill 851 was a dominant terrain commanding the whole area and thus was very difficult to attack during daylight.

The 3rd Battalion attacked first as the front line unit and the 2nd Battalion followed it. In that night attack, Hill 406 was occupied without difficulty, but at the ridge south of Hill 851 the attacking forces had a fierce engagement.

When the corps commenced its counteroffensive on the 16th, the 21st Regiment (-) resumed its attack and secured its footing for future attack by occupying the area west of Hill 851 and northwest of Hills 695, 682, and 596, while the 2nd Battalion conducted a diversionary attack at Hukunto-ryong. As the eastern flank of the 21st Regiment was exposed to the threat of attack from enemy forces at Paegam-san, the division commander planned to commit the 16th Regiment, the reserve, to the east of Hukunto-ryong, and to have it occupy Hill 1118 west of Paegam-san. In order to isolate Hukunto-ryong and then to attack it, the division adjusted missions for the regiments on the 17th to have the 21st Regiment occupy the hill mass on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on and
then secure the Kumsong-ch’on, and to have the 16th Regiment occupy Hill 1118 and then capture Hukunto-ryong. Accordingly, the 21st Regiment cut off the enemy’s rear by occupying Hills 569 and 625 north of Hukunto-ryong, and then the 16th Regiment attacked and occupied Hukunto-ryong that day.

The division then adjusted its front by deploying the 21st Regiment in Pyulwoo District, the 16th Regiment to the east of Hukunto-ryong, and the 10th Regiment, which had been the reserve, at Hill 569 in the center of the division sector. As the division advanced to the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on and occupied the objective of its counteroffensive operation on the 18th and 19th, it readjusted its dispositions by transferring the 21st Regiment to reserve and by deploying the 10th Regiment on the left front and the 16th Regiment on its right. Thus, the division took charge of the defense of the Kumsong-ch’on from Korisil to Songdong-ri.

Meanwhile the 5th Division on the right front of the corps lost Paegamsan and Sopaegam-san before the start of the counteroffensive, but blocked enemy forces along the line of Sudong-ryong, Kodun-gol, Hill 748 and Susang-ri south of Paegam-san. The 36th Regiment was guarding the eastern bank of the Pukhan River. The counteroffensive operation on the 16th was conducted under the command of Maj. Gen. Chang Do Young who had just taken over the command. According to the plan, two regiments of the division deployed along the new main line of resistance would occupy the line linking Paegam-san (1179), Sopaegamsan (1051), and Hill 876. Then the 27th Regiment on the left would attack along the ridge of Hills 819-689 stretching from Paegam-san, and the 35th Regiment on the right along the ridge of Hills 876-833-780, and finally the two regiments would restore the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River. At that time, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment was still in isolation, enveloped by enemy forces at Hill 876 which had been left behind when the regiment withdrew to the new main line of resistance.
At 06:00 of July 16, the 27th Regiment attacked its objective at Paegamsan and the 35th Regiment at Sopaegam-san. The 27th Regiment attacked the one Chinese battalion positioned at Paegam-san the whole day; however, unable to overcome the disadvantageous terrain, the regiment stalled. The 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment on the right succeeded in occupying Sopaegam-san in its surprise attack on the enemy’s flank from Hill 876, but upon an enemy surprise attack, the regiment lost both Sopaegam-san and Hill 876. Then, in order to reinforce offensive capabilities of the 5th Division at Paegam-san, the corps commander transferred the 7th Regiment of the 6th Division, which was attached to the 8th Division on the left and was attacking Hill 1118 west of Paegam-san, to the 5th Division.

On the 17th, the 7th and 27th Regiments attacked Paegam-san, and the 35th Regiment attacked Sopaegam-san and Hill 876. The division commander directed the attacking forces to detour around Paegam-san and to occupy a hill mass north of the mountain. Having moved eastward, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment attacked Paegam-san while the 1st Battalion secured advantageous terrain by occupying Salgajong after dashing along Route 103 with the support of tanks. The 7th Regiment maneuvered westward and occupied Hill 1118 and then advanced to Hill 962; however, the 35th Regiment on the right made no progress from the previous day’s situation.

As both regiments of the 5th Division detoured around Paegam-san and advanced to the north, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment recaptured the summit of Paegam-san under air support on the morning of the 18th, and the 1st Battalion advanced from Salgajong under the support of tanks through Sugotchi near Chang-jae, and then occupied Hills 662 and 641 along the bank of the Pukhan River that night. The 7th Regiment occupied Hill 819 and then Hills 595 and 689 on the bank of the Kumsong-ch’on. The 35th Regiment also recaptured Hills 876, 833, and 780 in sequence and advanced to Hill 501 on the bank of the Pukhan
River. In addition, Sopaegam-san was occupied in fighting that lasted for twenty hours. Thus, the 5th Division captured the objective of its counterattack operation and secured the line of the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River, linking Yonae-gol and Yo-gol.

6) Adjustment on the Front Line

The ROK II Corps secured the Kumsong-ch’on and achieved the objective of its counteroffensive in three days after it started the operation on July 19. The corps commander intended to advance toward the northern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on by employing the divisions that reached the creek; however, the Eighth Army commander did not approve the plan, wary of excessive bloodshed so close to the armistice agreement. Thus, measures were taken to get prepared for an enemy counterattack by adjusting the front line. On July 20, the 7th Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Kim Yong Bae, the corps reserve, was deployed on the axis of Route 17 between the 11th and 8th Divisions to take over parts of each of the two operation areas, and thus, to reinforce defense capabilities on the main avenue of approach.

In addition, the 6th Division, the corps reserve, took over the operation sector of the 5th Division on the right front, and thus reinforced defense on the right wing of the corps. The next day, the corps relieved the 6th Division of the responsibility for the area extending to Yangji-ch’on on the southern bank of the Kumsong-ch’on to be taken over by the 8th Division on the left, and thus had the 6th Division concentrate on the defense from Yangji-ch’on to the Pukhan River.

The II Corps set up a defensive line along the bank of the Kumsong-ch’on and Pukhan River, deploying four divisions including the 11th, 7th, 8th, and 6th Divisions, and had the 3rd Division in Sabanggori and the 5th Division in Hwach’on as reserve. (Later the 3rd Division was transferred to the Eighth Army
Operation Progress at Kumsong Salient upon Chinese Final Offensive

At that time, the US 3rd Infantry Division of the US IX Corps on the left of the corps and the US 45th Infantry Division of the US X Corps on the right in parallel faced the enemy.

The II Corps lost Paegam-san in its operation of the Kumsong salient, then blocked the enemy offensive in front of Line Wyoming, shifted to the counteroffensive, and secured the Kumsong-ch’on inbetween. Thus, it secured the front line, excluding the salient, by the time the armistice agreement was signed.

In this battle the ROK forces had casualties of 14,373 including 2,689 killed, 7,548 injured, and 4,136 missing; the CCF suffered confirmed casualties of
27,412 including 27,216 killed and 196 captured and presumed other casualties of about 38,700. Summing up, the Chinese had a total loss of 66,000. (However, in the Chinese History of Resist America and Assist Korea War, casualties in this battle were recorded as 33,253.)

In this battle the change of the frontline was only about four kilometers but human losses were extremely heavy. Therefore, this battle demonstrated well what an enormous price Korean soldiers had to pay to secure small parts of their homeland. Furthermore, this battle was the only battle of the Korean war in which ROK forces of a corps level fought in the same area shifting from defense to withdrawal and then to counteroffensive. It is more significant that the ROK II Corps blocked an offensive by fifteen divisions from Chinese five armies, conducted a major counteroffensive, and recaptured the Kumsong-ch’ on, ending the final decisive battle with a victory although it lost the Kumsong salient in this theater.

Through this battle, the ROK forces blocked the Communist objective to
recapture Hwach'on and the power plant in this area and secured a strategically advantageous position in determining the cease fire line. Subsequently, the leadership in battlefields and combat capabilities of the ROK forces were evaluated highly.

On the day the counteroffensive ended, President Syngman Rhee, the supreme commander of the ROK forces, visited the headquarters of the II Corps at Sot'ogomi of Hwach'on, in spite of his being seventy-eight years old, and encouraged officers and men in the following terms: 150)

General Chung, the Commanding General of the II Corps, well done! It is really fortunate that they were blocked here. The Communists intended to come down to Hwach'on and to draw the line of cease-fire there. Can you just imagine that? Our courageous officers and men of the II Corps fought well to the last minute and secured our country. Please pass my message of appreciation to all gallant soldiers.

### VI. Signing of the Truce Agreement

In late June and early July 1953, a conference on the cease-fire and to establish plans to deter the recurrence of wars was in progress between the ROK and the US. The armistice talks at P'anmunjom were adjourned due to the release of anti-Communist prisoners of war on June 18, but a fierce battle was going to defeat the enemy's final offensive.

On June 29, General Mark W. Clark sent a letter to the commanders of the Communist forces requesting resumption of the plenary meeting to discuss the signing of the armistice agreement, pledging that he would do his best to ensure
the cooperation of the ROK government. He clarified his position on the anti-Communist POWs who had been released.

On July 8 the Communists responded with the following message: ¹⁵¹) “Although our side is not yet entirely satisfied with the reply of your side, in view of the indication of the desire of your side to strive for an early armistice and in view of the assurances given by your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the question of implementation of the armistice agreement and the various preparations prior to the signing of the armistice agreement.”

Accordingly the plenary conference reconvened at P’anmunjom on July 10. North Korean representative Nam Il blamed the UNC for the escaped prisoners and requested the following guarantees for implementation of the armistice agreement:

If an armistice does not include the South Korean government and army, the war in Korea will not actually stop even if the representatives of the United Nations Command undertake to sign the Korean Armistice. Therefore, in order to insure that the Armistice Agreement can become truly effective, your side has the inescapable responsibility of putting forward concrete and effective measures in regard to the various questions mentioned above and putting them into effect.¹⁵²)

Pledging that the UNC would do its best within the limits of its authority to guarantee the cooperation of the ROK government, General William K. Harrison, the senior delegate of the UNC could only state:

We assume that the Republic of Korea forces presently under the command of the United Nations Command will remain so after an armistice and that
they will carry out the instructions of the United Nations Command and withdraw from the part of the demilitarized zone in which they are now deploying in accordance with the Armistice Agreement.

As stated in General Clark's letter of 29 June, the United Nations Command will make every effort to abide by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot guarantee that the Republic of Korea government will lend full support to it, but the United Nations Command shall continue to do everything within our power to cause them to cooperate.\textsuperscript{153}

At the meeting of July 11 the Communists described the UNC statement as contradictory and unsatisfactory. General Harrison responded by pointing out that the manner in which the UNC was to implement the armistice agreement was an internal affair of the UNC and then promised "the UNC will not give support during any aggressive action of units of the ROK Army in violation of the armistice."\textsuperscript{154}

When the Rhee-Robertson Agreement was released on July 12, Harrison at once conveyed President Syngman Rhee's pledge, contained in his letter of July 9, not to disrupt the armistice. Harrison stated that the UNC, including the ROK forces, were prepared to abide by all relevant provisions.\textsuperscript{155}

He informed the Communists on July 12: "In consequence of negotiations just completed with the Government of the Republic of Korea, we have received suitable assurances from the Republic of Korea government that it will, during the post-hostility period, work in close collaboration for our common objective....You are assured that the United Nations Command, which includes the Republic of Korea forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of the armistice. In view of this fact, there seems to be no reason for delaying further the completion of the details of and arrangements for signing the armistice agreement."\textsuperscript{156}

The Communist delegates continued to express their dissatisfaction and
demanded more specific guarantees and repatriation of the released POWs. At the meeting on July 13, they brought up a draft of the statement promised by President Syngman Rhee that he would not obstruct the armistice for ninety days and requested to clarify the meaning of the statement.

As the Communist side tried to delay the negotiations by raising trivial matters at the table while continuing its offensive at the front line, Clark told Harrison on July 14 he could walk out of the conference site any time when if the Communists stubbornly applied their usual delaying tactics. When the Communists continued to delay the talks on July 15, the UNC delegation left the table, pointing out that in the light of their offensive on the front line, the Communists were not showing any integrity at all in the armistice negotiations.\textsuperscript{157}

On July 16, the Communist delegates proposed a two-day recess; however, on the next day they proposed to extend the recess until July 19. On a visit to Munsan, General Clark conferred with General Harrison, decided not to accept any further requests by the Communists, including the demand on re-confinement of the released POWs and a reliable guarantee on the ROK government’s posture. Clark issued the following statement, consenting to the Communist’s proposal for recess:

\begin{quote}
The United Nations Command has clearly and unequivocally stated to you that it is prepared to enter into and abide by all provisions of the armistice agreement including Article 62. The United Nations Command would not enter into such an agreement unless it is satisfied that it is able to carry it out. This should be sufficient assurance for your side… However, I again assure you we have received from the Republic of Korea government necessary assurances that it will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of terms of the draft armistice agreement. I will have nothing further to say on this. If you sincerely desire an armistice, there is no reason that you should
\end{quote}
not, here and now, accept these assurances from the commander in chief of
the United Nations Command instead of attempting further to delay the
armistice upon the basis of misinterpreted press accounts which have no offi-
cial standing whatever and prolong needlessly the fighting and dying.\textsuperscript{158}

When both delegations returned to P’anmunjom on July 19, the enemy
had stopped the offensive, and the front line once again was stabilized. Nam Il,
chief of the North Korean delegation, said that he was ready to respond to the
final agreement in order to conclude the cease-fire immediately although he was
still somewhat dissatisfied with the attitude of the UNC.\textsuperscript{159} Nam Il demanded,
however, that the issue of the nonrepatriated POWs be transferred to the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission rather than to the Military Armistice
Commission.

With the concession by the Communists, the delegates at once started to
discuss the final preparations for the armistice. The Communists at first proposed
that the signing wait upon revision of the military demarcation line and the
Demilitarized Zone to reflect the recent advances scored by their forces. However,
General Harrison insisted that the date of signing be fixed immediately without
waiting for revision of the line. He proposed the date of July 24, with armistice to
take effect twelve hours after the signing, which the Communists accepted. Then
the delegations adjourned, turning over to their liaison officers the task of working
out details.\textsuperscript{160}

There were four issues remaining to be decided: 1) the military demarca-
tion line and the demilitarized zone; 2) the site for the transfer of the nonrepatriate
POWs; 3) activation of various committees to be created with the signing of the
armistice agreement; and 4) preparations for the actual signing of documents of
the armistice agreement.

The problem of adjusting the military demarcation line appeared to be
relatively simple in the beginning since there had not been much change on the front line and thus, it had been easy to determine the line of contact; however, the problem became complicated with the changes on the front line made by the Chinese final offensive.

On July 20, liaison officers of both sides started to discuss the adjustment on the demarcation line. Both sides exchanged maps as a preliminary step for renegotiating the demarcation line. The next day, they exchanged documentary evidence as negotiations progressed, and agreed to the final adjustment on the demarcation line; however, the demarcation line was not yet drawn on the maps. On July 22, the UNC side made a package proposal that became the settlement of those conflicting issues.

In order to decide the location for prisoner transfer before effectuation of the armistice agreement, the UNC side proposed that the nonrepatriated prisoners be transferred to the NNRC in the area south of the DMZ. This proposal was accepted in principle by the Communist side; thus, the issue was concluded on July 25.

Then, attention of both sides was focused on the numbers of prisoners to be repatriated to their home countries and of POWs to be transferred to the NNRC. On the 24th, the UNC released the figure of nonrepatriated prisoners, including 14,500 Chinese and 7,800 North Korean prisoners. The figure released by the Communist side was in total 12,746 including 3,313 American and 8,186 ROK prisoners.\footnote{161} As the figure released by the Communists did not deviate much from what the UNC side anticipated, the friendly side agreed to accept it.

Next, they discussed the issue determining the rate of exchanging prisoners to be repatriated. It was to be determined according to the lift and administrative capabilities of both sides. The UNC side notified the Communists that it could transfer 1,800 prisoners daily including 360 sick and wounded ones; however, the Communist side demanded that the UNC side transfer 3,000 Communist
prisoners daily in addition to sick and wounded prisoners. They then notified the UNC side that they would transfer only 300 daily due to their limited lift capabilities and the locations of their prisoner camps which were scattered in remote areas.

The UNC side then proposed to the Communist side a draft of its plan containing regulations and administrative details for functioning of the Military Armistice Commission. The Communists did not raise any specific objection, but did not hasten for an early settlement as they were attempting to make last minute political gains by dragging out disputes on formalities while the war was going on.

The enemy delegates continued to raise last-minute complications, insisting that newspaper correspondents from the ROK and Nationalist China must be barred at P’anmunjom when the top commanders were to sign the armistice agreement. On July 25 General Clark responded that he would then sign the agreement at his headquarters in Tokyo, but the enemy declined to agree and the UNC did not make an issue of it. Thus, they reached an agreement to have the armistice signed by the senior delegates at P’anmunjom, after which the top commanders would sign it. The time for signing was fixed at 10:00 on the

Senior Delegates Harrison & Nam Il Singing the Armistice Agreement
morning of July 27, to be effective at 22:00 the same day.\(^{64}\)

General Clark ordered the UN forces to confine operations to maintaining their positions and insuring their own integrity for twelve hours starting from 10:00 on the 27th, with the exception of certain preplanned air and naval operations.

At 09:57 on the 27th, delegates to the plenary conference entered and sat down in the front row of seats in a chilly atmosphere. Harrison and Nam II faced each other across the table. The two delegates did not exchange a single word of greeting while they signed the papers of agreement. After signing, Harrison left in a helicopter for Munsan-ni, and Nam II and his party got in Russian-made jeeps and left the area.

Two hours after the signing of the armistice agreement, President Syngman Rhee made the following statement announcing it to the whole world through newspapers and radio broadcasts:

I have opposed the signing of the truce because of my conviction that it will prove to be the prelude to more war, not less; to more suffering and ruin; to further Communist advance by war and by subversion.

Now that it is signed, I pray that my judgement of its effects may turn out to be wrong. We shall not disturb the armistice while a political conference undertakes within a limited time to solve peacefully the problem of the liberation and re-unification of Korea.

Our understanding with the United States insures effective cooperation between our two nations in maintaining the security of the area of our mutual interests.

Rehabilitation of South Korea will proceed promptly and effectively. Will the Communists do as much for the north?

To our suffering brethren who remain for a time under the Communist tyran-
ny, we say, "Do not despair. We shall not forget nor neglect you. The fundamental aim of the Korean nation remains and will be accomplished—to reclaim and redeem our provinces and our people in the north—with the definite pledge of United Nations cooperation to this end."

A detailed explanation of why we have adopted this changed policy of not disrupting the truce will be issued later.\(^{165}\)

The statement of President Rhee assured the nation that the government of the Republic of Korea would comply with the armistice agreement, reassured the nonrepatriate prisoners of the intent of the government, and made it clear that the ROK forces would take arms again in case the political negotiation ended in failure. Simultaneously with the release of Rhee's statement, President Eisenhower also made a statement announcing the conclusion of the armistice agreement.

Several hours later, General Clark countersigned the armistice agreement at Munsan, in the presence of the ROK delegate, General Taylor and of the Navy and Air Force commanders in the Far East, Vice Admiral J.J. Clark and General Otto P. Weyland. On that afternoon in Munsan, General Clark, in the presence of senior advisors of the K MAG and the representatives of the ROK forces, emphasized that the UN forces could not withdraw from Korea until reaching a definite conclusion and that the overall security stance would not be slackened. He reminded those present that the signing of the armistice agreement was nothing but a military arrangement to cease hostilities while searching for a political solution.

Until the armistice took effect, artillery fire continued. Fighter-bombers of the UNC hammered air fields, railroads, and roads in North Korea in order to reduce the overall combat capabilities of the enemy; on the sea, the guns of the naval fleets hit Kosong and Wonsan. However, around 22:00 firing ceased throughout the Korean theater, finally putting an end to the heated war.\(^{166}\)
In the Communist camp, Kim Il Sung of North Korea signed the armistice at 22:00 on July 27 in P’yongyang, and Peng Teh Huai did so at 09:30 the next day in Kaesong. Thus, the signing of the armistice was concluded.

Meanwhile, on July 27 in Washington, the nations fighting for the UN forces in Korea agreed to sign the ‘greater sanctions’ statement, which was designed to deter any renewed aggression. After consultation on the methods of publicizing the statement among member nations, its title was watered down to ‘Joint Policy Declaration’ and was to be transmitted to the United Nations as a part of a ‘special report’ of the UNC.

Accordingly, the US Representative to the UN submitted to the Secretary General of the UN the special report summarizing the Armistice Treaty and particulars of negotiation on August 7. In the Joint Policy Declaration annexed to it, the UNC warned the Communist side sternly in order to deter any renewed aggression in the following terms:

We the United Nations members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United
Nations, our consciousness of continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our
determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We
affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed
attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should
again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of
the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possi-
ble to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.
Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardiz-
ing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any part of Asia.167

By the time the armistice agreement was signed, the ground forces of
both sides were roughly even, confronting each other across the cease-fire line;
however, the friendly naval forces were completely blockading North Korea with
total command of the sea and securing strategic islands in the area, and the friend-
ly air forces were also in control of the whole air space excluding the corridor for
the MIGs. Comparison of military forces of both sides and the participation scale
of the UN forces are summarized as follows:
### Military Forces of Both Sides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK Forces</th>
<th>Friendly Forces</th>
<th>Enemy Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>3 corps, 18 div.'s (554,267 troops) &amp; 1 marine reg. combat team (22,174 troops reinforced): 576,441 troops</td>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1 fleet (57 vessels): 15,000 troops</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>1 combat wing &amp; 1 training wing (110 aircraft): 11,461 troops</td>
<td>Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Strength</td>
<td>602,902 troops</td>
<td>Total Strength</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Forces</th>
<th>Friendly Forces</th>
<th>Enemy Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>3 corps, 8 inf.&amp;1 marine div.'s: 341,628 troops</td>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The total strength and number of the vessels of the ROK Navy as of the end of 1953 are based on Statistical Annal of the Navy (HQ, ROKN: 1964).
- The strength of the North Korean and Chinese ground forces as of April 1953 is quoted from the Chinese writing, The History of Resist America and Assist Korea War.
- The number of corps of NKPA ground forces was estimated as six based on The History of North Korean Army and CPVA’s History of Resist America and Assist Korea War (6th & 8th Corps were excluded).
- The strength of Soviet and Chinese Air Forces were excluded from the total number of enemy units and troops due to lack of accurate materials.
## Strength of the UN Forces\(^{169}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7 infantry divisions, 1 marine division, &amp; 2 regimental combat team; 302,483 troops</td>
<td>261 vessels in the Far East Naval Command, the 7th Fleet, etc.</td>
<td>66 air squadrons, including the Far East Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2 infantry brigades, &amp; 1 marine ranger unit; 14,198 troops</td>
<td>17 vessels, including 1 aircraft carrier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3 infantry battalions; 2,282 troops</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 destroyers, &amp; 1 frigate</td>
<td>1 fighter squadron &amp; 1 transport squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 819 troops</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 infantry brigade; 6,146 troops</td>
<td>3 destroyers</td>
<td>1 transport squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 Artillery battalion; 1,389 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,119 troops</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,496 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 infantry brigade; 5,455 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,294 troops</td>
<td>1 frigates</td>
<td>1 transport squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,263 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 transport squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 fighter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 900 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1 infantry platoon; 44 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,068 troops</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion; 1,271 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341,227 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>medical unit; 70 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>medical unit; 72 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>medical unit; 105 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>medical unit; 154 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>341,628 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- About 100 medical personnel engaged in the Danish Hospital Ship are not included in the total figure of UN Forces participation.
Notes


5. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention (1949) requires an immediate exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners of war and evacuation of them to hospitals of neutral nations, specifying “parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war after having cared for them until they are fit to travel.”


14. Article No. 110 of the Geneva Convention (1949) stipulates those POWs to be repatriated as 1) incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished; 2) wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished; 3) wounded and sick who have recovered but whose men-
tal or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and permanently diminished and are currently under treatment.

15. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 292.


20. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 364.


22. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 295.


25. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 296.


29. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 299.


35. General Clark was authorized to carry on the war in new ways never before tried in Korea when the Communists rejected the final proposal of the UN without presenting any constructive proposal. Refer to Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, New York: Harper & Brothers (1954), p.267.
36. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 301.
37. UNC’s new proposal to the Communists on solving the POWs issue. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, p. C41; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), pp. 374-375.
38. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 302.
39. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, pp. 355-357.
41. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 303.
42. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, pp. C45-47.
43. When the belligerents raise suspicions on the violation of the Geneva Convention, POWs must be examined in the way agreed upon among the parties concerned. When the parties concerned cannot reach an agreement on the procedure, they should seek an agreement on the selection of referees who can decide the procedure.
44. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 304.
48. The Korea Institute of Military History, POWs of the Korean War, Seoul:
49. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 397.
50. Ibid., p. 394; Dong-A Ilbo (June 8, 1953).
51. The Korea Institute of Military History, op. cit., p. 203.
52. Ibid., pp. 204-205.
53. Ibid., p. 221.
55. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., pp. 399-400.
56. The Korea Institute of Military History, op. cit., p. 222. On that day General Clark strongly protested through his letter to President Rhee. Mark W. Clark, op. cit., p. 281.
59. Ibid., p. 404.
60. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op. cit., pp. C52-54.
63. Ibid., p. 378; Mark W. Clark, op. cit., p. 262.
64. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 378.
66. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 379.
67. Ibid., p. 380.
68. Ibid., p. 380; ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 297.
69. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 379.
70. Ibid., p. 381.
71. Ibid., p. 382.

72. On May 29, 1953 Minister of Foreign Affairs Pyun Young Tae said grimly that the ROK government was ready for action and was determined for an engagement against troops of the five nations. Dong-A Ilbo (May 29, 1953).


74. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 383.

75. Ibid., pp. 383-384.

76. Ibid., pp. 381-382 & p. 385.

77. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op. cit., p. C43.

78. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 390.

79. Ibid., p. 392.

80. Ibid., p. 393.

81. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 283.

82. Mark W. Clark. op. cit., p. 264.


84. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 395.

85. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op. cit., p. C49.


88. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 409

89. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 293.

90. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 416.

91. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 295.

92. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 418.
93. Ibid., p. 419.
94. Ibid., pp. 419-420.
95. Ibid., p. 420.
97. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 421.
98. Joong-ang Ilbo, *Testimony of the Nation, Vol. VI*, Seoul: Ulyoo Munhwasa (1972), p. 122; Song Hyo Soon, op. cit., p. 310. As the plan for ROK Army expansion into 20 divisions was confirmed in May 1953, the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 25th, 26th, and 27th Divisions were activated in addition to the 12th and 15th Divisions which were authorized earlier. The ROK III Corps Command was also reactivated. In keeping with the plan for expansion of divisions, field artillery group and tank units were also expanded: the number of artillery group was increased to 16, and that of tank units to 3 battalions (9 companies) before cease-fire. Refer to ROKA HQ, *Unit Histories of Branches*, Seoul: ROKA (1959), pp. 47-48 & 60; ROKA HQ, *History of the ROK Army Development, Vol. II*, Seoul: ROKA HQ (1970), pp. 404-417.
100. Ibid., p. 154.
102. Ibid., pp. 332-333.
103. Ibid., pp. 351-352; James I. Matray, op. cit., p. 332.
104. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 356.
p. 243.
108. Ibid., p. 333.
113. Ibid., pp. 268-269.
114. Ibid., p. 270.
115. Ibid., pp. 274-275.
117. Ibid., p. 275.
118. Ibid., pp. 278-279.
119. Ibid., pp. 281-296.
120. On April 15, 1953, the ROK 5th Division, replacing the ROK 3rd Division, was in charge of the main line of resistance on the eastern bank of the Pukhan River. On May 11, 1953, the ROK 20th Division took over this part of the main line of resistance from the ROK 7th Division.
121. This was the deployment of enemy forces as of May 1, 1953. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), op. cit., p. 281.
122. Ibid., p. 279.

125. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 283.


128. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *The History of the Korean War, Vol. XI*, Seoul: MND (1980), pp. 489-499. Hill Hook was labelled from the shape of the ridgeline; the summit on the north of the ridge was named ‘The Hook’ On that day, the CCF suffered losses of 300 killed and 800 wounded (est.).


133. The Chinese final offensive of June had been understood to have commenced on June 10 at the right shoulder of Kumsong salient; however, it actually started on May 27 on all frontlines according to the Chinese documents cited above.


135. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 284. According to the Chinese documents above, on June 14, 1953 the CCF 180th Division with augmented a regiment of the CCF 203rd Division of the 68th Army was committed to Hill 949 and Sudong-ri.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 284 & 382. Initially the enemy forces of three regiments(+) commenced to attack with two regiments of the CCF 200th Division, one regi-
ment of the 201st Division, and one battalion of the 202nd Division.

137. Ibid., pp. 285-286.

138. Ibid., p. 289.

139. Ibid., p. 290.

140. Ibid., p. 296; EUSAUK, Command Report, situation map (July 1953). The Chinese order of battle was written based on the source cited above; however, there are some differences with the existing literature on the Korean War.

141. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), op. cit., p. 383.

142. After the battle at Hills 949, 973, and 883, the ROK 5th Division was attached to the US X Corps as of June 16, 1953, and had the 36th Regiment, which had the least casualties, in defense of Kundol-Kwangsokgol (Hill 748) on the eastern bank of the Pukhan River, and the rest of the division (-) started to be rehabilitated. Thereafter, the division excluding the 36th Regiment was transferred back to the ROK II Corps, moved to Hwach’on, and conducted small unit combat training in order to up-grade its combat capabilities, especially for the green soldiers recently recruited. On June 26 the division took over the defense of the right sector of the ROK 3rd Division; thus, the division was in charge of the defense of line Iceland extending from Yangjich’on-Hudong-the Pukhan River-Kundol-and Kwangsokgol with the 35th Regiment on the left of the Pukhan River, the 36th Regiment on the right of it, and the 27th Regiment as reserve.


144. The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), op. cit., p. 384. In earlier writings, the CPVA 7th Division was described as the attacking forces of the enemy; however, the CPVA 1st Division herein turned out to be the enemy attacking forces according to the Chinese record cited above.

145. Ibid., p. 291. The Chinese order of battle was written referring to the Chinese
document cited above. There was substantial discrepancy with the intelligence estimates of the existing war history.

146. This action was taken in order to abridge the front of the Capital Division. The time for relief-in-position was set at 04:00, July 14, but with an agreement between two regimental commanders, the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment was relieved at 19:00, July 13 and was moving to the area of the 1st Battalion.

147. The 3rd Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Regiment was originally attached to the 1st Regiment as reserve; however, the 1st Regiment was forced to spread out all its three battalions on the front in defense of its extended defense area.

148. As of July 15, 1953 the ROK 7th Division transferred the defense of the left sector of the US X Corps to the US 45th Division and was attached to the ROK II Corps on July 17.


150. Ibid., p. 474. The areas on line Wyoming occupied by the ROK 6th and 3rd Divisions were as follows: Hill 926, Ch’okgun Mt., Changgo-bong, and west of Chup’a-ryong for the 6th Division; Chup’a-ryong, Hills 895, 1048, 915, 782, and Kanundae for the 3rd Division.

151. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 423; Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op. cit., p. C49.


153. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 337.

154. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 428.

155. ROK Army HQ (trans.), op. cit., p. 338.

156. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p. 428.
157. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 339. The position of the Chinese government was “in order to push the frontline southward, we must destroy Syngman Rhee’s troops until the armistice agreement is signed.” Refer to the *Soviet Diplomatic Documents, Vol. IV*, p. 194.

158. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 430.

159. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 339.

160. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 431.

161. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 341.


163. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *op. cit.*, pp. 441-442.


166. ROK Army HQ (trans.), *op. cit.*, p. 344.


169. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187;
Chapter Six  The Management of the Armistice and the Re-division of the North and the South

I. Creating of the Armistice Organizations

1. Establishment of the Demilitarized Zone

   With the signing of an Armistice Agreement, firing from both sides came to a halt all along the front line at 22:00 hours on July 27, 1953. At daybreak, following the historic moment of the signing of the cease-fire agreement, the ROK forces together with the UN forces began to withdraw from the line of contact.1)

   From that morning, the ROK and the UN forces began to leave the islands in the East and the West Sea located north of the truce line, and to transport the 3,600 North Korean and 1,200 Chinese POWs held in Chejudo and Kojedo by LSTs to Inchon.2)

   The Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone were prescribed in the Armistice Agreement: “A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. ... Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, both sides shall withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone.”3) Accordingly, the Demilitarized Zone included the meaning of buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

   The location of the Demarcation Line established in conformity with the
Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone (July 27, 1953)
Armistice Agreement was from the estuary of the Han River—the mouth of the Imjin River (eight kilometers southwest of Munsan)—P’annunjom—Koyangdae—Yujong-ri (12 kilometers north of Ch’orwon)—Hakap-ryong—Bamsung-gol—Mundung-ri—Shintan-ri—Su-ryong—to Kamho (one kilometer south) on the eastern coast.4)

The Demilitarized Zone was established between the northern boundary, which was drawn along a line two (2) kilometers north of the Military Demarcation Line, and the southern boundary, which was drawn along a line two (2) kilometers south of the Military Demarcation Line. Under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission, both sides erected the markers as provided along their respective boundaries and the Military Demarcation Line so as to clearly identify the boundaries and zones for which each side was responsible.

The waters of the estuary of the Han River were opened to civil shipping of both sides as neutral territory wherever one bank was controlled by one side and the other bank was controlled by the other side. The rules for shipping in this part of the Han River Estuary were to be prepared by the Military Armistice Commission, and civil shipping of each side was given free access to the land under the military control of that side.

Both sides were restricted from executing any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone. No person, military or civilian, was permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

Civil administration and relief in the part of the Demilitarized Zone which was south of the Military Demarcation Line was the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and civil administration and relief in the part of the Demilitarized Zone which was north of the Military Demarcation Line was the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who were permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief was to be determined by the respective commanders, but the total number authorized by either side was not to exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them was to be prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel were not permitted to carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

The complete freedom of movement within the Demilitarized Zone for any personnel (including materials and equipment) who were authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission was guaranteed. Convenience of movement was permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points were not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

Both side had to withdraw all of its military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and waters of the other side. If such military forces were not withdrawn within the agreed time limit, and there was no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side had the right to take any action deemed necessary for the maintenance of security and order. 9

The term ‘coastal islands,’ as used in the agreement, referred to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when the Armistice Agreement became effective, were controlled by the other side on June 24, 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do were to be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, except the island groups of Paengnyong-do, Taech’ong-do, Soch’ong-do, Yonp’yong-do, and U-do. All the
islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line remained under the military control of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.60

The first meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at P’anmunjom on July 28, 1953, the day after the Agreement of the Military Armistice was signed. Both sides designated members of the Military Armistice Commission and Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Far East, led the United Nation’s delegation while Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, a former delegate to the truce conference, led the Communist delegation.

Each side introduced its chief delegate, members, the chief secretary and exchanged letters of credentials; they began to discuss issues on the operations of the Joint Observer Teams, the control of the Demilitarized Zone, and the construction of premises to accommodate POWs and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. They agreed to exchange POWs who wished to be repatriated from August 5. On this day, President Syngman Rhee issued a statement to the nation in which he declared an unchangeable national goal for unification. He said the reason that Korea was issuing a statement on the Armistice agreement was that Korea from the beginning had not wished to accept truce or peace unless the CCF withdrew from Korea. He emphasized that Korea’s determination for unification had not changed and that the national goal must be achieved. Instead of refusing UN support and continuing the war by itself, however, he said that Korea had decided to cooperate with the UN and the US and allow time to see whether the United Nations could, through political talks, persuade the enemy forces to get out of Korea. Three month time was being allowed for talks out of a desire for and under the conditions of a successful political solution, however, if efforts were not successful, Rhee insisted that Korea together with the UN and the US would seek unification.71

While President Syngman Rhee, notwithstanding the Military Armistice
Agreement, was adamant about unifying his own country, the withdrawal of military forces from the front lines went on as scheduled in conformity with the agreement. The withdrawal of military forces from the Demilitarized Zone was completed on July 30 as scheduled, and the removal operations of dangerous materials and mines began.

The UN side completed its withdrawal of military forces from all islands off the western coast located north of the boundaries of Kyonggi-do and Hwanghae-do, except Paengnyong-do, Taech’ong-do, Soch’ong-do, Yonp’yong-do and U-do, which remained under the military control of the UN commander. All islands off the east coast located north of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone were abandoned.8)

The Korean Peninsula, which had been divided along the 38th Parallel upon liberation from Japan, was divided again under the new name of a ‘truce line,’ and thus the history of a divided country had begun.

2. Establishment of the Armistice Management Organization

(1) The Military Armistice Commission

The Truce Agreement was a military agreement signed between the commanders of the two sides in order to halt the war which had brought tremendous tragedy and bloodshed to the people of South and North Korea, and to enforce a complete cessation of armed actions until a peaceful settlement was attained.

Under the Truce Agreement, the Military Armistice Commission was the sole organization responsible for supervising all activities, and it worked as a joint organization to deal with possible violations of the Military Armistice Agreement. Should any violation occur against the Agreement, the Military Armistice
Commission was to take up the issues and hold discussions to settle the problems. The Military Armistice Commission was composed of ten senior officers; accordingly, each side appointed five members. Of the ten members, three from each side were to be generals or flag ranks and the remaining two members were to be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels or their equivalents.

The Military Armistice Commission was initially provided with and assisted by ten Joint Observer Teams. Each Joint Observer Team was to be composed of not less than four nor more than six officers of field grade, half of whom were to be appointed by each side, and additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters were to be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission was to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle any violations of the Armistice Agreement through negotiations. The Military Armistice Commission worked effectively in supervising, through the Joint Observer Teams, the withdrawal of units from the Demilitarized Zone and the removal of all explosives, mines, barbed wire entanglement and other dangerous materials within forty five days after the completion of withdrawal.

The general mission and the authority of the Military Armistice Commission were prescribed in the Truce Agreement as follows; 1) operate as a joint organization between opposing sides; 2) adopt rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary; 3) supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary; 4) direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams; 5) settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement; 6) transmit to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; 7) act as an intermediary in transmitting and communicating
between the commanders of the opposing sides; 8) provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.\textsuperscript{11}

The Military Armistice Commission was an organization authorized and

**Supervisory Organization for Cease Fire\textsuperscript{12}**

![Diagram of the Supervisory Organization for Cease Fire]

**The Organization of the United Nation’s Armistice Commission\textsuperscript{13}**

![Diagram of the Organization of the United Nation’s Armistice Commission]
characterized as a supreme body of consultation to maintain control over the administration of the cease fire while receiving information from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Military Armistice Commission was also authorized, within a limited time, to supervise and control the work of the committee on the repatriation of POWs and the committee on the home-coming of those who had lost their native towns. The headquarters of this Commission was to be established near P’anmunjom and could be relocated within the Demilitarized Zone upon agreement between the senior members of the two sides.

The Military Armistice Agreement and the Armistice Supervisory Commission were only temporary organizations to solve Korean problems, to be replaced after a general political settlement on Korea. The UNC side had foreseen that a political settlement would prove very difficult in light of its previous experience with the Communists and former negotiators had warned that the armistice might remain in effect for a number of years. The UNC’s prediction was soon shown to be justified. From the beginning, the machinery set up to police the armistice was hampered by the mutual suspicion and lack of will that was to destroy the hopes of an agreement at the governmental level.14)

(2) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

To enforce the prohibition against any new military buildup in Korea was the task of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission consisted of representatives from Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and was a joint organization commissioned to supervise, observe, inspect, and investigate the troop replacements, military equipment, and munitions that passed through the ten authorized ports: Inch’on, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung and Kunsan for South Korea and Sinuiju, Ch’ongjin, Hungnam, Manpo and Sinanju for North Korea. The results of such supervision,
observation, inspection, and investigation were to be reported to the Military Armistice Commission.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was composed of four senior officers, two of whom were appointed by the neutral nations nominated by the United Nations Forces Command, namely, Switzerland and Sweden, and two of whom were appointed from neutral nations nominated by the Communist Forces Command, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required, and these staff assistants could be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was initially provided with and assisted by twenty Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. Ten teams were stationed at the ports of entry enumerated in the agreement with five at the ports located in the territory under the military control of the United Nations Forces Command and five at the ports of entry located in the territory of and under the military control of the Communist Forces Command. The remaining ten teams were used as mobile teams in reserve and stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The number of inspection teams could be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides of the Military Armistice Commission; however, not more than half of the teams were permitted to be dispatched at one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Inspection Teams were responsible only to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in terms of both receiving instructions and reporting.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had to locate its headquarters in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission and conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in the agreement at the ports of entry enu-
merated in the agreement, and at those places where violations of the Armistice Agreement had been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the teams was to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition were not being introduced into Korea.\textsuperscript{15}

The Military Armistice Commission was not allowed to take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof had been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its teams should appear before the Military Armistice Commission at the request of the senior member of either side, for clarification of any report submitted.

The members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission assumed their mission on August 12, 1953 and left P’anmunjom for each side, south and north. In order to carry out its responsibilities, the commission required meticulous self-regulation on the part of the members. However, the Communist side began to interrupt the activities of the commission right after the Armistice Agreement was signed by importing military equipment through unauthorized ports and building up airfields and military bases. The UNC confirmed that while the armistice was strictly applied in South Korea, the enemy in North Korea was, under the patronage of Czechoslovakia and Poland, violating the agreement by importing personnel and equipment through other ports.\textsuperscript{16}

Efforts to verify this suspicion were hindered by the noncooperation of the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and by the refusal of the North Korean authorities to allow free inspection. This kind of noncooperation increased as time went on. Finally, the representatives of the Switzerland and Sweden, which had been patient, was driven to voice its complaints about the Communists’ noncooperation officially to the United Nations, on March 29, 1954, and on April 5, announced that the effort for inspection had met
with a serious setback.

Meanwhile on May 13, the Swiss and Swedish members sent an official letter to the UN representative of the Military Armistice Commission notifying him that the UN side's request for investigations on the violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communists had been rejected by the members from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Swiss and Swedish members would no longer be responsible for possible violations by the Communists.

The members of both Switzerland and Sweden also sent an official letter to the Far Eastern Peace Conference in Geneva protesting the Communists' non-cooperation and appealing to be released from the impossible mission of supervising North Korea. Thus, the provisions of the Armistice Agreement to supervise the armistice could not be carried out. Finally, the UNC was driven to announce in 1957 that it would ignore the prohibition against the importation of military material in South Korea and would proceed with the modernization of the Eighth Army and the ROKA.

As the armistice organizations, such as the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, were established and began to work, concrete means and procedures to supervise the execution of armistice and to repatriate POWs were discussed and sought. Meanwhile, vehicles to transport POWs for repatriation headed for P'anmunjom from the south and north.
II. Repatriation of POWs and Homecoming of Refugees

1. Exchange of POWs Wishing to be Returned

In order to exchange the prisoners of war and in keeping with the Military Armistice Agreement, a Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War was established. This committee, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, was responsible for coordinating the timing of the arrival and the delivery of prisoners of war, the work of the joint Red Cross teams, and the supervision of the speedy carrying out of repatriation.

The committee was composed of six field grade officers, three of whom were appointed by each side, and was to maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. The committee was to be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war. Joint Red Cross teams were organized in order to help the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. Three joint Red Cross teams were organized, and each team was composed of the same number of members from each side. A joint Red Cross team (twenty members) was committed to assist in delivering and receiving prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of the delivery and reception. One of two other joint Red Cross teams (sixty members each) was to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command and to provide services to the prisoners while en-route from the camps to the place of delivery and reception. The remaining team was to provide services to the prisoners of war under the administration of the Communist side. The first meeting of the Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War was held on July 30, and both sides agreed to begin to exchange
prisoners of war on August 5.¹⁹

Meantime, the Military Armistice Commission met on August 3 at P’anjumun and agreed, in conformity with the Armistice Agreement, to allow inspections by the joint Red Cross team of the prisoners camps of both sides prior to exchanging prisoners of war. In keeping with this agreement, members of the Red Cross teams of the UNC left for North Korea and Manchuria by jeeps to visit the prisoners-of-war camps, and members of the Red Cross teams of the Communist side flew to Pusan.²⁰

None of the other provisions of the Armistice Agreement attracted as much public attention as those regarding the exchange of prisoners. Prisoners who expressed a desire for repatriation presented no problem, but far more difficult and time-consuming was the disposition of those prisoners who refused repatriation.²¹

The United Nations Command, in order to exchange prisoners, planned and launched ‘Operation Big Switch’ and ‘Operation Big Swap.’ ‘Operation Big Switch’ was to deal with the reception of prisoners of war repatriated from the Communist side, and ‘Big Swap’ was to deal with the delivery of prisoners of war who had been under the custody of the UNC and expressed a desire to be repatriated to the Communist side.

Regarding the delivery of prisoners of war who had been under the custody of UNC side to the Communist side and the reception of prisoners of war from the Communist side, the United Nations Command, which had already gained experience through the exchange of wounded prisoners, launched into the task with confidence. The main difference between the current and previous exchange was the numbers of prisoners to be transported.

Since the pro-Communist prisoners of war who had expressed their desire for repatriation had mostly been sent to Koje-do or Cheju-do according to a dispersion plan for pro-Communist prisoners of war, the transportation of the prisoners from the islands to an exchanging place required a transport operations by
both land and sea routes. Among the prisoners who had expressed a desire for repatriation, the wounded, the sick, females, and children were transported from the islands to Pusan by ship, then by train to Munsan, which was the transit point, and by vehicles to the actual point of exchange. Male prisoners were transported from the prison camps on the islands directly to Inch’on by sea, then transported to Munsan via Yongdungp’o by vehicle or railway.

The prison camps for prisoners of war in North Korea were located around the Yalu, and most of them were difficult to reach by road. By this time, the prisoners of war of the UNC and Korean army had been told about the repatriation, and they were extremely anxious about the time they had to wait for repatriation and deeply suspicious that the Communist negotiators would delay their release. Within a few days, however, the prisoners of war from the North Korean camps were transported to railway stations by truck and then moved by train to the neutral area via P’yongyang and Kaesong.

The UN prisoners of war who arrived in Kaesong were separated and detained in tents prior to repatriation. A few prisoners a day were sent to the repatriation area and handed over to the United Nations side. A United Nations medical officer who was repatriated recalled the experience: “The few minutes we waited for the trucks which would take us to the Demilitarized Zone was the longest and most tedious time I have ever experienced in my life.”

With the world watching, at 9 AM on August 5, the first repatriation of prisoners of war took place at P’anmunjom as scheduled, following the signing of the Armistice Agreement. On the UN side, high ranking officers and many soldiers from the ROKA and the UNC attended the ceremony.

Mr. Son Won Il, the Defense Minister, and General Paik Sun Yup, the Chief of Staff, on the part of the ROKA, and General Maxwell D. Taylor and General Otto P. Weyland on the part of the UNC received the returning prisoners of war. The exchange took place as the prisoners of war arrived in two Russian
ambulances and four trucks, attended by many officers and soldiers. Right before
the exchange of prisoners, administrative officers of both sides exchanged the rosters of prisoners, and then the UNC began receiving the prisoners of war as the initial band of the first echelon got out of the ambulances. By noon, 400 prisoners, 250 ROKA and 150 UNC, had been repatriated in four echelons. Since most of them were sick or wounded, they were taken to the 86th Military Hospital for admission. On the other side of the exchange, the UN handed over 2,756 North Korean and Chinese prisoners to the Communists.  

In this process, the Communist prisoners of war tore off their newly supplied uniforms, kick off protective shelters, and threw away uniforms and medicine for the purpose of providing pitiful and ill treated looking prisoners for the awaiting Communist cameramen to photograph. The exchanged prisoners, stripped to their underwear, ran about waving red banners and singing Communist
military songs.

In the meantime, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was visiting Korea to attend the US-Korea conference, welcomed the prisoners of war, and General Paik Sun Yup shook hands with the repatriated prisoners of war and delivered a welcoming speech:

My fellow soldiers! I know the hardship you have experienced. I, together with all officers and soldiers, sincerely welcome you. Unfortunately, you were captured and imprisoned by the Communist puppets. Since we knew that you longed for a free Korea and thus, we bombed enemy positions hard enough with unprecedented animosity.

Finally, the Communist invaders threw up their hands and proposed a truce. My fellows soldiers, you have returned to the bright Republic of Korea. Your families and friends sincerely welcome you home. Even though some of you were forced to do things against your will due to enemy pressure, as long as you reflect on your conduct and pledge your loyalty to the nation, your future will be bright.26

At the temporary reception point, which was set up in a tent, a military band and a medical team from a unit were waiting for repatriating prisoners of war. Even though many undesirable incidents occurred, the exchange of repatriating prisoners went on as planned. The sick, wounded, and female prisoners were transferred to the Communist side three times every day, 120 prisoners at one time, between August 5 and 15. Thereafter, every day the Communist side transferred about 400 men to P’anmunjom and the UNC side 2,400 men to P’anmunjom for repatriation.

Meanwhile, on August 19, President Syngman Rhee delivered a message of welcome to the prisoners of war who had returned after having suffered hard-
ships under the brutal Communists in the fratricidal war:

Many patriotic youth who fought against the enemy, with no weapons or support, were killed in action. You were captured and tortured by the enemy as the prisoners of war, and survived to return to your homeland. I, together with our people, welcome you all.

We have only to exert ourselves to the utmost in reconstructing our fatherland. I do hope, my fellow soldiers, that you will recover your health as soon as possible to prepare for the future march to the north, and that you will make up your minds so that one day you will advance to save our brothers in North Korea, who are at the brink of death, so that we may all live together happily.‡

In the meantime, on August 22, the American Secretary of State delivered a message expressing his determination to support the repatriation of all prisoners, referring to the Russian detention of Japanese and German prisoners of war in spite of the promise of repatriation:

The United Nations Command is concerned about the continued detention of our prisoners who are under the custody of the Communist Army. ⋯

According to information received from some repatriated prisoners of war, some of our prisoners in the Communist camps were sentenced to confinement. This report was under investigation when I was leaving for Korea, and as far as I know at the moment, this report has not been officially confirmed. And it is not certain at this moment whether such sentences will be used or not as an excuse to prevent the repatriation of the prisoners concerned. ⋯

We have to do our best to get repatriated all those prisoners of war who are under the custody of the Communist camps and who express the desire for
repatriation.  

The repatriation plan (Big Switch/Big Swap) lasted for 33 days and was carried out as scheduled from August 5 to September 4. Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, who had been under custody in the Communist camp for thirty seven months, was among those repatriated on September 4. Statistics of the repatriated prisoners are given in the table below.

Right after the end of the exchange of all the repatriated ROKA and UNC prisoners of war, the repatriates told of their experiences in the Communist camps, and the UNC announced the following shocking fact.

In general, the medical care for the prisoners of war was practically nonexistent. During the first nine months after the war broke out, the prisoners of war of the UNC had not had any medical treatment. The repatriated prisoners of war who were captured during the autumn and winter of 1950, and during the beginning of 1951, described executions, beatings, forced marching, overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and lack of food and clothing. The Communists, upon being requested to take adequate care of the seriously sick or wounded prisoners, supplied only hot water instead of providing any medical care.

While the ROKA and the UNC repatriated all prisoners who expressed a desire for repatriation, the Communists did not repatriate many prisoners of the ROKA, and few officers were seen among the repatriated prisoners. The estimated number of missing ROKA soldiers who had been POWs or might have been POWs was 19,392, according to an analysis made by the Ministry of Defense using various sources such as records related to the number of war dead and records collected by both foreign and ROKA intelligence units. This esti-
Statistics of Repatriated Prisoners of War\(^{(30)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Wounded Prisoners</th>
<th>Prisoners Wishing Repatriation</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>7,862</td>
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</tr>
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<td>US</td>
<td>149</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>229</td>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>684</td>
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<th>Nationality</th>
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<th>Prisoners Wishing Repatriation</th>
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<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>70,183</td>
<td>75,823</td>
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<td>Communist China</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>6,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>75,823</td>
<td>82,493</td>
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Statistics of the Repatriation Plan and the Result of the Prisoners of War, Wounded or Wishing Repatriation

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Wounded Prisoners</th>
<th>Prisoners Repatriated</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prisoners Delivered to the UNC by</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Communist</td>
<td>ROK (450)</td>
<td>(8,186)</td>
<td>(8,536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(4,578)</td>
<td>(4,728)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prisoners Delivered to the Communist</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the UNC</td>
<td>NKA (5,100)</td>
<td>(69,000)</td>
<td>(74,100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCF (700)</td>
<td>(5,640)</td>
<td>(6,340)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (5,800)</td>
<td>(74,000)</td>
<td>(79,800)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

( ) are the number of prisoners to be repatriated, others are the number of prisoners repatriated.
mate was supported by the interviews of repatriated prisoners.\textsuperscript{14})

2. Handling of POWs not Wishing to be Repatriated

The prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated, that is, the prisoners of war who were under the custody of either side and did not wish to return to their country even after the war ended, were to be settled in accordance with the provisions of the Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War (Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission), signed on June 8, 1953, and the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was composed of one member each from India, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and it was prescribed in the rules of the agreement that the representative from India

\textit{UN Prisoners Released during Big Switch}
chaired the Commission. The Indian representative served the chairman, the executive agent and the umpire of the Commission, and the representatives from each of the other four powers were allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty each. India was responsible for providing armed forces to receive, safe-guard and care for the prisoners. India appointed Lt. Gen. K. S. Thimayya as the Chairman of the Commission.

In early September, with the help of the UNC, the member of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission from India, the Indian Custodian Force, and the members from Sweden and Switzerland arrived at Inch’on port.

Because of the pro-Communist leanings of the Indian Custodian Force, President Syngman Rhee voiced his opposition to the Indian Custodian Force’s passing through the land of South Korea, and the Indian Custodian Force, with the support of the US Army, moved to the Demilitarized Zone by helicopter. The Indian Custodian Force, commanded by General P. P. Thorat, consisted of 3,000 men, and its principal mission was to receive, guard, and keep order among about

*Anti-Communist Prisoners leaving Koje-do*
23,000 non-repatriating prisoners.

In the meantime, at the beginning of September, the UNC and the Communist sides began to construct camps for those who opposed repatriation and facilities in which to explain the importance of repatriation to them, and began the transportation of prisoners. While transferring prisoners to the Demilitarized Zone, the UNC endeavored to calm down the prisoners’ fear and distrust and to show the prisoners that the UNC was very much concerned about the safety of the prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated.\(^\text{36}\)

The NNRC had its first meeting on September 9, and on the following day the UNC side began to deliver the prisoners of war who opposed repatriation to the Indian Custodian Force. On the 11th, six members of the ‘explanation’ team from Korea, led by Lt. Col. Yoon Ha Jung, departed for P’anmunjom to persuade the prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated.

The UNC side delivered a total of 22,604\(^\text{37}\) prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated to the Indian Custodian Force, and the Communist side delivered only 359\(^\text{38}\) prisoners to the Indian Custodian Force. Thus, the prisoners who were delivered to the Indian Custodian Force began their second period as prisoners of war under the custody of the Indian Custodian Force.

The Indian Custodian Force, as time went on, showed a pro-Communist bias as the Korean government had feared, and because the Force showed this bias to the soldiers, the prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated were angered. The Force tried to persuade prisoners to repatriate against their will, and in the meantime, an incident occurred in which some anti-Communist prisoners were wounded and killed by Indian rifle shots.\(^\text{39}\)

The Communist side, in order to obtain a more favorable position in the diplomatic negotiations, deliberately attempted to change the minds of the prisoners of war who opposed repatriation with threats and controlled the Indian chairman through the Polish and Czechoslovakian members. The Communist side sent
a request to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission as follows: “We need to
give repeated explanations to the prisoners who do not wish to return either in
groups or individually and at least eight hours a day must be devoted to persua-
sion.”

To the prisoners, this request by the Communist side was actually coer-
cion rather than ‘explanation’, and as the UNC side had repeatedly insisted, the
procedure was not repatriation by free will but was repatriation by force.
Therefore, the UNC voiced strong opposition to the Communist request.

At this time, the anti-Communist prisoners refused the meetings for
‘explanation’ and staged demonstrations shouting slogans such as ‘go away
Communist puppets.’ Some of the prisoners attempted to escape from the camp
over the barbed wire.

Due to the antagonism between the UNC and the Communists, the
attempts to persuade prisoners to repatriate had been postponed. On October 7, the
NNRC vetoed the Communists’ request for continuing the explanation sessions
because of the Communists’ coercive way of conducting the explanation, but
agreed to begin the explanations again as of the 15th. During this time, the prison-
ers under the custody in the area of UNC control were anxious by these explana-
tion attempts.

The Korean government and the UNC were not in the position of under-
standing the exact situation of the prisoners in the Demilitarized Zone who
opposed repatriation because the Indian Custodian Force did not fully explain to
the UNC of the situation of the prisoners who opposed repatriation. Therefore, the
senior officers of the camps in the Demilitarized Zone sent secret messengers,
who were greatly welcomed by the Korean government.

The communist explanations to persuade the prisoners who opposed
repatriation were carried out in sixteen tents, two rooms in each tent, beginning on
October 15. Each room had a separate waiting room for 250 prisoners, and the
prisoners waited to be called one after another. However, the forced persuasion was ineffective, and the majority of the prisoners did not want the explanation interview.\textsuperscript{401}

In the case of explanation to the Chinese prisoners of war who opposed repatriation, only seven prisoners out of 500 changed their minds and wished to return to Communist China.\textsuperscript{411} On the following day, October 16, interviews began to be arranged for the North Korean prisoners, but the interviews were cancelled because the prisoners refused to be interviewed, and this incident presaged grave trouble for the future of the attempts to change the minds of the prisoners.

As the explanation effort seemed hopeless, on October 19 the Communist side changed its tactics and stopped the explanation work unilaterally and proposed discontinuance of the explanation efforts. The real intention of the Communists’ posture was to abuse the rules related to ‘explanation’ by the NNRC and to extend the ninety day period of explanation to an indefinite one so that the

\begin{center}
\textit{Communist Explanation to the Prisoners not wishing repatriation (On the Chest of a Prisoner Written 'Beat Red Puppet')}
\end{center}
prisoners who opposed repatriation could be taken into indefinite custody.\textsuperscript{42)}

On October 31, after many turns and twists, the ‘explanation’ efforts by the Communists to the anti-Communist Korean prisoners of the North Korean Army began. In spite of the explanation effort, none of the prisoners was persuaded.

The Communists’ explanation team appealed as follows: “On behalf of the Peoples’ Republic of Korea, we do hope you, for the sake of freedom and happiness, will come back to your native town where your wife, children and the fatherland are waiting for you.”\textsuperscript{43)} The team attempted to persuade prisoners by showing a prisoner who had once been a wounded prisoner and had recovered his health after being repatriated to North Korea through the repatriation program for wounded prisoners, and by showing a photo of the city of P’yonyang. However, the explanation effort proved fruitless.

On the eve of the expiration of the explanation period, the Communists betrayed their real character and raised objection to the rules governing the explanation period. The Communists insisted that only the actual time spent on the explanation work be counted and that they not be held to the pre-fixed length of the explanation period. However, the UNC resolutely refused the proposal by the Communists.

On December 22, UNC Commanding General John E. Hull,\textsuperscript{44)} in order to solve this problem, flew from Tokyo to Korea to talk with Lt. Gen. K. S. Thimayya, the commander of the Indian Custodian Force, the representative of India to the NNRC, and Chairman of the NNRC. As a result of the conference, Lt. Gen. K. S. Thimayya had to make an official statement that the explanation period would expire as of December 23.\textsuperscript{45)}

On the other side, explanation efforts for the prisoners from the ROKA and the UNC began on December 2. The prisoners from the ROKA were interviewed by the ROKA, the prisoners from the United States of America were inter-
viewed by the US forces, and the prisoners from Great Britain were interviewed by the British forces; however, there was little progress of persuasion. This was because the prisoners were thoroughly brainwashed by the Communists before being interviewed. The prisoners did not pay any attention to the explanation from the beginning to the end.46)

Actually, the Communists took only ten days for explanation until the expiration date of December 23, and only 628 prisoners expressed desire for repatriation. The UNC took eight days and ten were repatriated.

Thus, the explanation efforts on the prisoners who opposed repatriation ended on December 23; however, the prisoners who had not been persuaded and wished to remain created another problem to be settled. According to the Armistice Agreement, the settlement of those who wished to remain instead of being repatriated, should be handled by the Political Conference within 30 days, but the Political Conference had not met within that 30-day period.

The Commanding General of the UNC made a statement claiming that the explanation period had expired as of December 23 1953; hence the prisoners of war who opposed repatriation should be released on January 22, 1954.47) The Communists, however, complained to the UNC about the shortness of the ten-day period for explanation and requested and extension of the period of time for explanation. They also strongly insisted on deferring the release of prisoners until a final decision was made at the Political Conference.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission rejected the Communists’ request to extend the period of time; however, a part of the request was reflected in the report on the release of prisoners which was adopted on December 27. This adoption was possible for the Communist side because of the lopsided balance of three to two in their favor on the commission by India’s collusion with Poland and Czechoslovakia.48) The Indian Custodian Force stated that unless the two sides agreed on the date of the release of prisoners, the Indian government would make
the decision. However, the Korean government and the UNC were taking steps for
the release of the anti-Communist prisoners in due course, and at last Lieutenant
General Thimayya, the commander of the Indian forces, made a report to his gov-
ernment on the issue and received legal advise as follows: “The prisoners who
haven’t decided to repatriate even after the expiration of the explanation period,
should be delivered to the jurisdiction of the side on which they wish to remain.”

Lieutenant General Thimayya, first of all, notified the prisoners, and, on
18 January 1954, delivered a written notice to General John E. Hull, the
Commanding General of the UNC. The Communists, upon being notified of this
decision, rejected it right away. Finally, on January 20 and 21, around 21,000 anti-
Communist prisoners were freed from the prisoner camps in the neutral zone to the
UNC side, and, as of 00:00 hours on January 23, were returned to civilian status.

On January 23, the reception ceremony of the anti-Communist prisoners
was officially held with officials from the ROK, the Republic of China, and the
UNC. Fifteen LSTs were alongside the quay to transport the anti-Communist pris-
oners who wished to go to Taiwan. Four cruisers were mobilized to convoy the
LSTs, and the Fourth Regiment of the U.S. Third Marine Division was taken on
board to guard them. The Chinese anti-Communist prisoners were immediately
transferred from Inch’on to Taiwan and welcomed in Taiwan as heroes of anti-
Communism.

On that day, the Commanding General of the UNC made a statement on
the occasion of the release of the anti-Communist prisoners, proclaiming that the
prisoners had every right to become free people as of that day and that, in fact,
they had become free. Thus, the prisoners of war who had struggled against the
Communists in the Demilitarized Zone had procured their freedom.

On the other hand, the Communist side under the auspices of the
Chinese and the North Korean Red Crosses, on the 28th, received the remaining
prisoners who opposed repatriation and decided to release them.
At 10:33 on January 20, the anti-Communist prisoners, who chose the Republic of Korea began to cross the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone and were welcomed by high officials of the ROK and the UNC. The first train which carried the prisoners left Freedom Bridge at 12:14, and the last train arrived in Taejon at 02:25 on the following morning. Nine trains were mobilized including two hospital trains to transport these prisoners.\(^5^2\)

On January 23, the delegates of the UNC, the ROK and the ROC, signed the official receipt of taking over 21,839 prisoners (7,604 North Korean and 14,235 Communist Chinese) who opposed returning to North Korea or Communist China.

**Result of the settlement of the Communist prisoners not wishing to return\(^5^3\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>NKA</th>
<th>CCF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returned to the Communist Side</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaped or Missing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death under the Custody of Indian forces</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to India</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remained in UNC Control</td>
<td>7,604</td>
<td>14,235</td>
<td>21,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>14,704</td>
<td>22,604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Result of the settlement of the ROK and the UN prisoners not wishing to return\(^5^6\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>ROKA</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returned to the UNC Side</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to the Communist Side</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>335</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Indian Custodian Force completely left Korea, beginning its departure from Inch'on on February 7, with the last unit leaving on the 21st. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was dissolved on February 16; however, it remained in P'anmunjom to clear up unsettled issues by February 21. On 19 February 1954, delegates of the UNC, ROK and ROC signed an official document completing operations related to prisoners.

3. Homecoming of the Refugees

Paragraph 59, Article III, Armistice Agreement says that: “All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line.” Both warring sides, according to the agreement, should exchange refugees in keeping with the free will of the refugees.

In relation to this agreement, a Committee for Assisting the Return of the Displaced Civilians was established, composed of two field grade officers from each side (UNC and Communist). This Committee was a joint organization
and responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides to assist the return of the displaced civilians and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of the agreement relating to the return of the displaced civilians.

This committee was composed of four field grade officers, two appointed by each side. The headquarters of the committee was located in the proximity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, and it was under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission and was to be dissolved upon fulfillment of its mission. The committee was to report any matters on which the two sides were unable to reach agreement immediately to the Military Armistice Commission.

The number of civilians who had been captured by the Communists during the war was as high as 84,532, and the return of displaced civilians was a very important issue to the Korean side. Consequently, as the negotiations on the exchanging of captured civilians were progressing satisfactorily not only the families of the captured civilians, but also the whole nation showed great concern over this matter.

On December 11, 1953, when the explanation effort for the prisoners who opposed repatriation was nearly at its end, the Committee for Assisting the Return of the Displaced Civilians had its first meeting at P’anmunjom and began its routine work. At the first meeting, both sides agreed on the exchanging point, the dates, the criteria of kinship for accompanying family members, and personal belongings; however, the numbers to be exchanged per day was not agreed on, with the UNC proposing 500 prisoners a day and the Communists proposing 100.

At the second meeting on December 29, both sides agreed on exchanging 100 persons a day with the UNC side conceding in favor of the Communist side. It was also agreed that the persons would begin to return home on the first day of March 1954. As the exchange on displaced civilians reached agreement, a
concrete plan was under preparation by the government.

The government officially announced that displaced civilians who wished to return to North Korea should file a report at designated points between January 5 and February 17, but very few reports were received. The interest and concern of the people about the homecoming of displaced civilians was great, but the displaced North Korean civilians had no reason to return because they hated Communist rule and had taken refuge in the South.

In the meantime, on February 15, North Korea broadcast that it had no displaced civilians who wished to return to the south. On the 18th, three days after North Korea had made this broadcast, the UNC presented a list of thirty names of civilians who wished to return to the north and had completed registration in South Korea, but North Korea responded that they had no South Koreans who wished to return home except about ten foreigners who wished to be repatriated.

On March 1, the Communists delivered 19 foreigners (eleven Turks and eight White Russians) to the UNC side. On the following day, the UNC side delivered thirty seven Koreans to the Communists side. Initially, thirty nine prisoners had applied to return home; however, two of them were arrested by the investigative authorities in South Korea right before the exchanging of civilians because they were proven to have engaged in espionage.

Thus, the Communists did not return the displaced civilians who had been kidnapped from South Korea but continued to detain them in custody; as a result, not only the whole of Korean but also all free nations were disappointed and exasperated. The Communists did not clearly notify the displaced civilians that they had been given the right to return home, and did not guarantee them freedom of expression, clearly violating the Armistice Agreement. As long as the chance of free expression was not guaranteed and the whole procedure was not supervised by the authorized international organization, the exchange of displaced civilians had little chance of being successful.
At this point, the provisions of the Armistice Agreement were considered fulfilled within the Korean Peninsula, and the last hope for peaceful unification fell upon the Political Conference.  

III. Breakdown of the Political Conference at Geneva

1. Measures taken by the UN General Assembly

On August 7, 1953, while the exchanging of prisoners who wished to return home was being carried out at P’anmunjom in conformity with the Armistice Agreement, the UNC made a special report to the UN General Assembly on the progress of the truce negotiations and the prospects of Armistice Agreement. The United Nations confirmed the receipt of the special report and began to discuss the Political Conference for the unification of the Korean Peninsula, which was prescribed in the Armistice Agreement. Discussion was concentrated on the scope of participants and the agenda of the Political Conference.

In the meantime, from August 4 to 7, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Korea and held four meetings with President Syngman Rhee on unification plans, Korea-US joint policy for the forthcoming political conference, economic and military aid programs to Korea, and US-Korea joint defense treaty.

In relation to the Political Conference, Korea wished to include only the Republic of Korea, the United States, the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. With Dulles opposing it on the American side, Korea could hardly insist on her proposal any longer, but made it clear that Russia and India should not be
allowed to participate in the Political Conference.

The national assembly passed a resolution which limited the scope of the participants in the political conference only to the countries which had fought in the Korean War, stated that the conference should be held within a limited time, and provided that no resolution that violated Korean sovereignty should ever be made. This resolution was supported by President Syngman Rhee, who was supposed to hold a meeting with Secretary Dulles.621 Both the Republic of Korea and the United States, after having had extensive discussions between Pyun Young T'ae, Minister of ROK Foreign Affairs and John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State, signed the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty in front of dignitaries from both sides on August 8 at the Kyongmuda.631

The Republic of Korea brought the USA to an understanding about its concern for national security in Korea during the conference between Syngman

*Signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty (Minister Pyun Young T'ae and US Secretary of state Dulles are signing)*
Rhee and John Foster Dulles, and Dulles made it clear that the US government supported the unification of Korea.

Both countries agreed to close cooperation in achieving joint objectives, including the unification of Korea, and made a statement declaring that, should the efforts of the ninety-day Political Conference come to naught, Korea and the USA would withdraw from the Conference:

Our talk, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, was a clear indication by the US and the Republic of Korea of a sincere desire to achieve our joint objectives including the unification of Korea. Today, we signed a preliminary mutual defense treaty. This treaty is to make our two nations stand together in taking joint actions against common threats, and to solidify our relationship strengthened while confronting the Communist invasion in Korea.

Until the day when this mutual defense treaty becomes effective, the US forces in Korea under the UNC will observe the articles of the Armistice Agreement. If, within this period, the Communist forces violate the Armistice Agreement and launch an unexpected offensive against the ROK, the UNC including the ROKA will consider the action as an offensive against the UNC itself and the forces under the command of the UNC, and will engage in an immediate and automatic counterattack. …

We affirm that the Republic of Korea has the sovereignty to solve its own questions, however, we agreed to exclude a unilateral action to unify Korea by means of military forces, during the agreed political conference.⁴⁹

On August 17, 1953 a special session of the UN General Assembly was held at the United Nations in New York. After the general cease fire, one of the most important issues was the Political Conference. At the special session, the
Armistice Agreement and the Political Conference, in accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 60 stipulated in the Armistice Agreement, were discussed.

In the Armistice Agreement, it was stipulated that the Political Conference should be held before October 27, 1953, that is three months after the cease-fire; however, since nothing was stated about the characteristics, the organization or the administrative procedures of the Political Conference, there was fierce debate on these issues at the UN General Assembly. At the first meeting following the opening ceremony of the special session, the 16 countries which had sent troops to the Korean War passed a resolution unanimously which made an appeal: "If any one of the countries which participated in the Korean War wished to participate in the Political Conference, it should be allowed to do so, and their contribution in support of the UN's aid and the rehabilitation plan of Korea is expected."

The United States of America began to negotiate with the Communists concerning the opening of the Political Conference. On the following day, at the Political and Security Council of the General Assembly, discussion took place on the Political Conference. At this meeting, the Soviet representative to the UN proposed inviting representatives of Communist China and North Korea to the discussion of the Korean question; however, as this proposal was rejected by the USA and the free world member nations, he proposed an entirely new issue. he suggested that the Soviet Union would propose Communist China's admission to the UN at the next General Assembly, and that eleven countries should be allowed to participate in the Political Conference.

After the Soviet suggestion the Political Conference became a full-scale debate in the UN General Assembly. The subjects of discussion were whether the Soviet Union and India would be included among the participants and whether the subject of China's entry to the UN could be taken up at the same time as the discussion of the Korean question.
The eleven countries, recommended by the Soviet Union included the Soviet Union and India, and of the four members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, only Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were excluded. Thus, from the beginning, the proposal lacked equity, and trouble seemed inevitable. The USA immediately rejected the proposal, and all free world nations supported the USA and requested revision of the Russian proposal.

Accordingly, whether India should be allowed to participate in the Political Conference or not was the focus of debate since this was an important point which could shape the character, the organization, and the administrative procedure of the Political Conference. The USA insisted that the conference be made up only from the countries who were belligerents in the war; however, if the Communists wished participation of the Soviet Union, it could be allowed on the condition that it was one on the Communist side.68

The Russian proposal involved two aims. One was to give Communist China and North Korea the right of veto and the other was to exclude the ROK from discussion and to reassure India’s participation in the Political Conference.69

The Russian side, under the pretext of being in the region in which Korea was located, insisted that the Korean question had such an organic relationship with general affairs in Asia that some countries, especially India, should be included among the participants for the Political Conference, and also strongly requested a round-table conference.

On the 20th, the US representative made an official statement opposing the Russian proposal, saying that if the resolution in which India was recommended for membership on the Political Conference was presented to the General Assembly, the United States would vote against it. On this same day, Sweden made it clear that although Mr. Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative to the UN, had proposed on the 18th that the UN Political Committee should invite eleven countries (including Sweden) to the Political Conference on the Korean question,
Sweden would not participate in the Conference. The Chairman of the UN General Assembly (the Canadian foreign minister) expressed his personal opinion about the prospects of the forthcoming Political Conference, saying that as long as the USA, Korea, Communist China, and North Korea enjoyed the right of veto at the Political Conference, the Political Conference could not be successful on any issue unless those four countries agreed.

While the two sides were pitted against each other about the question of participants in the Political Conference, on the 24th, the Korean foreign minister, who had been participating in the UN General Assembly as an observer, made a speech at the Political & Security Council, stressing: “We wished a fair resolution on the Korean question and to be invited to the Political Conference; however, the Korean question can never be solved by an appeasement policy to the Communists. Accordingly, we oppose India's participation in the Political Conference.” He concluded by saying: “The concept of the neutralization or the demilitarization of Korea, which has frequently been a subject of propaganda these days, no matter what sources it came from, completely coincided with the concept of the Communist clique which was contemplating the military vacuum within the Republic of Korea. I, on behalf of the Korean delegation, strongly warn you to pay attention to such plotting.” He continued “We admit that the UN is authorized to decide whether or not to give India the right to participate in the Political Conference; however, Korea also has the right to decide on the participating countries in the Political Conference.”

Motivated by the statement by the Korean delegation, heated controversy continued within the Security Council on the participating countries in the Political Conference; at last, this question was called for decision on the 27th. However, a resolution presented by the free world nations claiming that the fifteen UN member nations which dispatched troops to the Korean War and the Republic of Korea should participate in the Political Conference as the representati-
tives of the UN forces, was carried at the UN Political Council with forty two ayes, seven nays and ten abstentions. Following the vote at the Political Council, the free world nations rejected a proposal by the Soviet Union, in which the Soviet revised the number of participating countries to fifteen\(^{72}\), with forty one nays, five ayes and thirteen abstentions.

After the Soviet proposal was rejected by a majority, England, New Zealand, Canada and Australia introduced a resolution to the UN Political Council, inviting only India to the Political Conference on the Korean question, and the Council passed the resolution with twenty seven ayes, twenty one nays and eleven abstentions. However, since the Indian representative voluntarily submitted a written resignation, voting in the General Assembly did not taken place.\(^{73}\)

Thus, on 28 August 1953, the resolution introduced by the western nations on the opening of the Korean Political Conference was carried at the plenary session of the General Assembly with forty five ayes, five nays and ten abstentions. Following this, a joint proposal by Australia and New Zealand which recommended that the Soviet Union be allowed to participate in the Political Conference if the Communists wished was passed with fifty five ayes, one nay and one abstention. The General Assembly adopted a resolution on Korea (Resolution 711-VII, General Assembly) as follows:

1. Implementation of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

(1) Notes the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement that in order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the ques-
tion of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

(2) Advises the following.

a. The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea. The participating governments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom of action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements which they wish to adhere to.

b. The United States government after consultation with the other participating countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, shall arrange with the other side for the political conference to be held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October 1953, at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides.

(3) Reaffirms its intention to carry out its programme for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member States to contribute to this task.

2. Having adopted the resolution entitled "Implementation of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement," recommends that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it.

3. Requests the Secretary General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and to the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate.\textsuperscript{741}
On October 26, three months after the cease-fire, the preliminary talks of the Political Conference were held at P’anmunjom.\(^{75}\) The UN Special General Assembly ended after two weeks of discussion on the Political Conference of the Korean question.

2. Failure in Contacts for Preliminary Talks at P’anmunjom

The United States, which was authorized to negotiate with the Communists on behalf of the UN General Assembly under the provision of “Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement and Resolution by the UN General Assembly on August 28, 1953,” was making the best of the preliminary talks at P’anmunjom prior to the Political Conference by the ranking representatives from countries concerned. On September 1, the United States delivered to North Korea and Communist China a “Request to Open the Political Conference at a place among San Francisco, Honolulu or Geneva on October 15, and wish to initiate the preparation of the Conference at once.”\(^{76}\)

However, Communist China and North Korea, on September 13, sent a note to the Secretary General of the U.N., questioning the date and the venue for the opening of the Political Conference. The Secretary General of the UN, upon receiving the note, delivered it to the US Government, and on September 18, the US Government, sent notification of the date and venue for the Political Conference to the Communist side.\(^{77}\)

On behalf of the representatives of the member nations, which together with the ROK sent troops to the UNC, and as we have expressed in our note delivered to your side by the good offices of Sweden, on September 5, 1953, we hope the Political Conference will be held in either San Francisco, Honolulu or Geneva on October 15, 1953. Since we need to begin prepara-
tion for the conference right away, immediate response on the date and venue which are acceptable by both of the governments on your side will be appreciated.

The Communists did not answer this note for more than two weeks. The United States, on October 8, again sent a note urging the Communists to reply. The US, in order to show good faith, conceded on some points and made it clear that the US would again negotiate about the scope of participants for the Political Conference after the Political Conference opened. First of all, the US urged opening the preliminary talks for the Political Conference.

The Communists responded to this proposal on October 10, two days after receipt of the note, confirming that the Communists would send delegates to the preliminary talks at P’anmunjom, in order to convene about the opening of the Political Conference:

1) To expedite the speedy convocation of the political conference, the Central People’s government of the People’s Republic of China, after consultations with the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, agreed that the governments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China will appoint representatives to meet with the United States representatives to hold discussions on the questions of the political conference.

2) Those discussions not only should settle the questions of place and time of the political conference, but what is more essential, should settle the question of composition of the political conference.

3) Since those discussions are confined to the two belligerent sides in Korea, it is appropriate that the place of the discussions be P’anmunjom, Korea.
Judging from the content of the above note, it was clear that the Communists intended to go back to the starting point and wanted to begin discussion about the participants for the Political Conference again, ignoring the UN Resolution, and also intended to draw world attention to P’anmunjom to intensify their propaganda.

However, the US had prudent discussions with Korea and the countries which had participated in the Korean War, and for the moment, decided to accept Communist China’s proposal, and on October 12, notified the Communists that the US agreed to dispatch its delegation to the preliminary talks for the Political Conference in P’anmunjom. On October 20, the US delivered another note, together with the list of delegates for the preliminary talks, to the Communists stating that the US viewed the preliminary talks as “nothing but a discussion in advance, and no essential issues could be taken up for discussion.”

On October 22, two days after the US note was delivered to the Communists, the conference of Military Armistice Commission was held in P’anmunjom, and at the conference the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal in which the UNC wished the venue of the preliminary talks, which were scheduled to be held on the 26th, to be within the Demilitarized Zone. Next day, on 23rd, Pyun, the foreign minister stated that the unification policy of the Korean government would not change due to political conference, and that the representative of Korean government would participate at P’anmunjom preliminary talks.

At last, the preliminary talks opened at 11:00 on October 26 at the newly constructed office of the Military Armistice Commission. The delegates on the UN side were Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, legal advisor to the American Secretary of State, Cho Jung Hwan, Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry, and Col. Lee Soo Young. On the Communist side were Hwang Hwa (later made the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Communist China) and Ki Sun-pok, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, DPRK.
The preliminary talks in P’anmunjom, which had been organized with such difficulty, got off to a rocky start with disagreement over the order of the agenda. When the preliminary talks commenced, the UN side representative proposed “to decide the date, venue and administrative matters for the Political Conference on the condition that the preliminary talks be concluded before November 24 and that the Political Conference be opened on the same day that the preliminary talks end.” However, from the beginning, the Communist side attempted to invalidate the UN Resolution of August 28. The first day’s meeting was disappointing due to lack of consensus again between the two sides on which countries should participate in the Political Conference.

Throughout the preliminary talks, the Communist side repeatedly demanded that the composition of the Political Conference be taken up as the first agenda item. Arthur H. Dean, the chief delegate of the UN, warned the Communist side that if it continued to insist on talking about the composition of the Political Conference, the Political Conference would not be held, and the preliminary talks would be closed.

However, at the eighth meeting, on November 3, the US proposed a compromise. The US wanted to discuss the opening date and the venue of the Political Conference, and the Communist side wanted to discuss the composition of the Political Conference. The US proposed that both items be discussed at the same time, and this proposal carried. The US also proposed organizing two sub-committees to discuss the matters of concern to each side.

As discussions continued, each side conceded some points and the two agreed to sit face to face and to include the neutral nations as advisory countries with the exception of the USSR, however, whose participation was yet to be agreed on.82

The intention of the Communists from the beginning of the meeting, by insisting upon talking about the scope of participants, was to render the UN
Resolution of August 28 null and void. Furthermore, by delaying the negotiations, the Communists attempted to create disharmony among the countries which had dispatched troops to Korea thus weakening the US position at the negotiations and strengthening their own position. From the beginning, the preliminary talks were bogged down in discussion on the participants and the venue for the Political Conference.

On November 30, the Communists made a last proposal in which they requested inclusion of the Soviet Union among the Political Conference members as an advisory nation like other neutral nations. However, the US would not compromise on this matter and reiterated that the USSR could not be considered a neutral nation but a belligerent. The US representative, on December 8, presented the following draft agreement as a final proposal.

- Participants in the Political Conference: United Nations members which participated in the Korean War, the ROK, the DPRK, Communist China and the USSR.
- Venue of Conference: Geneva
- Date(beginning) of Conference: Between the 28th and the 42nd day after the end of the preliminary meetings.
- Procedural Rules: Agreement by Both Sides.
- Official Languages: English, Korean, Chinese.

However, the Communist side rejected the UN proposal right away, and on December 12, 1953, criticized the US for its breach of good faith during the armistice conference. On the same day, the Communists alleged that the US was in conspiracy with South Korea, citing President Syngman Rhee's release of anti-Communist prisoners on June 18. The atmosphere of the meeting became so tense that it was put off indefinitely in the face of mutual criticism and refutation.
It was clear that nothing could be expected from the P'anjumunjom preliminary talks. The US government summoned Ambassador Dean home since it concluded that nothing could be achieved no matter how long the meeting lasted.

On the South Korean part, President Syngman Rhee warned against the Communists' intentions: "The initial purpose of the preliminary talks was to decide the date and the place of the Political Conference of the Korean question. However, the Communist side wasted time by making unnecessary proposals and speeches for more than three months. They will do the same thing again or go on even longer than three months if we reopen talks."\(^{84}\)

According to Ambassador Dean's testimony, the Communists repeated unrealistic demands such as complete withdrawal of the UN and the US forces, unification of the Korean Peninsula under the initiative of the Communists, establishment of a coalition government by the South and the North, removal of free China from the UN, and admission of Communist China to the UN, and removal of the trade sanctions applied to North Korea by the US.\(^{85}\)

In spite of having had several meeting of liaison officers for preliminary meeting from January 18, 1954, the talks broke down and the talks could not reopen due to the pending issue of the Soviet's participation in the Political Conference. Finally, the Korean question was handed over to the Far Eastern Peace Conference at Geneva after the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference by four powers.
3. Breakdown of the Political Conference at Geneva

The preliminary talks at P’anmunjom broke down because of the controversy over the Soviet participation in the Political Conference. The agreement on Geneva as the venue for the Korean Political Conference was made after the breakdown of the preliminary talks at P’anmunjom.

On January 25, 1954, just before the breakdown of the preliminary talks, a foreign ministerial conference of four powers—the US, UK, France and the USSR—had gotten underway in Berlin to discuss the unification of Germany and Austria. At the Berlin conference, with alternating conference venues between East and West Berlin, not only the questions of Germany and Austria but also the questions of Korea and Indo-China were under discussion.

At this conference, almost no agenda items were agreed on except for the decision to hold a Big Five conference, and this barely reached agreement. On February 18, the day before the closing of the conference, the four nations ministerial conference issued a joint statement; “On April 26, five powers including Communist China and countries concerned gathered and discussed the establishment of an Asian conference to deal with the unification of Korea and the cease fire of Indo-China.” Thus, the preliminary talks for a Political Conference at P’anmunjom were became irrelevant, and a full scale preparations began for the Political Conference at Geneva. However, the Berlin conference decision was made without the consent of the Korean government, which was especially dissatisfied with the fact that the Soviet’s status had been raised to one of the hosting countries at the Geneva conference.

Hence, the Korean government refused to participate in the Geneva conference at the beginning and adopted a stubborn stance, arguing that the resolution which was made without the consent of Korea was not fair and disregarded the UN. Mr. Kal Hong Ki, Minister of Public Information, stated “as was the case
with the Communists, we do not expect any agreement at the forthcoming conference.\textsuperscript{787)}

However, the countries which participated in the Korean War were preparing for the conference as planned, and the US, while announcing that the US would dispatch Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as the representative, appealed to the Korean government to participate in the Political Conference, emphasizing that there would be no infringement on the national interests of Korea. The Korean government, which was insisting on the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist Forces, persistently refused to participate in the conference and had diplomatic troubles with the US several times; however, at last, the Korean government accepted the US suggestion and decided to send a delegation to the conference.

The prerequisites by the Korean government for participating in the conference consisted of two items. First, should the Geneva talks make no practical progress within a certain period, the US would walk out together with Korea. Second, the US should take joint steps with the Republic of Korea in discussing Korean questions and build up Korean forces in preparation for the breakdown of the conference.\textsuperscript{88)}

On April 19, the ROK government announced a list of the Korean delegates with Foreign Minister Pyun Young T’ae as the chief delegate.\textsuperscript{89)} At the same time, President Syngman Rhee made a special statement in which he explained the reason that the Republic of Korea was participating in the Geneva conference, and declared to the world that the coming conference would be the last attempt to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea.

The government of Korea today decided to accept the good will of the US inviting us to participate in the Geneva Conference. I think there are many who don’t understand the reason that Korea has been hesitant to participate
in the conference.
Reasons. 1) We did not expect any outcome from the Geneva Conference; 2) We were concerned about the fact that we were giving the Communists time to prepare for war during a fruitless conference.
We tried our best for the past several weeks to get a definite and practical security guarantee from the US. Fortunately, we now have a definite answer, and we now are participating in the Geneva Conference with great confidence and hope.

On April 26, 1954 the conference began as scheduled at Geneva Switzerland. Participating countries at the conference were the Republic of Korea and the fifteen countries which had contributed ground combat units in the Korean War (the Republic of South Africa was absent), and North Korea, Communist China and the USSR, for a total of 19 countries. This conference should not have been called the Political Conference in conformity with Paragraph 60, Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement because this conference came about as a by-product in the process of discussion for the German-Austrian question by the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France and the USSR as the P’anmunjom preliminary talks broke down. The US, which had been greatly concerned about the Soviet’s advance into the world on account of the appeasement policy to the Communists after World War II, began to take a firm anti-Communist stand, and the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, adopted a policy of confrontation against the free world under the guise of seeing peace. The UK chimed in on the Soviet’s side, professing to advocate an appeasement policy to the Communists.

On the 27th, the first meeting, which was presided over by V. M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was held and the Korean question was taken up. Pyun Young T’ae, chief delegate of the Republic of Korea, explained the historic background in which Korea failed to be unified after the liberation due to
the Communists' interference, and insisted on a free election under UN supervision in North Korea and the completion of withdrawal of the Chinese Communist forces before the election.92)

The Korean delegate pointed out that: "In accordance with the UN resolution on February 26, 1948, a free election took place and a democratic government was established only in South Korea. We hoped to have the same free election in North Korea, however. Should the situation ever allow it, a free election with secret ballots will take place in North Korea on the unification of Korea. Since the Korean government, in accordance with the UN policy, reserved nearly 100 seats in parliament, holding a free election in North Korea is the best way to fulfil the UN mission and to maintain the dignity of the UN, as well as to observe the earlier UN Resolution on Korea."

The Korean delegate continued his speech on the withdrawal of foreign troops: "Some might think it fair that the US forces and the Communist Chinese forces should withdraw at the same time; however, this is contrary to reason. Since the UN forces were dispatched to the Korean Peninsula as police forces to punish Communist China and North Korea for their aggression, they should leave Korea only when their police action is considered finished. There is no reason for the US forces to withdraw at the same time as the invading forces of the

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On April 26, 1954, Geneva Political Conference was held with 19 countries participating: ROK, 15 War participating Countries under flag of UN (excluding South Africa), USSR, Communist Chinea and North Korea.
Communist China. For instance, how could an armed robber insist that the police disarm before the robber himself disarmed.” Thus, the delegate opposed the withdrawal of the UN forces at the same time as the Chinese Communist forces.

Following the speech by the delegate of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il, who had once been the chief delegate of the Armistice Talks, criticized South Korea and expressed strong disapproval of the UN in the following speech:

The government of the DPRK, in order to establish a democratic independent state by rehabilitating the national unification quickly, hereby advises the government of the ROK as follows.

1) Hold a general election for the National Assembly in order to establish a unified government.

2) Organize an All Korea Committee with assemblymen of both South and North Korea.

3) The All Korea Committee should prepare a draft law for a general election.

4) The All Korea Committee should take steps to promote and develop the economic and cultural exchange between South and North.

5) Organize a neutral supervisory committee to supervise the general election.

6) All foreign troops should withdraw from Korea within six months.

7) Secure peaceful development of Korea by the countries which concerned about keeping peace in the Far East.93)

The North Korean proposal contained a substantial difference in the manner of election, in that the All Korea Committee would supervise every facet of the election, and the Committee would be composed of an equal number from
each side, and decisions would be made only by 'the principle of mutual agreement.' The South Korean suggestion, which called for a free democratic election by proportional representation throughout Korea, was far removed from the suggestion of North Korea.

The North Korean proposal deliberately excluded the United Nations' role and insisted on the organization of a neutral nations supervisory committee, in order to diminish the dignity and authority of the UN and to eliminate any role by the UN. The North Korean proposal elaborated on the deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops, but did not mention anything about the election dates. Thus, from the beginning, the Political Conference was confronted with subjects such as the manner of election for the unified government, the management and supervision of the election, the recognition of the UN authority, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

On April 28, American Secretary of State Dulles expressed US support for a proposal by the South Korean delegate and presented a plan on the Korean question. The major points were refusal of the North Korean proposal, agreement with the principle of the UN Resolution at the fifth General Assembly on October 1950, securing free activities for the members of the UN Commission for Korea and a general election in the North Korean area only, and securing the stationing of the UN forces in Korea and the immediate withdrawal of the Communist Chinese forces. This UN stance coincided with the principles that the UN had long been advocating for the peaceful resolution of the Korean question.

A speech by the US delegate was followed by that of the delegate from Communist China. While supporting the North Korean proposal, he insisted the US give up all its bases in the Pacific Ocean, opposed Japanese rearmament, and called for a ban on weapons of mass destruction.

On the 28th, when a heated discussion was going on at the Geneva Political Conference, the ROK Information Minister made a statement saying that
the unification plan proposed by Nam II of North Korea was nothing but another Communist scheme to destroy the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea would never agree to it. Meantime, President Syngman Rhee also made a statement warning the free nations not to be misled by the Communists’ deceitful policy:

Advice can be more valuable than money, but unlike money, it is rarely welcomed. The Communists have painted a picture of the United States in false colors. They would convince Asians that the United States is imperialistic and greedy. … They (the Communists) usurp power in the name of ‘democracy’ and they institute dictatorships as ruthless as the rule of the worst despots in history. At the same time they seek to portray the United States as the other nations’ worst enemy instead of their best friend. The United States is not an aggressor nation. Americans seek no other reward. Americans want to help every nation in trouble and they seek only the good will of the people.95)

President Rhee’s statement was to emphasize to the delegates of the US and other free nations that they should not be misled by the North Korean proposal at the Geneva conference. However, as the differences between two sides’ position on the question of unification became clear, the Australian delegate presented a compromise: “It is certain that there is ample reason for insisting on an election in North Korea only; however, if needed for the sake of eventual resolution, we hope the South Korean side will accept a general election throughout Korea.”

The UK delegate, following proposal of the compromise by the Australian delegate, added two conditions, a general election in the whole of Korea proportional to population and voting under international supervision. However, he avoided concrete details in explaining the international supervision: “We think international supervision is reasonable.” The delegate was intentionally
vague and various interpretations of his remarks were possible.

The New Zealand delegate stated: "It is understandable that South Korea as an independent sovereign country is reluctant to concede anything to a government which South Korea does not trust; however, in order to settle the differences between the two sides satisfactorily, we believe some concession is necessary."

Other friendly nations also expressed similar opinions and stressed: "We hope the Republic of Korea will change its an election in North Korea only, and in order to resolve the Korean question peacefully, the Republic of Korea must change its stance." North Korea’s Nam II instantly hailed the attitudes of the UK, France, and Australia.⁹⁶

South Korean chief delegate Pyun Young T’ae, sensing this atmosphere, gave careful consideration to the matter before responding. And having received instructions from Seoul just before the conference began that our demands could be revised to follow the line proposed by friendly nations, the delegate revised the phrase “election in North Korea only” to the following phrase: “in accordance with the procedural law of the constitution of the Republic of Korea.”⁹⁷

On May 22, giving up the principle of an “election in North Korea only”, Pyun presented fourteen items of compromise for the unification of Korea. The points were as follows:

1) In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, hold a free election under the supervision of the UN, in accordance with the previous UN resolution.

2) Hold a free election in North Korea, where a free election has never been possible in the past, and if the majority of the South Korean people desire to have an election, the same will be held in South Korea.

3) Hold an election within six months after the proposal is accepted.⁹⁸
The main points of this proposal were unification by proportional representation, completion of the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist forces one month before the election, and maintenance of the UN forces in Korea until it was confirmed that the whole of Korea was effectively controlled by the unified government. This revised proposal represented a considerable concession from the one in which the Republic of Korea had insisted on an election in North Korea only. As the fourteen items of the compromise for unification were disclosed, Seoul interpreted it as agreeing to hold elections in both the North and the South at the same time, and there were proposals to summon the delegates home.\textsuperscript{99}

The proposal by the Republic of Korea was supported by fifteen friendly nations including the USA, and the friendly nations especially welcomed the fact that the Republic of Korea had conceded on its earlier demand for an election only in North Korea, and proposed a general election throughout South and North Korea. A free election under international supervision was a policy favored throughout the UN and the Geneva Political Conference. Moreover, it was emphasized that such international supervision could effectively be carried out only by the UN.

Delegates of all free nations made speeches and supported the Korean proposal, and the US delegate in his speech on June 5 suggested that the supervision should be carried out by the Unification and Rehabilitation Committee of the UN. The Belgian delegate, on June 11, suggested that the UN should appoint a special committee to supervise a free election. On June 28, Sir Anthony Eden, the delegate of the United Kingdom, wished to discuss some points of the Korean proposal further.\textsuperscript{100}

The Soviet Union and Communist China, responding to the United Kingdom, proposed to discuss the conditions for unification item by item instead of discussing all items at once. The Communist side on May 22 rejected the proposal by the Republic of Korea which suggested an all Korea election under the
supervision of the UN, and proposed an election under the supervision of the neutral nations committee. The Communist side also insisted that the neutral nations committee should be composed of the same number of delegates from both the Communist and the non-Communist countries, and that decisions should be made by unanimous vote.

The North Korean delegate insisted: “The future constitution of Chosun is not a matter of discussion at the Geneva conference like other domestic questions, and this question is entirely dependent on the people of Chosun and the authority of the future parliament of Chosun.” On June 5, the delegates of North Korea and Communist China rejected the fourteen item proposal by the Republic of Korea, and again opposed the all Korea election under international supervision.\(^{101}\)

The North Korean delegate explained the reason for their opposition: “When the various states of America were united in the eighteenth century to establish the United States, each state was given an equal right regardless of difference in population, and in the case of the cantons of Switzerland, in spite of the difference in population, they all had an equal right to speak in the federal government.”\(^{102}\) The delegate of the Republic of Korea pointed out, without delay, detailed differences between the case of the US, Switzerland, and the situation in Korea.

The Communists’ contention had been the coherent doctrine and the keynote of their policy in the UN since the Korean conflict broke out. The theoretical grounds of this doctrine for the Communists were given as follows: “First, the UN was the party itself which participated in the war. Second, the UN resolutions in 1950 were illegal and supervision by the UN would be foreign interference. Third, the Geneva conference has nothing to do with the UN, and there is no responsibility to accept the resolutions of the UN General Assembly.”

The Communist side, which intended to make use of the Armistice
Agreement as a military respite for rearmament, professed to advocate a peaceful solution and tried to use the Geneva conference as a propaganda site, exactly as the Republic of Korea and other free nations had expected. The North Korean delegates, controlled by the delegates of the Soviet Union and Communist China, made a final proposal on June 15, insisting upon direct negotiations between South and North Korea and simultaneous withdrawal of the foreign troops stated:

1) Both sides, within the date agreed at the plenary talks, should withdraw a certain number of foreign troops in accordance with the agreed proportionality.

2) The ROK and the DPRK should cut down military strength to fewer than one hundred thousand men each within a year.

3) Organize a committee composed of representatives of the South and the North to study the necessary steps to turn the present situation from a state of war to a state of peacetime.

4) All treaties including military obligations of both sides are considered obstacles for the peaceful unification of the nation.

5) In order to create an atmosphere of cooperation between the South and the North, seek ways to promote economic and cultural relations. For this purpose, organize an all Korea committee.

6) The participating nations in this plenary meeting should recognize the necessity of securing the peaceful development of Korea.

The Soviet delegate came out in favor of the North Korean proposal and proposed reduction of the military strength of South and North Korea, and the withdrawal of foreign troops within a limited time. The Soviet delegate also proposed to adopt a joint statement which emphasized prohibiting of any actions which might threaten the peace of Korea until the final settlement of the Korean
question was achieved.

As the Communist side was making self-serving proposals, the delegates of the ROK and the UN countries which had participated in the war deemed the Political Conference a failure, and concluded that unless the Communist side accepted the two principles proposed by the UN side, it was meaningless to continue to discuss the Korean questions. On June 15, Mr. Whan, the Thai delegate and at the same time the chairman of the conference, read a joint statement by sixteen nations and declared the suspension of the conference. He emphasized that the responsibility for the breakdown of the discussion was on the Communist side:

We have endeavored continuously and faithfully to lay the ground work for agreement to make unification possible. However, the Communist side rejected our every effort to gain mutual agreement. ... To our great regret, the Communist delegates rejected the fundamental principles which we deemed indispensable, so we have no other recourse but to suspend talks on the Korean question. We declare again that we continue to support the UN’s objective in Korea.¹⁰⁵)

As the joint statement by the sixteen nations on the UN side was announced, the Communist Chinese delegate proposed to organize secret talks among seven nations (ROK, US, UK, France, DPRK, Communist China and Soviet Union) to study ways to secure peace in Korea. However, the UN delegates rejected the proposal, and the Communist side also rejected the joint statement by the sixteen nations of the UN side.

Thus, the Geneva Political Conference to discuss the unification of Korea broke down without making any progress because of the Communists’ unreasonable obstinacy; however, on June 17, the ROK government announced that it was useless for the free world to negotiate with the Communists and it was
time to take the initiative from the Communists. The ROK statement follows:

The solid action by the sixteen nations of the UN side in the Geneva talks showed a firm determination which went beyond suggestion to the Communist invaders that the time had passed when they could have achieved success without bloodshed through making use of diplomatic negotiations. ... As long as the absolute consensus shown in Geneva continues in the future, and the whole free world maintains the determination to execute the decision, the date, Tuesday the 15th of June, will be noted down in the world history as the end of the Communists’ advance in the world, and as the fall of a vicious invading regime.\(^{(106)}\)

As the debate on the Korean question ended, the overall responsibility for this issue was placed on the UN, and the two principles, which had been presented in a joint declaration by the sixteen nations of the UN, became fixed as the UN principles on the Korean question. Accordingly, the UN followed these two principles in exploring ways for the unification of Korea.

On the other hand, the Republic of Korea was beginning to assert that it no longer felt obliged to abide by the Korean armistice, that the collapse of the Geneva talks ‘invalidated’ the armistice, and that the Republic of Korea now felt free to take any action it wanted when the time came, and clearly declared that if the appeasement policy toward the Communists continued, the Republic of Korea would not hesitate to make a sole advance to the north.\(^{(107)}\) The Korean government, taking the breakdown of the Geneva Political Conference as momentum, adopted a positive stance in diplomatic negotiations for the sake of mutual cooperation and solidarity among Asian countries and organized the Asian Anti-Communism Federation and President Syngman Rhee’s state visit to the USA.

However, in view of the international situation, Korea’s sole advance
north would never be allowed. Thus the long cherished desire of the Republic of Korea to establish a united, free, democratic and independent country remained unfulfilled, and the tragic division of the Korean Peninsula continued.\textsuperscript{108}

The Geneva talks began on April 26, 1954, and broke down on June 15, and made no progress toward the peaceful unification of Korea. The Communist side, in essence, had rejected all possible considerations for a unification involving a free election.\textsuperscript{109} With the breakdown of the Geneva talks, the Political Conference, along with the Armistice Agreement, was practically nullified, and for both the UN and the Communist sides, hopes for a peaceful means for the unification of Korea grew dim.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{IV. Crossroad between of War and Peace}

\textbf{1. Characteristics and Damages of the Korean War}

During the period of 1945 through 1950 after the conclusion of the Second World War, a process of reorganization of world order into a bi-polar rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union continued leading to a structure of cold war between the east and the west, like an opposing frontline throughout the world. Amidst this situation, the 38th Parallel of the Korean peninsula was a point where the US and the Soviet Union directly confronted each other. Under this precarious situation, the Korean War broke out.

In this pointed confrontation Kim Il-sung of the North Korean Communist regime, at Stalin’s instigation and with Mao Tse Tung’s support, broke through the 38th Parallel by surprise on June 25, 1950, invading South Korea. The cold war was transformed into a hot and fierce war, which was called
the Korean War. The goal of Kim’s aggression was to plunder the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and annihilate free democracy (capitalism), in order to absorb South Korea into the Communist regime. The war was, therefore, an ‘unjust aggressive war’ against South Korea and an ideological war.

With the war developing, the US and the UN Forces, consisting of troops from the free world participated in the war, and as a countermeasure, the Communist forces, with the Red Chinese Army and the Soviet Union at the center, took sides with the North Korean Army. Thus, combat units from twenty countries and supporting units from other countries were divided into two camps and fought fiercely. Right after the Korean war started. Therefore, it became an international warfare.¹¹¹)

North Korea and some circles of war historians dubbed this war an ‘internal conflict,’ and the North Koreans still claim that “the war broke out due to South Korean aggression.” It should be kept in mind that “their purpose for the claim was the fabrication of history.”¹¹²) The claims made by some circles of war historians, as to internal conflict and so forth, contain problems and contradictions, for the background of the war, the process of decision-making, and operation plan were all conducted according to Russian instructions, guidance, and support and with Mao Tse Tung’s assistance.

Especially after the UN forces confronted the Red Communist forces, the latter’s participation was far beyond the level of mere support of the North Korean Army, and both the UN forces commander and the Red Chinese forces commander exercised the right of operational command of the UN forces and the Red Chinese forces, respectively, including the South and North Korean armies. The Korean War, therefore, developed into a war between the Communist forces and the UN forces. In view of the fact that war guidances also were conducted by the two opposing commanders, to define the war as being an internal conflict is not in keeping in with the facts.
In terms of military affairs, both the US and the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons at the time, and although the US had already developed tactical nuclear weapons, it refrained from using them. In addition, the UN forces had reviewed the matter of expanding its war theater to Manchuria of Red China more than once; however, it showed restraint and limited the war within the Korean peninsula. As to the objective of the war, there had been conflicts between the Korean government and the United Nations Command to come extent, and the war was guided by limiting the objective of war to ‘the repulsion of aggression.’ When this objective was accomplished, the United Nations Command terminated hostilities. The Korean War, therefore, was localized warfare—a limited and restrained war—that was fought in the nuclear age after the Second World War.

Because the war was not only an aggressive and an ideological war, but also was a limited war within the Korean peninsula, staged on a world-wide scale, it was waged cruelly and fiercely without any parallel. It resulted in tremendous physical damage. The primary damage caused by the military operations were made worse by the secondary damage caused by the ideological struggles. All the latest weapons, except for nuclear weapons, had been mobilized in this small battlefield, and their destructive power and dense intensity had been great indeed.

Of all the wars the Han race had been compelled to engage in throughout a long history of thousands of years, it received the most terrible war damage from this war. First, in terms of loss of friendly lives, a total of 1,180,000 soldiers were killed in action, wounded or missing, including 630,000 members of the Korean Army (plus the police) and 550,000 UN forces; while on the enemy side, a total of about 2,040,000 lives were lost, including 800,000 members of the North Korean Army and 1,230,000 Chinese Communist Forces. On the two sides together, a total of 3,220,000 lives of soldiers alone, were lost.\textsuperscript{113} As for the civilian lives, when the North and the South sacrifices were added together, a total of 2,490,000 were killed injured, or missing.\textsuperscript{114} In addition to these figures, roughly 3,230,000
refugees were counted. According to the statistics as of March 15, 1952, the number of the war victims amounted to over ten million people. Until the conclusion of the truce, the number must have greatly increased. No statistics are available up to the time of the truce; however, even with the statistics of March 15, 1952, more than 1/2 of the total population was victimized by the war. There was no family that did not suffer from the war, and the relatives of those killed in action, the families of the wounded, and dispersed family members are still suffering the distress and pain brought about by the war.

Material damage was no less great than the loss of human lives. the entire territory of Korea except for the Pusan beachhead was the battlefield. The region between the 37th and 38th Parallels war taken and recaptured three times.

Private houses and properties were badly damaged or destroyed, school buildings and public facilities used as military facilities were damaged or destroyed, and roads, railroads, bridges, harbors, and industrial facilities were diverted to the purposes of military operations. The very ground on which the nation lived and the foundations of its social and economic system were completely laid waste.

Despite all this death, destruction, and ruin, the people's anti-Communist consciousness and strong will for survival were intense. This was the driving force of the antebellum restoration and reconstruction. With this spirit, the people of the Republic of Korea tolerated hunger after the conclusion of the war and endured a generation of seemingly impossible and perseverance. And they have finally established what the country is today. Meanwhile, the North Korean regime has not yet recovered from ruin and is still suffering from hunger. This may be due to the inherent contradictions within the Communist system itself, and to North Korea's investment of the majority of its national resources in the reinforcement of its military power.
2. Armistice and Redivision of Korea

The armistice agreement was signed at 10:00 on July 27, 1953 by the commanding generals of both camps, and it became effective at 22:00. With this, the opposing forces ceased all hostilities, and the war was transformed into an armistice. In compliance with the armistice agreement, both camps established armistice system by creating the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at P’anmunjom. From the military demarcation line as the base line, each camp withdrew two kilometers, and they faced each other in armed camps with a 4-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone in between.

The Armistice Line (Military Demarkation Line) had been set along the line of contact between friendly and the enemy forces at the time the armistice was affected. A line connecting the estuary of the Han River—the mouth of the Imjin river (eight kilometers southwest of Munsan)—P’anmunjom–Saet’oh (CT085075)—Koyang-dae—Yujong-ri (12km north Ch’orwon)—Hakap-ryong—Bamsung-gol—Mundung-ri—Shint’an-ri—Su-ryong—Kamho (one kilometer south) formed the Armistice Line.\(^{[17]}\) West of Saet’oh the line dipped south of the 38th Parallel, and east of Saet’oh was determined to be north of the 38th Parallel; therefore, the area gained by the UNC forces in the east was wider than abandoned in the west.

This armistice line, however, has been described as being similar to the line before the war. The most distinct feature resulting from the war and the armistice was that, in spite of a war having been waged for three years, the Korean peninsula was redivided with Armistice Line simply replacing the 38th Parallel. This is far from Korean unification. The country reverted to the status quo before the war and failed to shake off the yoke of the cold war. The country remains divided with the two sides opposing each other. This is an unfortunate historical fact. And this is a reality. There are some people who describe the war as ‘a war
without gain or loss,' that is, 'a war ending in a draw.' This is a superficial analysis. It should be emphasized that South Korea gained many things through this war and armistice.

More than anything else, the Republic of Korea has accomplished its objectives of war. In short South Korea has been the victor in the war by surviving. The UN forces not only repulsed North Korea, which originally invaded South Korea with the goal of Communizing South Korea, to the north of the 38th Parallel, but they also forced the Red Chinese forces, which sided with North Korea, back above the 38th Parallel. In the process, the UN forces punished the enemy thoroughly, thus achieving the armistice. One of the two objectives of the UN, "the repulsion of aggression and the restoration of peace," was fully achieved. As far as South Korea is concerned, of course, the unification of Korea was not achieved. This is South Korea's long cherished desire. It was, however, able to repulse the enemy and to preserve the hope of freedom and democracy. This is not all. South Korea has gone beyond restoration of the pre-war situation, which definitely signifies that it attained victory in the war. North Korea, in an instance of evil-doer's audacity, describes in its 'Complete History of Choson' that "The realization of an armistice in Choson...is the historic victory that the people of North Korea and the People's Army have earned by giving the enemy a fatal blow."[118] They claim that they have won the victory. Their claim is nothing but a fabrication of history to cover up their aggression, and a distortion of reality in which they refuse to admit their defeat.

Next, both in the development of the war and in the process of the conclusion of the armistice, the problem of legitimacy that North Korea had incessantly argued about since the two Koreas were established, was clarified. The system North Korea wanted to establish in its areas of occupation during the war was totally ignored by the majority of the people in those areas. People did not participate in and were not supportive of the system. This was one of the decisive rea-
sons for the failure of their aggression. By the conclusion of the armistice, a minimum of 1,260,000\textsuperscript{119} North Koreans had chosen freedom and moved to South Korea. After the armistice, when the exchange of people who had left their homes was conducted, only 37 returned to their homes. In the process of negotiation, even 51\%\textsuperscript{120} of the Communist POWs refused to return to North Korea and Red China. This was truly an unexpected phenomenon. The North Korean side, therefore, instigated a series of riots in order to force the non-repatriate POWs to go home, but this only prolonged the truce negotiations by two years. Despite the efforts made by North Korea, 87,000 prisoners, which is more than half of all the prisoners taken, freely chose to live in South Korea and other free world countries.\textsuperscript{121}

Refugees from North Korea and anti-Communist prisoners made up

*Anti-Communist prisoners, who rejected North Korean explanation, returning to the bosom of freedom.*
more than 14% of the total population of North Korea. In the competition between
the two systems, the number of those adopting South Korea dramatically proved
the victory of free democracy. In addition, this drama has been evaluated as a sig-
nificant event in solidifying the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea.

During the war, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung, as a foundation of his plan-
ning for war, had assumed that there would be uprisings or revolts in South Korea.
Far from his expectations, this never happened; anti-Communism sentiments were
so strong in South Korea that they not only played a decisive role in gathering
national power, but also served as a driving force in securing a victory in the com-
petition of systems and legitimacy.

Because of the war, the feelings of hostility and mistrust between North
and South Korea became aggravated - more aggravated than before the war. Kim
Il Sung’s regime, a one-party dictatorial regime, continuously pursued the policy
of arms buildup and military provocations - ‘Live or Die’ - toward South Korea.
As a result of this, the gap between North Korea and South Korea - in physical
and ideological dimensions - deepened and the gap functioned to increase tensions
and to prevent the establishment of unified country.

3. A Makeshift Bridge between War and Peace

Despite the fact that the two Koreas waged the war and incurred tremen-
dous damage and destruction, they failed to eliminate the boundary on the 38th
Parallel that had been set in 1945 at the end of World War II, and that had been
hardened in 1948 by cold war. With the failure, they were compelled to accept the
armistice roughly along that 38th Parallel and to remain divided.

The armistice, which had brought the redivision of the peninsula, was by
definition “a temporary cessation of military actions (hostilities),” that is, purely a
military action. In short, the armistice is not the termination of a war. It is nothing
but a temporary bridge between war and peace. With the armistice agreement, both camps agreed to a cease-fire for the time being. Once the cease-fire was achieved, they were to handle political matters by agreement within three months of the cease-fire to replace the cease-fire agreement by peace. The political conference was to be opened to deal with items such as peaceful solutions and withdrawal of foreign troops.122

On August 7, 1953, the sixteen nations that participated in the Korean War, adopted the 'Declaration of Common Policies' in order to promote 'the restoration of peace' through the political conference and to take subsequent actions of the prevention of a recurrence of the war. The gist of the declaration follows:

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist.123

The preliminary talk for Political Conference held at P'anmunjom, despite the efforts made by the Republic of Korea government and the United Nations Command, was soon abandoned. The main conference, therefore, did not convene within three months, as called for in the Armistice Agreement. Fortunately in the following year, through the good offices of the foreign ministers of the US, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, which had held talks dealing with post-World War II problems, the Political Conference was belatedly opened in Geneva on April 26, 1954. At the Conference, the Communists stubbornly refused to accept a free election method and the UN supervision in the plan for
establishing a unified government. The Communist side made no room for any compromise, and the conference ended.

The two parties had failed to transform the state of armistice into a state of peace, or sublimate it into the unification of the North and the South; consequently, the North and the South continue to oppose each other in a tense state of armistice.

North Korea’s true intention was to reconstruct its military power, which had been destroyed during the war, by taking advantage of the period of armistice, and to continue attempts to communize the peninsula with arms. In defiance of a key principle of the armistice agreement, Item 13d, “cease the introduction into Korea of new weapons, such as airplanes, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition”, a preventive measure taken to stop the war from recurring, North Korea introduced new equipment by avoiding the scrutiny of the supervisory organization. On June 21, 1957, the UN forces were compelled to proclaim the abrogation of Item d of 13. To cope with the military reinforcement of North Korea, the UN forces had to take countermeasures. Toward the end of 1959, it was finally confirmed that North Korea had been constructing pillboxes, ‘tochkas’, in the demilitarized zone. This served as impetus for the militarization and fortification of the demilitarized zone. In violation of the armistice agreement North Korea has dispatched armed guerrillas to South Korea from the beginning of 1960. By their provocations, large and small, they pushed the armistice to the crisis stage. In the 1990’s, after the cold war system had collapsed, North Korea’s maneuvers to nullify the armistice were more open. In 1994, the delegations of the Communist camp withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission, and the Polish and Chech delegations were expelled from the Neatral Nation Supervisory Commission; consequently, just half of the armistice structure remained. In reality, therefore, it ceased practical functioning. The implementation of the armistice agreement and its supervisory function was being paralysed. As a result, there is
no way of knowing if the armistice will change into a hot war. Nothing is predictable.

In the 1990’s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cold war structure has disintegrated and a new order of peace and mutual prosperity is being built. The Korean peninsula, in which the two Koreas oppose each other just a step short of war, is riding against the current of the times. In this circumstance, the urgent mission of Koreans is to maintain the remaining half of the armistice agreement and to attempt to restore the other half of the agreement. In so doing, Korea is endeavoring to prove that the armistice is not a temporary bridge that returns to war, but a makeshift bridge brings peace. The next stage is to achieve unification of the Korean people through peaceful means.

Looking back on the Korean War and the Armistice, the Korean people learned the invaluable lessons that deterrence of Communist aggression is possible only as long as Koreans maintain the strength of their own nation to preserve freedom and democracy, and that the unification of Korea should be achieved by peaceful means.
Notes

3. Refer to Clause 1, Article 1 on military demarcation line and Clause 13, Article 1 on concrete arrangements for cease-fire and armistice.
4. Refer to Clauses 2 & 3, Article 1 of the Armistice Agreement.
6. Refer to Clause 13 (b), Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement on cease-fire and armistice.
10. The chairman on the UNC side of the Military Armistice Commission was Army Major General Blackshear M. Bryan. The rest of the four were composed of flag officers of US Navy and Air Force, Thailand, and Great Britain.
11. Concrete arrangements for cease-fire and armistice:Clause 25, Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement.

15. Refer to Clause 41, Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement.


22. According to the prisoners’ testimony, the NK facilities for prisoners were temporary camps (natural caves, mines, schools, and civilian dwellings in remote areas, and cottages at wood-cutting sites), Hwap’oong mine Camp, Ch’osan Camp, ‘lodging for liberators’ at Diamond Mt., Hwaeryong Camp, Aoji Camp, a training camp near the Dalga area in Manchuria, Kang-dong Camp in P’yongyang, Manp’ojin Camp, and a camp in the Ch’olsan mine area. POWs were interned in about ten different areas. Korea Institute of Military History’s testimonial documents related to the prisoners of war.

23. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), *Prisoners of the

24. Ibid., p.283.
25. ROK Army G-2, op. cit., p.598.
29. Maj. Gen. Dean had undergone three years and twelve days of ordeal in captivity and was freed on September 4, 1953. After a brief medical check-up at US 121st Evacuation Hospital, he left for the US at 9:00 AM on September 5.
30. The 5,640 North Korean sick and wounded prisoners included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were civilian women and 18 WAC prisoners. Out of 70,183 NKPA prisoners, 60,788 were male POWs, 473 were female, 23 were children, and 8,899 were civilians. 5,640 Chinese prisoners included one woman. HQ, US Army Pacific Military History Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War during the Korean Conflict, Washington, D.C.: OCMH (1960), p.67 & p.89; also in Walter G. Hermes, op. cit., p.514.
32. According to a prisoner, 1st Lt. Yoo Ch’ang Sang, he was captured by the Chinese Communists in Dokch’on and then was delivered to the NK forces on their maneuver to Ch’osan. In captivity he identified himself as a pfc. carrying the service no. 0125987. He recalled many cases that were not repatriated. Refer to the interview with 1st Lt. Yoo Ch’ang Sang, a liaison officer of the 7th Division of the ROK II Corps in the testimonial documents collected by
the Korea Institute of Military History.

33. ROK MND, "Defense News: Plans Set Up to Have the MIAs Repatriate" (July 31, 1996).

34. Pfc's Shin Jae Kyun and Lee Woo Hak of the ROK 1st Division testified that two other classmates, Pfc's Sohn Ch'ang Soo and Paik Duk Ki, among about 3,000 internees were never repatriated. Refer to the above documents cited in 32.

35. Lt. Gen. K.S. Thimaya, the chief of the Indian delegation, had been the unique general of Indian origin who commanded a Commonwealth brigade during World War II and later assumed the office of the Army Chief of Staff in India.


37. Among 7,900 NK non-repatriates, there were 940 sick and injured prisoners; out of 14,704 Chinese non-repatriates, 163 were sick and wounded.

38. The Communists initially delivered 335 POWs; later, they passed over 24 more包括23 Americans and 1 British prisoner. The UNC was disappointed at the small figure of repatriates and vaguely expected that a substantial number of prisoners would be listed as non-repatriates; however, the total number of repatriates, against the UNC's expectation, was only 359.


40. Ibid., p.A3.

41. Walter G. Hermes, op. cit., pp.495-514. According to another source, 491 Chinese were persuaded and 10 were passed over to the Communist camp after changing their minds, causing a slight deviation in the figures. On repatriation, those espionage agents and the ones who changed their decision testified at length during interrogation in chorus about 'the panic-striken atmosphere' of the camp life in order to emphasize their patriotic stance.

42. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op. cit., p.A3.

44. General John E. Hull was appointed as CINCUNC on October 7, 1953, replacing Clark who signed the armistice agreement; he was former Deputy Army Chief of Staff. He retired after his term as CINCUNC (October 7, 1953-April 1, 1955).


47. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op cit., pp.331-332.


49. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op cit., p.333; ROK Army G-2, op cit., p.650.


51. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op cit., p.334.


53. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op cit., pp.A4-5. The rear unit of the Indian operating troops passed over the remaining internees to the Commanding General of EUSA on February 18, 1954. On December 8, 1953 CINCUNC transferred the duty of dealing with the nonrepatriates to CG of EUSA by designating him as his administrative representative to plan procedures and coordinate the mission.

54. Walter G. Hermes, op. cit., p.496.

55. Ibid., p.515. Under the control of the UNC, the final disposition for those prisoners who changed their minds was concluded on February 19, 1954.

56. Ibid, p.515. In 30 days after the persuasion session was over, only a small number of prisoners had changed their minds and chose to be repatriated to their homeland. On September 23, 1953, out of 22,604 nonrepatriates delivered to the NNRC by the UNC, 628 including 440 Chinese and 188 NK prisoners were finally delivered to the Communist control. 86 went to India. 51 either escaped or died. 21,839 prisoners including 14,235 Chinese and 7,604
North Koreans returned back to the hands of the UNC. The UNC failed in achieving desirable results in ‘persuading’ those 359 prisoners remaining in enemy custody. Only 10, including 2 US and 8 ROK prisoners, were repatriated home. The other 2 ROK prisoners chose to go to India. The rest, 325 ROK, 21 American, and 1 British, were delivered to the Communists.

67. Eleven countries recommended by the USSR for the political conference were the ROK, the US, Great Britain, France, the USSR, India, Poland, Sweden, Burma, North Korea, and Communist China.
68. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, *op cit.*, p.A5
70. ROK Army G-2, *op cit.*, pp.678-687.
71. The United Nations proposed to include 15 countries out of 16 participating in the Korea War as South Africa had declared its intention not to join the politi-
cal conference.
72. Egypt, Indonesia, Syria, and Mexico were added to those 11 nations initially proposed.
73. ROK Army G-2, op cit., p. 690.
75. Ibid., pp.A6-7.
76. Refer to the US Memorandum of September 1, 1953 aimed at detecting the Communists’ intention on the Korean question. Ibid., pp.C136-137. The US government dispatched Ambassador Arthur H. Dean as its representative to the preliminary conference.
77. ROK Army G-2, op cit., pp.699-700.
78. The US Memorandum of October 8, 1953 demanding the communists to manifest their position. Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, op cit., p.C137.
80. ROK Army G-2, op cit., p.706.
83. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op cit., p.344.
86. The purpose of this conference was to discuss the status of Austria; however, the sole outcome of this meeting was an agreement to hold an extended conference including Communist China in order to discuss Asian problems. It was achieved by the French efforts which had been attempting to find ways to get out of the war in Indochina. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND
89. The ROK delegation was led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pyun Young Tae with Deputy Minister of Justice Hong Jin Ki, Professor Choi Jong Woo of Dongkuk University, Director General of Intelligence Bureau Lee Soo Yung of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Yu Dong, Director of Protocol of MOFA Sohn Byung Shik, Stenographer Yoo Jo Ryong, and Typist Lee Ju Bom. The eight member delegation was augmented when Korean Ambassador to the US Yang Yu Chan and Ambassador to the UN Lim Byung Jik joined them. On the other hand, the delegations of the Communist camp were of extraordinary size: about 100 North Koreans, 200 Russians, and 300 Chinese.
98. ROK Army G-2, *op cit.*, pp.775~776.


100. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, *op cit.*, pp.352~353.


103. General Clark later on admitted “History might prove that President Rhee was more reasonable than the rest of us when he insisted that the Communists should be destroyed militarily in Korea not only for the Republic of Korea but for the whole free world.” Mark W. Clark, *op. cit.*, p.168.


105. ROK Army G-2, *op cit.*, pp.785~787; Troop Information & Education Bureau, ROK MND, pp. C292~293.

2 Basic principles:

1) UN has the authority to repel aggression and restore peace, and to further task for the peaceful solution of Korean problem.

2) In order to establish a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, hold free election under the supervision of the UN.


110. With the breakdown of the political negotiations on June 15, 1954 which were called in Geneva to resolve the Korean question peacefully according to Clause 60 of Armistice Agreement, both sides at the Military Armistice
Commission started to blame each other on the other’s arms build-up since the latter part of 1954. At the 70th plenary session on May 31, 1956, the UNC demanded that the Polish and Czech delegations, which had been acting in the south as neutral supervisory team return to P’anmunjom for their espionage activities for North Korea.

111. As a part of the UN forces, the US naval and air forces began to participate in the war three days after its start on June 27, 1950; the US ground forces arrived at Pusan on July 1 and had the first battle at Chukmi-ryong of Osan.

112. The Research Institute of History, North Korea, *The Comprehensive History of Choson, Vol. XXV*, P’yongyang: Scientific Encyclopedia Publishers (1981), p.73. North Korea fabricated the history in the writing above, dividing the Korean War into two stages: in the first stage, the ROK forces staged aggression northward and agitated ‘a civil war’; in the second stage, it planned to commit the US forces.


115. Number of Refugees: 2,611,328 South Koreans taking refuge elsewhere as of
April 1953 in Troop Information & Education Bureau, MND, *The Second-Year of the Korean War: A Chronicle* 1951, p.D6; 618,721 North Koreans taking refuge in the South in *ibid.*, p.D21. However, the publication by the Office of Five Provinces of North Korea (*op. cit.*, p.78) counted the total number of North Korean refugees to the south as 5 million, including 3.5 million before the outbreak of the war and 1.5 million during the war.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>No. of households</th>
<th>No. of refugees</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,104,661</td>
<td>10,189,301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees within</td>
<td>421,228</td>
<td>1,714,992</td>
<td>2,661,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees without</td>
<td>135,745</td>
<td>618,721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War victims(1)</td>
<td>656,949</td>
<td>3,419,996</td>
<td>3,626,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty line(2)</td>
<td>890,739</td>
<td>4,375,413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War orphans(3)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>48,332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others(4)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11,857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1) ‘War victims’ are South Koreans who were directly injured or damaged by war.

(2) ‘Native poor’ are those who were unable to survive independently.

(3) ‘War orphans’ are those under protection of public and private institutions.

(4) ‘Others’ are those homeless and beggars.

117. For the readers’ convenience, this line links the identifiable names of terrain
on the current military map where the military demarcation line passes. Saet’oh is an unknown place, but it is the only spot at which the 38th parallel and the current demarcation line intersect.


120. In the prisoner interviews conducted during June 23-27, 1952, 86,222 enemy prisoners out of 169,944 declined to be repatriated to their Communist countries. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND (trans.), op. cit., p.251.

121. A total of 87,227 Communist POWs were freed, including 38,000 civilian internees (classified as civilians among POWs and released), 27,388 anti-communist prisoners (escapees upon the action staged by the ROK government on June 18, 1953), and 21,839 non-repatriates with 14,235 Communist Chinese included (refused to be repatriated to the Communist camp and remained on the UNC side).

122. Clause 60 of the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War.

## CHRONOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1951</td>
<td>• The United States decided to pursue the policy of cease-fire in ending the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>• George Kennan and Yakov Malik started secret contacts for truce negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1951</td>
<td>• Secretary General of the UN issued a statement recommending armistice along the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• President Rhee made a statement opposing cease fire at the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14th</td>
<td>• North Korea, China, and USSR agreed on the strategy of cease fire along the 38th parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>• Norwegian medical support team arrived in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• Malik delivered a speech at the UN recommending truce talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• President Rhee issued a statement opposing truce talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CINCUNC Ridgway proposed truce talks to the commanding general of the Communist forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1951</td>
<td>• Communists accepted the proposal for truce talks and proposed to hold a meeting in Kaesong during the period of July 10-15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>• The ROK National Assembly passed a resolution opposing armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• A preliminary meeting for the armistice conference was held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>• Truce talks convened in Kaesong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup assumed the post of Korean delegate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>• Both sides agreed to an agreement to neutralized the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaesong area, the site for the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>• Both sides agreed to take up five items on the agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• They started to discuss the issue of establishing the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Demarcation Line, the second item on the agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 1951</td>
<td>• The ROK Air Force activated the 1st Combat Air Wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>• The ROK I and US X Corps commenced Operation Creeper, a limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>offensive operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• The ROK Capital Division captured Hill 924.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>• Communists refused to talk after fabricating an incident in which</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an aircraft of the UNC violated the neutral zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>• The UN forces recaptured objectives in the hills in the Kimhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Kumsong areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>• The ROK 11th Division captured Hill 884.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>• The ROK forces wiped out the Communist guerrilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces in the Sanch’ong area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1951</td>
<td>• The ROK 1st Marine Regiment occupied the ‘Punchbowl,’ a basin area in Hae An-myon, Yanggu-gun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep.～14 Oct.</td>
<td>• The ROK 5th Division attacked Hill 1211 near to Kach’il-bong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>• The US 2nd Infantry Division occupied Bloody Ridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>• The US 1st Marine Division occupied Hill 812.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>• 101 aircraft of the UNC and 155 MIGs engaged in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1951</td>
<td>largest air battle ever recorded in the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ROK 7th Division recaptured Paeksonk-san.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ROK 8th Division secured Paeksonk-san.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chairman of the US JCS Omar Bradley made an inspection tour of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>frontline in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>• President Rhee and General Bradley held a meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3~9th</td>
<td>• The US I and IX Corps conducted Operation Commando.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>• The US 2nd Infantry Division recaptured Heartbreak Ridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>• The ROK 2nd Division occupied the southwestern area of Kumsong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>• The ROK Capital Division secured the Nam-gang completely and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>advanced to the south of Kosong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>• The ROK 6th Division occupied Kyoam-san.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• The US Air Force released the fact that Soviet air forces had</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>joined the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>• The Korean delegate at P’anmunjom was replaced by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Truce talk resumed at P’anmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>• The ROK 8th Division recaptured Hill 1090.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ROK Army War College opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The US Army Chief of Staff Collins visited Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 November 1951</td>
<td>• The Italian medical support team arrived in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>• The ROK 6th Division occupied Hil 949.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>• Agreement on provisional Military Demarcation Line(Agenda 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiation began on Concrete Arrangement for ceasefire (Agenda 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December 1951</td>
<td>• Confrontation arose at the negotiating table on the issue of expanding air fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ROK ‘Paik Field Command’ led by General Paik commenced sweeping operation of the guerrilla forces in the southwestern area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>• Truce talk began to negotiate prisoner exchange(Agenda 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>• The Turkish Brigade repelled enemy attack on the line of their outposts south of P’yonggang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–28th</td>
<td>• The ROK 7th Division engaged in battle at Hill Christmas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• The US 45th Infantry Division was deployed to Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 January 1952</td>
<td>• North Korea reapplied for its entry into the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>• Sangmudae (ROK Army Combat Arms School) was inaugurated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>• North Korea refused the entry of the ICRC delegates to its territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>• Korea Military Academy reopened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• The ROK Air Force took over additional F-51 fighter-bombers from the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• President Rhee visited the frontline area including Ch’orwon, Kimhwa, Hwach’on, and Yanggu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 February 1952</td>
<td>• Emergency decree was proclaimed in nine counties of the Kyungsang Provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>• At the armistice conference the Communist side recognized the UNC’s control of the ‘Firve Islands, West Coast’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6th           | • Both sides started to negotiate ‘Recommendation to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>The UN forces attacked all enemy positions on the western front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Both sides came to an agreement on the agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>Prisoners revolted at the Koje Prisoner Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>The Communists fabricated that the Unites States for conducting biological warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1952</td>
<td>US Secretary of State Acheson flatly turned down the Communists’ fabrication and their blame on biological warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>Shin Tae Young was appointed as ROK Minister of National Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1952</td>
<td>The ROK II Corps was reactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>The UN side proposed a package deal at the armistice negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1952</td>
<td>The ROK 2nd Army Training Center opened at Nonsan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Dodd was kidnapped by Communist prisoners at the Koje Prisoner Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>General Clark assumed the command as Commander in Chief, the UNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>Prisoners revolted again at the Koje Prisoner Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Joy, the senior delegate of the UNC side, was transferred to US Naval Academy as superintendent, and Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>succeeded as the chief delegate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The UN forces conducted a large-scale air raid on military industrial complexes in P’yongyang and Chinnamp’o.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1952</td>
<td>• The Korean delegate at P’anmunjom was replaced by Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Colonel Muli Pamil, the deputy commander of the Turkish forces, was killed during his tour of the frontline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun.〜1 Aug.</td>
<td>• The US 2nd Infantry Division was engaged in battle at Hill Old Baldy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>• At P’anmunjom, the UNC side fiercely opposed enforced repatriation of prisoners against their wills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1952</td>
<td>• The ROK Capital Division was engaged in battle at Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>〜14 Oct.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul.〜10 Nov.</td>
<td>• The ROK 5th Division had been engaged in a combat at Hill 351.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• Lt. Gen. Paik Sun Yup was assigned as ROK Army Chief of Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1952</td>
<td>• In Korean election, President Syngman Rhee was reelected along with his running mate Ham Tae Young as vice president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9〜16th</td>
<td>• The US 1st Marine Division was engaged in combat at Hill Bunker east of P’anmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>• The UN forces were engaged in a fierce contest for hills east of P’anmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>• Prisoners revolted again at the Koje Prisoner Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>• General Clark visited the ROK Army Headquarters in Taegu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• In the Pusan area, 989 draft dodgers were sacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 September 1952</td>
<td>• The ROK 8th Division was engaged in combat at Hills 812 and 854.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~22nd</td>
<td>• The UNC side presented optional proposal on the prisoner agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October 1952</td>
<td>• The Communist forces commenced the fall offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6〜9th</td>
<td>• The ROK 1st Division was engaged in battle at Hills Nickie and Tessie near Koyangdae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6〜15th</td>
<td>• The ROK 9th Division fought at Hill White Horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• The Communist side rejected the UNC's optional proposals; Harrison proposed indefinite adjournment of truce talk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct.〜24 Nov.</td>
<td>• The ROK 2nd and US 7th Divisions conducted Operation Show-down at Sniper Ridge and Triangle. Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 1952</td>
<td>• The ROK 12th and 15th Divisions were activated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>• Ellis O. Briggs was appointed as US ambassador resident in Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>• The Indian proposal on prisoner issue was adopted at the General Assembly of the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>• The Communist side rejected the Indian proposal on the prisoner issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11〜13th</td>
<td>• The ROK 1st Division was engaged in battle at Hills Nori and Betty near the Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>• The International Committee of the Red Cross adopted a resolution calling for an armistice and the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>• Prisoners revolted at the Pongam Prisoner Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January 1953</td>
<td>- Eisenhower was inaugurated as the President of the United States of America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>- The US Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins visited Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>- The Commander in chief of the UN Command proposed the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 1953</td>
<td>- President Rhee held a meeting with Generals Clark and Taylor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>- Stalin’s death was officially announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>- The US 7th Division lost Hill Old Baldy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26～30th</td>
<td>- The US 1st Marine Division saved Hill Vegas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>- The Communist commanding general accepted the UNC’s proposal on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>- The UN General Assembly urged immediate resumption of the adjourned truce talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>- The commander in chief of the UN Command proposed resumption of the plenary sessions of the armistice conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 1953</td>
<td>- The liaison officers met at P’anmunjom and agreed on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>- The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution urging a solution to the prisoner issue at P’anmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Apr.～3 May</td>
<td>- Sick and wounded prisoners were exchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>- The plenary session of the armistice conference resumed in six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Korean delegate was replaced by Brig. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1953</td>
<td>Ch'oi Duk Shin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>• The ROK III Corps was reactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General Clark explained the final proposal on the prisoner exchange to President Rhee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The UNC side presented its final proposal on the prisoner exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ROK delegate declared his boycott of the armistice conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>• The Turkish Brigade attached to the US 25th Division lost its outpost at Hill Nevada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Commonwealth Division saved 'The Hook.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• The United States confirmed the plan of Operation EVERREADY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>• President Rhee emphasized that there would be no concessions at the armistice conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1953</td>
<td>• President Rhee submitted a compromise proposal to the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1〜9th</td>
<td>• The ROK 12th Division engaged in battle at Hills 812 and 854.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>• The ROK government ordered all of its officers and men staying in the United States to return home immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• Nationwide emergency decree was proclaimed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The agreement on the exchange of prisoners was signed at the plenary of the armistice conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>• The Chinese Communist forces commenced June offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10〜13th</td>
<td>• The ROK 8th Division lost Hill Capitol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10〜14th</td>
<td>• The ROK 5th Division lost Hills 949, 973, and 983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14〜18th</td>
<td>• The ROK 20th Division saved Hill 1090.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>• President Rhee released the anti-Communist prisoners interned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>• The ROK 26th and 27 Divisions were activated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun.〜3 Jul.</td>
<td>• The ROK 3rd Division lost Kwanmang-san.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun.〜1 Jul.</td>
<td>• The ROK 7th Division lost Hill Sunwoo (938).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun.〜11 Jul.</td>
<td>• President Rhee and US Special Envoy Walter Robertson held a meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• Vice Admiral Son Won Il was assigned as the ROK Minister of National Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6〜10 July 1953</td>
<td>• The US 7th Division lost Hill Pork Chop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>• The Chinese commenced the final offensive (the main July offensive).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13〜15th</td>
<td>• The ROK II Corps and Capital Division lost the Kumsong bulge; however, they blocked enemy's final offensive along the line of Route 117A, Chinhyon-ri, Sudong-ryong, Susang-ri, and Hill 748.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16〜19th</td>
<td>• The ROK II Corps secured the Kumsong-ch‘on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>• The Armistice Agreement was signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General Clark signed it in Munsan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Kim Il Sung signed it in P’yongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General Clark issued a message on armistice to the soldiers of the UNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• President Rhee released a statement on Armistice Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>• Peng Teh Huai signed it in P’yongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Military Armistice Commission was inaugurated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the first session of the commission was held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In the first session of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, an agreement was made to exchange prisoners starting from August 5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both sides started to withdraw from the DMZ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The UN forces started to withdraw from the islands they had occupied in the coastal areas on the east and west of North Korea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The UN forces commenced to transport the Communist prisoners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• The UN Command reported their complete withdrawal from the DMZ by 21:50 of the 30th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 1953</td>
<td>• The first session of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>• Red Cross delegate of both sides and the Joint Red Cross Team signed the agreement on inspection of both prisoner camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The UN forces notified the Military Armistice Commission of their complete withdrawal from the North Korean islands in its coastal area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Red Cross Team of the UNC camp left Kaesong to visit POW camp in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Red Cross Team of the Communist camp arrived in Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug.–6 Sep.</td>
<td>• Dulles and his party visited the ROK Presidential Palace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prisoners wishing to be repatriated were exchanged in accordance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with the Armistice Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>• Syngman Rhee and Dulles made complete agreement on the conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the US Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The sixteen participating countries to the UN forces declared the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>joint policy statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• Provisional signature was made on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>• The advance party of the Indian Custodial Force for the prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrived at a base of the UN forces in Munsan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>• A special session of the UN General Assembly was held in New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>• The Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>started discussion on the issue of the Political Conference on Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>• The UN General Assembly passed resolution to hold the Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conference on Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>• The ROK National Assembly announced returning of the capital back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to Seoul as of September 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>• The first part of the Indian Custodial Force consisting of 1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>troops arrived in the neutral zone via Port of Inch’on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>• Maj. Gen. Dean, the Commander of the US 24th Infantry Division,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>returned from captivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>• The first session of the Neutral Nations Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>- The third party of the Indian Custodial Force arrived at the neutral zone via Inch’on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>- The ROK Ministry of National Defense denounced Communists for their maltreatment of the ROK prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>- The Soviet delegation at the United Nations raised the issue of composing the Political Conference on Korea as special agenda of the UN General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>- One Soviet-made MIG-15 defected to Kimp’o Air Field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>- The UNC side announced its transfer of 22,604 anti-Communist nonrepatriate prisoners to the Indian forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Communist side announced its transfer of 359 pro-Communist nonrepatriate prisoners to the Indian forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1953</td>
<td>- The ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was officially signed in Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>- General John E. Hull replaced General Clark as new Commander in Chief of the UN Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>- The Communist side commenced to persuade the nonrepatriate prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>- The ROK government appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Jung Hwan and Colonel Lee Soo Young as ROK representatives for the preliminary conference at P’annunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>- The preliminary meeting of the Political Conference opened at Panmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 November 1953</td>
<td>• The UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Communists' atrocity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>• US Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited the ROK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>• Both sides agreed on the date and venue for the Political Conference and to establish two sub-committees to discuss the inclusion of neutral nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• Communist China and North Korea signed the economic and cultural agreement between them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>• The Communist side proposed to include USSR as a neutral nation at the Political Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December 1953</td>
<td>• Persuasion process for pro-Communist prisoners started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>• The UNC side made the final proposal containing seventeen articles on holding the Political Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>• The Refugee Repatriation Committee held its first session at P'anmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>• The preliminary meeting of the Political Conference was adjourned indefinitely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• Persuasion process for nonrepatriate prisoners concluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January 1954</td>
<td>• US President announced withdrawal of two US divisions as a measure of reducing its forces stationed in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>• The Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission announced that the remaining prisoners were to be released on January 22. • Meeting of liaison officials for the preliminary conference was held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>• The Indian forces announced the conclusion of pris-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>- A ceremony was held for the transfer and take-over of the anti-Communist prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The UNC released about 21,000 anti-Communist prisoners upon their repatriation.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Refugee registration began.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>- Four-Nation Foreign Ministers Conference convened in Berlin.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Communist side accepted over 347 pro-Communist prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February 1954</td>
<td>- The Four-Nation Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin arranged the Political Conference on Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>- The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission dissolved at midnight of the 21st.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>- The final party of the Indian management forces departed Inch’on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1954</td>
<td>- The UNC side accepted nineteen foreign refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>- The thirty-eight refugees wishing to go back to North Korea were repatriated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April 1954</td>
<td>- The ROK government issued a special statement on participating the Geneva Conference and released the list of the ROK delegation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>- The Geneva conference convened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June 1954</td>
<td>- The Geneva conference was broken off.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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