THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME II

FREE

KOREA INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Foreword

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, just five years after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. The war lasted for three years and a month before the two sides agreed to the cessation of hostilities on July 27, 1953, and the uneasy truce survives to this day.

The Korean War unfolded in the broader context of the Cold War under the US-USSR bipolar system. Triggered by North Korea's southward invasion, the war initially was an intranational conflict between South and North Korea. As the world's two ideologically opposed camps intervened, however, it developed into a full-blown international war involving troops from twenty different nations. Only in a geographical sense was its scope limited to the Korean Peninsula. During the war, the Korean people suffered horrors and tragedies unprecedented in Korea's five-thousand-year history. The Korean War, however, only replaced the 38th Parallel with what amounts to a cease-fire line, and failed to provide the Korean people with permanent relief from the possibility of another fratricidal war.

The War History Compilation Committee of the Ministry of National Defense, forerunner of the Korea Institute of Military History, chronicled the history of the Korean War over a ten-year span, starting in 1967. The resulting work in eleven volumes, has made a significant contribution to the study of the Korean War both within the country and abroad. This work, however, was published in a limited edition and had a broad scope that demand for a new, more accessible history of the Korean War has been increasing in recent years.

In response to this interest, the Korea Institute of Military History decided to write a new history of the war. While based on the old edition, this work will reflect subsequent findings — in particular, newly declassified docu-
ments made available to the public by the countries that participated in the war. The Institute is presently writing a three-volume work with the goal of completing it by the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. Volume 1 examines the background of the war and sketches its development up to the intervention by Communist China. Volume 2 then covers the period up to the opening of the armistice talks, and Volume 3 deals with the conclusion the war.

The present volume, second in the series, focuses particular attention stress on the background of China's intervention in the war. This volume then narrates by stage the development of the war: the ROK and UN forces which had reached the Korea-Manchuria border suffered a serious setback faced with the Chinese Communist Forces' intervention, retreated to the 37th Parallel (P'yongt'ae-k-Samch'o), but blocked the Chinese Communist Forces' advance, resecured the 38th Parallel, and then stalemated along the line similar to the pre-war front line. Also described in detail are the wartime policies, the strategic decisions and the controversial disputes over the enlargement of the war, the cease-fire, and the evacuation of the UN forces, together with the responsive actions to these events then taken by the Korean government. Finally, this volume concludes with research on the influence of the Chinese Communist Forces' entry into the Korean War upon the Korean national history.

I am confident that this new history of the war will contribute to an understanding of the realities of the Korean war. Not only will it reveal the turbulent situations which arose with the Chinese Communist Forces' intervention, but it will also show the will of Korean people to defend freedom, the direction of the war effort by Korean government, and the valiant fight by Korean Armed forces. I sincerely hope that this work will offer valuable lessons for national security and defense.

I would take this opportunity, first of all, to pray for those who gave
their invaluable lives to the cause of defending freedom and peace of the world, and also to express my deep, profound gratitude to those living soldiers who fought with us side by against Communist aggressors. I also tender my thanks to the nations and their people who came to our aid when we were in trouble.

A number of people have contributed to the development of this work. I am grateful to Dr. Cho Sung Kyu, professor emeritus, Yonsei University and Dr. Choi Sang Jin, former Professor, Korea Military Academy, and other professors of the translation team, for their immaculate translation of the Korean version into English. I am indebted to Dr. Kay McClanahan, professor of English, Yonsei University, and former chief researcher of this Institute, Kim Chong Gu for their revising labour of the English version. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Allan R. Millett, professor at the Ohio State University, for his voluntary proofreading of the translated manuscript. The following three people made especially valuable contributions to the development of the book, and I am grateful to them. The Director of War History Department Chae Han Kook, senior researcher Chung Suk Kyun, and also senior researcher Son Moon Sik collected data, wrote the Korean version, and proofread all or part of the manuscript.

December 31, 1998

Park Soon Chan
President
Korea Institute of Military History
Notes

1. Chapters, sections, and subsections are inscribed as the following:
   eg. Chapter : One, Two, Three...
   Section : Roman Numerals( I, II, III, etc.)
   Subsection : Arabic Numerals(1, 2, 3, etc.)

2. Proper names of Korean personalities are inscribed with the family name at the front and the first name at the end.
   eg. Kim Hong II
   But there are exceptions for names of established international use.
   eg. Syngman Rhee

3. Natural features are inscribed with flexibility as follows:
   (1) mountains & hills
   eg. Pukhan-san or Pukhan Mountain
       P'il-bong or P'il Hill (or Peak)
   But names of established use are exceptions.
   eg. Capitol Hill
   (2) rivers & creeks
   eg. the Han-gang or the Han River
       the lan-ch'on or the lan Creek
   But names of established use are exceptions.
   eg. the Yalu River
   (3) Pass(ryong)
   eg. Cho-ryong, Cho Pass, or Cho-ryong Pass

4. Administrative units and man-made constructions such as towns are inscribed as follows; administrative units such as ‘do’, ‘shi’, ‘gun’, ‘myon’, ‘ri (ni)’, and etc. are hyphenated.
   eg. Hajinbu-ri Am-dong
       Ch’ungch’ongnam-do or South Ch’ungch’ong Province

5. Periods after initials are deleted.
   eg. ROK, UN
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Chapter One  The Background of the Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War

Communist China intervened in the Korean War by Committing the Chinese Communist Forces in secrecy to Korean under the slogan of 'Resist America and Assist Korea' in mid-October, some four months after the outbreak of the Korean War, which was a result of North Korea's unprovoked invasion of South Korea. The war situation at this time was that the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, with the support of the United Nations forces, had launched a counter-attack and advanced up to the P'yongyang and Hamhung line, and Kim Il Sung's regime was on the brink of collapse.

At the outset of the war, the North Korean Communist regime, which, with the purpose of communizing South Korea, had systematically prepared for the war with Chinese and Soviet support, secured relatively superior combat power and achieved a complete surprise attack. The North Korean People's Army which captured Seoul three days after the invasion and reached the Naktong River in just over a month, appeared to have almost achieved its objective. On the other hand, South Korea, which was surprise-attacked by the North Korean People's Army, relocated its government to Pusan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, which was slowly recovering from the shock of the surprise-attack, conducted delaying actions under the support of the United Nations forces, halted the enemy advance, and secured the Pusan perimeter, following an all-out battle along the Naktong River line, with the spirit of defending the fatherland and a free democracy. With the landing at Inch'on on September 15, the friendly forces moved into counterattack, and not only
pushed back the invasion but reached the 38th Parallel around the end of September, thus restoring the pre-war status. The friendly forces, which seized the operational initiative over the enemy, advanced northward; the ROK Army crossed the 38th Parallel on October 1, followed by the United Nations forces to retaliate against the enemy invasion and achieve the sacred task of the unification of the country. The friendly forces made a swift and unopposed advance northward, seized P'yongyang, the North Korea(NK) capital, on October 19 and continued their advance toward the Korea-Manchuria border.

The NK Army, which collapsed following the friendly forces’ Inch’on landing and the strategic envelopment and was unable to defend the 38th Parallel line, continued its retreat, abandoned P'yongyang, and was fleeing toward the mountainous country of P'yongan puk-do and Hamkyong puk-do. The Kim Il Sung regime virtually lost the capability to carry out the war and was evacuated to Shinuiju and Kanggye, moving from one place to another. The North Korea, however, taking advantage of the ‘Sanctuary of Manchuria’, tried to reorganize its troops and urged them to fight it out to the end. In spite of its efforts, North Korea all alone was unable to resist the friendly forces, and it was only a matter of the time until the regime would collapse.

Around this time, the friendly forces which had already reached the line of the Ch'ongch'on River and Tanch'on, launched a general offensive on October 24 to secure the Korea-Manchuria border, their final objective. Prior to this offensive, the United Nations Command(UNC) had been apprehensive over the possibility of China’s intervention; however, being unable to detect any indications of Chinese intervention, the UNC surmised that the opportune time for China’s entry into the war had already passed. However, this was a miscalculation. The United Nations forces, which had launched its offensive based on this enormous miscalculation, encountered unexpectedly huge enemy forces the very next day, and consequently not only has the friendly forces of-
fensive halted, but they were also thrown into chaos when counterattacked by the enemy. The huge number of troops were the Chinese Communist Forces. With the purpose of assisting Kim Il Sung regime which was on the brink of collapse, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) secretly crossed the Yalu River just as the friendly forces captured P’yongyang. The CCF then advanced to the area north of the Ch’ongch’ŏn River, took defensive positions, and struck the friendly forces by surprise.

The CCF intervention in the Korean War took place and was confirmed as stated above. The CCF’s entry into the war turned the tide of the war into a new phase: the war situation was transferred from offensive to defensive. The friendly forces were forced to withdraw when they were close to the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers. The war situation developed into a confrontation between the NK Army and the CCF vs the ROK and UN forces, in other words, a showdown between Communist forces and United Nations forces. Thus the Korean War was linked with the then Cold War competition. It was the sharpest confrontation between the western and the eastern camps since the Second World War and stood at a crossroad as to whether the war would be limited to the Korean Peninsula or enlarged into another world war.

In short, the China’s entry into the war not only nullified the hope of unification, the nation’s long cherished dream, but also forced the nation deep into the calamity of a greater war. (Consequently, though in territory the war was restricted to the Korean Peninsula, with the CCF intervention, the war at its final stage turned into a war of international character and was prolonged for two years and nine months more before it came to a cease-fire.)

When Communist China intervened in the Korean War, it had been barely one year since it had established the communist regime (October 1, 1949), having expelled Nationalist China to Taiwan following the Nationalist-Communist intra-war. At this time the Chinese Communist regime faced nu-
merous difficult problems: it was yet to accomplish the occupation of Taiwan, its paramount revolutionary task; politically, it had to consolidate the Chinese people under its regime; economically, it had to rebuild a war-shattered economy; and militarily, it was to demobilize its huge army and reorganize it into a modernized army.

Though many of the revolutionary tasks were yet to be achieved and the remnants of the Nationalist Forces still resisted in many areas, upon receiving the requests to send the Chinese troops from both Stalin and Kim Il Sung on October 1, the same day that the ROK Army crossed the 38th Parallel, Mao decided on October 2 to enter the war under the slogans that “When lips hurt, teeth feel chilly”, “Resist America and Assist Korea”, and “Secure the house and defend the country.” Following this decision, the CCF crossed the Yalu with the utmost secrecy and intervened in the Korean War around October 19, the day when the ROK Army captured P’yongyang.

What were the objectives of China’s intervention in the war and by what process was the decision of committing troops to the war made? What were the CCF strategies and how could the CCF cross the Yalu River undetected? This chapter narrates systematically the background and process from the war planning stage to the crossing of the Yalu, primarily referring to the materials provided from both China and the Soviet Union.
1. The Plotting of the June 25 Invasion Plan

1. Mao and Kim Il’s Consultation on the War Plan

Communist China was deeply involved second, only to the Soviet Union in North Korea’s invasion plot. It encouraged Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea by promising that if the US or the Japanese rendered assistance to South Korea after the eruption of the war, China would assist North Korea. In addition, it provided North Korea with the decisive support for the war preparations by transferring the Korean troops in the Chinese Communist Forces to North Korea and rendering to North Korea necessary advice for the war direction.

The official secret consultation between Communist China and North Korea with regard to the invasion of South Korea dated back to April–May of 1949, one year before the outbreak of the war, with the visit to China by Kim Il, a member of the Central Committee of the North Korea Labor Party and chief of the Political Department of the North Korea Army. At this time the Chinese Communists had achieved victory after expelling Chiang Kai Shek to Taiwan following the Nationalist-Communist struggle, which had lasted from the end of the Second World War. However, in certain areas the mop-up operations against the remaining Nationalists were still under way.

On March 5, prior to Kim Il’s visit to China, Kim Il Sung held a meeting with Stalin in Moscow. In this meeting they agreed upon the unification of Korea by force proposed by Kim Il Sung. However, they agreed that the war should not begin by North Korea’s pre-emptive attack on the South, but should take the form of North Korea’s counterattack against South Korea’s
provocation, that is, they agreed to invade South Korea under the pretext of a
counterattack. They also agreed that China’s role in connection with the inva-
sion plan and the Chinese-Korean relationship would be settled through con-
sultation with Mao Tse Tung. It was in compliance with these agreements that
Kim Il Sung dispatched Kim Il to Peking.

Kim Il went, first of all, to Mukden and met Gau Gang, the North-East
Military Region commander, and then proceeded to Peking, where he met in
succession with Chu Teh, the commander in chief of the CCF, Chou En Lai,
the foreign minister, and Mao. Kim Il delivered the letter of the Central Com-
mittee of the North Korea Communist Party, informed them of the Kim-Stalin
meeting, and consulted about North Korea’s policy of unification by force.
They also consulted about transferring the Korean troops in the CCF to North
Korea and exchanged broad views on East-Asian issues.

Mao expressed deep interest in the Kim-Stalin meeting in Moscow and
asked questions in detail about the North Korea situation, and then said, “As
the war may breakout at anytime in Korea, Kim Il Sung must take it into con-
sideration and make through preparations. Once the war breaks out, it may
end rapidly or it can also be a prolonged war. For North Korea, a prolonged
war is not desirable because it can invite the Japanese Army to the war to as-
sist the South Korean government.” However, he added that “you don’t have to
worry about it, because the Soviet Union is near beside you and we are also in
Manchuria. If the Japanese Army intervenes in the Korean War, we will dis-
patch our army as rapidly as possible to drive them out.”

Mao also noted that the then current international situation, generally
speaking, was not favorable, and the Chinese Communist Party was not in a
position to assist P’yongyang since it was still fighting with Chiang Kai Shek’s
army. Mao continued that it was not necessary for North Korea to invade
South Korea in the near future and advised him to reserve decisive action
until the Chinese Communists defeated the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party) and achieved complete control over China. Mao estimated that the beginning of 1950 would be a favorable period for North Korea to attack South Korea from an international standpoint, and if the Japanese army invaded the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese Communists would send their best troops and defeat the Japanese.

In addition, he discussed war planning. Like Stalin, he advised invading South Korea in the guise of a counterattack against South Korea’s provocations in order to justify the invasion of South Korea, and added that actions would be taken only with the consent of Moscow.*

September 12, 1949, Kim Il Sung voiced the same opinion as Mao when he had a conversation with Minister Tunkin of the Soviet Embassy in P'yongyang. He said "If the intra-war prolongs, it (invasion of South Korea) will be unfavorable for North Korea, and under the current situation North Korea can hardly expect victory by a blitzkrieg. In consequence, the war in Korea will be feasible only after the end of the intra-war in China."**

As for the Korean divisions in the CCF that Kim Il Sung requested, Mao mentioned that the two divisions stationed in Mukden and Changch'un could be transferred to North Korea, at anytime, but the third one was staging an operation against the Nationalists in southern China and would not be available for a month at the earliest. Since these divisions were equipped with Japanese weapons, when Kim Il asked about the possibility of supplying the ammunition for these weapons, Mao replied that as China was producing the ammunition, it could supply it to North Korea at anytime it requested.

Mao also informed the North Korea delegation that he received letters from Burma, Indo-China, and Malaya, which requested the establishment of an Intelligence Bureau of the East-Asian countries, and asked if the North Korea delegation had thought about it during its stay in Moscow. Asking the opinion
of the North Korea Central Committee of the Labor Party about it, Mao said it was still premature to activate such an organization. He explained that since China and Indo-China were at war and the situation in the Korean Peninsula was very acute, the establishment of the Intelligence Bureau might be regarded as a military alliance.

The results of the meeting were reported to Stalin by Mao and Kim II Sung through the Soviet Ambassador of each country. Kim II Sung also reported to Shtykov in detail on May 14, while Mao did the same to Kovalev on May 17. Thus, Kim II Sung, Stalin, and Mao had virtually agreed on the unification of Korea by force, that is, the communization of the Korea peninsula through North Korea’s invasion of South Korea.

As stated above, the Chinese Communists and Kim II consulted on the strategy including the support for North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. Mao, anticipating that General MacArthur would send the Japanese Army into the Korean War, expressed his determination to defeat the Japanese Army if it entered the war. This, in particular, held significant meaning in connection with the China’s intervention in the Korean War later on. In addition, the facts that Mao mentioned that all the actions would be taken only after Moscow’s consent and that the results of the North Korea-China meeting were reported to Moscow are clear proof that China had close consultations not only with North Korea but with the Soviet Union about North Korea’s invasion plan. Accordingly, it is evident that the war was proposed by Kim II Sung, but was planned and plotted jointly by the three countries, led by the Soviet Union.

2. Mao and Stalin’s Moscow Secret Treaty

Following the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime on Oc-
ber 1, 1949, Mao visited Moscow on December 16 of the same year, and stayed there for around two months. During his visit, he held marathon meetings with Stalin and other high-ranking officials, discussed with them the expansion of communism throughout Asia and the rest of the world and other pending issues between the two countries. As a consequence, they agreed on the principle of dividing responsibility for the expansion of the communist revolution, and on February 14, 1950, the two countries strengthened their political, economic, and military relations by promulgating major agreements such as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Agreements on Changch’un railway, Port Arthur and Dairen, and loan agreements. It was revealed that Mao and Stalin had seriously discussed the unification of the Korean Peninsula by Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea and encouraged Kim Il Sung to trigger a war. The Mao-Stalin meetings served as an important backdrop for China’s later entry into the war.

At that time the two countries had pending issues such as boundary disputes and the Soviet’s passive attitude toward the Chinese Communists during the Nationalist-Communist intra-war, but such controversies were overshadowed by their common belief in Marx-Leninism and their sense of the responsibility for the proletarian revolution in the new international environment, when the East-West cold war structure was being formed. Mao and Stalin maintained consolidated relations for mutual defense.

The Chinese Communists also faced the necessity of maintaining the dynamism of the revolution. Mao had the ambition to elevate China’s international position to that of the most powerful country of the world. China’s international position was degraded by its challenge against the existing order, and all of this encouraged Communist China to strengthen its relationship with the Soviet Union. However, more the direct cause was the common concern of Mao and Stalin about the US threat. Stalin needed China’s support in the pan-
world confrontation against the United States, while Mao and the Chinese leaders looked to the alliance with the Soviets not only to counter the US influences in South-East Asia, but as the most effective way to defend against America’s ‘aggressive ambitions of the invasion’ of China.

In the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, which was contracted based on the common concern, Mao and Stalin resolved that “the two sides will make every effort possible to stop Japan’s aggression and the aggression of third states which are directly or indirectly associated with Japan’s act of aggression, and in the event of one of the High Contracting parties being attacked by Japan or state allied with it and thus involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.”

In an agreement granting China a loan, the Soviet Union agreed that it would provide China with $300 million at an annual interest rate of one percent with the understanding that the money was largely designed to cover China’s purchase of Soviet military equipment. In this way during the Moscow meeting, Stalin guaranteed Mao assistance for the Chinese Communist revolution and military commitment for China’s security.

During Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists ordered 586 planes from the Soviet Union including 280 fighters, 198 bombers, and 108 training planes, and before leaving Moscow, Mao wrote to Stalin to order another 628 planes. Immediately after the meeting, from February 16 to March 5, 1950, a mixed Soviet air-defense division, following the request of the Chinese Communists moved into Shanghai, Nanjin, and Xuzhou to take responsibility for the air-defense of these areas. China had purchased the aircraft to prepare for the Taiwan campaign and to modernize the Chinese Army, while depending on the Soviets for air-defense until it secured its own capabilities.
With the conclusion of the new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty and the Soviet military assistance, which was aimed against America from China's point of view, Mao was convinced that China occupied a more powerful position in the face of the long-range threat from America. On March 20 Chou En Lai stressed in an internal address to the Foreign Ministry that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty made it less likely that the United States would start a new war of aggression in East Asia. One month later in a speech to the sixth session of the Chinese People's Government Council, Mao further claimed that with the establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance, China's external position had been strengthened. "If the imperialists prepare to attack us, we already have Soviet help." 30

In this meeting Mao also managed to resolve in China's favor such issues as the Soviet Union having priority in treating the post-war issues in Manchuria according to the Yalta Conference and the conference between the Chiang Kai Shek government and the Soviet Union as compensation for the Soviet's participation in the war against Japan in the Second World War. Stalin agreed to transfer the Southern Manchurian railway to China by the end of 1952, and withdraw the Soviet forces from Port Arthur following the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, or no later than the end of 1952.

With the signing of the treaty and agreements with the Soviet Union, Communist China externally not only manifested its solidarity with the Soviets in the fields of ideology, politics, and economy, but significantly enhanced the position of Communist China which was endeavoring to escape from the old order, and internally it provided the basis for unification of the country and post-war rehabilitation.

The American policy makers understood that the Sino-Soviet alliance represented a big blow to America's strategic interests in the Far East. The alliance symbolized the failure of 'driving a wedge' into Chinese-Soviet rela-
tions, a primary American objective during 1949~50. Particularly, the contracting of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty and military assistance served as the most important backdrop for the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War and further escalation of the Sino-America confrontation.

On the other hand, since Communist China and the Soviet Union conference took place after the Korea-Soviet meeting in Moscow and the Korea-China meeting in Peking in which Kim Il Sung’s invasion plan was discussed, it is quite probable that Mao and Stalin also discussed the strategy of the Korean War, but it was kept in secret and remained as only conjecture. However, it came to light when Nikita Khrushchev, the prime minister of the Soviet Union, revealed in his memoirs that “the Korean War was not the invasion of north by South Korea, but was led by Kim Il Sung. Stalin who received Kim’s proposal gave the final approval for it, after having heard Mao’s opinion as to the possible American counter-actions.” He also added that “Mao agreed with Kim’s proposal” and related his view that “The Korean War would be an intra-war which should be resolved by the Korean people themselves, and hence America would not intervene in it.”

The memoirs, which were published first in the early 1970s were then shocking material that supported the theory of the invasion of the South as the origin of the Korean War, but because of the absence of back-up materials, it could not proven to be true or false. However, materials recently provided by China and the Soviet, though their contents contain certain ambiguities and partial misrepresentation, proved that Mao, Stalin, and Kim had discussed the invasion plan.

According to Soviet Foreign Ministry documents declassified in 1994, Mao committed the support for North Korea in the meeting with Kim Il in May 1949, but made it clear that he would take action only after Stalin’s approval. Kim Il Sung, on the other hand, requested his visit to Stalin through
Shtykov while the China-Soviet conference in Moscow was going on: "I would like to meet Stalin and consult with him about the invasion plan of the South. If it is not possible at this time, I will meet Mao upon his return from Moscow, as he certainly will have received instructions about all the matters at the meeting in Moscow." Kim's remarks back up the theory that Mao and Stalin discussed Korean Peninsula issues in Moscow.

In particular, Shi Zhe, who accompanied Mao to Moscow as an interpreter and attended the Mao-Stalin meeting, during a dialogue with Chen Jian in 1992 disclosed details about the talks between Mao and Stalin the Kim Il Sung's invasion plan.

While Mao was in Moscow, he and Stalin discussed Kim Il Sung's plan of the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Stalin told Mao: "Kim brought me the plan. I asked him if there existed any condition unfavorable to his plan such as the American's intervening. Kim was in high spirits. He will only listen to the voices for his idea, not the voices against his spirits. He was really young and brave." Then Stalin asked Chairman Mao's opinion of Kim's plan, especially if he thought the Americans would intervene. Chairman Mao did not reply immediately. After a while, he said "The Americans might not come in because that is Korea's internal affair, but the Korean comrades need to take America's intervention into account."

As Khrushchev's and Shi's recollections indicate, at the Moscow conference Mao and Stalin discussed thoroughly the communication plan of the Korean Peninsula, that is, Kim's invasion plan, particularly in connection with America's intervention. At that time both sides believed, as was disclosed at the Stalin-Kim and Mao-Kim meetings which were to take place soon, that North Korea could achieve victory without direct outside military assistance. In the eventuality of America's entry in the war, it seems that they reached the agreement that the Chinese Communists should intervene in the war under So-
viet support. According to the division of the responsibility for world communization, Mao and Stalin stipulated North Korea's communization of the Korean Peninsula by force to be the Communist China and North Korea joint task. In this sense, the Moscow conference constituted an important milestone for the Chinese Communists entry into the Korean War.

3. Mao and Kim Il Sung Agree on the War Plan

After the Mao-Stalin meeting, the Stalin-Kim Il Sung meeting took place in April 1950 in Moscow. In this meeting Stalin, noting that the international situation was changing in their favor, agreed to the modified preemptive attack plan which Kim Il Sung proposed as the means for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that a final decision should be reached jointly by Communist China and North Korea, and if China showed any negative views on it, the decision would be deferred until they reach a new agreement.20

Complying with this agreement, Kim Il Sung, accompanied by Pak Heun Yung, visited Mao in person, and the North Korea-Communist China conference took place in Peking. The following was what Kim Il Sung planned to do at this conference:21

(1) To inform the Chinese Communists of the intention to achieve unification by force, and explain about his meeting with Stalin in Moscow
(2) To exchange views on signing of a trade agreement. Kim would propose the signing of the trade agreement in the near future, but contract the friendship treaty after the unification.
(3) To inform them of the other issues discussed at the Moscow conference, and establish close relationships between the Central Commit-
Mao welcomes Kim Il Sung, who visited Peking to discuss the Korean War strategy.

tee of the North Korea Labor Party and that of the Chinese Communist Party.

Mao was informed late on May 13 by Kim Il Sung of the Moscow meeting in which the invasion plan had been discussed. However, Mao, wishing to hear Stalin’s personal explanation on it, asked the Soviet government through N.V. Roschin, the Soviet ambassador in Peking. The next day, Stalin sent him the following telegram reply.

Dear Comrade Mao:
During the conference with the comrades of North Korea, Filippov [Stalin] and his close staff members agreed to the proposal that as the international situation has changed, they would set to the north-south unification task. This issue, however, must be agreed upon in advance between North Korea and Chinese comrades. In case the two sides show
different opinions on this issue, it must be deferred until both sides discuss its solution. As for the contents of the conference, the North Korea side will explain them to you in detail. 

Filippov [Stalin]

On May 14 Mao received the above telegram and the message which contained the contents of the Kim–Stalin conference from the Soviet ambassador to Peking. Mao, then, held a conference in which he said he shared the same opinion with North Korea about North Korea’s decisions on the North and South Korea situation, and the comparison and analysis of the military power of both Seoul and P’yon Yang. He also proposed to establish the Korea–China Friendship Alliance and the Mutual Assistance Treaty, following the model of the Sino–Soviet Treaty, but only after the unification.

On May 15 in the meeting that followed, Mao exchanged views with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heun Yung in detail about North Korea’s plan for unification by force. Kim explained that the plan was to be implemented in three phases.

The 1st phase: preparation and strengthening of military power (the war planning and preparation)
The 2nd phase: proposal to the south for the peaceful unification (camouflaged peace offensive)
The 3rd phase: refusal of the dialogue by South Korea, and the commencement of the war (launching an invasion of the South)

Mao expressed his consent to this plan, and rendered advice on the war directions such as the operational preparation and the employment of the military forces. They also exchanged views on the possible Japanese and American intervention in the war.

Mao emphasized first the importance of the preparation, saying that in order to implement successfully the planned operation, thorough preparation
was a must, and it was important to instruct every soldier and commander in a concrete way how to act. He, then, advised that the North Korean Army should act rapidly once the operations started, and might encircle the major cities, but should not delay in order to occupy them, and the forces should be employed in a concentrated way to annihilate the enemy troops.

When Mao asked about the possibilities of the Japanese Army’s intervention, Kim replied that he saw little possibility of it; however, he did not exclude completely the possibility that the US would send 20,000~30,000 Japanese troops to Korea. He added, however, that the Japanese entry into the war could not change the situation in a definitive way. On the contrary, under such circumstances, the North Korea troops would fight even more fiercely against the enemy. Mao then mentioned that 20,000 to 30,000 Japanese troops’ intervention might lead to a prolonged war, but the current situation showed little possibility that Japan would intervene.

While Mao anticipated little chance of Japan’s intervention, he was worried about the America’s entry into the war. He said that if America intervened, then China would send its troops to assist North Korea. He also mentioned that since the Soviet had an agreement with America on the partition of the 38th Parallel, the former was in an inconvenient position to enter the war, but China, which was free from such obligation, could assist North Korea. Later on (July 1950), Roschin, Soviet ambassador to Peking, was told by Chou En Lai that in the Kim-Mao meeting, Mao had warned of the possibility of American troops’ direct intervention in the Korean War, but Kim said there was little possibility of it. Judging from this, it seems that in the conference the opinions of both sides were divided largely on the possibility of the American troops’ intervention.

Finally, Mao mentioned that if the invasion of South Korea began after China had occupied Taiwan, China would be able to assist North Korea
sufficiently. However, as North Korea decided to start the operations at this point, and it became the common task for our two countries, China agreed to it and would provide necessary assistance.\(^7\)

At the dinner on the same day, Kim mentioned to Roschin, Soviet ambassador to Peking who was sitting beside Mao, "During the meeting, we reached perfect agreement on every issue." This means that Kim, Mao, and Stalin reached perfect agreement on the invasion of South Korea.

As was revealed in the series of secret meetings, Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership were deeply involved in the Korean War plot second only to Stalin from the beginning; they shared the responsibility, taking it as their common task, rendered the military assistance including the transferring of the troops, and particularly made clear their intention that if American troops intervened, China would commit the CCF to assist North Korea. Thus, the Chinese Communists started preparation for entry into the Korean War.

II. War Preparation and Establishment of the North-East Border Defense Army

Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership were deeply involved in the North Korea war planning stage second only to Stalin, through the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Korean meetings which were held immediately before or after the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, and the Chinese Communists agreed upon the time of the war commencement in the meeting with Kim Il Sung.

Their war plot was based on the assumption that North Korea would achieve victory in the war in a short period, that is, before the intervention of
the US forces in the war. However, Mao who had promised the commitment of his troops, if the United States did intervene, took necessary measures in advance and began to accelerate war preparation to assist North Korea, in case the latter faced immediate United Nations and United States involvement.

Toward this end the Chinese Communists had to hastily readjust the pending internal and external security issues, such as the Taiwan campaign. It then expedited the CCF modernization program and the establishment of military units to send to Korea (North-East Border Defense Army), while it sought the appropriate diplomatic measures, paying close attention to the development of the war on the Korean Peninsula.

1. The Postponement of the Taiwan Campaign and Strengthening of the Security of the Southern Border

(1) Deferment of the Taiwan Campaign

After occupying the Chinese mainland, the Chinese Communists’ primary objective was to unify the Taiwan, and the nearby islands such as Kinmen and Penghu Islands which were occupied by Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalist government. However, before the operations to occupy these islands made any progress, the Korean War broke out. Upon the eruption of the Korean War, America intervened in it and at the same time deployed the US 7th Fleet along the Taiwan Strait. Hence, China estimated that it was being threatened from America in three directions: Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. The Chinese Communists, therefore, were forced to face at least two front lines, the Korea-Manchuria border and the Taiwan Strait, thus dividing its military power into two parts.
Taiwan, which had been a Japanese colony since the Sino-Japan War in 1894, was returned to China at the end of the Second World War. However, the Nationalist government, which had been expelled from the mainland following the Nationalist-Communist Intra-war, moved to Taiwan in May 1949. Since then the Nationalist government had been building up its political and military bastion there and declared its will to recapture the mainland, and hence the Taiwan Strait became the battlefield of both sides.

The Chinese Communists regarded the Taiwan liberation as the last battle of China's civil war and estimated that if it could succeed in this campaign, the Nationalists would be completely eliminated, and the political conflicts and agitations on the mainland would come to an end. And with the realization of a unified China, it would become the central country of South-east Asia and the world. At that time Mao was apprehensive about whether the United States, an opponent country, might interfere with the accomplishment of his plan. However, Communist China determined the Taiwan liberation to be its priority task and assigned the mission to the 3rd Field Army and Huadong in June 1949, emphasizing the necessity of resolving the Taiwan issue in an expeditious way. At first they planned to complete the preparation during the summer and autumn of that year and occupy Taiwan that winter. However, after a careful study of the difficult problems of the landing operations, Mao decided to complete the operation by the summer of 1950 at the latest, that is to delay it one year.

On the other hand, Chiang Kai Shek and the Nationalist Party who arrived in Taiwan declared that they would immediately blockade the harbours of the Chinese mainland with their naval forces and bombard the coastal cities with their air forces, particularly the commercial and industrial zone of Shanghai. Mao, who did not possess reliable naval and air forces, came to realize that in order to achieve successful in the Taiwan campaign, the CCF
should either secure the capability to force the Nationalists to surrender, or prepare sufficient military power to cross the Taiwan strait and launch a landing operation with the support of the Soviet naval and air forces. In summer of 1949, the Chinese Communists opened negotiations with the Soviet Union to get support, and with the arrival of the support of the Soviet naval and air forces in autumn, Communist China could strengthen the capability of the landing operation. The 3rd Field Army, in October–November 1949, launched its first phase offensive against Kinmen, and Dengbu of Zhoushan Islands, and seized the objectives, but at the end it failed in the operation as it could not suppress the air and sea forces of the Nationalists, who were equipped with US made ships and aircraft. In this campaign the CCF suffered the highest loss of lives recorded throughout its liberation war, and this failure forced a change in the planned date of the Chinese Communists Taiwan liberation operation.

With the setback in the operation, Mao and the communist leadership once again realized the difficulties of the landing operation, and revised the policy, that first they would make sufficient preparations and seize the coastal islands of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, before launching the Taiwan campaign. In this way, the Taiwan campaign was deferred several times, and when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, and in reaction to the US Seventh Fleet's appearance in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese Communist leadership quickly decided to put the preparations for invasion on hold and, on July 30, officially informed the commander of the navy of the decision to postpone preparations for the Taiwan campaign operation.10

At this time, Su Yu, the commander of the forces responsible for the Taiwan liberation operation, explained to his the 3rd Field Army, that the Taiwan campaign was postponed in order to concentrate our efforts for the campaign of 'Resist America and Assist Korea.' His remarks indicated that the main reason for the postponement was to concentrate its efforts for the prepa-
ration for the Korean War. In other words, when the Taiwan campaign became virtually impossible because of the US navy deployment, the Chinese also faced the task of preparing for the Korean War. Therefore, in order to avoid the division of the forces into the two fronts, and to concentrate them on the north-east front, the Chinese Communists deferred the Taiwan campaign.

The other significant result in connection with the Kinmen and Dengbu operations was that the Chinese enmity toward America was further intensified. The Chinese Communist leadership believed that the most important reason for the failure in the campaign was the air and naval superiority of the Nationalist forces equipped with the US-made aircraft and warships. They believed that but for the US support, the Nationalist troops would have been unable to resist and survive the CCF attacks. In addition, as the Nationalist forces bombed Shanghai and the coastal areas and blockaded the major harbours, using the US-made bombers and warships, the Chinese Communist leadership became certain that America was their main enemy. After that, they regarded and treated the Taiwan liberation issue in the structure of the long range confrontation between America and China, and the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party along the Taiwan Strait was also interpreted to be a confrontation between America and China. Because of such analysis, the solutions of Taiwan problem became even more difficult.

Although the Chinese Communist leadership viewed America as their main enemy, they estimated that America would not commit its troops in order to defend Taiwan from the Chinese Communist attack or protect the Nationalist. The reason was that the Chinese Communists estimated that America was militarily vulnerable and would require at least five years to become combat ready. Besides, America would have difficulties politically with its allies such as Great Britain and Japan. This idea was further strengthened by Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman’s remarks on January 5, 1950, which suggested that Taiwan was a part of China, and by Dean Acheson’s statement one week later that Taiwan and Korea were not involved within the US West-Pacific defensive perimeter.

For such reasons, viewing the United States simultaneously as a hostile enemy and ‘paper tiger’, Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership adopted a more aggressive strategy vis-a-vis the United States in East Asia, to challenge the existing order in the Asian Pacific area in which China had little voice, as well as to expand the influence of the Chinese revolution. Such an approach constituted the backdrop of the China’s entry into the Korean War in 1950.

With the revision of the Taiwan liberation policy and the deferment of its campaign, the Chinese Communists redeployed their central strategic reserve toward the Korea-Manchuria border area and rapidly activated the NEBDA (North-East Border Defense Army), which was to be committed to the Korean War.

(2) Strengthening of the Vietnam Border Security

With the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, Mao began to show interest in the Indo-Chinese border region, together with its Taiwan reclamation campaign. At that time, the communist army under the command of Ho Chi Minh, who had established the Vietnam Democratic Republic upon Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, and the French army, which returned to Vietnam claiming the vested rights before the occupation by Japan, were waging the so-called First Indochina War. In January 1950, Communist China officially recognized the Vietnam Republic which was fighting against the French army, and began to assist Ho Chi Minh and his communist party. The
Chinese Communists insisted that supporting Vietnam not only would contribute to China's security but was also its international obligation.

Taking advantage of the international situation, the bipolar cold war structure, Ho Chi Minh secretly visited China in January 1950 and requested China's assistance. He then visited Moscow early in February, where Mao and Stalin were holding a meeting, to meet them and request Soviet and Chinese military, political, and economic assistance. In this meeting, Stalin, who was reluctant to commit the strength of the Soviet army directly to the Vietnamese Communists, told Ho to discuss the assistance issues with the Chinese Communists. Mao and Chou En Lai promised him that the China would do its best to offer all military assistance needed by Vietnam in its struggle against France.²⁹

In the background of Mao's promise of assistance was his understanding that the southern Chinese border could be secured with the existence of Communist Vietnam. Historically, the Chinese rulers had been obsessed with the central Chinese ideology that with the barbarous and potential enemy countries around China, middle Kingdom could not be properly secured, and Mao himself basically dealt with the external affairs based on this idea. During 1949~1950, in particular, the remnants of the Nationalist hid themselves in the China-Vietnam border region, and the Chinese Communists had to pay increasing attention to this region. In addition, the Chinese Communist leadership regarded Vietnam as the most probable country to follow the model of China's revolution. The Chinese Communists understood that their revolution, which was the first of its kind not only in Asia but in the world, should lead the communist revolution and national movement elsewhere.

The Chinese military assistance to Vietnam began in March 1950. Communist China assigned its military advisors down to the battalion level of the Vietnamese Army and established a military school. Particularly, China and Vietnam jointly developed an operation plan for the border area cam-
campaign with the participation of the Vietnamese Army General Command and the Chinese military advisory group, under the leadership of Chen Geng, the Chinese Communist Central Committee member and Yunnan Military Region commander, dispatched to Vietnam at Ho Chi Minh’s request. With the implementation of this operation plan (September 16-October 12) the French army was defeated. As the French Army suffered great losses and its defense structure was completely collapsed, the Vietnamese military and civilians could secure the rear bases and could launch a limited counterattack. Thus China’s military as well as political and economic assistance to Vietnam, served to a great extent to achieve the security of the southern Chinese border.

In conclusion, the Chinese Communists, during the period of the establishment of its regime and just before and after the outbreak of the Korean war, solved with the Soviet Union the problem of dividing the responsibility of expanding the communist revolution in the world, and other mutual pending issues by contracting the China-Soviet treaty, deferring the Taiwan campaign, and strengthening the security of its southern border by rendering assistance to Vietnam. Since Communist China resolved all the pending issues on security, except the north-east border, it now could concentrate all its national power on further implementation of internal revolutionary tasks and on preparation for the Korean War.

2. The establishment of the North-East Border Defense Army and the War Preparation

With the outbreak of the Korean War, China put on the shelf the Taiwan campaign, which had been a national objective of the highest priority, and at the same time carried out the modernization program of its army through demobilization of it. It was during this busy period that the Chinese
Communists began the preparation for the war by organizing forces, under the name of the NEBDA (North-East Border Defense Army), which was earmarked for the Korean War.

The national task to which Communist China assigned priority next to the Taiwan campaign during the period from the establishment of its regime to the outbreak of the Korean War, was the 'peace construction project', which was to rebuild the economy shattered by the prolonged war. Complying with this program, the Army not only assumed the mission for it, but was to be demobilized and reorganized. The CCF, which had grown too large in manpower throughout the anti-Japanese war and the Nationalist-Communist civil war, was to switch its manpower to industrial projects and transfer military expenditure to the industrial development fund.

Based on the central political bureau's decision on the demobilization and the reorganization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in April 1950, the total strength of the CCF was reduced to 4,000,000 from 5,400,000 and the army was to consist of the National Defense Forces and the Public Security Unit. The unit identifications, such as army groups and the four field armies, which had been used until then, were canceled. The CCF established six large military regions of the North-West, South-West, Central-South, East-China, North-East, and North-China. (However, in reality, the unit identification of army groups and field army were either canceled or reorganized around 1958). In May at the meeting chaired by Chu Teh, the commander in chief, and attended by all the army staff, the tables of organization and strength of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were fixed for the first time, and overall reorganizations were being implemented.

The infantry of the Chinese army was organized into armies (corps), divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies, and was in a triangle organization, while the activation of units such as artillery and armor was under prog-
ress. Chinese army fixed the strength of a division at around 10,000, and made the table of equipment which standardized the type, number, and caliber of the division's organic weapons. The division had an organic logistical bureau, and the newly established logistical system supplied the military material from the large military region directly to the divisions, thus strengthening the divisions' combat and operational functions. The budgets, which were left over after the reduction of the army infantry units in the demobilization, were appropriated for the establishment of the navy, the air force, and other military branches, and thus the balance among the services and branches was maintained. The air force (activated in November 1949) and navy (activated in May 1950), which were only branches of the Chinese Liberation Army, had a short history, and began their activation with the organization of their commands first and then units with the subsequent introduction of the equipment and technical support from the Soviet Union. Around the same time the public security unit also completed its reorganization.\textsuperscript{109}

As was mentioned above in 1950 the Chinese Communists were externally and internally facing many difficult issues and were in a transitional period of the army demobilization and modernization at the same time. In spite of this, Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership, after the meeting with Kim Il Sung in Peking, immediately began to move the central mobilé reserve units to Manchuria, the northeast region. With the outbreak of the Korean War, these units were reorganized into the NEBDA and were prepared for entry into the Korean War.

However, from the outset, the Korean War developed in an utterly different direction from that which Mao, Stalin, and Kim Il Sung had planned and expected. In the course of the war planning, Kim Il Sung said that once North Korea launched an attack, the people would revolt within South Korea and topple the government. Taking advantage of such a situation, the North
Korean Army could swiftly advance up to the southern coast, without giving time to the US forces to intervene in the war. Stalin believed this concept and approved it. Mao, though he agreed with it, added that they should guard against the possible US forces intervention. In reality, however, no people’s revolt took place, and from the outset a blitzkrieg was impossible due to the stubborn resistance by the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the rapid US and UN forces intervention.

According to the resolutions of the UN Security Council’s June 26 demand to stop the North Korean invasion and the June 28 recommendation to render military assistance to the Republic of Korea in compliance with the Korean government’s request for such assistance, beginning on June 27, the UN forces with US forces at its head, entered the Korean War to assist the ROK forces. At the same time, the US warships deployed in the Taiwan Strait and performed the mission of checking the CCF’s attack on Taiwan and vice versa. Based on the resolution of July 7 which created the United Nations Unified Command, the UN forces assisting the Republic of Korea were placed under commander in chief, United Nations Command and conducted delaying actions against the North Korean Army.

Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership, who had promised during the period of the war plotting to dispatch its troops and assist North Korea if the United States intervened, paid close attention to the progress of the war, analyzing in detail the war situation in July. They all agreed that the Korean War, which had already become utterly complicated, had become the focus of the international conflict or at least that of East-Asia. Mao, who estimated that the war was expanded and prolonged due to the US entry into the war, chaired the meeting of the military committee, and ordered the movement of the 13th Army Group, the strategic mobile reserve, to Manchuria to consolidate the defense of that region and to be prepared to assist North Korea.
In order to carry out the rehabilitation of the domestic economy, the highest priority task, Mao left the responsible bureau as it was, and assigned the North-East Administration Committee the important mission of supporting the war to 'Resist America and assist Korea.' On the other hand, he instructed the holding of a nationwide campaign of 'protesting America's invasion of Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula', which would serve the nationwide political mobilization and the war preparations.

Following Mao’s proposal, the Central Military Committee convened national defense meetings twice on July 7 and 10, and decided the following under the title 'to safeguard the North-east region and to assist North Korea if necessary', which Mao approved.25

1. To assemble four armies and three artillery divisions by the end of July in the areas of Antung, Chian, and Benxi, and organize the NEBDA.
2. To assign Su Yu to the position of the NEBDA commander and political commissar, and Hsiso Hua as the deputy political commissar.
3. To carry out the necessary preparations for the logistical services.
4. To prepare for the replacement of strengths.
5. To commence work for the political mobilization.

Based on the above decisions, the Central Military Committee made 'the decision on safeguarding the northeast region' on July 13, decided to deploy the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies (corps), the main forces of the Fourth Field Army together with the attached supporting units such as artillery and engineer elements to organize the NEBDA (North-East Border Defense Army).26

The 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies, which belonged to the 13th Army Group, were the central strategic mobile reserve, and stationed in the Hanan region, and the 42nd Army was around the Heilong River. The 38th and 39th
Armies of the strategic reserves were engaged in an irrigation project in the Hanan region, while one division of each of the armies was conducting mop-up operations. The 40th Army, after having completed the liberation campaign in Hainan, was then resting in Jiangsu and preparing to move northward soon toward Hanan. The 42nd Army, which was earmarked to be demobilized by phases, was involved in the irrigation project around the Heilong River.

However, the 38th and 40th Armies began to move to the Mukden area of Manchuria, the northeast region, in May and June, before the outbreak of the Korean War and prior to the July 13 decision of the Military Committee. This indicates that Mao, following the Mao-Kim meeting in Peking expeditiously, prepared for entry into the war. Their main forces completed the movement into Manchuria by the end of July. In consequence, the NEBDA was composed of the 12 divisions of the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies, 13th Army Group under the Fourth Field Army, together with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Artillery Divisions, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and one engineer corps. The total strength of the NEBDA amounted to 255,000. Early in August the forces occupied their assembly areas at Antung, Tonghua, Liaoyang, Haicheng, Benxi, Tieling, Kaiyuan, and so on, on the opposite side of the Yalu River, and undertook training and preparation to enter the war at any time on order.

The selection of the Fourth Field Army to enter the Korean War meant that it was highly estimated in combat capability by the Military Committee, which made close and repeated evaluations.

First of all, the Fourth Field Army was comprised of many soldiers from the northeast region who had fought in this region during the liberation war and were accustomed to the geography and climate of the region. Next, at that time, the Chinese military units were widely dispersed all over the mainland, engaging in both production work and mop-up operations against the
local guerrilla, and due to the shortage of transportation, the troop movement was faced with mobility problems. Nevertheless, the 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies, which were the main forces of the Fourth Field Army and the Military Committee’s central strategic mobile reserve, were stationed in the central region and could maneuver quickly. In particular, their combat power, which was strengthened through combat experiences both in the liberation and anti-Japanese wars, was highly regarded, and this coincided with the policy of dispatching first-class troops to Korea.

The NEBDA command confirmed Su Yu, then vice commander of the East-China Military Region, as its commander and the political commissar, Xiao Jin Guang as the vice commander, Hsiao Hua as the vice political commissar and Li Chu Kuei as the logistics commander. The NEBDA had under its command the new 13th Army Group headquarters, which was to command the corps. However, in reality Su Yu was sick and could not assume the responsibility, while Xiao Jin Guang was assigned as the naval forces commander. Because of this change, the headquarters of the NEBDA was not organized, but only that of the 13th Army Group was activated, and therefore, the North-East Military Region exercised direct command over the NEBDA units.79

The 13th Army Group command was manned mostly by the 15th Army Group command personnel, that is, the commander was Teng Hua, the political commissar was Lai Chuan Zhu, the vice commanders were Hung Hsueh Chen and Han Hsien Chu, the chief of staff was Hsieh Fang, and the head of the political bureau was Tu Ping. They all assumed their posts.

Teng Hua, the commander, who became known as a brilliant general in the course of the Chinese revolutionary war, had both military and political experience, and was called a general well qualified in military and politics. He was also crafty in matters of strategy and later became the Chinese representa-
tive to the cease-fire talks, thus rendering considerable influence in the Korean War. The other members except for Lai Chuan Zhu (not assigned because of illness) all bettered their reputations in the Korean War.

The Chinese Communists, along with the organization of the NEBDA, strengthened the defense and particularly the anti-aircraft capability of the North-East Military Region (Manchuria Region), which would serve as the supporting base in case Communist China would intervene in the war. They also strengthened the supporting capability by unifying the logistics systems of the military region and the NEBDA.

Immediately after the establishment of the NEBDA was decided on, on July 18 the air force command, and in August, the anti-aircraft command of the North-East Military Region were activated. According to the Sino-Soviet agreement, one Soviet air division (122 MIG 15, training and liaison aircraft) arrived in the Chinese northeast region and carried out an air defense mission. (Later on the personnel returned to the Soviet Union, handing over the equipment to the Chinese Air Force). In the middle of August the North-East Military Region held an air defense meeting to consult on the air defense communication system and equipment, and carried out an overall reorganization of the air defense structure. Late in August, the anti-aircraft artillery units, which had been defending the important areas along the Yalu, were committed to combat.

On August 7, in compliance with the decision of the Central Military Committee, the logistical department of the North-East Military Region was established. It consisted of logistical command, political section, financial section, military supply section, transportation section, medical section, and train section, and had under its command three branch units of 2,600 personnel each, and rendered logistical support to NEBDA for the war preparation.

In addition, late in August, the 9th Army Group in Shanghai and the 19th Army Group in the northwest region were deployed respectively in Jinsu-
and Longhai, which were the railway transportation centers, and performed the mission of supporting the NEBDA, as the central reserve. From this region they could have easy access to any of the northeast and southeast areas, and in particular, the deployment provided the possibility of commitment to the Korean Peninsula both on the land and on the sea.

In spite of the many difficulties the Chinese Communists faced, they carried out the demobilization and reorganization of the army. In July, they completed the organization of the NEBDA, and in August prepared for the war not only by strengthening the functions of the North-East Military Region, which was to become the supporting base for the Korean War, but by augmenting the capability of the air defense.

The NK Army was advancing up to the line of the Kum River and Sobaek Mountains when the Chinese Communists issued the order for the establishment of the NEBDA on 13th July. The former was attacking the Pusan perimeter defense line, keeping the operational initiative when the latter strengthened the North-East Military Region in the middle of August. All of this indicates that China’s preparations for entry into the Korean War were pre-planned and were implemented as planned in advance.

At the same time the Chinese Communists concentrated their efforts for the augmentation of the air and sea defense capability all over China through the advanced organization of the naval and air forces together with the Soviet’s equipment and technical assistance. On the other hand, the Army, which activated the artillery command and the armor command, endeavored to increase the artillery and armor combat power. In addition, the railway Army Corps were reorganized into three divisions and were placed under the direction of the Military Committee to augment the transportation capabilities. The seven public security divisions also completed their organization. With all of it completed, the Chinese Communists, in a year after the establish-
ment of the regime, modernized their armed forces, and were expediting the strengthening of the mainland defense capability and the preparation for the intervention in the Korean War at the same time.

3. The Diplomatic Scheme: Assistance for North Korea and Seeking Justification to Enter the War

Around the period when North Korea initiated the invasion, the Chinese Communists resolved the pending issues with the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and Vietnam, organized the NEBDA, and were preparing for entry into the war. At the same time they concurrently launched a diplomatic offensive to justify their intervention in the war.

The Chinese Communists began the diplomatic offensive when they saw that the war was developing in an unexpected direction when they had plotted the war, and that their strategic estimate was obviously incorrect and would bring about a setback in the war plan. Particularly, North Korea’s failure in the war resulted from the fact that the United States and the United Nations took a rapid and positive countermeasure against their invasion.

Upon receiving the request by the Republic of Korea, the United States and the United Nations rapidly took countermeasures, and within 24 to 72 hours adopted the June 26 and June 28 UN resolutions that reprimanded North Korea for its invasion and recommended that the UN member countries render assistance for the Republic of Korea. Based on these resolutions, President Truman announced on June 27 that the United States would assist the ROK Army with the US naval and air force and deploy the 7th Fleet along the Taiwan Strait. Subsequently, he decided on the US Army’s intervention on June 30. Based on these decisions, the US navy and the air force participated in the war, and on July 1 the advance party of the US ground forces landed at
Pusan, followed by the British and Australian forces which entered the war as UN forces.

The Chinese diplomatic offensive jointly with the Soviet Union varied according to the war situation. Their diplomatic countermeasure developed from their efforts to prevent the UN forces’ entry into the war, insisting on the peaceful solution of the Korean problem by the UN forces evacuation, attempting to halt the UN forces’ crossing of the 38th Parallel, and, finally, their intervention warning.

The Chinese first diplomatic reaction to the United Nations and the United States countermeasure was opposition to June 26 and June 28 UN resolutions and June 27 statement by President Truman. At the 8th Central People’s Government Council on June 28, Mao, “expressing his strong objection to the US interference in the Korean War and to its occupation of Taiwan which was Chinese territory, mentioned that the affairs of each country in the world must be managed by its people themselves… America should not interfere. America’s invasion in Asia is causing wide and intensive antagonism… The Chinese people are never apprehensive of imperialistic threats.” He also stated that “The people of the world should be united… and defy any of America’s provocations.”

On the same day Chou En Lai, the minister of foreign affairs, issued the statement that “Truman’s June 27 statement and the US navy actions are military invasion and violation of the UN charters. Our people… will fight to the end to liberate Taiwan.” On July 6, he again criticized the June 28 UN resolution saying “It is an action supporting America’s military invasion, interference in the Korean domestic affairs, and destruction of the world peace.” He also pointed out that “It is a violation of the UN’s basic principle described in the UN charter that the United Nations should not interfere in any of the domestic affairs of a country.” At the same time he announced: “As the
resolution was adopted while China and the Soviet Union, two permanent members of the Council member countries, were absent, it was obviously illegal, and therefore the Chinese peoples are determined to oppose it."

As was mentioned above, Communist China first attacked the measures taken by the United States as an 'invasion', an 'interference in the domestic affairs', and a 'destruction of the peace' and considered the UN resolution to be illegal. The Chinese Communists' real intention was to check as far as possible the United States entry into the war and the support from the UN member countries to the Republic of Korea, and then to assist the North Korea troops to reach the south coast before the arrival of the UN and the US reinforcements. One can also see China's underlying intention to use the Korean War as diplomatic strategy to obtain the representation right of China in the United Nations.

In 1950 the representation right of China remained in the hands of the Nationalist Party government. On November 15, 1949 Communist China raised the question about the representation right in the United Nations, asserting to the effect that the Nationalist Party government representative could not represent China, should be withdrawn, and should be replaced with the representative of the Chinese Communists regime. The Soviet representative brought it up to the UN Security Council for discussion, but being rejected by the United States and other member countries of the council, declared his withdrawal from the council. Because of this incident, the United States–Communist China relations even further deteriorated, and the Soviet Union did not attend subsequent Security Council meetings as a sign of protest. Communist China and the Soviet Union declared that the UN resolutions on the Korean War were null and void as they were passed without the presence of the Soviet Union. However, not only was the absence of the member from the Council against the charter, but also it was the opinion of the majority and the general rule that an
absence could not be regarded as a veto, therefore, the resolution was legitimate and without procedural problems.\[34\]

Accordingly, Communist China and the Soviet Union failed in persuading other members, and by the end of July, starting with three United States divisions, free world countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada, and France dispatched ground, naval, or air forces and intervened in the War. In consequence, it became difficult for the North Korea Army to maintain the relatively superior military power it had enjoyed. In early August the frontline became stalemated along the Pusan perimeter. As the war showed signs of being prolonged, it turned out to be more and more unfavorable to North Korea with the passing of time. Its initial objective to occupy the all of South Korea before the US forces’ arrival, and the subsequent Communist China and Soviet’s diplomatic scheme to halt the United States entry into the War were already thwarted.

Around this time the Soviet representative returned to the UN Security Council, assumed the chairmanship of the council, and the communist diplomatic offensives began in a new form. On August 4, the Soviet representative proposed a resolution demanding the suspension of hostilities in and withdrawal of the foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula, and also demanded that the Chinese Communist representative attend the discussion on the Korean issues.

On August 20, Chou En Lai of Communist China in turn supported the Soviet’s proposal and said “Korea is China’s neighbor, and the Chinese people cannot but intervene in the Korean affairs...and it should be and can be solved in a peaceful way.” He sent a telegram to the United Nations, requesting the participation of the Chinese Communist representative when the Korean affairs was discussed by the Security Council.\[35\] At the same time Communist China started to mobilize its people by mass media, saying that the Korean sit-
In order to intervene in the Korean War, Communist China organizes a mass rally protesting that the US invaded Taiwan and North Korea.

uation was seriously menacing its security. The following articles which appeared in the August 26 World Intelligence Magazine, which had revealed for the first time the postponement of the Taiwan campaign and the prolongation of the Korean War, indicated a certain change in the Chinese Communist policy.53

The barbaric acts of the American imperialists and their tools threaten not only the peace of Asia and the world, but menace significantly the security of China. The Chinese people will not allow such aggressive acts of the imperialists in Korea... Not a single issue of Asia can be solved without the Chinese people's participation. Korean problems cannot be solved without the participation of China, the nearest neighbor of Korea... The friend of North Korea is also our friend, the enemy of North Korea is our enemy, the defense of North Korea is our defense, and the victory of North Korea is our victory.

The above statement was clearly different from the Chinese strategy in
June-July. The aim of the strategy at that time was to halt the assistance of the UN forces to secure victory for North Korea. However, this time their target was to solve the problem by negotiation, and Communist China insisted on the evacuation of the UN forces and the participation of the Chinese Communist representative. To that end, the Chinese Communists launched a diplomatic offensive, inciting the people through mass communication, insisting that China's security was in danger. They estimated that they could occupy an advantageous position in solving the problems by starting the negotiations while their military situation was still favorable. Their ultimate goal was to help the NK Army achieve the operational objective by leading to the evacuation of the UN forces, and at the same time make use of the occasion for sending the Chinese Communist representative to the UN.

In spite of such efforts and schemes, the Soviet and the Chinese attempts to solve the Korean problem in the UN through negotiation were frustrated as the Soviet's proposal and the request by Communist China to send its representatives to the United Nations were rejected by the Security Council on September 6.

On the battlefield, following the successful Inch’on landing on September 15 and the reoccupation of Seoul on September 28, the ROK and the UN forces were ready to advance northward. On the other hand, the NK forces, which had collapsed all of sudden due to the large-scale encirclement, could not even defend the 38th Parallel and were in the worst situation since the war broke out. Therefore, crossing the 38th Parallel became a matter of urgent concern to North Korea, and with the world's attention focused on the battlefield, the Chinese and the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the United Nations to prevent the UN forces from crossing the 38th Parallel reached a climax.

At this time President Syngman Rhee, who concluded that the meaning of the 38th Parallel had ceased to exist with the invasion of the NK army,
and that the advance northward should be made to achieve the unification of South and North Korea, issued the order to the ROK forces to continue its advance through the ROK force chain of command. The United States government, representing the United Nations and based on the June 26 and July 7 Resolutions, decided to conduct military operations into North Korea to destroy the NK Army, and issued the instruction for this mission (September 27 Instruction).\footnote{36}

On September 30, in compliance with the forementioned policy, Warren W. Austin, the American ambassador to the United Nations declared that "the opportunity for new acts of aggression should be removed... The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind the imagery line (the 38th Parallel line)...the artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence in law and in reason."\footnote{37} This statement was the public announcement of the rationale for the advance to the north, and implied the impending operations to destroy the aggressors in the areas north of the 38th Parallel.

On the same day (September 30) eight countries beginning with Great Britain introduced to the United Nations a common resolution to the effect that "the United Nations will take proper measures to maintain security throughout Korea, take necessary measures to carry out a general election under the supervision of the United Nations to establish a unified democratic government..."\footnote{38} This resolution reconfirmed the basis for the conduct of the UN forces' military operation in the North Korea, and at the same time it became what was called "the Korean Unification Resolution" for the establishment of the unified government under the sponsorship of the United Nations.

In this way the United Nations forces received permission to cross the 38th Parallel, with the understanding that the retaliation against the communist invaders was morally sound and legal under the UN charter, and it coin-
cided with the basic principle of military operations that in the battlefield when the defender halted the aggressors, the former would switch to a counter-offensive and conduct a pursuing operation without losing time.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communists estimated that "The American imperialists are committing an even greater military adventure by crossing the 38th Parallel and attempting the occupation of the whole of Korea through a strategic blitzkrieg" and reacted positively together with the Soviet Union, directing its diplomatic focus on halting or delaying the UN forces' (the American forces') breakthrough of the 38th Parallel. They warned and threatened saying that if the UN forces crossed over the 38th Parallel, the CCF would intervene in the war.

On September 24 Chou En Lai cabled UN headquarters to protest the alleged US air intrusion over Antung, saying that "...the United States exposes...the determination...to extend the aggressive war against Korea...and to further extend aggression against China." After summarizing his past notes, Chou warned:39

The flames of the war being expanded by the United States in the Far East are burning more fiercely. If the representatives of the majority states attending the UN General Assembly should still be pliant to the manipulation of the United States, and continue to play deaf and dumb to these aggressive crimes of the United States, they shall not escape a share in the responsibility for lighting up the war-flames in the East.

It was pressure designed to swing wavering delegations against the UN forces' crossing over the 38th Parallel.

The next day, on September 25, Nieh Jung Chen, the acting Chief of Staff of the Chinese Communist Forces, mentioned to K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador, "China will not sit back with folded hands and watch the Americans come up to the Korea-Manchuria border."40 He continued:
We know what we are in for, but at all cost American aggression has to be stopped. America can bomb us, they can destroy our industries, but they cannot defeat us on the land... They may even drop atom bombs on us... They may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice a nation's independence cannot be upheld.

On September 30, the same day when Warren Austin delivered the speech, Chou En Lai spoke against America at the national day congratulatory meeting of the Central People's Government Council: "The Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people absolutely will not allow foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."

The statements of both the acting chief of the general staff and Chou En Lai, at face value, expressed the determination, as well as a warning, that if the UN forces crossed over the 38th Parallel, they would intervene.

On the other hand, "on October 2, Vyshinsky, the Soviet foreign minister, against the UN forces' eight-nation proposal, counter-proposed a resolution calling for the immediate ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula, the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops... and the election to be observed by a UN commission with representatives of the states bordering on Korea."

In the Chinese warning and the Soviet scheme, their strong will and attempt to halt or delay the advance of the UN troops were clearly involved. However, their attempt failed. Since the acts of the destruction of peace and invasion had to be punished and international justice had to be realized, the military preparation was already underway to achieve that objective, and the majority of the UN member countries supported it. The two countries responsible for plotting the invasion could not change the general trend. In the long run, Communist China and the Soviets made desperate diplomatic efforts
by phases to halt or delay the UN forces' support, to realize the evacuation of the UN forces, and finally to halt the advance northward of the UN forces, but they failed to reach their goal.

Though Communist China's diplomatic maneuver failed in attaining the initial objective of communizing the Korean Peninsula by suppressing the UN support and assisting North Korea, it, nevertheless, provided Communist China with a pretext to intervene in the war in the course of the nation-wide campaign, served to mobilize the people, and accelerated the war preparations.

4. The North Korean, Chinese, and the Soviets Operational Consultation and Estimate of the War Situation

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao and his leadership paid close attention to the war development and performed such actions as the activation of North-East Border Defense Army (NEBDA) for the war preparation. Along with necessary diplomatic measures, they also sent a special envoy to North Korea and exchanged the military delegations in order to keep abreast of the latest developments of the war and consult with the North Korea on military operations.

Communist China and North Korea had already established diplomatic relations (October 6, 1949) when the war broke out. Lee Ju Yeon, the NK ambassador to China, was already in Peking, but Ni Zhi Liang, the Chinese ambassador assigned to North Korea, was not yet in North Korea because of sickness. The Chinese Communists were obliged to send a special envoy to the North Korea for the purpose of obtaining the latest information on the developing situation.

Immediately following Truman's announcement of the dispatching of US troops, on June 27, three days after the outbreak of the war, the general
staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army planned to dispatch a military observation team to P'yongyang. On July 7, almost the same date as that of the establishment of the NEBDA, a team was composed of seven members with the political counsellor Chai Cheng Wen and the military attache' Zhu Guang as the team's principal members. It arrived in P'yongyang on July 10, met Kim Il Sung, and began its work. On August 13, roughly a month later than the above-mentioned team arrived, Ni Zhi Liang, the Chinese ambassador, came to the North Korea.48

Ni Zhi Liang attended the fifth anniversary celebration ceremony of the liberation on August 15, together with the Chinese celebration envoys, who had arrived two days earlier with Guo Mo as their head and Li Li San as the deputy. Later they were briefed on the war up to that point and promised their support. With their visit, the North Korea and Communist China relations became deeper, and China could focus more efforts on obtaining information on the latest war situation. At that time the People's Daily Report carried an editorial paragraph in which it praised the North Korea victory and promised support, demonstrating the solid relations between the two countries. At the same time it drew Chinese people's attention on the situation of the Korean Peninsula.

Around the middle of August, Mao, based on the report of the team dispatched to Korea, considered the development of the war on the Korean Peninsula in two ways, that is, a short term war in which North Korea could terminate the war with its own capability, and a long term war which would require Chinese participation, and Mao renewed his determination to intervene in the war in the latter case. His decision was apparent in the interview he had with P. F. Yudin, the Soviet Marxist scholar, on August 19. What he mentioned can be summarized as follows.49
First, if America continued the war with its current combat power, the US army would be defeated in the near future, and that was the most desirable development.

Second, if the US wished to wage a general war and was determined to win the war, it would need 30 to 40 divisions. Then, North Korea alone could not resist them and would require direct Chinese intervention. The North Korea and Communist China combined forces would certainly destroy the 30 to 40 American divisions. If such a situation should be realized, Communist China and the Soviet Union might hold a favorable position in a Third World War that might ensue.

Mao’s renewal of his intention to intervene if necessary in the Korean War was along the same lines as his own’s promise to enter the war during the war plotting stage and was regarded as significant. This interview also implied that the Communist China was not apprehensive about a Third World War that might result from the Korean War.

Approaching the latter part of August, as the NK Army’s offensive lost impetus and the war went into a stalemate, the Chinese Communists analyzed with great concern the probable direction of the war. On the 23rd the general staff reported to Mao that considering the augmentation of the US Army and the concentration of the naval forces, it was anticipated that the ROK and US Forces might launch a landing operation in the rear while the NK army was concentrated along the Pusan Perimeter. They considered Inch’on, Wonsan, Nampo, Kunsan, and Hamhung to be possible landing sites, of which the most probable and dangerous site was Inch’on. From the military point of view, Inch’on was very important, as it was situated near Seoul, the center of transportation, in other words, the center of the lines of communication. Upon receiving this report, Mao decided to take three measures immediately. First, Mao reiterated to the NEBDA that regardless of difficulties, all preparations
for operations should be completed by the end of September. Second, he decided to inform North Korea and the Soviets immediately that Chinese military planners believed that the Americans might land at Inch'on, and suggest that the NK Army move some units from the Naktong to Inch'on areas to strengthen its defense. Third, he decided to order both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CCF General Staff to pay close attention to the enemy's movements, to the possible reversal of the war's course and to the danger resulting from any change.45

A few days later, when Mao received Lee Sang Cho, the head of the NK military delegation, who briefed him on the combat situation, he stressed that North Korea should pay attention to “the possibility that the UN forces may land at any area of the east and west coasts of the Korean Peninsula and attack the NK Army from the rear.” At that time Mao indicated Inch’on to be the most probable landing site and urged North Korea to prepare a contingent plan for it.

In this way Mao received the NK delegations twice at the end of August and early in September, and was briefed by them on the development of the war, and consulted with them on the countermeasures to be taken. During the consultation, he speculated on two possible courses of development of the war: the first one was that North Korea would terminate the war early by exterminating the American forces and driving them into the sea, and the second one was that the war would be prolonged. Mao particularly gave a great deal of advice on the second possibility.45

In the second case, Mao estimated that America would strengthen the defense line of Taegu–Pusan and tie the NK forces there, while preparing landing operations in other areas. In order to meet this possibility, Mao advised the NK delegations that North Korea should possess a sufficient reserve force and pay more attention to the security of the Inch’on–Seoul and Chinnamp’o–
P'yongyang areas, which could provide defensive strong points against the probable axes of the enemy attack. He also pointed out that the military forces should be employed with the aim of exterminating the enemy troops as had been shown in the past battles of the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and should not commit the error of attempting to secure the territory just by driving off the enemy troops.

Mao pointed out that the enemy could launch a counteroffensive at the proper time since North Korea had neither military power to conduct a blitzkrieg nor any reserve forces, and that was why the US Forces could withdraw to the Taegu and Pusan areas where they had established defensive positions. He also mentioned that the NK Army had been stalemated along the Pusan Perimeter for over one month without any significant results nor one step of forward advance, and had suffered serious damage. He also noted the necessity that North Korea should not concentrate all of its forces along the Pusan Perimeter, but should seriously study the rapid withdrawal of its troops for reorganization and the establishment of a new front-line.

This indicated that Mao had a good grasp of the war situation and estimated that North Korea had already lost the opportunity of a victory by blitzkrieg. He also advised North Korea to prepare against a prolonged war and particularly against the enemy's landing operation in the rear area. This was significant, in that, it meant that the Chinese Communists had already concluded in late August that the war was turning toward the phase in which they would have to intervene.

After the UN forces' landing at Inch'on, the Chinese activities for the collection of information on the Korean War became even more intensive. On September 18, three days after the landing at Inch'on, Chou En Lai summoned Roschin, the Soviet ambassador to Communist China, and Kotvokonov, the military advisor, and showing his keen interest in the on-going situation of
Korea, requested Soviet assistance in gaining information of the war trend. Chou En Lai mentioned that "the Chinese Communists had no other information on the landing at Inch'on except that reported by the P'yongyang newspapers and radios," and asked if the Soviet Union had any other information. He also mentioned that Communist China had offered to send into Korea a large number of CCF troops, which were deployed along the border, to ascertain the battlefield situation, but P'yongyang had not responded. He even expressed his dissatisfaction that Mao's estimate and advice had been ignored by North Korea. He also said that as the Chinese ambassador in P'yongyang had no access to any military information, the Chinese Communists did not have the necessary information in a timely fashion.

During this meeting Chou En Lai expressed his opinion about the enemy's landing operation at Inch'on and discussed the countermeasures with the Soviet representatives. Prior to this meeting, Chou had submitted this opinion to Mao, based on the available though not accurate information on the Inch'on landing. Chou's thought can be summarized as follows:45

First, if North Korea possesses 100 thousand reservists at Seoul and P'yongyang, it could destroy the enemy troops who had landed at Inch'on, but if not, it should evacuate the main force northward, leaving a part of its force to maintain the current front-line. In this way North Korea could tie the US troops to the current defense area, and defeat the enemy.

Second, North Korea should organize the principal striking force and keep it in secret until the decisive offensive moment arrives.

Two days later (September 20) Moscow replied to Chou En Lai through its embassy in Peking. The Soviets first of all stressed that it was not appropriate that North Korea did not provide Communist China with sufficient information on the development of the war on the Korean Peninsula; however, it
expressed its opinion that it was not intentional but because of the confusion at the front-line. Moscow was also belatedly receiving piecemeal information on the war situation from its ambassador in P’yongyang, and assumed that it was because North Korea was lacking in experience, in communication equipment, and in the capability of situation analysis. As for Mao, he presented the following opinions: 48

First, the tactics the NK army employed to counter the complicated situation in the Inch’on and Seoul areas, that is, the dispersed deployment of the battalions and regiments, was a failure. Second, the operation might have ended in success if a strong defense line had been established in the east and north of Seoul. Third, with the complicated situation resulting from the landing operation at Inch’on, the peaceful solution of the Korean problem has become more difficult.

Upon receiving Moscow’s position from Ambassador Roschin on September 21, Chou En Lai expressed his satisfaction that Moscow and Peking shared the same opinions on the evaluation of the war situation. In this meeting, he noted that the Soviet Union had reported its position to North Korea on September 18, as had Communist China.

While discussing with the Soviets countermeasures for the Inch’on landing, the Chinese Communist leadership sent five additional military attaches to Korea immediately after the Inch’on landing in order to prepare for their entry into the war. The group arrived in P’yongyang around September 20, and all five members received a letter of instruction personally signed by Kim Il Sung and started immediately for the different parts of North Korea to investigate the military situation. Earlier, on August 31, the NEBDA commander had proposed that an advance party be sent to Korea to get familiar with the general situation, make a survey of the Korean topography, and pre-
pare for future battle. However, at that time it had not been accepted by the Chinese Communist leadership, and this time the Military Committee sent them as a Chinese military attaches.  

On September 20, Chou En Lai laid down the following principles of military action for Chinese Communist Forces to be sent to Korea:

The war to ‘Resist America and Assist Korea’ should be conducted as a protracted war on the basis of self-reliance. In every campaign and battle, we have to gain superiority by concentrating our manpower and firepower in order to break up or destroy the enemy. By weakening the enemy gradually, we will be able to carry out a protracted war.

After Mao’s approval, the principles were transmitted to Kim Il Sung via the Communist China ambassador in P’yongyang. After that, the Chinese Communist leadership repeated protests and warnings that the United States was expanding the war up to the Korea-Manchuria border and into China, and expedited steps for the final decision to intervene in the war.

As was mentioned above, Communist China had not only paid close attention to the progress of the war from its initial stage, but exchanged views with the Soviets and provided North Korea with advice on the war direction. In particular, following the Inch’on landing, the Chinese interest in the war increased in such a way that it turned into dissatisfaction over North Korea’s somewhat unenthusiastic attitude. Consequently, the Chinese Communists hastily dispatched a corps of military attaches which was to perform the mission of the “survey party for the dispatching troops”, and intensified its preparations for entry into the war.

On the other hand the advice of China and the Soviet Union was of little use in turning back the reversed war situation. The ROK and UN forces were deployed along the 38th Parallel, and the situation was critical to the communists as the breakthrough was imminent and it was only a matter of
time on the order.

At this stage, since Communist China had failed in its diplomatic efforts to gain time for war preparation by halting or delaying the ROK-UN forces advance, the Chinese Communists, who defined the Korean War as a Communist China-North Korea joint task, had only to make the military decisions of how and how rapidly they would send the prepared troops into the Korean War.

III. North Korea and Soviets Request for Support and Communist China's Decision to Enter War

1. Stalin Requests China to Intervene in the War

While Communist China prepared for the war militarily by organizing the North-East Border Defense Army (NEBDA) and looked for justification to enter the war diplomatically, on October 1 the UN forces commander publicly read a letter advising Kim Il Sung to surrender. And on the same day the advance elements of the ROK forces crossed the 38th Parallel, and the UN forces were also on the point of advancing northward. Meanwhile, at the UN General Assembly, the 'Korea Unification Resolution' was being prepared along with the military operation.

At this great reversal point, on September 29, Kim Il Sung and Pak Heun Yung met Ambassador Shtykov and discussed what measures to take in the future. Kim Il Sung who did not have a clear idea as to whether the ROK and the UN forces would cross the 38th Parallel or not, showed embarrassment at about the situation and anxiety about the future, and wrote to Stalin re-
questing advice and support. Shtykov emphasized that North Korea should take necessary actions rapidly to defend the 38th Parallel. However, North Korea had virtually lost the defense capability because the majority of the NK Army, which had invaded the south, was encircled and destroyed following the friendly force’s Inch’on landing and counteroffensive, while the newly organized NK units were delayed in moving southward. Kim Il Sung, who decided to request support from Stalin, wrote the following letter in the joint names of Kim Il Sung and Pak Heun Yung of the North Korea Labor Party Central Committee.\textsuperscript{51}

Dear Comrade Stalin

We extend our sincere appreciation to you, the benefactor of the liberation of our fatherland and the leader of the working people all over the world, for your continued encouragement and assistance in all wary to the Korean people struggling for the independence and the liberation of their fatherland.

Here, I would like to explain to you briefly about the Korean people’s Liberation War against the American aggressors. Before the Inch’on landing, the American aggressors continued to fail in battles and were pushed back to the southern end. Accordingly, we had much opportunity to win a victory in the last decisive battle, while the prestige of the United States definitively plummeted. Then, the Americans assembled almost all of their army, navy, and air forces stationed in the Pacific and landed a large number of troops at Inch’on on September 16 (15), invaded Seoul, where presently street fighting is underway. The war situation is becoming increasingly urgent.

Though the NK Army is resisting bravely against the Americans’ attack, we have to mention to you that we are faced with unfavorable conditions on the frontline. About 1,000 of various types of enemy aircraft are continuously and freely striking us both in front and rear, day and
night. As we have no aircraft to oppose them, the enemy is, indeed, yielding the power of its air force. On the other hand, the enemy is exercising mobility to the maximum, but that of our NK Army is deteriorated and numbed.

The enemy cut off our forces' communication, transportation and liaison network. The enemy forces which landed at Inch'on made a link-up with the enemy advancing from the southern front and had a strong possibility of seizing Seoul. On the other hand, the NK Army was cut off from South Korea and those troops on the southern front were further separated into smaller groups. Therefore, our troops are not only out of food and ammunition, but some of them are dispersed and are in danger of being encircled.

Once Seoul falls into enemy's hands, they will cross the 38th Parallel and invade North Korea. If we continue to remain in the unfavorable situation, that we are in today, we think the enemy aggression will succeed. If we are to resolve logistical and supply problems and to secure mobility, we have to have, first of all, an air force. Unfortunately, we have no available pilots.

It is our firm determination that no matter what difficulties we may face, we will overcome them and fight to the last drop of our blood for independence, democracy, and the happiness of our people. We will do our best to organize as many new divisions as possible and train them. We will also assemble our troops in South Korea in the designated areas, and conduct a prolonged war until the entire population will be armed.

However, in case the enemy, taking advantage of our urgent situation, continues its advance north of the 38th Parallel line, without giving us any time, we have no capability to overcome this crisis on our own.

Therefore, we cannot but solicit your support. In other words, if the enemy invades north of the 38th Parallel, the intervention of the Soviet forces is absolutely needed. If the Soviet Union is not in a position to provide such aid for one reason or another, we ask you to arrange the creation of an international volunteer army by China and the other
democratic countries.

The North Korea Labor Party Central Committee
Kim Il Sung
Pak Heun Yung
September 29, 1950

This letter was cabled to Moscow by Ambassador Shtykov the next day on October 1, 1950 when the ROK Army crossed the 38th Parallel line. Stalin received the letter in his summer house located far away from Moscow. Upon receiving the letter, "as Stalin was unwilling to risk a confrontation with the United States, he considered a more acceptable form of assistance to North Korea to be assistance by the people's volunteers, which, in his view, was a question that must be discussed first of all with the Chinese comrades." He immediately sent Mao the following telegram requesting the dispatch of China's troops through the Soviet Ambassador in Communist China. He also relayed his intentions to Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador in North Korea, and A. I. Matyveev, his personal military representative in North Korea.

Request you send this letter immediately to either Mao or Chou.591

Since I am now on leave far away from Moscow, I cannot follow closely what is going on in Korea. Nevertheless, according to the information sent to me from Moscow, I understand that the North Korea comrades are now in a desperate situation.

Moscow already warned the North Korea comrades that the Americans' landing at Inch'on on September 16 [15] was significant in that it cut off the NK 1st and 2nd Corps from the northern rear area. Moscow advised North Korea to immediately move four divisions from the south to establish defensive positions north and east of Seoul and then gradually redeploy the main force of the southern front toward the north and defend the 38th Parallel. However, the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd

19 сентября 1950 года.
Corps were unable to execute Kim Il Sung's order to evacuate the troops northward, and consequently, the troops were cut off and enveloped. The North Korea comrades has no forces to launch a counteroffensive, and hence one has to admit that the roads to the 38th Parallel line are open.

If you think that you can support North Korea with troops, then your troops can swiftly move to the 38th Parallel. Supposing that you commit only five to six divisions, I think, the North Korea comrades can take the opportunity to organize the reserve forces north of the 38th Parallel line under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions, of course, will be under the command of Chinese commanders and can be dispatched in the form of a volunteer army. I have not informed the North Korea comrades of any of this, nor will I. However, I am more than sure that if the North Korea comrades learn of it, they certainly will be elated. I am looking forward to your reply.

Filippov (Stalin)
October 1, 1950

To say nothing of the political prestige of Kim Il Sung who had been convinced of victory, the honor of Stalin, who had consented, and Mao who had agreed to the war, were at stake, and at this crossroad Stalin advised Mao to rescue Kim Il Sung. Prior to the war, in the Sino-Soviet, the North Korea-Soviet, and the Sino-North Korea meetings, they had agreed that Communist China should assume the primary responsibility of the communist movement in Asia. Communist China not only defined the Korean War to be a Chinese-North Korea joint task, but also promised to enter the war in the event that the Americans intervened. Under such circumstances, it seemed to be reasonable for Communist China to take action first.

On this point, Khrushchev mentioned in his memoirs that Stalin was afraid of direct confrontation with the Americans in the Korean War, and in
order to avoid it, he said he would not send Soviet troops to the war, even though Kim Il Sung might be defeated. This was related to the fact that the Soviets had withdrawn their military advisors dispatched to the NK infantry divisions prior to the war, as the Soviets were afraid that their involvement in the war would be exposed if the advisors were captured. In consequence, the Soviets advice that Communist China intervene in the war backed up the reasoning that the former wanted to conceal their support for the war and to avoid a direct confrontation with the Americans. However, Stalin seriously considered the fact that once Communist China entered the war with the Americans, the Soviets would be obliged to intervene in the war also, following the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. Dmitri Volkogonov mentioned in his book Stalin that Stalin requested China’s intervention in the war with the understanding that it might lead inevitable to a Third World War, in the then East-West cold war structure. Here is what Stalin surmised:

The United States might wage a big war for the sake of hegemony. The United States forced Communist China into the war and will also force the Soviet Union, which contracted a mutual assistance treaty with Communist China. Should we be afraid of it? In my thinking the answer is ‘no’. The reason is that the combined forces of our two countries are stronger than the United States and Great Britain together. The European capitalist countries, now without Germany which can offer no assistance to America, do not possess any considerable military power. If the war is inevitable, let’s have it now, not in a few years when Japanese will have been revived.

Following the consultation which he had with Mao during the war planning stage, and in order to avoid a direct confrontation with America, Stalin requested the Communist China’s intervention in the war, but that he seriously considered the possibility that Chinese intervention might lead to a
Third World War. In view of such such consideration, he requested China to enter the war in the form of a 'Volunteer Army.'

2. Kim Il Sung Asks China to Assist North Korea

On October 1, when Stalin requested Mao to commit the CCF, following Kim Il Sung’s request to Stalin to send troops, Kim Il Sung hastily dispatched a delegation led by Pak Heun Yung, the North Korea foreign minister, to Peking to ask Mao to send troops to Korea. Pak flew to Peking, met Chou En Lai and Mao, and asked them to dispatch the CCF, handing over Kim Il Sung’s letter to Mao. The content of his letter, which was similar to that addressed to Stalin, explained the urgent military situation, expressed their determination to wage a prolonged war, and requested the immediate dispatch of Chinese troops. The letter was as follows:

Until the Americans landed at Inch'on, the war situation was favorable to us. The enemy committed failure after failure in battles and was confined in the small region of the southern end of Korea. The last decisive victory was imminent for the NK Army, and America’s military prestige plummeted. Then, the Americans, in order to recover their prestige and establish their colony and military base on the Korean Peninsula, hastily assembled almost all of their army, navy and air force in the Pacific region, landed its troops at Inch’on in the middle of September, and captured Seoul. The NK army resisted stubbornly against the enemy which landed, but the latter had already made link-up with the troops of the southern front, thus cutting through the middle of the NK army. The NK troops on the southern front were also cut off and in danger of being divided. The enemy seems to continue its advance northward after seizing Seoul, and unless the NK Army can overcome the unfavorable conditions, it appears that the war will develop as the
enemy intends.
By all means possible, we will overcome the difficulties and stop the
Korean Peninsula from being transformed into a colony and a military
base. We will not spare bloodshed and will continue our struggle to
achieve independence and liberation until the last drop of blood is
shed.
Currently, we have set to work organizing new divisions with all of our
available resource and are assembling over 100,000 troops in the south-
ern front in areas which are operationally favorable. We are now pre-
paring for a protracted war by mobilizing all our people.
If the enemy exploits our urgent situation to the maximum and contin-
ue to advance north of the 38th Parallel line without giving us time, we
will be unable to overcome this difficulty with our own power.
Accordingly, we are obliged to solicit your special assistance. In case
the enemy advances north of the 38th Parallel, we urgently request that
the Chinese Communist Forces intervene directly and assist us.36

In addition to Pak’s visit to Peking, Kim Il Sung met the Ambassador
Ni Zhi Liang and the counsellor Chai Cheng Wen of the Chinese embassy in
North Korea at the reception of the first anniversary of the establishment of
the Communist China regime, held in the basement of the Chinese embassy,
and asked that Communist China send troops as soon as possible to assist the
NK Army. He also said “MacArthur wishes to shake hands with me, but in our
custom there is nothing like shaking hands.” He then made the gesture of
wielding his first, and requested that the CCF 13th Army Group which was de-
ployed along the Yalu, cross it and assist the NK Army as soon as possible.
The ambassador confirmed that he would transmit the request to Peking as
quickly as he could.37

On October 1, 1950, when Kim Il Sung requested Chinese assistance
through the Chinese Ambassador in P’yongyang, in addition to the dispatch of
Pak Heun Yung to Peking, the ROK Army began to cross the 38th Parallel, just as Kim Il Sung had predicted in his letters requesting military assistance. On the same day, General MacArthur advised Kim Il Sung: As in the near future, North Korea’s potential capability for war will inevitably be destroyed, surrender so that further unnecessary bloodshed and destruction of property can be avoided.\textsuperscript{309}

The next day (October 2), however, Kim Il Sung, in the name of the Supreme Commander of the NK Army, issued an order to the NK Army: Continue to resist, withdrawing in order to occupy a new northern position. This was an expression of the determination to resist to the end without accepting MacArthur’s advice to surrender.

In consequence, Kim Il Sung not only brought about unprecedented fratricide and destruction of the national land by provoking the war, but also, when repulsed, attempted to involve the Soviet or Chinese troops, taking the risk of leading to an even bigger war and a greater tragedy.

3. Mao Decides to Dispatch the Troops

Mao received the request to dispatch the Chinese troops on the day that marked the beginning of the second year of the Chinese Communist regime. On this day, in the presence of Mao, a magnificent ceremony celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the regime was held in Tienanmen Square. Upon returning late from the ceremony, he summoned a meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party to deal with the North Korea’s request to dispatch the troops. They decided to discuss this issue on the next day in an enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee with the participation of military planners of Peking.

That night Mao pondered over the problems until after midnight: the
dangerous military situation developing in Korea, the various problems which may result from China’s intervention in the war, and the consequences which a war against America, would entail, since America was such a super-power that the whole world is in America-phobia.’ After consideration, Mao reached the important decision to dispatch the troops and assist North Korea, based on the following arguments:39

First, Communist China should dispatch its troops and assist North Korea in the interest of international communism and to oppose America’s domination of the world.
Second, America’s expansion of the war was not limited only to the threat of the existence of North Korea, but also directly connected with that of China. The United States historically has been friendly to Chiang Kai Shek and aggressive toward Communist China.
Third, it is unavoidable that Communist China should wage a war against the United States. It is true that America is superior in economy, technology, and equipment, but since it also has weak points, we can win the war.

In the long run, Mao himself decided on the intervention, a nationally important matter at 02:00 on October 2, following his considering the matter during many sleepless nights. Immediately after his decision, he ordered Gau Gang, who was responsible for the NEBDA region, and Teng Hua, the 13th Army Group commander, to complete the preparations before the planned date, and wait for the operation order.

At 15:00 on October 2, the enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee was held. Mao, Liu Shao Chi, Chu Teh, and Chou En Lai, who were the Standing Committee members, attended the meeting, as did Gau Gang, the North-East Military Region commander, and Nieh Jung Chen, the acting chief of staff of the CCF. At the beginning of the meeting, Mao gave his opinion that,
Mao's Decision To Enter the War

友邻危急，毛泽东决心派兵援助

1950年10月1日新中国迎来了建国后的第一个国庆节。全国一片欢腾气氛。

也是10月1日这一天，从朝鲜传来消息，美、伪军已经越过三八线。

同日，朝鲜劳动党总书记金日成和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府和中共中央发出了急盼中国人民解放军出兵援助的请求。是出兵参战？还是不参战？这一重大问题已刻不容缓地摆到了新中国的领袖面前。

国庆之夜，北京天安门广场。多姿多彩的焰火把夜空点缀得像是仙境，明亮的探照灯光柱在空中欢快地跳跃，广场上，欢声笑语汇成了欢乐的海洋。..............................

深了，毛泽东和其他中央领导走下天安门城楼，乘车返回住地。毛泽东回到中南海，下了汽车，走进他的办公室。

夜，灯光并不明亮。

墙上一幅很大的世界地图，毛泽东主席严肃地站在地图旁，久久地凝视着地图上的朝鲜半岛和我国领土台湾海峡。

多少天来，毛泽东夜不成眠，反复思考出兵援助问题。这时，他正陷于决策思维的复杂过程中。朝鲜是我国的邻邦，在面临唇亡齿寒的危险时刻，作为新中国的最高领导者，应该采取什么样的决策，是一个十分重大的问题。他在考虑新中国走过的艰难道路和新面临的抉择：..............................

毛泽东考虑：一是从国际主义的总体利益出发和反对帝国主义称霸世界的需要，必须出兵支援朝鲜人民；二是帝国主义扩大侵略战争，不仅是危及朝鲜民主主义共和国的生存，而且也是针对中国的。美帝国主义集团执行蒋介石积极支持中国人民共和国为敌的政策；三是我们同美帝的一场较量是不可避免的。美帝有经济技术和装备优势，但也有弱点，是可以战胜的。毛泽东是一位具有远见卓识的策略家，他深思熟虑，胸怀全局，面对强敌，无丝毫怯意，他科学分析形势，以革命领袖的勇往直前的胆略和气魄，战略上的高超决策艺术，决心派兵支援朝鲜。

房间烟雾弥漫，隐约可见毛泽东主席在来回踱步，不停地抽着香烟。那浓重的烟雾告诉人们，毛泽东主席正在为共和国的命运夜以继日地运筹帷幄。

时间又过了半个小时，墙上时钟正指向2时整，毛主席走到
under the current situation, China should intervene in the war. He emphasized that the North Korea situation was very dangerous. "The question is not whether we send the troops to North Korea or not, but how soon we can send them. One day's delay may bring about decisive effects in the whole situation. Today, we have to discuss two urgent matters, that is, when we will send our troops, and who will be the commander." His speech was positive and indicated the conclusion of the meeting. His thoughts became the keynote of the discussion of the Chinese Communist leaders about Communist China's role in the Korean Peninsula in the future.

Consequently, in the meeting they accepted Mao's decision as an accomplished fact, and mainly discussed when to dispatch the troops and appointment of the commander. They first discussed the appointment of the commander. They could have solved the problem easily if Lin Piao had accepted the commandship. They regarded him as the right man to command the Chinese Forces to be sent to Korea because he had a reputation as a distinguished general of the CCF, had commanded the Fourth Field Army mostly in the northeast area during the Nationalist-Communist civil war, and was familiar with the terrain of Manchuria and the Korea-Chinese border areas. In addition, the NEBDA was now mostly composed of the armies which had been under the command of the Fourth Field Army. However, Lin Piao refused the position for reasons of health. Besides, he maintained a reserved attitude about dispatching troops when it was discussed. He believed that Communist China should not confront the Americans as China faced many difficulties both externally and internally, and that the Americans were superior in technology to China.

Therefore, the Standing Committee as an alternative appointed Peng Teh Huai as commander. He was one of the founding members of the CCF, had fought many battles together with Mao since the end of 1920's, and had
won the reputation as a commander with distinguished ability and sound judgment. During the Nationalist-Communist civil war he commanded the First Field Army and fought in the northwest area. With the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, he assumed the posts of the first secretary of the North-West Bureau, the chief of the Political Council of the North-West Army, the commander as well as the political commissar of the North-West Military Region, and then was promoted to deputy chief of the People’s Military Committee of the central government, as well as the vice commander-in-chief of the CCF.

They then discussed seriously the time of dispatching the troops. The timing basically depended on how soon the NEBDA could complete their final preparations, and how much time the Korean situation could offer to them. Taking into account the two factors, they decided on October 15 as the date of intervention, that is, they decided to send the troops within two weeks (14 days).

At the end of the meeting, Mao said that he would personally cable Stalin to inform him of decision so that Peking and Moscow could work out details for wartime Chinese-Soviet military cooperation.

In consequence, on October 2 the Chinese Communists (the Politburo Standing Committee of Chinese Communist Party) decided to send troops to Korea around October 15 with Peng Teh-huai as the commander.80

After Communist China had made the decision, it took two important diplomatic actions: Mao replied to Stalin who had requested Communist China to send troops to Korea, and Chou sent warning messages to the Truman administration. First, following the meeting, on October 2, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin in the form of a reply to Stalin’s letter of request. According to the Soviet documents, however, the reply, contrary to the decisions made by Mao himself and the Politburo Standing Committee, was written in a very cautious
and reserved way, as described below, indicating that the current situation was different from what they had initially expected.\footnote{\textsuperscript{61}}

The contents of Mao's reply differs according to the source material, but here a document made public by the Soviets is quoted.

I received your telegram of October 1, 1950. We planned to send several divisions to North Korea, in case the enemy crossed over the 38th Parallel.

However, we think it is difficult to do so now because such an action will bring about grave consequences.

First, it is difficult to resolve the Korean problem with several divisions. (The equipment of our army is outmoded, and we do not have the confidence that we will win in battles against the Americans.) The enemy may cut off our retreat route.

Second, it will bring about direct confrontation between Communist China and America, and may result in Soviet involvement, and the problem will be worsened to a great extent.

Many of the Chinese leaders take the position that we should be more cautious. Of course, if we do not send troops, the North Korea comrades will face a very difficult situation, but they have to deal with it. If we send several divisions and directly confront the Americans, our peaceful projects at home will be nullified, and the Chinese people will be most dissatisfied. (The Chinese people need peace as they have not yet recovered from the hardship of the war.)

Accordingly, we think that we had better prepare against battle in future, instead of sending troops now. The North Korea comrades may switch to guerrilla warfare to overcome the current situation. We convened the Central Committee... and, therefore, it is not yet our final decision. This is our preliminary reply and we hope to continue consultation with you. If you permit, I would like to dispatch Chou En Lai and Lin Piao to discuss this matter and brief you on the Communist China and North Korea situations.

Mao Tse Tung

October 2, 1950
Mao had promised Kim Il Sung twice before the invasion, in April 1949 and in May 1950, that Communist China would send its troops if Japan or America entered the war. And after North Korea’s invasion, Mao reiterated his promises when he evaluated the war situation on the Korean Peninsula with Ambassador N. V. Roschin: “If the American forces cross over the 38th Parallel, the Chinese troops, disguised as NK troops, would enter the war to oppose the American troops.” He reconfirmed the policy of sending troops, recalling the fact that the Chinese Communist leadership had already assembled 120,000 soldiers of three armies around Mukden for that purpose. And in dialogues with Liu Chen on August 19 and 28, Mao reiterated his will to enter the war by saying that if America was to win the war, it would need 30-40 divisions, and in that case, the North Korea comrades could not drive them back, and would need China’s assistance. China and North Korea combined forces could defeat these American divisions. In addition, he had ordered the NEBDA to complete preparations to enter the war by the end of September.

At that time, Ambassador Roschin, cabling Mao’s reply to Moscow, reported to Stalin on Mao’s changed attitude, as follows: [27]

Mao’s reply shows a change in the Chinese Communist leadership’s original position on the Korean problems. His reply conflicts with the Chinese position that Mao mentioned several times during the dialogues with Liu Chen, and that Liu Shao Chi expressed in the interviews with me, which I reported already. In these dialogues, they said that Communist China was ready to assist the North Korea people, if they needed the support of the Chinese people and troops. They also said that as they regarded the American troops to be weaker than the Japanese troops, they could defeat the American troops.

The Chinese Communist regime will be able to send more than five or six divisions. Of course, the CCF are in need of being reinforced with anti-tank weapons, cannons, and so on. The reason why Communist
China has changed its position, is not known yet.

As was shown in the report, Mao promised North Korea and the Soviets that they would enter the war in case America intervened in the war, and made the NEBDA ready for that end, strengthening the overall CCF war preparations. However, faced with the combat power and high morale of the US and UN forces, which Communist China had not anticipated at the war planning stage, the CCF certainly saw the difficulty in opposing American troops with its land force oriented army with inferior equipment and without an air force. Accordingly, Mao’s cautious attitude could be interpreted as China’s strategy to get a promise from the Soviets for the support of the Soviet Air Force, and to secure additional support in the way of combat equipment, before giving the final reply.

On October 3, the next day of the meeting, Chou En Lai arranged an emergency meeting with Indian Ambassador Panikkar, and asked him to convey the following message to the American government:

The American forces are trying to cross the 38th Parallel and expand the war. If they really want to do this, I will not sit by without doing anything. We will intervene in the war.

As was seen above, Chou’s warning message was sent off after the top Chinese Communist leaders had made the decision to enter the war. However, in the past, without knowing that the decision had already been made before Chou’s warning, it was quoted by many scholars as evidence that Communist China did not want a direct confrontation with the United States. In other words, it was utilized to back up the assertion that this warning was the last chance to avoid a direct Chinese-American confrontation, and if the United States had responded seriously, and ordered the UN forces not to cross the 38th Parallel, Communist China’s military intervention could have been
averted.

Since we now know that top Chinese leaders had made the decision to enter the war before Chou's warning, not after it, the above assertion is groundless. Then a question emerges: What was the real meaning of Chou's warning? To answer this question is obviously not an easy task, especially because we have no way of getting into the minds of Mao, Chou, and other Chinese leaders. Combining the clues now available, however, two hypothetical alternative interpretations are offered here.\(^{90}\)

First, it could have been designed to delay the advance of UN forces. Though the Chinese were preparing for the war and decided to enter the war, they still needed time for the last-minutes preparations. As UN forces were advancing northward rapidly, top Peking leaders must have realized that the UN forces could reach the Chinese-Korean border before they could act. If so, they would lose the grounds on which to send in Chinese troops. They needed some actions to delay the advance of the UN forces.

Second, it could have been made for political consideration to justify Communist China's intervention. Chinese Communist leaders were eager, internally, to use 'The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea' as a means to mobilize the Chinese nation, and externally, to promote China's prestige and influence in the world through intervention in the war. They believed that the justification of hostility would serve to resolve many domestic and foreign problems resulting from their intervention.

In Peking following the diplomatic actions, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Central Committee was held on October 4. The central topic of the meeting was the Politburo Standing Committee's decision to send Chinese troops to Korea. This meeting was attended by the members of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and other key leaders including Peng Teh
Huai. Mao announced at the beginning of the meeting that the Politburo Standing Committee had made the decision to send troops to Korea. Because of the importance of the decision, Mao asked those attending the meeting to list the possible disadvantages involved in dispatching troops to Korea.

Following Mao's call, most people attending the meeting, including Lin Piao and Gau Gang, expressed their reservations about the decision to enter the war; and surprisingly, their views prevailed during the first day's meeting. Their opinions can be summarized as three main arguments.⁶³

First, having experienced decades of wars, China faced tremendous economic and financial problems. To achieve economic recovery and reconstruction, China needed a period of peaceful recuperation. Sending troops into Korea might cause discontent at home.

Second, China faced difficult political problems. The country had not been finally unified, and Taiwan and some offshore islands were still controlled by remnants of the GMD (Guomindang). Furthermore, land reform was just beginning in many recently liberated areas. Participation in the Korean War would weaken the efforts to solve these problems.

Third, the Chinese Army would meet in Korea a geographical situation completely different from that of China, and would have to conduct warfare without control of the air or guarantees of logistic supply. They could, therefore, suffer in face of superior American weapons and equipment.

Mao did not directly refute these opinions, but before the adjournment of the meeting, he revealed his disagreement with them: "All you have said is not without grounds. But when other people are in a crisis, how can we stand aside with our arms folded. This would make me feel sad."

Mao's determination to enter the war, obviously, had not been weakened by the reservations of his comrades. He had the confidence that his deci-
sion was correct. In the meeting which resumed on the following day (October 5), Peng Teh Huai, who accepted the commandship, spoke firmly in support of sending troops. He stressed that by entering the Korean War, Communist China would have an opportunity to conquer both the arrogance of the United States and the bluster of reactionaries at home. Peng concluded that it was absolutely necessary to send troops to Korea.

Peng’s speech transformed the mood of the meeting, and the discussion now centered on the advantages of sending troops to Korea. The participants finally reached a consensus:

First, the Korean problem was not an isolated one. It had become the focus of the confrontation between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp in the East, perhaps even in the world. The purpose of sending troops to Korea was not only to rescue Korea, but also, and more importantly, to defend and promote an Asian and world revolution.

Second, the safety of Korea was closely linked to the security of China. If the Americans reached the Yalu River, China would lose an important strategic buffer zone and face a heavy burden in defending its northeast border.

Third, comparing China’s situation with that of the United States, China was superior in terms of manpower, moral strength, and support from the people, which would balance China’s inferiority in terms of weapons and equipment.

At the end of the meeting, Mao said “Our entry into the war certainly brings lots of difficulties. But Korea is our neighbor and a friendly country, and the Chinese people cannot look on idly at what Americans are doing in Korea. ‘When lips are hurt, teeth feel chilly’, and ‘When the door is destroyed, the house is in danger.’ We must intervene in the war. If we enter the war, it will be to our interest, and if we don’t, it will bring us immense loss.”
Mao concluded the meeting, stressing the necessity to enter the Korean War, "we have now only one choice, that is, no matter how many difficulties or dangers we may encounter, we have to send troops to Korea immediately, before P'yongyang is occupied by the enemy."\[^{68}\]

At the closing address, Mao mentioned that the regarded Korea as the door-step to China, and recalling that in the past the Japanese occupied Korea by force and used Korea as a bridgehead from which to invade China, he emphasized that China should not permit the American occupation of Korea, that it would bring about a serious threat to China's security. He also said that the Soviet Union had no obligation to enter the war, and China which had contracted the alliance treaty with the Soviets, had a close relationship with the Soviets. He also said that if the Americans attacked China, the Soviet would perform their duty according to the treaty.

The Politburo's meeting on October 4 and 5 was not a decision making one in a strict sense, because the key decision had been made by the Politburo Standing Committee on October 2. Mao's purpose was to secure acceptance of his decision to enter the Korean War by the 'democratic process.'

After the meeting, Mao invited Chou En Lai, Gau Gang, and Peng Teh Huai to dine with him. They further discussed the practical problems involved in implementing the decision to send troops to Korea. Mao stressed again that Chinese troops needed to enter Korea quickly, and he worried that any delay could result in fatal consequences. He directed Peng and Gau to travel to Mukden as soon as possible to convey the decision to commanders above the division level of the NEBDA. The troops of the Border Defense Army, Mao emphasized, should enter Korea by October 15. At the same time Chou En Lai would fly to the Soviet Union to finalize details of Soviet air support for Chinese ground forces and supply of military equipment.\[^{69}\]

In this way, Communist China's decision to enter the war which was
made by Mao himself, was confirmed at the Politburo Standing Committee, and was passed at the Central Committee, as the necessary formalities on October 4 and 5. In the meetings, they named Peng Teh Huai as the commander, and decided that the CCF would enter the war by October 15.

As was seen above, Communist China’s decision had been made before the US Forces crossed the 38th Parallel (October 9). China’s ‘Resist America, Assist Korea’ war history, which was compiled recently, however, indicates that the decision was made early in October, as follows: 76

Early in October, Mao chaired the several Central Politburo meetings, and discussed the issues of sending the troops to Korea. In these meetings, they analyzed carefully and scientifically the national and international situation and calculated the gain and loss. In consequence, they decided to rescue North Korea from danger from the standpoint of proletarianism, internationalism, and patriotism. They also made an important strategic decision to ‘Resist America, Assist Korea’, and ‘Secure House, Defend Country’ for the security of the country and the peace of the East and the world. Determined to overcome all sorts of difficulties, they decided to organize the CPV (Chinese People’s Volunteers), send it to Korea, and defeat the American aggression jointly with the Korean people.

After the confirmation of the entry into the war, the Chinese Communist leadership prepared two strategies in consideration of the possible changes of the war situation following its intervention: one was to repel the US (UN) forces from the Korean Peninsula, and the other was to prepare against the US naval and air forces attack on the Chinese mainland. In this connection, the ‘Resist America, Assist Korea’ war history states as follows: 77

The one is to prepare to exterminate and drive out the invading forces of America and the other countries. The other one is to prepare against
Prior to the dispatching of the troops, Communist China stages nation-wide campaigns 'Resist America, Assist Korea,' and 'Secure House, Defend Country'.

the America’s declaration of war against China as the Chinese forces will fight against the American forces in Korean territory, and take necessary measures at least against the US air force’s bombing of the many large cities and industrial centers, and the navy’s attack on the coastal areas. Of these two, the priority will be given to the defeat of the US army by the CCF in Korean territory, and the effective resolution of the Korean problem. To defeat the American forces means that the CCF will destroy the US Eighth Army. The seriousness of the second problem (America’s declaration of war on China) still exists, but such situation will serve favorably for the revolution front and the whole of China. The Chinese leadership must also anticipate in advance the possible diplomatic bargaining with America, once the CCF have led the operation successfully.

In order to carry out the first strategy (extermination of the US Forces in Korea), in the employment of forces, the Central Military Committee decided to commit 12 divisions of the four east border armies (corps) at first, and then
24 divisions of seven armies in the second and the third echelons successively. This number of the divisions was equivalent to double the number of the then ROK and UNC divisions in Korea.

In the operational field, they planned to establish the base area in the mountainous area north of the P'yongyang-Wonsan line first, then establish two or three defensive lines north of that line and south of the Tokch'on-Yongwon line, conduct the defensive operation first, and then switch to a counteroffensive to exterminate the US 'invaders.' Their plan was that during the defensive phase, if the enemy launched attacks, they would defeat the enemy in detail. Even if the enemy did not advance up to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line, they would stick to the defensive line, and would not go forward to attack the enemy for six months.

They planned that the CCF would wait until the equipment they purchased from the Soviet Union arrived, they would conduct sufficient training with this equipment, and thus the CCF would maintain the overwhelming superiority over the enemy both on the land and in the air, that is, they would wait for six months before switching to the offensive. In other words, their initial strategy was to have a six month defensive or preparation period before launching an offensive operation.

Along with the first strategy, the Chinese Communists also prepared for the second strategy. They organized the National Air Defense Preparation Committee, to strengthen air-defense capability for the defense of the large cities and industrial centers from the US air strikes. They also deployed four armies in Fujian and Jiangsu to defend the coastal areas from US or Chiang Kai Shek’s naval attacks.

At the same time, the Chinese Communist leadership issued a directive to all the members of the Communist Party and the people of the country encouraging a correct understanding of the situation and confidence for vic-
They developed their reasoning saying "We are necessary not only to send the troops, but also must win the war against the imperialists. America is but a paper tiger; though it is superior in economy and equipment, it will be politically isolated since its aggressive acts are faced with the opposition of all the people of the world. Militarily, it is vulnerable, too, as the front-line is long and far away from the rear, strength is short, and the morale of its troop is not high... The atomic bombs which are not its exclusive possession, cannot decide the victory or defeat of the war. Therefore, the final victory will surely belong to the Chinese and Korean peoples."

In particular, Mao devalued the atomic bomb, saying "The atomic bomb is a piece of equipment capable of massive destruction, but the outcome of the war will be decided by the people, not by one or two atomic bombs."

As was described above, in spite of many domestic, political and economic difficulties, Communist China decided to enter the war, placing stress on the positive aspects such as its national security and the enhancement of its international position. In establishing strategy, The Chinese divided it into that of the campaign in Korea, and that of the mainland defense, and expedited their war preparations. They also encouraged the people’s fighting spirit, calling America a paper tiger, and made systematic preparations for their strategies. As Mao stated in the closing address of the Central Politburo meeting, it is evident that the Mao-Stalin meeting in Moscow and the Sino-Soviet treaty played an important role in making his decision.
IV. Organization of ‘Resist America, Assist Korea’
Troops and Preparation to Enter War

1. The North-East Border Defense Army Reorganized into the
Chinese People’s Volunteers

Mao, who had ratified the decision of the CCF’s entry in the war in
the Central Politburo meeting, changed the name of the NEBDA, which had
been preparing to enter the war, to the CPV (Chinese People’s Volunteers) on
October 8, in the name of Chairman of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary
Military Commission, and ordered it to move into Korea. With the issuance of
this order and with only one week left until the date of intervention, the prepa-
ration to enter the war was further intensified.

As was seen in the reorganization order, the Chinese forces committed
to the Korean war was a part of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), the Chi-
nese Communist regular army, of which the NEBDA was a part. Nevertheless,
they called it a volunteer force, not an army. It was the Chinese Communist re-
gime’s intent to pretend that the troops were not sent officially by the govern-
ment, but were organized voluntarily by the people. It implied that China’s dis-
patching troops was not a governmental action to fight against the Americans
and the other UN member countries, but a civilian level action. In other words,
Chinese Communists used this camouflaged method to convey the message to
the United States that the dispatching troops did not mean a declaration of a
war. Following are the organization of the CPV (Chinese People’s Volunteers)
and the order to enter the war, as described in the ‘Resist America, Assist
Korea’ war history.
The organization of the CPV and the order to enter the war:

(1) In order to assist the Korean people’s liberation war and oppose the American imperialists and their tools, and thus safeguard the interests of the people of Korea, China, and East-Asia, the NEBDA is to be renamed CPV and move into the Korean territory, conduct joint operations with Korean comrades, and attain an honorable victory.

(2) The CPV will control the 13th Army Group headquarters, its subordinate units of the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies, and the North-East Border Defense Artillery Command and its subordinate units of the 1st, 2nd, and 8th Artillery Divisions. These units will complete the preparations for the war and wait for the order.

(3) Peng Teh Huai is designated as the commander and political commissar of the CPV.

(4) The CPV will use the North-East Administration Region as its rear base, and Gau Gang, the commander and the political commissar of the North-East Military Region, will be responsible for the logistical and rear area missions appropriate for assisting the Korean comrades.

(5) The CPV must show friendship and respect for the Korean people, the Korean People’s Army, the Korean Democratic Government, the Korean Labor (communist) Party, the Korean Democratic Party, and Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Korean people. It also must observe military morale and political discipline. This is an important political basis which will guarantee the achievement of the military mission.

(6) The CPV is to consider seriously the possible situations and difficulties it is to face, and must be prepared to overcome those difficulties with great passion, courage, thoughtfulness, and a spirit of endurance. The current domestic and international situations are favorable to us and unfavorable to the aggressors. If you, comrades, are determined and valiant, cooperate with the Korean people, and fight well against the aggressors, the final victory will be ours.

The Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Commission
Chairman Mao Tse Tung
October 8, 1950, Peking
Mao informed Stalin of the above order and hastily dispatched Chou En Lai to Moscow in secrecy to guarantee the Soviet support in connection with China’s sending of troops. At the same time Mao cabled Kim Il Sung the following messages:①②

The Chinese government will send the CPV to Korea to assist the NK army. Peng Teh Huai was designated to be the commander and political commissar of the CPV. Gau Gang, the commander and the political commissar of the North-East Military Region, will be in charge of logistical support for the CPV.

Together with the message, Mao asked Kim Il Sung to send Pak Il Woo, the NK domestic affairs minister, to Mukden to meet Peng Teh Huai and Gau Gang and discuss the entering operation of the CPV into Korea. Consequently, Chinese Communists officially informed Stalin and Kim Il Sung of the dispatch of the CPV one week after Stalin had received the official request to dispatch troops from Korea. It is important that the issuance of the order for the CPV’s organization and entry into the war, and the official announcement of the intervention in the war, all took place one day earlier than October 9, when the UN forces began the advance northward. On October 9, the commander in chief of the United Nations Command, General MacArthur, for the last time called upon Kim Il Sung to surrender, informing him of the UN resolution of October 7 through radio and dissemination of leaflets. As was anticipated, no response was made by Kim Il Sung, and the UN force’s attack northward began on the same day. Two days later (October 11) Kim Il Sung responded by issuing order to the NK Army: “Let us defend our fatherland with our blood.”⑥

Peng Teh Huai (age 66), who was designated as the CPV commander,
went to Mukden, his new post, where he summoned the Commanders of the North-East Military Region and the 13th Army Group and its subordinate units, and organized the CPV headquarters based on the 13th Army Group headquarters. He then named Teng Hua as CPV vice commander and vice political commissar, Hong Hsueh Chih and Han Hsien Chu as vice commanders, Hsieh Fang as chief of staff, and Tu Ping as the chief of the political bureau. He also established the chain of command of the party, in addition to that of the military, by organizing the CPV Military Committee, of which Peng himself was the secretary and Teng Hua the vice secretary.78

2. The Chinese Communist Forces (Chinese People’s Volunteers)

Preparation to Enter the War

While the CCF (CPV) were expediting the preparations to enter the war, Pak Il Woo, the NK domestic affairs minister, came over to Antung on October 12, and consulted with Peng, Teng Hua, and Gau on the operation for the CPV’s entry into Korea. Pak Il Woo reported to them that in the eastern front Wonsan had fallen into enemy hands. On the western front the UN forces had begun to advance northward, and P’Yongyang, the NK capital, was in grave danger. He then again requested, on behalf of Kim II Sung and the North Korea Labor Party, the immediate dispatch of troops to Korea.79

At that time, The Chinese Communist Central Military Commission estimated “since the Chinese army (corps) was inferior 42 to 1 to the US corps in the number of cannons, and the Chinese Navy and Air Force were also not in the position to enter the war immediately, it was hardly expected that the CPV could exterminate one enemy corps at a time. The CPV’s operation was feasible only if it was 4 times superior to the enemy in strength and 1.5 to 2 times in firepower.” For that reason, the commission decided to purchase
weapons from the Soviet Union and requested Soviet air force support, while augmenting its weapons and equipment. According to the Central Military Commission’s analysis of the competition of friendly and enemy forces’ combat power, the CPV, in order to strengthen its combat power, was waiting for the arrival of the purchased weapons and equipment, and also for the support of the Soviet air force, which was then under negotiation.

After the briefing by Pak Il Woo, Peng decided on the line where the CPV was to be deployed, based on the Central Military Commission’s strategy to secure their base area north of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line. He planned that one army would be deployed around Tokch’on, a mountainous area, about 100 kilometer northeast of P’yongyang, while the other three armies and three artillery divisions would be deployed around Huich’on and Kanggye to achieve the following two objects.

First, to make the ROK and US Forces feel the danger because of the CPV deployment, and halt their further advance. It would allow the communists to secure the region north of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line, and would keep at least these areas from enemy occupation. By doing so, the CCF would gain time to prepare the war.

Second, if the enemy in the western part of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line continued to advance northward to Tokch’on, the CPV would employ a part of its forces to check the enemy (US forces), concentrate its main forces toward the enemy (ROK forces) coming from the direction of Wonsan, and attempt to exterminate them. If the CPV could destroy only two or three enemy divisions, the war situation would be changed to a great extent.

In this way, the CPV, which had completed operational coordination and the operation plan, was making final preparations and waiting for the order to go.
However, on October 12, an order was received from Mao. It was not an order to go, but an order to hold the CPV movement, as described below.\(^3\)

(1) The implementation of the war order of October 8 is to be suspended immediately. All units of the 13th Army Group should 'stay where they are to undertake more training, not to begin operations.'

(2) Peng and Gau are requested to return to Peking for further discussion about entry into the war decision.

Mao Tse Tung
20:00 hours of October 12

On the same day, Mao sent another telegram to the political commissar and the commander of the East China Military Region, ordering the units under their command that had served as the NEBDA’s reserve forces to stop all actions and stay in their current positions until further notice. This was due to the difficult problems at issue in the Chino-Soviet final negotiation. Because of this delay, the CPV’s entry into the war entered a new phase, and North Korea became more and more nervous.

V. Sino-Soviet Final Negotiation and China’s Reconfirmation of Entering War

1. Chou En Lai’s and Stalin’s Final Negotiation

On October 8, Mao issued the order to organize the CPV, informed the Soviet government of it, and dispatched Chou En Lai to Moscow secretly to complete details of Chinese-Soviet military cooperation in Korean War.
During the initial decision making process for dispatching the Chinese troops to Korea, Mao and Stalin had several meetings, and agreed in principle that China would dispatch troops, and support North Korea, and the Soviet would dispatch air forces to Korea to cover the Chinese troops and provide China with the military assistance which could equip 20 divisions.\textsuperscript{82)}

Chou arrived in Moscow on October 10 and, accompanied by Lin Piao, then in Russia to receive medical treatment, flew to southern Russia to meet Stalin who was vacationing at his villa on the Black Sea. They had a marathon meeting which lasted from 19:00 until 05:00, the next morning. The Chinese participants at the meeting were Chou En Lai, Lin Piao, and Wan Jiaziang, the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Shi Zhe, the interpreter, and the Soviet participants included Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Molotov, and N. T. Fedorenko (the Russian interpreter).\textsuperscript{59} Considering the participants and the length of the meeting, it could be assumed that the meeting was not a usual one.

The meeting was held in the midst of an urgent war situation, and both sides carried the burden of completing the details of Chinese–Soviet military assistance with regard to CPV’s participation in the Korean War. The atmosphere was tense at first because neither side knew the exact stand of the other. Chou requested military assistance and air force support from the Soviets, informing them that China had made the final decision to send troops to Korea in spite of many internal and external obstacles.

Stalin pointed out that North Korea was in a most dangerous situation and mentioned that if UN forces reached the Yalu, it would cause a very difficult situation for both the Soviet Union and China, and said that the Soviet Union was not in a position to directly enter the war, but reconfirmed its support of China.

He said that the The Soviet Union is not in a position to send troops to
Korea because the Russian border with Korea was too small and the Soviet Union had already announced a complete withdrawal from Korea. If the Soviet Union sent troops there, a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States could follow. The Soviet Union would, however, provide sufficient military equipment and war material for the Chinese, and the Soviet air force would defend China's northeastern and coastal areas such as Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin and also cover the Chinese troops to be deployed along the Korean side of the Yalu.

The discussion then focused on if and when the Soviet air force could enter into Korean War. Stalin insisted that the Soviet air force needed more preparations and was therefore unable to cover the Chinese troops in Korea, at least in the initial stage. Deeply disappointed, Chou informed Stalin that China might not send its troops to Korea without cover of the Soviet air force. It was a trick to get commitment from Stalin to provide air support prior to the Chinese troops' crossing the Yalu, considering that the air support was directly related with the morale of the Chinese troops. Though Chou placed pressure on Stalin, the barrier of air support was not resolved.

In the end, Stalin and Chou decided to send a telegram to Mao jointly about the meeting through the Soviet embassy in China on October 12.(x) The telegram said "The Soviet Union will fully satisfy China’s needs for the supply of artillery, tanks, airplanes, and other military equipment" but "it will take at least two or two-and-half months for the Soviet air force to be ready to support the CPV’s operation in Korea."

From a Chinese point of view, however, Stalin's attitude violated the Soviet promise in the treaty signed with China eight months earlier (February of 1950) which stated that the Soviets would offer 'all-out' support for the Chinese if the latter entered a military confrontation with imperialist countries. It is easy to understand why Stalin's decision was viewed by the Chinese leaders
as nothing less than a betrayal at a time of real crisis. In consequence, in the final decisive meeting, Communist China failed to reach an agreement with the Soviet on the most important issue of air support.

2. Mao’s Reconfirmation to Send the Troops

Stalin’s sudden change angered Mao and the Chinese Communist leaders while, at the same time, it created tremendous pressures for them. After receiving the telegram from Chou and Stalin, Mao put the CPV’s movement on hold. Mao and other Chinese leaders in Peking now had to decide if they would intervene without direct Soviet air support. It was a very difficult decision to make whether or not the Chinese Communist ground force alone should fight against the US forces which were supported by a powerful air force.

Since early October, after the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao and his colleagues had been acting on the assumption that the Chinese troops would have sufficient support from their Soviet comrades. They had believed that the Soviet Union would supply the Chinese with military equipment and war materials, take the responsibility of protecting important industrial centers in China’s coastal areas, and provide air cover for the Chinese ground troops in Korea.

In particular, the last issue of air cover drew increasing attention from the CPV commanders, as the troops were about to enter the Korean War. For example, at the October 9 conference attended by army-level commanders in Mukden, the same question was raised, and Peng and Gau jointly asked the Central Military Commission about it. On the other hand, in the subordinate units, the army commanders were telling the junior officers and the enlisted men that they would have as many planes as they wanted. At the October 13
Chinese Communist politburo meeting, Peng became angry when he learned that the Soviet Union would not send its air force to Korea to cover the Chinese troops, and threatened to resign as the CPV’s commander. Mao again dominated the discussion. He emphasized to Peng and other participants that although the Soviet air force would not enter Korea in the initial stage of the war, Stalin had promised air defense over Chinese territory as well as the supply of large amounts of military equipment to Chinese troops. After weighing the pros and cons, especially having evaluated the serious consequences of China’s failure to send troops to Korea, the participants reached a consensus that even without direct Soviet air support in Korea, the Chinese were still in a position to fight the Americans there. As a result, the meeting reaffirmed the Communist China’s position to enter the war, whether or not the Soviets dispatched its air forces to Korea.

Immediately after the meeting, Peng sent a most urgent telegram to Teng Hua, Hsieh Fang, and other CPV commanders, ordering CPV units to accelerate preparations for entering Korea. After the meeting, Mao telegraphed to Chou to respond to Chou’s and Stalin’s October 11 telegram by summarizing the reasoning and conclusion of the Politburo meeting. Although in this telegram not all of the background of the China’s decision to enter the war was described, the reconfirmation of their decision to send the troops to Korea was well presented as follow:

(1) As a result of my discussion with the comrades of the Politburo, we are still convinced that dispatching our troops to Korea would be beneficial to us. In the first phase of the war, we may concentrate on fighting the puppet (South Korean) army, which our troops are quite capable of coping with. We may open up some bases in the mountainous areas north of Wonsan and P’yongyang. This will surely raise the spirits of the Korean people. If we can eliminate several
divisions of the puppet (South Korean) army in the first phase, the Korean situation will take a turn in our favor.

(2) The adoption of the above-mentioned active policy will be very important to the interests of China, Korea, the East Asia, and the whole world. If on the other hand, we sent none of our troops and allowed the enemy to reach the banks of the Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary bluster would surely become louder; such a situation would be very unfavorable to us and it would be even worse for the Northeast. The whole North-East Border Defense Army would be tied down there, and the electric power in southern Manchuria would be subject to the control of the enemy. In short, I believe that we should enter the war and that we must enter the war. Entering the war can be most rewarding, failing to do so may cause great harm.

Mao Tse Tung

October 13, 1950

Mao instructed Chou to inform the Soviets of China's decision, and to stay in Moscow a few more days to consult with the Soviet comrades on other pending issues. Mao wanted to know whether the Soviet Union would ask China to loan or to purchase the military equipment that Stalin agreed to provide. Mao wanted to loan it. Though the CCF could not have the Soviet air support at the initial stage of the war, Mao wanted to make sure of the defense of the Chinese coastal areas by the Soviet air force and clarify when the Soviet air force would provide air cover to the CCF in Korea.

In short, in the October 13 meeting, Mao and the Chinese leadership reaffirmed the decision of sending troops to Korea, regardless of Stalin's breaking his promise to provide air support and the CPV commanders' appeals of difficulty when fighting without air cover. Mao believed that Korea's fate concerned both the vital security interests of China and the destiny of an
Mao and Peng ponder over the difficult decision of entering the Korean War.

Eastern Asia and world communist revolution, of which the Chinese Communist revolution was an important part. Moreover, the Chinese Communist leadership’s management of the Korean crisis had been strongly influenced by Mao’s desire to use the crisis to mobilize the party and the entire Chinese nation for the completion of the Chinese Communist revolution. His decision to send Chinese troops into Korea was not an easy one; however, it was a decision consistent with the Chinese Communist Party’s specific revolutionary commitments and security concern.

3. The Overcoming of the Last Obstacle and the Committing of Troops

With the October 13 reconfirmation of dispatching of the troops, the CPV’s preparations to enter the war were expedited, while Chou’s schedule in Moscow became even busier. He informed the Soviet government of the Chi-
inese Communist Politburo's decision and consulted again with Stalin on Mao's requests. Although Stalin expressed his admiration of the Chinese government's decision, saying "The Chinese comrades are great," he continued to refuse to use Soviet air units in operations inside Korea when Chinese ground forces began operations. He did confirm, though, that the Soviets would take the responsibility of safeguarding China's territory, that the Soviet air force might enter Korea later (but no deadline was given), and that the Soviet Union would guarantee China's military supply.59

This ambiguous approach left a stamp on the long-range development of Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin's incomplete commitment made clear to Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership the limitations of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Yet the Chinese desperately needed Soviet support in any form at that moment, and Mao had no other choice but to swallow the fruit of the Soviet 'betrayal'. Mao, however, would never forgive it. A seed of the future Sino-Soviet split had thus been sown in the process of China's intervention in the Korean War.

On the other hand, around this time (October 14) Mao and Peng estimated that it would take a lot of time for UN forces to advance up to Tokch'on after the occupation of P'yongyang, since the enemy main forces were positioned around the 38th Parallel. However, they modified their operation plan because they feared that if the enemy advanced rapidly after destroying the bridges over the Yalu with its superior air force, their initial plan and the river-crossing would not be carried out as planned, particularly under the current circumstances in which the troops entered Korea without air cover.

The Military Commission's initial operation plan was to send two armies (corps) and supporting artillery across the Yalu in the first echelon to halt the enemy, followed by the other two armies in the second echelon. After Peng investigated the Mukden and Antung areas several times, he revised his
plan to send the four armies into Korea simultaneously, and requested Mao's approval for the new plan. If the first plan primarily considered that the CPV would secure safe strong points after entering Korea, the revised one put emphasis on the strategy to defeat the enemy by using superior forces on maneuvering, demoralize the enemy, and seize the operational initiative over the enemy. After consulting with Chou En Lai and Nieh Jung Chen, the acting chief of staff of the CCF, Mao approved the revised plan and thus the bold decision was made to assemble 260,000 troops, the total strength of twelve divisions, simultaneously to the south of the Yalu River.\(^{(50)}\)

Mao hoped that the Chinese troops could gain the initiative on the battlefield through a few victories over the UN forces, especially over the ROK Army units, in the initial contacts. He believed that "once we destroy one to two, or two to three, entire divisions of the ROK Army, the situation will become more favorable for us". On October 14, he ordered the CPV to cross the Yalu on October 19, four days later than the initial plan. He also ordered the Ninth Army Group (the 20th, 26th, and 27th armies) of the Third Field Army, which was the strategic reserve and stationed in Shandong Peninsula, to continue to move into areas with easy railway access to the northeast.\(^{(50)}\)

On the following day, October 15, Mao learned that UN forces, including the Americans, were preparing to seize P'yongyang. Mao, who worried that their planned defense line might be occupied by the UN forces, cabled Peng who was on his way back to Mukden from Peking, instructing him to "have our advanced troops start off on the 17th so that they will reach Tokch'on on the 23rd...and start the construction of defensive positions by the 25th..."\(^{(50)}\)

When Peng arrived in Mukden, he found that Pak Heun Yung was there. Pak told Peng that the enemy troops had approached P'yongyang, that the North Korea Communists needed their Chinese comrades to assist them at the earliest time, and that Kim Il Sung wished to meet Peng as soon as possible.
The primary purpose of Pak's visit to Mukden was to arrange the Kim-Peng meeting at Huich'on. Around that time the North Korea's regime moved to Kanggye but Kim Il Sung was commanding operations personally at the military command post at Huich'on.\(^{29}\)

On October 16, Peng chaired a conference attended by division-level commanders from CPV at Antung. He first conveyed the final decision and the background of the Politburo to send troops to Korea, and ordered that all CPV units should enter Korea in the shortest possible time. With this order, the CCF's entering operation into Korea began. On that night, an advance party, one regiment of the 42nd Army crossed the Yalu and entered North Korea.\(^{29}\) On the following morning, Hsich Fang, the chief of staff of the CPV, crossed the Yalu to Sinuiju and prepared for the comming of the main forces, and Peng returned to Mukden to solve pending issues such as logistical support for the CPV.

At this crucial moment, an unexpected problem occurred. On October 17, Teng Hua and other top CPV commanders expressed strong reservations about entering the Korean War. They said that our troops had only a few anti-aircraft artillery pieces and had no air support at this moment, and the enemy could concentrate large numbers of planes, artillery, and tanks to wage heavy attacks against us without any problem. And as the Korean terrain was mostly composed of mountainous areas and water rice fields, it would be difficult to construct defensive positions in the cold weather and the frozen soil. If the enemy started an all-out offensive, it would be less than possible for us to hold our position... It would be better if we sent off our troops not this winter but next spring.

Upon receiving this report, Mao decided to hold the issuance of the final order until he received a first-hand report from Chou En Lai, who was returning Peking from Moscow on the 18th. On the 17th he cabled Peng and Gau
ordering that the advance units of the CPV continue preparing to enter Korea and wait for a formal order which would be issued the next day. He also asked Peng and Gau to return to Peking again for discussion.

On October 18, the Chinese top leaders met again. In this meeting Mao received a report from Chou En Lai on his meeting with Stalin and then Peng reported on the reservations expressed by CPV commanders. The content of their reports was substantially identical with that already described. Listening to the reports, Mao’s mind was dominated by the worries that “the enemy troops are now attacking P’yongyang, and in a few days they could reach the Yalu River.” After the reports, Mao told his comrades “no matter how many difficulties there are, we should not change the decision to send our volunteers to cross the Yalu River to assist Korea, and we should not delay the time of action.” Following Mao’s suggestions, the meeting finally established the evening of October 19 as the deadline for the CPV to cross the Yalu. Following the meeting, Mao personally cabled Teng Hua and other CPV commanders (Peng and Gau were then still in Peking) to order CPV troops to cross the Yalu.76

The troops would start to cross the Yalu from the Antung and Chian sections tomorrow (the 19th) evening. In order to maintain strict secrecy, the troops should start to cross the river after dusk each day and stop the crossing at four o’clock the next morning; by five all troops should be completely under cover. Details will be conveyed to you in person by Gau and Peng.

In order not to reveal prematurely the CPV movement into Korea, the Chinese Communists took strict security measures: Mao ordered that what they were doing should not be reported by public media and newspapers, and that only high-ranking cadres of the party would be notified of the actions undertaken. Mao also ordered CPV soldiers to dress in the uniform of the NK
army in the initial stage of their operations, and the CPV soldiers were not allowed to send personal letters to family or friends before their departure for Korea.

In the early morning of October 19, Peng and Gau flew back to Antung. They immediately convened a meeting of top CPV commanders to guarantee that Mao’s decision would be implemented. Peng stressed that he would not tolerate any further opposition or reservation to the war decision. Peng met also with Pak Il Woo, who learned with excitement that the main forces of Chinese troops would enter Korea “today, after dark.” On October 19 after dusk, the massive CCF troops started to cross over the Yalu. Following those four armies, the 50th Army and the 66th Army also crossed the Yalu on October 26, thus a total of eighteen divisions of six armies crossed the river and entered Korea by the end of October.

As has been described, Mao was deeply involved in Kim Il Sung’s war planning stage, next only to Stalin, in the cold war structure which was formulated during the reorganization of the world order following World War II. In the Moscow meeting, Mao assumed the leading role in the acceleration and expansion of the communist revolution in the Asia. He also promised that he would dispatch Chinese troops to assist North Korea if the latter was in an unfavorable situation due to America’s intervention in Kim’s invasion war. He carried out his promise by sending the CCF (CPV) to the Korean War.

With the establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance and friendship treaty, by which it was agreed that when China entered the war with ‘the imperialist countries’, the Soviet Union would render military assistance to China, the Chinese Communists could intervene in the war under the cover of the Soviet. Immediately after he finalized the war plan with Stalin and Kim Il Sung in May 1950, Mao started preparation to enter the invasion war by postponing the Taiwan campaign and organizing the NEBDA early in July.
Mao had followed the war situation closely, and when North Korea was faced with the UN’s strong retaliation, contrary to the initial anticipation, he, together with the Soviet Union, attempted in vain to employ shrewd diplomatic countermeasures to halt the UN forces. When the battle front started to stalemate along the Pusan Perimeter, the Chinese Communists estimated that the time of their entry into the war was approaching and in August ordered the NEBDA to complete its war preparation by the end of September.

In the course of time the war situation was reversed with the Inch’on landing by the UN forces, Mao received the official requests to enter the war from both Kim Il Sung and Stalin on October 1. The next day (October 2) he made the decision to intervene in the war of ‘Resist America, Assist Korea’, and ‘Secure House, Defend Country’ under the slogan of ‘Lips Hurt, Teeth Chilly’, and ‘Door Broken, House in Danger.’ On October 8, the NEBDA was reorganized as the CPV, and the Chinese Communists issued the order to the CPV to cross the Yalu with the target date of October 15, and informed Stalin and Kim Il Sung of the decision. Following that, the Communist China went through a complicated process in which Communist China postponed the final decision twice and convened meetings of the Communist Central Politburo because of the Soviet’s changed position on air support for the CPV. However, China finally sent the advance party into Korea on October 16, followed by the main forces of the CPV which crossed the Yalu on October 19, the day when the ROK and UN forces occupied P’yongyang.
Notes


16) Ibid., p. 27.
18) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 131.
19) Ibid., p. 102.
20) Ibid., p. 104.
22) Ibid., p. 98.
31) Ibid., p. 5.
32) Ibid., p. 5.
34) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 7; War History Compilation Committee, tr., op. cit., p. 110.
35) War History Compilation Committee, tr., op. cit., p. 118.


39) Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, tr., by War History Compilation Committee, p. 147.

40) Ibid., pp. 147-148.


47) Ibid., p. 46.


49) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 163.

50) Ibid., p. 163.


52) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 171.


54) Jerrold L. Schecter, tr., *Khrushchev Remembers, The Glasnost Tapes* (Little, Brown

56) Korea Institute of Military History, tr., The Chinese Communist Leaders’ Direction of the Korean War, pp. 41-42.

57) Ibid., p. 43.


62) Ibid., p. 102.


65) Ibid., p. 182; Korea Institute of Military History, tr., The Chinese Communist Leaders’ Direction of the Korean War, pp. 64-67.


67) Korea Institute of Military History, tr., Ibid., p. 67.

68) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 184.

69) Ibid., p. 185.


72) Ibid., pp. 11-12.
73) War History Compilation Committee, tr., *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 182-185.
79) Ibid., p. 89.
80) Ibid., p. 89.
81) Ibid., p. 90.
82) Ibid., p. 83, p. 91.
83) Ibid., p. 83; Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 197.
84) Ibid., p. 82-87; Chen Jian, Ibid., pp. 196-200.
87) Ibid., p. 96; Chen Jian, Ibid., p. 204.
89) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 205.
90) Ibid., pp. 205-206.
92) Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 206.

93) Ibid., pp. 207-208.


Chapter Two  The Chinese Communist Forces Cross the Yalu

I. The Grand Strategy and Risk of Both Sides

1. The Chinese Communist Forces Cross the Yalu

The general war situation in the middle of October was that the Republic of Korea Army and the UN forces which had crossed the 38th Parallel were pursuing the North Korean People’s Army rapidly and not strong opposed, maintaining an operational initiative over the enemy. In the west the Eighth US Army captured P'yongyang and reached the Ch'ongch'on River. In the east ROK I Corps, which had seized Wonsan and Hamhung was approaching Changjin and Pujon Reservoirs and Songjin, while the US X corps was preparing for landing at Wonsan and Iwon. Accordingly, ROK and UN forces were anticipating that they would conclude the war with a victory by the end of November at the latest.

On the other hand, the North Korean People’s Army which, at the outset of the war, had made a triumphant drive up to the Nakdong River and had been exultant over the victory, was beaten definitively by the UN forces’ Inch’on landing. It fled in total disorder under the collapsed chain of command, and part of it reassembled mainly around Kanggye, the heart of mountainous inland south of the Korea-Manchuria border.

Around this time the Communist China made the strategic decision that China would intervene in the Korean War. Based on this decision, during
the period of October 12–16 the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) dispatched an advance party, prior to the main forces, across the Yalu. Its mission was to cover the main forces' crossing the Yalu. The CCF main forces crossed the river through three routes: from Antung to Sinuiju, from Ch'ang-tien-ho-kou to Sakchu, and from Chian to Manp'o'jin starting the evening of October 19, the same day that the ROK Army seized P'yongyang amid cheers.  

The CCF sent across the river its first echelon equivalent to two–three divisions from after dark on the evening of the 19th until four o'clock the morning of the following day. They finished the troop movement before five o'clock, and then prepared the positions to conceal themselves from the UN aerial reconnaissance. Utilizing the experiences of the first day river crossing, the CCF maintained, to the maximum, the secrecy of the river crossing of the follow up echelons, and concluded the river crossing without being detected by the UN forces. The CCF troops moved only by night, made a thorough camouflage, and suspended the use of wireless communication in order to keep their entry into Korea secret.
CCF foods and ammunitions are transported into North Korea across the frozen Yalu.

The CCF which crossed the river and entered the Korean Peninsula under the guise of a 'Voluntary Army' consisted of twelve divisions of the 38th, the 39th, the 40th, and the 42nd Armies, Ⅲ Army Group, together with the supporting units of the 1st, 2nd, and 8th Artillery Divisions, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one engineer regiment and other miscellaneous units. Their total strength amounted to around 260,000.

The 40th Army which crossed the river at Antung, moved to Kujang, Tokch'ŏn and Yongwon, the 39th Army which crossed the river at Antung and Ch'ang-tien-ho-kou advanced to Kusong and T'aech'ŏn, the 42nd Army which crossed the river at Chian advanced to Sach'ang-ri and Oro-ri, and finally the 38th Army which followed behind the 42nd Army marched toward Kanggye. At this time the 4th and 6th Engineer Battalions constructed bridges and repaired the routes between Chian and Imgang and between Sakchu and Ch'angsong to support the main forces' river crossing.
CCF organization for operations in Korea

HQ, Chinese People's Volunteers

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Artillery HQ

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River Crossing, Oct. 19, 1950

River Crossing, Oct. 26, 1950
In order not to be detected and bombarded by the UN Air Force, the CCF troops marched in the night led by vehicles along the narrow road and against the harsh cold wind blowing from the mountain. Since the leading vehicles moved under blackout condition, and the soldiers marched carrying with them ammunitions and food, their movement was very slow. Occasionally, when they crossed on the road with the vehicles of retreating North Korean troops, it took a lot of time because of congestion, and if attacked by the UN Air Forces during the movement they were much more delayed. Because of such delays, their initial defensive plans were not carried out as planned.

While the main forces were in movement, Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese People’s Volunteers commander, moved to Taeyu-dong, where he established his headquarters. Taeyu-dong was situated half way between Unsan and Pyoktong, north of Tongch’ang, and was surrounded by mountains. It was a place where once a mining village was located. Peng Teh Huai met Kim Il Sung there. In the meeting he informed Kim Il Sung that the CCF had crossed the Yalu, and requested that the North Korean People’s Army would stage delaying actions against the UN forces as the CCF would need a great deal of time to move to the planned defensive position.33

Around this time, the CCF was slowly approaching, without being detected by the UN forces, around the Chokyu-ryong Mountains, their assembly area.

2. The Chinese Communist Forces Strategy and Deployment

Prior to entry in Korea, Peng Teh-Huai, who had been named the Volunteer Forces commander, held conferences of the high ranking commanders of the intervening forces in mid-October at Mukden and Antung. In these conferences he presented his operational guidance based on the instructions of the
Central Military Commission and Mao Tse Tung. He stressed that as the enemy possessed superior tactics and equipment, and the Korean Peninsula was relatively small and limited, the mobile operations of large scale advance and retreat which they had successfully exercised in the past domestic campaign were not necessarily applicable in the Korean Peninsula. Instead he adopted the operational policy of extinguishing the enemy troops by counterattack, raid, and ambush, that is, by the mixed operations of both position warfare (area defense) and movement warfare (mobile defense). In addition, he confirmed the plan that four armies would cross the Yalu simultaneously and assemble in the areas of Kanggye, Huich'on, Unsan, Tokch'on, and Maengsan.

Complying with this guideline, the CCF decided on the defense line extending along Kusong, T'aech'on, Kujang, Tokch'on, Yongwon, and Oro-ri, the mountainous areas regarded favourable for the CCF defense while unfavourable for the UN forces offensive. Their plan was, first of all, to halt ROK and UN forces' advance in this area and, switching the war tide in their favor, to gain the time to assist the North Korean Army's retreat and reorganization.  

When they reached the Yalu, however, they found that the ROK and UN forces advance northward from P'yongyang was much faster than anticipated. At this time (on the 20th) in the west, the ROK and UN forces were only 90-130 km away from Kujang, Tokch'on, and Yongwon, and in the east the ROK Army was already reaching Oro-ri, their planned assembly areas. On the other hand, the CCF main forces were moving south of Uiju, Sakchu, and Manp'o'jin, that is, they were still 120-270 km away from their planned defense line. Therefore, it was impossible for them to reach Kujang, Tokch'on, Yongwon and Oro-ri, their planned assembly area before the arrival of ROK and UN forces.

In this unexpected situation, however, the Chinese Military Authority noticed the vulnerability of the ROK and UN forces, that is, the latter, without knowing of the CCF's entry into the war, were advancing dispersed, and more-
over, a salient front line was constituted by the three ROK divisions. In addition, there was also a large gap between the Eighth US Army and the US X Corps. The CCF estimated that the present situation would render them the best opportunity to win the victory by a surprise attack on the UN forces. On the 21st, Mao modified his first operational plan that the CCF would occupy the planned defense area for the time being before switching to an offensive. He now ordered the CCF to defeat in detail the advancing ROK and UN forces by the mobile defense operations. He stressed that it would change the tide of the war to its favor in the Korean Peninsula if CPV defeated three or four ROK divisions in the first offensive since its entry into the war.

According to this revised plan, Peng Teh-Huai made up his mind to destroy three ROK divisions, and for this purpose, he concentrated three armies into the west, redeploying a part of his forces. He moved the 39th Army to Kusong and Taechon, the 38th Army to Huich'on, and the 40th Army to Tokch'on and Yongwon, and ordered them to destroy the enemy they would encoun-
ter. He also moved one division of the 42nd Army toward Changjin Reservoir to halt the ROK Capital and the 3rd Division’s advance, and instructed the main body of the army to occupy Sobaek Mountain (2184m), which was physically dividing the UN forces into two, and then advance south of Maengsan in order.

Mao Tse Tung also instructed the CCF not to advance beyond the boundary of 20km north of the line extending Chongju-Pakch’on-Kunu-ri, lest ROK and UN forces, having discovered the existence of Chinese Volunteer Forces, either suspend their advance or retreat before reaching P’akchon, Kunu-ri or north of them. They considered these areas favorable for defeating the advancing ROK and UN forces.

Peng Teh Huai strongly instructed his units to concede the area south of the line extending Huich’on, Onjon-ri and Kusong to the ROK and UN forces and avoid by all means any premature contact with them. While the main forces were heading for the frontline according to the modified strategy, on October 23, Mao Tse Tung directed Peng Teh Huai with particular emphasis that the Korean War situations would be determined by the following factors."

First, the most important point was whether the CCF could achieve complete surprise attack and destroy three to four ROK divisions or not. When a complete victory was achieved in this battle, it would force the enemy to redeploy and fall into a passive posture. If not successful, however, the tide of the war would turn out to be favorable to the enemy.

Second, under the situation that the enemy air forces would destroy our troops and interfere with our military activities, the war situations would largely depend on the proficiency of our troops’ night movement and night combat skill.
CCF's Initial Deployment (Oct. 19~24, 1950)
Third, the matter of great concern is how far we can defeat the US and ROK forces either by mobile operations or attacking against isolated strong points, before the US dispatches the five to ten divisions of reinforcement.

Around this time (on the 24th), the advance party of the ROK 1st Division was heading for Yongbyon and Yongsan-dong, the 6th Division for Ch'osan and Onjong-ri, and the 8th Division for Huich'on and Kanggye by way of Tokch'on. Now, Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese Communist Forces commander, ordered his troops to destroy the ROK 1st, 6th and 8th divisions first and then attack the US and British troops.

While the CCF, utterly prepared for both defensive and offensive operations, were waiting for the advance of the ROK Army, the latter, without even knowing of the CCF's entry into the Korean War, was dashing at the foremost of the friendly forces to the Korea-Manchuria border to encounter the unexpected enemy, the CCF troops, not the North Korean People's Army.

3. The United Nations Forces' Misestimation and Adventure

In the middle of October 1950, the ROK and UN forces, which maintained the initiative in the war, estimated that the CCF, having missed the opportune time, would not intervene in the Korean War, and held the optimistic view that before them up to the Yalu, Korea-Manchuria border, there would be only remnants of the defeated North Korean People's Army scattered and impotent just waiting for surrender. They also optimistically anticipated that they could terminate the war by Thanksgiving Day (November 23), and with this optimism decided to launch the general offensive, the coup de grace, toward the border which was now not far away. One can find the bases of such
estimation in the conference records of Wake Island.

The main purpose of the meeting between Mr. Truman, the president of the United States and General MacArthur, the commanding general of the UN Command, held on Wake Island on October 15, 1950 was to hear directly from the General about numerous rumors and intelligence reports as to whether Communist China would intervene in the war or not, and based on the information to establish a strategy. First, President Truman asked the question as to the prospect of the Korean War. General MacArthur replied: "I believe that formal resistance will end throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving Day. The 15,000 enemy troops remaining in the south would be mopped up or destroyed by the approaching winter." North Korea, he continued, was "pursuing a forlorn hope," using about 100,000 poorly trained replacements who "are only fighting to save face." He believed that, with the impending capture of P'Yongyang, most of the remaining enemy troops would be trapped and the war ended. "It is my hope" went on General MacArthur, "to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas."[10]

When President Truman then asked about the possibility of China's entry into the Korean War, he said "very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Forces in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to P'Yongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter."[11]

At that time the United States already acknowledged the presence of twenty-four Chinese divisions near the Yalu River crossing points and another fourteen elsewhere in Manchuria. General MacArthur, however, estimated that there would be "very little" chance that their main forces would intervene
in the war.19

And then General Omar N. Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who accompanied the President asked the Far East Commander about the necessity of additional dispatch of the UN forces. In other words, he wanted to know if the United States should continue to underwrite the costs for those troops which had not yet arrived, with the end of the war approaching. The General replied that they were useless from the military point of view, and probably would see no action. By replying so, he implied that the additional dispatch of the troops to Korea was not necessary as the end of the war was near at hand.

In this conference “President Truman had been assured by the theater commander that the war would probably end soon and that Communist China was not likely to make trouble.”20 The General’s estimate and statement led to tremendous blunders, not only in his military operations but in military support and foreign policy on the part of the president of the United States and the war leading organizations.

On October 24, General MacArthur removed the line of restriction on the advance of American troops. He said the line was made based on the assumption that the enemy would surrender. He authorized the Eighth US Army in the west and the US X Corps in the east to utilize all the ground forces necessary in securing all the North Korean territory. However, it was added, non-Korean forces should be withdrawn from border areas as soon as feasible and replaced by ROK forces. With this order, all the commanders were entitled to advance with all speed, utilizing all the available forces.

However, because of this order, which resulted from the poor intelligence capability and hasty erroneous estimate by General MacArthur, the ROK and US forces were exposed to a grave danger, as they dashed in disarray as if they had been competing in a race to the border. This directive, how-
ever, faced grave challenges the very next day, as it was given without knowledge that the well-prepared CCF troops were waiting to encircle and destroy the advancing friendly forces.

In related actions, General Bradley, upon returning from the Wake Island Conference, reduced UN forces earmarked to Korea and readjusted downward the estimate of the UN troops requirement. On October 25 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins' proposal to cut down the US burden on logistical support, while maintaining political objectives of the UN forces.

The misestimation of the Far East Command and Washington authorities that there would not be Chinese intervention, and the misadventure resulting from this estimate, allowed the CCF to launch nearly 200,000 Chinese troops in a complete surprise attack. The blindness of the US and ROK intelligence estimate capabilities was thus revealed, and from this time on, though it was a brief time, the ROK and UN forces rapidly fell into defeat in the Korean War.

II. Encounter with the New Enemy

1. The United Nations Forces' Thanksgiving Day Offensive

In late October 1950, with the capture of P'yongyang, the UN forces commanders exulted as if the war were over. The US Department of the Army and the Commander in Chief, Far East, made plans for the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division to the United States or to Europe. On 24 October, the Department of the Army notified General MacArthur that it planned to cancel
shipment of enlisted reserve corps troops to the Far East. All this was in accordance with general agreements reached at the Wake Island Conference earlier in the month. On October 22, General Walker requested authority from General MacArthur to divert to Japan all bulk-loaded ammunition ships arriving thenceforth in Korea from the United States, as he felt there was enough ammunition in Korea to satisfy future needs. MacArthur approved this request, and he also took steps to have six ammunition ships, en route to the Far East carrying 105-mm. and 155-mm. shells and Air Force bombs, diverted to Hawaii or returned to the United States. And General Weible, Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, requested the Commanding General, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, to cancel all outstanding requisitions for ground ammunition..."\(^{146}\)

Whereas the military leaders were in such an optimistic mood, the troops in the front line were excited and growing more so. They could hardly control their restlessness, imagining that they would eat turkey and walk around the busy streets in Tokyo on Thanksgiving Day.\(^{134}\)

Around that time the main forces of the Eighth US Army crossed the Ch'ongch'on River in the west and the US X Corps was preparing for landing at Wonsan, when, on 24 October "General MacArthur in an extraordinary order commanded Walker and Almond to drive forward with all possible speed using all forces at their command."\(^{176}\) It was an action to remove the advance restriction line which he had established one week before (October 17). When this message reached the Joint Chief of Staff, they at once reminded Commander in Chief, Far East of their directive of 27 September, which had specified that only south Korean forces would operate in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border... General MacArthur replied that his instructions had been a matter of military necessity. The ROK forces, he explained, were not strong enough to secure
North Korea by themselves, and "their commanders were often highly emotional and unreliable." He found further justification in Secretary Marshall's instructions that he was to "feel unhampered tactically and strategically."-General MacArthur assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of their 'directive of 27 September' and that every possible precaution is being taken in the premises.13

In accordance with General MacArthur's order Lt. General Walker, the Eighth Army commander, lifted all the restrictions so far imposed on the UN Forces with regards to advance northward, and on 24 October ordered his subordinate units to launch an attack to the north simultaneously. He attached the ROK 7th Division, which had been the Eighth Army reserve to Maj. General Frank W. Milburn, the US I Corps commander (as of 24:00 on October 23) so that the ROK 1st and 7th divisions would conduct the operations in the border areas as far as the situations permitted. In the 7th Division's place the US 1st Cavalry Division remained behind to garrison P'ongyang.14

Maj. General Yu Jae Hung, the ROK II corps commander, on the right of Eighth Army, launched an attack toward the border on October 24 with the 6th Division on its left and the 8th Division on its right. The objective of the 6th Division was Ch'osan and Pyokdong, and that of the 8th Division was Manp'o'jin and Chunggangjin.

Maj. General Milburn, the US I Corps commander, on the left of Eighth Army, ordered the ROK 1st Division which was on the right of the corps to advance to Sup'ung Reservoir along the Anju-Usan axis, and the US 24th Division on the left to which the British 27th Brigade was attached, to cross the Ch'ongch'on River, and attack Sinuiju, its objective, by way of Sonch'on. The ROK 7th Division remained as the Corps reserve at the initial stage.

The four divisions (the ROK 1st, 6th and 8th Divisions and the US 24th Division), which had launched an offensive on 24 October were pursuing the enemy rapidly and unopposed along the main routes in the central-western
The Eighth US Army Combat Organization

Note. ROK 7th Division attached to US I Corps on October 23, then the division shifted to ROK II Corps on October 29.

front line west of the Nangrim Mountains. However, on the next day (October 25), all of a sudden the four divisions were raided by the main forces of the
CCF Army Group, which had been ambushing around the Chokyu-ryong Mountains, and came under heavy engagement with CCF troops.

2. The Confusion at Unsan

The ROK 1st Division, which was on the right of the US I Corps, and under the command of the newly assigned commander Brigadier General Ch’oi Yong Hee, crossed the Ch’ongch’on River around Anju on October 23-24 and reached Unsan on October 25. The British 27th Brigade, which was the division’s left adjacent unit, also advanced to the vicinity of Pakch’on, that is, the Corps was approaching to the north latitude 40 degree line. The 6th Division, ROK II Corps which was the right adjacent unit of the 1st Division, was also advancing toward Pyoktong and Ch’osan by way of Huich’on. At this time, the North Korea People’s Army was unable to establish a defense position, to say nothing of the organized resistance, and was only continuing unilateral retreat. Accordingly, the divisions in offensive just hurried their advance toward the north as if they were competing in a race, and as such was the situation, the coordinated operations among the advancing divisions were hardly expected.

At 10:30 of October 25 the ROK 1st Division launched an offensive from Unsan toward the Sup’ung Reservoir by way of Ch’ongsanjangsi. The division was led by the tanks attached from the Corps and was in attacking formation with two regiments abreast in the front. The 12th Regiment on the left advanced west of Samtan-ch’on, while the 15th Regiment on the right drove east of it respectively, and the 11th Regiment, the division reserve, marched along at Yongsandong, following behind the attacking regiments.

The division was passing through Unsan, around 11:00 hrs, and the US tanks leading the 15th Regiment at Samtan-ch’on were about to cross a bridge, when the enemy deployed on the opposite hill of the river interdicted the
bridge with converging fire of large caliber cannons such as 120mm mortars and 122mm howitzers. This enemy artillery barrage was the most intensive one since the division advanced north of the 38th Parallel. Because of this enemy resistance the regiment’s attack came to a halt and soon the attack of the 12th regiment on the left was also halted.

The division, which had been until then unable to determine the scale of the enemy strength and belonging, estimated that the North Korean People’s Army was attempting the last resistance. However, around 11:30 the 3rd company, 15th Regiment “captured the first Chinese soldier taken prisoner by UN Forces in the Korean War.” Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, who returned to the post of the division commander after having been assigned to the corps commander, interrogated the prisoner, who said “I am a CCF regular soldier of Kwangdong province. There are 10,000 CCF soldiers deployed north of Unsan and another 10,000 in the vicinity of Huich’on.” The division commander concluded that the prisoner was, in fact, Chinese Regular Army and reported it to
the corps commander. And this fact was transmitted by the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) dispatched to the division, to a reconnaissance plane of the US Air Force, then in mission, and was in turn reported directly to the Eighth Army Forward Command Post. However, the US side suspected the prisoner to be one of "the Korean Volunteers serving in the Chinese Army."³⁰

In this situation, the US I Corps commander urged the divisions to advance to the Korea-Manchuria border. However, the situation was turning out to be increasingly unfavorable because of the mounting pressure by the enemy, who was well-prepared in advance. Turning to a defensive posture, the division committed the 11th Regiment, the division reserve, and established hasty defensive positions on the hills around Unsan and fought seesaw battles throughout the night under terrible cold weather conditions until the dawn of October 26.

Faced with the stubborn resistance of the division, around dawn the enemy committed an estimated regimental troop to divert to the rear of Unsan, where the Nammyon-ch’on flowed, and occupied the estuary of Nammyon-ch’on, so called ‘estuary of a camel’s head bend’ (Sangch’o-dong), and cut off the Main Supply Route connecting Unsan and Yongsan-dong. With the cut-off, the division was encircled.

One platoon of the tank company, under the cover of the 10th Anti Aircraft Artillery, attempted to open the retreat road; however, it failed as it ran soon into shortage of fuel and ammunition. Since both the division and the supporting units gradually fell short of fuel and ammunition, and the supply road was cut off, the division’s situation continued to deteriorate.

At 11:00 of the next day, October 27, Eighth Army dropped air fuel and ammunition at Unsan by ten C-119 cargo planes, which eased the critical supply situation of the division. Freshly supplied with ammunition, the division launched an offensive under the support of the tanks and Anti Aircraft
Artillery and regained the hills west and north of Unsan. This gain temporarily eased the situation of the division.

On the other hand, the war prisoner the ROK 1st Division had captured on 25 October, and the other three prisoners captured later on were transported to the Eighth Army and were interrogated at the Forward Command Post at P'yongyang. At first General Walker and his staff firmly refused to believe in the entry into the war of the Chinese Communist Regular Army. However, as the extend of reverse north of the Ch'ongch'on River mounted quickly during the one or two days, they were forced to question the correctness of their initial estimate.

In spite of the changing situation, the Eighth Army decided to push the original offensive plan. In order to maintain the offensive spirit, it ordered the US 1st Cavalry Division, the corps reserve, relieved of its security mission at P'yongyang, pass through the ROK 1st Division, to advance up to the Yalu and attack to the Yalu.

The CCF night attacks, which were repeated every night against the ROK 1st Division since the latter seized the surrounding hills of Unsan, suddenly halted and until the 28th there was a lull in front of the division. While the US 1st Cavalry Division was on the move for two days beginning on the 29th, the ROK 1st Division launched an attack under the support of artillery and close air strike, but failed to break through the enemy positions as they, dug in solidly constructed defensive positions, made stiff resistance with automatic weapons and small arms.

Around this time, the ROK II Corps, the 1st Division's right adjacent unit, which had attacked Onjong-ri and Huich'on, was pushed back and retreated. On the division's left, there was also a gap of 25km between the division and the US 24th Division which was attacking Pakch'on, and thus the division's operational zone constituted a salient. On the morning of October 30
the advance party of the US 1st Cavalry Division arrived at Unsan and was followed by the US 8th Cavalry Regiment. As soon as the main forces of the US Cavalry Division assembled in the Unsan area, General Walker modified the area of operation, and instructed the ROK 1st Division to advance to Ch'osan by way of Onjong, while the US 1st Cavalry Division moved to Sakchu.²

According to the revised plan, the 12th Regiment on the left of the 1st Division started being relieved by the US 8th Cavalry Regiment on the morning of October 31, when the CCF troops, upon noticing the relief, concentrated their attacks on the 12th Regiment, committing their reinforced troops. The CCF set fires at several points in the mountains so that great smoke clouds from forest fires obscured UN aerial observation. The regiment continued advance and retreat fighting until the afternoon of November 1, and then transferred the positions west of Unsan to US troops and moved to Ipso-k-ri to become division reserve. With this deployment the US 1st Cavalry Division was positioned on the left of Unsan with the ROK 1st Division on the right of it, and the two divisions fought against the enemy back to back to each other.

The deployment of the friendly forces around this time was as follows. With Unsan as its center, the US 8th Cavalry Regiment was deployed around Yongp'o-dong and Cheinsang-dong on the left of Unsan, and the ROK 15th Regiment around Choyang-dong and Puhung-dong on the right of it. In the rear, with the Kuryong River as a boundary, the ROK 11th Regiment assumed the defense of the east of it, with the US 5th Cavalry Regiment west of it. The ROK 12th Regiment, the corps reserve, assembled at Ipso-k, south of Unsan. The US 7th Cavalry Regiment, US 1st Cavalry Division, at Kaech'on, south of the Ch'ongchon River, carried out the flank covering mission, and was prepared for the eventual operation in the ROK 11 Corps area.

On the enemy side, the CCF 39th Army which had concentrated its forces around Unsan during the day time, with sunset, started to press the en-
circling net against unsan. At this time (at 2200 of November 1) the US 1 Corps commander who returned after having confirmed the retreat of the adjacent ROK II Corps, called an urgent division commanders meeting.

At this meeting Maj. General Milburn ordered the corps to go from attack to defense immediately. He decided the defense line extending along Pakch'ŏn-Yongsan-dong-Yongbyon-Unhung-ri north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River, and ordered all the units in the front line withdraw to this area as rapidly as possible. He also asked the US 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division, both at Unsan, to coordinate closely for their withdrawal. This was the first defensive order issued since the UN forces counterattacked northward from the Pusan Perimeter. Furthermore, it was the order issued to the units which had reached close to the border to withdraw 50 to 80 km rearward in order to secure the bridgehead of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River.

After the corps meeting, Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, the ROK 1st Division commander and Major General Hobart R. Gay, the US 1st Cavalry Division commander, agreed to leave the ROK 15th Regiment behind with the mission of maintaining the contact with the enemy, and let the US 8th Cavalry Regiment withdraw first. However, even before the withdrawal order reached the battalions in the front-line, an unexpected situation unfolded.

Around 2300 of November 1, Colonel Raymond D. Palmer, the US 8th Cavalry Regimental commander, received the withdrawal order from the division and in turn issued an order to each of his subordinate battalions and supply units to withdraw to Ipsok east of the Kuryong River. However, the ROK 15th Regiment on the right which was to cover the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry Regiment came under the CCF concentrated attack. The ROK 15th Regiment was defending its positions at Sangjiang-dong east of Unsan without the support of tanks or artillery, when the CCF 116th Division struck the regiment starting at 2200 hours. The regiment resisted the enemy attack through heavy
engagement for an hour, but outnumbered by the enemy, the defensive positions were penetrated at last, and troops started to retreat in disorder even abandoning heavy weapons and communication equipment.

The aftermath of this defeat affected the zone of the US 8th Cavalry Regiment. A part of the enemy blocked the road connecting Unsan and Yongsan-dong, thus completely isolating the regiment. After the encirclement the CCF troops raided a battalion command post and threw handgrenades into vehicles and so on. The regiment made a desperate effort to break through the enemy encirclement. In an attempt to support the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, the division ordered the 5th Cavalry Regiment to attack at dawn on November 2 the hill on the opposite side of Turtle Head Bend (Hach’o-dong), the road blocking site, on the riverside of Nammyon-ch’on south of Unsan. While the attack was going on, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 8th Cavalry Regiment, seizing the opportunity, managed to withdraw, but the 3rd Battalion was still isolated amid the enemy and, moreover, the attack of the 5th Cavalry Regiment was halted by the enemy heavy resistance.

Under such circumstances, Major General Milburn, the corps commander, realizing the serious development in the corps front area, concluded that he could not only concentrate his efforts for the rescue operation, and at 15:00, November 2, he ordered Major General Gay, the division commander, to abandon the rescue operation and withdraw south of the Ch’ongch’on River.

The 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, which was now isolated, fought fierce battles with the enemy until November 4, during which some escaped the encircling net, but the main forces of the battalion were either killed or taken prisoner. As for the ROK 1st Division, it became the corps reserve, crossed the Ch’ongch’on River by regiment, and assembled at Anju, where it concentrated on the unit restoration.

 Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, then the division commander, com-
mented later about the Unsan battle: “It was a blood consuming battle. The US media reported that the ROK 1st Division and the US 8th Cavalry Regiment were decimated. Really in this battle my division lost more than 530 lives, either killed or missing in action. The 15th Regiment suffered tremendous loss.”

3. Disaster at Onjong-ri and Huich’on Salient

The ROK II Corps (the ROK 6th and the 8th Divisions) which conceded the P’yongyang seizing operation to the US 1 Corps, instead became the vanguard unit of Eighth Army, crossed the Ch’ongch’on River first and was pursuing the enemy toward Huich’on, its objective. On October 23, when the US 1 Corps was crossing the Ch’ongch’on River to the west, the advance element of the II Corps, the 7th Regiment, 6th Division on the corps’ left, advanced up to Huich’on. The 2nd Regiment, which followed behind the 7th Regiment, reached Chajak north of Kunu-ri. The 8th Division on the right was more or less delayed due to the steep mountains, nevertheless, its 16th Regiment advanced to Kaech’on, and its 10th Regiment to Yongwon from Maengsan.

Upon receiving the Thanksgiving Day General Offensive Order on the 23rd, for the advance up to the Korea-Manchuria Border, the ROK II Corps launched the offensive on October 24. General Yu Jai Hung, the corps commander, ordered the 6th Division on the left to occupy Ch’osan and Pyoktong and the 8th Division on the right to take Manpojin and Chunggangjin.

Complying with this order, Brigadier General Kim Jong Oh, the 6th Division commander, in turn ordered the 2nd Regiment on the left to attack Pyoktong from Chajak by way of Onjong-ri, and the 7th Regiment on the right to attack Ch’osan from Huich’on by way of Kuksong-ryong. The 19th Regiment, the division reserve, was to remain at Huich’on at first and then follow behind the 2nd Regiment to advance to Onjong-ri.
The 7th Regiment, against slight enemy resistance, crossed over the Kuksong-ryong and secured Hoemok-dong, the intermediate objective, on the first day, the 24th, and occupied Kojang on the 25th. The regiment seized Ch’osan, the final objective on the 26th, and had the honor of reaching the Yalu, the border, first among the friendly units.

On the other hand, the 2nd Regiment on the division’s left occupied Onjong-ri on the first day as scheduled, but on the following day, while advancing toward Pyoktong, its objective, the Regiment encountered unexpected CCF troops resistance. On the 25th, the regiment launched an attack led by the 3rd Battalion reinforced with howitzers and anti-tank guns, and around noon the advance element of the 3rd Battalion reached Yangsu-dong, while the 1st Battalion, the rear unit, passed through Onjong-ri. Thus, the Regiment was driving north in column attack formation along Onjong-ri-Pukchin road, the valley passage running along the Onjong-ch’on River.

At this time, CCF troops were waiting, having constructed numerous ambush foxholes along the ridgelines; one ridgeline ran from Tori-san (841m), the governing hill on the west of the road and the other from Tongrim-san (1165m), the governing hill on the east of the road, both of them running parallel with the road. Once the ROK army reached within the firing range, the CCF which had occupied favourable terrain, fired indiscriminately against the ROK forces. The 2nd Regiment was caught by a surprise attack in a narrow valley, and the casualties began to increase rapidly from enemy fire even before it could take proper actions. The 3rd Battalion, the leading element, came under particularly concentrated attack from three directions, front, left and right. Instantly, its chain of command collapsed, and even without trying engagement, the troops began to retreat in total disorder toward Onjong-ri. The 3rd Battalion troops who escaped to Onjong-ri that night were no more than 400 of 750, and only the soldiers could manage to escape, abandoning vehicles.
attached 105mm howitzers, and anti-aircraft guns.\textsuperscript{24}

The 2nd Battalion, which followed behind the 3rd Battalion, in spite of such a confused situation, captured two Chinese soldiers alive, and as the CCF main forces were pushing toward Onjong-ri, the battalion withdrew to Unsan, where the ROK 1st Division, the left adjacent unit, was operating. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion withdrew to Onjong-ri and covered the 3rd Battalion's withdrawal and defended Onjon-ri.

On October 25, the Chinese prisoners taken alive talked about their units and related that a huge number of troops amounting to nearly 10,000 were in an ambush position in the vicinity of Tonglim-san. The division commander, who perceived instantly that there was a large CCF unit in front of his division, dispatched one battalion of the 19th Regiment, the division reserve, to Hoemok-dong with the mission to keep open the withdrawal route for the 7th Regiment, which had advanced as far as Ch'osan against possible cut-off by the enemy. Once the CCF's pursuit stopped, a lull came to the front line, and it seemed that the combat had ended for the time being, but at 03:30 on the 26th the CCF 40th Army renewed a large scale offensive to the Onjong-ri area.

In this offensive the CCF committed two divisions, not just one division as the ROK 6th Division had earlier estimated. The enemy deployed in advance their troops with weapons at the critical points such as major roads and hills around the Onjong-ri prior to its surprise attack at midnight. They launched attacks by echelon after echelon, utilizing the primitive methods of frightening the enemy by blowing bugles and beating gongs in the dead of night. They used their unique offensive method, the so-called 'human wave tactics', which consumed human lives like bits of straw. They continued to advance disregarding their comrades falling from the fire of the ROK Army.

Stricken by fright and unable to cope with the situation, the ROK 2nd Regiment fell into confusion in less than 30 minutes and started to disperse
and pull back. However, since CCF troops blocked key points on the roads leading south to Unsan with weapons emplaced, the regimental main forces were forced to retreat eastward to Huich'on. Colonel Ham Byung Sun, the regimental commander, assembled a part of his troops at Kudu-ryong, 5km east of Onjong-ri, and hastily established a defensive position in an effort to assemble the regimental troops, but even this defensive position was penetrated in less than an hour, and the 2nd Regiment ceased to be an organized unit.

On the 26th Brigadier General Kim Jong Oh, the 6th division commander hastily dispatched the 19th Regiment (-) at Huich'on to Onjong-ri to rescue the 2nd Regiment and proposed to the II Corps the withdrawal of the 7th Regiment, which had advanced to Ch'osan. Major General Yoo Jai Hung, the corps commander, approved it, and as of 14:00 of that day suspended the 8th Division's advance on the right of the 6th Division. On the 27th he also ordered the 10th Regiment, 8th Division at Huich'on to advance to Onjong-ri, not only rescue the 2nd Regiment, but to reoccupy Onjong-ri and collect the artillery pieces and vehicles the 2nd Regiment had abandoned there. 29

Around this time, the 2nd Regiment suffered about 1,000 casualties either by being taken prisoner, wounded or killed while attempting to escape through the CCF encircling net. For two consecutive days, on the 26th and 27th, the regiment tried to assemble its troops at T'aep'yong, but could assemble only around 400 soldiers, who were mostly of the 1st Battalion. Most of the 3rd Battalion troops withdrew to Huich'on, while those of the 2nd Battalion withdrew to Yongjon-ri south of Unsan. Because of this defeat, the 2nd Regiment virtually ceased to be a combat capable unit.

There was hardly any way of resisting the Chinese 'human wave tactics.' The 19th Regiment (-) and the 10th Regiment, 8th Division, which left Huich'on one after another, approached a mountain pass northeast of Onjong-ri and were preparing for an attack when CCF troops hit the regiments on the night of the 27th. A fierce battle took place in the mountainous area east of
Onjong-ri and Ch'osan Battles
Onjong-ri. For three days until October 28, the 19th Regiment (−) and the 10th Regiment concentrated their combat power in a fierce engagement with the enemy. However, overwhelmed by the CCF 'human wave tactics' which outnumbered the ROK forces by more than five to one, the latter’s attack was halted, and, moreover, as the road was blocked, all the vehicles of the two regiments and the howitzers of the three batteries were lost.

According to the enemy documents taken after the battle, the enemy that invaded Onjong-ri at that time was the CCF 40th Army consisting of the 118th, the 119th and the 120th Divisions, and when they were attacking the 19th (−) and the 10th Regiments, it was learned that another division of the CCF 38th Army which had advanced toward Huich’on, joined to the attack. Thus four divisions in all launched a coordinated attack against the ROK 6th Division’s positions.

Accordingly, the Onjong-ri battle like that of Umsan was the first battle in which the ROK Army was defeated by the CCF in number. Moreover, it was a complete surprise attack to the ROK Army, in that the ROK Army learned of the CCF entry into the war only after having an encounter with them on the battlefield. The loss of the battle was felt even more bitterly because after having heard the statement of prisoners of war, the advance toward the north continued without proper measures being taken.

As the ROK Army suffered unexpected and tremendous losses, Eighth Army recognized the seriousness of the situation and committed the army reserve and concentrated on containing the CCF advance. In particular, the rescue of the ROK 7th Regiment isolated at Ch’osan became an urgent and increasing concern. At this time the ROK 11 Corps, in an effort to prepare for the future operations, deployed the 16th and 21st Regiments, ROK 8th Division in front of Unhung-ri north of the Ch’ongch’on River, assembled the 2nd and 19th Regiments, 6th Division and the 10th Regiment, 8th Division around
Kaech'on south of the Ch'ongch'on River and waited for the early withdrawal of the 7th Regiment.

4. The Ch'osan Withdrawal Operation

The 7th Regiment, 6th Division, which became the vanguard of the ROK Army, met only light enemy resistance, as it was out of the CCF main invasion route. The regiment reached Ch'osan, riverside town of the Yalu by way of Kojang on the 26th, while the friendly units on both its right and left heavily became engaged with CCF troops.

It was at 14:15 on October 26 that the advance party of the regiment put up a national flag on the riverside, which announced its arrival at the long cherished border. It had been 41 days since the 7th Regiment began a counterattack on 16 September at Sinnyong of the Pusan Perimeter.

However, barely one day had passed after the regiment's arrival at the border before it received the order around noon of the 27th to withdraw to Hoemok-dong. At this time the supplies could not catch up with the regiment's rapid advance and the regiment was badly in need of supplies. Particularly, the soldiers were not clad in winter uniforms, and had to endure cold weather at the night in the temperatures that fell below zero. The adversity was, however, overcome by the soldier's tough spirit and sense of duty to accomplish the unification of the fatherland.

Around this time, the general situation around the regiment did not allow it to stay any longer at Ch'osan. Since the 2nd Regiment on the left was fighting an uphill battle with CCF troops around Onjong-ri, there was a danger that the regiment's withdrawal route might be cut off at any time. To make the situation worse, the regiment, being short of fuel and ammunition, was not in a position to begin the retrograde operation. Fortunately, the regiment was
supplied around 11:00 on the 28th with 45 drums of gasoline and all kinds of ammunition by air drop. In the meantime the 1st Battalion, which had advanced up to Ch’osan, withdrew to Kojang where the regiment’s main body assembled. Now, the regiment was ready to move toward the south. The regiment, prior to its movement, sent out a reconnaissance company with the mission of patrolling the road connecting Kojang and Hoemok, which was scarcely more than a mountain trail along the valley.

At 07:00 on the 29th the regiment began the movement in vehicles with the 2nd Battalion as the leading element, the 3rd Battalion, the Regimental Headquarters, and the 1st Battalion in order of march. In about an hour after the regiment had left Kojang, it received a message from the division: “Your regiment is now under dangerous situation. Tactical air support is to be pro-
vided. Do your best to conclude the withdrawal operation successfully." Recognizing instantly that an unfavorable situation was unfolding at Onjong-ri, Colonel Lim Bu Taek, the regimental commander, expedited the movement, while strengthening his flank security. In the vicinity of P'ungjang the 2nd Battalion, the leading element, met the reconnaissance company, which had left the main body the previous day for the reconnaissance mission. The 2nd Battalion was about to pass through the Chuwon valley, located in-between Kojang and Hoemok, when it came under enemy fire.

The CCF deployed an estimated regiment in ambush along the ridgeline of the rugged mountain precipice, and waited. Once the 7th Regiment reached the valley, the CCF delivered concentrated fire upon the regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, the leading element, was caught in a trap laid by the CCF. The soldiers tried desperately to escape the trap by running toward the north as fast as possible, abandoning vehicles, but were unable to escape, while the casualties continued to increase. Though it was an uphill battle, the battalion attempted counterattacks under occasional air support, and captured five CCF prisoners. But as soon as the close air support was over with the sunset, the CCF resistance increased, and the battalion was unable to pass through the Chuwon-ri valley.

Brigadier General Kim Jong Oh, the division commander, having received a report on the situation, reached an important decision and issued an withdrawal order which sounded like an ultimatum to the regiment: "Destroy or burn up all the equipment except for those the troops can carry with them, and assemble at Hoemok-dong by all available means." At that time the division had no means to open the retreat road for the regiment. Since the 2nd Regiment had collapsed at Onjong-ri, and the 19th Regiment and the 10th Regiment, the 8th Division were also in a critical situation, there was no other way than for the 7th Regiment to resolve the withdrawal problem by itself.
The regimental commander planned that while the 2nd Battalion at front would hold the enemy in check, the 3rd Battalion would make a detour and infiltrate Myongjiang-san and attack the enemy from behind to open the road, but the 3rd Battalion was blocked by the CCF troops which had occupied Myongjiang-san in advance. The regiment, though driven to the wall, managed to get its troops under control and moved to a night defense posture.

The deployment of the regiment was that the 2nd Battalion occupied the defensive position around Sangch'ang-dong south of P'ungjiang while the 3rd and the 1st Battalions deployed their troops north of P'ungjiang along both sides of the road, thus making a prolonged defense line. Though the regiment established a defensive position, it was along the road in the valley surrounded by rugged mountains, and the troops were vulnerably exposed to enemy attack. Therefore, the troops waited until the daybreak so that they could open the road with the support of air forces. The CCF, which had well perceived their enemy's vulnerable situation, launched an attack again at midnight of the 30th, and soon the valley was filled with the earthshaking booming of artillery, machineguns, the sounds of burgles and pipes, and the shouting of troops.

The regiment desperately fought a midnight battle against the numerically superior enemy. However, in around two hours, the defensive positions of the 3rd and 1st Battalions began to collapse one after another and the whole regimental defensive position was totally devastated by the CCF 'human wave tactics.'

In this critical situation Colonel Lim Bu T'aeck, the regimental commander, made a critical decision and issued a last order: "Every soldier of the regiment is to break through the enemy line individually and assemble at Kujang-dong." 26

The regiment, the morale of which was high when it reached the Yalu first among the friendly forces, now had a depressed fighting spirit, faced with
the unexpected CCF attack, and had to break through the enemy line dispersed in small groups of two or three.

During the dispersed breakthrough the soldiers had to overcome the rugged terrain, terribly cold weather, and hunger, and they continued their aimless southward retreat dragging their heavy feet. The soldiers continued the stony road march, crossing over the Myohyang Mountain, toward the south of the Ch'ongch'on River. Eventually, on November 6, about 875 officers and men of the 3,552 in the regiment escaped to Kaech'on and rejoined the 6th Division. Many officers and soldiers were listed as being captured, killed, or missing in action, to include one battalion commander, principal staff officers of the regiment and battalions and KMAG advisors to the regiment. This loss made the reorganization of the regiment unavoidable.39

The regiment later on joined the main force of the division, which was the corps reserve and under reorganization at Kaech'on. The regiment also likewise underwent the reorganization by being manned and supplied with equipment. Even during this time some of the soldiers were returning to the regiment.

5. The Ch'ongch'on River Bridgehead Operations

Since the UN Thanksgiving Day Operations suffered a setback due to unexpected CCF intervention, the ROK II Corps frontline collapsed, and because the situation in Unsan, the US I Corps area, was also increasingly deteriorating, a new countermeasures to meet the situation was hastily being arranged.

On November 2, at Eighth Army an important discussion was held as to whether the US I Corps should withdraw south of the Ch'ongch'on River or not. The idea of securing the bridgehead north of the river for the future oper-
ations conflicted sharply with that of withdrawal south of the river. The latter proponents insisted that the deployment of the friendly forces north of the river might invite the danger of the retreat road being cut off as the Kunu-ri area was seriously threatened by the CCF troops.

Finally, General Walker, the Eighth Army Commander, stepped in and decided on the operational policy which would secure the bridgehead, including the tank fords and the bridges over the Ch'ongch'ón and Taeryong Rivers. He ordered the US 24th Division and the British 27th Brigade on the west to withdraw hastily and establish a bridgehead north of the Ch'ongch'ón River. He also deployed the ROK 7th Division and the US 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), a subordinate unit of the US 24th Division, at Kunu-ri to secure the eastern front. He reinforced the 9th RCT, US 2nd Division, which had just reached Sunch'on, and assigned it the mission of securing the road connecting Sunch'on and Kunu-ri. The ROK 1st Division and the US 1st Cavalry Division were ordered to withdraw rapidly to Anju and Shinanju south of the Ch'ongch'ón River.\(^2\)

(1) The establishment of the Bridgehead at the Ch'ongch'ón River

The bridgehead that the ROK and UN forces had to secure consisted of areas estimated to be the enemy's major avenue of approach. It included the Pakch'on area which could dominate the tank fords and the bridges over the Ch'ongch'ón and the Taeryong Rivers, and then Pansongch'on village, which could control the riverside road of the Kuryong River. It also included the important terrain features around the Ch'onbul-san, which could block the valley passage of the Ch'ongch'ón River. Of this terrain, the US I Corps assumed the defense of the Pakch'on and Pansongch'on areas on the left and the ROK II Corps the Ch'onbul-san area on the right.
The available units being limited, the US 1 Corps established bridgeheads around the Pakch’on and Pansonch’on areas only with the British 27th Brigade and the US 19th Regiment. At that time the ROK 1st Division and the US 1st Cavalry Division were in operation in the Unsan area, the 21st Regiment, US 24th Division, which had withdrawn from Chonggo-dong, was under unit maintenance at Anju, and the US 5th Regimental Combat Team, which had withdrawn from Kusong, was moving toward Kaech’on to reinforce the ROK 7th Division.

According to the plan, the British 27th Brigade which had advanced up to Chonju, withdrew to Pakch’on and established strong point defensive positions by each battalion, in front of Pakch’on, at Tongmun-ri in the west of the Taeryong River, and Ongyo-bong. On the other hand, the 19th Regiment, US 24th division established a defensive position along the Kuryong River bend south of Yongbyon.

On November 3, the 19th Regiment and the British 27th Brigade together with other reinforcing units occupied the assigned defensive positions north of the Ch’ongch’on River and made every effort to cover the withdrawing friendly units while pushing back the CCF troops dashing to the Ch’ongch’on River. 8)

In the meantime, the US 1st Cavalry Division (−) and ROK 1st Division, which withdrew south of the Ch’ongch’on River, were under unit maintenance at Anju and Sinanju, respectively. The 7th Cavalry Regiment, US 1st Cavarly Division was carrying out the covering mission for the withdrawing units around Yondang-ri northwest of Kaech’on.

The situation of the ROK II Corps, which was responsible for the defense of the Ch’onbul-san area north of Kunu-ri, was as follows: the ROK 6th Division which had failed in the Onjong-ri battle, and the 10th Regiment, 8th Division were both under reorganization, and the ROK 7th Division was carry-
ing out the covering mission of the corps' east flank in the vicinity of Piho-san. Therefore, the available units for the corps commander were only the 16th and the 21st Regiments, ROK 8th Division, which he deployed along the line extending from P'ungdong to Kosadong west of Wonri.

Now, Eighth Army in the western front established bridgehead defensive positions with the British 27th Brigade in the Pakch'on area, the US 19th Regiment in the Pansongch'on area, and the ROK 8th Division (-) in the P'ungdong and Kosadong areas. Thus, the bridgehead covered the area which extended northward from the Ch'ongch'on River 2km at the nearest and 10km at the farthest point.

(2) The Piho-san Battle

The ROK 7th Division assembled at the Yongbyon area as the US I Corps reserve while the ROK 1st Division and the US 1st Cavalry Division, the US I Corps, were in operation in the vicinity of Unsan. However, since the situation of the ROK II Corps was deteriorating, the ROK 7th Division was attached to ROK II Corps as of October 29 and moved to Kuniu-ri.

At that time, the ROK II Corps was in the worst possible situation. The 2nd Regiment, ROK 6th Division retreated in dispersion from Onjong-ri, while the 19th Regiment and the 10th Regiment, the 8th Division which attempted a counterattack to reinforce the 2nd Regiment ended in failure. Then the corps committed the 16th and the 21st Regiments, ROK 8th Division to block the enemy, but the enemy advanced to T'aep'yong south of Huich'on before the regiments. To make the situation worse, the 7th Regiment, ROK 6th Division, which had reached the border, was retreating in small groups as the enemy cut off the withdrawal route. This meant that the four of Corps' regiments (the 2nd, 7th, 10th and 19th Regiments) out of six regiments were in a dis-
Battle of the Ch'ongch'ŏn River Bridgehead (Nov. 3~11, 1950)
persed status and the corps was defending its front of Kunu-ri with only two remaining regiments. In order to overcome this situation, the II Corps commander ordered the newly joined ROK 7th Division to occupy the blocking positions between Kujang-dong and Tokch'ŏn as soon as possible in order to halt the CCF troops attempting to penetrate the east flank of the army and the corps.

Upon receiving the order the division drove hastily toward the objective area on November 1, without even having time to study the enemy situation. The division advanced with three regiments abreast: the 3rd Regiment on the left drove toward the Paengnyong River north of Kujang-dong, the 8th Regiment in the center toward the Yongmun Mountain (1190m), and the 5th Regiment on the right toward Tokch'ŏn as their respective objectives. The 3rd and 8th Regiments occupied their objectives and were establishing the blocking positions when the CCF launched a night attack, and the 3rd Regiment withdrew to Yongbyon and the 8th Regiment to Wonri. Because of these withdrawals, the 5th Regiment, which was advancing to Tokch'ŏn, occupied Wolbong-san in the vicinity of Aril-ryong.

Once the operation to occupy Kujang-dong and Tokch'ŏn ended in failure, on the 2nd the corps commander instructed the 7th Division to establish a defensive position around Piho-san (622m) north of Kunu-ri. In that afternoon the 3rd Regiment on the left established the defensive position around Piho-san while the 5th Regiment on the right deployed its troops at Hill 760, east of Piho-san. The ROK 5th Regiment had a link-up with the 5th Regiment, US 24th Division, which advanced there to secure the road between Kaech'ŏn and Tokch'ŏn. The 8th Regiment remained at Yonghyon-ri south of Kunu-ri as the division reserve.

Piho-san, 622m high, where the division established a defensive position, was the highest dominant terrain which stood on the plain formed in the downstream area of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River. Accordingly, this ground not only
dominated the road and railway running to Kunu-ri, but was an important hill for the defense of Kunu-ri, a tactically critical area. Because of it, Eighth Army stressed the importance of this area.

Determined to defend this hill to the last not only for the importance of the terrain itself, but also to recover the damaged honor of the corps, the 7th Division strengthened the defensive position and prepared for the enemy night attack. At 03:00 on the 3rd, an estimated division of the CCF 38th Army attacked the 3rd Regiment on the left, and another estimated enemy battalion hit the 5th Regiment on the right. The 5th Regiment pushed back the enemy, which was the secondary attack, after a 30 minute engagement. The 3rd Regiment, which had engaged the main attack, however, continued the bloody battle until dawn.

The 3rd Regiment, which detected early the enemy infiltrating along the road connecting Huich'on and Kunu-ri, delivered a concentrated bombardment of regimental mortar and division artillery fire on the massed enemy troops around Pongch'on-ri. Despite this bombardment, the enemy continued its attacks in wave and in 30 minutes the out-post battalion was isolated amid the enemy. Fortunately, as the enemy concentrated its effort only on seizing the mountain crest of Piho-san, the outpost battalion, isolated but by-passed by the enemy, could withdraw. When the battle was taking place at the main defensive position, both wire and wireless communications were cut off, and it was difficult to command, not to mention request fire support. Both sides fought in fierce give-and-take close combat, pushing and being pushed around the crest of Piho-san, during which both sides lost and then regained the crest three times. The regiment, which lost the crest for the third time, organized a suicide team and launched suicide attacks at dawn, and finally succeeded in seizing the crest. After the battle was over, the 3rd Regiment, which won the Piho-san battles, transferred the battle ground to the 8th Regiment in reserve.
and moved off the front line to become the division reserve.

Once the CCF troops retreated, the front line remained quite with only occasional patrol activities. However, the CCF 38th Army renewed attack at 03:00 on the 5th, to reverse the previous operational failure. This offensive was comparable with the previous one in scale and tactics. This time, however, they advanced along the ridgeline, utilizing their mountain movement ability, their preferred tactics, and directed their concentrated attack on the 5th Regiment. The regiment fought desperately, but outnumbered by the enemy, it was pushed back. It affected the 8th Regiment, which also withdrew from Piho-san around dawn, thus abandoning the hill to the enemy again.

As the situation turned out to be unfavorable, Brigadier General Shin Sang Ch'ul, the division commander, immediately sent the 3rd Regiment to Undong and Chungch'am south of Piho-san to cover the withdrawal of the 5th Regiment, and at the same time delivered concentrated barrage around the crest of Piho-san with all the artillery deployed around Kunu-ri. Estimating that the enemy positions were neutralized by the artillery fire, the division commander gave an order to the 3rd Regiment to counterattack. The 3rd Regiment attacked toward the crest of the hill with the support of artillery. However, because of the enemy's stubborn resistance from the positions on the hill and the unfavorable terrain for the offensive, the counterattack was halted about half way to the crest.

This time the 5th and 8th Regiments prepared for the next offensive, while the 3rd Regiment was counterattacking, and they took turns and launched attacks at 08:00, November 11. Following 30 minutes of preparation fire, the 8th Regiment attacked Piho-san from the east and the 5th Regiment from the west to seize Piho-san by an enveloping attack. And finally, the attackers did seize Piho-san, pushing back the CCF troops after a heated battle that lasted for three hours.
The CCF 38th Army, which failed twice both in attack and defense at Piho-san, started to vanish slowly from the battlefield. In addition, the CCF 39th and 40th Armies, which attacked on the left, also suspended their offensive and began to fade away from the front-line following the Piho-san battle.

The victory the 7th Division achieved by defeating the CCF troops in the Piho-san battle was invaluable. It was, indeed, of great significance in that it was the first victory over CCF troops and it constituted an important momentum which provided confidence to the ROK and the UN troops who so far had been fearful of the CCF troops.

In consequence, while the surging waves of the CCF aroused at Unsan and Onjong broke into spray and bubbles at the breakwater of Piho-san, the Eighth Army grasped the decisive momentum of securing the bridgehead of the Ch'ongch'on River.

(3) Battles at the Forward Line of the Bridgehead

The ROK and UN forces, which had arrived at the bridgehead, were strengthening the new defensive positions, when the CCF 38th Army struck the 7th Division defending Piho-san on November 3, and the CCF 40th Army hit the 19th Regiment, US 24th Division and then the British 27th Brigade on the 4th. These CCF offensives signaled that the battle of the bridgehead had begun.

The 1st Battalion, US 19th Regiment was consolidating its defensive position at Yaksan hill at 11:00 November 4, when an aerial observer on a reconnaissance mission along the Kuryong River reported that more than 1,000 enemy soldiers were crossing the Kuryong River two miles northwest of the battalion, and moving south. And in less than 30 minutes after the report, the 1st Battalion came under the attack of these forces. When the aerial observer discovered the enemy column, the latter had already infiltrated through wood-
en terrain, evidently intent on getting into the rear of the battalion. The enemy maneuver succeeded. Chinese troops captured the battalion’s radio while the operator was using it to report the situation to the regimental headquarters, and the 81mm mortar position was also destroyed. The Battalion did not make much of a fight, and after destroyed and abandoned its heavy equipment and vehicles. Learning it later, the regimental commander committed the 3rd Battalion, the regimental reserve, and tried in vain to push back the enemy. It was beyond his capability.

Upon receiving the report that the 1st Battalion defensive position was penetrated, General John H. Church, the commanding general of the US 24th Division, organized a task force around the US 19th Regiment, including the division units such as tanks and engineer positioned north of the Ch’ongch’on River, and ordered Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, the assistant division commander to assume the command of the task force. The division commander instructed him to recover the bridgehead rapidly in coordination with the 27th Brigade on the left, and also gave him the authority to use the US 21st Regiment, the division reserve.

Having arrived at the 19th Regiment command post and learned of the serious situation, General Davidson immediately ordered the US 21st Regimental commander “to prepare to attack tomorrow” and then visited the position of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment at Komgak-san, where he stressed to the battalion commander the importance of holding the hill to the last by any means. The battalion was to cover the attack of the 21st Regiment.

Following this order the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions, US 21st Regiment, which had been under unit maintenance at Anju, crossed the Ch’ongch’on River and moved to Yonghung-ri on the night of the 4th, and launched an attack on the morning of the 5th. The attacking units advanced along the heavily fogged valley to Yongyong-dong and recaptured Hill 166 which the 1st Battal-
ion, US 19th Regiment had lost, thus reestablishing the bridgehead.

After night fell, however, the CCF 40th Army renewed the attack. In this battle the 21st Regiment (-) held the position against the enemy attack, and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment in defense of Komgak-san also held the position but only after a fierce battle. At this time the CCF troops exploited the gap, roughly 8km wide, between the battalion and adjacent British 27th Brigade on the left, and hit hard the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment. However, in this battle the CCF was defeated again and suffered considerable casualties. After daylight when an element of the 2nd Battalion patrolled around its position area, they confirmed 474 enemy dead scattered around the valley of Komgak-san. The 3rd Battalion also counted more than 100 enemy dead in front of Hill 166.

On the other hand, the British 27th Brigade which was defending around Pakch'on engaged with the enemy in the late evening of the 4th, about 10 hours later than the US 19th Regiment, its right adjacent unit. A part of the CCF unit which was attacking the US 19th Regiment moved to the west and raided Battery C of the US 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Ch'uto-ri south of Pakch'on which was delivering fire support to the brigade. The battery immediately moved into infantry combat, formed a tight perimeter defensive position around the battery positions, and resisted stubbornly. In this battle, the battery, though being outnumbered by the enemy, repulsed the attack, killing 71 enemy soldiers. The battery also suffered considerable loss. There were 2 killed and 17 wounded, and one 105mm howitzer, 6 vehicles, and radio equipment were destroyed.38

At dawn of the 5th, the CCF troops launched a frontal attack to Pakch'on and penetrated the defense line of the Middlesex 1st Battalion, British 27th Brigade. The brigade immediately committed the Australian 3rd Battalion to a counterattack, but the general situation turned out to be unfavor-
able. To make the situation worse the aerial observer reported that an estimated enemy division was moving southward around east of Pakch’on in a clear attempt to encircle the brigade. With this report the brigade commander realized that his brigade was in danger.

Brigadier Basil A. Coad, the British 27th Brigade commander, concluded that his unit could not maintain the position of the bridgehead any longer, proposed to the corps commander that he withdraw, and his request was approved. The brigade started its withdrawal while the friendly air forces were continuously striking the enemy troops around the brigade. Under the cover of the Australian battalion, the brigade withdrew to the north bank of the Ch’ongch’on River with the artillery battalion, the Argyll 1st Battalion, and the Middlesex 1st Battalion in that order. In the evening with the arrival at Maengjung-ri of the Australian Battalion, which performed the covering mission, the brigade’s withdrawal was completed. The Brigade occupied a new bridgehead around the road juncture with a lateral road running to the US 19th Regiment area.

During the night the CCF attacked the 27th Brigade again and the desperate combat continued for four hours and ended in CCF defeat. At dawn on the 6th, one could observe the CCF column withdrawing northward along the valley in front of the Australian Battalion. After this combat the CCF suspended their offensive.

On November 6 the whole front line of the Ch’onch’on River became quiet, and an aerial observer confirmed the general withdrawal of the CCF troops.

On the same day (the 6th of November) the US Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized MacArthur “to proceed with the planned bombing of the Korean end of the Yalu bridges, provided that he still considered such action essential to the safety of his forces.” The first bombing strike against the Yalu river bridges
at Sinuiju went in on 8 November, seventy-nine B-29s under fighter escort executing the mission.\(^{33}\)

The Eighth Army, ordered the US 24th Division to attack and regain the previous bridgehead area taken by the enemy. The division launched an attack on the 7th and the 8th, and against light enemy resistance, completely recovered the initial bridgehead defensive positions at Pakch'ŏn and Pansongch'ŏn, and this concluded the first round of the engagement with the CCF for 12 days.

In conclusion the CCF withdrew, abandoning the Eighth Army bridgehead of the Ch'ŏnch'ŏn River, and this enabled the Eighth Army to formulate new offensive plans.

III. The Uncertain Advance in the East

1. The Arrangement of the Front Line between the ROK and the US Forces

While in the western front, which was west of the Nangnim Mountains, the Eighth Army encountered the CCF's first offensive (the October Offensive) and was fighting an uphill battle, in the eastern front, east of the Nangnim Mountains, for which the ROK I Corps (the Capital and the 3rd Divisions) was responsible, the enemy resistance was light and no serious engagement took place. At this time, the ROK 3rd Division was securing the bridgehead of the Wonsan, Hungnam and Hamhung areas to support the landing at Wonsan of the US X Corps. On the other hand the Capital Division, in compliance with the general offensive order issued on the 24th, was pursuing the retreating enemy toward the Korea-Manchuria border. The main forces of the US X Corps
(the US 1st Marine and the US 7th Division), which were to be committed to the eastern front, were on the fleet, outside Wonsan harbor in the Eastern Sea of Korea waiting for the completion of the sweeping of the mines laid by the North Korean People's Army.

As the mine-sweeping operation around the Wonsan and Hungnam harbors was approaching completion and the landing of the US 1st Marine and the US 7th Divisions was imminent, on October 26 Major General Edward M. Almond called an operational conference in order to arrange the area of operations. At this conference he issued the operation order as follows:360

**Operation Order (extracts)**

The Corps will continue advancing toward the north-east Korea-Manchuria border.
The ROK I Corps will continue advancing toward the north along the axis of the East Sea coastal road and the road to Musan to occupy the border, east of Paektu Mountain, and pacify the enemy in that area. The ROK I Corps will direct some of its forces toward Changjin and Pujon Reservoirs and P'ungsan areas and exercise the maximum pressure on the enemy until the arrival at that area of the US Ist Marine and the US 7th Division.
The ROK 3rd Division, which is securing Wonsan region, will transfer the mission to the US Ist Marine Division, and follow behind the ROK Capital Division.
The US 1st Marine Division will advance up to Changjin Reservoir, then attack Kanggye as its objective. The Division will guard the Wonsan and Hamhung area with a part of its troops until the arrival at Wonsan of the US 3rd Division.
The US 7th Division, upon landing at Iwon, will advance immediately toward Hyesanjin, south-west of Paektu Mountain, by way of P'ungsan and Pujon Reservoir.
The US 3rd Division will take over the securing mission of the Wonsan and Hamhung areas, mop up the enemy guerrilla in the rear area, and keep open the corps lines of communication.

With this order, the US X Corps and ROK I Corps arranged the area of operation with Mach’on-ryong Mountains running from Paektu Mountain to Songjin as the corps boundary: the US X Corps assumed the responsibility of Hamkyongnam-do, west of the Mountains, while the ROK I Corps Hamkyongpuk-do, east of the Mountains.

The situation of the eastern front was, however, uncertain due to the CCF troops which infiltrated in mass into the vicinity of Changjin and Pujon Reservoirs, and the CCF’s concentrated offensive on the west.

In such an uncertain situation, the US 1st Marine Division, the US 7th Division, and the ROK Capital and the 3rd Divisions continued their advance toward the Korea-Manchuria border throughout November under the rigorous winter weather and along the rugged terrain.

2. Advance to Changjin Reservoir

Upon receiving the order to advance to Changjin Reservoir, Major General Oliver P. Smith, the US 1st Marine Division commander, instructed the 7th Marine Regiment to relieve the 26th Regiment, ROK 3rd Division at the valley running from Hamhung to Changjin Reservoir, and advanced to Changjin Reservoir. He ordered the 1st Marine Regiment to relieve the ROK troops at Kojo south of Wonsan and Majon-ri west of Wonsan, and take over the operations. The 5th Marine Regiment was to secure the Yongp’o airfield and the west flank of the corps.5

The US 1st Marine Division started landing at Wonsan harbour at
09:00, October 26, led by the 1st Marine Regiment and followed by the 7th and 5th Marine Regiments in order, and completed its landing on the 28th. The 7th Marine Regiment which was to advance toward the Changjin Reservoir, moved to Hamhung on the 31st due to the delayed embarkation of the major heavy equipment. Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, the 7th Marine Regimental commander, was not informed about the enemy from the division commander except that the enemy in front of his regiment was the CCF troops. In order to find out the road conditions, he dispatched Captain Myron E. Wilcox, Jr., Company B commander, to Sudong, where the command post of the 26th Regiment, ROK 3rd Division was positioned. The regimental main body, then, left Hamhung in vehicles in the early morning of November 1 and late on that day arrived at Majon-ri, located at the beginning of the valley passage leading to the Changjin Reservoir, and relieved the 26th Regiment, ROK 3rd Division on the following day (November 2). Around this time the 26th Regiment, which had advanced as far as Sudong, was raided by the CCF 370th Regiment, 124 Division, and withdrew to Majon-ri, where it established a defensive position.

On the 2nd of November the 7th Marine Regiment launched the first offensive against the CCF with the support of the air force to recapture Sudong, which the 26th Regiment had lost. Following a fierce engagement with enemy around the Yongdae-bong (698m) located at the entrance of the village, the regiment seized Sudong and advanced to Chinhung-ri on the 4th. At this time the enemy retreated to Hill 750, which dominated the road leading to the Hwangch'o-ryong Pass north of Chinhung-ri. The hill was located at the first corner of the road. The road, which became suddenly steep from Samgo railway station, twisted its way below the hill. Therefore, if the CCF troops held this hill and intercepted the head and tail of the regiment moving along this road, the latter would be like 'a fish in a bottle.' So tactically important was the hill.
The regiment commander, in an attempt to ascertain the enemy intentions, sent the Division Reconnaissance Company, attached to the regiment, to search the hill. As was expected, the CCF troops resisted stubbornly, and the company withdrew. Then the 3rd Battalion took a turn and assaulted the enemy for two days from the 5th under the support of air force and artillery. However, the enemy’s concentrated fire of 122mm mortars made the assault end in failure.

The regimental commander decided to renew the attack the following day after having suppressed the enemy positions with a barrage. During the night of the 6th, the 105mm howitzers, 4.2 inches heavy mortars, and 81mm mortars pounded the hill. In this barrage the 81mm mortars, for example, fired a record-breaking 1,800 rounds.

On the morning of the 7th the battalion commander sent the platoon-size reconnaissance team to search Hill 750, and found that the CCF troops had fled, leaving behind many dead and some wounded. The CCF prisoners taken captive disclosed later that the marine artillery and mortar barrage throughout the nights of the 6th and 7th, had inflicted such crippling casualties to the CCF 372 Regiment on Hill 750 that it was paralyzed, and the division commander had ordered the regiment to retreat at dawn of the 7th. This showed how the serious damage was suffered by the enemy.

The 7th Marine Regiment which then assembled at Chinhung-ri was badly in need of unit maintenance, because the regiment had suffered damage at the battles of Yondae-bong and Hill 750, and there were still 15km to go to Kot’o-ri. However, the division commander urged the regiment to keep on the advance in order not to give the enemy time to reorganize.

After seizing Hill 750, the 7th Marine Regimental commander estimated that Mun-kogae, the peak of the mountain ahead, would be the next stumbling block, and the Hwangch’o-ryong which stood behind it constituted a real
terrain barrier. In order to determine the enemy situation in these areas, the regimental commander dispatched the Goggin (William F. Goggin) Reconnaissance Team composed of 16 volunteers to the area between Chinhung-ri and Kot’o-ri. The reconnaissance team which departed Chinhung-ri patrolled the mountains and roads around the target area for 26 hours and returned to the regiment to make the unexpected report that they had found no enemy either along the roads or in the mountains.

The regiment then departed Chinhung-ri at 16:00, the 9th, crossed the Hwangch’o-ryong, and without enemy opposition at 10:00 on the 10th and occupied Kot’o-ri, where it established a perimeter defensive position. With the occupation of Kot’o-ri, the first phase of the Marine Division’s advance to the Chanjin Reservoir was concluded.

The regiment, which reached Kot’o-ri, began to fight against the rigorous cold winter with a biting north wind blowing. The temperature, which was 8 degrees below zero during the daytime, dropped to 26 degree below zero at night, and this stunned the marines, who were shocked by the subzero temperatures.

Under these circumstances, at midnight of the 11th, the US X Corps commander ordered the advance to the Korea-Manchuria Border to continue and expressed his discontent over the Marine division’s slow advance. The Marine 7th Regimental commander dispatched a patrol to search the area between Kot’o-ri and Hagaru-ri. It encountered only small sized enemy units and found no enemy occupying the established position. The regiment departed Kot’o-ri on the 12th and advanced toward Hagaru-ri. However, due to the accumulated snow and poor road conditions, the regiment, which constituted a long column, was unable to move rapidly and could not occupy Hagaru-ri until 13:00 on the 14th.

At this time in spite of the urging from the corps, the division and the
regimental commanders concluded that the division would invite danger if it continued the advance to the inland without taking proper security measures for the division rear. The division was to consider the exposed flank and enemy guerrilla actions in the rear. Based on this estimate, the division commander made up his mind to halt the advance temporarily to assemble subordinate units, secure the supply road from Chinhung-ri to Kot'o-ri, and establish an operational base at Hagaru-ri for the winter operations, prior to the march to the Yalu.

Based on this decision, the expansion and repair of the road between Chinhung-ri and Kot'o-ri was accomplished, and the materials embarked at the Wonsan harbour could be transported through this road to Hagaru-ri, to say nothing of the movement of tanks. In addition, the construction of airfields at Hagaru-ri and Kot'o-ri was begun on the 18th. The 5th Marine Regiment, which carried out the mission of guarding the Hamhung area, transferred the mission to the US 3rd Division, moved north, and began to secure the line of communication between Chinhung-ri and Kot'o-ri. The 1st Marine Regiment, which had guarded the Wonsan area, also transferred the area of responsibility to the US 3rd Division and assembled at Chigyong-ri to move northward.

With these actions completed, at 08:00 on November 23, the division commander renewed the attack to the Korea-Manchuria border; he ordered the 7th Marine Regiment to advance to Yudam-ri, and the 5th Regiment to Memul-li, north of Yudam-ri. However, this order was cancelled due to the new operation order from the corps. The new mission assigned to the division was not to advance to the Korea-Manchuria border, but to attack Mup'yong-ri 60km west of Yudam-ri, as the main attack of the corps. This meant that the division's mission was to attack the rear of the CCF troops confronting the Eighth Army in the west and support the Eighth Army advance.
3. Advance to Hyesanjin

The US 7th Division, which remained outside of the Pusan harbor for 10 days because of the delayed mine-sweeping operation around the Wonsan harbor, moved northward on the eve of the 27th of October and landed at Iwon without enemy opposition on the 29th, three days later than the Marine Division. Major General David G. Barr, the US 7th Division commander, ordered the US 17th Regiment to advance to Hyesanjin by way of Pukch‘ong and P‘ungsan, and the 31st Regiment to the Pujon Reservoir and Singalp‘ajin following the axis of Pukch‘ong–Hamhung–Oro-ri–Shinhung. The 32nd Regiment was ordered to secure the rear as the division reserve.

The US 17th Regiment headquarters and the 1st Battalion, which landed first as the leading element of the division, advanced immediately to Ch’o-ri by way of Sinpukch‘ong, Pukch‘ong and Changhung-ri, accompanied by the 49th Field Artillery Battalion and the 13th Field Engineer Battalion. In the meantime, the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions landed behind the 1st Battalion. The leading element of the regiment arrived at P‘ungsan on the evening of October 30 after having crossed over the Huch‘i-ryong, which was 1,335 meters high. At that time the 1st Regiment of the ROK Capital Division was attacking CCF troops which were stubbornly resisting north of P‘ungsan. The US 17th Regiment (—) joined the ROK 1st Regiment and pushed back the enemy in a joint operation. On November 2, with the conclusion of the battle, the ROK 1st Regiment transferred the positions to the US 17th Regiment and moved to the East Coast.

The landing at Iwon of the follow-up elements was delayed due to the rough sea conditions and the lack of a breakwater at the Iwon harbor. Therefore, the 31st Regiment completed landing only on November 3. Upon landing,
the Regiment moved immediately toward the Pujon Reservoir along the road from Iwon to P’ungsan and relieved the 18th Regiment, ROK Capital Division, which in turn moved to Songjin. The US 32nd Regiment, the division reserve, landed on November 4, moved to Hamhung the following day, and then to Tamp’ung-ri, northeast of Hamhung, where it made preparations for the further operation. With this all concluded, the US 7th Division completed the take over of the operational area from the ROK Capital Division.

Although the US 7th Division had completed the deployment of its main forces, the landing of the supporting units and disembarkation of equipment such as vehicles were delayed. Since the delay affected the execution of the operation plan, the division requested emergency aerial supply, and on the 4th received all kinds of mortar shells and ammunition by air drop. Upon completing the combat preparedness by being supplied, the division commander ordered the 17th Regiment to attack toward Hyesanjin, and the 31st Regiment, toward Pujon Reservoir as their objectives.

The US 17th Regiment drove toward the Ungi River flowing laterally south of Kapsan, maintaining the triumphant spirit of having destroyed two enemy regiments at P’ungsan. However, the advance of the regiment was not easy because of the rugged mountains, narrow valley, and poor road conditions. On the other hand, the US 31st Regiment, which attacked toward the Pujon Reservoir, encountered an estimated battalion enemy on November 8 east of Paek Mountain and killed 50 enemy soldiers in a fierce engagement. Investigation of the dead the enemy abandoned revealed that they were part of the troops of the CCF 376th Regiment, 126th Division, 42nd Army.

When the CCF troops showed up in front of the US 7th Division, as they did in front of the US 1st Marine Division advancing toward Changjin Reservoir on the 7th Division’s left, the feeling of apprehension as well as tension began to mount in the division. However, the commander of the X Corps
who visited P'ungsan on the 12th just ordered the division commander to continue the advance northward.

Following the order, the 17th Regiment crossed over Maedok-ryong (1546m), a gorge, and reached the ford of the Ungi River. When the regiment reached the river, the bridge had been demolished by the retreating North Korean People's Army, and it delayed the regiment's river-crossing. The regimental commander let the 2nd Battalion cross the river at Konp'yong-ri by a makeshift walkway bridge made by connected drums, and the 3rd Battalion by the ford north of Changp'yong-ri. As the 2nd Battalion’s river-crossing site was out of the enemy's smallarms range, it finished the river-crossing on the 14th, but the 3rd Battalion's situation was different. The enemy, who had noticed the regiment's river-crossing at the ford, opened a control gate of the dam in the upper stream on the night of the 13th, which increased the depth of the water by 60cm. In addition to that, the enemy concentrated their smallarms and mor-
tar fire on the troops around the ford, causing wounding and drowning. The battalion commander proposed to the regimental commander that they use a walkway bridge after the 2nd Battalion crossed, and they completed the river-crossing on the 15th.

After the river-crossing of the Ungi River, the regiment was preparing for the advance to Kapsan when the aerial observer informed the regiment that the enemy was retreating in small groups toward Kapsan. The regiment immediately began to pursue the enemy, and occupied Kapsan on the 19th by an infantry-armor coordinated operation. On the 20th with the Yalu near at hand, the regiment advanced toward Hyesanjin, its objective, along the frozen road of the gorge in the order of the 1st, the 3rd, and the 2nd Battalions.

At 10:00 on the 21st, the regiment occupied Hyesanjin, a riverside town, and the high ground around it, against the enemy’s minor resistance. Thus, the US 17th Regiment became the second unit to reach the Yalu after the ROK 7th Regiment.

As the advance of the 17th Regiment was well underway, the division commander ordered the main body of the 31st Regiment in the vicinity of the Pujon Reservoir and the 32d Regiment securing the division rear to move to Kapsan for the early occupation of the vicinity of the Yalu. The 32d Regiment, the division reserve, arrived at Kapsan earlier than the 31st Regiment, which advanced to the Pujon Reservoir. The division commander ordered the 32d Regiment which arrived first to advance and occupy Shingalp’ajin by way of Samsu. The advance element of the regiment, the task force led by 2d Lt. Robert C. Kingston, occupied Shingalp’ajin by way of Samsu on the afternoon of the 22nd, and was followed by the main body, which arrived at Shingalp’ajin in succession. The advance operations to the Yalu were concluded with the link-up between the reconnaissance teams of the 32nd and 17th Regiments.
4. Advance to Cho’ngjin

Around the time that the Eighth Army began the Thanksgiving Day Offensive in the west, in the east the Capital Division, the main attack force of the ROK 1 Corps, was pursuing the enemy with the 18th Regiment advancing to Pujon Reservoir, the 1st Regiment to P’ungsan, and the 1st Cavalry Regiment toward Pukch’ong-Tanch’on-Songjin. When the US 7th division advanced north following its landing in early November, the ROK Capital Division turned over the area of operation to the US 7th Division, and pursued the enemy along the axis of the east coastal road.

The ROK 1st Cavalry Regiment, which led the division, occupied Songjin on October 30 and was ready for the attack to Kilchu. At this time the North Korean Forces, such as the 41st Division and 507th Brigade, were establishing successive blocking positions around Kilchu, Myongch’on and the Orang-ch’on River. Of these areas, Kilchu, which was located at the junction of Hamkyong and Hyesan railways and highway, constituted a key tactical area for the further and easy advance to the Tumen River. As the regiment’s troops were fatigued due to the pursuit operations, the division commander decided to wait for the arrival of the other regiments before renewing attack.

With the arrival of the 1st Regiment from P’unsan, Brigadier General Song Yo Ch’an, the division commander, ordered his regiments to attack Kilchu, which signaled that the division’s full scale offensive had begun. The 1st Cavalry Regiment, the main attacking force, launched a frontal attack along the road of Songjin-Kilchu, while the 1st Regiment’s, secondary attack was to swing around Wahyon-dong, follow the east coastal road, and attack the enemy from the rear.

Complying with this plan, the 1st Cavalry Regiment, which departed
Songjin, advanced to Ilshin-dong south of Kilchu, and the 1st Regiment advanced as far as Houi-dong to the rear of Kilchu on November 3. When the leading element of the 1st Cavalry Regiment advanced around Toksan-dong and Shint'ap-dong, it came under the concentrated fire of enemy guns and mortars, and the division countered the enemy with counter artillery fire and close air support. After saturation bombing by US Marine fighter-bomber’s, and converging artillery fire against the enemy on the 4th, the 1st Cavalry Regiment passed through an open area south of Kilchu and seized its southern hills, which could dominate the city of Kilchu. Indeed, assisted by the artillery, the determined enemy made a stubborn stand at the stronghold to defend Kilchu, but the regiment succeeded in pushing back the enemy and secured the east part of the city by the evening. When the main body of the Cavalry Regiment entered the center of town at daybreak of the following day, the enemy had already deserted the town and retreated to Myongju during the night. On the same day the 1st Regiment continued to pursue the enemy toward Hwanggok-dong and Myongch'on.

The enemy which lost Kilchu moved north toward the Orang-ch'on River while fresh enemy troops stationed at Ch'ongjin and Nanam were moving south toward the Orang-ch'on. It was evident that the enemy who would get together at the Orang-ch'on would prepare strong defensive operations, taking advantage of the natural barrier around the river.

Faced with this situation, the division commander ordered the 1st Cavalry Regiment to block the enemy attempting to advance from Hapsu to the division's flank and rear, and the 1st Regiment to attack Myongch'on along the east coastal road. The 18th Regiment which had transferred the area of the Pujon Reservoir and was on the way back to the division, was ordered to pass through the 1st Regiment and to attack the Ponggang and the Orang-ch'on River, the greatest obstacles of this operation.
As soon as the 1st Regiment had secured Myongch’on against enemy resistance on the 7th, the 18th Regiment, which was to be the division’s main attack for the next operations, arrived at Myongch’on by train. On the following day the 18th Regiment launched attack, led by the 1st Battalion to the Ponggang, the ford of the Orang-ch’on River, by way of Yongam-ri and Chomak-san. On the other hand, an enemy force, estimated to be two battalions, had taken up the strong defensive position on the far bank of the Orang-ch’on, and was determined to engage in battle with the approaching regiment and waited.

When the 1st Battalion was approaching the riverside, the enemy concentrated its whole fire on the battalion to prevent it from crossing the river, and it delayed the battalion river-crossing. On the 10th, Major Lee Byong Hyong, the battalion commander, deciding to force a frontal river-crossing, requested fire support against enemy positions on the far bank of the Orang-ch’ on. The division artillery, the regimental and the battalion mortars, and heavy machine guns converged their fire on the far bank of the Orang-ch’ on. Seizing the opportunity of the barrage, the battalion crossed the river and reached its far bank.

However, the battalion’s advance toward the inland met stiff enemy resistance. In spite of the artillery fire, the enemy did not withdraw, but instead, committed reinforcements and resisted stubbornly at the established positions. From this time on, both sides fought a fierce advance-and-retreat, attack-and-defense battle around Yonggang-dong north of the Orang-ch’ on River. On the 12th an estimated six to seven battalion enemy supported by tanks launched a counterattack, and in the resulting battle the regiment withdrew south of the stream. The 1st Regiment, which reached Balha-dong following behind the 18th Regiment, came under the enemy’s concentrated fire from tanks and mortars which advanced to the riverside and was also forced to
withdraw to Yondae-bong west of Myongch'on.

As the Capital Division's offensive did not progress satisfactorily, the corps commander dispatched to Hapsu the 3rd Division, which had been securing the corps rear. The Cavalry Regiment operating in the Hapsu area was ordered to join in the offensive operation of the Orang-ch'on, so that three regiments would be committed to this operation. The Capital Division launched an attack again on the 19th, a week after its withdrawal from the Orang-ch'on.

This time the 18th Regiment crossed the river from south of the Ponggang, with the 1st Regiment on the left of the 18th Regiment. On the part of the enemy, as they suffered tremendous damages from the division's attack, together with continued air and artillery bombardment, the enemy's resistance was not so stubborn as in the previous battle, and the regiments could secure bridgeheads north of the river without significant enemy opposition.

The enemy, which was defeated around the Orang-ch'on established successive positions for the delaying action while withdrawing toward Chuur and Ch'ongjin by way of Hoemun, and attempted in vain to block the advance of the Capital Division. On the 24th, the division reached Nanam by way of Chuur and Kyongsong without enemy opposition.

The enemy again attempted a battle on Hill 303 located beside the Nabuk-ch'on and the highway leading from Nanam to Ch'ongjin, but the 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment pushed it back by night attack. When the 18th and the 1st Regiments advanced to Ch'ongjin on 25th, they found that the city had been deserted by the enemy, who had retreated toward Hoeryong in the north and Unggi in the east. Thus, the Capital Division's operation for the occupation of Ch'ongjin was concluded.
5. Advance to Hapsu and Paegam

The ROK 3rd Division, in order to support the landing at Wonsan of the US 1st Marine Division, carried out the mop-up operation against the remainder of the defeated North Korea People's Army in the vicinity of Wonsan and Hamhung for more than 20 days. After having mopped up the stragglers of the enemy and seizing a great deal of equipment, the 3rd Division handed over the areas to the US Marine Division, regiment by regiment, and moved to Hongwon, Shinp'o and Pukch'ong on November 5.

Colonel Lee Jong Ch'an, the division commander, deployed the 22nd Regiment at Pukch'ong, the 23rd Regiment at Shinp'o and the 26th Regiment at Hongwon in order to protect the corps rear. He also ordered them to concentrate on unit maintenance while carrying out concurrently the mop-up operation against the remnants of the defeated enemy in those areas.

When the Capital Division, the main force of the corps, seized the Songjin and started to advance to Kilchu, the corps headquarters and the 3rd Division moved into Songjin on November 13. The triumphant Capital Division which captured Kilchu and Myongch'on, however, began to lose its initiative in attacking following the Orang-ch'on River battle. In order to support the Capital Division, the corps commander directed the 3rd Division to attack Hapsu. In compliance with this directive, the division commander ordered the 22nd Regiment, which had returned from the corps reserve, to make preparations for the attack toward Kilchu-Hapsu axis and the 23rd Regiment toward Songjin-Immyong-dong-Hapsu. With this order, the division joined in a real advance toward the Korea-Manchuria border together with the US 7th Division on the left and the Capital Division on the right. The 26th Regiment, 3rd Division was attached to the US 1st Marine Division as of November 9 to pro-
tect the left flank of the US 7th Marine Regiment, which was attacking the Changjin Reservoir.

The axis of Kilchu-Hapsu-Hyesanjin, along which the division was to operate, was the road running along the Mach’on-ryong Mountains, which ex-
tended from Paektu Mountain. It was a critical area because it provided the shortest route from the inland to the Eastern Sea. A part of the enemy which had suffered defeat by the Capital division at Kilchu was retreating along this road, and the 1st Cavalry Regiment, Capital Division was pursuing them.

At this time an estimated 1,000 enemy troops which had been defeated in the Kilchu battle by the Capital Division, were establishing defensive positions at Hapsu, utilizing the advantage of the rugged mountain barrier, and still further north at Paegam about 4,500 enemy troops, which were regarded as the newly activated Labour Brigade, were assembling. In addition to that, the guerrillas and independent action groups were attempting to cut off the supply route and raid the post of the friendly forces in the rear.

The 22nd Regiment, which moved to Kilchu, deployed the 2nd Battalion at Chaedok about halfway between Hapsu and Kilchu and positioned the regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion at Kilchu. The 3rd Battalion was continuing its mission of guarding the corps headquarters at Songjin. The 23rd Regiment, which had moved to Songjin, ordered the 3rd Battalion to take over the positions of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, Capital Division which was in operations at Taesin-ri 30km south of Hapsu. The regimental main forces were deployed around Immyong-dong.

Once the forward regiments completed their deployments, at 10:00 on the 21st, the division commander ordered the regiments to capture Hapsu by 18:00 of that day. Following this order the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment on the left launched an attack along the ridgeline, while the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Regiment attacked on the right along the Paekmu railway. As the 1st Battalion, 23d Regiment approached Hapsu, the enemy resistance increased. However, under the support of the air force, the battalion drove back the enemy and occupied Hapsu around noon of the 22nd. The 2nd Battalion, the 22 Regiment, however, encountered an estimated two battalion enemy troops stubbornly resisting
around Yukgok-dong roughly half way to Hapsu. The battalion launched a
dawn attack on the following day, pushed back the enemy, and in the morning
entered Hapsu, where the 22nd Regiment made the link-up with the 23rd Regi-
ment.

The 1st Battalion, the 23rd Regiment handed over Hapsu to the 2nd
Battalion, 22nd Regiment on November 24 and pursued the enemy, and occu-
pied Paegam around noon of the 25th without enemy opposition. There the
battalion seized four locomotives the enemy had abandoned. The main body of
the 23rd Regiment moved subsequently to Paegam, while the main force of the
22nd Regiment advanced to Hapsu, securing the flank of the 23rd Regiment.

Throughout this advance operation which lasted more than 20 days,
the ROK 1 Corps occupied Hapsu and Paegam, the strong points of the in-
land, and Ch’ongjin, which constituted the foothold for the advance to the
Tumen River.

IV. The Pacification Operation in the Rear Area

1. The Second Front Created by the North Korean People’s Army

Cut off by the Inch’ on landing and the recapture of Seoul in Septem-
ber 1950, trapped below the 38th Parallel, in its chain of command broken, the
North Korean People’s Army main forces were either vanishing into the moun-
tainous terrain or escaping to the north along the Taebaek Mountains. As the
ROK and UN forces advanced across the 38th Parallel into North Korea more
rapidly than initially expected, an increasing number of enemy stragglers as-
sembled in the rear of the friendly forces without any route of retreat. The
Iron Triangle composed of P’yonggang, Ch’orwon, and Kimhwa was one of the assembly areas for a relatively large segment of the forces. Thus, the NKPA Headquarters collected about 10,000 stragglers, reorganized them into three divisions, and attached them to the NKPA II Corps to conduct the unconventional warfare.  

The formation of the NKPA second front and its operation in UNC rear area were based on a strategic policy to intercept the support of reinforcements by harassing the rear and to conduct double-front warfare in coordination with the strike forces of the first front upon conversion to counterattack. In NK Comprehensive History of Choson, the following was recorded as Kim Il Sung’s instruction:

In order to exploit gains in counterattack, we have to intensify our strikes in the rear of the enemy forces in addition to the strikes at the first front. Those NK People’s Army and partisans operating in the rear of the enemy should upgrade their activities in depth of the rear.

In addition, Kim Il Sung had the regular forces organize and develop those forces according to the strategic policy of unifying strikes on both fronts, and defined the mission of the second front forces as follows:

Those unified NKPA units operating in the rear of the enemy in close coordination with the people’s guerrillas, should interdict the enemy’s line of communications in all areas, raid at command posts, rescue those patriots arrested and detained by the enemy, and expand the liberated area continuously.

In NK’s version of the history, this was glorified as Kim’s creative strategy; however, Mao Tse Tung, the Chinese leader, had also advised those remaining NKPA in the rear area of UN forces to resume operation by that time. The message he sent to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai on October 10, 1950 read as follows.
It is recommended that all those NKPA unable to withdraw to the north remain there and resume operation in the rear area of the enemy as the enemy's rear is vacated now with the majority of the enemy forces advancing to the north. It is not only a strategic necessity but also would provide an important advantage for our future operation. If 40,000 to 50,000 NKPA were to stay on and carry out their mission, they would contribute considerably to the operation in the North Korean area in the future.

As was indicated in the message above, Mao Tse Tung led the effort to organize the NKPA remnants of contained without a route of retreat by the speedy advance of the ROK and UN Forces, and to conduct the harassing operation in the rear so as to contribute to future regular warfare in the North Korean area. The advantage for the NK forces in organizing the second front lay in the fact that a substantial part of the NKPA were contained in areas north of the 38th Parallel, where they had support of North Korean residents and they were familiar with the terrain.

Having been reorganized as the second front unit, the NKPA II Corps started its operation from October 14, mainly in the Kangwon-do and Hwanghae-do areas. Each unit secured the bases for its operation and the popular support by consolidating relations with the civilian residents, and reactivating the existing party and government organizations and labor associations. Thus, they mobilized and utilized the civilian residents in a systematic manner. In addition, they had the local party apparatus organize people's guerrilla forces for the coordinated operations.40

In accordance with this policy, the NKPA II Corps occupied critical strong points in the mountainous central area around the Iron Triangle and inflicted heavy losses on United Nations Forces by completely intercepting the routes of Wonsan-P'yongyang and Wonsan-Ch'orwon as they posed threats on
friendly forces flanks, and by raiding supply facilities, field hospitals, supply trains, signal units, and so on."

The formation of the NK forces' second front caused the anxiety of the ROK and UN forces at the front and created the need for additional personnel for the rear area operations by blocking the movement of replacement and cutting off lines of communication.

2. The Pacification Operation of the Restored Area

As the ROK and UN forces continued their speedy advance toward the border with China, the vacuum area in the rear expanded proportionately. Following the harassing activities by the enemy forces of the second front units and guerrillas, especially in the Iron Triangle Area in the rear of the Eighth Army on the western front and in the Wonsan area in the rear of the US X Corps on the eastern front, occurred frequently the pacification opera-
tion loomed as a major task for the friendly forces.

(1) The Pacification Operation in the Western Area

Having confirmed the CCF commitment, the Eighth US Army committed the US IX Corps (US 2nd and 25th Divisions) which had been clearing out guerrillas from the Taejon area and also guarding the rear area as an army reserve into the front along the Ch'ongch'on River in order to reinforce the combat capabilities of the frontline forces. Accordingly, the US 25th Division moved to Kaesong in early November, and then maneuvered to Sunch'on on the 10th. However, with increasing damage inflicted by guerrilla activities south of P'yongyang, the division held back its advance in order to wipe out the enemy in the rear.
At that time, the enemy based in the Ich’ on and P’yonggang areas infiltrated up to the Yesong and the Imjin River areas and dared to raid and intercept the supply route of the UN forces. On October 28, the enemy staged a surprise attack on the ROK field hospital in Ich’on, slaughtered the wounded, and escaped. On the morning of November 2, about 1,000 enemy forces raided a rapidly moving train 16 kilometers north of P’yonggang. Fortunately, about 200 convoy soldiers of the ROK 17th Regiment on the train chased and caught the enemy, killing 40 and capturing 23. According to the interrogation of those captured, there were about 4,000 remnants of NKPA troops conducting guerrilla operations with their main mission to raid the supply trains on the Seoul-Wonsan railroad.

On November 9, about 1,400 soldiers of the 18th Regiment, the NKPA 4th Division, raided the ROK police forces numbering about 800 in Ch’orwon, and the next day about 500 of the 5th Regiment of the same NK division moved in and out in the Yonch’on area. One company of the 24th Regiment, the US 25th Division, went into action to get rid of them, but upon a surprise enemy attack, it suffered 38 killed in action.

With the increasing guerrilla activities in the central interior area, the Eighth US Army instructed the US 25th Division, with the ROK 17th Regiment and the Turkish brigade attached, to conduct an intensive mopping-up operation in this area. Accordingly, the 27th Regiment of the US 25th Division developed its operation in Ich’on and the Sibyon-ri area, the US 24th and ROK 17th Regiments in the Iron Triangle, and the Turkish brigade in the area south of Kumch’on.

In accordance with this plan, the main forces of the 17th Regiment moved to Ch’orwon on November 10, only to have its 1st and 2nd Battalions surrounded by enemy guerrillas with under support of enemy mortar fire. This battle lasted until the 13th. The regiment, supported by air, repulsed the ene-
my. In this engagement, the regiment had losses of 11 killed and 23 wounded; the enemy, on the other hand, suffered much heavier losses with 141 killed and 20 captured alive.
Following this battle, the friendly units intensified sweeping operations around the Iron Triangle for five days starting on November 17, driving the enemy deep into the interior, and then the US 25th Division and the Turkish brigade moved up to Kunu-ri in order to join the battle along the Ch’ôngch’on River from November 24.

The remnants of NK forces in the areas of Kap’yong, Ch’unch’on, and Hwach’on near to the 38th Parallel also conducted guerrilla activities on their way to the north. On October 22, they raided the 60 ROK soldiers and policemen guarding the Hwach’on Reservoir, opened the dam’s control gate raising the level of the Pukhan River by 1.2 meters, and destroyed a pier near the Hwach’on power plant on October 23. The police reinforcement arrived at the scene on October 25 to witness the plant severely damaged. In November, the ROK 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Ranger Battalions were deployed to sweep up the remnants of the NK forces. According to the statements made by the POWs, most of the forces there belonged to the NKPA 10th Division, and their mission was to cut off the Seoul-Ch’unch’on line of communication by operating in the Ch’unch’on area.

In order to mop-up these enemies the ROK Army Headquarters redeployed the 31st Regiment of the reorganized 2nd Division in Kap’yong and the reactivated 5th Division in the Ch’unch’on area. However, the main forces of the enemy retreated to the north earlier, and thus only small numbers of scattered enemy soldiers were swept up without engagements with the enemy on a large scale.

(2) The Pacification Operation in the Eastern Area

Upon capturing Wonsan, the ROK 3rd Division was guarding the routes of the east coast and P’yongyang-Wonsan, the main lines of communica-
tion in this area, as well as the harbor and air field facilities, in order to cover the US X Corps landing at Wonsan. In addition, the division was also conducting a mopping-up operation of the NK stragglers moving northward. An NKPA regimental commander who defected in mid-October explained that "about 4,000 stragglers of the NKPA 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions are operating along the T'aebaek Mountains southwest of Samch'ok." As if to prove his statement, the vanguard of the NK forces moved northward to Tongch'on and Kojo and committed atrocities, slaughtering innocent civilians and looting food. Another POW explained that "Major General Pak Sung Ch'ul, commander of the NKPA 15th Division, collected around 10,000 stragglers in the Majon-ri area 35 kilometers south of Wonsan, and as they started to plunder civilians, the residents discovered their hide-outs in deep valleys." 49

Under these circumstances, the US 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan, and took over the area of operation from the ROK 3rd Division to conduct the mopping-up operation of the enemy stragglers. The 1st Battalion of the US 1st Marine Regiment, the vanguard of the division in landing, moved to Kojo where the supply facilities of the ROK I Corps were located and relieved the 3rd Battalion of the ROK 22nd Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st US Marine Regiment replaced the 2nd Battalion of the ROK 22nd Regiment in Majon-ri, which was tactical key terrain at the junction of the P'yongyang-Wonsan and Ch'orwon-Wonsan routes.

At that time about 3,000 refugees flocked around Kojo, and the NK stragglers joined this stream of refugees to exploit the confusion. Starting on the evening of October 28, about 700 NK stragglers commenced a surprise attack on the 1st Battalion that lasted till the early hours of the next morning. The battalion was taken by surprise in the middle of a sound sleep, but overcame the crisis by repulsing the enemy and secured the supply facilities.

Around that time, the 3rd Battalion set up a refugee reception center,
wary of the enemy's northward movement and of raids by the stragglers hiding in the mountains near the Majon-ri area. It conducted pacification activities by dropping leaflets encouraging enemy soldiers to surrender. Consequently, the number of defectors rose; in addition, the battalion learned that the NKPA 15th Division was to attack the battalion at once. On November 2, the straggler forces concentrated their assaults at the supply route of Wonsan-Majon-ri. The division commander gave up land supply and replaced it with air drops for the battalion since damages to supply personnel and vehicles had occurred repeatedly.

Upon receiving an air reconnaissance report that 2,000 to 3,000 remaining enemy forces were swarming over the Turyu-san area 11 kilometers north of Majon-ri, the US X Corps commander ordered his forces to repulse the enemy. The battalion patrolled this area and returned without any contact with the enemy. However, the civilian residents informed the battalion that Pak Sung Ch'ul, the NKPA 15th Division commander, had bragged: "We'll wipe out the US Marine completely!" The enemy launched a surprise attack at 01:30 on the 6th, but had to retreat leaving behind about 150 dead.

On the other hand, those remaining forces hiding south of Kowon raided the supply train moving northward along the route of Wonsan-Hamhung, and burned up 23 train carriages. Another train moving northward with 30 escorts was also raided and its operator and some of the escorts were killed or wounded in Kowon when it made a stop to take on a supply of water.

At about 02:30 the next morning, the enemy stragglers assaulted the 1st Battalion, the 65th Regiment of the US 3rd Division that had just moved into Yonghung after landing at Wonsan, set fire to the trains containing all the ammunition supply of the US 96th Field Artillery Battalion, and then disappeared to the north after day light.

By that time the Commanding General of the US X Corps had ordered
the US 1st Marine Regiment that was conducting the pacification operation in
the Wonsan area to move to Hamhung in order to reinforce the US 1st Marine
Division advancing to the Changjin Reservoir. The US 3rd Division took
charge of the Wonsan area. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion, the 15th Regiment
of the US 3rd Division left Wonsan to take over the Marine position at Majon-
ri, but was blocked on its way by the enemy forces that occupied the route. On
the 14th, the ROK 3rd Marine Battalion attached to the US 3rd Division made
a breakthrough on the enemy interdiction line and advanced to Tongyang-ri in
the middle of the Majon-ri–Yangdok route, enabling the 15th Regiment to take
over the position of the US 1st Marine Regiment at Majon-ri.

Then, a lull was sustained in the Majon-ri area, but in late November
when the CCF were to commence the battle of the Changjin Reservoir, the NK
straggler troops intensified their assaults in the Tongyang-ri and Majon-ri are-
as in order to support the Chinese operation. The ROK 3rd Marine Battalion
was caught in a crisis isolated among the enemy and without supply, and the
1st Battalion of the US 15th Regiment suffered heavy losses in a surprise at-
tack during its movement to join the ROK marine battalion. Still, both battal-
ions succeeded in their link-up in coordinated attacks and thus in the defense
of Majon-ri.

While a fierce battle developed against the NK straggler troops in the
Majon-ri area west of Wonsan, another battle unfolded in the Nangnim Moun-
tains northwest of Hamhung against enemy guerrilla forces infiltrating into
rear area.

From the 18th to the 22nd of November, the 65th Regiment of the US
3rd Division deployed in the Paek Mountain (Hill 1724) area tried to link up
with the 26th Regiment of the ROK 3rd Division east of this hill, but failed. The
straggler forces of about 2,500 built a guerilla strong point, utilizing the
rugged terrain without a network of roads which was the sector boundary be-
tween the Eighth Army and X Corps.

Major General Robert H. Soule, the commander of the US 3rd Division, made a decision to sweep up the enemy guerillas in the Paek Mountain area, and requested the corps on November 21 to adjust the rear sector boundary of the US 1st Marine Division to the north of the route linking Sach’ang-ri-Huksu-ri-Hamhung in order to secure the only maneuver route in this area. Thus, the ROK 26th Regiment occupied the blocking positions in Sach’ang-ri and Huksu-ri. Thereafter, the regiment repulsed enemy advances to the rear several times, and on November 24 captured 26 Chinese soldiers in the Sach’ang-ri area.

In November alone, those remaining NK forces of about 25,000 heading northward along the mountainous area west of Wonsan raided, on average, 35 times a day at the lines of communication, the supply facilities, the supply vehicles and units on maneuver, and popped in and out at 169 different places in the rear area of the US X Corps south of Hamhung. With the friendly mopping-up operations, the enemy guerrilla activities were reduced, but stragglers in small numbers continued to show up.

3. The Guerrilla Mopping-Up Operation in the Rear Area

When the ROK and UN Forces were advancing toward the Manchurian border, about 15,000 of the remaining NK forces and local guerrillas south of 38th Pararell together imposed a substantial burden on the overall friendly operation in the rear by cutting off lines of communication, destroying supply facilities and materiel, and raiding the friendly forces in operation. The enemy committed all kinds of atrocities such as raiding supply trains, seizing logistic material, assaulting police installations, looting civilian residents of food and livestock, and kidnapping innocent civilians. Thus, the ROK Forces conducted
intensive mopping-up operations in the Honam (Cholla Province) area around Chiri Mountain and the Yongnam (Kyongsang Province) area south of the T’aebaek Mountains where the guerrilla activities were rampant.

(1) The guerrilla Mopping-Up Operation in the Honam Area

Having been intercepted during their operation in the Honam area southwest of the Naktong River, those remaining NK forces of about 10,000 commenced guerrilla activities, taking a posture of unconventional warfare by joining the local guerrilla elements.

They set up the General Headquarters of the South Cholla Province Party guerrillas in this area and organized its subordinate guerrilla units labeled as follows: the Hwasun·Posong, the Hwasun Mine, the Naju East, the Yongkwang, the Kwangsan, the Changhung·Kwangyang·Changsong, the Namhae Brigade, the Great Father, the Tamyang, the 522nd·523rd·524th Units. In addition, the 1st, 3rd, 8th, and 15th regiments and the artillery unit were organized, and the 540th and 550th Units were activated as elements under the direct control of the General Headquarters.

In North Cholla Province, the enemy organized the following guerrilla units under the General Headquarters of the North Cholla Party guerrillas: the Thunder Group of the Chonju City Party, the Eagle Group, the Kachyusha Group, the Lightning Group, the Security Group, the Cavalry & Artillery Group, the Ch’ilbo, the Huh Saryong units, the Tank Group, Imsil·Namwon·Sunch’ang·Chongup·Puan County Party Group, the Paegam, the Flying Tigers, the 206th unit, and associated small bands.

These guerrilla forces interdicted the friendly supply routes, plundered food and grain, raided police boxes, attacked vehicles by surprise, cut off the signal lines, and committed murder and arson extensively in all the
Honam area with their strong point bases at Paegun-san, Togyu Mountain, Hoemun-san, Songni Mountain, Pulkap-san, Paega-san, and Hwaak-san around Chiri Mountain. Particularly these forces established the control mechanism modeled after the system of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 21 cities and counties out of a total of 25 in Chollanam-do (Province) and were conducting active guerrilla activities.7

The ROK Army Headquarters assigned the mopping-up mission of those guerrilla forces in the Chiri Mountain area to the ROK 11th Division activated on August 27, 1950 in Yongch’on and assembled in Taegu. Thus, the 11th Division (minus the 9th Regiment) established its base in Namwon and was reinforced with five battalions (3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Security Battalions) along with the local police and the Youth Guard Group which were attached to the division.

Brigadier General Ch’oi Duk Shin, the division commander, had each of his regiments plan its own operation as the area of guerrilla activities was extensive. He assigned the 13th Regiment in the North Cholla Province area, the 20th Regiment in the South Cholla area, and the 9th Regiment in Sangju of the North Kyongsang Province area to conduct the mop-up operation in each region. He committed five security battalions, police forces, and the Youth Guard Group to continue their security missions on the supply routes and critical installations in their areas.

By the time the division arrived at the Honam area about 4,000 guerrilla forces thought to be NKPA stragglers had occupied the Mach’on-myon area of Hamyang-gun north of Chiri Mountain and were cutting off the route of Kwangju–Namwon–Chinju. The division employed the 13th Regiment in the Mach’on-myon area and the 20th Regiment in the Chongsong area for a concerted mopping-up operation, and secured the road of Kwangju–Namwon. The guerrillas in disarray sought hideouts in the nearby mountains. After that, the
guerrillas ceased to commit raids on a large scale and instead, appeared in small groups everywhere. Thus the division converted to company and battalion-sized operations. By the end of October, the 20th Regiment had swept out those guerrillas operating in the Sunch’ang, Tamyang, and Yongam areas and had those areas secured.

With the start of November, the 9th Regiment, which had been detached to Sangju, moved to Chinju, and took over the eastern part of Chiri Mountain. Upon its arrival, the regiment sighted increasing guerrilla activities in this area, and had frequent encounters with the enemy. On November 20, the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment engaged in a battle against one guerrilla battalion mainly composed of the NK remnant troops in Taejon-ri of Namwon-gun. The battalion achieved enormous gains in this battle: 532 guerrillas killed and 98 captured; 99 rifles of various types, 2 machine-guns, and 1 artillery gun seized. Subsequently, the 3rd Battalion also engaged about 500 guerrilla forces in Tansong south of Sanch’ong. The battalion killed 32 guerrillas, and captured 12, and seized 1 artillery gun, 1 mortar, 3 small arms, 1 jeep, and 30 sacks of rice. On the other hand, 41 soldiers of the regiment traveling by train on their way to combat operations were raided by guerrillas, and 31 of them were killed and 5 wounded due to neglect of security on maneuvers.

Having suffered heavy losses in the division’s mopping-up operation, the disorganized guerrillas in disarray disappeared deep into the mountains. Thus, a lull was secured for the time being.

(2) The Guerrilla Mopping-Up Operation in the Yongnam Area

The NK People’s Army that had been operating in the eastern part of the Nakdong River, with their route of retreat cut-off, infiltrated into the Sobaek and T’aebaek Mountains and escaped to the north. Still that part of
them left behind joined the local guerrillas, reorganized their combat capabilities, and then started their activities blocking the friendly supply routes, raiding supply facilities, and pillaging food and livestock of the civilian residents. Thus the ROK 5th Division commenced the mopping-up operation in the Yongnam area.

The ROK Army Headquarters reactivated the 5th Division on October 8, 1950, assigned it to the ROK III Corps, and ordered it to conduct the mopping-up operation in the Yongnam area south of the T'aebaek Mountains. The 5th Division conducted this operation for about one month from October 16 to November 22, 1950.

The division, with its CP in Taegue committed the 27th Regiment to P'ohang, the 35th Regiment to Chinju, and the 36th Regiment to Kimch'on to conduct their mission of operation according to the division's Operation Order No. 1.4\(^8\)

Taking note that its operation area covered the border area of the four provinces (Kyongsangnam-do, Kyongsangpuk-do, Chollapuk-do, and Ch'ungch'ongpuk-do), and that the area was frequently used by guerrillas as avenues to the north linked to the Sobaeck and T'aebaek Mountains, the 36th Regiment deployed the 1st Battalion in Yongdong, the 2nd Battalion in Koch'ang, and the 3rd Battalion in Kimch'on. The 27th Regiment in charge of the southern part of the T'aebaek Mountains deployed the 1st Battalion in Yonghae, the 2nd Battalion in Yongju, and the 3rd Battalion in Pohang. The 35th Regiment, assigned to the eastern part of the Chiri Mountain, deployed the 1st Battalion in Hadong, the 2nd in Chinju, and the 3rd in Tansong respectively.

In the eastern part of Chiri Mountain, the area for the 35th Regiment, guerrillas popped in and out frequently in mid-November in the Hwagae, Ch'ongam, and Akyang areas north of Hadong, and also in the Ch'ilsong, Chhayang, Hori, and Tangsang-ri areas around Tansong. As the regiment conducted its
mopping-up operation, the guerrillas escaped toward Chiri Mountain. Those chased by the 2nd Battalion in Koch'ang started to move northward along the Sobaek Mountains. Then, the 36th Regiment established the first line of interdiction by deploying the 1st Battalion in Yongdong and another line of interdiction along Songni Mountain, Poun, and Sangju by maneuvering the 2nd Battalion to Chomch'on in order to sweep up those encircled guerrilla forces trying to escape northward.

During the period November 14-16, the 27th Regiment committed the 1st Battalion in the Munsu-san and Ch'ongyang-san areas, the 2nd Battalion in the Chuk-ryong (pass), and the 3rd Battalion in the Kuryong-san and Sondalsan areas in order to eradicate those guerrillas hiding in the nearby mountains. In this operation, most of the guerrillas that had conducted organized activities in the interior of Kyongsangpuk-do were wiped out.

Having swept up the NKPA remnant forces and guerrillas operating in the Yongnam area for over one month through late November, the 5th Division handed over its area of operation to the 9th Division, and moved up to Seoul in order to wipe out those stragglers moving northward in the Ch'unch'on area near the 38th Parallel.

In mid-November, after one month of its activation in Seoul on October 25, 1950, the 9th Division set up the combat headquarters for the Daedunsan area in Taejon, and then, took over the Daedunsan area and the interior of Kyongsangpuk-do from the 5th Division to conduct the mop-up operation according to the corps' Operation Order No. 10 issued on November 20, 1950. The division deployed the 28th Regiment in the Daedunsan and Ch'ungchongnam-do areas, the 29th Regiment in the Kimch'on and Waegwon area in Kyongsangpuk-do, and the 30th Regiment in the Sangju, Yongju, and Munkyong area in Kyongsangpuk-do in order to conduct mopping-up operations.49
On its patrol of the Daedun-san and its neighbouring area on November 15, the 28th Regiment attacked the guerrilla forces of one battalion-size causing them to disperse in disarray in Songgok-ri south of Kumsan, and on the 20th, the regiment discovered the guerrilla hideout and made a surprise attack on it, wiping out about 200 guerrillas. In this operation, the regiment learned through the interrogation of POWs that the NK Labor Party Committee of South Ch’ungch’ong Province and the guerrilla headquarters were located in this area. The regiment continued to patrol in its vicinity and, having suffered heavy losses from the regiment’s operation, the guerrillas escaped toward Songgok-ri, Nami-myon, Kumsan-gun, leaving behind numerous corpses. Thus, the majority of the guerrilla hideouts built in the mountain area near Daedun-san were destroyed and their bases of activities crumbled.

Around November 19, the 29th and 30th Regiments relieved the 27th and 36th Regiments of the 5th Division that had conducted the mopping-up operation in the Kyongsangpuk-do area. At that time, the guerrilla forces operating in Kimch’on, Yongju, and the vicinities around Sangju counted in total about 1,700 including the remnants of NKPA and local guerrillas. In order to prepare for the approaching winter and to reinforce manpower, they routinely raided the remote villages, plundering and kidnapping. Thus, the regiments, in their mop-up operations, completed the pacification of their sectors of responsibility.

By this time, as the frontline shifted southward to the 38th Parallel with the Chinese intervention, the 9th Division handed over its mission of mopping up in Daedun-san and the western area of Kyongsangpuk-do to the 11th Division that was conducting operations in the Honam area, and left for Kangnung via Wonju on December 18 in order to consolidate the frontline.76

The two-month operation of mopping up by the ROK 5th, 9th, and 11th Divisions starting from mid-October reduced the activities of guerrilla
forces that had been harrassing the rear area by intercepting the line of communications, raiding government offices, pillaging civilians, and committing arson. Some peace returned to the rural areas. The ROK 5th and 9th Division headed back to the front, and the 11th Division alone continued its operation against those guerrillas hiding deep in the interior around Chiri Mountain.

V. The Policy in the Occupied Area

1. The Policy of the ROK Government in the Liberated Area

In implementing military administration in the reclaimed area north of the 38th Parallel, a serious disagreement developed between the US and ROK governments. The ROK government began to become vaguely conscious of the military administration when debates took place on the issue of the occupation as to the authority and method of the military administration among the US Administration, the press, and the UN in August 1950.

The ROK government argued that it should, of course, assume the leading role in military administration over the northern part of Korea. The basic position of the government was that the sovereignty over the northern part of Korea should be in the hands of the ROK government and the ultimate unification of Korea should be accomplished in the way that Koreans wanted as the United Nations recognized the Republic of Korea in December 1948 as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula.

Admid foreign reports on August 20 about placing the northern part of Korea under the UN trusteeship, Dr. Chang Myon, sent to Washington as the presidential special envoy, declared that the ROK Government rejected any
proposal of a compromise with the aggressor. It would not accept trusteeship or a coalition government by two Koreas or any principle except that of freedom and unification. He added that the friendly forces would continue to advance northward in order to press the enemy to surrender, and that unification should be achieved through an election under the auspices of the UN to fill those 100 seats in the Korean National Assembly reserved for the representatives of the northern part of Korea.

On September 1, at the UN General Assembly he insisted that the civil affairs administration on the northern part of Korea should be in the hands of the ROK government, emphasizing that Koreans are a homogeneous people with one culture and common historical background. However, not a single office of the Armed Forces or any agency of the ROK government had set up a systematic plan for the military administration and the procedure for unification upon occupying the northern part of the Peninsula.

It was not until October 7 that the ROK Armed Forces, upon crossing the 38th Parallel, issued the guidelines for conduct in dealing with residents in North Korea as the ROK Army Headquarters Instruction No. 86.

The Principles of Conduct for the ROK Armed Forces in North Korea

The ROK Army Instruction No. 86 (Issued on October 7, 1950 in Taegu, Kyongsangpuk-do)

1. Civilians in North Korea are liberated brethren; they are not enemies.
2. They are the future citizens of the Republic of Korea; thus, their rights, and private and official properties should be respected.
3. The ROK Armed Forces are protectors of the civilians in North Korea, not conquerors.
4. The ROK Armed Forces are, by all means, the armed forces of a democratic nation, and of its people; they are not the armed forces
that suppress their people but that should behave so as to gather respect from their people.

5. All the officers and men of the ROK Armed Forces are the harbingers of democracy; thus, they are expected to prove that democratic principles are far superior to the regulations of the police state under the communist dictatorship through reliable good conduct and kindness.

However, this instruction did not mention the procedures and the detailed plan in preparation by the military administration. On October 10, President Syngman Rhee instructed the Minister of Home Affairs Chough Pyung Ok to set up the administrative policy in North Korea. Accordingly, the minister set a plan for government up, got the approval of the cabinet, and released it to the public on October 13.78.

The essence of “The Policy of Restoring Administration in the Northern Part of Korea” issued as a statement by the Minister of Home Affairs was as follows: Upon pacifying the NK communist forces, martial law is would be proclaimed, the armed forces to appoint the chiefs of martial law administration for each city and province, and to organize the committees for self-government composed of residents as the war-time organs to maintain peace and to restore local order. On the other hand, upon the request of the armed forces prior to restoring the administration, the Ministry of Home Affairs dispatched to each city and province one administrator plus a few assistants, a police chief and a substantial number of police officers in order to establish the basis for restoring administration, by assuming the duties of war-time relief, basic investigation, and the maintenance of public peace. Upon securing public order in the restored area, the ministry was supposed to appoint and dispatch civil servants such as the governors, the county headmen, and the police chiefs. Once administration was restored, then the governors under the command of
the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters were to administer in a unified manner.35

In the aforementioned statement, the minister released the policy of dispatching leaders in various fields and young men and women residing in the south in order to employ them in hunting down the communists, in maintaining order, and in pacifying with propaganda. Along with the roles to be played by government administrators on dispatch, those of the social organizations, especially, the roles to be played by the Northwestern Young Men's Association with a strong anti-communist orientation and other south Koreans of North Korean origin were emphasized. Furthermore, it was also intended to repatriate those refugees from North Korea back to their original residence in order to utilize them in restoring order, in changing the ideological orientation of North Koreans, and in determining their allegiance. The Minister of Home Affairs emphasized that those refugees from the north were expected to be role models and leaders in their hometowns for the victory of democracy in the election to be held in North Korea under the auspices of the UN.36 Thus, he revealed his intention to employ anti-communist associations such as the Northwestern Young Men's Association and those refugees from the north residing in the south. Minister Chough Pyung Ok said that the ministry had enlisted police officers to be dispatched to North Korea in order to restore the administration in the north, and that preparations for establishing the civilian administration were proceeding smoothly.6

He denied refused to acknowledge the military administration to be implemented by the United Nations. Instead, he reaffirmed the military administration to be initiated by the ROK government by releasing the plan of appointing governors, county headmen, mayors, and so on, upon securing public peace by the civil administrator to be dispatched along with the advancing forces to take charge of the terminal administration under the Martial Law
Enforcement Headquarters since the northern part of Korea was a territory under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. Accordingly, it was decided to implement a military administration over the entire north Korean area to be extended from the occupied area, and thus the independent military administration by the ROK government was to be conducted in the areas of North Korea occupied by the ROK forces ahead of the UN Command by some of the police officers and chief administrators sent as the vanguard from the south.

2. The Military Administration Plan for Civil Affairs by United Nations Command

On September 15, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a preliminary instruction to General MacArthur to set up an occupation plan of the area north of the 38th Parallel. With the success in the landing operation at Inch'on, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff "instruction on September 27" defined the objective of the UN forces operation in North Korea as that of destroying the NK forces, and referred to the follow-up actions to be taken by the UNC upon termination of resistance by the NK forces.

On the other hand, the US administration tried to deter in advance the plan of the ROK government to extend its sovereignty over the area north of the 38th Parallel in the process of occupying the NK area. On October 3, the US Department of the Army sent to General MacArthur a more detailed plan of the military administration in the North Korean area. The content of this occupation policy was composed of the general concept and detailed instructions. According to the general concept, the military administration was to be conducted in three stages. In its first stage, the primary task was to secure public peace. Thus, political affairs were restricted with emphasis on mainly relief
activities, minimum support, maintaining and establishing law and order, and restoring administration in locality and provinces. In this stage, the supreme authority was the Commander-in-Chief, UNC, and he would be under the control of the UN and the US Government, but free from any other interference.

In the second stage, normal political and economic activities were to be guaranteed under the guidance of the UN Commission, and military security was supposed to be a matter of secondary concern. At this stage the Commander-in-Chief, UNC was to exercise full authority in ruling the northern part of Korea although he was obliged to seek advice and recommendations of the Commission and its members to the fullest extent so long as they did not impair military safety.

In the third stage, the government of the unified Korea through elections was to take over the sovereignty, and all the UN forces except those forces essential for the security of Korea were supposed to withdraw. At this stage, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC was to be responsible only for the safety of those UN forces remaining in the northern part of Korea.

The detailed instructions of the occupation policy for General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, UNC and also the Chief of Military Administration, were specified as follows:

1. The mission of the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC is to occupy north Korea, to restore public order, to stabilize a democratic way of life by rehabilitating the economy, and thus to establish the frame for autonomous, independent unified Korea in the area north of the 38th Parallel in the name of the United Nations.

2. The United Nations retains the ultimate authority for administering the occupied North Korea, and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as the institution for implementation is subject to issue orders and get reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC.
(3) In order to achieve the objective of the Korean unification, the UN is to set up several institutions for necessary support, advice, and research. The Commander-in-Chief, UNC is to render in his capacity the best possible cooperation and support to these institutions and to accommodate their recommendations and advice to the largest extent. The sovereignty of the ROK government is not recognized over the area north of the 38th Parallel; however, it is desirable to cooperate with the ROK government on internal matters in North Korea in order to speed up the ultimate unification.

(4) Those policies decided by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, UNC in the future should try to maintain the status of North Korea as it had been at the time of the occupation; the interpretation and implementation of those policies should be carried out to the extent not to alter the initial status to the best possible extent.

(5) The North Korean government, the Communist Party, its power base, and all the organizations, which are inconsistent with the objective of occupation, agitating order, and totalitarian in nature are to be dismantled. The Commander-in-Chief, UNC should not create any form of the central government other than the implementing organization for occupation affairs.

(6) The Commander-in-Chief, UNC retains the authority to appoint, fire, and recommend necessary personnel, and can conduct reform on political organizations when such actions are considered favorable for the occupation affairs and the ultimate unification.

(7) No one can be punished on the basis of his past career or for retaliation, nor be fired from government positions or other places of work.

(8) The Commander-in-Chief, UNC can provide the occupied area with relief and support in terms of material and services in order to publicize the American humanitarian ideology and the promptness and efficiency in its relief activities of the United Nations.
(9) The decision to be made by the Commander-in-Chief, UNC as to what extent the law of North Korea and of the institution of the Military Administration are to be applied to those members and civilian representatives of the United States and the United Nations should be approved by the United Nations. All the individuals entering the north Korean area are subject to these laws.

(10) It is desirable to minimize the utilization of military personnel by separating the Military Administration Headquarters and the operational command, in order to actively recruit personnel from the member countries of the United Nations, and to refrain from employing Americans and South Koreans as far as possible. It is also desired to manage the affairs in such a way that the transfer of the Military Administration to the non-military institution of the United Nations can be made without much alteration in its organization.

(11) In order to allow North Korean residents the ability to choose their own way of life and the qualities to pursue unification smoothly, a planned program for reeducation and reorientation should be implemented.

Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, UNC issued on October 7, the detailed policy of the military administration based on the policy of the US Department of the Army as Appendix I (Civil Affairs), Operation Order No. 2 to the Commanding Generals of the US Eighth Army and X Corps.

3. Conflicts on the Plan of the Military Administration

The initial conflict arose on the issue of advancing across the 38th Parallel between the ROK and the UNC. When the ROK forces were stopped at the 38th Parallel by the order of the UNC, President Rhee, voicing discontent, on September 30 ordered the ROK forces alone to advance to the north. At that time, the differences were resolved when MacArthur gave tacit consent
to the ROK forces to cross the 38th Parallel. The second conflict was between the UN and the ROK concerning sovereignty over the North Korean area. The position of the ROK government was that it was reasonable for the ROK to exercise sovereignty over that area after occupation as the United Nations had recognized the ROK as the sole legitimate government on the Peninsula. Against this claim by the ROK, the US Administration insisted that the ROK claim over sovereignty in North Korea could not be accepted as elections had not been held north of the 38th Parallel. Thus, it was the basic position of the UN and the US Administration that the Commander-in-Chief, UNC was to exercise jurisdiction over the occupied area after occupation under the authority of the UN, and that it was impossible for the ROK to govern in that area until the Korean Peninsula was unified by the UN.

In addition, the ROK government proposed a supplementary election in the northern part of Korea alone to fill the seats of the ROK National Assembly reserved for the North Korean representatives as a procedure for setting up a unified government after the end of the military administration. On the other hand, the UN and the US Administration insisted on a general election over the whole of Korea.

As conflicts deepened, on October 12 the US and western allies called the UN Interim Committee on Korea and passed a resolution on interim administrative measures in the occupied area in the north.

This resolution recommended the following: first, the committee respects the decision of the General Assembly on all necessary measures including the general election in establishing a unified government; second, there is no government capable of exercising sovereignty over the occupied area in North Korea; and third, the UNC takes immediate actions in order to control all the institutions and personnel in charge of jurisdiction and the general administration in North Korea temporarily until the UNCURK (United Nations
Resolution of the UN Interim Committee (October 12, 1950)
— Administration of the North Korean territories occupied —

The Administration of the Territories Occupied by the United Nations Forces

(October 12, 1950)

The Interim Committee on Korea,

1. Considering the provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October, under which the Interim Committee on Korea is requested to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the recommendations contained in that resolution;

2. Having regard to the General Assembly recommendation that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea;

3. Recalling that the Government of the Republic of Korea has been recognized by the United Nations as a lawful Government having effective control over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and that there is consequently no government that is recognized by the United Nations as having legal and effective control over other parts of Korea;

4. Advises the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibility for the Government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities, and which may now come under occupation by United Nations forces, pending consideration by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and

5. Recommends that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate with all authorities established for civilian administration in accordance with the present resolution officers from the several forces of members of the United Nations under the Unified Command in Korea;

6. Invites the Unified Command to keep the Interim Committee informed of the steps taken in response to this resolution, pending the arrival of the Commission in Korea.
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) takes it over. But the resolution of the UN Interim Committee on Korea on October 12 intensified the conflict between the ROK and the US governments. As to the claims on setting up a unified government and holding a general election, President Syngman Rhee made it clear that the resolution of the committee was unacceptable. He insisted that it was totally impossible to have a re-election in the south as "a national election" had been held on May 10, 1948, and thus, the election should be held in North Korea alone under the auspices of the UN. Subsequently, through a spokesman of the ROK government expressed regret over the "October 12 Resolution" and declared that the ROK government would exercise an independent military administration and sovereignty, and that the election in the north would be held by the ROK government under the auspices of the UN.

President Rhee sent a telex of protest containing the following message to Marshall MacArthur on October 16: the ROK cannot accept the resolution of the UN Interim Committee on Korea:

The Korean people have the right to hold an election and establish their government according to their free will under the auspices of the UN; no other country including the UN as an outside force can interfere in the internal affairs of Korea; the ROK government is to dispatch, upon ceasing combat activities, the governors of five provinces of North Korea appointed two years ago in order to assume the general administration; and, as soon as circumstances allow, an election will be held in a free atmosphere to elect new governors in order to guarantee the North Koreans the same rights enjoyed by South Koreans.

Upon receiving the telex of protest, MacArthur immediately reported the contents to President Truman, reminding Truman of his earlier concerns at "the Wake Island Conference." MacArthur recommended to Truman that ef-
forts should be made to find a compromise between the resolutions of the Interim Committee on Korea and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thus, the US Administration, in order to calm down the protests and anger of the ROK government, commenced its efforts to explain and persuade the ROK government and President Rhee to agree to the contents of the UN resolutions and the basic policy of the US Administration.

The US State Department, through its resident ambassador in Korea, explained the conflicting problems in the following terms: first, the election for unification and other legal matters belong to the function of the UN Interim Committee on Korea since the UN and the US have agreed that the application of the ROK sovereignty does not automatically extend to the northern part of Korea; second, the resolution of the Interim Committee is an interim measure for the UNC assuming the administrative responsibility in North Korea temporarily until the UNCURK arrives in Korea, and upon arrival, the UNCURK is to consult President Syngman Rhee on administration matters; and third, it is not intended to protect or to revive communism, but rather to insure that the UN forces solidly control all the institutions established for the general administration. The ambassador added that the resolution of the Interim Committee was nothing but a repetition of the resolution of the UN General Assembly on October 7, and that the US Administration requested the Korean government’s restraint on this matter since the ROK was the legitimate government composed of the representatives elected in a free and fair election, and President Rhee, and thus, the ROK government would be consulted sufficiently on the election issue.50

Upon this explanation by the American Embassy, President Rhee insisted that the ROK government could not accept the illogical legal terms restricting the sovereignty of the ROK Government even though the resolution of the Interim Committee on Korea was provisional.50 Thereafter, numerous
telexes were exchanged between the US Department of State and Ambassador John J. Muccio and Counsellor Everett Drumright of the US Embassy in Seoul, and many contacts were made between the US and President Rhee and the Korean government officials.

Upon persistent endeavors of the US Administration, the stubborn stance of President Rhee, having insisted that “the resolution of October 12” could never be accepted, gradually modified. At a press conference on October 17, President Rhee displayed a more flexible position by stating “the ROK government is to accept the resolution of October 12; however, the United Nations is also expected to take a posture of counselling rather than of controlling the North Korean residents in the election.” Along with the change in President Rhee’s attitude, the Minister of Home Affairs Chough Pyong Ok, who had once responded by insisting on the independent maintenance of public order and restoration of administration in occupied North Korea, made it clear by saying “the ROK government is to solve the problems of jurisdiction and of restoring administration in consultation with the UN Interim Committee on Korea.”

This change in the stance of the ROK government meant that the ROK government would not follow unconditionally to the direction of the UN although it intended to cooperate with the will of the UN and the US. This position was manifested in the prolonged dialogue between President Rhee and Ambassador Muccio on October 20.

The US made some revisions to the plan of military administration of the UN forces by accepting some of the ROK claims such as employing those personnel recommended by the ROK government as the military administrative staff in North Korea. Thus, the conflict between the ROK and the US gradually subsided.
4. Implementation of the Military Administration in North Korea

Before the final settlement on the issue of the military administration in the North Korean area between the ROK government and the UN, the occupied area was extended, and both the ROK government and the UN independently pursued military administration. In early October, the ROK Government detached its police forces to nine occupied areas, conducted patrols, and maintained public order. From the beginning, the military administration in North Korea was carried out differently in the eastern and western areas in terms of system and operational procedure.

In the western area, dual systems of military administration were maintained by both sides as the US and the ROK forces occupied the important areas including P'yongyang; in the eastern area, the ROK forces took the initiative in the military administration as they advanced across the 38th Parallel on October 1 and occupied the critical areas in advance while the UN forces landed in and occupied Hamkyong Province about one month later. The ROK forces thus proclaimed martial law in the northern part of Korea and set up a civil affairs bureau of martial law enforcement forces and appointed the chief of the bureau in each province.

The following are the list of the bureau chiefs appointed for provinces: Colonel Yu Soong Yul for the P'yonganpuk-do area; Colonel Chang Seok Ryun for the P'yongannam-do area; Colonel Kim Wan Yong for the Hamkyongnam-do area; Colonel Ch'oi Kyong Man for the Hamkyongpuk-do area; Colonel Lee Yong Moon for the Kangwon-do area; and Colonel Pak Seung Hoon for the Hwanghae-do area. The ROK forces instructed the civil affairs bureaus of each corps and division to set up self-ruling organizations in each city and county in the reclaimed area. Accordingly, the self-ruling committees
were organized in some areas as local units around the non-communist figures among resident before the administrative staff of the Ministry of Home Affairs were dispatched to the area occupied by the ROK forces. In addition, the ministry sent Youth Pacification Groups to the area as vanguards where the ROK forces had wiped out the NK forces and completed occupation, and employed them in conducting propaganda and in hunting down and investigating communists. Subsequently, the ministry sent one civil affairs administrator, several staff members, one police chief and about 100 to 150 police officers each to cities and counties, and assigned them to the work of war-time relief, investigation in civil affairs, and maintenance of public order. Those police forces were a part of the 30,000 recruited to assume the police mission in the reclaimed area.

In keeping with the policy and procedures mentioned above, the military administration in the occupied area started to gain momentum. In the eastern area, the ROK forces organized each province into 7 cities and 26 counties, and then set up a self-ruling committee for each city and county as a provisional administrative organ in order to rehabilitate administration in the area. The ROK forces set up the administrative policy in North Korea as a guide for the interim administration under military rule, and accordingly, they took over critical facilities that the communists had confiscated, redistributed these among the residents, and organized a management committee to repair and manage the factories and power plants.

Following the guidance of the civil affairs bureau of the corps, the self-ruling committee elected Lee Kwi Ha, the former principal of Osan Junior High School, as the governor of Hamkyong Province. Under the governor, were 8 bureaus in charge of investigation, commerce and industry, agriculture and forestry, education, health and social affairs, police, construction, and finance, and under each bureau were departments and sections. The total manpower of
the province committee was about 400; however, the investigation bureau was the largest employing more than 100. Each city and county organized self-ruling committees. The members of those committees were screened and recommended by the civil affairs bureau through intelligence bureau, and appointed to assume duties of rationing food, of recovering water and power supplies, and of managing the major properties of the NK government.

The military administration under the command of Hamkyong Province was transferred to the UNC as the UN military administration team arrived and assumed its duties after the landing of the UN forces in Wonsan. In this process of transfer, difference of opinion and confusion in administration surfaced when the two chairmen of the self-ruling committee, the one elected under the ROK occupation and another appointed by the UN forces, confronted and were set against each other over one chair. In one case, Major Yu Won Shik, the Chief of the Civil Affairs of the ROK I Corps, persuaded his counterpart in the US 1st Marine Division, and had the chairman appointed by the ROK resume his duty of leading the self-ruling committee. In spite of conflicts and differences in some cases, the military administration in the eastern area was a success in relative terms since the ROK forces continued to perform the main role in substance and the US military administrative personnel served an advisory role, although the final authority was in the hands of the UN forces.

In P'yongan Provinces, the area of operation for the Eighth US Army, the military administration seemingly started with the initiative of the UN forces. Upon entering P'yongyang on October 21, the UNC's military administration commenced its duty in the P'yongannam-do area led by Colonel Munsky (name unidentified) appointed as the administrator of the civil affairs bureau of the US I Corps. Subsequently, Kim Sung Ju, a former member of the Northeast Youth Association, was appointed as the Governor of P'yong-
annam-do by the civil affairs bureau of the UN forces and assumed his duty as of October 26. Woo Jae Soon was appointed as the major of P’yongyang, and his staff and police officers were also appointed. The US forces also established the interim city council of P’yongyang composed of selected non-communists as a self-ruling committee.

The American administrators went too far without proper knowledge on the North Korean situation when carrying out the military administration, including the selection of the city councilmen. As a result, public affairs were left unattended for a few weeks after the occupation of P’yongyang, law and order were kept only in daylight on broad avenues, and there were serious food shortages.

On the other hand, the ROK forces also conducted their military administration in this area. As the chief of the civil affairs bureau and military administrator of the ROK II Corps, Colonel Kim Chong Won, the commander of military police, was appointed. The ROK government informally sent out some of its officials for the local administration, to be rejected by the UNC authority; thus, they were unable to exercise administrative control in any substantial manner. Still some of the police officers were sent by the ROK government to the occupied area. The chiefs and deputies of the ‘dong’ offices (smallest unit of administration) were selected and appointed from among the residents, and each ‘dong’ organized its own security guard composed of around 10 members in order to maintain public order and to hunt down the communists. The ROK government sent various social organizations informally to the occupied areas and utilized the bureau of general affairs on North Korea of the Korean Youth Association, mainly composed of the elements of the Northwest Youth Association, in investigating civil affairs of the occupied area.

The ROK forces started to recruit and appoint police forces of 500 out of 1,000 planned for P’yongyang. These police forces were to lead the effort to
sack and punish the remaining members of the NK internal affairs committee, high ranking officers of the NK forces, and the executives and 'undesirables' of the Communist party. The friction and confrontation in the process of starting the military administration between the ROK and the UN forces was submerged since the ROK government accepted the "October 12 Resolution" of the UN and thus recognized the UN sovereignty over the occupied area. Thus, the ROK government ceased its activities to lead the military administration, and those self-ruling committees, self-defense forces, and the police organizations were absorbed by authorities of the US military administration under its command. As the institutions for the UN military administration were organized in the P'yongannam-do area, a part of those police forces and administrative personnel were incorporated into the organ of the UN administration, but the rest returned to the south.

Finally, the basic nature of the UN military administration in maintaining the self-rule under its command turned out to be a formality. However, the basis of the residents' daily life depended upon the self-ruling committees, police, self-defense forces or security guard composed of the mature youth organized for each unit. Situations varied according to the region, but various social organizations, such as the YMCA, the Korea Youth Association, the Northwest Youth Association, and others were set up for active participation in the occupied area.
Notes


2) The Central Research Office of Chinese Archives, Mao Tse Tung's Writings since the Foundation of PRC (vol. 1), 1971, p. 568.

3) The CCF Organization
   Army Group: It is composed of a few armies, corresponding to the ROK field army.
   Army: It is organized with three fixed infantry divisions, corresponding to the ROK corps.
   Division: It equals the ROK division.
   Team: It corresponds to the ROK regiment, organized on a tripartite concept.


7) Ibid., p. 19.

8) Ibid., p. 20.


11) Ibid., pp. 203–204.


15) Thanksgiving Day is one of the biggest celebrations in the United States of America falling on Thursday of the 4th week in November. It fell on November 23, 1950. It is the American version of Korean Ch’usok.


18) Ibid., p. 212.

19) The ROK Army HQ, tr., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 364.

20) Major General Yu Jai Hung, the Commanding General of the II Corps, was transferred to the ROK Army HQ as Deputy Chief of Staff as of October 24, 1950 to be replaced by Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, the Commanding General of the 1st Division at the change of command. However, with the commencement of the Chinese offensive, Yu returned to his former position.

21) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 364.


27) Ibid., p. 67.

28) Ibid., pp. 68-69.


30) Ibid., p. 384.

31) Ibid., pp. 384-385.

32) Ibid., p. 384.

33) Ibid., p. 385.

34) Ibid., p. 386.

35) Ibid., p. 388.


37) Ibid., p. 586.

38) The Capital Division, operation order No. 10, November 5, 1950.


41) Ibid., p. 102.


At that time, the ROK 26th Regiment handed over the attack mission at the Changjin Reservoir to the US 7th Marine Regiment on November 2, and was attached to the US 3rd Division, covering the left flank of the US 7th Marine Regiment.
50) The War History Compilation Committee, op. cit., p. 162.
53) *The Dong-A Ilbo* (daily), October 14, 1950.
54) Ibid., October 14, 1950.
55) Ibid., October 14, 1950.
56) Ibid., October 12, 1950.
57) Ibid., October 14, 1950.
60) *The Dong-A Ilbo* (daily), October 17-28, 1950.
Chapter Three  Withdrawal to the 38th Parallel

I. Preparations for the Winter All-out Offensive

The ROK-UN forces that had secured P’yongyang on the October 19, 1950 pursued the NK forces which had been virtually demolished toward the Korea-Manchuria border. Victory seemed to be imminent in four months after the Korean War began.

However, around the end of October, the ROK-UN forces who were advancing toward the Korea-Manchuria border were surprised by the CCF troops who had secretly crossed the Yalu and were deployed into the mountainous interior. The Allied advance was halted and the Eighth Army was barely able to secure the bridgehead of the Ch’ongch’on River.

In this first encounter, both sides suffered considerable losses in personnel and equipment, and experienced extreme difficulties in military operations due to the severe winter weather. Despite such harsh conditions, both sides continued preparations to fight a decisive battle in the next offensive.

1. The Chinese Communist Forces Strategy and Offensive Preparations

(1) The Chinese Communist Forces Strategy

In early November, when the first offensive operation was almost at an end, the Chinese Communist wartime Leadership evaluated the situation as follows: “We achieved the first victory against the enemy by secretly infiltrat-
ing our troops into the Korean battlefield. We have not only frustrated America’s intention but also have made them feel apprehensive and realize the seriousness of situation.” However, they admitted that throughout the battle in which they held the operational initiative, they failed to annihilate the opponent main forces due to their outmoded equipment and lack of ammunition and food. Hence the Chinese leadership worried about an expected counter-offensive by the ROK and UN forces.

The Chinese troops, at that time, secured a bridgehead along the mountainous area south of the Yalu, however, after the first phase offensive, they were exhausted and were short of food and ammunition. In the meantime the NK forces, which had scarcely escaped defeat by the CCF intervention in the war, were reorganizing north of Kusong, Maengsan and Kanggye.

On November 4, Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army commander, taking those situations into account, decided to take the ‘induce and counter-offensive strategy’ as the next operational policy. This was the strategy the CCF had utilized in the first phase offensive. That is, if the ROK and UN troops launched an offensive, the CCF would lure them deeply into their position, strike the flank units first and then exploit the results.

Complying with this policy, the CCF began to redeploy its units starting on the 5th. First, each army in the west deployed its main forces at Sinuiju, Kusong, T’aech’on and Unsan, and also Shinhung-dong, Somin-dong, and the Myohyang Mountain area, which were located south of Huich’on. Each army then deployed one division forward around Sonch’on, Namsi, Pakch’on, Yongbyon, Wonri and the Kujang area. The missions of the forward deployed divisions were to annihilate the enemy troops if they were small units, but they would try to lure the enemy large units deep into their positions by ‘hit and withdrawal’ tactics.

On the eastern front, the CCF deployed the main bodies of the 42nd
Army around Kot'o-ri, Kujin-ri, and the Pujon Pass area, and One division selected from the main unit, around Yongwon. The selected division again deployed a part of its forces at Togwon and ordered it to carry out guerrilla activities toward Yangdok.

By that time, the three armies (the 20th, the 26th and the 27th Armies) of the CCF IX Army Group, which had recently been committed to the Korean War, under the command of Sung Shih Lun, crossed the Yalu in three echelons (on November 7, 12, and 19) at Chian and the Im River, and proceeded to the eastern front.

Mao Tse Tung, approving this strategy, rearranged the battlefield to the north of the Sonch'on-Wonsan line, and instructed the CCF to annihilate the ROK and UN forces in this area. Mao in particular emphasized the importance of the Tokch'on area. The IX Army Group, which was about to enter North Korea, was to be deployed around the Kanggye and Changjin area to attempt to change the tide of the war on the eastern front.4

(2) Preparation for Offensive

The CCF endeavored to increase their military strength in order to make up for their inferior equipment and firepower with their abundant human resources. Consequently, the CCF deployed 30 divisions of nine armies on the front line, namely, 18 divisions with a strength of 230,000 on the west and 12 divisions with a strength of 150,000 on the east. This deployment, in terms of military strength, was double the number of the ROK and UN forces.

On the other hand, the CCF, in order to strengthen its rear area support and transportation capabilities, reinforced the rear area service and supporting units. The CCF improved the capabilities of transportation and the repair work by committing a railway division. At the same time, the CCF also
improved the transportation capability for materials such as food and ammunition by committing engineer units which completed the damage control of the destroyed roads along Huich'on, Yongwon, and Tokch'on, the main attack axis. China, specially, in order to supply war materials as fast as possible to the south of the Yalu, requested vehicles from the USSR, and the soviets supplied China with 3,000 vehicles from November to December 1950.5)

As the preparations for offensive went on as planned, the CCF on the November 11 and 13, held a party committee meeting in connection with the next operation. In this meeting, the CCF finalized its operational policy that, in consideration of its inferior air force and armored units, the CCF would conduct an operation on an interior lines and annihilate the ROK and UN forces by luring them deeply into their positions.

In accordance with the policy, the CCF established a plan to induce the ROK and UN forces up to the line extending along Taekwan-dong-Onjon-ri-the Myohyang Mountain-P'yongnamjin on the west, and the line connecting Kujin-ri-Changjin on the east. They also prepared an alternative plan for the eventuality that the ROK and UN forces would not launch an offensive as they anticipated.

In conclusion, the CCF decided to launch an attack before the end of the year, destroy six to seven ROK and UN regiments, push back the frontline south of the P'yongyang-Wonsan line, and secure a foothold favorable for the next offensive. Complying with the decision, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Commander issued a detailed operation plan to the subordinate units.

**Operation Plan (Extract)**

(1) Western front

- The 39th Army defend the Taech'on area with a part of its units while its main forces strike the right flank of the attacking enemy.
- The 40th Army defend the Yongbyon area, and in cooperation with the 38th Army, attack the left flank of the enemy forces advancing to Kujang-Huich'on route.

- One division of the 38th Army and one regiment of the 125th Division, 42nd Army secure the routes between Kujang-dong-Huich'on, and Kujang-dong-Kaesong, the enemy's probable avenues of approach and lure enemy main forces into our position by mobile defense operation.

- The main force of the 38th Army and that of the 125th Division, 42nd Army lure the enemy main force into the mountainous Somin-dong and Naech'ang-ri area north of Tokch'on and strike them.

- The main force of the 42nd Army will hand over the eastern front to the IX Army Group and move to Shinui east of Yongwon to strike enemy from the rear of right flank.

- The 50th Army will cover the right front of the CCF and defend the west coast against enemy eventual landing operation.

- The 66th Army in reserve will be assembled at Chongju area.

(2) Eastern front

- The IX Army Group (Excluding the 26th Army) is to advance to the south of Kujin-ri north of the Changjin Reservoir and defend the area with a part of its unit, while the main force is to be concentrated at Kujin-ri and its south eastern area to annihilate the US 1st Marine Division advancing to the Changjin area.

(3) The Chinese People's Volunteers Command, in order to assist the frontline units' attack, is to infiltrate guerrillas composed of two battalions of the 42nd Army and one North Korean Army regiment to Maengsan, Youngdok, and Songch'on areas in mid-November, with the missions of destroying the enemy lines of communications and attacking the enemy by surprise.
With its military strength significantly reinforced and the operational experiences obtained in the 1st phase offensive, the CCF was prepared not only for the defense but was waiting for the ROK and UN forces offensive to strike at the vulnerable points of the enemy on the move.

The Volunteer Army commander, knowing that a ROK and UN offensive was imminent, held a military committee meeting on November 21 and revised a part of the attacking plan. That is, worrying about the reinforcement by the US divisions by way of the route of Kujang-Huich’on when the CCF main forces would attack the ROK II Corps, the CCF decided to tightly control the route, and shifted the overall deployment of its forces eastward. The CCF also finally confirmed the D-days: on the evening of November 25 for the western front and on the evening of the 26, one day later, for the eastern front.  

2. Deployment of Soviet Air Forces

Around the time that China intervened in the Korean War, the USSR deployed its air forces within China and Manchuria, and intervened in the War. According to a recent report by Russia, the USSR, at Mao Tse Tung’s request, and in accordance with the China-USSR treaty on mutual friendship and assistance, deployed 12 air force divisions in China from October through December 1950 to defend China’s air space, of which the 64th Fighter-Attack Corps was known to be sent to intervene in the Korean War upon Kim Il Sung’s request.

Thus, the intervention in the Korean War by the Soviet Air Force had nothing to do with supporting the CCF in Korea but was to support North Korea itself. In fact, the North Korean Air Force was considerably destroyed during the War and, as a result, they recruited and trained pilots in a reactivation program in the USSR. The Chinese Air Force, in its infancy, also needed
to be trained by the USSR instructors. However, the USSR intervention in the Korean War was not only significant in itself but also forecast a meaningful change in the operational progress along the Korea-Manchuria border.

The 64th Fighter-Attack Corps consisted of three air divisions, one maintenance division, two anti-aircraft artillery brigades, and three separate brigades (night fighter brigades, naval aircraft fighter regiment, searchlight regiment), and was reinforced, in 1952, to a 26,000-strong force. Its main fighter was the MIG-15 as it was the newest and equipped with the features comparable to that of the US F-86, the newest in the US Air force. The commanders and pilots were chosen from among many volunteered veterans who fought against the German Air Force during World War II.

The Soviet fighters commenced air combat in the Korean War from November, 1950. However, the air supremacy, at that time, was on the side of the UN Air Force, and the USSR Air Force, taking the advantage of the Manchurian sanctuary, at the beginning, mainly operated around the Yalu air space. The B-26 bombers of the Fifth Air Force was the main operational target for the Soviet Air Force during this time.

The record in 'The History of US Joint Chiefs of Staff' reads “On the 1st of Nov., the F-80 fighters encountered the YAK fighters near Sinuiju and while having fierce air combat, the Soviet Air Force MIG-15 fighters crossed over the Yalu and chased the UN fighters. This development showed the enemy intention, seeking for air supremacy which from the beginning of the war had been enjoyed by the UN Air Forces.”

From this time, as the CCF advanced southward and consequently the front line was pushed back to the south, the operational space of Soviet Air Force was further extended to the P’yongyang-Wonsan line. The Soviet Air Force took air operations in a limited air space and conducted rather passive tactics mainly intercepting the UN planes, but, they still allegedly claimed that
they shot down a considerable number of UN airplanes while suffering minor losses on their part.\(^b\)

Later on, the Soviet Air Force conducted joint operations with the re-activated North Korea Air Forces and the Chinese Communist Air Forces which were ready for combat. This development gave considerable change to the operation of the UN Air Forces. Yet the Soviet Air Force, in order to hide the fact of its intervention in the Korean War, did not fly south of the Py'ongyang-Wonsan line nor conducted operations on the seas.

Their operation was so strictly secretive, even among the Soviet Air Force pilots themselves, that they were not allowed to transfer any knowledge collected during the operations to other wings and not permitted to discuss or study their experiences obtained during air combat. As a result, the UN forces carried out the war without knowing these important information about the enemy air situation.

3. Preparations for the Last Offensive by the United Nations Forces

(1) The United Nations Command Evaluation of Enemy Situation

Since the plan was not carried out as originally conceived to advance up to the Korea-Manchuria border, due to the unexpected surprise attacks by the CCF, the United Nations Command encountered the first phase offensive by the CCF for 13 days and was pushed back to the Ch'ongch'on River; accordingly, the enemy situation had to be reevaluated. However, the Chinese main forces who reached the climax of their surge into opponent position on the 6th of November were never traced throughout the front. Instead, the NK People's Army were observed performing security missions and, together with a part of the CCF engaging in sporadic contacts with the reconnaissance units
of the ROK and UN forces on the front area of the Pakch’on-Yongbyon-Kujang-dong line. This development led the UN forces into further confusion in evaluating the enemy situation.

At this time, the UNC was aware of the latent power of the CCF and of the fact that around 400,000 regular forces were deployed in Manchuria, but the purpose of the CCF intervention in the Korean War, its expected operations and the scale were yet to be understood. However, on the 9th of November, the UNC notified the Eighth Army that the Chinese Communist forces might have infiltrated around 76,800 regular troops into North Korea.9

With an intelligence report on the new sightings of the 42nd Chinese Army in mid November, the Eighth Army estimated the number of the CCF sent to North Korea to be around 60,000 men, and relying on the UNC notice as a reliable estimate, planned the 2nd phase offensive (Christmas Offensive) based on the current estimate. However, there had been a grave mistake in estimating the enemy situation on the part of the friendly forces. More than 300,000 men from China had already been sent to North Korea to prepare against the ROK-UN offensive. The NKPA, once seemingly demolished, had been reactivated and emerged again as a new threat to the ROK and UN forces.

The NKPA I Corps joined the 66th Chinese Army north of Chongju, the NKPA III Corps with the 26th Chinese Army in the Kanggye area and the NKPA V Corps with the 27th Chinese Army in the Huch’ang area. The Chinese forces were now ready to commence a combined operation, and with the NKPA II Corps as its main force, a guerrilla unit of 20,000 troops, deploying the Second Front along the Onjin Mountains, launched aggressive guerrilla warfare against both the front line and the rear area.

By this time, the number of Chinese and North Koreans conducting combat in North Korea totaled around 420,000 men, but the Eighth Army extremely underestimated the number at around 80,000 men. The Eighth Army
made mistakes in estimating the enemy situation due to lack of reliable strategic intelligence from the UNC and higher military authorities on the purpose and the scale of the CCF entry into the Korean War. However, the misjudgement was made mainly because of the lack of combat intelligence on the CCF due to its covert activities and night time maneuvering in order to prevent from being detected by the UNC Air reconnaissance. The fact that the US forces leaders, having underestimated the CCF out of confidence in the UNC’s supremacy both in air and naval operations, made mistakes, should not pass unnoticed.

(2) Preparation of the United Nations Forces Last Offensive

On November 6, right after the CCF 1st offensive, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the UNC, described his own view on the CCF as follows:

When the North Korean communist party was definitely defeated and the war was almost at an end, the CCF intervened in the Korean War and, attempting a large-scale massacre, committed a crime the likes of which had never before been seen in human history. Nevertheless, the UN forces with their well placed reconnaissance and experienced maneuvering minimized losses and escaped from the danger. And my mission is to fulfill the UN resolution, that explores the rehabilitation of unification and peace in Korea, by destroying the communist army in North Korea, and to take the offensive again.

On the other hand, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, reported his own strong determination to General MacArthur, supporting MacArthur’s plan as follows: “The Eighth Army would never be on the defensive at the Ch’ongch’on River bridgehead,
and is prepared to take on the offensive at an earlier time provided the situations allowed. As soon as the exposed eastern flank is reinforced and supplies obtained, we will switch to offensive.”

General Walker issued an operational directive for the resumption of offensive to his staff and subordinate commanders as follows:

Advancing the US IX Corps toward the north, the Eighth Army will take offensive operation with three Corps, with the US I Corps on the west, the US IX Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps on the right, in a coordinated attack, advance to the Korea-Manchuria border. The commencement date of attack is when the preparation is completed.

According to this plan, on the 3rd of November, the US IX Corps moved to Sunch’on from Taejon, with the US 2nd and 25th Divisions, turning over the mission of securing the main supply line and the mopping-up operation against the NK guerrillas in the three southern provinces (Chungchong-do, Kyongsang-do, Cholla-do) to the newly activated ROK III Corps. The Eighth Army had been preparing to commence an attack on the 15th of November, as it concluded that the preparation would be completed within a week. However, the D-day had to be put off due to the delayed supply of war materials.16

At that time, the Eighth Army had been supplied with one thousand tons of war materials a day by air from Kimp’o to P’yongyang, but the average store of POL and Ammunition was scarcely enough for the operation of one day. Furthermore, as it was getting into winter and there was an increasing need for supply of winter uniforms and heating oil, the accelerating the northward flow of resupply appeared to be the urgent task. G-4 of the Eighth Army estimated the daily need of supply for three Corps to continue attacking operations to be at least 4,000 tons. The damage control of the railway to P’yongyang and the clearance of mines on the Chinnamp’o coast which had been planted
by the NK Army also needed to be done immediately. Because of the improving effort, around the 17th of November, the daily amount of supply the Eighth Army could get reached to 2,000 tons of goods to P'yongyang by train and 1,500 tons to the Chinnamp'o port by sea.

The Commanding General of the Eighth Army decided to take the offensive on the 24th of November. The US I Corps (ROK 1st Division, US 24th Division and British 27th Brigade) on the left front was to advance through the P'yongyang-Sinuiju route along the west coast, the US IX Corps (US 2nd, 24 Division, and Turkish Brigade) on the center was to advance through the left of the Kunu-ri-Huich'on route. And the ROK II Corps on the right front was to advance through the right side of the route in close cooperation with the US X Corps on the right.

The Commanding General of the Eighth Army was deeply concerned
about the obstacles that could impede and delay the offensive operation, such as the Kangnam Mountains and the Myohyang Mountains which traversed in front of the operational area, the limited routes for maneuvering and cooperative operation, and thus dangling tenuously at the end of supply lines. He also emphasized a cooperative attack between neighbouring units to prevent a surprise attack by enemy ambush.\(1\)

According to this directive, from the 20th through the 23rd, the ROK II Corps rearranged the front line, and the 7th and 8th Divisions secured the Tokch'on and the Yongwon area respectively. The US IX Corps, while advancing its 2nd Division to Kujang-dong and the 25th Division north up to Yongbyon, staged a coordinated parallel attack with the ROK II Corps. With the US I Corps already deployed for combat, the ROK 1st Division and the US 24th Division posturing for attack at Yongsan-dong and Pakch’on and at the passage of the west coast, west of the Taeryong River, respectively, three Corps as a whole under the Eighth Army were ready to take the offensive.

On the other hand, the US X Corps on the eastern front, apart from that of the western area, did not come across any surprise attack by the Chinese forces, and under such a situation, the 7th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division, advancing from Kot’o-ri to Hagaru-ri, the south edge of the Ch’angjin Reservoir, started to make forward positions and the 5th US Marine Regiment, in order to reinforce attacking capability, moved to Kot’o-ri. In the center of the Corps, the US 7th Division was advancing north to the Yalu, and on the 21st of November, the 17th Regiment reached Hyesanjin near the Korea-Manchuria border. Meanwhile, the ROK I Corps, the right wing of the US X Corps in the eastern front, continued advancing north, repulsing sporadic attacks by the straggling NK troops.

The Capital Division, in the Corps’ right front, advanced along the eastern coastal road to Ch’ongjin on the 25th of November, and the 3rd Divi-
sion, in the Corps's left front, advanced through a rough mountainous route to occupy Paegam on the same day. By that time, the Commander in Chief of the UNC gave a revised directive for attack to the Commanding General of the X Corps, for the X Corps to advance to Changjin then turn its attack to the west and support the Eighth Army's attack by striking Kanggye, the tactical and strategic point of the enemy's rear area.

However, the Commanding General of the X Corps proposed a revised plan, in which the X Corps was to attack westward directly from Yudam-ri to Mup'yon-ri south of Kanggye to avoid the extended supply line and the expected increasing enemy surprise. The plan was approved. Accordingly, the 1st US Marine Division was to support the attack of the neighbouring ROK II Corps on the left and at the same time to cut off the route of enemy retreat.

4. Controversy over the Conduct of War Directions in the Camp of United Nations Command

While field units of UNC were preparing new offensive, the high political and military leaders disagreed on the countermeasure to deal with the Chinese Communist forces' intervention in the Korean War, and at times the discord was beyond compromise. Consequently, the controversy significantly affected the operations at the border area. The first note of discord came when General MacArthur and the US government disagreed on the question of bombing bridges over the Yalu. On the November 5, General MacArthur notified Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, the Commanding General of the Far East Air Forces, to make intensive and large scale bombings on wide areas for two weeks starting from the 7th of November, for the purpose of paralyzing the enemy.
The plan was to destroy, with high explosives and incendiary bombs, all the bridges at the ends to the Korean side along the Yalu, and factories, communication systems and cities, except the Sup’ung electronic generating facilities. This bombing issue was reported to the US government right away and the US administration, taking the relationship between the US and other war participating countries into account, ordered that this air raid operation be put off.

General MacArthur responded to this directive as follows: "Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations on the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. . . . . . Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision."(12)

General Bradley, the chairman of the JCS, upon receiving General MacArthur’s protest, reported the content of the telegram to the president immediately. President Truman allowed the raid, in spite of knowing the grave risk the border operation could bring about, and on the condition that China’s air space would not be violated. The air raid started on the 8th of November. Not only bombers but also carrier-based planes were called out to make bombing raids, from Sinuiju the mouth of the Yalu through northeastwards to Hyesanjin, on the Yalu bridges and other military targets in North Korea.

As of December 5, within a month after the bombing started, 12 rail-
ways and 4 road bridges were destroyed and the rest of them damaged. By this
time, however, with the rivers frozen, destroying bridges made little practical
difference in the operations.

The second issue was the military objective for the UNC due to the
new enemy, the Chinese Communist Forces. That is, whether the UN resolution,
that the North Korean People's Army be destroyed and Korea be united under
a democratic system, should be changed or not was on the subject of argument
among the UNC, the Korean government and the US administration.

With China's intervention in the Korean War, the war situation devel-
oped a new aspect and the US administration, evaluating the significance of
China's intervention, decided to revise the military goal, to destroy the North
Korean people's Army, which had been set up before China's entrance into the
War. This meant that General MacArthur's offensive plan must be abandoned
and forces had to retreat to a certain defensive position. 18

General MacArthur, however, had no intention of giving up his offen-
sive plan. Admitting the totally modified situation of the Korean War due to
the intervention by strong Chinese forces, he emphasized the bombing into
Manchuria and notified the US JCS of his adamant objection to any alteration
of the mission.

While in Korea, On November 10, the ROK defense minister Shin
Sung Mo made a statement as follows: "The Chinese communist forces illegally
invaded our sacred land and we together with the democratic friendly nations
from all over the world have to exterminate these illegal invaders."

Minister Shin recalled an historic event in which Korea defeated the
invasion of a large scale northern enemy in the Salsu and Yodong plain and
overcame national difficulties in the past.

Following minister Shin's message, President Syngman Rhee made a
special statement, titled "On the new situation of war", emphasizing that the
whole nation must stand up against the Chinese Communist forces invaders and should drive the enemies out from our border.\textsuperscript{14}

In spite of the strong opposition by the UNC and ROK government, the National Security Council of the US made a tentative conclusion on General MacArthur’s request as follows: “The operation may be performed at General MacArthur’s discretion, but the bombing of Manchuria is not allowed while the State Department of the US seeks the possibility of negotiation with the Chinese Communist.”

Because of the conflicting positions of the UNC and the US government, on the part of the UN forces, there was continued indetermination, hesitation and misjudgment of the enemy situation, which prevented the rarely given period of disengagement from taking advantage of the chance to estimate the CCF in actuality. Thus, the US failed in its last opportunity to prevent the march toward disaster in Korea.

II. Armageddon on the Frozen Soil

While the Korea-Manchuria border captured the world’s attention, the ROK Army and the UN forces took an offensive against the CCF without knowing its real strength with the strong intention of ending the war. The CCF, on the contrary, being totally prepared was ready to fight back against these offensives. Naturally, throughout the front line both sides kept on dashing into the fireball as if they were warming up in the severe cold.
1. The United Nations Command 'Home-by-Christmas' Offensive

The Christmas offensive, intended to carry the troops right up to the northern boundary of Korea, began on the morning of the November 24, 1950. The US I Corps (ROK 1st Division, US 24th Division) with Napch’ongjong and Taech’on, the US IX Corps (US 2nd Division, 25th Division) with Onjong-ri and Huich’on, and the ROK II Corps (7th Division, 8th Division) with Huich’on-Yuwonjin as their respective objectives, commenced the attack, and the echelons advanced without any particular enemy resistance.

General MacArthur, aboard an airplane, observed the Eighth Army operation and later on cheered up soldiers by saying that if the operation was successful, the US 8th Army soldiers would return to their hometowns by Christmas, at the latest.

The Headquarters UNC released a special communique setting forth the objectives and the general nature of the planned operation, as follows:

The United Nations massive compression envelopment of North Korea against the new Red Army operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our Air Forces of all types, have, for the past three weeks, successfully interdicted the enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer ... has steadily advanced in a brilliant tactical movement and has now reached a commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in a general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise. If successful this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the
prompt withdrawal of the United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.

The ROK Army and the UN forces, on the first day of attack, had few contacts with the enemies and advanced north for 10 to 15km, but from the 2nd day, the 25th of November, they encountered strong resistance by the Chinese Communist forces all along the line. The US 2nd Division which was advancing along the Ch'ongch'on River valley, encountered for the first time the CCF around the north of Kujang-dong and fought a fierce battle. In front of the ROK II Corps, the attacks by the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions were blocked near the Myohyang Mountain and the Yangam-ryong area.

The advance of the US I Corps, with the ROK 1st Division in the Taech'on area facing strong resistance by the CCF, was also blocked. The CCF's resistance was unexpectedly strong and showed no sign of abating. The UN forces attacked, on the 25th of November, the CCF in an air-ground joint operation throughout the day, only to meet the CCF's strong resistance. Eighth Army advanced very little.

The Chinese Communist forces, having blocked the UN forces's advance, launched an all out counter offensive (2nd phase offensive) throughout the front line at sunset of the November 25. Its main attack was directed to the front of the ROK II Corps and struck the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions in the Tockch'on and Yongwon area hard and forced the Eighth Army to divert its attack into defensive on the verge of a break in its east flank.

The US IX Corps in the center of the Army also reverted into defensive position to block the CCF attack in front. A huge decisive battle centering at the Cho'ongch'on River had developed.

On the eastern front, due to the delayed assembly of the attacking
units, the friendly forces launched an attack on the 27th of November, three days after the western front. The US 1st Marine Division, with the purpose of filling up the gap with the 8th Army and cutting off the enemy main supply route between Kanggye and Huich'on, launched an attack toward Mup'yon-ri 60km west of Yudam-ri as its objective. As a result, some of the US 7th Division moved to the west and attacked along the east side of the Changjin Reservoir. Which the US 1st Marine Division were to attack on initial plan. The 1st Marine division on the reservoir's western edge, however, from the first day of attack, encountered strong CCF resistance and was deadlocked. During
the night, the CCF infiltrated to all surrounding hilltops around the marine units and cut off the withdrawal route. With its superior manpower the Chinese attacking force enveloped the Marines. The 1st Marine Division had to give up the offensive and was pushed back by the CCF to take a defensive posture. Furthermore, the Marine Division had to penetrate the Chinese encircle line in order to retreat.

The main forces of the US 7th Division, who had already advanced up to Hyesanjin, and the ROK 1 Corps, positioned in the extreme north of the eastern front and advancing toward the Tumen River, called off the offensive and diverted into a hasty defense according to the US XX Corps’ plan.

2. Collapse of the Ch’ongch’on River Bridgehead

The ROKA and the UNC, when their advance up to the Korea-Manchuria border seemed to be imminent, launched an offensive with the intention of ending the war before Christmas, but attacks were not carried out as intended because of the persistent resistance by the CCF. The CCF, who had been looking for a chance, launched an offensive to turn the war situation upside down. Both sides, in order to hold the Ch’ongch’on River bridgehead which was tactically and strategically critical, fell into a fierce offensive and defensive battle.

(1) T’aech’on Battle

On November 20, the ROK 1st Division which had completed reorganization near Sinanju, south of the Ch’ongch’on River, took over the Taeryong River-the Yongsan-dong area, which was the operational area of the US 24th Division. According to the attacking plan of the US 1 Corps, as the
right front division of the Corps, it would advance through T'aech'on-Kusung-Sakchu-Sinuiju. At this time, the US 24th Division on the left advanced to Chongju along the west coast. The US 25th Division of the IX Corps on the right marched to the Unsan area.

The ROK 1st Division with the attack preparation completed had been waiting for an order, and at 10:00 hours on the 24th, under the cover of air support, launched an attack, with the 12th Regiment on the left front, the 11th Regiment on the right front and the 15th Regiment in reserve, thus taking two regimental parallel advances toward T'aech'on, the important enemy communication center.

The enemy, in order to block the division advance, destroyed bridges and buried booby traps made from the shells of the 120mm mortar, all along the routes. It took time for the division engineers to clear booby traps and due to a slight enemy resistance, at dusk, the division was able to envelope T'aech'on from both the south and east.

After dusk, the CCF's resistance grew stronger and by dawn some of Chinese units even started a counterattack; in consequence, both sides crashed into a fierce battle centering on T'aech'on. At this time, a Chinese officer defected to UNC side and allegedly disclosed that the CCF had launched a full-scale offensive toward the south. Throughout the front line the build-up of the enemy forces was observed.

Meanwhile, the US 25th Division, on the right, was deadlocked in its attack by strong enemy resistance and, accordingly, the ROK 1st Division front was bulged into the enemy position. Hence, Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, the division commander, diverted his operation into defense for a while, awaiting the situation to become favorable, and in preparation to cover the exposed right flank from the enemy attack deployed the 15th Regiment (minus the 3rd Battalion) forward, from Pakch'on to Yongsan-dong.
Around November 27th, the enemy launched a full-scale attack against the east of the Taeryong River, the 11th Regiment's defensive position. The Regiment battled hard against the CCF attack around Hakbong-dong, Kiu-san and T'ora-san, southeast of Taech'on, but was not able to drive back the enemy, who attempted an enveloping attack in overwhelming force.

The regiment withdrew to the Ch'ungmak-dong-Pongji-ri line, north of Pakch'on, and established a blocking position. At this time, the main body of the 15th Regiment drove back the CCF, who tried to penetrate the rear flank of the 11th Regiment around Yangji-dong and Tunjon-dong. The Regiment then retreated to the Yongsan-dong area.

Thus, the Chinese divisional counterattack near the Sinsang-ri-Kiusan-Munbong-ri line, south of the Taech'on-Unsan route, smashed up the 11th Regiment. On the eve of the 27th, the enemy advanced up to the Taech'on-Yongsan-dong route, which the division had been defending. The ROK 1st Division was prepared to take the offensive as soon as the situation of the neighboring US 25th Division become favorable. However, according to the withdrawal order by the Eighth Army, due to the unfavorably developing situation with the US 2nd Division in the Kujang-dong area and the ROK II Corps in the Kaech'on and the Yongwon area, the division began to prepare for retreat to the south of the Ch'ongch'on River on November 28.

(2) Kujang-dong Battle

The US IX Corps in the middle of the western front launched an offensive, with the 25th Division on the left against Unsan and the 2nd Division on the right against Huich'on. On November 24, the US 2nd Division, which would carry out the most important role in the offensive, launched an offensive, with the 38th Regiment on the right front attacking toward Hyongje-bong
on the western ridgeline of the Myohyang Mountain, and the 9th Regiment on
the left front advancing along the coastal route of the Ch'ongch'on River. Most
of the supporting units such as armored and artillery battalions advanced
through the relatively good Kujang-dong-Huich'on route following the 9th
Regiment. The 23rd Regiment remained as the Division Reserve in Won-ri,
15km to the rear.

The battle during the day was not nearly as serious as expected and
the attacking echelons gained 8 to 10km and secured significant terrain fea-
tures for the future offensive. The Division, on the following day (November 25)
too, continued the attack expecting no substantial enemy resistance, but the
Division attack was blocked at the Hill 219 (Chinaman's Hat Hill), a command-
ing ground above the road north of the Paengnyung River.

The 9th Regiment attacked the CCF in order to capture this hill under
support of four tanks and two APCs for 7 hours from 10:00 in the morning, but
was stymied by the persistent resistance and the massive mortar fire of the
CCF. This situation affected the operation of 38th Regiment to be deteriorated,
on the right and to make things worse, after dusk the CCF commenced limited
attacks. At a result 2nd Division attack was deadlocked and converted into de-
defensive.

At 02:00 hours on the November 26, the CCF launched a large scale
counteroffensive. With the tracers exchanged along the Ch'ongch'on River and
the boom of guns heard from the 38th Regiment area, a fierce battle broke out.
In the meantime, the 40th CCF Army which had waited in the Myohyang
Mountain, the Ch'ongch'on River valley and in the Taepy'ong area, launched
an all out counterattack, at dawn on the 26th, and infiltrated part of its forces
into the rear area to strike the Division command post. The 2nd Division was
thrown into significant disorder.

The 3rd Battalion of the US 9th Regiment, deployed at the Regiment's
left, had all its companies struck by surprise attacks from behind and the casualties rose to more than half of the Battalion strength. The 2nd Battalion in the center (West of Ch’ongch’on) was also pressed by the CCF encirclement. The 1st Battalion on the east of the Ch’ongch’on River, with the chain of command paralyzed due to the Battalion HQ and A Company a attacked by the enemy surprise, was unable to support the forward companies which was engaged in fierce combat on the Hill 219 and suffered considerable casualties.

On the other hand, the 38th Regiment at the division’s right front was also engaged in fierce combat with a regiment scale CCF that attempted to pass through the east flank of Kujang-dong. The US 2nd Division faced multi-
ple CCF counterattacks simultaneously all along the line.

With the situation developing as such, Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, the Commanding General of the IX Corps, ordered the 2nd Division Commander to set up a hasty defense position centering on Kujang-dong, and to block the Ch'ongch'on River path. The Division Commander reinforced the Kujang-dong defense line, deploying the 9th Regiment on the left of the Ch'ongch'on River, the 38th Regiment on the right and two battalions of the 23rd Regiment in reserve on the central forward.

However, the relocation of the units was also difficult under such a situation. From the previous night, specially the 9th Regiment on the left front had been under the enemy enveloping and the 1st and 3rd Battalions dispersed and withdrew, putting the Regiment in a difficult and unclear situation in establishing a defensive position. Meantime, having seized the initiative, the CCF launched, with a reinforced battalion in a converging attack against the 2nd Battalion. However, the Battalion with fire support by the US 23rd Regiment, fought desperately for two hours to push the enemy back.

In this daylight attack, the enemy lost more than half of the attacking forces while the division won a victory over the enemy for the first time since its attack. On the other hand, the commander of the US IX Corps, while the 2nd Division was engaged in a fierce combat around the Kujang-dong area, was notified that the ROK II Corps on the right had been penetrated by the CCF. So, the commander of the Corps ordered the Turkish Brigade which was assembling at Kunu-ri to move to Tokch'on to cover the Corps' right flank. The 3rd Regiment of the ROK 7th Division, which had retreated to the US 2nd Division area while operating on the division right, fell under the command of the US 2nd Division for the time being.

At dusk on the 26th, the CCF started a converging attack against the US 2nd Division which was defending the Kujang-dong area. The 9th Regiment
on the west of the Ch’ongch’on River and the 23rd Regiment in front of Kujang-dong had their respective command posts of both the regiment and battalion attacked by the enemy in surprise. Furthermore, the regiments lost their artillery positions and were forced to retreat south to Wonsch’am. At this hour, the US 38th Regiment and the ROK 3rd Regiment repulsed the CCF near the Paengnyong River area and defended in place, but retreated 10km south to the area of the Changha-ri and Yangji-ri, following the withdrawal of the main body of the division.

The CCF attack during the day of November 27 seemed to be in lull but the CCF began to move as it got dark. The division reinforced the security measures centering on the road. The CCF moved to the mountainous area within the division boundary and advanced to the rear area of the forward regiment, and around 01:00 on the 28th, the CCF began a pincer attack against the division from both front and rear.

The 9th and 23rd Regiments, which were isolated in the enemy and scattered into small units, penetrated the enemy positions and assembled in Won-ri where the division command post was located, 8km north of Kunu-ri. At this hour Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser, the division commander, ordered the 23rd Regiment commander to reorganize the scattered forces and put them under his command regardless of their units to establish a blocking position in Won-ri as it was the last important junction on the road running from the Ch’ongch’on River to the south.

At daybreak, the 23rd Regiment was assigned to cover the Won-ri area while the 9th Regiment concentrated on reorganizing the troops flowing in from the scattered units. The ROK 3rd Regiment, which retreated while keeping enemy contact, and the 38th Regiment were deployed in the area between Won-ri and Piho-san and in Piho-san, respectively. Thus, the division, from the evening of the 25th through the morning of the 28th fought hard bat-
tle in the Kujang-dong area and was successful in setting a blocking line in the Won-ri-Piho-san area. How long the division could hold the line was unknown.

(3) Tokch'on Battle

In Christmas offensive, according to the US IX Corps' movement to the front, the ROK II Corps zone was shifted east and the ROK 7th Division, on the 19th of November moved to Tokch'on to become the Corps' left. Meanwhile, as the date of the last offensive was set on the 24th, the corps commander, for a coordinated attack with the IX Corps neighboring on the left, secured a distinguishing line of departure in advance along the Paengnyong River-Uhyon-Naech'ang-ch'ŏn. On the 22nd, the 7th Division, launched an offensive and drove back the enemy resistance which was relatively small: hence, the 3rd Regiment on the left occupied the Yongyon-dong-Uhyon area, the 8th Regiment on the right front Sahang-san-Haryonggok-san line, and the 5th Regiment in the Division reserve moved to Tokch'on. Thus the division completed the preparation for the next offensive.

At 10:00 on the 24th, the division launched a parallel attack with two regiments, with the 3rd Regiment toward the Hill 1,531 on the west of the Myohyang Mountain, and the 8th Regiment toward Kama-bong and Paegaesan south of the Myohyang Mountain. However, the Myohyang Mountain area, with deep valleys and a steep ridgeline, was so rough and limited in space for the operation that the attacking echelons had gained only 3km by 12:00 hours, 2 hours after the attack was launched. During the battle which lasted until dusk, the two forward regiments continued attack, under air support twice and continued fire support of the 18th Field Artillery Battalion, but to no avail. From this time on, the CCF reconnaissance units were frequently sighted in many places and the division hurriedly shifted its offensive into defensive for
an expected enemy counterattack. The area of the Hill 1,531, Kama-bong and Paegae-san against which the division attacked as the first phase objective was, in fact, the CCF’s primary defensive position, as was learned later, and the reconnaissance units had been operation in front of the their primary position. Therefore from the beginning, the ROK 7th Division offensive was in a difficult situation. The 3rd Regiment captured the Hill 1,101 and the Hill 956 3km south of the Hill 1,531 and established a defense position against the expected CCF counterattack. The 8th Regiment in Naech’ang-ch’on retreated to Uhyon Pass, proceeded to Hill 818 and established an all-around defense.

This deployment produced a gap between regiments, and the division commander Brig. Gen. Shin Sang Ch’ul instructed the 5th Regiment commander to move two battalions from Tokch’on to T’ak-gogae south of the Paengnyong River to close the gap between the 3rd and 8th Regiments. The division reconnaissance company deployed in the valley north of Haryonggok-san near the sector boundary between the Reconnaissance Company and the 8th Division on the right to cover the eastern flank.

At daybreak on the 25th, the division, which gained the least on the first day attack among the units which participated in the Eighth Army last phase offensive, launched the second day attack with a firm intention to compensate for its poor performance of the previous day. The division continued attacking until 15:00 hours. Because of the persistent resistance by the CCF 38th Army which was deployed around the Myohyang Mountain, however, the attack was deadlocked without gaining even 1km.

As it was getting dark, the division commander instructed the forward regiments to get into defensive posture at the present position, and the 5th Regiment commander of the division reserve to advance two battalions deployed in T’ak-gogae to Uhyon-dong between two forward regiments, to block the probable enemy avenue of approach between Kama-bong and Tokch’on. In
keeping with this directive, the 3rd Regiment established a defensive position in the Changan-gol area 18km northwest of Tokch'on and the 8th Regiment occupied Sahang-san 20km northeast of Tokch'on.

As dusk covered the valleys and rough hills of the Myohyang Mountain, sporadic harassing artillery fire was heard but battle fields seemed to be in lull when a report was received that the Chinese had been sighted in front of the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Regiment deployed on the ridgeline east of Sahang-san, and at the same time loud gun shots began to shake the entire mountain. These gun shots began to spread from the area, to the position of the 3rd Battalion of 8th Regiment on the left and Haryonggok-san on the right where the division reconnaissance company deployed for defending the boundary between the divisions. The division right front was wrapped in flame. The division reconnaissance company, having been struck by a regimental scale surprise attack, fought hard against the Chinese but was unable to overcome the superior enemy strength and withdrew in scattered groups; as a result, the division right flank was completely exposed.

The ROK II Corps realizing the critical situation in later hours decided to send the Corps reserve, which was on stand-by in Pukch'ong 20km south of Tokch'on, to the exposed area because the 7th Division had only a battalion in reserve. The ROK 2nd Regiment of the 6th Division was called out for a mission and moved to the front to block P'ungjon-ri south of Haryonggok-san. However, the CCF advance force had already passed P'ungjon-ri and marched to the rear area before the 2nd Regiment reached the point. The 8th Regiment, not knowing this situation, strove desperately to block the enemy assault from the front. In the meantime, as the night of the 25th went on, passed midnight and reached 02:00 hours on the 26th, the CCF opened a full scale counterattack. The CCF 38th Army which was standby around Myohyang Mountain struck hard against ROK 7th Division and the US 2nd Division neighboring on
the left with a mission to defend Kujang-dong. The CCF 38th Army which attacked the 7th Division front rushed for a converged attack against the 8th Regiment on the right front. Some of the enemy soldiers were penetrating along the boundary between the ROK 8th Division on the right and continued to the rear area; accordingly, the east flank of Tokch’ón was endangered.

The 8th Regiment, while engaged in a fierce battle on Sahang-san from the early evening, was struck by a strong converged attack of a two regimental scale, and with the 2nd Battalion penetrated and pushed back, to make things worse, was attacked from behind and was in greater disarray. From this hour, the 8th Regiment chain of command was paralyzed and the infantry men began to escape individually from the Sahang-san valley and reached Ch’udong-ri 4km to the rear and escaped enemy pursuit. Col. Kim Yong Joo, the 8th Regiment commander, with the intention of constructing a new blocking position, was assembling the retreating infantry men when they were struck again by the Chinese, a surprise attack from behind.

In the meantime, the CCF, who had destroyed the reconnaissance company position in the Haryonggok-san valley at the division right, infiltrated into the division rear and, while occupying the Haga-dong pass, launched a surprise attack against the assembling infantry men in Ch’udong-ri making a vicious circle of the situation. When the 8th Regiment position was penetrated, the 5th Regiment (-) on the left, daunted by the deteriorating situation as a result of having been attacked on its flank by an overwhelming number of Chinese from Uhyon, was pushed back without much resistance against them. Around 04:00 on the 26th, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Regiment, who recovered their troops in P’undong-ri 10km north of Tokch’ón, established a blocking position on the ridgeline north of P’undong-san and attempted a hasty defense, but were overwhelmed by the CCF human wave tactics. They failed to stop the enemy and began a scattered withdrawal toward Tokch’ón.
Tokch'ŏn Battle (Nov. 25-26, 1950)
Around this hour, a shocking situation occurred at the division headquarters in Tokch'on. A battalion size Chinese force, who infiltrated and outflanked the 8th Regiment rear, struck the division headquarters. Struck by an unexpected surprise attack, the division commander and his men first moved to a hill behind Tokch'on and ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regiment in the division Reserve to repulse the Chinese. After for a while, the CCF seemed to have reinforced both men and supporting arms as they opened concentrated mortar fire on Tockch'on and cut off the pathways around it. The division commander, after he was briefed by the 3rd Battalion commander of the 5th Regiment on the pathway cut-off leading to the rear area, decided to withdraw the division headquarters and the units in Tokch'on to Pukch'ang, while instructing Maj Kim Sang Bong, the battalion commander, to break the blocked pathway. As the 3rd Battalion opened the pathway, destroying the Chinese blocking position in Chenam-ri 2km south of tokch'on, the division headquarters, Headquarters Company and Battery B of the 18th Artillery Battalion managed to get out of Tokch'on. However, after the 3rd Battalion got off the paths around Tokch'on, Tokch'on was blocked again by the CCF and, as a result, troops scattered in the battle at dawn and the troops retreating from the front line were unable to pass Tokch'on.

Meanwhile, the 5th (−) and 8th Regiments, without knowing this information, marched south to assemble in Tokch'on and attempted to open the block only to meet a Chinese surprise attack and be dispersed. From this hour, some of the scattered forces, while trying to get out of the Chinese encirclement, penetrated a path toward Pukch'ang and others to Kaech'on.

While Tokch'on was in the Chinese encirclement, the 5th and 8th Regiments were desperate to get out of the enemy area, but the 3rd Regiment on the frontal left, having no strong enemy attacks, was able to secure a defensive on the north of the Paengnyong River until noon on the 26th.
On the afternoon of the 26th, Lt. Col. Chung Jin, the 3rd Regiment commander, recognizing that the communication with the division was cut off and the retreating route to Tokch’on was also blocked, decided to march to Kujang-dong in the US 2nd Division sector. The regiment which began to retreat through the Paengnyong River Valley reached south of Hyongje-bong by sunset and met Col. George B. Peploe, the US 38th Regiment commander. By Col. Peploe’s getting the US 2nd Division commander’s approval to join ROK 3rd Regiment at the Kugang-dong battle, where the ROK 3rd Regiment fought with the US troops against CCF that evening.

Later, the ROK 7th Division (-) withdrew from Tokch’on, again southward to Sunch’on via Pukch’ang and reorganized the unit in Sunch’on taking a brief respite. On November 30, passing through Kangdong, the division marched to Sungho-ri to prepare the Taedong River defense line.

(4) Yongwon-Maengsan Battle

The ROK 8th Division at the II Corps’ right front was to take an offensive at the extreme east of the western line. At 10:00 on November 24, the division along with the ROK 7th Division on the left, launched an offensive with the 10th Regiment on the left against Sok’wae-san and the 21st Regiment on the right against Paegam-san. Around this hour, the 16th Regiment in division reserve deployed two battalions along the eastern flank of Maengsan to cover the exposed flank during the offensive and a battalion in division reserve was put on security for the division command post. The division offensive, though the enemy resistance was insignificant, was not gaining ground as planned due to the rough roads and dense forest. As a result, the division advanced with the 10th Regiment in Yonghung-dong crossing over Haryong-gok-ryong 5km north of Yongwon and the 21st Regiment on the small Yang-
gam-ryong 12km northeast of Yongwon, and assumed a night defense.

On the following way (the 25th), the division launched an offensive again as planned. However, the division was thwarted by a strong enemy resistance as soon as it launched its offensive. The 10th Regiment on the left front launched an attack to its target, Sok'gae-san, but was deadlocked by the CCF’s converging fire together with an intensive artillery support and suffered considerable casualties. The 21st Regiment on the right front attacked for three hours and was opposed by strong resistance of the Chinese position well built in advance, and the offensive was deadlocked.

While the division was concentrating on the frontal attack, the CCF 42nd Army, with its main forces blocking the 8th Division attack, sent a division around the eastern mountainous terrain to capture the Maengsan area 20km in the rear. Around 13:00 hours, the leading body of the force was sighted at Aech'ang-ch'on Valley northeast of Maengsan where two battalions of the 16th Regiment established a defensive positions.

The division commander, interpreting the situation as critical, instructed Lt. Col. Yu Eu Joon, the 16th Regimental commander, to defend the present position to the end, but on the other hand, reported to the Corps on the situation and requested the reinforcement of men and fire support and a close air support. At the same time, he ordered the 50th Artillery Battalion commander in Yongwon to send battery to Maengsan without delay to support the 16th Regiment.

As the Chinese rushed in from the front, the 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment waited until the leading troops reached within the effective range of fire and tried to block the Chinese assault southward by massing all available firepower; however, the battalion could not stem the flow of the Chinese who desperately poured in the second and third wave attacks and the position was penetrated. At the end, the battalion was in a grave critical situation, of being
enveloped by the CCF.

Fortunately at this hour, a fighter bomb squadron of the US Fifth Air Force turned up and raked the Chinese with napalm, rockets and machine guns. As a result, the Chinese attack was slowed down. The battalion, exploiting this pause, broke free of the Chinese encirclement and moved to Sokaraebong north of Maeng-san.

The Corps was informed of this critical situation of the 8th Division, but, because of the lack of reserve units, could not help. In fact, the Corps had the 6th Division in reserve but the only available unit was the 2nd Regiment which was sent to the sector boundary of the 7th and 8th Divisions. The 7th and 19th Regiments were on a mission to secure the operational route between Tokch'on and P'ukch'ang while the regiments were still to be reconstituted for the damages suffered from the Chinese 1st Phase Offensive.

The CCF never dared frontal attacks on well consolidated positions. As though they did show a tactical pattern of attack throughout the front line, the Chinese without exception attacked at night with small units, striking command posts in the rear, then while taking advantage of the disorderly chain of command, penetrated and defeated the units in detail. In addition, their blocking of retreat paths compromised defensive positions.

In case of the CCF 126th Division which attacked the ROK 16th Regiment, the Chinese assaulted the regimental CP in Songam-ri first, north of Maeng-san, to create a disorderly situation, then attacked the blocking position in Sanghwa-ri along with the Maengsan area where the division command post was located. The division commander instructed the 16th Regiment to withdraw to Soyo-dong, the junction of the Maengsan River and Aech'ang-ch'on, and the forward regiments to secure the routes: the 21st Regiment to secure the route between Yongwon and Maengsan, and the 10th Regiment to secure the route between Tokch'on and Maengsan and to destroy the Chinese infiltra-
Yongwon-Maengsan Battle (Nov. 24~25, 1950)
tion from the eastern flank. However, a large-scale Chinese force infiltrated through the sector boundary between the 7th and the 8th Divisions and advanced south to the Yongwon area before the ROK regiment troops reached the point to block the retreat path for the 10th and 21st Regiments. The Chinese attacked the retreating ROK troops and the forward units were dragged into chaos.

That is, a division level Chinese force infiltrated the Yongwon area and blocked all the roads around. The Chinese encircled the 10th and 21st Regiments and attacked. As a result, these two regiments and the 50th Artillery Battalion were drawn into confused combat, most of the essential equipment and vehicles were destroyed or abandoned, and the troops were scattered in small groups and began to scatter. As such, the plan to abandon Yongwon and block the enemy in the east of Maengsan was not carried out and most of the troops were driven back to the Maengsan area where the division command post was located.

The CCF 42nd Army, having seized the initiative, in order to extend the victory drive toward the south of the Ch'ongch'on River continued its pursuit along the lateral-route between Maengsan and Pukch'ang, and thus the 8th Division was again in a critical situation. Like the forces retreatting from Yongwon, a part of CCF 42nd Army was marching westward to Pukch'ang, leaving the 16th Regiment behind in Maengsan. It was at 12:00 on November 26 when the division was notified from the Corps such a situation that the regiments were cut down by CCF. Hence, the ROK 8th Division commander instructed the 16th Regimental commander to retreat to Maejae-ryong on the Maengsan-Pukch'ang route without delay and to cover the retreating main force of the division, and all other units of the division to assemble in Kach'ang south of Pukch'ang by whatever possible means.

However, this plan was not carried out as the division commander in-
tended. A part of the Chinese forces had already occupied Maejae-ryong before the 16th Regiment got there and ambushed to strike the 16th infantry men climbing the hill. Having encountered the Chinese surprise attack, the 16th Regiment was pushed back toward Maengsan, the path from which the Regiment had come. As the situation developed in this way above, the Corps ordered the ROK 6th Division to deploy the 7th and 19th Regiments around Pukch’ang to cover the retreating forward units, and at 01:00 on November 27, the ROK 7th Division to assemble in Sunch’on and the ROK 8th Division to Kach’ang. The 16th Regiment, according to instruction, penetrated the Chinese position in Maejae-ryong and, in the afternoon, retreated via Pukch’ang to Kach’ang, and the dispersed men of the 10th and 21st Regiments who retreated through the mountain paths assembled in Pukch’ang and Kach’ang. Later on, the ROK 8th Division moved from the Kach’ang assembly area to Kangdong, reorganized and prepared to commit the Py’ongyang-Wonsan defense line.

(5) Pukch’ang Battle

The ROK II Corps, on November 25, was attacked by the Chinese main force who launched the second phase offensive, and went into a defensive position along the Tokch’on-Yongwon line. Meanwhile, the CCF 38th Army launched a converged attack against the boundary area between the ROK 7th Division on the left front and the ROK 8th Division on the right front, and a part of the CCF 42nd Army infiltrated into the gap of position between the US Eighth Army and the X Corps and attacked the 16th Regiment, in the 8th Division reserve, which was defending Maengsan to cover the Corps’ exposed right flank.

Maj. Gen. Yu Jai Hung, the Commanding General of the ROK II Corps, with the intention of checking the expansion of enemy penetration in
the front line by reinforcing frontal divisions, ordered the 2nd Regiment of the 6th Division standing by in Kach'ang in Corps reserve to move to P'ungsan without delay, and to check the CCF who were advancing south from Haryonggok-san.19

The ROK 6th Division, during late October while advancing toward the Yalu, was struck by a Chinese surprise attack in Onjong-ri, Ch'osan and fought hard battle, and then according to the Ch'ongch'on River defense plan of the Eighth Army, assembled in Kaech'on and joined the ROK II Corps in reserve. The Division was badly damaged by the previous battle but prepared for the next operation by completing a hasty reorganization and concentrating on combat training.

The division, on November 24, prior to the launching of the Christmas offensive, again moved to Kach'ang by the side of the Tokch'on-Sinch'ang route in order to cover the Corps rear. The 2nd Regiment, the division's advance party, moved toTokch'on, and at 15:00 on the 25th, listened to the division commander General Chang Do Yong's, special message on patriotism at the play-ground of Tokch'on primary school and then advanced north to Sinha-ri near the sector boundary between the 7th and the 8th Divisions.20

The 2nd Regiment was the first regiment to complete its reorganization within the 6th Division; however, the men of the regiment had been considerably demoralized by the Chinese human wave tactics and the continued withdrawing. Under such circumstances, it was beyond the regiment's capacity to match a Chinese division. To make matters worse, on the morning of the 26th, the regiment command post was assaulted by the enemy and the regiment retreated to Sunch'on in scattered groups. Nevertheless, the Corps fought a fierce battle against the enemy but, around noon time, since the 16th Regiment position east of Yongdok-ri (8km north of Maengsan) was penetrated, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The forward regiments, worrying over the intercep-
tion of the retreat by the enemy, began to withdraw and the corps main line of resistance collapsed.

The commanding general of the ROK II Corps decided to establish an blocking position in an area south of Pukch'ang, a junction of roads from Tokch'on and Maengsan to Sunch'on, and deployed the 6th Division (–the 2nd Regiment) to cover the retreating 7th and the 8th Divisions from the front line. However, while the 6th Division was moving to Tokch'on, the main force of the II Corps, having been struck by the CCF enveloping attacks, was in serious disarray with command and communication paralyzed and was withdrawing in a dispersed and disorderly fashion via the Tokch'on–Pukch'ang and Tokch'on–Kaech'on roads or through mountains.

The Eighth Army commander, after having been briefed on the situation, intended to reinforce the exposed right flank, and instructed the ROK 6th Division to be attached to the US IX Corps and the ROK II Corps to retreat to Sunch'on and Kangdong area to reorganize the unit. In keeping with this instruction, and in order to augment the 6th Division which was to defend the Corps' right flank, the IX Corps commander ordered the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the US 1st Cavalry Division reserve, which was deployed by the road side of the Sunch'on–Songch'on route, to move to Pukch'ang-ri.21)

Before dawn on November 29, the aerial reconnaissance observed a bigger than four regiment size Chinese force (Later confirmed to be the 125th Division of the 42nd Army) approaching via Pukch'ang to the front of the ROK 6th Division. Around noon, before the US 7th Cavalry arrived, the 6th Division battled this enemy, but because of the inferior strength of the division, retreated to Wolpo-ri south of the battle ground.

The enemy continued chase the ROK soldiers but the 6th Division withdrew to Sinch'ang-ri by taking a chance while the Chinese lessened pursuit. The division completed its reorganization and, in order to cover the right
flank of the Eighth Army, linking with the 7th Cavalry Regiment, established a defensive line along the Sunch'on-Sinch'ang-ri route. As such, the ROK II Corps' Christmas Offensive, which was launched to the north of Tokch'on and Yongwon, not only failed because of the Chinese second phase attack but also suffered considerable casualties and lost equipment and, as a result, needed hasty reorganization.

3. Decision of Withdrawal to the P'yongyang-Hamhung Line

In the last offensive (the christmas Offensive) by the UN Forces, the ROK II Corps (6th, 7th and the 8th Divisions), the attacking echelon of the Eighth Army eastern flank encountered stubborn enemy opposition from the first day of the offensive, but the US I Corps (the ROK I st Division, the US 24th Division, the Br 27th Brigade) on the left flank and the US IX Corps (the US 2nd and 25th Divisions and the Turkish Brigade) in the center, until the following evening (the 25th), had little contact with the enemy and could advance without difficulties. However, since in the evening the Chinese diverted its defensive into offensive, the attacks by friendly forces came to a standstill and, at last, the ROK II Corps' front, to which the enemy's primary attack was directed, began to collapse.

Before launching this operation, the commander in chief of the UNC believed that 'China will never send large troops to this campaign', but when he was informed by the US 8th Army and the IX Corps about the Chinese offensive which had taken place on November 27 and 28, he began to realize that China was intending to intervene in the war with large forces.

He reported to the JCS as follows: "we face entirely new war and the strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to the defensive." This indicated that his confidence in victory was not strong.
In keeping with this directive, on the evening of the 28th, an urgent meeting was held at the United Nations Command in Tokyo to device a strategy against China's large scale offensive. Participating in this meeting were General MacArthur and his staff, who for practical purposes had taken command of the Korean War, General Walker, the commanding General of the US Eighth Army, and General Almond, the X Corps Commander.\(^{30}\)

At this hour on the western front, the Eighth Army, with the Tokch'on-Maengsan area in front of its right wing penetrated and on the verge of being enveloped, eventually gave up the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead and was assembling in Kunu-ri. And in the eastern front, the US X Corps had launched an attack toward Mup'yong-ri at Yudam-ri west of the Ch'angjin Reservoir, with the intention of supporting the Eighth Army. On the contrary, however, the Corps was facing an envelopment and the interdiction of the rear area by the overwhelming Chinese forces; hence, it shifted to the defense while engaging in a pitched battle.

General MacArthur, who was briefed on the situations by both commanders, ordered the units on the western front to withdraw an adequate distance so as not to expose the right flank to the CCF and the units on the eastern front to assemble in the coastal bridgehead areas of Hamhung and Hungnam.\(^{32}\) At this time, General MacArthur concluded that by letting the X Corps secure the coastal bridgehead so as not only to threat the left flank of the southward advance of the communist forces but also to break up the concentrated enemy strength in the western front, the Eighth Army could secure the P'yongyang-Wonsan line without difficulties. In keeping with this plan the G-3 of the UNC proposed that the US 3rd Division, which was on operation around Wonsan, should attack the Chinese, who might threaten the right flank of the Eighth Army by taking advantage of the mountainous road between Tokch'on and Wonsan traversing the T'aebaeg Mountains. However, the com-
manding General of the X Corps opposed this plan because even though there were roads printed on the map, the roads were, in fact, too narrow to be used as main supply routes and the plan presented a possible danger for the whole 3rd Division to be attacked by the enemy in a severely cold and rough area.

At the meeting on the 28th, the Commander in Chief of the UNC without setting up any concrete directive, made an important decision to withdraw, but could not make any decision as to when and how to support the Eighth Army. However, since the support for the Eighth Army issue was one of General MacArthur's great concerns, the matter was turned over to the generals, as an issue to be coordinated between the two commanders, who returned to the field on the November 29.

Since the total withdrawal of the ground forces was decided on, the operational plan of the UN Air and Naval Forces was also modified. The US Fifth Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Earl E. Patridge was able to conduct increased close air support under the challenge of the increasing activities of the MIG-15s north of the Yalu. The carrier aircraft wing of the Task Force 77, which so far had only been engaged in the rear area bombing and reconnaissance, also prepared to give close air support for the ground troops.

Admiral C. Turner Joy, the commander of the US Naval Forces Far East, in order to reinforce the ground forces' fire, ordered those aircraft carriers and battleships which had been standing by near the coastal sea of the Korean Peninsula to return to the operation area. In preparation for the expected sea evacuation of the ground forces, he also redeployed one landing combat group of Task Force 90 in both the Eastern and the Western Sea.

4. Disaster in the Western Front

General Walker, on the 28th, prior to his departure for Tokyo, issued
an operational directive to establish a defense line along estuary of Ch’ongch’-on-Pakch’on-Pugwon-T’aen-ri. This was part of the plan for the friendly forces, after blocking the Chinese offensive at the Ch’ongch’on River bridgehead, to advance again toward the border line. However, when he returned from the Tokyo meeting, during the afternoon of the 29th, he realized that the plan originally conceived was impossible to be carried out because of the failure of the US 1st Cavalry Division to support the ROK 6th Division in Sinch’ang-ri, the withdrawal of the Turkish brigade from Wawon-ri, and the losses the US 25th and 2nd Divisions suffered in the battle of the Ch’ongch’on River Valley.\(^{221}\)

At this time, the US I Corps (the ROK 1st Division, the US 24th Division, the US 25th Division) on the western flank had secured the Pakch’on area north of the Ch’ongch’on River, but the US IX Corps (the ROK 6th Division, the ROK 3rd Regiment of the 7th Division, the US 2nd Division, the Turkish Brigade) on the right front was struck by a Chinese converged attack and the defense line was narrowing, centered toward Kunu-ri. The US 2nd Division in Kunu-ri in particular was in danger of being entrapped by the CCF who had reached the rear area through the mountainous ridgeline, an offshoot of the Myohyang Mountain northeast of Kunu-ri.

The commander of the Eighth Army, evaluating the war situation carefully, decided to establish a new defense line in south of the Ch’ongch’on River with the intention not only of getting rid of the enemy pursuing from both east and north but also of consolidating the main line of resistance and keeping the depth of the defense by reducing the defensive line.

In keeping with this plan, the US I Corps was committed to defend the Sukch’on-Sunch’on line, the US IX Corps the Sunch’on-Songch’on line, while the ROK II Corps attached its 6th Division and the 3rd Regiment of the 7th Division to the US IX Corps and was able to reform the main body of the Corps (the 7th Division\(^{(-)}\), the 8th Division, and its service support unit) in the
south of Kangdong.\(^{29}\)

Thus, the ROK and the UN Forces which, in the beginning of October, having launched an offensive northward to the Korea-Manchuria border, had been advancing like a flow for two months only to come across a Chinese ambush when they were on the verge of securing the border, and had met the situation to withdraw just like an ebb.

(1) Defense of Sukch’on and Sunch’on

On November 28, the 5th day since the Christmas offensive was launched, the ROK 1st Division of the US 1 Corps advanced to the outskirts of Taech’on but was met by the CCF and established the Ch’ungmak-dong-Yongsan-dong line north of Pakch’on. The US 25th Division on the right advanced to the south of Yongbyon and made contact with the enemy. However, the US 24th Division (—the 5th Regiment), on the left of the ROK 1st Division, was advancing toward the Napch’onjong with little enemy contact and was instructed to become a reserve of Eighth Army and moved to Kangdong. On the following day, the ROK 1st Division fought with concerted effort to hold the Pakch’on-Yongsan-dong area, but was unable to overcome the Chinese attack which committed reinforcing troops in succession, and withdrew to Tongi-dong south of Pakch’on while conducting successive delaying actions.

At this hour, the enemy, in parallel with the Yongsan-dong attack, attempted to breach the defensive position of the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division, which had been in defense of the Kujang-dong-Kaech’on route running along the Ch’ongch’on River, the sector boundary between the US 1 Corps and IX Corps. If the enemy who penetrated the US 2nd Division advanced to the Kunu-ri-Sinanju route, the main units of the US 1 Corps, having the retreating roads cut off, would have been in great danger of being
isolated within the enveloping enemy.

Later the same day, Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, the Commander of the US 1 Corps, saw through this situation and ordered the ROK 1st and the US 25th Divisions to withdraw by phases to the south of the Ch'ongch'on River.30

The ROK 1st Division according to the instruction on the successive withdrawal, as a first step retreated to the Maengjung-ri-P'unghang-ri area. The US 25th Division, on the right, began to withdraw from the Pugwon area, and by midnight, assembled near the junction of the Kuryong River and the Ch'ongch'on River. As the main body of the Corps completed the planned first phase withdrawal, the commander of the Corps ordered the US 5th Regiment of the 24th Division in Corps reserve to be deployed in the Sinanju-Anju area south of the Ch'ongch'on River and to cover the main unit crossing the Ch'ongch'on River.

In the morning of the 30th, the ROK 1st Division and the US 25th Division, which had moved along the bank of the Ch'ongch'on River, crossed the Ch'ongch'on River under the cover of the US 5th Regiment and continued marching through the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route to assemble the ROK 1st Division in Sukch'on and the US 25th Division in Sunch'on. The 5th Regiment as the main body completed its withdrawal, blew up the Anjubridge and, around 18:00 hours, blasted all remaining bridges over the Ch'ongch'on River.31

The Corps gave up the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead and withdrew as planned with only slight enemy contact, but the 3rd Battalion of the 24th Regiment, the US 25th Division was exposed and isolated by the enemy because of the withdrawal of the US 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division on the right. With the battalion headquarters in Kunu-ri attacked by surprise, the battalion was in great confusion. However, the 3rd Battalion, supported by air bombings and powerful tank guns, managed to escape from the Chinese encirclement and
joined with the main body though the battalion suffered 30 casualties and 104 missing.

On the evening of the day, the ROK 1st Division deployed the 15th Regiment to the west of Sukch'on, the 12th Regiment to the east. The US 25th Division also deployed, linking up with the 15th Regiment to the west of Sunch'on, and thus established the Corps' main line of resistance.

(2) Kunu-ri Disaster

The US IX Corps, on the 28th, in accordance with the Eighth Army plan, established a defensive line along the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead between Pugwon south of Kujang-dong and Taecul-ri northeast of Yangdok.

The commander of the Corps ordered the ROK 3rd Regiment and the Turkish Brigade to be attached to the US 2nd Division on the left front, to defend Pugwon-Wawon northeast of Kunu-ri, and the ROK 6th Division on the right front and the US 1st Cavalry Division to defend the Pukch'ang area south of Tokch'on. Meanwhile, the commander moved the British 27th Brigade on Corps reserve from Kunu-ri to Chasan south of Sunch'on in order to support the frontal divisions effectively.

While the US 2nd Division was redeploying the units, the Chinese People's Volunteers commander ordered the 38th Army to immediately advance the main forces to Kunu-ri concluding the Tokch'on battle; on the other hand, some of the forces were to occupy Samso-ri and cut off the US 2nd Division from its retreat road in order to destroy the division in an enveloping operation.

In accordance with this plan, the Chinese 38th Army, as if announcing the opening act of the Kunu-ri armageddon, launched an offensive against the Turkish Brigade in Wawon on the right front, and the Chinese 40th Army at-
tacked the main forces of the US 2nd Division in Knu-ri; thus, both parties fell into an armageddon—a battle whose outcome was out of anybody's guess.

- Turkish Brigade's Delaying Action

On the 20th of November, the Turkish Brigade, while engaged in a sweeping-out operation against the NK guerrillas in the Changdan area, Kyunggi province, was ordered to join the US IX Corps and moved to Knu-ri to prepare for forthcoming combat. In the late evening of the 26th, the brigade, having been instructed to block the Chinese who had attacked the ROK II Corps and secured Tokch'on and then attempted to enlarge the breakthrough toward Kaech'on, advanced to Wawon on the Kaech'on-Tokch'on route. At about 14:30, the main body of the brigade which started moving again was ordered to cancel the march toward Tokch'on, while passing Aril-ryong located halfway between Wawon and Tokch'on, and to establish a defensive position in Yongdok-ri, east of Aril-ryong. The brigade was given an intelligence report of a sighting of a regiment size enemy, 10km to the north.

Brigade Commander, Brig. Gen. Tahsin Yasici had not only a poor grip on the situation of the neighboring forces both on the right and left, but also thought that Aril-ryong could be dangerous because of the roughness and the narrowness of the roads which could either block their own retreat or make the reinforcement difficult, so he concluded that Wawon-ri on the west would be better for interdicting the enemy than Yongdok-ri. As a result, The brigade commander ordered his units to retreat to Wawon and establish defense positions, a move which was against the Corps instruction.34

The brigade, around late evening, retreated to Wawon which was surrounded by hilly mountains, established a defense position in a half circle centering on a road. The troops, who were extremely exhausted after the long marching throughout the day, were taking a respite. Around midnight, loud
gun shots were heard from the front, and soon afterwards, the leader of the reconnaissance platoon of the rear guard came to report that the platoon had been dispersed by the enemy’s surprise attack. The brigade took a combat posture, anticipating an imminent enemy attack.

On the 28th, the CCF, who marched over Aril-ryong in the darkness, opened fire at dawn and the brigade, for the first time since it joined the war, was about to engage in fierce combat with the CCF. The enemy concentrated on opening the brigade’s position by staging a wave attack, but was driven back by the brigade’s opposition with the support of converging fire. However, as time went on, the enemy was being reinforced and assaulted the brigade from all directions with wave attacks as if the enemy had enveloped the brigade.

As it was moving to sunset, the brigade commander concluded that even though the brigade was blocking the enemy advance, since the defense area was surrounded by rough mountain, it would be too difficult to defend the position. The commander ordered his units to withdraw to Sinnim-ri, 5km to the rear from the present position, where units could make use of the open terrain for the operation. The battalions which established strong positions and fought both offensively and defensively against the Chinese throughout the day in the cold with temperatures as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius, withdrew to Sinnim-ri and established new defensive positions. However, the troops who were hungry, suffering from the severely cold weather, and facing the fearful Chinese wave attacks for the first time were extremely demoralized.

At the point, that Turkish brigade had a poor understanding of neighboring situation because radio communication with its superior command and the neighboring units had been cut off, and thus the brigade did not even know that the brigade itself was detached from the Corps’ reserve, by midnight of the 28th, and attached to the US 2nd Division. The brigade fought on its against an
enemy division without having any supporting fire. Shortly after midnight, the Chinese launched mortar fire and attacked from all directions with support of machine guns and automatic weapons; they then concentrated their attack on the artillery battalion, mortar company and the 3rd battalion in reserve. This
attack caused the brigade's position to become compromised, throwing the brigade into confusion, and some of the units left in vehicles for Kaech'on where the brigade's CP was located.

Thus, in spite of the fact that the battalions on the front were engaged in fierce combat in Sinnim-ri, the brigade's command in Kaech'on, 5km to the rear in the southwest, was not aware of the situation on the front at all, due to a communication shut down. The artillery battalion retreated and reported to the brigade commander: "The friendly forces have been enveloped by the enemy." The brigade commander, knowing the situation of the front, ordered his main body to withdraw to Kaech'on and, at the same time, one of the companies in reserve and a tank platoon to deploy forward to cover the retreat of the main body.

At this hour, the forward battalions, even though encircled by the CCF, battled hard until they exhausted their ammunition in keeping with the commanding chain, but because of the increasing casualties and the shrinking defense line, were in danger of being penetrated. Fortunately, at 11:00 hours on the 29th, when the supporting air bombardment by eight friendly airplanes in the Sinnim-ri area halted the enemy attack, the forward battalions were able to disengage enemy contact and retreat to Kaech'on to establish a blocking position.

The US 2nd Division commander instructed the Turkish Brigade to establish a blocking position south of the Kaech'on River, which ran along the outskirts of Kaech'on. The troops, though extremely fatigued from their break-out from the enemy encirclement, established a blocking position centering on Kaech'on.

Some time later, the Chinese mortar fire concentrated on the Kaech'on area and a part of the Chinese 38th Army, which had passed south of Kaech'
on in spite of the Turkish brigade’s tank gun fire, was advancing to Yongbok-ri, the midpoint on the road between Kaech’ŏn and Kunu-ri. As time went on, the brigade commander began to worry about the retreat route, which could be cut off by the enemy and the casualties which could mount up, and ordered the brigade to move to Kunu-ri in small groups of a company level and assemble in Kunu-ri. From this hour, the brigade started moving to Kunu-ri in small groups, and when the advance party was passing the enemy blocking line, the enemy increased the machine gun fire. To make things worse, the US 38th Regiment on the brigade’s left assembled at Kaech’ŏn and started to retreat through this road; the road was congested and thrown into great confusion by the US and Turkish troops and the vehicles. The brigade retreated in small groups overcoming the difficulties and assembled, at dawn on the 30th, in an area southwest of Kunu-ri.39

- Kunu-ri Withdrawal

When the Chinese Second Phase Offensive (November Offensive) was launched, the Kunu-ri area was under the defense of the US 2nd Division. Kunu-ri was an important strategic point for transportation located on a widespread plain, downstream of the Ch’ongch’ŏn River, which flowed through Huich’ŏn to Anju, and a diverging point from which a road stretched east to the rough Myohyang Mountains.

On the 28th, the division commander instructed the 9th Regiment, which was battling the Chinese who advanced through the rough Ch’ongch’ŏn River Valley and which had suffered a large number of casualties, to retreat to the south of Kunu-ri for reorganization, the 23rd Regiment to be deployed on Pugwon to control the Kujang-Kunu-ri road, and the ROK 3rd and the US 38th Regiments to be deployed to the south of Piho-san, which was a hill com-
manding the division area.

At this time, the US 25th Division was deployed to the west of the Ch’-ongch’on River on the division left, and the Turkish Brigade was deployed in Wawon on the division right. At around noon on the 29th, while the Turkish Brigade battled hard in Wawon, Sinnim-ri and Pongmyong-ri, the CCF 40th Army attacked the ROK 3rd and the US 23rd Regiments. The CCF 38th Army attacked the US 38th Regiment, and thus the Kunu-ri battle was underway.

The CCF 38th Army, filled clan after it attacked the Turkish Brigade, launched a converging attack against the US 38th Regiment. The regiment strongly resisted against the Chinese, but as time went on the situation was worsening. To make things even worse, a part of the enemy which had defeated the Turkish Brigade joined in the attacking force. The regimental commander, realizing this critical situation, committed a tank platoon and an infantry battalion in reserve to reinforce the frontal battalion. However, the Turkish troops who were retreating on the Kunu-ri-Kaech’on route add to the road congestion making the reinforcement of forces to this area impossible.39

Under such congested road conditions, the US 38th Regiment, which was unable to overcome the superior enemy, started to retreat to Kunu-ri where the Turkish Brigade was located. From this hour, the Kunu-ri-Kaech’on route which was the only road that could be used for retreat turned into chaos, as in addition to the 1st Battalion of US 38th Regiment, other retreating forces such as the remaining forces of the Turkish Brigade and the 2nd and the 3rd battalions of the US 38th Regiment moved along this route. At this point, the CCF 38th Army, in order to block the retreating UN forces, sent a part of its forces, bypassed the south of the Kaech’on River and infiltrated into the Hill 132 to control the road, and the enemy started mortar fire on the road. Only armored cars for transporting wounded and a few other vehicles could be seen
on the road.

As the 2nd Division was in trouble, the US Fifth Air Force, in spite of the bad weather and the darkness, called out B-26 bombers for close air support and subdued the Chinese artillery fire. The withdrawing echelons made use of the slowing down of the enemy fire, and hurriedly escaped from Kaech'on.

On the other hand, the right front of the US 2nd Division was also confronted with a dangerous situation, and the IX Corps commander instructed the 2nd Division commander to retreat from Kunu-ri to Sunch'on and connect with the 1st Cavalry Division which had been defending the Songch'on area. In relation to this order, the US 23rd Regiment deployed the 3rd battalion and a tank platoon in an area 3km north of Kunu-ri to cover the forces retreating from Kaech'on to Kunu-ri, and around dusk, the main body, retreated to Majang-ri, which was located between the Kaech'on River and the Chot'ong River, and commanded Kunu-ri. The ROK 3rd Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 38th Regiment were redeployed to the east of Kunu-ri to cover the retreating Turkish Brigade and the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions of the 38th Regiment.468

On the same day, one of the companies of the 23rd Regiment and a tank platoon which had been maintaining contact with the enemy north of Kunu-ri attempted intensive counterattacks four times against the enemy to gain time for the 38th Regiment and the Turkish brigade which were withdrawing. As the main body of the ROK 3rd Regiment, which was the last unit of the retreating echelons, reached the Anju road via Kunu-ri, the unit that had been covering in the north also retreated.

In the process, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment, the rear guard which had been blocking the Chinese pursuit, was surprised and placed in a dilemma. The battalion, realizing that it was impossible to withdraw via the
road, dispersed in groups, crossed over the plain and the Kaech'on River, and returned to its regiment.\textsuperscript{43}

The war situation during these days was written up in the US official history as follows:

The US 38th Regimental commander proposed that the ROK 3rd Regiment withdraw with them at the same time. The ROK 3rd Regimental commander responded, "No, my soldiers will remain on the line until all American soldiers are out, and then I will come out." There was much praise from the 38th Regimental officers and men for the ROK 3rd Regiment, which had fought with them from the 26th to the 30th of November.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, Kunu-ri, an important strategic crossroads at the lower end of the Ch'ongch'on River, was to be taken by the Chinese. The US 2nd Division prepared to retreat for the next operation to open the enemy blocking position. This would be the fiercest battle of the withdrawal operation.

- Kunu-ri-Sunch'on Roadblocking by CCF

On November 28 just before the friendly forces retreated from the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead, the G-2 of the Eighth Army thought that the Chinese III Army Group might have originally planned to advance with its main body through the Ch'ongch'on River valley, where it was relatively easy to maneuver, and to attempt a frontal attack; however, since they had driven back the ROK II Corps at Myohyang Mountain, the CCF diverted its attack to the southwest in order to exploit its operational success. It was assumed that they would send some part of their forces to envelop the Eighth Army, bypassing the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, while keep pressure on Kunu-ri.\textsuperscript{49}

By this hour, the CCF IIII Army Group with its two regiments of the 113 Division had ambushed for destroying the US 2nd Division withdrawing
south-ward from Kunu-ri by blocking Kunu-ri-Sunch'on and Anju-Sunch'on roads. This information was confirmed by the 5th Cavalry Regiment and a tank platoon which moved from Kunu-ri to Sunch'on to join the main body of the 1st Cavalry Division, just before the US 2nd Division retreated. The US 5th Cavalry Regiment, after having fought fiercely, until late evening against the Chinese in the hills nearby Samso-ri, withdrew to Sunch'on. A platoon of the US 72nd Tank Battalion, which was moving from Kunu-ri to Sunch'on to support the British 27th Brigade, was surprised by enemy troops of two companies; however, because of the armored protection, the platoon was able to withdraw to Sunch'on safely.

At 05:00 on the 29th, right after the US 2nd Division had established its command post at the Ch'ongnyong-ri elementary school, information was received that a Turkish convoy was attacked by surprise while transporting supplies from Sunch'on to Kunu-ri, and barely escaped. Thus, the road was confirmed to be under Chinese control.

The US 2nd Division commander ordered his reconnaissance company to attack the enemy who was occupying the mountain pass area, 6km south of the Yongwon railway station. The reconnaissance company attacked the enemy with the fire support of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion, but, around noon, the attack was blocked by persistent enemy resistance. The division commander then reinforced the reconnaissance company with a company from the 38th Regiment and a tank platoon, and they attacked the mountain pass until dusk but failed to break through the enemy line and returned. Even though the friendly forces failed to penetrate the enemy blocking position, they were able to confirm that the enemy was covering the road with fire power alone and had not buried any obstacles.

While the 2nd Division was attacking the Chinese who were blocking the retreat routes, the US IX Corps commander relocated the Middlesex Battal-
Kunu-ri Withdrawal Operation (Nov. 29–30, 1950)
ion of the British 27th Brigade, in order to support the division's retreat, to an area 11km south of the Kal-gogae Pass where both sides had engaged in a fierce battle. The Middlesex Battalion attacked the Kal-gogae Pass with the support of one tank platoon and a 105mm howitzer battalion, but was blocked by the persistent enemy and retreated southward to Yongwon-ri. The Corps commander then ordered the brigade commander to resume an attack to the north on the following morning, and so notified the 2nd Division commander. He urged the division to open the enemy blocking in closely coordination with the British 27th Brigade, which was advancing from the south.

As it grew dark, the enemy mortars, automatic weapons and rifle fire were sporadically directed at the division headquarters area. The division commander ordered the US 9th Regiment, which had lost half of its strength and had been in division reserve after four days of combat, to open the enemy block at 08:00 on the 30th. At this time, the division set up a withdrawal plan in which the 9th Regiment was to lead the withdrawing force, followed by the division headquarters, artillery and supporting units, the Turkish Brigade, the 38th Regiment and the ROK 3rd Regiment, with the 23rd Regiment as the rear guard.46

At dawn on the 30th, the CCF 38th Army sent its main force to the Yonghung-ri and Ssangryong-ri area north of the blocking line to reinforce the 113th Division which was blocking the Samso-ri and Yongwon-ri area.47 By this reinforcement, the blocking line of the CCF was strengthened; however, the 2nd Division was not aware of this situation. Thus the withdrawal operation seemed to be quite difficult.

- Desperate Combat by the ROK 3rd Regiment

While the ROK 3rd Regiment of the 7th Division was attacking the Myohyang Mountain, the regiment was surprised by the Chinese troops and
forced to retreat. However, since the retreat paths were blocked, the regiment was bypassed through the sector of the US 2nd Division on the 26th of November, when the ROK II Corps ordered the regiment to be attached to the US 2nd Division. The regiment, along with the 2nd Division, then retreated via Kujang-dong-Piho-san north of Kunu-ri.

By the evening on November 29, in accordance with the division order, the ROK 3rd regiment occupied the area east of Kunu-ri and covered the withdrawal when the neighboring US 38th Regiment and the Turkish Brigade on the right began to retreat from Kaech'on. Late at night, the regiment assembled southwest of Kunu-ri and connected with the US 23rd Regiment to defend Kaech'on River area at the Konji-san.\(^{69}\)

At 03:30 on the 30th, the two battalions that were leading the attack of the US 9th Regiment followed a tank platoon and departed the assembly area. At 06:30, as they were advancing through an area 1.5km south of the division headquarters at Ch'ungyongch'am, they were surprised by enemy fire. The regimental commander ordered the vehicle echelon to get away from the enemy fire range, and committed the 2nd Battalion to attack the hill west of the road and the 3rd Battalion, the open area on the right. However, the attacking echelons were soon blocked by the persistent enemy, equipped with automatic weapons and mortars. Only the tank platoon was able to pass the enemy fire net and advance south to join the British troops who established a blocking position near Yongwon-ri.\(^{69}\)

Preparing for the situation that the attack failed, the division commander ordered all artillery units, except those attached to the 38th and the 23rd Regiments, to assemble at the headquarters area, and the 38th Regiment, which had been following the main force as the rear guard, to advance to the front. At the same time, in order to open the enemy blocking swiftly, the troops were allowed to carry with them only the essential equipment and to leave all
nonessential items behind.

The US 9th Regiment tried to open the Chinese block again with infantrymen riding on the top of tanks. However, as soon as the opening attack started, they were stopped by the Chinese small arms and mortar fire. Soon after 09:00 hours, the division hurriedly dispatched the ROK 3rd Regiment to help the 9th Regiment out of the dangerous situation.

The ROK 3rd Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Chung Jin advanced to the front and took over the position of the 2nd Battalion of the US 9th Regiment which had its attack blocked by the enemy. At 10:30, supported by air strike and the fire of Company C of the US 72nd Tank Battalion, the 3rd Regiment rushed to the Chinese position south of Uyong-ri (the village west of Ch’ongnyongcham). Lt. Col. McMains, the 3rd Battalion Commander of the US 9th Regiment, observing this brave and resolute action, highly praised “The Korean troops’ rushing was really brave, and I have never seen such excellent attacking combat in my life.” As a result, the Korean troops quickly penetrated the first ridgeline position, which was defended by about 20 Chinese, and continued to rush toward the second ridgeline. It appeared that they would reach the top any moment. The American soldiers had been watching the operation from the foot of the hill in anticipation of seeing the Koreans set up the ‘air-ground signal panel’ on the top of the hill. The spectacular event, with a lead man carrying the panel on his back, was about to take place when tragedy struck.

A tank belonging to the 72nd Tank Battalion, mistaking ROK troops for CCF, fired at the friendly troops who had been attacking the enemy with heavy machine gun and tank gun and killed two Korean soldiers. The regiment, in spite of the accident, retreated to the rear slope of the hill for a while to reorganize and began to attack again. However, the Chinese increased firing. To make matters worse, the US tank which started firing against the Chinese,
fired again at the friendly troops, and the regimental attack was halted. Thus, the regimental attack failed miserably because of the two misdirected rounds from a friendly tank.\(^5\)

- The Brave Opening Attack by the US 2nd Division

While the ROK 3rd Regiment failed in its attack, the US 23rd Regimental commander, whose regiment was covering its division rear, reported to the division commander: "The enemy approaching was cut off by the air raids; however, the enemy near the Kunu-ri area was being reinforced while a part of the forces were moving to the eastern flank of the division." Such being the case, the US 2nd Division which had assembled at the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road was at a stalemate and, as time went on, the enveloping net was shrinking.

Within the US 1 Corps zone on the division left, the main supply route of the Corps, linked Kunu-ri-Anju-Sukch'on-Sunch'on; however, not only did the division have to march back to Sinanju in order to use this route, a move which would be observed and commanded by the enemy which had advanced to the Kaech'on River, but also the road was impassable due to block by the enemy which had chased after the 1 Corps and advanced to the Anju area.\(^6\) Thus, the division commander had no choice but to force the enemy block to withdraw to Sunch'on.

It was the division commander's evaluation that the depth of the enemy position appeared to be shallow because of the attacks by the US 9th and the ROK 3rd Regiments, and the enemy position seemed to have no heavy weapons deployed. On the other hand, while the Middlesex Battalion of the British 27th Brigade was attacking from the south, the division could withdraw to Sunch'on without much difficulty. Therefore, the division commander cancelled the previous order, which would have allowed the troops to bring only minimum equipment, and instructed them to bring all service vehicles and
usable equipment.

Prior to the withdrawal, the division commander reorganized his division for withdrawal, with the 38th Regiment as the leading echelon, followed by the division headquarters, the various artillery units, the engineering units, the 9th Regiment, the ROK 3rd Regiment and the Turkish Brigade. The division commander instructed the infantry units to mobilize all vehicles to carry the infantrymen and emphasized to all units to continue marching to the south without pause.\(^{39}\)

In the late afternoon the US 2nd Division, under the cover of the 23rd Regiment which was committed to the rear guard, began to march. The CCF, in order to intercept the division withdrawal, set up obstacles on the road around Inch'onch'am and the Kal-gogae area with an M-39 carrier an M-4 tank and a 2 1/2 ton truck captured from friendly forces. These obstacles had not been set up on the previous day. Because of these obstacles the withdrawal operation was hindered for a while; however, the leading echelon with its nine tanks pushed the obstacles off the road, and at about 14:00 hours, passed through the outpost of the 27th Brigade in the south. The 27th Brigade, which observed the withdrawal procession, notified the IX Corps that the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road was open for traffic.\(^{34}\)

The situation of the units which followed the leading tanks, however, was entirely different. As soon as the leading tanks passed the Chinese blocking line, the two chinese regiments deployed in advance at the Inch'onch'am area delivered a concentrated fire of 30~40 machine guns and about 10 mortars at the follow-on forces. Because of this fire, the retreating echelon repeated the 'stop-standby-depart' action, and the 38th Regiment was suffering damage to both its personnel and vehicles. Within this vortex, the 38th Regiment while repeating engaging and moving, passed the Chinese blocking line at about 15:00 hours.
When the 9th Regiment was passing the Chinese blocking line at Kal-
gogae, the intensive Chinese firing from both precipices and about 20 de-
stroyed vehicles scattered on the road, which provided covers for the troops,
impeded the regiment's breakout from the enemy's blocking. At this time, the
airplanes the division had requested appered and struck the enemy positions
hard, and the vehicles on the road began to burst into flames. When the enemy
firing slowed down because of the air strikes, the 9th Regiment completed its
withdrawal.

The 17th Field Artillery, the only US 8” howitzer battalion among the
rear artillery units, passed through the blocking line with minor losses includ-
ing only one gun, but other artillery units were again enveloped by the rein-
forced Chinese forces at the Kal-gogae area which was surrounded by hilly
flanks. The artillery units, isolated within the enemy encirclement, began to re-
treat to Sunch’on in scattered groups, discarding equipment. 90 After the
artillery units retreated, the enemy resistance was notably reduced, and the
Turkish Brigade and the ROK 3rd Regiment, which followed the artillery
units, withdrew to Sunch’on repulsing light enemy resistance.

The 23rd Regimental commander, whose regiment had been covering
the division rear, concluded that his regiment withdrawal following the main
body could not possibly complete before sunset and thus asked for and re-
ceived permission to retreat to the Sinanju-Sukch’on road within the US 1
Corps zone neighboring on the left. The regimental commander concluded that
the road was too narrow for the retreat of the field guns and, therefore, used
up all the ammunition by firing at the enemy for 20 minutes before the with-
drawal commenced and then destroyed the remaining guns. The regiment
moved to Sunch’on, before sunset via the US 5th Regiment position, the cover-
ing force of the US 1 Corps. The bloody Kunu-ri withdrawal of the US 2nd
Division was thus completed.
The Kunu-ri withdrawal had been planned and attempted in order to open the narrow roads, but the plan was made without sufficient knowledge of the enemy situation; accordingly, the withdrawing units became trapped and suffered too many casualties including men killed, wounded, captured or missing. The division also had to throw away various firearms and mobile equipment. The only consolations in this tragedy were that the soldiers showed excellent military discipline and bravery as a result of their routine training and displayed touching humanity when the soldiers with minor injuries carried their seriously wounded fellows as they made their narrow escape from the Valley of Death. Following this withdrawal, the US soldiers called this the 'Valley of the Gauntlet', and the valley was described as such in the official history.

According to the statistics, as of the 1st of December, the war casualties of the US 2nd Division during the latter half of November rose to 4,940 among which 4,500 casualties (90%) were counted in the Kunu-ri area after November 25. These losses equaled one third of the division strength in numerical figures; as a result, the division lacked 8,622 men on the table of organization. The loss of equipment was also significant. Among the losses were hundreds of vehicles, 64 artillery pieces, almost all the engineering equipment of the 2nd Combat Engineers Battalion and 20~40% of the communication equipment carried by the various division units.  

One of the reasons the 2nd Division experienced such disastrous battle, while passing through the Valley of the Gauntlet, was the difficulty of a combined forces operation. While the 2nd Division was opening the enemy blocking, the British 27th Brigade had been deployed at Hill 127, 5km southwest of Kal-gogae. If the British brigade had advanced farther north and occupied Kal-gogae to cover the division retreat, the breakthrough would have been much easier. And, if the ROK 3rd Regiment had more closely coordinat-
ed with the US tanks and had the appropriate support of the tank gun fire instead of being fired on by mistake, the results could have been very different.

The US 2nd Division, which had been damaged so badly that it could not go on an ordinary operation without being reformed, left the front for reorganization and was assembling at Kaesong via Chunghwa, while the Turkish Brigade was also assembling at Kaesong. The ROK 3rd Regiment returned to the 7th Division, which had been deployed at Songho-ri east of Py‘ongyang for the Taedong River line defense operation.

5. Evacuation Operation in the Eastern Front

When the Eighth Army on the western front was withdrawing from the Ch’ongch’on River bridgehead, the ROK 1 Corps and the US X Corps on the eastern front, which had been advancing toward the border, ceased their offensive just four days after the offensive was launched, on November 29, following orders from the commanding general of United Nations Command to assemble at the coastal beachhead area of Hamhung and Hungnam. This withdrawal operation was not easy. The ROK 1 Corps which had advanced along the eastern coast to Ch’ongjin was to retreat 480km through the coastal line, and the US 7th Division which had advanced to Hyesanjin was to retreat 320km through the mountainous terrain. Furthermore, the US 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of Changjin Reservoir had to retreat 240km through the enemy encirclement. 271

(1) Battle on the Snow Covered Changjin Reservoir

- The Standstill of the US 1st Marine Division at Mupy’ong-ri

Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, the commanding general of the X
Corps on the eastern front, ordered the US 1st Marine Division to attack Mupy’ong-ri (located halfway between Huich’on and Kanggye) to the west, to connect with the right front-wing of the Eighth Army on the western front in accordance with the latest offensive plan of the UN Forces. D-day was set for November 27, three days after advance of the Eighth Army, November 24.

At that time, the main body of the marine division was assembling at Hagaru-ri in order to advance to the Korea–Manchuria border north of Changjin Reservoir. Since the division commander was not aware of the enemy situation and the operational area was too mountainous to maneuver, he instructed the 7th Marine Regiment to occupy Yudam-ri and the 5th Marine Regiment, at 08:00 on the 27th of November, to make a passing attack toward Mupy’ong-ri. The commander also instructed the 1st Marine Regiment, in the division reserve, to guard the Changjin Reservoir–Hamhung road, the main supply route of the division.36

In keeping with this instruction, on the 25th, the main body of the 7th Marine Regiment without much opposition occupied the inland basin Yudam-ri first, as the foothold for the next attack. On the following day the 5th Marine Regiment, the attacking force, handed over the eastern area of the Changjin Reservoir to the 32nd Regiment of the US 7th Division, then assembled in Yudam-ri to prepare for the next offensive.

As this time the subordinate units of the Marine division had been deployed in column stretching from Yudam-ri in the north through the valley paths to Chinhung-ri in the south. Task Force Faith37 of the US 7th Division had been deployed near the P’ungnyuri River east of Changjin Reservoir to block the Chinese advance to Hagaru-ri.

Hagaru-ri, located at the extreme south of Changjin Reservoir, was an important basin surrounded by hills and had a temporary runway as well as the tactical command post and the supply depot of the Marine division. As a
result, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment had jointly established a defensive position along the rim of the base.

In Kot’o-ri, located halfway between Hagaru-ri and Chinhung-ri, the 1st Marine CP, the 2nd Battalion and the fire support units were deployed in order to secure the main supply route, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment and the fire support units were deployed in Chinhung-ri to the south to cover the rear area of the division.

While preparing for the offensive, the 7th Marine Regiment captured 3 Chinese soldiers. The soldiers gave the following information: “We belong to the 20th Division of the 60th Army, and if the Marine division was to launch an attack, the CCF would in return launch an enveloping attack with two armies.” They described a relatively detailed attack plan. However, the interrogator distrusted them because they seemed to be too aware of details on operational plan for enlisted men. This distrust was to become the primary cause of the Marine division committing a serious blunder.\(^8\)

Nevertheless, the division, in the severe cold weather with temperatures dropping as low as 20 degrees below zero, launched an offensive at 08:00 on the 27th as planned. As the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment occupied the flanking hills of the road entrance to Mup’yong-ri, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment, the leading element of the attacking echelon, attacked along the road, but made little progress due to opposition from the Chinese deployed on Hill 1251. At this point, a reconnaissance plane which was making a scouting flight dropped a communication box containing a message: “There is a fortified position in front of the battalion”, thus providing information on the enemy.

In the late afternoon, the 2nd Battalion, under the cover of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, occupied Hill 1251; however, because the recon-
naissance team which was dispatched from the 7th Regiment patrolled the surrounding hills and encountered the enemy, Yudam-ri was confirmed to have been enveloped by the Chinese. Hence, the attacking echelons, out of fear that the Chinese might attack at night, shifted to the defense for the time being and concentrated on all-around security.

When night fell, the temperature dropped down to 32 degrees below zero, limiting the soldiers activities, and as the Marine division had expected, when it reached 21:00 hours the enemy launched its offensive all at once and the Yudam-ri area was wrapped in flames.

The battle which started in the evening continued throughout the night with repeated hand-to-hand fight and exchange firing, and calmed down in the morning when the friendly air forces started attacking. However, Hill 1403, commanding the outpost positions of Marine forward regiment and Yudam-ri, was under enemy possession and the division was having trouble maintaining the front line.

Meanwhile, the 5th and 7th Regimental commanders at 11:00 hours, on 28th discussed operations. Both commanders concluded that, judging from the present enemy situation, attacking Yudam-ri was out of the question and defending the present position would not be easy. Therefore, the commanders decided to reestablish a position from which to defend Yudam-ri. In accordance with this decision, the 5th Marine Regiment established its position on the west and the north, and the 7th Marine Regiment established its position on the east and the south that night. At this time, they received a withdrawal order from the United Nations Command and the situation turned to an entirely different direction. The Marine Division commander, on the evening of the 30th, first of all ordered the 5th and the 7th Regiments which were deployed in Yudam-ri and Task Force Faith of the US 7th Division, deployed near the P'ungnyuri River area, to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. The Corps com-
mander, in order to support the operation of the Marine Division, allowed them to destroy those materials and equipment which would hinder the operation and confirmed that they would get supplies by air if needed.\textsuperscript{81}

- The Chinese Scheme and Development

In early November, Sung Shih Lun, the Commanding General of the CCF IX Army Group, in order to support the III Army Group, led the 20th, the 26th, and 27th Armies across the Yalu from Imgang and Chian, and advanced south through the Nangnim Mountains to take charge of the eastern front. He surmised that the US and the ROK forces were deployed separately, and con-
cluded that neither the US nor the ROK forces were aware of the entry of his Army Group into Korea. He also considered the possibilities of the US Marine Division’s withdrawal, observing the frequent movement of the troops and the vehicles of the US Marine Division, the hasty construction of an airfield in Hagaru-ri, the evacuation of the wounded by helicopter, the air drop of supplies, and the destruction or the burning of combat materials. He decided to strike the Marine Division out of the conviction that he was certain to win if he struck at the vulnerable point of the moving forces as they were retreating.

The commander of the CCF IX Army Group deployed the 27th Army (4 divisions) among the 12 divisions of the three subordinate armies to the north of the Changjin Reservoir and ordered them to make an enveloping attack from both the east and the west on the Yudam-ri-Hagaru-ri area where the main body of the US Marine Division was assembled. The commander, in the hope of destroying the US troops by taking an enveloping attack, deployed the 20th Army (4 divisions) to detour through the west of the Changjin Reservoir and to block the mountainous road between Hagaru-ri and Hamhung from south of the 27th Army the only road by which the marine division could retreat. He retained the 26th Army (4 divisions) which was assembled in Changjin as the Army group reserve.

The Chinese planned first stage to surprise the two Marine regiments which were deployed in the Changjin Reservoir area and annihilate them in Yudam-ri, Shinhung-ri and Hagaru-ri. If the operation was successful, they would continue to attack both the 32nd Regiment of the US 7th Division and the reinforcing unit of the Marine Division.63)

According to this plan, the CCF 27th Army instructed the 81st Division to advance to the west of the Pujon Reservoir to cut off the connection between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Division, the 79th Division to attack the north of the Chanjin Reservoir, and the 80th Division to attack east of the
Changjin Reservoir. The 20th Army instructed the 59th Division to occupy Shinhung-ri to cut off the road between Yudam-ri and Hagaru-ri, the 58th Division to make an enveloping attack against Hagaru-ri, and the 60th Division to occupy the Pusung-ri area to cut off the road on which the US marines could retreat or be reinforced. On the other hand, the CCF 89th Division was to make a detour to Sach’ang-ri, and a part of the division was to occupy Ko-t’o-ri to cut off the road for the marine division’s retreat, while the main body was to attack Hamhung.\(^{43}\)

The Chinese, in the evening of the 27th, launched offensives. However, from the first day, the Chinese attack encountered persistent resistance by the US Marine Division armed with a fighting spirit and was overwhelmed by the superior fire power. The Chinese not only suffered considerable casualties, but also had little impact against the US forces. To make matters worse, in the severely cold weather with the snow falling and the temperature dropping as low as 30 degrees below zero, they were not only in need of combat materials but also were short of food and ammunition, and the operation began to stumble.

- **Withdrawal of the Marine Division**

At 08:00 on December, 1st, the 5th and the 7th Marine Regiments, which had battled fiercely, began to retreat to Hagaru-ri where the division headquarters was located, under the cover of artillery and mortar fire. The regiments took time to repair the bridges, which the Chinese destroyed at the beginning, or for construction of detours, and the advance was hindered by ambush, yet they were able to assemble at Hagaru-ri on the 4th.\(^{45}\)

By this hour, Task Force Faith, which had advanced to the east of the Changjin Reservoir, suffered considerable casualties due to the bombardment by friendly air force by mistake and the Chinese blocking of the retreat route. The Task Force returned to Hagaru-ri on the 3rd, passing over the frozen
Changjin Reservoir.

The most urgent problem, at this point, was the evacuation of the wounded. As the frontal regiments and Task Force Faith were retreating, the number of wounded sharply increased, and the division commander urged testing the landing of a C-47 on the Hagaru-ri temporary air field (width: 50ft, total length: 2,900ft), which was under construction with a progress rate of only 40%. Fortunately, the test was successful even with the larger cargo planes and 4,300 wounded were evacuated by the cargo transport plane by the 5th. Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, the commanding general of the Combat Cargo Command of the Far Eastern Air Force, visited the division commander and proposed to transport the troops while giving up the combat equipment to reduce the weight. However, the division commander rejected the proposal, believing that they could retreat by land with their equipment and vehicles to Koto’ri.\(^6\)

In Hagaru-ri, about 10,000 troops, about 1,500 refugees, various pieces of combat equipment and about 1,000 vehicles had been gathered and the area was very congested. However, aerial supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition continued to be dropped from the planes. The Chinese, deployed on Piyak-san, a commanding hill in the east, observed this scene and picked up those supplies which were dropped in areas beyond the reach of the marine troops, but did not attack the marine troops or fire even a single gun.\(^6\)

While each echelon was preparing for the retreat, the commanders, in order to boost the troops, morale, emphasized that, “Retreating is moving to the rear area under the circumstances of being forced by the enemy, but in this operation we have the enemies in the rear area, and destroying those enemies is our principal mission, therefore, this is not a retreat but a new offensive.”\(^6\)

In the early morning of December 6, the main force of the division began withdrawing under the cover of the 5th Marine Regiment, and on the following day, arrived at Kot’o-ri, the second assembly area. About 1,000 civil-
ians of Hagaru-ri, in order to push out the communist troops, had greatly aided the US marine division, risking danger by engaging in intelligence gathering activities or by providing labour. As the US troops began to withdraw, due to the worsening situation, the civilians followed the retreating procession of troops, some on foot and others in vehicles because they feared the retaliation of the communist troops.13

The Marine Division retreated to Kot'o-ri from Yudam-ri, overcoming enormous difficulties, and the operation had almost come to an end. However, the two most difficult and yet important issues still remained to be solved. The first was how to secure Hill 1081 which commanded the Hwangch'o-ryong Pass, the dividing point of the retreat paths, and the second was the construction of a treadway bridge over the sluicegate bridge, which the Chinese had destroyed to prevent the retreat of the US Marine Division.14 The division commander instructed the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, standing by at Chinhung-ri, to occupy Hill 1081 before the main body of the division passed; as for the treadway bridge, they were supplied the needed materials for bridge by an airdrop from the corps and constructed six makeshift bridges.

By this time, The CCF IX Army Group, knowing that it was the last chance to recover the failure of the Yudam-ri and Hagaru-ri envelopment, instructed the 26th Army to move to Kot'o-ri from the Changjin Reservoir, the 60th Division to the Hwangch'o-ryong Pass, and to establish a strong blocking line.

When the withdrawal preparation was completed, the division commander ordered the division to begin the retreat at 08:00 on the 8th. Prior to this at 02:00 hours, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment which was to occupy Hill 1081, had begun to advance to contact with enemy under the limited field of observation provided by the whirling snow. The battalion attacked the whole afternoon under support of artillery fire, but was blocked by the
persistent enemy. The battalion spent a severely cold night with a low temperature of 34 degrees below zero, was supported by air raids on the following morning, and occupied the hill a few minutes before the main force arrived.

The 7th Marine Regiment, which passed over the Hwangch’o-ryong pass on the 9th, resumed an attack under the cover of the air force and the artillery fire against the last difficult target, sluicegate bridge. An extremely persistent enemy blocking had been expected; however, to the contrary, the enemy resistance was negligible, and the leading battalion occupied sluicegate bridge without much difficulty. At this stage, the Chinese troops, exhausted by severely cold weather and near starvation, seemed to have no intention to fight, giving up to resist in sheltered areas.

The engineer battalion constructed a makeshift bridge in 3 hours and completed it at 15:30 hours at the site of the destroyed sluicegate bridge, but it was precariously weak for use. However, troops and vehicles passed over the bridge the whole night. The advance party, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, finally arrived in Chinhung-ri at 02:30 hours on the 10th having gone through the Hwangch’o-ryong Pass, followed by the subordinate marine units. They were greeted with welcoming cheers by the troops deployed in Chinhung-ri.

As soon as the tank company, which was the last echelon of the Marine Division, passed over the sluicegate bridge, a demolition team from the engineer unit, blasted the makeshift bridge at 02:00 on the 11th. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, which covered the division retreat at Hill 1081 returned to Chinhung-ri at 13:00 hours upon confirming the completion of the division over sluicegate bridge. The division continued retreat to reach Hungnam by 23:30 hours. Thus, the long tedious withdrawal at the Changjin Reservoir ended.

From November 27, when the 1st Marine Division began to retreat, until December 10, the number of casualties rose to 2,621 among which 393
were killed, 2,152 were wounded and 76 were missing. There were also 1,534 non-battle losses, mostly due to frostbite.\textsuperscript{70}

The CCF Ⅹ Army Group blocked and enveloped the US 1st Marine Division with 8 of its 12 divisions, but the blocking was opened by the persistent marine division with strong support from air, artillery and tank fire. As a result, the CCF suffered high casualties. The CCF not only lost men in battle, but the lack of combat experience and lack of preparation for the extremely cold weather, coupled with insufficient supplies, produced a considerable number of frostbitten casualties and starving soldiers all of which conspired to make the CCF operation stumble.\textsuperscript{71} As a result, the Ⅹ Army Group was able to be committed to the front only after four months of rehabilitation in the Hamhung area.

On the 30th of November, the main body of the US 7th Division on the Marine Division right, which had advanced to Hyesanjin and Simgalp'ajin, was ordered by the US Ⅹ Corps commander to retreat to Sinhung-ri north of Hamhung to establish a blocking position and began to retreat. While the ROK 26th Regiment attached to the division had been covering at the halfway point on the Hyesanjin-Pukch'ong route, the main body of the division retreated to Sinhung-ri on the night of December 5, delaying the enemy pursuit by destroying the bridges on the roads.\textsuperscript{72} The Task Force Faith Which had been attached to the US Marine Division retreated with the division to Hamhung in advance.

(2) Ch'ongjin-Paegam Withdrawal

In late November when the main units of the US Ⅹ Corps were marching to the upper stream area (Changjin Reservoir-Hyesanjin) of the Yalu, the ROK 1 Corps advanced to the Paegam-Ch'ongjin line and was to reach the Tumen River as soon as possible. On the 27th of November, the 1 Corps com
mander, in accordance with the UN Forces' general offensive plan, issued an order to occupy the Tumen River line.  

Corps Operation Order No. 121 (Nov. 27, 1950)

1. The Capital Division with its two regiments is to occupy Hoeryong and Unggi with another regiment. The Commando Battalion of the 1st Regiment is to be posted in Kilchu and be attached to the Combat Force of the South Area of Paektu Mountain. (Movement by another order)

2. The 3rd Division with one regiment is to advance through Nanam-Musan road and occupy Musan without delay and keep one regiment in reserve in Nanam. To use this regiment in reserve requires permission from the Corps and movement by another order.

3. The 26th Regiment (attached to the US 7th Division) is to advance to Hamhung-Tanch' on-Hyesanjin within a week.

On the 27th, the ROK 3rd Division in Hapsu, in order to stage an envelopment of Musan, prepared an offensive by advancing the 22nd Regiment to the Paegam area north of Hapsu and the 23rd Regiment to Nanam south of Ch'ongjin. The 26th Regiment was attached to the US 7th Division and advanced to Samsu, Kapsan and Hyesanjin. The Capital Division in Ch'ongjin, with its 18th Regiment, launched an attack against Hoeryong and advanced to Puryong, and the 1st Cavalry Regiment launched an attack against Unggi and was advancing to Pugo.

Until a few days before this time, the enemy situation at the Corps front was relatively calm; however, since the Chinese began its second phase offensive, the enemy situation had been strengthening gradually, and at times the North Korean People's Army made some counterattacks too.

On November 30, Maj. Gen. Kim Paik Il, the Commanding General of
the ROK I Corps, received an order from the US X Corps to withdraw to Hamhung-Hungnam. At this time, the Corps, which had advanced to the extreme northern part of the eastern coast, worried that the withdrawal of two divisions (the 3rd and the Capital Divisions), through the narrow roads and the railways would be quite difficult in view of the fact that the enemy situation was being strengthened. On the 1st of December, the corps commander, having made up his mind to withdraw by stages, instructed the Capital Division to retreat to Pukch’ong-Iwon, under the cover of the 3rd Division, and ordered the 3rd Division, after covering the withdrawal of the Capital Division, to retreat to Songjin.\textsuperscript{71}

According to this directive, the Capital Division under the cover of the 3rd Division began to retreat via Chuur, Myongch’on, and Kilchu and assembled in Songjin on December 4, and the main body of the 3rd Division assembled in Kilchu. Under the cover of the main force of the 3rd Division, the 1st Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Regiment of the Capital Division and a part of the 3rd Division moved toward Pukch’ong-Iwon. The Corps had no enemy contact while retreating; however, from December 6, the enemy started sporadic attacks against the front of the 3rd Division, and the enemy howitzer fires were heard at times. According to the information of evacuating refugees, a large scale enemy contingent seemed to be assembling between Myongch’on and Ch’ongjin.

While the enemy was advancing to the Songjin, Kilchu area on the 7th, the HQ and the 18th Regiment of the Capital Division experienced great difficulties in marching on the road because of heavy snow fall. They retreated to Hungnam (Sohojin) from Songjin on a US naval vessel, and the 26th Regiment of the 3rd Division, which had been attached to the US 7th Division, returned and assembled in Pukch’ong.\textsuperscript{72} While the ROK and US forces were retreating, after disengaging with the enemy, the US Air forces and the US Navy covered
the Corps withdrawal with their fire power.

The 1st Regiment of the Capital Division, which had moved by land to an area nearby Hamhung, occupied Ch'ohung-ri-Unju-bong east of Hamhung, and the 1st Cavalry Regiment occupied Chuhung-ri-Majon-ri northeast of the Hungnam harbor; thus, the Capital Division secured the right flank of the Hamhung bridgehead line. The 18th Regiment in the division reserve guarded the division command post in Sohojin.

On the 9th, the ROK 3rd Division(−), which had covered the withdrawal of the Capital Division, assembled in Songjin from Kilchu and moved to an outer port of Hungnam on US naval ships. The 26th Regiment, which reverted to the Corps reserve on this day, was preparing to retreat to Hamhung around dawn when about 200 enemy soldiers advanced to an outlying hill to interfere the regiment’s retreat. The regiment with its headquarters and the 3rd Battalion made an enveloping attack against the enemy and the dispersed enemy escaped, leaving many dead bodies and equipment behind. On the 10th, the 26th Regiment moved to Majon-ri east of the Hungnam harbor and the main body of the 3rd Division was preparing to land at Sohojin; thus, the Ch'ongjin withdrawal of the 1 Corps was completed. The losses the enemy suffered were not confirmed; however, the ROK 1 Corps suffered casualties of 142 killed, 448 wounded and 340 missing during the withdrawal to the Hamhung bridgehead line.
III. Reversal on the 38th Parallel

1. The United Nations Command New Strategy

In early December (4th~8th), confronted with the CCF second phase offensive (November Offensive), the United Nations forces gave up the Ch’ongch’on River bridgehead on the western front and retreated; and at the same time, the forces on the eastern front also began to retreat to Hamhung. In the meantime, the UNC had been trying to come up with a new strategy by which to deal with the situation.

General MacArthur concluded that even if the UNC shifted its offensive into a defensive, with the UNC’s inferior strength compared with that of the CCF, unless the UNC was reinforced, a forced withdrawal was inevitable. In spite of MacArthur’s reservations, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the defensive strategy but did not agree with the UNC’s judgement that it was unable to secure a fixed defensive line, and instructed the Eighth Army and the X Corps to unite and occupy the line connecting Py’ongyang and Wonsan.\(^7\)

General MacArthur voiced his opposition as follows: “Even if the Eighth Army and the X Corps are united, the distance on the road between Py’ongyang and Wonsan will be about 250km, meaning an extended defense line with a thin depth. Accordingly, the front will be exposed to the danger of being opened and enveloped by the Chinese; furthermore, because of the Taebaek Mountains, the coordinated operation between the two armies and the logistic support will be extremely difficult. In particular, there is a possibility of losing the existing advantage of the sea line of communication.” General MacArthur believed that keeping the X Corps in Hamhung not only
pressed the enemy flank but also could block a large scale enemy force from advancing to the rear area passing over this gap. He emphasized that it would be a better plan to choose, but would only be a tentative measure without reinforcement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree with General MacArthur’s plan on the deployment of the X Corps in Hamhung because the JCS believed that the plan would give a large space to the Chinese who had proved to be excellent moving in such mountainous areas.

The report which the United Nations Command submitted to the JCS read: The Eighth US Army casualties in two days (Nov. 30th ~ Dec. 1st) exceeded 11,000 by the first check. The US 2nd Division suffered 6,380 losses which amounted to half the division strength; the Turkish Brigade counted 1,000 lost out of 5,000. The strength of the Eighth Army and the X Corps at that moment totaled only 110,000 while, on the other hand, the enemy committed a large number of troops estimated at 256,000 of the CCF and 100,000 of the NKPA, to the front.” This report which indicated the significantly inferior strength of the friendly forces compared to that of the enemy worried the JCS.

Confronted with the CCF which mobilized a large number of troops, General MacArthur thought that the political decision and the strategy used for the relatively small scale NKPA should be revised, and if the UNC was unable to establish and maintain superiority against the Chinese forces, there was no choice but to withdraw.

Thus, there were opposing opinions between the US JCS and the UNC, and in order to settle this difference in the early stage, on December 4, General J. Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, flew to Tokyo and had a meeting with General MacArthur. He explained to MacArthur that it was not possible to reinforce a large number of forces within the near future and agreed with General MacArthur’s idea to move the UNC to the coastal bridgehead
area because maintaining the UNC strength during that time was the first priority.

General Collins made an inspection tour of the front line from December 4 to 6 and returned to Tokyo. He had a second strategic meeting with General MacArthur and his staff, the Navy and the Air supporting commanders, and agreed to a final plan that the Eighth Army and the US X Corps would be united and withdraw to Pusan, carrying out delaying actions in the reestablished defensive positions by stages. There were nine defense lines in this plan, and in order to concentrate on Seoul defense, four defense lines were set up north of Seoul and the last defense line was set at the Naktong River line as had been the case during the early stage of the war.

On December 8, General MacArthur ordered this plan as operation order No. 5, and the Eighth Army was to return to the 38th Parallel and the ROK I Corps and the US X Corps were to retreat to the southeastern coastal area from Hungnam.

2. Evacuation Operation of Py'ongyang

(1) Evacuation Decision and the Plan

On December 1, the friendly forces retreated to a line along Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on, 32km south of the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead, and established a defense position. The Chinese who occupied Kunu-ri did not concentrate on chasing after UN forces but sent a small scale reconnaissance team, and only a lull were taking place at the front. However, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army concluded that the enemy resume the attack against the front and the right flank after having reorganized.
The situation was written up in the CCF Official Publication.\^\textsuperscript{90}

The Central Military Commission of Communist China, at 05:00 on December 2, ordered the commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army to give the main force on the western front a respite for 4 to 5 days, in the northern area of the Sukch'on-Sunch'on line. The commander was also instructed to restock war materials and ammunition, and to reform troops during this respite, in preparation for the next operation.

General Walker estimated that he confronted an enemy strength as six armies (18 divisions) with 165,000 troops. The frontal forces of the UNC were the US 1st Cavalry, the 24th, the 25th Divisions, the ROK 1st Division and the British 27th and 29th Brigades. A total of about five divisions were deployed, but other units had been so badly damaged during the battle of the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead that the reconstitution was inevitable. Thus, the difference in strength between the enemy and the friendly forces was too great for the UNC to oppose the enemy in an ordinary blocking position, and it was decided that in order to overcome the unfavorable situation Eighth Army should avoid any fixed defensive against the enemy and continue the delaying actions by stages.

Around December 2 according to air and land reconnaissance reports it was confirmed that the enemy was moving to the east of Songch'on, and judging from the fact that the Chinese guerrilla unit and the NKPA guerrilla unit occupied the road between Songch'on and Yangdok, it was certain that the enemy had blocked the road between Py'ongyang and Wonsan. The commander of the Eighth Army concluded that the enemy was planning to intercept the UNC' reinforcement between the eastern and the western fronts, and to advance westward through the Py'ongyang-Songch'on road to envelop and destroy the main body of friendly forces north of Py'ongyang. Since it was im-
possible for the friendly forces to confront the superior Chinese forces, the commander decided to withdraw from Py'ongyang before the Chinese attacked.\(^{31}\)

However it was decided that the stockpile of war materials around the Py'ongyang and Chinnamp'o area would be transported to the rear area, exploiting the maximum time for the transporting. The importance of this transporting of materials was emphasized because besides the early losses of the personal equipment and the equipment on the table of organization by the frontal units during their retreat from Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead, they had also destroyed 1,400 tons of ammunition in Sinanju and 500 tons of ammunition upon retreating from Kunu-ri.

On December 2, the forces on the Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on line in the western front, in order to gain time for transporting the stockpiles of war materials in the Py'ongyang and Chinnamp'o areas, retreated, first of all, to the half circle area along Yongyu-Sainjang-Kangdong, 32km north of Py'ongyang. Except for the US IX Corps being harassed lightly by NK guerrilla on the right of the Sunch'on-P'yongyang route, the Eighth Army units were able to secure this defense line, the middle point between Sunch'on and P'ongyang, without any enemy contact.

Around this time, the commander of the Eighth Army, in order to defend the P'yongyang-Sariwon-Kaesong route, the main route for supply and withdrawal, and at the same time, to consolidate the defense of the right flank, committed units to the east of Route No. 33 (P'yongyang-Yulli-Sin'gye-Sibyon-ri). As part of this plan, he committed the US 24th Division in Yulli and the ROK II Corps, which was still under reorganization in Kangdong, for deployment in Sin'gye. The ROK 2nd and the 5th Divisions were already deployed and conducting a sweeping operation against the guerrillas in the Sibyon-ri, Yonch'on, P'och'on and Ch'unch'on area southeast of Singye. Thus, as the UN forces on
the western front were securing the important junction of Route No. 33, it was possible to establish a defense line in the eastern flank of Route No. 1 (P'yongyang-Kaesung-Seoul), the main line of communication. The US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (attached: British 29th Brigade) assembled in P'yongyang was committed to cover the four floating bridges constructed on the south and east of P'yongyang for support the withdrawal of the units and the transportation of the war materials. The Eighth Army commander also instructed the US 2nd Division and the Turkish Brigade, which had retreated from Kunu-ri, to move to Munsan and Kaesung respectively for concentration on reconstitute in the army reserves.22

The reasons that the commander of the Eighth Army made such a strategic decision were the demoralization of the troops due to the retreat from the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead, the high number of casualties during combat the previous week, the waverung confidence of the army because of the large scale Chinese attacks, and, most important, the Chinese envelopment was underway from the east.23

(2) P'yongyang Evacuation

In December there had been no large scale offensives by the enemy; however, on the 3rd, there was an intelligence report that a large scale enemy force was deployed to the northeast and the east of the Eighth Army. The commander of the Eighth Army estimated that the enemy was planning to attack P'yongyang or to block the retreat route by advancing southwest to Singye, and the commander ordered a retreat, at 08:00 hours on the 4th to a line from Kyomipo south of P'yongyang to Koksan. On the Eighth Army Operation Plan No. 107, the 1st phase defense line which the Eighth Army was to occupy before retreating to the Imjin River and Seoul, was noted as the line along
Kyomip’o south of P’ongyang-Chunghwa-Yulli-Koksan, and the 2nd phase defense line was shown as the line along Haeju-Sinmak-Singye-Ich’on.\(^{90}\)

On the 4th, the engineering units of the US I Corps destroyed some of the industrial facilities and the military bases in P’ongyang and the flames began to rise in the sky from the morning. The US I Corps which was to defend the Chunghwa area south of P’ongyang, exploiting this situation, began to retreat from P’ongyang through Route No. 1 with the US 25th Division as the leading element under the cover of the ROK 1st Division. In the afternoon, the ROK 1st Division also withdrew from P’ongyang. The US IX Corps, being attached the US 24th Division, which had advanced to Yulli, retreated through Routh No. 33 and occupied the Yulli-Koksan area. At this time, many refugees from the P’ongyang province citizens including P’ongyang city crossed over the Taedong River and joined the retreating UN forces.

General Paik Sun Yup, commander of the ROK 1st Division, described the P’ongyang withdrawal in his memoirs as follows:

As the division passed the public square of P’ongyang City Hall, where on October 29, President Syngman Rhee had appealed to the P’ongyang citizens for national solidarity and had been enthusiastically welcomed, and the Taedong River area, the dream for national unification seemed to have vanished, and I as a man whose native town was P’ongyang, retreated from P’ongyang with inexplicable sorrow because of the dim prospect of returning to P’ongyang again.\(^{95}\)

The ROK 1st Division soldiers also recalled the withdrawal: “We were the first ones who entered P’ongyang and the joy and enthusiasm were beyond explanation because occupying the enemy capitol symbolized national unification. When we had to retreat from P’ongyang in just 45 days while we could still hear the enthusiasm, we couldn’t repress our resentment.”\(^{96}\)
While the frontal Corps were withdrawing, the transportation operations in P'yongyang and Chinnamp'o were continuously being carried out. The amount of war materials in Chinnamp'o was relatively small and could be transported without much trouble, but the amount of materials in P'yongyang piled up over the past several weeks was too large to be transported. In P'yongyang there was piled up cargo to be transported while the wounded soldiers and the service units were allocated as the first priority for trains; furthermore with the increasing demand on trucks for the troop movement, vehicles were very short. Especially by UNC air raids, the railway yard facilities were destroyed and the transportation operation became even more difficult.

Under these conditions, the transportation operation of Chinnamp'o continued until the evening of the 5th. The UN forces, under the cover of four US destroyers and fighters from a British aircraft carrier, mobilized all avail-
able ships such as US Navy LSTs, the Japanese transports, the US Navy Squadron and about 100 small ships, and transported the wounded, the prisoners of war, the war materials from P'yongyang and Chinnamp'o, and about 30,000 refugees who rushed to this area. As the last retreating echelon moved out of the port, the Chinnamp'o dock was wrapped in flames and about 2,000 tons of abandoned materials were destroyed.

The CCF, expecting the Eighth Army to defend P'yongyang, sent three divisions to the north of P'yongyang to keep Eighth Army in check and committed four or five divisions, consisting of the Chinese army and the NKPA, to attack flanks. The CCF planned a double envelopment employing the main body of five armies to make a convergent attack against the Songch'on, Kandong, Koksan and Singye areas. However, the enemy occupied P'yongyang without bloodshed since the main units of the Eighth Army had already retreated; thus, the enemy failed to destroy the UN Forces.

On the 6th, the Eighth Army, retreated from P'yongyang, established a defense line with the ROK 6th Division and the US 24th and 25th Divisions along Songlim-Chunghwa-Suan. And the 7th and the 8th Divisions of the ROK II Corps moved from the Koksan area to Sibyon-ri to sweep out the enemy stragglers who were still operating around the Iron Triangle, upon ROKA Headquarters operation order No. 122 (6th Dec.).

By that time, the G-3 of the Eighth Army expressed his concern as follows; "The greatest concern at the moment is what the enemy might attempt. Under the present situation when we are disengaged from the battle, the enemy could attempt not only an envelopment but also could occupy the whole of South Korea. Therefore, the plans or orders of our operation should be directed toward gathering information on the enemy movement and, while we should avoid decisive combat against the superior enemy, we should engage in delaying actions."
Withdrawal Operation in the Western Front (Dec. 1~23, 1950)

The Commander of the Eighth Army was also concerned over the enemy movement because from the time of the withdrawal from the Ch'ongch' on River bridgehead until the 5th, there had been no enemy contact and no enemy prisoners had been taken. He ordered each Corps to dispatch a reconnaissance unit reinforced with tanks to the Taedong River area to get information on the enemy location and intentions.
At this time, a reconnaissance unit of a two battalions of the 1st Caval-
ry Division advanced up to Koksan and had slight contact with the NK forces;
thus, the enemy in front was confirmed to be the NK People’s Army. On the
following day (December 6), the enemy was observed by air reconnaissance to
be moving southward to an open field after having crossed over the estuary of
the Taedong River from Chinnamp’o by boat.

The Commander of the Eighth Army, evaluating the above mentioned
information, ordered the frontal units to disengage from enemy and to retreat
to the second phase defense line (Haeju-Sin’gye-Ich’on-Kimhwa) on December 8.
The next retreat was planned to go up to a line connecting the mouth of the
Yesong River on the western coast through Sibyon-ri-Ch’orwon-Hwach’on to
Yangyang on the eastern coast—a defense line north of the 38th Parallel. The
commander instructed that the western part of the defense line was to be occu-
pied by the US I Corps and the IX Corps, and the eastern part of the defense
line was to be occupied by two divisions of the ROK II Corps and three divi-
sions of the ROK III Corps, which had been engaged in a sweeping up opera-
tion against the communist guerrillas in the rear area.

On the 8th, in compliance with this instruction, the main units began
to move to the second phase defense line, when the UNC ordered the Eighth
Army to retreat to the 38th Parallel. Because of this order, the Eighth Army on
the west was, at first, confused with the retreat plans; however, after having re-
arranged the retreat plan, completed the return to the 38th Parallel.

Peng Teh Huai, the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers,
failed to destroy the Eighth Army because of the Eighth Army’s retreat by
stages and, on December 8, made a report to Mao Tse Tung on an attack plan
as follows:

If our forces are successful in destroying the UNC main units by
launching a converging attack on the 17th of December against the
Chunghwa, Sangwon, and Suan area, we will cross the 38th Parallel and recapture Seoul; however, in case we fail in exterminating the main units of the UN forces, we will discontinue pursuit of them north of the 38th Parallel, in order to induce the ROK-UN forces to occupy the 38th Parallel. Then, we will launch a new offensive next year to destroy the main units of the enemy.

This attack plan by the enemy was not carried out as planned, because of the hasty withdrawal of the Eighth Army to the 38th Parallel. The UN forces had established a defense position on the 38th Parallel while keeping the combat strength of the main forces.

3. Evacuation Operations of Hungnam

(1) Evacuation Plan

The US X Corps had originally planned to establish a strong coastal bridgehead in the Hamhung, Wonsan area, if the US 1st Marine Division and the ROK I Corps were to retreat to Hamhung; however, on December 8, the Corps received the Hungnam withdrawal order from the Commanding General of the UNC, and hastily prepared for a withdrawal plan. The Corps Commander, on the 11th, as soon as the Marine Division completed its withdrawal from the Changjin Reservoir, instructed the US 3rd Division (attach: ROK Marine) to deploy on Yomp'o-Oro-ri; the US 7th Division to the north of Hamhung; and the ROK I Corps (the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the Capital Division, the 26th Regiment of the 3rd Division) to the east of Hamhung and on the eastern coast to establish a bridgehead.

The Commanding General of the US X Corps instructed an orderly
contraction of defenses, with the US 1st Marine Division as the first unit to reembark, the headquarters of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps as the second, then the US 7th Division and the US 3rd Division, setting up three phase lines for a successive retreat to avoid any possible gaps within the bridgehead.

The first phase line was set along the Yowichon River west of the Yonp’o airfield, a point 4.8 km south of Hamhung, and Majon-ri east of Hungnam. When the 1st Marine Division embarked toward the first phase line, this line was to be occupied by the units on the bridgehead. The second phase line was designed to abandon only the Yonp’o airfield and to move from the Yowichon River to the Songch’on River. When the X Corps headquarters and the ROK I Corps completed their withdrawal, then this line was to be occupied by the US 3rd and 7th Division. The third phase line was drawn along the Hungnam harbor through the outskirts of Sohojin on the east, and was scheduled to be occupied by the US 3rd Division upon completion of the withdrawal of the US 7th Division. In the meantime, in order to cover the units’ withdrawal and the vacant positions with maximum fire power, seven aircraft carriers, a warship, two cruisers, seven destroyers and three rocket launcher ships were deployed around Hungnam.

Including the troops and materiel outloaded at Wonsan and Songjin, the X Corps needed shipping space for 105,000 troops, 18,422 vehicles, and some 35,000 tons of bulk cargo. Although the US Navy commanded a transport group of over 125 ships, some would have to make more than one trip to meet the X Corps’ needs. The Far East Air Forces’ Combat Cargo Command flying out of Yonp’o airfield was to fulfill airlift requirements.

To conduct the evacuation as rapidly as possible, the Commanding General of the X Corps organized a control group to supervise the actual loading of troops and materiel at water’s edge, while organizing another at sea to
control the docking, sailing and the assignment of anchorages, and emphasized close coordination between the groups.

(2) Evacuation Operation

The X Corps Commander published his formal evacuation order after briefing General MacArthur on his plan on December 11, the date on which General MacArthur flew into Yonp'o airfield. The first unit which retreated in compliance with this plan was the ROK 3rd Division. The division was originally
scheduled to evacuate from Songjin by sea and to land at Sohojin at 14:00 on
the 10th; however, at Sohojin, instead of landing, the division took on board
the 18th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division, which had been defending
Sohojin, and sailed for Pusan, the first transports from the eastern front. The
next echelon to evacuate was the US 1st Marine Division which assembled in
Hungnam and the Yonp'o airfield. On the 12th, the division began to take its
personnel and equipment on board and upon completion of the boarding, at
09:00 hours on the 15th, sailed for Pusan.

After the evacuation of the 1st Marine Division, as the units on the pe-
rimeter began to move to the first phase line, an air reconnaissance report in-
dicated that the enemy forces were closing in around the X Corps perimeter,
but not in a great strength. However, a greater immediate problem than the ap-
proaching of a relatively small number of enemy forces was the massive flow
of civilians into the Hungnam harbor, in spite of the control by friendly forces.
The Corps Commander had originally planned to evacuate only the families of
the military and the policemen, and some civilians; however, as the number of
refugees grew way beyond his expectation, he moved the civilians to the south-
eastern suburbs of Sohojin and organized them for evacuation as soon as shipp-
ing space became available.

This arrangement for evacuation was the result of Gen. Kim Paik Il’s
request to Gen. Chung Il Kwon, the Chief of General Staff who visited the
Corps HQ in Songjin while the Corps was still retreating to the perimeter:

Chief of Staff, could I know the present development of the situation?
Soldiers are adamant that they will never put down their rifles. We
have not advanced this far on a sight-seeing tour; how could we retreat
only because the enemy is blocking Wonsan? We would prefer dying to
withdrawing. We, the military personnel, can manage to retreat; howev-
ner, the civilians, who enthusiastically welcomed the friendly forces on
their advance north, would be retaliated by enemy as traitors. I would evacuate all of them if they wanted to go. I wish to ask the X Corps to support their transport."\[41\]

As the US 1st Marine Division completed its boarding on the 14th, the 32nd Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division, which had retreated from the battle of the Changjin Reservoir, and the US X Corps HQ were taken on board. Since the Chinese attack had been concentrated on the zones of the US 3rd and 7th Divisions, the withdrawal of the Capital Division of the ROK I Corps was delayed for a while. The Capital Division, in an effort to trick the enemy into thinking it would hold the position, stuck to the position during the daytime, then on the 17th, exploiting the darkness at night, was relieved by the US 7th Division, assembled in the Hungnam harbor. The division outloaded into, the US Navy LSTs at 24:00 hours and sailed for Pusan at dawn on the following day. Although original plans called for the ROK I Corps to go to Pusan, the UNC had directed that the units then on the Hungnam perimeter be sea lifted to Samch‘ok, in order to support the Eighth Army in its operation.

The US Cargo Aircrafts, on the 18th, lifted out 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo, and several hundred refugees from Yonp‘o airfield and then closed it. The US 3rd Division, which had been defending the airfield, also retreated to the second phase line, the Songch‘on River bank.

Around the 18th, there had been some partial attacks by the CCF from the northwest, followed by contacts with the 3rd Division of the NKPA from northeast. Although they tried to strike the perimeter at various positions, their action appeared to be only an attempt to reconnoiter the perimeter.

As the 17th and the 31st (-) Regiments of the US 7th Division, on December 20 and 21, embarked and sailed for Pusan, the US 3rd Division, on the
23rd, retreated to the 3rd phase line. The indirect fire received on the day proved to be the last opposition offered. By the morning of the 24th, the perimeter was silent. A battalion from each regiment stayed on the 3rd phase line while the main body moved to Hungnam harbor and outloaded, followed by the remaining units. The Division’s 10th Engineer Combat Battalion and the Navy underwater demolition teams prepared port facilities for destruction. As the last platoons of the covering force and the demolition teams disengaged enemy contacts, under the cover of air and warship guns, and outloaded for steaming off, at 14:30 the Hungnam harbor roared into flames. At the same time the warships, which had been standing by off shore, laid down a wide barrage around the harbor.

At the end of November 1950, while the units on the eastern front commenced to retreat, the ROK Marine, attached to the US 3rd Division, had been engaged in a sweeping operation against the NKPA stragglers around the Majon-ri and Tongyang-ri area, in order to secure the P’yongyang-Wonsan Route. On the 3rd of December, the Marine, in compliance with the US X Corps defense plan for the bridgehead, the headquarters, the 2nd and the 5th Battalions retreated to Hamhung and the 1st and the 3rd Battalions to Wonsan, and defended the harbor and the airfield. As the US X Corps, on the 8th, abandoned the outer area of the Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter, the 1st ans the 3rd Battalions, covering the demolition of the facilities of the Wonsan airfield retreated by the US navy ship on the night of the 9th. The Marine (-), in relation with the Hamhung withdrawal plan, assembled in the Yonp’o airfield and, flew to Pusan on the 15th.

The Marines recalled the situation as follows: “When we were retreating from Yonp’o airfield without achieving the glorious united Korea, we felt broken-hearted. Especially when we left the civilian refugees behind, who appealed us to bring their children, if not the refugees themselves, made us even
more broken-hearted. At first, we did not know our destination while steaming off Wonsan; however, as soon as we were cruising by Ulsan, we realized that we were retreating, and we could not help giving vent to our resentment.”

General MacArthur had anticipated that the retreat of the US X Corps would end on December 27. However, because of the systematic operation by the transport unit and the relatively silent enemy situation, the last echelon of the US X Corps steamed out of Hungnam harbor on Christmas Eve. At this time, about 200 tons of ammunition, a like amount of frozen dynamite, 500 bombs, and about 200 drums of oil and gasoline had not been taken out. All of this added to the final blowup of the port of Hungnam.

4. The 38th Parallel Secured

On December 8, the Commanding General of the UNC ordered all subordinate units to establish strong positions on the 38th Parallel as a part of the concept of successive defense strategy. In keeping with this plan, the Eighth Army set up a main line of resistance along the Kimp'o peninsula—the Imjin River–Hwach'ón–Yangyang, and assigned the defense responsibility to the US forces on the western front, with the P'och'on–Kimhwa Route as the boundary line, and the ROK forces on the eastern front. The Corps, which retreated to this line, conducted reconnaissance activities on the forward areas while reinforcing the defense positions.

(1) Situation in the Western Front

The Eighth Army withdrew from P'yongyang through Chunghwa-Sariwon and Yulli-Sin'gye to the 38th Parallel without having any significant enemy pursuit; however, while passing through the Myorak Mountains area,
which represented the boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do, the enemy stragglers frequently ambushed the friendly troops. They blocked the roads and made surprise attacks against the retreating the ROK and UN forces and looted in the villages.

On December 7, the ROK 1st Division moved from Sariwon to Namch'ŏn and the Reconnaissance Company of the division cleaned up stragglers of a battalion size who had been operating around Kuwol-san. The division, occupying the successive positions such as the Wich'on-ri, Kuhwa-ri area for the purpose of delaying actions, covered the retreat of the friendly forces, while carrying out a mop-up operation of the stragglers in the area. When the withdrawal of the US I Corps was completed on the 14th, the Division, deployed the 11th Regiment at Korangp'o, the 15th Regiment at Pobwon-ri and the 12th Regiment at Sinsan-ri. Deployment had been made in the very same positions six months before, just before the war broke out.

The US I Corps, which retreated to the 38th Parallel, deployed the Turkish Brigade to establish the main line of resistance on the Kimp'o Peninsula, the US 25th Division in the downstream area of the Imjin River traversed by the Kaesong-Munsan Route, and the ROK 1st Division in the Korangp'o-Choksong area. And the Corps instructed Br 29th Brigade to assemble Sindun-ri in Koyang-gun as the Corps’ reserve.

The US IX Corps, which retreated from Sin’gye, instructed the ROK 6th Division to assemble in the Chongok area which was on the Yonch'on-Uijongbu axis, the US 24th Division in the Yongpyong area which was on the Kimhwa-Uijongbu axis, and the BR 27th Brigade in the Tokchong area as the Army reserve.

By this time, on December 11, the ROK 6th Division on the left front of the Corps had been operating a delaying action and was to retreat through the Sibyon-ri-Saknyong-Yonch'un Route; however, due to the frequent haunt-
ing of the enemy stragglers on the Route, it withdrew by taking a detour along the Sibyon-ri-Kuhwa-ri-Yonch'on Routh. The Division deployed the 7th Regiment south of the Hant'an River, the 19th Regiment in the Paegui-ri area which was on the main line of resistance, and the 2nd Regiment assembled in Tongdutch'on as the Division reserve.

While the US I Corps and the IX Corps were establishing the defense position, the Eighth Army Commander, in compliance with the directive by General MacArthur which emphasized defending for Seoul, deployed the US 1st Cavalry Division around T'oegeyon, to reinforce the vulnerable points such as the shallow depth in defense, large gap between disposition, and the wider front of the ROK units, and to block the enemy advancing from Ch'-unch'on to Seoul.

In the meantime, the commander moved the US 2nd Division, which had been significantly weakened during the Kunu-ri battle and assembled in Yongdunpo, to Ch'ungju, and instructed it to block the enemy if the enemy attempted to penetrate the positions of the ROK forces in the center or the east, and, in case the US I and IX Corps on the west front were to retreat, to cover their right flanks.

The commander ordered movement of the supplies piled up on the north of Seoul to the south and reduction of the war materiel in the Inch'on harbor. At the same time, he ordered the reduction of the numbers of the Army headquarters personnel to a minimum size and movement of the main body to Taegu.

(2) Situation on the Central Front

On December 10, the ROK III Corps (the 9th and the 11th Division), in accordance with Operation Plan No. 251 (Dec. 10, 1950), returned the 9th and
the 11th Divisions, which had been engaged in a sweeping operation against the enemy stragglers in the rear area, to the headquarters of the ROKA. The Corps moved to Yangp’yong and had the 2nd, 5th and the 8th Divisions attached, and for the first time since the Corps was established, was assigned to the front.

From November 11, the ROK 2nd and 5th Divisions under the control of ROKA headquarters, was on a sweeping operation against NKPA stragglers from the Naktong River battle, marched north through the Taebaek Mountains and assembled in the 'Iron Triangle' area.

The ROK 2nd Division (minus the 31st Regiment) moved to Kap’yong and deployed the 17th Regiment in the Ch’orwon area, the 32nd Regiment in the Uijongbu area and the attached 35th Regiment of the 5th Division near the Kuhwa-ri area and instructed each regiment to conduct a sweep-out operation. The ROK 5th Division (minus the 35th Regiment) moved to Ch’unch’on and deployed the 27th Regiment in the Homyong-san area east of Ch’ongp’yong, the 36th Regiment in Chiam-ri north of Kap’yong and the 31st Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division, which had been attached to the 5th Division, in Hongch’on. Each regiment was defending the line of communication while engaging in sweeping operations against the enemy stragglers.

Around the 13th, when the headquarters of the 11 Corps arrived in Yangp’yong, the ROK 2nd and 5th Division ended their sweeping operations, and the 31st and the 35th Regiments which had been attached to other units returned to their own units. Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, the Commanding General of the Corps, decided to deploy the 2nd Division to the north of Kap’yong on the left front, the 5th Division to the north of Ch’unch’on in the center and the 8th Division to the east of Ch’unch’on on the right front, of the main line of resistance. However, due to the delayed arrival of the 8th Division, there was some confusion in organizing the Corps’ position.
The 8th Division arrived in Sibyon-ri, on December 5, via Sin'gye and took a respite for four days because of the fatigue accumulated during the continued retreating, and then reconstituted.\(^\text{930}\)

By the air reconnaissance, the 8th Division was notified that the Sibyon-ri-Yonch'on Route, which was on the route of the Division retreat, was not available for either the heavy equipment or the vehicles to pass because the bridges and more than 10 places on the road had been destroyed by UNC air raids. Amidst this situation, Brig. Gen. Lee Song Ga, the Division Commander, appointed Lt. Col. Yu Eu Joon, the 16th Regimental Commander who had a great deal of combat experience, to lead the retreat of the Division main force, while the Division Commander himself retreated in advance through the Sibyon-ri-Kaesong route, with the Division headquarters, the heavy equipment, the wounded, and the supply vehicles.

As the Division headquarters, started to move, Lt. Col. Yu Eu Joon led the main forces toward Yonch'on as the 16th Regiment leading element, followed by the 10th and the 21st Regiments. The road, which the retreating troops marched on, ran along the Imjin River which was flanked by hills on both sides. It was not long after the leading element of the 16th Regiment began to move and advanced to the Sinjang-ri fording point that the enemy commenced a converged fire.

The enemy which enveloped and attacked the division was a group of stragglers of two battalion size belonging to the NKPA II Corps, and the main body seemed to be deployed on the Tokdong area of the opposite bank. Since the enemy resistance was so persistent that the three regimental commanders gave up the idea of fording to Tokdong east of the Imjin River, instead, electing to occupy Hill 520, a commanding hill west of the Imjin River. The Division, in spite of the converging enemy fire, advanced from Maegok-dong through the ridgeline connected with corridors. At around sunset, the division
advanced near Hill 520 and deployed the 16th Regiment on Hill 237 on the right front, the 10th Regiment on Hill 282 on the central front, and the 21st Regiment on Hill 400 on the left front, thus establishing a half circle defense position in anticipation of an enemy attack at night. However, the Division suffered many casualties while opening the enemy encirclement during the day. Later, when the enemy resistance slowed down, the division retreated to Yonch’on and was attached to the Ⅲ Corps in Wonju, then moved south of the Hwach’on Reservoir to be assigned to the front again. However, Brig. Gen. Lee Song Ga, the 8th Division Commander, was disciplined in regard to the Sibyon-ri battle.

General Yu Jai Hung, the Commanding General of the Ⅲ Corps, recalled the situation as follows:

The 8th Division was instructed to retreat through Korangp’o even though it was detouring; however, in spite of knowing that the Yonch’on path was blocked by the enemy, the division attempted to penetrate the enemy. It was wrong. I cannot understand, even at this moment, how the division commander himself, with full combat experience, retreated in advance leading the vehicle echelon, while leaving his main forces behind.90

The Headquarters, ROKA, on December 15, in order to reinforce the depth of position of the Ⅲ Corps and employ as the covering force, moved the ROK 7th Division, which had been reconstituting in Hongch’on, to Ch’unch’on as the Army reserve.

(3) Situation in the Eastern Front

On November 28, the ROK Ⅲ Corps, while the Eighth Army was retreating from the Ch’ongch’on River, which was committed to the eastern front,
reverted the 6th Division, which under its command had carried out delaying action in the Tokch'on battle, to the US IX Corps, and reorganized the main body of the Corps near Kangdong to cover the eastern flank of P'yongyang. Later, the Corps moved to Sin'gye-Koksan and was committed to defend the right flank of the Eighth Army and to block the enemy advancing to the rear area through the vacancies on the zone between the Corps and the US X Corps; however, the Corps was reinstructed by the Headquarters, ROKA to defend the Ich'on-P'yonggang-Kimhwa line and, in accordance with this instruction, on December 5, assembled in Sibyon-ri. On December 8, in compliance with the UN Forces defense plan for the 38th Parallel, the Corps occupied the defense position east of Hwach'on again. By this time, the Corps had to retreat through Yonch'on, since the P'yonggang-Kimhwa-Hwach'on Route had been cut off by the stragglers from the NKPA II and the V Corps.

While the Corps was retreating to the 38th Parallel, on December 8, the 9th Division, which had been carrying out a sweeping operation against the enemy stragglers in Taegu, moved to Wonju and Kangnung and defended the area ranging from Naep'yong-ri northeast of Ch'unch'on to Ingu-ri on the eastern coast. The 28th Regiment was deployed south of the Soyang River, the 29th Regiment in Hyon-ri and the 30th Regiment in the Ingu-ri area, and they were committed to block the enemy advancing to the rear area; however, each regiment defense line was wider than 30km to make effective blocking difficult.

Evaluating the situation, the II Corps hastily retreated to Wonju on December 14. Without having enough time for reorganization, according to the directive by the headquarters of the ROKA, the Corps reverted the 7th Division, which had fought hard in the battle of the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead and Sibyon-ri, to the direct control of the HQ of the ROKA, and the 8th Division to the III Corps. Instead, the II Corps assumed control of the 9th Division,
which had been defending a wide position in the eastern front, and the 3rd Division, which retreated by sea from Hamhung to Kuryongp’o.

However, while the II Corps was still working on establishing the defense position, the I Corps retreated from Hungnam, landed on Mukh’o and took charge of the eastern coast, in compliance with the instruction of the ROKA headquarters which intended to strengthen the defense of the eastern front. As the 9th Division was transferred to the I Corps control again, the II Corps had to defend the area between Pup’yon-ri and Kwandae-ri south of Inje alone with the 3rd Division which had advanced to Hongch’on. Brig. Gen. Ch’oi Suk, the 3rd Division Commander, deployed the 18th Regiment in the Hongch’on-kogae and the Hasunae-ri-Sangsunae-ri area which the 16th Regiment of the 8th Division had been defending, the 22nd Regiment in the Umyang-ri-Suri-bong area which the 28th Regiment of the 9th Division had been defending, and dispositioned the 23rd Regiment as the division reserve in Hongch’on. And, in order to oppose the expected enemy infiltration through the boundary to the rear area, strengthened that area by covering the flank with the combat police and the security battalion. Thus, the ROK 3rd Division took its position on the main line of defense which connected with the 8th Division on the left, which was on the right front of the ROK III Corps, and connected on the right with the 9th Division, which was on the left front of the I Corps.

(4) Commitment of the ROK I Corps to the Eastern Front

On December 18, the I Corps which retreated from Hungnam and landed on Muk’ho, assumed the 9th Division in its Kwandae-ri-Hyon-ri-Sorim-Yangyang defense position.

The main mission of the Corps was to secure the defense position on
the 38th Parallel and to sweep-out the haunting guerrillas near the Taebaek Mountains and at the same time to oppose their infiltration to the south beyond the 38th Parallel. Corps commander Maj. Gen. Kim Paik Il, in order to strengthen the main line of resistance, deployed the 9th Division in Kwandae-ri-Sorim on the left front, the Capital Division in Sorim-Yangyang on the right front, and three Security Battalions (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd) in Yongwol, Ch’ong-song and Hajinbu-ri in the rear area.

Since the 9th Division handed over to the Capital Division the Sorim-ri-Ingu-ri area, which the 30th Regiment had defended, and the Pup’yong-ri-Kwandae-ri area, which the 28th Regiment had defended, to the 3rd Division, it had only the Kwandae-ri-Hyon-ri-Sorim area to defend. However, the area which the 9th Division had to defend was not only too wide (30km) but a high and steep Hill 1073-Pangdae-san-Kuryongduk-bong, which ranged south and north was also between the 9th Division and the Capital Division neighboring on the right. There were also lofty hills and passes such as Kilhyang-san-Tacom-san-Pu-bong-Kadeug-bong, which connected the south to the north, between the 9th Division and the 3rd Division neighboring on the left; accordingly, there had been great difficulties in connecting the front line with the neighboring units both on the right and left. Furthermore, the Division, having been newly organized on October 25, had no combat experience; it had only conducted sweep-out operations against the red guerrillas. The operation area was also rugged and mountainous and had no sufficient road.

Brig. Gen. Oh Duk Joon, the 9th Division Commander, in order to intercept the enemy guerrillas who were advancing north through the Taebaek Mountains and to block the enemy main forces which advanced south through the Wont’ong-Inje axis, deployed the 28th Regiment in Wondae-ri-Hyon-ri, and the 29th Regiment in Hyon-ri-Hachijon. He then committed the 30th Regiment which was in division reserve to assemble at Ch’angch’on to guard the
Deployment on the 38th Parallel (Dec. 26, 1950)

Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch' an, the commander of the Capital Division, concluded that the enemy regular army had not yet been committed to the front; however, the guerrillas around Odac Mountain would establish a strong hold in the rough mountainous area and would attempt to harass the rear area, and then would try to connect with the NKPA which was expected to advance to this area. As the first step in taking a countermeasure against the enemy plan, the division deployed the 1st Regiment, the 1st cavalry Regiment and the 26th Regiment in that order, along between Yangyang and Chumunjin, in order to make the depth of position deep. Later, the division deployed the 1st Regiment in the Hawangdo-ri area south of Namdae-ch' on, the 1st Cavalry Regiment in the Sangkwangjong-ri area and assembled the 26th Regiment in Pangnae-ri south of Chumunjin to prepare for the expected haunting of the en-
emy stragglers around Odae Mountain.

While the Corps was reorganizing the defense position, the enemy 69th Brigade had completed its reorganization north of Yangyang and the stragglers of the NKPA II Corps had been operating near Inje. About 2000 stragglers had been conducting guerrilla warfare around Odae Mountain. The Capital Division commander instructed the 1st Regiment to strengthen the position for expected enemy advance to the south, while instructing the 1st Cavalry and the 26th Regiments to make reconnaissance patrols toward Odae Mountain.

The ROK forces completed the deployment and organization of the position throughout the 38th Parallel line except the position north of Munsan, which was the responsibility of the 25th Division of the US I Corps, and the position north of P'och'on, the responsibility of the 24th Division of the US IX Corps, and prepared for the expected enemy attack.

5. Uncertain Eastern Front

While the friendly forces established the defense line and were concentrating on strengthening their positions around December 23, the CCF, which were planning the New Year’s Offensive prior to its main attack against the friendly forces, employed the NKPA II Corps(4 divisions) and the V Corps (1 division) to infiltrate toward the boundary area between the ROK I Corps and II Corps, in order to block the retreat paths of the ROK divisions, and blocked the tactical key points of Hongch'on and Ch'unch'un.

The NK forces, which advanced to Yanggu–Inje, attacked the ROK forces' position in Hongch'on–Hyon-ri while the ROK forces were still working on the position and this contact developed into a fierce battle.
(1) Preemptive Attack by the NKPA

- **Attempt to Breakthrough Hongch'on**

The subordinate units of the NKPA II Corps, which had advanced to the Hwach'on-Yanggu-Inje line, deployed units of a regimental size each in Ohang-ri in front of the 8th Division, Kwandae-ri in front of the 3rd Division and the Inje area in front of the 9th Division, and in order to attempt a double envelopment against the 3rd Division, some of the NK troops launched an infiltration attacks through the boundaries between the 8th Division on the left, and the 9th Division on the right.\(^9\)

On the 23rd of December, some of the enemy, which had penetrated the 8th Division main line of resistance, advanced to the Hongch'on-Kogae to threaten Chaun-ri. The 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment of the 3rd Division launched a coordinated operation with the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division, which was hastily dispatched to Chaun-ri, and repulsed the enemy around Hill 714 to the Soyang River side. However, the 10th Regiment, which had advanced to the Soyang River on the left of the 3rd Division, met the enemy counterattack and at dawn on the 24th withdrew to Chaun-ri. The 18th Regiment was also attacked by some enemy surprises.

The 3rd Division with the 10th Regiment attached tried to recapture the lost main line of resistance of the 8th Division around the Naep'yong-ri area south of the Soyang River; however, as the enemy launched a preemptive strike, the 18th Regiment fought fiercely against the enemy throughout the day. On the evening of the 24th, since an enemy of regimental size advanced to the Hongch'on-kogae and attempted to block the retreat routes of the forward regiments, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment in reserve advanced to this pass to support the 18th Regiment.

Up to this time, the enemy had been making converged surprise at-
tacks with small units on the 8th and the 9th Divisions, but after midnight on the 25th, the enemy began an infiltration attack on the 3rd Division front. At first, the headquarters of the 22nd Regiment in Oron-ri was attacked by surprise by an enemy unit of two-platoon size, and chaos ensued for a while; however, the Regiment managed to repulse the enemy around dawn. Meantime, the forward battalions, which had been defending Sangsunae-ri-Umyang-ri-Suri-bong, were also attacked by the enemy but repulsed them by concentrating their fire power against them.

While the enemy was carrying out offensive and defensive battles on the main line of resistance, a segment of the enemy infiltrated into Oron-ri through the valley path of Chonja-dong-Samch'on-Mae-bong and attempted to block the withdrawal routes of the forward regiments. The part of the enemy which penetrated the 28th Regimental area neighboring on the right advanced through the boundary and threatened the right flank of the 3rd Division.

As the situation of the forward regiment worsened with time, the commander of the 3rd Division ordered the subordinate regiments to retreat to the Hongch'on-kogae-Changnam-ri-Pu-bong line. In keeping with the order, the 18th Regiment retreated and deployed its battalions on the left of the Inje-Hongch'on Route, and the 22nd Regiment on the right. But on the morning of the 26th, while the 3rd Battalion of the 18th Regiment, which had been deployed in Sangsunae-ri, was retreating through Oron-ri, it was attacked by an enemy envelopment and suffered considerable casualties.

At 18:00 hours, while the division was concentrating on the reorganization of the position, the ROK II Corps issued an attack order, in which the division was committed to regain the lost main line of resistance. The division commander planned to launch an attack at 09:00 on the 27th, with the 18th Regiment keeping abreast of the 8th Regiment of the 7th Division, which had been committed to support the 8th Division on the left, to attack the Chongja-
dong area south of the Soyang River, and while the 22nd Regiment on the right front to secure Hatamulli north of Oronri. The main body of the 23rd Regiment in the division reserve would be committed to guard Hongch'on and the rear area, and the 2nd Battalion was to be deployed on Paegu-san to cover the right flank of the division.\textsuperscript{971}

The division launched an offensive in the morning on the 27th. The 22nd Regiment on the right front had slight enemy contact and advanced to a hill south of Oron-ri without difficulties; however, the 18th Regiment on the left front fought a fierce battle for three hours against the enemy, which persistently resisted around Mae-bong, and advanced near Hill 721 in the north. On the 28th, the division was launching an offensive again, however the 8th Regiment of the 7th Division on the left, which was advancing toward the north of Kari-san, delayed in advancing; therefore, in order to wait for the regiment, the 3rd Division diverted its offensive into a defensive for a while. At this time, the NK forces of two regimental size assembled in the Ch'önch'on area in front of the 18th Regiment; however, the enemy was raided by the US air bombardment which had been making sorties to support the division. The enemy suffered considerable damage and then scattered.

On the 29th, the 18th Regiment, which was attacking abreast the 8th Regiment on the left, repulsed the enemy to the north of the Soyang River and advanced to the Ch'önja-dong area, and the 8th regiment handed over its position near Mulro-ri to the 10th Regiment and retreated to Yangdeogwon-ri. The 3rd Division established its position on the main line of resistance along Mae-bong-Ch'önja-dong-Oron-ri.

Then, there had been no heavy fighting around this area; however, the NKPA 10th Division advanced to Sangsunaeri to reinforce the 2nd Division, and the NKPA stragglers of two-battalion-size had been operating around Ch'angbong-ri in the rear area of the 3rd Division. Thus, near the Soyang River
area south of Yanggu–Inje the enemy and the friendly forces were pitted against one another and the situation was extremely uncertain.²⁸

- **Infiltration to the Hyon-ri Area**

  While the 3rd and the 8th Divisions had been engaged in battles against the NKPA troops around the Soyang River north of Chaun-ri, the 9th Division north of Hyon-ri reorganized the defense position by deploying the 28th Regiment, which handed over part of its defense area to the 3rd and the Capitol Divisions, in Wondae-ri–Hyon-ri, the 29th Regiment in Hyon-ri–Hach’-ijon, and assembled the 30th Regiment in division reserve in Ch’angch’on to guard the rear area.²⁹

  On December 24, as the units were engaged in redeployment, the NKPA II Corps and the guerrilla units, launched a preemptive strike. The North Koreans had been attempting to advance to Odae Mountain south of Inje and exploited the loose security of the friendly forces which had been exhausted by the unit movement. At 21:00 hours, the enemy surprised some troops of the 29th Regiment who had been left behind while retreating from Sorim-ri, and after midnight an enemy of regimental size began a converging attack on the 2nd Battalion of the 28th Regiment which advanced to Hyon-ri.

  The battalion engaged in fierce offensive and defensive with the enemy, but the situation was developing unfavorably, and at 04:00 hours on 25th, the encircling net by the enemy began to shrink and the battalion retreated in scattered groups to Sangam-ri. Around sunset, an unconfirmed number of enemy, who had infiltrated through the rough Sorak Mountains were advancing to the front of Hach’ijon. Maj. Gen. Kim Paik II, the Commander of the ROK I Corps, evaluating the situation of the 9th Division, instructed Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch’an, the Commander of the Capital Division, to establish a defense position without delay in Sorim-ri to support the division.
The 9th Division, on the 26th, tightened security in preparation for an anticipated offensive by the enemy which had advanced to the Hyon-ri-Hach’-ijon area; however, in the afternoon, the enemy unexpectedly began to appear in the rear area on the left. At this time, an enemy unit of three-regiment-size infiltrated through the Maebong-san-Kilhyang-san-Taem-san line, which was the boundary with the ROK 3rd Division; the main force attacked the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd Division; and some advanced to Kadeug-bong southwest of Sangnam-ri to threaten the rear area of the division.\(^\text{[60]}\)

The 9th division, on the 27th, recaptured the tactical point of Hyonri, and in order to recover the main line of resistance, launched an offensive. At this time, enemy forces of two battalion size infiltrated to the rear area of the division and launched an offensive in order to advance to Odae Mountain via Kwangwon-ri and Ch’angch’ón, thus the division had to fight against the enemy both in the front and in the rear.

The situation of the division worsened as time went on. The 1st and the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Regiment attacked Hyon-ri; however, the attack was opposed by the continuously reinforced enemy. The 29th Regiment rather attacked Hill 872, the commanding ground in the area, in order to support the 28th Regiment attack from the flank; however, the 29th Regiment was rather attacked by an enemy envelopment which was reinforced to a division size, and some of them threatened the 30th Regiment which had been deployed in Kwangwon-ri-Ch’angch’ón to the rear of the regiment.

Thus, as the situation of the 9th Division worsened, the commander of the Corps instructed the Capital Division Commander to support the 9th Division. On the 29th, the Commander of the Capital Division instructed the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, which had advanced to Sorim-ri to cover the left flank of the division, to move to Hach’ijon, and the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment to advance to Kalmakok-bong to support
the 29th Regiment.

On the 30th, the 9th Division having failed to overcome their inferior strength in numbers, retreated from the main line of resistance and established defense positions redeploying the 28th Regiment in the Pubong-Ch'îmye area and the 29th Regiment in the Sangam-ri area. At this time, the flank of the 28th Regiment was exposed since the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd Division on the left had withdrew, and it was surprised by an enemy enveloping attack but managed to repulse them. The 30th Regiment, in the Kwangwon-ri-Ch'angch'on area, which had been blocking the enemy advancing to the rear area, had the reinforcement of the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment and fought a fierce battle. A part of the NKPA II Corps, exploiting the confused situation, advanced to Odae Mountain in the rear area.

Later, the battle in the division area slowed down for a while; however, the enemy forces were assembling in the Inje, Hyon-ri area, and the enemy which had infiltrated into the Odae Mountain threatened the rear area; accordingly, the security had been tightened.

(2) Redeployment of the US X Corps

Friendly forces occupied the defense line along the 38th Parallel by December 23, but the defense zone for the ROK forces, which was from Ch'unch'on eastward to the east coast, was too wide in comparison with the units deployed; furthermore, the depth was too thin. Thus, there were vulnerable points that had to be improved. Therefore, the Eighth Army quickly moved the US 2nd Division, which had been reorganizing in Ch'ungju, to the Hongch'on-Wonju area. The Eighth Army also intended to assign the US X Corps to the Ch'unch'on area as soon as it retreated from Hungnam in order to reduce the defense line of the three ROK Corps and to strengthen the defense capabilities
in the eastern front.\(^{40}\)

However, the X Corps, each division of which had retreated from Hungnam on its own, was yet to be refurbished for assignment to the front; furthermore, it would take 8 to 10 days for the Corps to move to the front. By this time, the US 1st Marine Division, which had withdrawn first, had assembled in Pusan, and the Corps headquarters and the US 7th Division had assembled in Kyongju. However, three quarters of the US 3rd Division, which retreated as the last echelon, were still retreating by sea.

The Eighth Army Command taking into account the urgent situation on the eastern front, which had been in charge of the ROK forces, had decided to commit the X Corps to the mideastern area by stages. It assigned the US 7th Division, which had completed its assembly early, to move to the Chech'on area in coordination with the US 2nd Division to intercept the enemy, which was expected to infiltrate into Hoengsong and Wonju through Ch'unch'on and Inje. At the same time, the X Corps was instructed to secure the route connecting Wonju-Chech'on-Tanyang-Andong which was allotted to the Corps as the main supply route. On the 31st, the US 1st Marine Division moved from Masan to Yongch'on-Kyongju-P'ohang to become the Corps reserve, and the US 3rd Division in the south of Kyongju moved to P'yongt'aek-Ansong and prepared to be committed to the area of the I and the IX Corps.\(^{42}\)

Thus, the ROK-UN forces were strengthening the defense along the 38th Parallel on the one hand, and on the other hand preparing for the defense of Seoul by completing redeployment of the units.

6. The Change of Command of the Eighth United States Army

On December 23, 1950, when ROK and UN forces were concentrating their efforts on strengthening the defense position along 38th Parallel, General
Lt. Gen. Walker, the Commanding General of the 8th US Army was awarded by President Syngman Rhee. He was killed in a traffic accident on Dec. 23, 1950.

Walker, the Commanding General of the Eighth US Army left Seoul by jeep to visit the British 27th Brigade to preside at an awards ceremony. When the jeep was passing through Tockchong (16 km north of Uijongbu) there was a tragic traffic accident and the General, to great regret, was killed.185

The general had been assigned to his post on July 13, 1950, when the situation had been at its worst, had led the Naktong River defense operation successfully with the leadership based on the spirit of ‘stand or die’ to establish a foothold for the Inch’ on landing and the advance to the north, and was the military leader and the field commander who had achieved the recapture of P’yongyang and the advance to the Korea-Manchuria border.

General MacArthur appointed Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn of the US I Corps commander as the temporary Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, and asked the Army Chief of Staff for Lt. Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway as the successor to General Walker.186 Upon his sudden assignment as the Commander of the Eighth US Army, General Mathew B. Ridgway made a visit to

the Headquaters UNC in Tokyo to exchange views with General MacArthur on the command and the operation of the UN Forces, and later on the 26th flew to the Eighth US Army Command in Taegu.

General Ridgway was not familiar with the terrain in Korea; he had served on the Department of the Army as the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration, so he had sufficient knowledge of the frontal situation. Furthermore, as he had already been designated as the successor to the Commander of the Eighth Army in contingency situation of the accident of field commander there was no gap in the change of command.

On the following day, Ridgway made a courtesy call to President Syngman Rhee and exchanged views on the wartime leadership. General Chung Il Kwon, the ROKA Chief of Staff, recalled the dialog exchanged between the president and General Ridgway as follows:
President Rhee: I wish to extend my appreciation to your country for sending us the most excellent and bravest general of your Army and, together with my army, extend a heartfelt welcome to you.

Gen. Ridgway: I am here to stay in Korea.

President Rhee: A large unit of the CCF has advanced near the vicinity of Seoul. What is your plan to get them out?

Gen. Ridgway: As soon as the preparation is completed, an offensive will be launched.

President Rhee: It's encouraging to see the hand grenades on both of your chest straps. Do they have any particular meaning?

Gen. Ridgway: I am from the airborne forces and this has always been my battle dress.

President Rhee: It would be good for the ROK Commanders to follow the way Gen. Ridgway wears hand grenades on his chest.

(President Rhee laughingly spoke to Gen. Chung, the Chief of Staff.)

When he finished his courtesy call on President Rhee, he hurried to the main line of resistance for an inspection of the ROK-UN forces, starting from the estuary of the Imjin River to Yangyang on the east coast. At the end of his inspection, in order to boost the morale and the fighting spirit of the soldiers, he instructed the commanders of divisions to be up with their forward battalions and the commanders of Corps up with the regiment which was engaged in the most intense fighting of all. The Headquarters, Eighth Army in Taegu was to establish a Tactical Command Post in the area within the easiest reach of the middle of the front line, the division and the Corps headquarters. He also had the reconnaissance activities strengthened to obtain accurate intelligence and instructed his men to become familiar with the operational terrain and the enemy sizes.
IV. Deployment of the Chinese Communist Forces along the 38th Parallel

1. Rebuild-Up of the North Korean People’s Army

In the middle of October 1950 Kim Il Sung, the Supreme Commander of the NKPA, which was on the verge of ruin due to the landing at Inch’on and the northward advance by the ROK-UN forces, moved part of his forces, those which had withdrawn from the Naktong River battle line and the forces in the rear, to the Korea-Manchuria border while maintaining delaying actions with some of his forces.

At this time, remainder of the NKPA units retreated via Anju to Sinuiju and Kanggye while avoiding UN ground forces speedy pursuit and the UN air raids which were aimed at interdicting their rear area; however, the units had suffered tremendous loss of personnel and materials. Kim Il Sung, knowing that the forces needed reorganization before assignment to the front, instructed Gen. Ch’oe Yong Kun, the deputy commander, and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, the Chief of Staff, to have the units reorganized without delay near Kanggye.

In compliance with this instruction, during October and November 1950, North Korea organized 6 new Corps and 15 divisions and by November 14, expanded to a total of 8 Corps, 25 infantry divisions, 3 infantry brigades, a tank division, a mechanized division, a landing brigade, 2 independent infantry regiments, an independent tank regiment and an officers candidate school. At this time, North Korea was maintaining a total number of forces of around 250,000~270,000. Of the newly organized forces, six divisions of the three
Corps (the 3rd, 4th and 5th) were reorganized and trained in North Korea and were to be committed to the front. The 9 divisions of the VI, VII, and VIII Corps, Army reserve, were to be organized in the Kando-Killim area with the civilians drafted from among the Koreans who lived mainly in Manchuria. There were negotiations with China to organize a military candidate school, a political commissar school, a tank training regiment and an aviation training regiment in Manchuria.

The North Korean I, II, III and V Corps, which had been under reorganization in North Korea, concentrated on refurbishing units in the Kusong, Kanggye, Yongbyon and Maengsan area north of the Ch'ongch'on River, and the IV Corps was deployed on the eastern coast. The details of the organization and the strength are as follows:

**NKPA Units and Deployment**

- North Korean area
  - the I Corps (the 8th, 46th, 47th infantry divisions, 17th mechanized infantry division):
    40,000 troops
  - the II Corps (the 1st, 3rd, 15th infantry divisions, the 26th mechanized infantry brigade, the 105th tank division): 46,000 troops
  - the IV Corps (the 41st infantry division, landing brigade, independent infantry regiment, tank regiment): 22,000 troops
  - the V Corps (the 6th, 12th, 38th, 24th infantry divisions): 30,000 troops
  - Others (the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th infantry divisions do not belong to the corps organization and are to be operated independently): 20,000 troops

- Stragglers in the South Korean area
  - the II Corps (the 31st infantry division, the 23rd, 27th infantry brigades, independent tank regiment)
Manchuria area

the Ⅱ Corps (the 18th, 68th, 36th infantry divisions): 30,000 troops
the Ⅲ Corps (the 13th, 32nd, 37th infantry divisions): 30,000 troops
the ⅢⅢ Corps (the 42nd, 45th, 76th infantry divisions): 30,000 troops
Various Military Training Courses: 15,000 troops
Organized as follows: division: 10,000; brigade: 6,000; regiment: 3,000

North Korea requested Joseph Stalin to extend the period of attachment of the military advisory group to the NKPA and strongly requested that the naval and air strength be reinforced.

Kim Il Sung, in order to strengthen the naval power, in early October established a navy and landing courses, which could train 800 navy officers in the Soviet Union and asked the Soviet Union that NKPA ships be allowed to use the Vladivostok Port.

Around the middle of November, North Korea requested the Soviet Union to train 119 North Korean pilots, who had been under training in the USSR, so as to organize two fighter bomber regiments and a bomber regiment. In addition to this, it asked the Soviet Union to train 120 ground men (maintenance crew: 90, controller: 30) who would support the aviation unit, and to single out 200 among the North Korean students who had been studying in the Soviet Union and train them to become pilots. Besides this, Kim Il Sung requested 1,000 tank crew, 2,000 pilots, 500 signalmen and 500 engineer officers to be trained among the Korean residents in the Soviet Union.  

By early December, North Korea was able to employ three Corps (the Ⅰ, Ⅱ, Ⅲ Corps), comprised of 14 divisions with 75,000 men, to the operation.

2. The North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces
   Combined Operation

Kim Il Sung, the Supreme Commander of the NKPA, who had been
driven out of P’yongyang, set Kanggye as the temporary capitol, and as the CCF intervened in the War, established a Combined Headquarters comprised of the officers of both Armies after conferring with Peng Teh Huai, the Commanding General of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

According to establishment of the Combined Headquarters, it was the Commander of the Combined HQ who would decide the basic operational decision for the two Armies. Since the Chinese were assigned to the Supreme Commander, Peng Teh Huai, the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers was authorized to control even the operation of the NKPA. However, it was announced as if Kim Il Sung himself was authorized to control the operation. This was to justify the intervention in the Korean War by the Chinese Forces as if the forces were comprised of volunteers to support North Korea. ¹⁰

The fact that the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers took command of the NKPA was supported by the Chinese war history. On the establishment of the Combined Headquaters between North Korea and China, the following was written in the Chinese war history:

In order to promote the efficiency of the integration and coordination of the operation between NKPA and CPV, in early October the combined HQ was established by negotiation of the two countries. It takes command and control of the scope of operations and charge of all military activities. Peng Teh Huai, the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers was appointed as the first Commander of the Combined HQ and the Political Commissar as well, and a deputy commander and another political commissar will be nominated by the NKPA. Information of the Combined HQ shall never be made public. ¹¹

Thereafter, the function of the Combined HQ was applied to the Chinese forces operation plan and the NKPA Corps followed the operation plan designed by the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

As the ROK-UN forces retreated from all front lines, Mao Tse Tung of
Communist China made a report to Joseph Stalin on the establishment of the Combined HQ, the result of the offensive, and the prospect of the war situation, and Stalin responded with a congratulatory message on the victory of the war, thus the fighting spirit had further been encouraged. This was another piece of evidence of Joseph Stalin's leading role in the War.

3. The Chinese Communist Forces Advance to the 38th Parallel

After the Eighth Army retreated from Kunu-ri to the north of P'yongyang in early December because of the CCF's second offensive (November Offensive), the Chinese 13th Army Group secured the Ch'ongch'on River bridgehead; however, it suffered considerable casualties and consumed ammunition and food; consequently, it was impossible for the CCF to continue pursuing the Eighth Army forces.

Peng Teh Huai, the Commander of the CPV, ordered the pursuit of the ROK-UN forces with limited units while the main force was respiting for 4~5
days along the Anju-Kaecho'n-Sinch'ang-ri-Pukchang-ri line. During this period, the CCF had the opportunity to replenish ammunition and food.

The CCF, on the 4th of December, 1950 realizing that the Eighth Army were withdrawing from P'yongyang, reopened their offensive. The CCF, anticipating that the UN forces would hold out for P'yongyang, had planned to make a frontal attack with secondary efforts, one Chinese army and one~two NKPA divisions and the primary attack toward the Songch'on, Kangdong, Koksan and Sin'gye area on the eastern rear with five Chinese armies. If the Eighth Army retreated out of concern over the possible blocking of the retreat routes, then the CCF would attack the vulnerable flanks of the retreating forces and annihilate the main body of the UNC.

However, as the plan was failed because of the UN forces' spontaneous early withdrawal from P'yongyang, Peng Teh Huai, on the purpose of destroying the main force of the Eighth Army south of P'yongyang, assembled his units in the western front, and on the 17th, attempted a second attack on the Chunghwa, Sangwon and Suan area. Neither operation of the CCF was successful because of the early retreat of the ROK-UN forces to the 38th Parallel.

Peng Teh Huai had originally intended to break through the 38th Parallel and recapture Seoul, provided he could destroy the main body of the United Nations forces south of P'yongyang; however, since both the ROKA and the UNC retreated to the 38th Parallel without losing their strength, he had to revise the offensive plan. The Communist forces, knowing that the line of communication would be extended if their forces continued persuit the friendly forces to Taedong and Taegu, halted their persuit north of the 38th Parallel.

The enemy, on the 12th, designed and operational plan to destroy the ROK and UN Forces on the 38th Parallel by launching a new offensive in the following year, and deployed the NKPA I Corps in Kaesung, the 50th Army
of the CCF XIII Army Group in Kumch'un, the 39th Army in Kuhwa-ri, the
40th Army in Saknyong, the 38th Army in Yonch'on, the 42nd Army in Cho'-
rwon, the 66th Army in Hwach'on, and had the NKPA II and V Corps
advance to Yanggu-Inje to prepare for the offensive. While the Eighth Army
was withdrawing from P'yongyang to the 38th Parallel, the units, comprised of
the NKPA stragglers who had been engaged in guerrilla warfare in the Koksan-
Ich'on area, were assigned to the NKPA II Corps and moved to the north of
Yonch'on, Ch'unch'on and Hwach'on. The number of NK troops assembled in
the mid eastern front was estimated as 65,000.

It was confirmed by the UN Air Force that the Chinese forces, who
were advancing to the western front, were moving southward along the Ch'-
onch'on River-P'yongyang axis; however, after the middle of December, as
the enemy had themselves covered up or camouflaged and discontinued day-
time maneuvering to get away from the UNC air raids, the enemy contact was
cut off for a while. In spite of the quietness, however, in the later part of the
month, Chinese troops and supplies, which were being transported from
P'yongyang to the southeast, were observed by the air reconnaissance and the
intelligence service several times. This was a clear indication of an imminent
new offensive by the CCF.
V. Choosing Freedom and the Struggle for It

1. North Koreans Desert Homeland in Mass for South

As the ROK-UN forces, which had advanced to the Korea-Manchuria border, began to retreat because of the Chinese offensive, many North Koreans refusing to live under the Communist dictatorship decided to move to the south seeking freedom, and the roads to the south were covered with the procession of refugees. Some of the refugees began to assemble at the harbor area which had been under military control.

The military authority had been concentrating on transporting troops and war materiel, and had not expected the growing number of refugees who would hinder the military operation. As the number of refugees grew, the army took positive measures to transport the civilians in safety. The refugees escaped by land and sea from the hell of communism, while struggling with the severe cold weather, diseases and starvation.

(1) Evacuation in the P’yongan-do Province

The transportation of refugees was one of the most significant problems for the Eighth Army prior to the P’yongyang retreat. The refugees from the P’yongan-do area were one step ahead of the CCF in marching toward P’yongyang, and NKPA agents disguised themselves as refugees and infiltrated into the refugees procession and agitated them with false stories which caused confusion in the procession. In spite of such tactics by the Communist army, a huge number of refugees gathered in P’yongyang.\(^{114}\)
On December 4, as the Eighth Army abandoned P'yongyang and began to retreat, a huge crowd of refugees had gathered around the Taedong River Railway bridge. At that time, the Taedong River Railway bridge had not been repaired after the friendly air raids, and the refugees who gathered in front of the destroyed bridge were merely stomping their feet on the ground out of frustration at not being able to cross. Some were climbing up and down destroyed steel bridge to cross at the risk of their life. In this venture many of the refugees were drowned in the river by careless missteps. In spite of such heartbreaking occurrences, the endless procession of the refugees to the south continued.

Some of the ROK soldiers, who had been watching the confusion, helped them to cross the river by providing temporary footholds on the destroyed parts of the bridge with wooden boards, so that the refugees could safely cross over. The number of refugees who crossed over the Railway bridge from the 4th through noon on the 5th of December exceeded 50,000.\[13\]

In addition to this crossing, the refugees crossing on timber rafts covered the Taedong River in midwinter. The Eighth Army supported the refugees in their river-crossing, providing all possible means such as barges and boats, before it completely destroyed the bridge and the river-crossing materials.
Later on many civilians forded on foot in shallow areas.

Most of the refugees who succeeded in the painstaking river-crossing, except for those who had the luck to be taken on ROKA vehicles, had to march on foot several hundred Kilo-meters to the south. While moving from P’yongyang to the south of the 38th Parallel, the refugees encountered brutal acts and surprise attacks by NKPA stragglers several times, and a considerable number of refugees died of starvation or disease halfway along their journey. The only reason the refugees were able to overcome such hardships without giving up their march toward the south was nothing but their longing for freedom.

In addition, early December, refugees from the P’yongando province rushed into Chinnamp’o on the western coast. The ROK and US Navy in charge of the withdrawal operation in the area, until the 4th which was the closing date of the operation, evacuated 50,000 refugees, 30,000 by sea and 20,000 by land.

The refugees evacuation had a tremendous impact on the military operation. The refugee groups on the roads hindered the unit movement and the transportation of supplies, and these confusion made the NKPA and the Chinese forces easy to disguise themselves as the refugees, so that to infiltrate the friendly fronts. Because of this risk, from December. 28, the military authority prohibited refugees from approaching the front lines.

(2) Refugees Evacuation of Hwanghae-do Province

The residents in the Hwanghae-do area, around June 25, formed many anticommunist organizations and staged systematic actions and protest against the NKPA forces. As a result, more refugees from Hwanghae-do than any other province evacuated to the south. As the refugees from P’yongan-do and
P’yongyang joined together, the road along Sariwon-Kumch’on-Kaesong was especially jammed with refugees.

In the middle of December, following the withdrawal of the UN forces, the Communist forces advanced south to Kaesong, and the NKPA garrison unit swiftly moved into Hwanghae-do Province, thus the evacuation route by land for the refugees was blocked. In order to escape by sea, refugees assembled in western coastal towns such as Changyon, Songhwa and Unnyul, and sailed out on small boats. By this time, patriotic youth in Hwanghae-do had organized hometown youth garrison in many villages such as Chaeryong, Sinch’-on, Anak, Changyon, Songhwa and Unnyul. The garrison not only blocked the approach of the NK 26th Coast Guard Brigade but also supported the assembling refugees.

Under these circumstances, upon receiving the request to help the youth with their anticomunist activities and the transportation of the refugees, the navy instructed the pertinent units to support the youth activities and refugees evacuation to nearby islands.

The full-scale support for the refugees transport by the navy ships started on the 7th of December in Toktongp’o, Changyon-gun, and from that date the transport operation of the refugees continued without interruption until the end of January 1951. Since this operation was carried out during the coldest season of the year, there were grave problems in berthing the ships alongside the quay due to the severe cold weather with temperatures dropping as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius, the heavy seas and the freezing seashore. Accordingly, small wooden ships were called out to carry refugees from the pier to the navy ships; however, due to the lack of small ships, they put ropes between the pier and the ships, and the refugees moved to the ships while holding onto the ropes.

The refugees who overcame all sorts of hardships and privations and
reached the west coast totalled about 62,000, as of the end of January 1951. Most of them were dispersed and accommodated in Tokchok-do, Paengnyong-do, Yongp'yong-do, Taech'ong-do and Mu-do.

(3) Evacuation in the Hamkyong-do Province

In early December, as the ROK-UN forces which had advanced near the Tumen River began to retreat, many residents in Hamkyong-do joined in the procession of refugees. For the refugees, the long distance to South Korea and the cold weather, as cold as 30 degrees below zero, seemed to make their situation hopeless. Unless the refugees could get appropriate transportation, it was clear that the enemy advance would overtake them before they could get to the 38th Parallel.

Under the circumstances, around December 10, the harbors such as Songjin, Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan were crowded and confused with refugees. The Commander of the US X Corps had originally planned to evacuate 25,000 family members of the military people, police men and government officials, however seeing the overflowing refugees, he increased the number to 50,000. Even this revision did not meet the demand, and he decided to transport as many refugees as possible, calling out all available navy ships and wooden ships. As the evacuation of refugees by sea commenced, the Hungnam harbor and the central area of the city were congested with refugees who were desperate to get on board.

On December 15, when the ROK Marines were taking off the Yongp'o airfield in a USAF plane, sad sights were seen when some of the refugees rushed onto the airfield and begged that at least their children to be taken onto the plane. On December 24, the last date of the operation, Hungnam harbor was overflowing with the refugees who had rushed there to get on a ship.
When the last transport was sailing out, the refugees who had been left behind were kicking and screaming toward the leaving ship, and some of them threw themselves into the sea.

The ships then, in order to pick up as many refugees as possible took on extreme overloads. The 2,700 ton ship 'Onyang' loaded 17,000 refugees who looked like bean sprouts sticking out in every possible direction.

The number of refugees transported by the army during this period was recorded as 91,000~98,000, but the real number would rise to 100,000 at least because of some uncounted infants and possible miscalculations due to the chaotic situation at the time. Unfortunately a similar number of refugees were left behind due to lack of ships.

Thus, when the ROK-UN Forces which had advanced north began retreating, many civilians throughout North Korea moved to the south out of their longing for freedom. The places where the refugees came from ranged from the mountainous village of Hyesanjin in Hamkyongpuk-do to Yonpaek
south of Hwanghae Province. This was the peak period when the highest number of refugees were counted, and the total number of refugees including those who escaped by taking advantage of the military operation were reported at more than 1,000,000.\textsuperscript{10}

Later, a song entitled 'Kumsun, Be Strong Minded', which sang of the sorrow of parting, consoled the people who had fled their homes and became popular throughout the country during a generation, making us to look back on those days.

2. The Anti-Communist Guerrilla Warfare

Almost at the same time the Korea became independent, the country was divided into two and a communist government was installed in the northern area. In various provinces in the north, people with democratic and anti-communist ideas, especially the youth, initiated the organization of groups, large and small, and set themselves up against the communist government. However, before the Korean War, the North Korean Red Army launched a massive liquidation campaign against those groups; consequently, most of the groups were disintegrated and some of them had gone underground to maintain their tenuous existence.

In October 1950, as the ROK Forces began to advance north, they re-formed the groups and devoted themselves to keeping the security of the communities while, on the other hand, carrying out sweeping operations against the communist stragglers. They also contributed to the ROK Forces by supplying information collected from various sources. Meanwhile, when the CCF intervened in the Korean War, the situation became reversed and the ROK-UN Forces began to retreat and they were pushed to the wall.

Most of the armed groups, out of concern on communist retaliation,
followed the ROK Forces to the south, but some of them in the coastal areas, believing that the ROK-UN forces would soon launch a counteroffensive, converted themselves to armed guerrillas to continue opposition against the communists. They operated mostly in the Hwanghae-do area. The groups such as the Songhwa Security Unit, the Yonp’ung, the Paekho and the Suwol, had been operating around Kuwol-san. And the Sinch’on Armed Security Unit, the Sinhwa, the Songrim and Ongjin Student Unit had been operating in the cities such as Unnyul, Changyon and Ongjin on the western coast. On the eastern coast, since there were few islands on which to build up strong holds, only the Kowon youth guerrillas were operating around Wonsan.

The guerrillas had committed themselves to defend their hometowns to the last; however, they were very much in need of firearms, ammunition and food. To make things worse, the advance of the enemy’s main forces to the south made the desperate civilian opposition hopeless. However, even though the civilians were inferior in strength and firepower, as they had a fighting spirit and the advantage of familiarity with the terrain, they were able to impede the enemy advance and covered the assembling of refugees in the coastal area. During this process, the civilian guerrillas who were pursued by the enemy repeated their tactics of fighting, evasion and escape, day and night. At times, they had to clamber up cliffs or traverse the coastal sea by breaking through the frozen ice.

In spite of such plucky resistance, they were pushed away by the NKPA sweeping operation, and retreated, at the end of January 1951, to the islands nearest to their hometowns such as Paengnyong-do and Ch’o-do to wait for the day when the ROK and UN forces launch a counter-offensive. Those self-generated guerrillas, in latter days, became the cadre members of the guerrilla unit which was organized by ROK-UNC.
Notes


2) Ibid., p. 43.

3) Ibid., p. 44.

4) Ibid., p. 44.


6) op. cit., pp. 54-55.

7) The Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, USSR, *Activities of the 64th Fighter Wing*, sep. 1996, collected by the Korea Institute of Military History; the War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, tr., *The History of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Korean War*, vol. 1, 1990, p. 222, from James F. Schnabel & Robert J. Watson, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Joint Chiefs Staff 1978). In this publication the nationality of the pilots of MIG-15 was not mentioned.

8) G. Lobov, *in the North Korean Sky (Aviation and Space Navigation.)*


11) Ibid., p. 35.

12) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, tr., op. cit., p. 226.
13) Ibid., p. 234.
15) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, tr., op. cit., p. 260.
17) The ROK Army HQ tr., op. cit., p. 49.
18) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, The Battle at the Ch’on’gh’ŏn River, p. 197.
19) Ibid., p. 209.
20) The date of commitment of the 2nd Regiment to Tokch’ŏn was recorded as November 24 in Ch’ongsong’s War History; however, it was recorded as the 25th in Gen. Yu Jai Hung’s memoirs, the Commander of the Corps at the time.
21) The ROK Army HQ tr., op. cit., p. 62.
22) This operation was called the ‘Christmas Offensive’ as UNC anticipated the operation would end within a month and the UN soldiers, especially the US soldiers, expected to return home by Christmas.
26) The ROK Army HQ tr., Policy and Direction, p. 357.
28) Ibid., p. 68.
29) Ibid., p. 108.
30) Ibid., p. 103.
32) Kunu-ri was renamed Kaech’on after the Korean War.
33) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 56.
34) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND. *The History of the Korean War*, vol. 11, 1980, p. 301.

35) Kaech' on was renamed Kuup-ri after the Korean War.


37) Ibid., p. 99.


40) Ibid., p. 102.

41) Ibid., p. 103.


44) Ibid., p. 70.

45) Ibid., p. 107.

46) Ibid., p. 111.

47) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 60.


49) The ROK Army HQ tr., *Ebb and Flow*, p. 112.


53) Ibid., p. 114.

54) Ibid., p. 115.

55) Ibid., p. 118.

56) Ibid., p. 120.

57) Ibid., p. 123.

59) Task Force Faith consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment and the 57th Artillery Battalion (minus one company) of the US 7th Division and took its name from the 1st Battalion Commander of the 32nd Regiment.


63) Ibid., pp. 62–63.


67) Ibid., p. 222.

68) Ibid., p. 241.

69) Ibid., p. 252.

70) The ROK Army HQ tr., op. cit., p. 147.


76) The ROK Army HQ tr., *Ebb and Flow*, p. 147.

77) The ROK Army HQ tr., *Policy and Direction*, p. 358.
79) The ROK Army HQ tr., Ebb and Flow, p. 149.
81) The ROK Army HQ tr., Ebb and Flow, p. 150.
82) Ibid., pp. 151~153.
83) Ibid., pp. 150~151.
84) The ROK Army HQ tr., Disaster in Korea, 1995, p. 385.
85) Paik Sun Yup, The ROK Army and Me as a Soldier, (Seoul, Taeryuk Research Institute, 1989) p. 144.
86) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, The History of the Korean War, vol. 5, p. 146.
88) The ROK Army HQ tr., Disaster in Korea, p. 419.
89) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 68.
92) The accounts of Second Lieutenant Lee Tong Yong, deposited by the Korea Institute of Military History.
95) The ROK 18th Regiment originally belonged to the Capital Division; however, during the evacuation from Hamhung, the regiment had been attached to the ROK 3rd Division. At the same time the 26th Regiment of the 3rd Division attached to the Capital Division.
97) Ibid., p. 364.
98) Ibid., p. 368.
99) Ibid., p. 345.
100) Ibid., p. 347.
102) Ibid., p. 191.
103) Ibid., p. 181.
104) Ibid., p. 182.
107) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p 44.
110) The ROK Army HQ tr., *Ebb and Flow*, p. 43.
112) Ibid., pp. 68~69.
114) The ROK Army HQ tr., *Disaster in Korea*, p. 383.
Chapter Four  The January-Fourth Retreat

I. Wartime Leadership of Both Sides

1. The Communist Forces Strategy for Exploitation of the Victorious Campaign

The Chinese Communist Forces recaptured P’yongyang by the October, and November Offensive Operations, and subsequently in December restored most of the ground north of the 38th Parallel lost by the North Korean People’s Army. The Chinese communist leaders, having seized the initiative of operations through the first and second offensives made a decision to launch the Third Offensive (New Year’s Offensive) to exploit the victorious campaign. In the process of making the decision for the Third Offensive, however, discord arose between the Chinese Communist Leadership and the Chinese People’s Volunteers commander over the favorable offensive time. Peng Teh Huai, the commander of the Chinese Communist Forces sent a report of the front situation to the Chinese Communist Military Committee as follows.1)

On the eastern front the IX Army Group had suffered heavy damage at the Battle of the Changjin Reservoir and needed reorganization and rest in the Hamhung area for two months. The XII Army Group on the western front had been exhausted from the continuous two month battles without any let up. Along with the lengthening of the line of communications to the South, the winter sup-
plies such as cotton clothes, blankets, and bed clothes were destroyed en route south by the UN forces air bombardment. The oil and food supplies could not reach the forces in time for the operation because of the lack of transportation, and also the number of the wounded and the worn-out soldiers were increasing rapidly.

In the last October and November operations, our forces launched a successful surprise attack against the assaulting ROK and UN forces, taking advantage of their vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the next operation will be a battle of position against the enemy (the ROK and the UN forces) which had been deployed along the 38th Parallel. We are not used to and well trained for the position of warfare.

On the other hand, the enemy has shifted to a defensive operation reducing the front line and has deployed concentrated troops to strengthen the positions in depth, which resulted in an efficient coordinated operation of all the branches. The morale of the troops is lower than before but still we maintain 260,000 troops.

In conclusion, we are planning to launch the Third Offensive around February–March, 1951, after fully reorganizing and resting during the winter in keeping with the deployment of the III Army Group to the battlefield. Then we will destroy the enemy main forces.

Mao Tse Tung considered this report on the strategy of the Chinese Communist Forces field commander reasonable, but, on November 19 he ordered the reopening of an attack as follows.\footnote{The enemy (the UN forces) were plotting to lure the friendly forces (the Chinese Communist Forces) into a cease-fire and by earning the recovery time would reopen an offensive against us. On the other hand, among the UN member countries who had joined the war, there was confusion due to different understandings about the Korean War. In this situation, if we destroyed the ROK forces, we could isolate the US and the UN forces. And then if we could annihilate a few US divisions.}
we would settle the Korean Peninsula problem easily. The operational initiative is in our hand now, and we should cross the 38th Parallel to engage the enemy, taking advantage of its vulnerability. Then we will get ready for the Spring Offensive after reorganizing and reequipping for one or two months.

Following this order the Chinese communist Volunteers commander decided to change the previous strategy for "the reorganization and rest during the winter time" to the commencement of the Third Offensive. The objective of the Third Offensive was to exploit the victories, which were attained by the Firsts and Second Offensive Operations, and to capture Seoul in order to establish favorable political and military positions. They were to advance as far as the 37th Parallel and prepare for the Spring Offensive with unit maintenance and reinforcement of the new units.

Kim Il Sung also held a Communist Party Central Committee Meeting in late December and delivered the operational instructions for the Third Offensive; in brief, before the enemy (the ROK and the UN forces) could strengthen the 38th Parallel defense line, the North Korean People's Army should penetrate into the vulnerable enemy boundary of the mountainous area in the east front and establish a strong Second Front in the deep rear area, while the Chinese Communist Forces in the central western front would break through the enemy main line of resistance, by linking up together, and envelope the enemy forces and destroy them.31


When the ROK and the UN forces began to withdraw from P'yongyang, a serious evacuation problem from the Korean Peninsula emerged. The Far East Command, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US govern-
ment, the UN participants, and the UN studied the problem. The ROK government, the Korean people, and the ROK Armed Forces worried about the probable decision to evacuate the UN forces from Korea. Fortunately, however, as the UNC strategy tended toward seeking a cease-fire near the 38th Parallel as it was before the war, they were greatly relieved. According to the policy, the Eighth Army changed its operational concept to a strategy for successive defense. The newly appointed Eighth Army Commander General Ridgway, differed from General Walker who had considered a retreat to the Pusan area, visited President Rhee and promised him that the Eighth Army would not leave Korea. He said that UNC would carry out an offensive soon after the rapid reorganization of the units.⁶

At that time, the operational concept of the Eighth Army was that they would launch successive delaying operations, taking advantage of the favorable terrain for defense from the 38th Parallel down to Pusan and would inflict heavy losses on the enemy and eventually would turn from a defensive to an offensive operation. Ridgway established six defensive phase lines as follows.⁷

The UN forces’ Successive Defense Line

The 1st Phase Line: the main line of resistance stretched from the mouth of the Imjin River to Yangyang along the 38th Parallel.
The 2nd Phase Line: the defense line along Suwon–Yangp’yong–Hongch’–on–Chumunjin, would allow the forces to gain time to establish the Pyongt’ack–Samch’ok Defense Line.
The 3rd Phase Line: the defense line along Pyongt’aek–Ansong–Wonju–Samch’ok, the most favorable and the narrowest front line in Korea.
The 4th Phase Line: the Kum River defense line along the southern bank of the Kum River and Sobaek Mountain.
The 5th Phase Line: the Sobaek Mountains defense line. In the rugged
mountain area, this line would be useful for buying time for preparation of the Naktong River defense line.

The 6th Phase Line: the Naktong River defense line on which the UN forces could resist the enemy. It was planned that if this line collapsed, the UN forces were to evacuate to Japan and the ROK forces to an offshore island.

After General Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army, he set up the operational concept of the successive defense operation. A Joint ROK–UN Command Operational Conference was held to discuss the concept. In the conference, General Ridgway, indicating the six defense lines on the situation map drawn in the operational zone 300Km deep stretching from the 38th Parallel down to the Naktong River, stressed that “these six phase lines were not step by step blocking positions set up for the ROK and the UN forces to withdraw to the Naktong River.” He underlined that “the friendly forces should bleed the CCF along each phase line, and when they would seize a good chance, should turn to conduct a counter offensive to destroy the enemy.” He also underlined that “even though we confront the worst situation, the ROK and the UN forces will never withdraw to below the 37th Parallel.”

Being assigned to the commander (on December 26, 1950), General Ridgway inspected the west front line and had an operational meeting with the US I and IX Corps commanders the next day. At the meeting the established an additional intermediate phase line north of Seoul as a bridgehead to cover and prevent the friendly forces from withdrawal in disarray south of Seoul.

The bridgehead line was established stretching from the Han River bank near Haengju to southeast of Uijongbu then to the east of Seoul, a semicircle that would allow pontoon bridges across the Han River to be immune against the enemy artillery fire. He stressed that while both of the corps would withdraw to this line, they should employ a counter offensive against enemy
attacks on the way. He also issued instructions that the friendly forces should block the enemy forces' advance until all of the main friendly forces reached the bridgehead line by deploying strong troops organized by infantry and armored units on the hills commanding the enemy route.

On the other hand, in late December the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that "if the Chinese Communist Forces would launch an all out offensive against the friendly forces they would have enough strength to expel the UN forces from Korea." Accordingly General Ridgway, to cope with the development of the contingent situation, set up three additional defense lines, reviving the Nak-tong River defense plan having been set up the previous September. The three additional defense lines newly established were: the line along Masan and the Eastern Sea coast, the line along Chinhae and the Eastern Sea coast, and the line along the mouth of the Nak-tong River and the Eastern Sea coast. They were established in between the Nak-tong River defense line and the Pusan area. Each defense line enclosed Masan, Chinhae, and Pusan, shaping a semicircle which stretched from the Southern Sea coast to the Eastern Sea coast. General Ridgway ordered Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin, the commander of the 2nd Logistic Command, to mobilize Korean laborers and all the materials available to establish strong fortified positions along the line."

Still there were problems for the 'successive defense' strategy of the Eighth US Army. After they retreated from P'yon-yang, the morale of the troops had collapsed and they had lost the will to fight. Another serious problem was that the commanders' leadership. The issue of particular concern was how to block the NK People's Army penetrating through the eastern front to cut off the major lines of communications and to conduct harassment operation in the rear area.
II. Seoul Falls Again to the Communists

1. The Chinese Communist Forces New Year's Offensive

While the ROK and the UN Forces cut off the engagement with the enemy and concentrated their efforts to establish the main line of resistance (MLR) in the vicinity of 38th Parallel, the enemy forces were accelerating the preparation of an offensive according to the decision of the Third Offensive. At the time, the Eighth Army intelligence services estimated the available enemy strength roughly at only 174,000 and were not aware of either their locations or their intentions. Accordingly the Eighth Army commander issued an order to the forward divisions to send a reconnaissance team deep into enemy positions to ascertain the enemy strength and location.

After four day's inspection on the front line, the Eighth Army commander came back to Seoul, with an estimation that the enemy offensive would be launched at the beginning of the new year when the friendly forces security posture would most probably be relaxed. Around this time the Eighth Army chief of intelligence staff also reported that the enemy offensive would begin very soon. According to his report, on the west front line, the NKPA I Corps and the CCF 50th Army were deployed on the Kaesong-Munsan axis; in the upper Imjin River region, the CCF 39th Army; on the Yonch'on-Uijongbu axis, the CCF 38th and 40th Armies; around Ch'orwon and Hwach'on on the central front line the CCF 66th and 42nd Armies were deployed. It was estimated that the NKPA V and II Corps were deployed along the mid-east front where the ROK forces were in defense stretching from east of Hwach'on to the Eastern Sea coast, and that the NKPA III Corps and the CCF IX Army Group
located near Hamhung would also possibly be committed to the mid-east front line.\textsuperscript{56}

At that point, the CCF, which had twice suffered huge losses from the offensive operations, were reinforced in their forward units by 84,000 experienced troops selected from units in mainland China. The CCF had also repaired a part of the Kyongui railroad (between Chongju and Maengjung-ri) and the Manp'o railroad (between Huich'on and Kaech'on) to improve their transportation of supplies.

When the offensive operation was ready, the Chinese Communist Volunteers Commander Peng Teh Huai set up an offensive operation plan: penetrate the 38th Parallel where the ROK and the UN forces were in defense, by a combined operation of the three NKPA and the six CCF Armies, and eventually destroy a part of the ROK 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Divisions. He delivered a detailed operational plan that if the operational situation would develop favorably, CCF should launch a continuous assault to rapidly capture Seoul, Ch'unch'on, Hongch'on, Yangyang, and the Kangnung areas; and then rest and reorganize to prepare for the future Spring Offensive.

\textit{The Outline of the CCF New Year’s Offensive}\textsuperscript{56}

(1) The five armies (the CCF 38th, 39th, 40th Armies and the NKPA I Corps) on the right front would conduct their offensive toward Seoul as a main effort. The two armies (the CCF 42nd and 66th Armies) on the left front would attack Kap'yong and Ch'unch'on. The two NKPA Corps (the II and V Corps) would attack toward Chaun-ri and Hongch'on.

(2) The NKPA I Corps would conduct a parallel attack to the Munsan area to support the CCF's attack and to cover their right flank. A part of the forces would defend the seashore of Haeju to cope with any enemy landing operation.
(3) The CCF 50th Army would intercept the reinforcement of the ROK and the UN forces or attack the ROK 1st Division in cooperation with the CCF 39th Army in Korangp’o-ri.

(4) The CCF 39th Army would cross the Imjin River, and a part of it would advance to Sinsan-ri to block the retreat route and the reinforcement of the ROK 1st Division, and its main forces would conduct the enveloping attack against the ROK 1st Division in cooperation with the CCF 50th Army.

(5) The CCF 38th Army would cross the Hant’an River, and a part of it should advance to Chilbong-san to block the ROK 6th Division’s route of retreat and reinforcement, and its main forces would execute an enveloping attack against the ROK 6th Division in cooperation with the CCF 40th Army.

(6) The CCF 40th Army would cross the Hant’an River, and attack toward Tongduch’on, and eventually besiege the ROK 6th Division along with the CCF 38th and 39th Army.

(7) The CCF 66th Army would advance to Chiam-ri, and operate a besieging assault against the ROK 2nd Division in cooperation with the CCF 42nd Army. A part of the army would attack Ch’unch’on to contain the ROK 5th Division, and eventually support the NKPA II and V Corps in their offensive operations.

(8) The CCF 42nd Army would besiege the ROK 2nd Division in cooperation with the CCF 66th Army.

(9) The NKPA V Corps would advance to Inje and Yanggu, attack through the boundary between the ROK I and II Corps as far as Hongch’on. It would conduct the enveloping operation against the ROK forces whose route of retreat had been cut off in coordination with the forward friendly forces.

(10) Prior to the offensive, the NK II Corps would covertly infiltrate into the 38th Parallel to move south-east of the Hongch’on to be ready for a link-up operation with the front line unit.

(11) The NKPA III Corps and the IV Corps would defend Wonsan and
the West Sea Coast, respectively. The CCF IX Army Group would continue the unit reorganization in the Hamhung area.

The Communist Forces, who were ready for the offensive operation in accordance with this plan, took a covert attack position on 27 December; the NK I Corps moved south of Sariwon, the CCF 50th Army east of Kaesong, the CCF 39th Army to the Kuhwa-ri, the CCF 40th Army to the Saknyong area, the CCF 38th Army to the Yonch’on area, the CCF 42nd Army east of Ch’ongwon, and the CCF 66th Army south of Kimhwa. The rest of the units assembled in the Inje area.¹⁷

Around this time friendly air reconnaissance observed that the bulk of the enemy artillery units had been deployed mainly along the sector boundary

The CCF New Year’s Offensive (Dec. 31, 1950—Jan. 1, 1950)
between the US I and IX Corps, the Yench'on-Uijongbu road for supporting main effort, and also that there was a large stockpile for a bridging materials on the Imjin riverside. The prisoners of war said that the enemy main attack would be directed toward Seoul and an offensive operation would begin on the night of the 31 December.

The enemy, which had completed the reconnaissance and was ready to cross the river, fixed the D-day for the offensive on the last day of 1950, the blood stained year. The enemy commenced the New Year's Offensive with some preparation fire at 17:00. The lines along the 38th Parallel in Korea again was engulfed in a new eddy of the war, terminating the momentary lull of fighting maintained since the middle of December.

2. The Defense Along the 38th Parallel

The 31 December, 1950 was the last day of the year and also a Sunday; nevertheless, in the operation center of the ROKA Headquarters, the Chief of General Staff and other high-ranking officers, such as the Chief of Intelligence and the Chief of Operations, solemnly assembled. They were all flushed with seriousness. When the short winter sun was going down, the Chief of General Staff issued an order to the corps commanders to strengthen the security posture as soon as the sun set. Up to this time the front line was quiet and calm as usual, but after a while, soon after darkness, the CCF began to cross the Imjin River and launched the New Year's Offensive against the ROK 1st Division. The CCF II Army Group, quickly expanded their offensive to the right and, at around midnight, committed the reinforcements to attack the ROK 6th Division deployed near the boundary between the US I and IX Corps. Three hours later, the CCF III Army Group assaulted the ROK 5th Division north of Ch'unch'on and at dawn attacked the ROK 2nd Division deployed on the right
of the Ch’orwon-P’och’on route. With those enemy assaults, the defensive posi-
tions of the ROK forces were engulfed in the flames of enemy fire. Thus the
ROK forces and the CCF waged a bloody contest a six-month after clashing on
the 38th Parallel.

(1) The Combat near the Imjin River

The ROK 1st Division, during the six months since the Korean War
broke out, had fought along to the Imjin River, the Naktong River and the Ch’-
ongch’on River and returned again to the Imjin River, according to the devel-
opment of the situation. Eventually it established a defense position for the
second time in this area. Around this time, many friendly soldiers who had
shared both life and death, joy and sorrow, were killed or wounded in action
on the bloody battlefield were evacuated from the division and had to be re-
placed by recruits. Nevertheless, there remained many veteran soldiers who
were well aware of the terrain features around the division area. They had no
difficulties in the construction of defense positions or in scouting activities.

The division established its main line of resistance on the enemy’s ex-
pected main assault route, along, south of Korangp’o-ri-Mapo-ri-the Togamp’o
area south of the Imjin River. As the division sector for defense was so wide,
the division deployed its 11th Regiment on the left around Pijang-ri and its
12th Regiment on the right around Togamp’o, giving priority to these two are-
as. The 15th Regiment was placed around Maji-ri south of Choksong as reserve
to augment the vulnerable sector boundary of the forward regiments and to
cover their withdrawal rapidly in a contingency situation. The division con-
centrated its effort on detecting the enemy situation by dispatching a recon-
naissance team north of the river while it laid mines and wire for the strengthen-
ing of the defense positions.
The CCF opened the New Year's offensive, crossing the Imjin River on the night of the last day 1950.

General Paik Sun Yup recalled the situation: "The division’s defense line was placed a little bit east of the location where the division had been deployed just before the war. Because of the shortage of the troops compared to the wide front and the severely cold winter weather then, the Imjin River, frozen solid, was not useful for our river line defense. With construction of the barbed wire fences and mine-field along the enemy main avenue of approach, we concentrated our effort on establishing defense positions by digging individual foxholes and connecting the trenches in the frozen ground, encouraging the soldiers whose morale was very low."

When the sun set in the west, on the last day of 1950, the enemy, as if CCF was expecting us, concentrated their artillery fire on the strong points of the 12th Regiment in the Togamp'o area. Soon after preparation fire, the two
regiments of the CCF 116 Division began to cross the river. Although the 12th Regiment did its best to block the enemy river crossing with final protective fire, it was unable to hold back the enemy. Consequently, the forward battalions retreated to the foot of Kamak Mountain, worrying about being enveloped by the enemy.

The CCF, which had established a bridgehead south of the Imjin River, made the follow-on unit cross the river, to pursue the 12th regiment. A part of the enemy also attacked the 11th Regiment on the left front line. At around 20:00, a part of the 12th Regiment began to withdraw along the road and was approaching the defense positions south of Choksong, which the 15th Regiment in reserve was defending, and the enemy was pursuing the 12th Regiment. A part of the 15th Regiment’s defense line was penetrated even without a round of fire against the enemy. Eventually, the CCF infiltrated deep into the inner area and exploited a breach on the right front line of the division. The division conducted a desperate all-out defensive operation throughout the night to block the enemy’s expansion of the penetrating. As the night deepened, the combat situation worsened, and the division organized a special anti-tank task force composed of engineers and signal units and committed it to the area of the 12th and 15th Regiments; however, it was unable to control the situation. To make the situation worse, communications failed between the regiments and they could not read each other’s situations.

At dawn of New Year’s day, the division deployed the 11th and 15th Regiments along the Tapo-ri-Kumgok-ri-Mugon-ri line to block the enemy exploitation of the breach, and the 12th Regiment, which had broken through the enemy positions, was on its way to reorganization around Kanap-ri west of Tokchong.

In regard to the situation, it was written in the CPV’s officially published War History that “the 39th Army’s main forces at 17:40 on the 31st pene-
trated the Imjin River line, but as the 117th Division confronted strong opposition five times on the way, it could not reach Pisang-ri and Sunam-ri southeast of Tongduch'on until 5:00 on the 1st day of New Year.¹⁰ During day, friendly air bombardment and artillery fire weakened the enemy assault until, eventually, the fighting underwent a momentary lull.¹³ Shortly afterward, the US I Corps commander ordered the US 25th Division and the British 29th Brigade to occupy the bridgehead line covered by the ROK 1st Division. The ROK 1st Division, occupying the dominating ground along the road side stretching from Munsan, via Pobwon-ri to Shinch'on-ri, covered the US and British Forces' movement.

At sunset the CCF began attack and the division conducted a full scale operation to cover the withdrawal of the corps. Around midnight, soon after the US 25th Division and the British 29th Brigade had established the bridgehead line, the CCF concentrated their assault on the 15th Regiment on the Right. The 15th Regiment did its best to block the enemy's enlargement of the penetration, taking advantage of the rough terrain around Nogo Mountain until dawn, but failed in its effort. By order of the division, it withdrew to Koyang-ri, employing delaying tactics. The 11th Regiment on the left, therefore, was engaged in a fierce battle with an enemy battalion. The regiment managed to drive back the enemy, but was then isolated by the enemy. Fortunately, at dawn the CCF halted their attack, worrying about UNC air strike, and the regiment was able to escape from the crisis.

Following orders from the corps, the 12th Regiment pulled back to the south of the Han River on the 2nd January, and then the 15th Regiment withdrew also. The 11th Regiment, which had provided cover for their retreat also moved back by means of vehicles supplied by the corps, under cover of a battalion reinforced by the tanks dispatched to the outpost of the US 25th Division around Pongil Creek. On 3 January, the division established a defense
line south of the Han River along Yongdungp'o-Noryangjin-Tongjak-dong. At that time great numbers of refugees were rushing along the river bank.

The soldiers of the division on the south bank of the river, who had
witnessed the refugees crossing the river on floating bridges or on the frozen river, renewed their firm determination to resist to the point of annihilation spurred on by feelings of guilt over the people, who were taking refuge in such severely cold weather.

(2) Battle near Tongduch' on

The ROK 6th Division established the main line of resistance by deploying its 7th Regiment near Konung-ri on the left of the road along Chongok-Tongduch' on, and the 19th Regiment at Ch'udong-ri on the right of the road. The Hantan River and the cliffs scattered around provided an advantage for the defense in the divisional area of responsibility. The 2nd Regiment was placed on alternate positions around Mach'a-san and Soyo-san to maintain the defense in depth. The ROK 1st Division was on the left flank and the US 24th Division on the right flank.

The division, for fifteen days from the middle of December, strengthened the positions of the main line of resistance, and sent forward patrols. The division also set up anti-tank mines and other obstacles on the enemy's expected avenue of approach along Yonch'on-Tongduch' on road. As the ground was frozen and the heavy snow piled up, it was very difficult to construct the defense positions, but they managed to do it with a great deal of effort.

In the meantime, the 19th Regiment's reconnaissance team captured two Chinese prisoners at the north of the Hantan River, and according to their statement, the CCF 38th Army was assembled around the Yonch'on area and very soon would invade the south. Their statement was supported by the facts that the size and activities of the enemy patrols were increasing remarkable as the end of the year was coming nearer.

The soldiers and officers of the division, even on special alert for the
last day of the year 1950, were enjoying the special New Year rice cakes and wishing each other a Happy New Year. In the evening, when the ROK 1st Division on the left front was receiving enemy preparation fire, many enemy artillery shells fell even in the inner area of the ROK 6th Division. The 6th Division delivered counter battery fire against the enemy artillery position.

The enemy commenced an assault on the entire division front line deploying its main effort along the Tongduch'on-Uijongbu axis with the CCF 38th Army as the main forces in the same pattern as at the outbreak of the war. The enemy main forces, with unarmed innocent civilians ahead of them, passed through the mine field of the division, and initiated an attack utilizing their human wave tactics. The CCF tried to advance toward the Chongok route, Hoech'un-ri and Kososong-ri area; however, the 7th and 19th Regiments managed to block and beat back the enemy assault in waves by final protective fire.

While the division was engaging in fierce battle with the enemy in front and beating them back, a part of the enemy, which had broken through the ROK 12th Regiment area of the adjacent division on the left, advanced as far as near Anhung-ri in the rear area of the division, and another part of the enemy, which had broken into the right adjacent US 24th Division, conducted a surprise attack on Tongduch'on. Since the enemy had been infiltrating into the rear area of the division, the combat situation was rapidly getting worse and worse and, consequently, a segment of the defense positions began to collapse.

The division commander, who had judged that the situation was unfavorable and was worried about the enemy siege, ordered the forward regiments to pull back to an alternate position near Tongduch'on under cover of the 2nd Regiment, which was occupying a blocking position north of Tongduch'on; however, the withdrawal of the division was not easy. At the left front, the 7th
Regiment, which had conducted fierce combat against the enemy in front, disengaged the enemy at 08:00, and began to withdraw, but as the enemy had already cut off near the Tokchong area, it had to move toward Uijongbu through the trails in the mountain. The 19th Regiment, on the left front withdrawing along the trail in the mountain, also encountered enemy assault, which had penetrated the 24th Division on the right adjacent front, but it managed to retreat to Tokchong with a part of it in dispersion. At 10:30, as the Tongduch'on area had been occupied by the enemy, the 2nd Regiment, which began to retreat after providing cover to the withdrawing forward regiments, was also cut off in its retreat route, but managed to retreat breaking through the enemy positions. Major General John B. Coulter, the US IX Corps commander, committed the British 27th Brigade, the corps reserve, to the area near Tokchong to support the ROK 6th division whose retreat route had been intercepted by the enemy.\(^7\)

The Eighth Army Commander, while the division was retreating with difficulty due to the enemy main forces' concentrated assault, issued an order to the division commander to assemble all of his units at Ch'angdong-ri, giving up occupation of the alternate positions in the Tokchong area. Afterwards on the morning of the 2nd, the division commenced its move for the defense of the Han River as corps reserve, but none of the regiments in the division was completely organized. While the 2nd Regiment, which moved first, was taking a defense position south of the Han River along the Kwangjin Bridge-Sinchang-ri line, the 19th Regiment had been deployed to Kodong-ri north east of Namhan Mountain after completion of the reorganization at Sujin-ri. The 7th Regiment assembled at Kwangju, Kyonggi Province continued organizational maintenance, and many stragglers who had withdrawn in disarray were still returning.
(3) Battle near Ch’unch’on

While the ROK and the UN forces were working on the construction of the defense line near the 38th parallel, the mid-west front line was experiencing a momentary lull. However, particularly on the mid-east front line which the ROK forces were holding, the NK forces intended to infiltrate their Second Front line units into the rear area of the main line of resistance around Hongch’on and Hyon-ri in order to establish a strongpoint, so the continuous engagements with the enemy broke out there. The ROK III Corps organized the MLR by deploying its 2nd Division in the hill masses north of Myongji Mountain; the 5th Division in the Chich’on-ri area along the road side from Hwach’-on to Ch’unch’on; the 8th Division (reinforced by the 3rd Regiment of the 7th Division) in the Naep’yon-ri area south of the Hwach’on Reservoir; and the 3rd Division around Ch’onggu-ri on the side of the Soyang River south of the Inje. The corps had difficulties in constructing the defense positions due to the heavy snow and severely cold weather. Furthermore, the frozen roads limited rations and ammunition supplies; nevertheless, the engineer units laid out a lot of mines and other obstacles on the enemy main avenue of approach along the Hwach’on-Ch’unch’on route.

Captain Cha Kyu Hun, the 6th Company Commander of the 27th Regiment of the 5th Division, recalled the situation as follows: “My company was deployed on the hill near Kotan-ri east of the Pukhan River. Fortunately, as the area had been the defense positions constructed by the friendly units before the war broke out, we had no difficulties in constructing the positions. However, the lack of drinking water was a great problem for us. In the severely cold weather, more or less 20 degrees centigrade below zero, everything around was frozen, and we had no choice but to go down to the civilian houses or to the river to get potable water. However, due to fear of a NKPA’s surprise at-
tack, my company had difficulty getting water except by melting snow in their mess kits and using it."\(^{10}\)

The CCF concentrated an attack against the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions on the west front line from the evening of the 31st, but the ROK III corps area unexpectedly experienced a momentary lull. However, shortly after midnight the CCF began to launch a converging attack against the ROK 2nd and 5th Divisions.

The 17th Regiment deployed east of the Mansegyo-ri on the left front of the 2nd Division and the 32nd Regiment deployed around Hwaak Mountain on the right front of the division, having had their main line of resistance penetrated by the enemy in an early stage attack, began to withdraw. However, it had to withdraw in disarray because its route of withdrawal had been cut off by the enemy, which had infiltrated through the boundary of the adjacent division on the left and right flank. The division commander immediately committed his reserve, the 31st Regiment, to block the enemy advancing to Mokdong-ri north of Kap’yong. He was not successful, however, because communications were down not only between his division and the corps but also with his regiments.

The 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division on the left around Chiam-ri east of the Pukhan River, the 35th Regiment on the mid-front at Songam-ri west of the Pukhan River, and the 27th Regiment on the right around Kosong-ri were attacked by the CCF. When the 35th Regiment and the 27th Regiment encountered the enemy’s light assault, they were assembling near Ch’unch’on conducting a delaying operation. The 36th Regiment, which was under heavy enemy attack and also worrying about being cut off from its retreat by the enemy, which had broken into the sector of the 32nd Regiment of the 2nd Division on the left flank, inevitably had to pull out. In order to withdraw to Kap’yong, the 36 Regiment tried to assemble in Sindang-ri and then move to Mokdong-ri,
but the Chinese troops had already advanced there ahead of them.

The 36th Regiment first dispatched one of its battalions to support the 31st Regiment, which had been holding off the enemy, but the CCF had already committed reinforcements to Mokdong-ri; consequently, the regiment was enveloped completely by the enemy and had to withdraw to Yangp'yong via Pukpae-san and Yongmun on the east.19

On the other hand, as the 8th Division, defending around the Nae-p'yong-ri, had very slight contact with the enemy, managed to maintain the main line of resistance continuously. However, since the divisions on both left and right flank began to withdraw, the 8th Division, confronting the possible isolation, also had to retreat to Hongch'on.

(4) Battle near Inje and Hyon-ri

While the CCF were mounting the New Year's Offensive against the ROK and the UN forces on the midwestern front, the ROK II Corps (the 3rd Division) on the mid east and the I Corps (the 9th and Capital Divisions) on the eastern front were under completely different situations. Both of the corps, instead of confronting an enemy frontal attack, were engaged in fierce battle with a part of the NK II and V Corps, which had penetrated into the rear area in advance of the New Year's Offensive to cut off the retreat route.

The ROK 3rd Division was establishing the main line of resistance around Kwandae-ri, on the banks of the Soyang River, for the defense of the route between Inje and Hongch'on. While the division was concentrating its effort on the defense of the main line of resistance, roughly one regiment size of enemy troops had penetrated into the sector of the 28th Regimient, the 9th Division, which was deployed on the right adjacent front. The enemy's aim was to harass the rear area and cut off the supply route, and enemy unit appeared in
Ch’angbong-ri, north of Hoengsong and then were moving northward to Hongch’on. The division commander Brigadier General Ch’oi Suk ordered his forward regiments to block the NK 2nd Division’s attempt to advance toward Chaun-ri–Hongch’on–Wonju axis. He also instructed the 23rd Regiment in reserve, assembled at Hongch’on, to destroy the enemy that had interdicted the withdrawal route in the rear, making a concerted attack the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division which was advancing to the north from Hoengsong to support the division. On the 31st, both the US 23rd Regiment and the ROK 23rd Regiment conducted a sieging operation against the enemy from the north and south, respectively. They drove the enemy back on the Sammach’i Pass, and eventually by linking up, secured the retreat route of the division.

In the evening, the ROK 3rd Division received an order from the ROKA Headquarters that the division would be released from an attachment to the ROK II Corps and, simultaneously, would be transferred to a reserve of the army to move to P’yongch’ang and prepare to conduct a counterattack to the area of the ROK divisions in defense. According to this order, the division started to move to P’yongch’ang, employing successive delaying actions.

Meanwhile, the ROK 9th Division, which was defending Sangnam-ri area South of Hyon-ri, whose commander, Brigadier General Oh Duk Joon, had been replaced by Brigadier General Kim Jong Kap on January 1st, resumed the attack toward the objectives, Sangnam-ri–Hill 1091–Kwangju-dong–Pang’aeok–Yongp’o to recapture the Hyon-ri area lost by the enemy a few days earlier. At 12:00 the same day, a regimental sized enemy force which had broken into the sector of the neighboring ROK 3rd Division on the left executed a surprise attack from the front of Kumbu-ri west of the Omach’i Pass. In light of this situation, the division had to stop its advance and fierce offensive and defensive battles were conducted. The division exchanged bloody battle with the enemy until 18:00 on the 2nd, and the situation continued to wors-
The division, worrying about approaching sunset, disengaged the enemy and had to withdraw to Pangtaegok. During the development of the operation, the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment was isolated by the enemy’s encirclement and had to withdraw in disarray.

The Capital Division, in defense of the Eastern Sea coast, established its main line of resistance along Toch’ae-dong-Sorim-Yangyang line and was ready for the enemy frontal attack; however, the enemy intended to wage a harassment operation rather than a frontal attack, advancing to the rear area of the division by utilizing the mountain area connecting the Odae and the Sorak Mountains as a foothold. At the time, the 26th Regiment, on the 30 December 1950, in coordination with the 30th Regiment of the 9th Division, moved to Taesa-ri in the rear area of the division and found about 1,000 enemy troops. They destroyed or dispersed the enemy with fire power and close combat. The 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment pursued them as far as Hajiinbu-ri but failed to catch the enemy which excelled in slipping out.

General Ridgway, who inspected the battlefield confirmed that not only was the enemy offensive very strong but also that the bulk of the enemy force were moving down from the Ch’orwon area by the air reconnaissance. He estimated that the friendly forces had missed the opportunity to conduct a counterattack to recover the opening made in the sector of the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions. The ROK III Corps on the mideast front-line also confronted the enemy’s concentrated attack, and eventually its 2nd and 5th Divisions were placed in danger of being enveloped by the enemy. General Ridgway, just six days after taking command of the Eighth Army at noon on 1 January 1951, issued an order that the US I and the IX Corps should retreat to the Seoul bridgehead line, and the three ROK Corps to the C-Defense Line (along the Han River-Y’angpy’ong-Hongch’on-Wonp’ori).
(5) Establishment of Seoul Bridgehead Line

Before the US I and IX Corps took the positions of the Seoul Bridgehead line (along Haengju-Uijongbu-Toegyewon), the Eighth Army commander stressed to the corps commanders that they should retreat to the line by employing strong delaying operations and also should complete the retreat in daytime while friendly air support was available.

Under cover of the ROK 1st Division, the US I corps Commander moved the US 25th Division. The 25th Division had only slight contact with the enemy and was deployed around Munsan, to be redeployed in the Wondang area, left of Route 1 and the British 29th Brigade, which was assembling at Sindun-ri as Corps reserve, to occupy the area around Koyang on the right of the route. The CCF, who had detected the retreat of the corps, tried to break through the front line of the ROK 1st Division by carrying out an attack in waves all afternoon but failed to break the ROK’s main line of resistance. At this favorable moment, the 25th Division and the British 29th Brigade maneuvered rapidly to occupy the Bridgehead line around midnight and then were able to provide cover for the retreating ROK 1st Division which had disengaged the enemy.

The US I Corps commander urged US 25th Division commander, Major General William B. Kean, and British 29th Brigade commander, Brigadier General Thomas Brodie, to secure the bridgehead positions at any cost. However, the Eighth Army commander did not consider the bridgehead line as the decisive position; therefore, taking into account the morale of the friendly forces, he gave the order that the operation should be carried out to impose on the enemy maximum damage, with as little loss to the friendly forces as possible. In keeping with this instruction, the concept of the defensive operation of the bridgehead line had to be flexible to cope with the changing situation rath-
er than a desperate defense.\textsuperscript{21} 

The US IX Corps commander planned that the forward ROK 6th Division and the US 24th Division while conducting successive delaying operations, would withdraw to south of Uijongbu under cover of the British 27th Brigade deployed around Tokchong, and eventually occupy the right flank positions of the bridgehead line. In accordance with the plan, the US 2nd Division on the corps’ right established the bridgehead line around midnight; however, as the retreat route of the ROK 6th Division on the Corps’ left forward was intercepted by the CCF which had advanced to the rear area, the division had to retreat in dispersion and the 27th Brigade, the Corps reserve, had to be responsible for the left forward section of the bridgehead line instead.

After the friendly forces established the bridgehead line, there was no decisive enemy attack, but it was estimated that the CCF might be within 15km of the line or even nearer. Judging from the enemy disposition and the rate of advance, it was estimated that the enemy’s full scale offensive would be on the 3rd of January. At the time, four divisions of the CCF were launching an offensive to the bridgehead area and the 50th Army, the reserve located in Kaesong, was advancing toward Seoul along Route 1; the 42nd Army assembling at Kimhwa was possibly to move either to Seoul or to Ch’unch’on and Kap’yong along Route 3.

On the evening of the 2nd, the Eighth Army commander, in order to strengthen the defensive power of the bridgehead area, attached the Thai Battalion to the British 29th Brigade and deployed the 92nd and 96th Field Artillery Battalions of the US X Corps, moving forward from Kyongju, into positions in the area of the US I and IX Corps, aiming at the enemy main attacking forces. He also stressed to the I and IX Corps commanders that they should defend their positions within the sphere so as not to allow their subordinate units to be encircled or trapped by the enemy.
3. The Retreat from Seoul

(1) The Decision to Retreat from Seoul

After taking the Eighth Army commander, General Ridgway, on his visit to President Rhee, declared that there would be no Korean Dunkirk, and we would commence the offensive operation again after the reorganization of the troops. However, contrary to his intention the ROK and the UN forces had to retreat from the main line of resistance along the 38th Parallel in a few days since the CCF had launched their New Year's Offensive. Consequently, the
Eighth Army commander was dissatisfied, feeling that the friendly forces had retreated unilaterally without having imposed as many losses as possible on the enemy.

Furthermore, the US I and IX Corps, retreated from the 38th Parallel, though continued to occupy the bridgehead which Ridgway had set up for the defense of Seoul, and he was not convinced that they could hold onto Seoul. He had no other choice but to resign himself to giving up Seoul.

The first factor which led to his decision to retreat from Seoul was a report on the 2nd January from the engineer unit which was controlling the pontoon bridge installed on the Han River. Seeing that the refugees coming from Seoul were crossing the river not on the bridge but on the surface of the river, the engineer unit reported immediately that the river was frozen so solidly that it could be crossed on foot. This meant that the enemy would be able to conduct a frontal attack, and also possibly to siege the friendly forces by passing over the frozen river and attacking from the flank. In addition to this, if the refugees continued to come down to south crossing the frozen river, the CCF would easily be able to approach the friendly positions under cover and barrier of the refugees. Furthermore, if the refugees after crossing the river continued to come down in columns along the main line of communication, they might obstruct and restrict the maneuver of the friendly units and the transportation of supplies. The presence of the refugees was sure to disrupt UNC future operations.

The second reason for leaving Seoul was the unstable situation on the east front line. To cope with this situation General Ridgway, on the evening of the 2nd, committed the US X Corps to the centreal front to reinforce the defense of the MLR and also readjusted the combat organization and operational sector of the ROK Corps, that is, the ROK I Corps (the 9th and Capital Divisions) and the ROK III Corps (the 3rd and 7th Divisions) would occupy the steep
Taebaek Mountains up to the Hongch'ŏn-Wonp'o-ri line on the east of the Mountain. Toward this effort, he attached the 2nd, the 5th, and the 8th Divisions of the III Corps to the US X Corps. He also moved the ROK II Corps (with the 11th Division attached) to Taejon to carry out an anti-guerrilla mission in the rear area.

However, as the ROK units on the eastern front were not able to occupy the C-Defense Line (Yangpy'ŏng-Hongch'ŏn-Wonp'o-ri) until 3 January, General Ridgway doubted his eastern forces could organize and hold Line C, and his G-3 suggested that in this situation, ROK forces in the east would have difficulty even in establishing Line D-Defenses (Pyong'aek-Ansong-Changhowon-Wonju-and Wonp'o-ri) further south. The general also believed that Wonju were occupied by the enemy, the western front units might be placed in direct threat from the enemy on the right flank.

Around this time, the CCF 66th Army, supported by the 42nd Army, had already captured Kap'yŏng, and it was observed at 08:00 on the 3rd that the long column of the CCF was marching down south east of the Kap'yŏng along the Seoul-Ch'unch'ŏn Route. The leading unit was advancing as far as 24km in front of the US 1st Cavalry Division which was in defense around T'oegyewon. If the CCF would attack westward bypassing the Cavalry Division, they could surely cut off the National Route 1.

The Eighth Army commander, after all factors considered, concluded that the risk to his command had reached the critical point. At mid-morning on the 3rd, he issued a preliminary order to his units deployed at the bridgehead that they were to withdraw from the bridgehead in the late that day. At that moment, there was not threat to the defense of enemy attack but moving the 75,000 troops together with their equipment and evacuating the ROK government and residents in Seoul across the Han River was a very serious problem.

At the time, the Communist Combined Command which had learned
of the ROK and the UN forces' retreat from Seoul, ordered reopening of the offensive operation on the 3rd to exploit the situation. The right offensive echelon (composed of the CCF 38th, 39th, 40th, and 50th Army and the NK I Corps) commanded by Han Hsien Chu would occupy Seoul, Inch'on, Suwon, and Yangp'yong, and the left echelon (composed of the CCF 42nd and 66th Army and the NK II and V Corps) commanded by Wu Jui Lin would occupy Hongch'on, Hoengsong, Yangyang, and Kangnung. Right after they reached those lines, they would lift the operation to prepare for the next operation by reorganizing and resting the units.  

(2) Withdrawal of the Forces on the Bridgehead Line

Around 03:00 on the 3 January, the CCF 50th Army, which had advanced along National Route 1, launched an attack against the US 25th Division, and then at around dawn a part of the CCF 39th Army, which had advanced along Route 33 (Chorwon-Yonch'on-Uijongbu), began to attack the British 29th Brigade. The offensive and defensive battle went on until the afternoon, with repeated exchanges of attacks and counterattacks. In the region of the US IX Corps at 05:00, the CCF 38th Army and a part of the 40th Army commenced the attack, but they lifted the assault later in the morning.

In the afternoon of 3 January, the Eighth Army commander ordered the US I and IX Corps to withdraw from the bridgehead soon after the coordinated plan was completed, and the control of the Han River Bridge was entrusted to the I Corps commander. After withdrawal from the bridgehead, the US I Corps was to be deployed so as to provide a cover of the withdrawal for the units and the facilities in the Seoul airport, Kimpo airfield and Inch'on area. The US IX Corps was to be deployed along the Han River bank from Yongdungp'o up to the conjunction point of the South Han River and the
North Han River. General Ridgway stressed that the two US Corps should evacuate the available equipment rather than abandoning it, and all the wounded and those killed in action, taking into account the morale of the troops. He also emphasized that they should inflict maximum losses on the enemy to delay its advance, and to maintain their own combat capabilities.

Due to his instructions, both Corps commanders prepared and revised the withdrawal plan from the bridgehead. At first the 1 Corps was to use the two bridges just south of Seoul, and the IX Corps was to cross a bridge located far to the east, but later they agreed that a part of the IX Corps would use the bridge in the south, as well. At that time, all the original bridges were destroyed and left as they were. The ROK and the US Forces, and refugees, as well had to use a few temporary bridges set up by the US engineer units; therefore, it was very difficult to cross the river. In the US 1 Corps area on the west of Seoul, the M-4 pontoon bridge and a pontoon bridge which could accommodate heavy equipment were established, and the M-2 floating bridge was constructed in the IX Corps area on the east. The refugees, for the most part, had to use the five floating foot bridges. 23

A part of the US 25th Division, in cooperation with the British 27th Brigade of the US IX Corps, was to cover the withdrawal of the US 1 Corps' main forces. It had been planned that, upon the completion of the main forces' withdrawal, the US 25th Division was to be deployed in the Yomch'ang-dong area between the Turkish Brigade and the ROK 1st Division and the British 29th Brigade was to assemble at Suwon as a corps reserve. Until at 16:00 on the 3rd, around the beginning of the withdrawal, a momentary lull was experienced in the bridgehead area; however, the leading units of the CCF 50th and 39th Armies were advancing up to the outside line of the bridgehead. At that point, an aerial observer reported that "the large enemy forces and equipment including artillery pieces are moving southward along National Route 1 and
Route 33. The attack of the CCF 38th and the 40th Armies, advancing along the Seoul-Ch’unch’on National Route to strike the US IX Corps, seems to be delayed.” It was estimated that the CCF in front of the US I Corps sector had been ready to attack the bridgehead and exploit a pursuit operation.

The main forces of the divisions of the Corps, under cover of the 27th Regiment of the US 25th Division, withdrew by vehicles, and successively at 18:40, the British 29th Brigade began to move. Around midnight while the brigade was maneuvering, the main forces of the CCF 39th Army conducted a surprise attack against the brigade rear guard. However, all units of the Corps except the covering unit, the 27th Regiment, already had withdrawn south of the Han River so that it was difficult to commit reinforcements. During the operation the 29th Brigade lost about 250–300 troops and 10 tanks, but the main forces of the brigade managed to complete their withdrawal south of the river by 03:30 on the 4th.

The 27th Regiment, which had provided cover for the last withdrawing unit, was also itself preparing to withdraw and the regiment arranged its 1st Battalion to cover the withdrawal of the regiment by putting companies on each of the possible enemy routes of advance to Seoul: the Han Riverside, the Seoul–Sinuiju railroad, and National Route 1. The regiment was in a hurry to withdraw of its main forces. At the same time a segment of the enemy tried to cut off the withdrawal of the main body of the regiment, but it managed to break off engagement with the enemy and started to withdraw. In the early morning, a battalion sized enemy force launched an assault against the company deployed along railroad, but the company blocked the enemy incursion with air support. Due to this engagement, the withdrawal of the regiment was a little delayed, but around 11:00, the regiment broke contact with the enemy and began withdrawal; consequently, by 13:00 all the units had completed their movement south of the Han River. The Han River bridge control team, waiting
The UN forces are withdrawing from Seoul on the pontoon bridge constructed near the destroyed Han River bridge.

for the completion of the friendly forces' withdrawal, demolished the temporary bridge at 14:00; thus, the Seoul withdrawal operation was completed.

In contrast, the US IX Corps withdrawal was proceeding like an exercise with no enemy obstruction. In the afternoon of the 3rd, the US 24th Division withdrew by vehicles under cover of the British 27th Brigade, and at 02:00 on the 4th, the last column of the brigade completed its withdrawal. The engineer team tried for five hours to disassemble the M-2 floating bridge but was unsuccessful because the severely cold weather had frozen the sectional parts of the bridge. The Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson who was responsible for the bridge control, issued an order around 07:30 to demolish the bridge. According to air sightings, about an hour after the demolition of the bridge, the CCF rushed into Seoul and soon the North Korean flag was flying over Seoul City Hall; this was the third replacement of the ROK national flag by the NK flag. The friendly forces handed over the capital city of Seoul to the enemy for the second time and had to retreat to the D-Defense line (along P'yongtaek-Ansong-Wonju-Samch'ok).
(3) Withdrawal of the Logistic Support Units

As the ROK and the UN forces had retreated to the Seoul Bridgehead and C-Defense line, the supply points in the Seoul-Inch'on region were placed in danger. On January 3rd, the Eighth Army Commander ordered the 3rd Logistic Support Commander to remove all the supply installations in the northern area of the D-Defense line and to cease port operations at Inch'on at noon on the 4th.

By that time, since the forward units had begun to retreat from P'yongyang in early December, the 3rd Logistic Command, had been gradually reducing the stockpile of war materials at Inch'on Port and Kimp'o Airfield keeping only the minimum supply level, and, accordingly, did not expect any problem in the evacuation of the materials. However, because of the shortage of special ships for transporting the oil tankers and the railway tracks, etc., some of the materials remained until noon on the 4th. The Logistic Command, being pressed on the timing of the I Corps' retreat had to destroy 1.6million gallons of petroleum products, 9,300 tons of engineering materials, and 12 rail cars loaded with ammunition at Inch'on Port, Kimp'o Airport, and Pup'yong Depot. Finally, the personnel of the command withdrew to Pusan by road and airway, leaving behind only a team to demolish Kimp'o Airfield and Inch'on Port.

In the afternoon, the remaining team at Kimp'o Airfield demolished the buildings, the aviation fuel, and the napalm bombs, and other ordnance, and finally destroyed the oil pipeline facilities. The 50th engineer port construction company started to demolish the Inch'on Port. The company destroyed all of the port facilities including the lock gate of tidal basin, leaving only a pier and a causeway connecting road to Wolmi-do. The demolition work went on until 15:00 on the 5th. Taking into account the urgency of the
evacuation time and the available tidal time, it was inevitable that the war materials had to be destroyed. Nevertheless, the extensive demolition of the port facilities could not be justified. Denying the enemy the use of a port was theoretically sound; on the other hand the United Nations Command's absolute control of Korean Waters made Inch'on's destruction purposeless. There were also stocks of war materials for the army and air force in the Suwon airport, and it was estimated that it would take about 24 to 36 hours for the evacuation of these materials. General Ridgway, when he had issued a preliminary order for withdrawal at noon on the 4th urged the US I and IX Corps commanders to conduct determined delaying actions to earn time for the evacuation of the materials prior to the retreat of the combat units to line.

General Ridgway, expecting that the evacuation of the supplies would be completed by noon of the 5th, ordered withdrawal to line D. However, he learned on the morning of the 5th that it would be impossible to evacuate the war materials stocked in Suwon and the airfield south of Suwon by noon of that day. In addition to the huge amount of the materials, there were also roughly 100,000 refugees who had rushed down from the Seoul area and assembled in mass near the Suwon railway station, obstructing the train operation and making a timely evacuation impossible. General Ridgway ordered the US I and the IX Corps commanders to defend in place their present positions. Due to this determined measure, all of the supplies stocked in Suwon were evacuated to the rear.

(4) Evacuation of the Civilians

A while after the ROK and the UN forces had retreated from the 38th Parallel positions, the residents nearby also began to evacuate. The Eighth Army commander, taking into account the effect of the evacuation of the refu-
gees on military operations, issued a special instruction to prohibit the refugees to pass through the front line positions and induce them to use the secondary roads along the right and left side of National Route 1 between Seoul and Inch'on, rather than using the National Route itself.

Soon after the order to retreat from the bridgehead line, General Ridgway decided on the final hour for crossing the Han River. For the civilians the time was set at 15:00 on the 3rd January to prevent the CCF advance under a cover of the civilians. He also stressed that the bridge crossing should be controlled strictly with only the exceptional case he might approve. He notified the ROK government of these measures and asked it to disseminate the information to the citizens of Seoul.

The Chief of General Staff, General Chung Il Kwon, recalled the situation as follows:

I visited the president at Kyong Mu Dae (the presidential office) and reported to him the operational developments. I recommended the president leave Seoul again, and he answered that he would follow my advice for the sake of the military operation. He said that he was ashamed of himself before the Seoul citizens and the refugees, and he also mentioned that while last June at least had not been cold, January this year was severely cold and he was concerned about how much the children, the women and the elderly would suffer. Lastly, he strongly urged that a temporary bridge be set up for them.54

The evacuation of civilians this year was quite different from the previous one in that the earlier evacuation had been carried out in disarray at the initial stage of the war. The government and armed forces for the final two weeks, evacuated the government officials, their dependents, inpatients, orphans, refugees from the north, prison inmates, government administration, documents, precious cultural assets, and banknotes, everything except the es-
The refugees in column are coming down southward carrying their household stuffs and necessities of life on varied transportation means such as horse carts, bicycles, bicycle trailers, and others, during January Fourth Retreat.

sentential personnel. Some government officials, city hall officials, UN envoys, and foreign religious persons remained in Seoul, and they were issued special passes which allowed them to pass along National Route 1. On the 2nd, the US I Corps set up a river crossing check point south of the river, and the police established traffic control points in the city for the adequate control and supervision of the river crossing.

Finally, the government officials who were supposed to go to Pusan evacuated and, thus, the evacuation operation was completed without any great difficulty. However, some of the civilians were still evacuating on the 4th, crossing the floating foot bridge and the frozen river surface. Most of the civilians who could not take refuge in time, left Seoul for the nearly countryside, and the city of Seoul was vacant. General Ridgway described the situation of the civilian evacuation then in his memoirs as follows:
Many hundred thousand refugees, seized with fear, were to use only one floating bridge laid between Chungjido and Noryangjin. It was certain that if chaos took place on the floating bridge, it would negatively affect the military operation I issued a special order for the control of the civilians to Brig. Gen. Palmer (Charles D. Palmer) that he must accomplish the withdrawal operation successfully without any confusion by controlling the civilians’ passing, even using arms in the worst situation.

However, such an order proved to be based on my foolish and groundless concern. The refugees were obedient and did not have to be controlled by the military. Since they had no other desire but to get away from the CCF, they waited for their turns with their household goods on their heads or back despite the severely cold weather⋯⋯ Nobody shouted or cried. They crossed the river in silence, leaving the sound of their footsteps on the snow. Not only I, but whoever witnessed the scene, could never forget it in one’s lifetime.20

4. Withdrawal to P’yongt’aek–Samch’ok Line

Even though the ROK and the UN forces had withdrawn from Seoul, the Eighth Army commander expressed his confidence in the defensive operation to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff saying, “the friendly forces confronted a difficult situation for a while due to the CCF New Year’s Offensive, but still our US Forces are keeping enough combat power to fight against the CC Forces.”

He estimated that “the CCF is only superior in the number of troops, but their weapons system are inferior both in quality and quantity. They are not capable of air support and have only poor communication equipment and a few armored vehicles.”

While the US I and IX Corps were preparing for the withdrawal from the Seoul Bridgehead line, there was no threatening enemy offensive. However,
the decisive reason for the UN forces' withdrawal to line D (P'yongt'aek-Ansong-Changhowon-Wonju-Wonp'o-ri) was that the east frontal line had been penetrated by the enemy. At that time the most vulnerable defense line of the ground forces was the sector of the ROK Forces around Ch'unch'on, Hongch'on, and the Inje area. The enemy committed 70,000 NKPA and CCF to this region and a part of them, which had advanced to the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on-Hoengsong route and to the mountainous area, attacked Wonju. Another part of the enemy forces shifted its attacking direction southeastward in an attempt to envelope the US I and IX Corps. Under such a situation, there was no choice but to withdraw to the D-Defense line.²⁸

The US I and IX Corps, which had withdrawn south of the Han River, were en route north of Suwon conducting delaying tactics to support the evacuation of the war materials at Inch'on and Suwon. The Eighth Army commander, in the evening, gave instructions to organize covering forces, reinforced with tanks, and to employ a strong counterattack against the pursuing CCF. He further ordered the main forces to begin withdrawal to the D-Defense line at noon on the 5th.

The US I and IX Corps, having had only light contact with the enemy had completed preparations for the withdrawal and were standing by on the morning of the 5th. About 10:00, the Eighth Army ordered a defense in place on the present positions until further notice, because the evacuation of the supplies stocked in Suwon had been delayed. The US I Corps could have deployed its main forces around the Anyang area, but there was some misunderstanding during the process of delivering the order for the Corps. The ROK 6th Division, attached to the IX Corps already, started to withdraw as an advance element, but the order reached the division on its way east of the Suwon, and the division had to be deployed along the road between Kumyangjang-ri and Yangji-ri.
At night, the regimental sized enemy forces which had crossed the Han River and passed over the Kwanak Mountain scouted the frontal line area including the entire sector of the ROK 1st Division, but fortunately they did not discover the open right flank created by the withdrawal of the 6th Division. From the morning of the 6th, a battalion sized enemy force had tried to break through the central sector of the 1st Division by assaulting throughout the morning, but pulled back at about 14:00. After that, the US I and IX Corps, with no contact with the enemy were able to occupy the line which ran from

Withdawal to P’yongt’aek-Samch’ok Defense Line (4-7 January 1951)
P'yongt'aek and Ansong to Changhowon, so that those units on the west front could complete their withdrawal operation to line D.

The US I Corps deployed the British 29th Brigade (with the Thai Battalion attached) on the West Sea coast area on the left side of National Route 1, south of P'yongt'aek, the US 3rd Division, in the right hill area; the ROK 1st Division, in the Ansong area right of Route 17, and eventually established its main line of resistance. To maintain a defense disposition in depth, the US 25th Division and the Turkish Brigade assembled at Ch'onan as its immediate reserve.

The US IX Corps placed the ROK 6th Division, tied to the left neighboring ROK 1st Division, in the Chugsan-ri area, the British 27th Brigade around Popch'on-ri, and the US 24th Division in the Changhowon area, consequently establishing its main line of resistance. The US 1st Cavalry Division's main forces assembled at Ch'ungju as the corps reserve to protect the line of communications, and the 5th Cavalry Regiment secured the route between Ch'ungju and Munkyong to guard against the enemy guerrilla activities around the Tanyang area.

While the US I and IX Corps on the west front line were constructing strong defense positions on the line D along P'yongt'aek-Ansong-Changhowon, General Ridgway severely criticized both corps because they had neither destroyed the enemy nor accomplished the practical delaying action during their withdrawal. Since both corps had withdrawn from the Seoul Bridgehead line, breaking off the engagement with the enemy, the main forces did not engage the enemy at all except the ROK 1st Division, which had a fierce battle with the enemy near the Anyang.

The Chinese People's Volunteers commander, Peng Teh Huai had his forces to pursue the ROK and UN forces as far as south of the Han River, but they could not annihilate the enemy as he had expected. Since they estimated
that the US and ROK forces had retreated to the line along P'yonɡtaek-
Ansong-Chech'ón-Samch'ok intentionally to induce the friendly forces (CCF
and NKPA), they lifted the pursuit operation on the 8th.28

5. Danger on the Mid-East Front Line

The CCF during the New Year's Offensive, directed their main attack
toward the US I and IX Corps on the west front line and the supporting attack
to the ROK III Corps on the central front. While the UN forces concentrated
their concern on the midwest front line, other supporting attack, the NK II
and V Corps, were infiltrating the mideast front line in silence through the
steep mountain pass in the Taebaek Mountains in order to strike the flank
and rear of the friendly forces in central western front.

While the units on the midwest front, had been forced by the CCF to
retreat from Seoul and north of the Han River to be deployed on the D-De-
fense line, the situation of the front was in a momentary lull. However, the ene-
my mobilized the NKPA Forces, and lit fuse to bring the New Year's Offensive
to a conclusion; consequently, both sides engaged in bloody offensive and de-
fensive battles at the mideast front line.

(1) The Intention of the NK People's Army

The NKPA II Corps, which had experienced to advance as far as the
Naktong River defensive line as the main body of the NKPA was almost wiped
out by the ROK-UN forces' counter-offensive operation; however, the CCF
participation in the war saved the corps, earning it two months for reorganization. With the completion of the reorganization, the II Corps and
the newly activated V Corps were deployed on the east central front line
again. In late December, both of the corps, to support the CCF New Year’s Offensive, committed their 2nd and 12th Divisions to penetrate into the rear area of the main line of resistance through the steep mountain passes in the Taebaek Mountains and through the gaps among the defensive positions of the ROK divisions created by the wide front defense.

Therefore, the ROK III Corps, which was deployed on the mideast front and had been cut off from its route of withdrawal, failed to defend its main line of resistance and had to pull back to the rear area and, eventually, allowed a breakthrough in the area from Inje to Hongch’on.

The ROK forces, from the early stage of the enemy’s New Year’s Offensive, maintained a defensive posture, having been attacked on both sides from the front and the rear by the enemy. Consequently, they focused their efforts on securing line C without contact with the enemy, and were not aware of the enemy’s strategy. At the time, according to air reconnaissance and other sources of information, the NKPA III Corps was moving down from the Hamhung and Wonsan area to Inje to support the II and the V Corps deployed forward and the bulk of the enemy forces were assembling north of Wonju.

At that point, a patrol of the US 2nd Division, defending Wonju, captured enemy prisoners and according to their statements, the enemy strategy was clarified. The prisoners’ statements were as follows. “The boundary between the II and V Corps, which had begun the New Year's Offensive, was along Route 29, and ran through Ch’unch’on–Hongch’on–Hoengsong. The NKPA V Corps (composed of the 6th, 7th, 12th, 27th, 28th, and 43rd Divisions) commanded by Pang Ho San, which had advanced to Route 29 and west of the Route, was to occupy Wonju by all out attack and successively press the US X Corps to pull back. the NKPA II Corps (composed of the 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 31st Divisions) commanded by Ch’oe Hyon, east of Route 29 should advance through the mountains east of Route 29, southward, avoiding contact with the
enemy, and attack Wonju, Chech'ón, Tanyang, and Taegu. About 5,000 to 7,000 guerrilla forces will move down through the inland mountainous area and along Route 29 to assemble near Tanyang and cut off the UN forces' main line of communications, the traffic network between Pusan and Andong. This NKPA Forces operation will be conducted in connection with advance of the CCF in the west."

As if to prove the prisoners' statement to be true the NK 6th and 27th Divisions which came down south from Hoengsong on the night of the 6th, were waiting in combat readiness north of Wonju to open the offensive at dawn on the next day. Earlier, the NKPA 2nd Division which had advanced to Hongch'ón and Hoengsong, marched across the road to the front of the positions of the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division, defending the area northwest of Wonju. And the NKPA 10th Division, the II Corps, was approaching rapidly east of Wonju passing through the exposed open mountain area to support the V Corps' offensive.

At that time, Kil Won Pal's 2,000 guerrilla forces, hiding in the mountain area stretching from Sorak Mountain to Odae Mountain, were seeking to move to the rear area.

(2) The Situation of the Friendly Forces

Among the ROK forces which had withdrawn from the central-eastern front due to the CCF New Year's Offensive, only the Capital Division of the ROK I Corps occupied the preplanned C-Defense line (along Yangpyong-Hongch'ón-Wonpo-ri) on the 2nd January, and the situation of the ROK III Corps was uncertain. On January 1st, a regiment of the ROK 2nd Division on the left of the corps, was completely dispersed, and the other two regiments were isolated in the area 8km north of the Kap'yong by subordinate units of
the CCF 66th Army, which had broken into the left flank of the central ROK 5th Division. The situation of the 5th Division and the right forward 8th Division was not known because of the communication rupture. And the corps reserve, the 7th Division, was assembling 20 miles north of Wonju. At that point, the ROK 3rd Division was moving along Route 24 to Hongch'on and was to assemble at Pyongch'ang to block the NKPA Forces' enlargement of the breach shaped around the Hongch'on area.

During the enemy New Year's Offensive, the Ch'unch'on frontal positions of the ROK 2nd, 5th, and 8th Divisions, which had been deployed on the wide sector in the mountain area, were penetrated, and the supply line and the routes of withdrawal were cut off in places by the enemy guerrilla forces.

This unstable situation was not only limited to the midwest front line, but the UN main forces deployed on the west front, were also attacked by the enemy on their right flank, and, consequently, it was judged that they would be
placed in great danger. The Eighth Army commander decided to commit the
US X Corps, which had withdrawn from Hungnam and was reorganizing in the
Kyongju area, for the purpose of early stabilization of the mideast front line.
He adjusted the boundary between the corps and also the attachment of some
of its subordinate units and composed a new task organization.

According to the order, the US X Corps would interdict the enemy as it
advanced southward from Ch'unch'on. It would also block the enlargement
of the enemy penetration around Inje and Hongch'on. The corps, with its main
forces composed of the US 2nd and US 7th Divisions, including the ROK 2nd,
5th and 8th Divisions attached from the ROK III Corps, for a total of 5 divi-
sions, had occupied the 48km C-Defense line (along Yangpyong-Hongch'on)
placing the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on route (Route 29) in its central sector.

The ROK III Corps, which turned over the area of responsibility in
Kap'yong and Ch'unch'on to the US X Corps, took over the sector, the steep
T'aebaek Mountain area between the US X Corps and ROK I Corps, and was
to block the of enemy penetration with its 7th Division and the 9th Division
attached from the ROK I Corps. However, the ROK 9th Division was con-
ducting a hard fight against the enemy and the 7th Division had to move west-
ward from Hongch'on, so the situation was not so optimistic.

The ROK I Corps, which had been a somewhat less engaged with the
enemy than other corps and attached its 9th Division to the III Corps, was to
defend the front line from the east T'aebaek Mountains as far as the Eastern
Sea coast, with an attachment of the 3rd Division from the ROK II Corps.
However, it was expected that it would take quite a long time for the 3rd Divi-
sion to return to the Corps by a roundabout route southward from Hongch'on.
Accordingly a very uneasy situation was created since there was no unit to in-
terdict the NKPA Forces coming down to the south between the Capital Divi-
sion on the Eastern Sea Coast and the US 2nd Division north of Wonju, and
also open gap created in between.

At this stage, the ROK Army Headquarters issued an order on the 5th January to the ROK I and the III Corps that their units should withdraw to the revised D-Defensive line between Wonju and Samch'ok before the main forces of the NK 2nd, 9th, and 31st Divisions approached the Hoengsong area. According to the order, the ROK divisions had started to move on the 6th and

**Situation of the Central-Eastern Front (Jan. 7, 1951)**
withdrew, through Wonju, to the defense line along Ch'ungju-Chech'on-Yongwol-Samch'ok. The US 2nd Division, which provided a cover to the withdrawing ROK forces, was placed in danger with its east flank exposed. On the other hand, the retreating ROK division, with revised orders being delivered almost every day, created confusion in their command of the units and also wasted much of their physical power in unnecessary unit movements.

(3) Scramble for the possession of Wonju

The US X Corps commander focused his effort on the defense of Wonju, by deploying the ROK 5th Division which had retreated from the 38th Parallel on the east of the Namhan River, the ROK 8th Division in the center of his sector, and US 2nd Division (minus 9th Regiment) in Wonju. And the US 7th Division's main forces and a part of the US 2nd Division were in route to Chech'on. The ROK 2nd Division withdrawing in disarray, was to assemble south of Ch'ungju as a corps reserve.

Wonju was the most important strategic point in the central front line, and if the enemy captured Wonju, it could advance to Yoju and Ich'on, and through Ch'ungju to Taejon and Kimch'on, eventually threatening UNC ground forces around Seoul and the west front line. The enemy could also advance to Chaech'on and Yongju to assault Andong and Taegu. Wonju was indeed a vital strategic location. Accordingly, the possession of the Wonju area would be so influential for future operations that the US 2nd Division's decisive battle against the enemy was inevitable.

The US 2nd Division commander deployed 23rd Regiment on the west and southeast and the 38th Regiment on the north and northeast along the Wonju perimeter in order to establish its main line of resistance for defending Wonju and the airstrip in the south.
At around 05:30 on the January 7, 1951, the NKPA V Corps, prior to the main forces’ attack, put about 400 soldiers disguised as civilians and mixed into the column of refugees coming down along Route 29. They had passed through the forward out-posts of the division and its main positions, and began a surprise attack against the headquarters of two battalions in the rear area, and the division learned of the enemy infiltration by the surprise attack.30

At almost the same time as the surprise attack, the NKPA 12th Division assaulted the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division, deployed northeast of the Munmak on the left of the US 2nd Division, and broke through the regimental defense line to advance northwest. Eventually the US 2nd Division’s defensive positions were flanked. Being assaulted strongly by the enemy on both flanks, the US 2nd Division commander determined that it would be difficult to maintain his defensive line, and he requested the Corps commander to permit its withdrawal and his request was granted. The Corps commander expected the division would withdraw to the hill masses south of the city, from which it could control the streets of the city and could be a base for the future offensive; however, the division withdrew to the road along Wonju-Mokkye-dong further to the southwest than expected. On the night of the 7th, the 23rd Regiment had been deployed in the rear, 7km south of Wonju, and the 38th Regiment near Mich’on further south than the 23rd Regiment.35 Thus the division had actually retreated from Wonju because it could control Wonju only by fire power. The situation was far from the Corps commander’s intention.

The Corps commander thought Wonju was a critical point of tactical importance with its well established traffic network and, accordingly, whether to hold it or not would be the key factor in dominating the central region. As the division had given up Wonju, in the evening the Corps commander gave an order to the division commander that by dawn next day, the division should deploy more than four battalions on the hill masses south of the city of Wonju.
According to the order, on the morning of the 8th, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment launched an attack under cover of close air support by four fighters and, around noon, advanced to Hill 247 south of the city. During the attack, the battalion found the sleeping enemy troops and killed about 200 by surprise attack; however, a regimental sized enemy conducted a surrounding

**Wonju Battle**
assault, and the battalion had to withdraw to the rear area of Hill 247. Following the move to Hill 247, the battalion withdrew to Mich'ŏn, which the regiment's main forces had been defending, and was deployed south of Mich'ŏn to cover the exposed left flank created by the withdrawal of the ROK 8th Division. Hill 247, where both sides had fought bloody battles without conceding an inch of ground by either side, was not only critical terrain for commanding the streets of Wonju from south of the city and a basis for assaulting Wonju, but also could control the route between Wonju and Ch'ungju.

The US X Corps commander realized that the enemy had suffered from the heavy damage and its combat power was weakened, and he ordered the US 2nd Division to resume the attack with two battalions supported by an air strike and artillery fire in order to wipe out the enemy on Hill 247 and eventually should establish control of Wonju and the airstrip.

Following orders, the 23rd Regiment commenced attack with its two battalions at 10:00 on the 9th January. Unfortunately heavy snow fall on that very day forced the close air support to be cancelled. When the assaulting forces approached Hill 247, the enemy, as if they had been waiting for the American forces, opened concentrated fire against the assaulting forces and the attacking forces soon bogged down. In the meantime, a segment of the NK 12th Division penetrated into the rear area and isolated the assaulting echelon, forcing it to shift itself to defense on the spot. They strongly resisted the enemy attack and managed to repulse the North Koreans.

The assaulting echelon commenced the attack again on the 10th, but again because of the frequent heavy snow storms, the air strike had been cancelled, and the northern cold wave made the maneuver of the troops difficult and they were barely able to advance 1km. The 23rd Regiment commander at around noon, as the regiment's attack had made poor progress and as the enemy was continually receiving reinforcements, recommended withdrawal to the di-
vision commander. However, he ordered the regiment to hold its present position.

For the whole afternoon, both sides conducted bloody battles several times attempting to take ownership of Hill 247, and the regiment had inflicted about 2,000 NK troop casualties that day. However, the regiment also incurred heavy losses, and in the afternoon of the 11th, was reinforced by the French and Netherlands battalions. Fortunately in the afternoon, the first fine weather in a few days made air bombardment and close air support available, and the regiment killed about 1,100 enemy troops and held Hill 247 in its hand.\textsuperscript{560}

Thereafter, the NK V Corps committed all its units for the last fight against the American forces, but they suffered a rather heavy loss of troops, and also used up their ammunition; consequently, they failed to seize Wonju. The enemy division, committed to this battle was a crack troops unit of the NKPA, which had advanced as far as the Naktong River in the initial stage of the war, but at the Wonju battle had been decisively hurt enough to need reconstitution. On the 17th, the NKPA forces had deployed the 27th Division in the forward area to maintain contact with the UN forces, and their main forces withdrew to near Hoengsong; accordingly, the Wonju Battle was terminated with US 2nd Division's victory.

The US 2nd Division at Wonju could then support the ROK forces' withdrawal from the central eastern front and also simultaneously block the enemy breakthrough and hold onto the strategic point for the future counteroffensive operation. The outcome of the Wonju Battle for the division wiped out the dishonor of the Kunu-ri Battle of the previous November and it was a truly honorable victory for the division.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{(4) Breach in the Tanyang-Yongwol Area}

The ROK I and III Corps, which had been defending the steep mountain area on the mid-east front line, were having a difficult time defending their
positions from enemy pincer attacks on both flanks, from the front and the rear, attacks that had gone on since the first day of the enemy New Year’s Offensive. On January 1st they had to withdraw to the C-Defense line (Hongch’ŏn-Wonp’o-ri) and then, on the 5th, withdrew to the D-Defense line (Wonju-Wonp’o-ri). During the retreat, the ROK Divisions, due not only to the rugged terrain but also to the cutting off of the extremely limited routes by the enemy, had difficulty in withdrawing and their morale was very low.

On the other hand, on the 4th, the 9th Division near Hyon-ri which was marching to Soksa-ri via Ch’angch’ŏn, and the 3rd Division in Hongch’ŏn which was marching via Hoengsong, assembled at P’yŏngch’ang. The 7th Division, which had advanced north as far as Hongch’ŏn and Ch’unch’ŏn, was withdrawing from northeast of Ch’unch’ŏn via Hongch’ŏn-Hoengsong-Wonju to the Mokkye-dong-Ch’angdong-ri line.

Before the forward divisions could occupy line D (the Wonju-Wonp’o-ri line), the Eighth Army commander revised the defensive line which both ROK corps were to occupy, to the Wonju-Chongson-Samch’ŏk line 64km south of the original line. This revised strategy was undertaken in case the enemy advance to the rear area of line D, to provide the ROK forces the available time and space for attack the enemy and also to strengthen the defense capability east of Wonju. Despite such a confused situation, the ROK I and III Corps continued to move swiftly to occupy the revised defense line to blocking the enemy advance.

While the 3rd Division of the III Corps was in route to Yongwol from Hongch’ŏn on the 7th, the 7th Division moving from Sillim-ri to Yongwol encountered the enemy and was conducting a fierce battle. The 9th Division was also withdrawing to Chongson maintaining contact with the enemy at Chang-p’yŏng-ri; accordingly, the corps had not yet been able to organize the designated D-defense line. The Capital Division, the ROK 1 Corps was en route to
Samch'ok from Chumunjin. In the meantime, the US X Corps on the mideastern front line was ready for the NKPA V Corps, which intended to attack Wonju, and the ROK I and III Corps were maneuvering to occupy the revised defense line. In spite of these efforts, there remained a large gap between Wonju and the East coast, with no unit to block the enemy advance.

At this stage, the NKPA II Corps came down southward through the mountain area east of the Wonju-Chech'on-Tanyang Route, taking advantage of such vulnerability on the part of the ROK-UN forces. The vanguard of the NK forces, the 2nd and 9th division were advancing to near Yongwol far south of the Wonju-Samch'ok new defense line. Then it was ascertained that the NK II Corps, which had unified the command of the Kil Won P'al unit, operated a frontal attack with its main forces and, with its Second Front unit, penetrated into the area of Odae Mountain-Taegwal-ryong Pass-Taegi-san-Pohyon-san, on the right flank of the 9th Division to harass the rear area.\[51]\n
Because of these developments, the Eighth Army commander began to realize that his expectations would not be realized, and a large deep penetration was shaped around the Yongwol area. The Eighth Army commander ordered X Corps not permit of the enemy's advance south of Yongwol. And the US X Corps commander also put his operational priority on blocking the movement of the NK II Corps to Yongwol, worrying about their flank attack rather than the NK V Corps' attack against Wonju.

Around the same time, the ROK Army Headquarters resigned III Corps commander Major General Lee Hyung Koon, who had turned over his operational zone to the US X Corps after a fierce battle on the 38th Parallel, appointed Major General Yu Jai Hung, the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army as the new corps commander. General Yu recalled the situation as follows:
When I was assigned as Corps Commander, the 9th Division was assembling south of Chongson, the 7th Division southeast of Yongwol, and the 3rd Division at Ch'ungyang. All divisions were exhausted after the fierce battle on the main line of resistance near the 38th Parallel; however, as the situation did not allow for delay, the divisions had to quickly prepare for future combat and, at the same time, do their organizational maintenance. At that point, the enemy II Corps together with the Kil Won P'al's guerrilla forces was to slip out to Yongju and Andong, through Yongwol and Ch'ungyang. 

On the 8th, the leading unit, the 27th Regiment of the NKPA 10th Division, which had advanced to the front of the ROK 7th Division, was maneuvering southward along Route 29 via Chech'on and encountered a patrol of the US 7th Division. About 500 men of the regiment were killed in action and 14 were captured alive.

Following this, the US 3 Corps and the ROK III Corps were to conduct an unforeseeable battle against the NKPA forces which would attempt an enlargement of the penetration in connection with the guerrilla forces activity in the Yongju and Andong area.

The Communist forces had committed about 300,000 troops (the CCF 6 armies, about 230,000 and the NKPA 3 Corps, about 70,000) for the New Year's Offensive, had recaptured Seoul, and then had advanced to near the 37th Parallel; however, about 85,000 troops including 2,700 NKPA troops were killed in the offensive. The New Year's Offensive came to an end creating a difficult situation of the supplies due to the extension of the lines of communication.

On the other side, the UNC forces lost Seoul but, by conducting stubborn defensive and offensive battles in the Wonju area, managed to overcome the crisis of the January Fourth Retreat on the P'yongt'aek-Wonju-Chaech'on line and to block the enemy offensive successfully. However, the most urgent
operation for the ROK-UN forces was to sweep out the NK II Corps, which had infiltrated through the mountain area of Tanyang and Yongwol for a harassment operation in the rear area.

III. The government Establishes the Total War Posture

1. Demonstration of the Determination for Total War

Overcoming the crisis of the 'January 4th Retreat,' the war situation was narrowly stabilized on the 37th Parallel. In October of the previous year, when President Rhee had participated in the welcome gathering at the plaza of the Capitol building in Pyongyang, the unification of the country seemed to be just before us. However, in a few days the CCF participation in the war became a fact and the battlefield faced a new phase: consequently, the war situation turned in the opposite direction.

When the ROK and the UN forces began an all out retreat from Pyongyang, on the 2nd of December 1950, the defense minister of the ROK government released a statement urging the friendly forces to destroy the CCF's invasion with a total war, and the people to consolidate their determination to win the war.

We should fight against the enemy to our last breath and to the last moment and should not let the enemy devastate our nation. ......Now is the time to mobilize the whole nation with full armament and to conduct the bloody fight against the enemy. We will not have another chance. ......Each house and family should rise up and fight against the enemy even with axes, sickles, weeders and hoes, whatever may come
to hand. ..... The final victory should be ours not only for our country but also for the whole world and all human beings.

On the same day, President Syngman Rhee released an important statement that the war had entered the final decisive phase for our liberty and independence and we should cope with the crisis with a national total war posture. The government, to back up the President’s determination for a decisive victory, declared nation-wide emergency martial law on December 7th 1950 for the second time since the beginning of the war. At 15:00 on the 12th, a large-scale national convention to urge the beating back of the CCF’s invasion and the attaining of national unification was held at the Seoul Sports Stadium under the auspices of the Federation of Patriotic Societies. President Rhee participated in the convention and a resolution was adopted.

The Resolution

1. We are fighting against a new enemy, the CCF which has invaded Korea. We resolve to rise up to wipe out the enemy from Korea for the sake of liberty and peace for all human beings, and also for the unification and independence of Korea.

2. We will immediately provide arms to a million patriotic young men who can join the battle at once. We must struggle against communism and all of us should immediately bear arms so as not to repeat the failure of the June 25th war.

3. We, 30 million Korean People, should be united to defend our country, the stronghold of democracy. We solemnly declare that we cannot expect world peace and freedom for human beings without the stability of Korea.

While the UN forces was almost withdrawing to the 38 Parallel from the North Korean area on the 14th December 1950, the national convention of armament for crushing communism was being held at the Seoul Sports Stadi-
um for the adoption of a resolution that the young people should be armed with swords and rifles and all the people of the nation with spiritual armament to defend their fatherland.

At that time, the number of the volunteers for the army was increasing among the youngsters waiting a call. Some of them volunteered by writing in blood “I have the spirit of Wharangdo (the spirit of the elite youth in the Silla Dynasty who excelled in beauty, bravery and military arts). The victory of the war is ours. I will dedicate my life to my country.”

2. Establishment of the National Defense Army

Despite the resolution of the Korean nation, as the withdrawal of the UN forces which had pulled out from Pyongyang continued, the ROK government had to establish all out national security posture to cope with the state of national emergency. It decided to establish the National Defense Army for the purpose of a rapid mobilization of man power which would be greatly needed for the fight against the CCF. Accordingly, on December 21, 1950, the National Defense Army Law was established with the following essential points and the National Defense Army was to be organized.

1. All Korean men between the ages of 17 and 40 can join the National Defense Army voluntarily.
2. The National Defense Army should be organized by regional groups in principle, but organizations designated by the defense minister can establish the organizational groups.
3. The National Defense Army can only conduct military actions or military training by order of the Army Chief of Staff and is prohibited from engaging in political activities or public security activities.
4. In case of war or related incident, if necessary for military operations, the National Defense Army can be called in groups according to the military service law.

5. The National Defense Army will have an officer grade system and the Minister of Defense will appoint officers in accordance with the organization and ranking system of the army.

6. The presidential decree decides the disposition of the strength, the organization, the training, and the service term of the National Defense Army.

7. The Army Chief of Staff commands and supervises the National Defense Army by order of the Defense Minister.

According to the law, the Ministry of Defense and the Army Headquarters appointed Brigadier General Kim Yoon Koon as National Defense Army Commander and organized its Headquarters. The Army’s strength reached around 500,000.

The National Defense Army was organized in accordance with the active service of the army, and under its Headquarters, 51 training regiments were organized all over the country and enlisted the men between 17 and 40 years of age. A few key figures in the headquarters, some of the training regimental commanders, and a few of the key members were active service officers. The rest of the leaders were made up of rapidly commissioned officers taken mainly from the youth associations. Most of the soldiers were former farmers, and the officers included the evaders of active military service.

The National Defense Army was organized hastily in late December, 1950, but had to withdraw to the rear area along with the January 4th Retreat by the CCF offensive. The headquarters moved to Taegu and the Regional Defense Army moved to the south in regional groups and assembled at in the Taegu and Pusan areas.
However, during the movement, the high ranking officers embezzled a large sum of the appropriation for transportation, accommodation, food, clothing, medical supplies, and other supply items. As a result, on the long march in severely cold weather with temperatures below zero, many of the soldiers fell ill or ran away, and some even died due to starvation, freezing to death, or illness.\(^{43}\)

After this, the National Defense Army existed only in name and did not achieve the objective of its foundation. Eventually the Army was dismissed because of its scandalous management.\(^{45}\)

3. Attempt to Arm the Korea Youth Corps

On the occasion of the CCF's entrance into the war, the government and the people faced up to the solemn reality that the war would dominate the destiny of the nation. Though we appreciated the UN forces' desperate fighting against the enemy at the front, we could not stand by and only watch their withdrawal in the face of the CCF's invasion. To defend our country and territory, we had to come forward ourselves, and we needed, first of all, the arms to destroy the enemy. Confronting the reality of the situation, President Rhee made a decision to arm 500,000 members of the Korea Youth Corps and requested support for equipments from the United States.

Due to the special order of the President, Mr. Chang Myon, Ambassador to the United States, visited the US Department of State on the 6th of December and discussed the problem, but the response was negative because the US Government was already burdened with improving the equipment of the UN forces. Ambassador Chang, who had been assigned to the Prime Minister, visited the White House to say good-bye and directly asked President Truman for the armament of 500,000 Korea Youth Corps members. The ambassador
appealed to the President to “supply the arms for one million youth who have received basic military training and are waiting to be armed.” It was, in fact, difficult to get additional support from the UN forces at the time and the United States had no more available troops to dispatch; accordingly, the problem of the reinforcement of the UN Force’s combat power came to the fore. Considering the situation, the US Department of State decided the expansion of the ROK forces would be the best way to strengthen the UN forces’ combat power as an alternative measure.

The strong request by the ROK government and the necessity for the arms support caused the US Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problem, and the US Joint Strategic Plans Committee agreed on a plan. After looking into the available arms stock, the committee proposed to organize from 75,000 to 100,000 Koreans into special forces units and employ them for the security of the lines of communication and as guerrilla forces in the enemy occupied area. However, General MacArthur disagreed with the proposal for the reason that the existing ROK units had performed so poorly that there was little advantage creating new ones.42 He insisted that the Korea Youth Corps should be employed as replacements for the existing units.

Consequently, the US government accepted the Far East Forces commander’s judgment and the armament plan of the Korea Youth Corps which the ROK government had pushed so hard, did not materialize. The ROK government strengthened the diplomatic activities at the UN together with efforts to establish a total war posture, to found the National Defense Army and to attempt to arm the Korea Youth Corps. The government also focused its effort on informing the world about the Chinese illegal invasion and getting more stronger support to recover world peace.
IV. A Crossroad of the War

The ROK government decided to cope with the CCF participation in the war with a total war posture. However, the situation of the war reversed the offensive to the defensive and a new strategy had to be established, forcing the friendly forces choose either an evacuation or an escalation of the war, and the government had to study its evacuation problem from the military point of view. The period of time from the CCF entry into the war until "the January 4th Retreat" created the grand crossroads of the war.

1. Seeking for a New Strategy

Once the CCF’s entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKPA forces and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation.

During the discussion, the US and UNC assumed that China would be the 'second team' for the war and the ultimate enemy would be the USSR; accordingly, it was decided that the US should not be involved deeply in the war with China which could eventually lead into general war with the commitment of the main military forces. The most important point of the new strategy was that the UN should not give up Korea, and also should maintain the US troops
and units not to fall in disaster in Korea to defend Japan. The majority of the group of US leaders thought that the measure to cope with the Chinese invasion had to be set up through the UN collective security means, and so stressed that solidarity of the western UN member countries would be the most important matter. Consequently, it was determined that the most desirable scheme would be a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel under the initiative of the UN rather than expansion of the war or evacuation from Korea.

Nevertheless, the Korean delegation to the UN insisted that “the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists.” The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation’s desire.

At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The United States, from the time it had committed the US ground forces in early July 1950, studied and developed the nuclear weapon employment plan, and, in October and late November, when the UN forces faced a crisis due to the CCF offensive, the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons suddenly rose up. The US Department of Defense was to recommend the use of the nuclear weapons to the President if the UN forces faced disaster, and was prepared for rapid employment of such weapons whenever it was authorized by the President. The Defense Department, in close cooperation with the Far East Command established ‘the Emergency Use of Atomic Bombs in Close Support Plan’ and prepared to drop the bomb.
The employment plan of the nuclear weapons, which had been formulated in top secret, was released at a press conference by President Harry S. Truman, who suggested the possible use of nuclear weapons. The press conference was held on November 30, 1950, the day after the UN forces retreat had been decided on. At the opening of the conference, he released a statement that was intended to assure the friendly nations, uneasy about the CCF intervention, especially the UN member countries who had dispatched the UN forces to Korea. "The UN forces, he said, "had no intention to abandon their mission in Korea." In response to subsequent questions by the reporters, he answered, "The United States will take any steps necessary to meet the military situation including the use of every weapon that we have." He continued, "There has always been active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb."(a)

The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington.

The new strategy of war was discussed at the meeting between British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and US President Truman, which lasted from the 4th to the 8th December. Before departing for Washington, the British Prime Minister received a hurried visit from Prime Minister Rene Pleven of France, and they discussed the development of the war situation due to Communist China's intervention. In fact, the British Prime Minister came to the conference as a spokesman for Western Europe as well as for his own country, so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. Both sides easily reached a fundamental agreement to uphold the prestige and authority of the United Nations and to attempt to avoid a general war. However, there were some differences of opinion on practical matters.

Regarding the immediate situation in the Far East, it was agreed that
the time had come to seek a cease fire. The United States, however, as a condition for an end to the hostilities, insisted that a cease fire in Korea must not be linked to other issues; it must be an unconditional cease fire. The British, on the other hand, advocated the concession of Taiwan and the admission of China to the United Nations. In the end, the British gave up the Taiwan problem but continued to favor admission of China to the United Nations. As for the use of nuclear weapons for expansion of the war, the United States avoided a formal commitment. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee discussed the subject, and the President verbally promised that he would not consider the use of an atomic bomb without consulting the United Kingdom. While they agreed that voluntary withdrawal from Korea was unthinkable, in the case of forcible expulsion, the United States favored reprisals—military, political or economic, including UN condemnation of China as an aggressor, but the British strongly opposed any reprisals. Perhaps the most important result of the conference was to end the war on the basis of the old border—the 38th Parallel.\footnote{Of course, there remained the issue of whether or not concession should be given to Communist China’s unreasonable demand; however, an armistice was a general principle for the UN forces guidance in conducting the war against Communist China.}

Though the adoption of the strategy was inevitable, it was against the Korean government’s objective and also the Korean nation’s desire. Consequently, the hope to punish North Korean for its invasion and further to seek national unification on the basis of the June 28 UN Resolution for supporting Korea, which had been submitted at the beginning of the war, and the October 7 Resolution of the Unification of Korea, was extinguished. This was a turning point for the expectation that the unification of Korea depended only on political means after an armistice.

On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day
Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response.

The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and delegates of India, the United Kingdom, Sweden, etc., tried to determine the Chinese intention for the conditions of a cease-fire in Korea through its special delegate Woo Su Chuan. As a result, Chou En Lai issued the conditions for suspension of military action in Korea, as follows.  

1. Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. Withdrawal of the US force from the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan Area.
3. The solution of Korea's problems by the Korean nation.
4. Participation of the Communist Chinese delegate to the UN and withdrawal of the delegate of Chiang Kai Shek government from the UN.
5. Foreign Minister's Conference of Four Powers to be held for the preparation of a peace agreement with Japan.

Before delivering these conditions, Communist China informed Russia of the conditions through the Russian Ambassador to China, asking for their immediate response. Later that same day, the response of Stalin reached Chou En Lai.  

We fully agree with the conditions you proposed for a suspension of the military action. We believe that the military action should not be suspended if all the conditions are not satisfied. We also think that we should not be too frank to the delegates of these three spy countries of
the United States and should not show them our plan beforehand. ·····
Your five proposed conditions might be perceived as an insult to the
UN because of US trickery. The US will make use of it if possible, so
do not give them the opportunity. Accordingly, we think that we must
handle the situation as follows.

(1) The Chinese government also wants the military action to be sus-
pended in Korea as the delegates of the United Kingdom, India,
and Sweden proposed. China will make every effort for a rapid
suspension of the military action forced on China and Korea.

(2) We want to know the intention of the UN and the US in regard to
the conditions of peace. We know that you are not entrusted to
talk about the matter of conditions for peace like the UN or the
US.

(3) We are waiting for the opinions of the UN and the US about the
conditions for suspension of the military action in Korea.

The Chinese response to the United Nations’ attempt to ascertain the
Chinese intention was disguised with the tricks of Russia, which was actually
leading the Communist war guideline. Superficially they appeared to accept the
peace proposal; however, their conditions were far from acceptable by the UN.

Communist China’s strategy, which already had been shown in Mao’s
statement about his opinion on the guidelines for the development of the Kore-
an War delivered to Peng Teh Huai on December 4th was clearly to expel the
UN forces (actually the US Forces) and the cease-fire was a precondition for at-
taining this objective. The Chinese strategy was not in harmony with that of
the UN forces to seek a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel.

The enemy would ask for a cease-fire. The US imperialists must surely
accept the withdrawal from Korea, but first they have to withdraw
South of the 38th Parallel, then we can accept the cease-fire talk. The
best thing for us is to capture Pyongyang and also Seoul. The impor-
tant thing is to annihilate the enemy and first we have to destroy the South Korean Forces because this will enhance the US imperialists withdrawal.  

The two cease-fire resolutions of the Arab-Asian Bloc had, meanwhile, been laid before the General Assembly on December 11, without knowing the Communist position. The first resolution was to constitute a three persons commission for a cease-fire, and the other one was to ask for the opening of a conference on Far East issues. The two resolutions would satisfy the American insistence for an unconditional cease-fire and also would assure China that there would be a consideration of the wide Asian problem. One of the resolutions for a cease-fire was to be discussed at the three persons commission led by the President of the General Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, and including the delegates of Canada and India, and this commission would determine satisfactory basis on which a cease-fire was to be arranged. These basis were to be laid before the General Assembly as early as possible. The resolution was approved by the Assembly on the 14th of December.  

The United States had held a National Security Council conference on December 11 when the cease-fire commission had laid its resolution before the UN General Assembly and discussed conditions for a cease-fire. The final recommendation agreed on by the Council was as follows: We will consider a cease-fire, but “must not place the UN forces at a military disadvantage and without any political concessions. Details of a cease-fire should be negotiated in order to protect the security of UN forces before a cease-fire is accepted.”  

This, in effect, indicated that the cease-fire policy of the war was almost reaching a conclusion. The ROK government also had sensed the delicate turn of a cease-fire by the US, and President Syngman Rhee gave instructions to the Ambassador to the US, Chang Myon, to ascertain the true inten-
tions of the Americans. Ambassador Chang visited the State Department and the White House four times and stated, "According to my government instruction, I came to stress to you that the Korean people would fight against the Communists to the end. There can be no cease-fire for us. There are 500,000 anticommmunist youth who want to go to the front line to fight. What we need now is the armament of those 500,000 youth, and we need your support." He also said that Korea "strongly opposes the American appeasement policy to the CCF." He also discussed a report that the British Foreign Minister, Earnest Bevin, had made a proposal to establish a buffer zone in Korea to prevent a clash between America and China. He said to Assistant Secretary of State, "The ROK government would not agree with a proposal to set up a buffer zone in Korea. We will fight to the last moment. We urge you, the US and the UN, to present a united, determined effort to expel the invaders." He asked that the Korean position be reported to President Truman.32

At this stage, the Korean Foreign Minister Lim Byong Jik, who was serving at the UN, found out that a cease-fire mood was prevalent, and then he reported to President Rhee that strong sanctions should be imposed on Communist China. President Rhee repeatedly instructed Ambassador Chang to carry on the negotiations with the US government. Ambassador Chang made a call on President Truman and explained to him that "one million Korean youth were under military training and waiting for the supplies of arms," and urgently requested support. On 11 December, while the redemarcation of the 38th Parallel was under discussion at the UN, the ambassador visited the State Department again and he insisted that, "the ROK absolutely opposes the redemarcation of the 38th Parallel. We also oppose the setting up of a buffer zone south of the Yalu River, whether it is to be temporary or not." He expressed strongly the ROK government's opposition to a cease-fire.33

Despite the ROK government's strong resistance to a cease-fire, due to
the resolution of the General Assembly, the cease-fire committee, after obtaining the US statement of cease-fire terms, assured China of their clear understanding that as soon as a cease-fire had been arranged, the negotiations envisioned under the second part of the Arab-Asian plan would take place, and asked Chinese cooperation. The answer received from Peking on 21 December, however, was a flat rejection, on the grounds that all UN actions taken without participation of Communist China were illegal. The Chinese government rejected the cease-fire proposal and pulled out its special delegate to the UN.

On December 13, Mao Tse Tung had already issued an order for the 3rd offensive to Peng Teh Huai to envelop and destroy the enemy (the ROK and the UN forces) south of the 38th Parallel, and eventually to capture Seoul. At this time, the CCF were fully preparing an offensive operation. The only lingering hopes were slashed by a subsequent telegram from Foreign Minister Chou En Lai on December 23, 1950, the text of which was broadcast over the Peking radio on December 22 (Washington time). Assailing US actions the Chinese officials declared that the 38th Parallel as a demarcation line had been obliterated forever by the invasion of North Korea. He made it clear that Communist China would not consider a cease-fire apart from favorable disposition of Far Eastern political issues: withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, settlement of Korean affairs by the Korean people themselves, withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, and the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations. The content of the telegram was a summary of the secret pact exchanged between China and Russia. This telegram of rebuff brought the peace effort to an end.

A week after, on January 1, 1951, the Communists opened the prepared offensive operations, and on next day the commission reported to the Assembly that "no recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made at this time." After the end of the New Year's Offensive, on January 11,
the three persons cease-fire commission drew up a new peace plan, intended to meet some of the demands put forth by Peking, which proposed to establish peace in the Far East through the following five steps.53

(1) An immediate cease-fire in Korea.
(2) Exploration of future measures to promote peace.
(3) Withdrawal of armed forces from Korea, and appropriate arrangements for the Korean people to express their wishes regarding their government.
(4) Interim arrangements for unification of Korea and maintenance of peace and security therein.
(5) Establishment of an appropriate body, including representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Russia and Communist China to settle Far East problems including the status of Taiwan and China’s representation in the United Nations.

On January 13, 1951, this proposal was approved by the Political Committee and the General Assembly in support of the US and in opposition to Soviet Russia, and it was reported to Communist China. After studying the proposal on the 17th, China declared that it would not accept the cease-fire proposal without negotiation on political issues. China submitted an alternative proposal, repeating the same demands as before: the seating of the Chinese People’s Republic in the UN and withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan.

At that point, the ROK government submitted a note of protest to the UN, indicating that it was an injustice for the aggressor, the Communist Chinese delegate to the commission to participate in a discussion of Korean affairs.565

The ROK government appreciates the continuous efforts of the three persons Commission for the peaceful solution of the war; however, the main items of the proposal of the Commission are not acceptable to
the Korean government. Because the Communist China in every sense was a practical aggressor, we strongly oppose the Chinese participation in the solution of the Korean affairs and holding a conference of the four countries seems to be impossible.

The American leaders had seen through the Chinese Communist intention to oppose a cease-fire plan and to expel the UN forces from Korea by a continuous offensive, as it had repeatedly threatened to do. The US determined that the Communist China had no intention to stop a challenge against UN member countries and could insisted them stand up to China. The US, on December 16, declared a state of emergency and successively on January 20 submitted a resolution to characterize China as an aggressor. The resolution was approved by the General Assembly on February 1, 1951. Accordingly, the cease-fire effort at the UN, which had begun with the Chinese entry into the war, ended in failure. 50

2. Controversy over Evacuation vs Escalation of the War

The controversy over evacuation versus escalation of the war, which had begun with the CCF entry into the war, was postponed since the policy of war directive was agreed on at the United States-United Kingdom Summit Conference to lead the Korean War to a cease-fire, and the cease-fire commission commenced its operation. Because of the CCF opposition, however, the endeavors of the cease-fire commission were to no avail, and the CCF conducted its offensive continuously; consequently, the strategic controversy over evacuation versus escalation of the war came up again.

On December 22, 1950 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff made a very important decision concerning the problem: the first resolution of the UN, which had brought a commitment of the US and the UN forces to Korean War, was no
longer timely and needed to be revised. It was agreed that a government level decision for the United Nations Command withdrawal should be made as soon as possible, to the effect that if the CCF, strengthening their battle power, continued a strong offensive, their intention to expel the UN forces from Korea would come to fruition. They determined, therefore, that it would be a most desirable course of action to commit additional UN forces to Korea in order to make China pay a high price for its aggression, and force China to give up its intention of aggression. However, the international situation and atmosphere in the UN did not permit obtaining UN forces reinforcements or additional commitment of the US Forces.

In particular, the US believed that Korea was not the place to fight a major war. Further, the US believed, in view of the world strategy, that they should not commit their remaining available ground forces to action against the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of all-out war due to Chinese aggression. Accordingly, the US thought it was inevitable that they must yield to the enemy in its attempt to force the UN forces out of Korea in consideration of the safety of their troops in operation.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff made a decision to evacuate by force and it was approved by the President. The UN forces commander was so informed on December 29. The instructions from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was as follows.

* * * At which defense line in Korea a successful resistance against Chinese-North Korean aggression and deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists should be achieved would be of great importance to our national interest. You are now directed to defend in successive positions, as generally outlined in the telegram on December 7, imposing serious damage to the enemy, subject mainly to the safety of your troops. Since development of the situation may
force our withdrawal from Korea, it is important, particularly in consideration of a threat to Japan, to determine in advance our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation. It seems to us that if you were forced back to the Kum River and a line of positions along eastward there from and if thereafter the Chinese Communists were to mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, then it would be necessary under this situation to order you to commence an evacuation to Japan. ———

To General MacArthur, this message seemed to indicate a loss of determination to fight and win the war in Korea. In his reply on the next day (December 30), he recommended a strong retaliatory measure (escalation of the war). He said that the entire military resources of China were vulnerable; however, existing policy prevented exploration of this opportunity. He suggested four actions that might be undertaken in case the administration decided to recognize the State of War which had been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities.39

(1) To blockade China’s coast.
(2) To destroy the country’s industrial war-making capacity through air and naval bombardment.
(3) To reinforce the UN Command with Nationalist Chinese contingents.
(4) To allow the Nationalists to undertake diversionary action against the mainland.

Through these actions, General MacArthur contended, the UN forces, with a relatively small investment of military force, could severely cripple and largely neutralize China’s capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from engulfment otherwise facing it. The pressure on the UN troops in Korea would be reduced, and a decision could then be made whether to carry on the
fight there or to redeploy forces to the offshore islands, meanwhile continuing naval and air action against China.

General MacArthur insisted on military retaliation, recognizing that such a course of action had been rejected earlier as likely to provoke a major war, but China was now fully committed and nothing we could do would further aggravate the situation. Whether the Soviets would intervene was a matter of speculation. His own view was that the Soviet rulers would make their decision solely on the basis of their own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities. The Soviets were showing increasing interest in Japan: it was for this reason that he had asked for four National Guard divisions for use in the Far East. "It has never been my thought" he added, "that they should be committed to the Korean campaign."

Regarding the priority of the strategic deployment, he understood the demand for European security and concurred in supporting that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat everywhere else an acceptance which he was sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself. He stressed that the preferential use of forces in the present emergency in the Far East would not in any way prejudice this basic concept of the national strategy.

In conclusion, General MacArthur agreed that given the continuance of restrictions on UN command military operations, the tactical estimates of the JCS message was sound. Evacuation, if it were to take place, could only be accomplished through a successively contracting defense line south to the Pusan beachhead.

The Far East Command on January 7, 1951 fixed the draft of the evacuation plan which had been made out on the December 6, 1950 into an Operation Plan CINCFE 1-51. The essentials were that "the UN forces including the ROK forces should be evacuated from Korea in an orderly fashion, and the US Forces were to be deployed along the national defense line to cope with the
general war, and the UN forces were to be evacuated to their countries." This plan was also delivered to the subordinate units with the proviso that the plan would be effective for planning purposes.

On the other hand, the disagreement between Washington and Tokyo over the guidelines of war had been settled with the establishment of the UN forces military plan and political guideline on the pending problem at the conferences of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national Security Council during CCF New Year’s Offensive. After the telegram instruction on January 12, two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, General Collins and General Vandenberg, visited Tokyo and Seoul on the 15th and mediated the policy. First, as to the reprisals against China proposed by General MacArthur, with a precondition of prudent execution, the blockade of the China coast would be established depending on the situation when the front line was stabilized or the evacuation was completed. The bombardment of Chinese territory would be approved if the Chinese attacked the UN forces outside of Korea. Reinforcement of the UN forces with Nationalist contingents would not be helpful for operations and possibility of their deployment should possibly be made in other regions would be raised high; thus, this issue remained pending. Only a plan to lift an operational restrictions for the Nationalists was adopted, and they were to get logistic support for effective anti-communist operations. Regarding the additional reinforcement of troops, when the defense line in Korea was stabilized, two National Guard divisions would be deployed in Japan for its security; otherwise, the evacuated troops from Korea would be used for that purpose.

President Truman, especially in light of a demand for extending the military operation directly to Chinese territory, warned that "pending the build-up of our national strength, we have to act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in them-
selves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea could not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities."

In conclusion, the US JCS understood the situation confronting the UN forces and issued a directive to General MacArthur to conduct successive defensive operations imposing on the enemy as maximum damage as possible and, avoiding personnel and material losses, of friendly forces, to evacuate to Japan. They proposed that even if a continuous resistance would be impossible in Korean peninsula, the friendly forces should fight against the enemy on Cheju Island or on other offshore islands after evacuation. It was stressed that it must be made clear to the world that any military expulsion from Korea was an inevitable result of military necessity, but the result would not be accepted politically or militarily until the aggression had been rectified. This included a strong determination that though UN forces would evacuate, Korea would be never abandoned and also the war would not be escalated. In keeping with the spirit of this guidance, the US government then set up one of the objectives of resistance of the Korean exile government which was set up to handle the worst situation.61

3. Evacuation of the Government Considered

Included in the instruction for the UN forces which the US Government had formulated on January 12, 1951, on the occasion of the CCF entry into the war were that in forced withdrawal, the UN forces were to evacuate to Japan temporarily, and to evacuate the Korean government, the ROK armed forces and police forces to Cheju Island to continue the resistance, that is, to support the Korean government to establish an exile government on Cheju Island and continue the fight for a recovery of its territory.
This had been considered since the early evacuation plan (December 6, 1950) established by the United Nations Command and, according to the decision of the policy made up on January 12, 1951, was studied practically on the occasion of a visit of Generals Collins and Vandenbergh to Tokyo. The Evacuation Plan itself, however, had been discussed under strict security measures and the important matters discussed were kept secret and discussed between Washington and Tokyo without outside disclosure. It had been cleared up that the ROK government at the initial stage of planning, was only to be asked what to do if the US Forces inevitably evacuated from Korea in the worst military situation.

On December 6, 1950 (Washington time, December 5), Ambassador Chang, receiving the report that General MacArthur had informed the ROK government that the UN forces might evacuate from Korea, visited US Assistant Secretary of State Rusk. He pleaded that “if the UN forces could not expel the CCF and pulled out from Korea, all Korean people should die.” The Assistant Secretary of State mentioned that “we would not give up the Korean War or evacuate from Korea if the military situation did not force us to do so inevitably.” He also made the following statement of great significance:

I will stress again that we will never evacuate the US Forces from Korea if not forced by military action. However, in case the us troops have to pull out from Korea in the worst situation, (of course it won’t happen), we will discuss the possibility of the establishment of the Korean exile government if you want, and we would like to hear your opinion about it.27

Ambassador Chang reported this inquiry to his government. At that time, according to this planning which was going on in secrecy, “the ROK government, to keep its legitimacy and to continue the war, together with its military and police forces, has to evacuate to Cheju Island.” With this precondi-
tion they estimated that the number would include approximately one million, including 36,000 government officials and their dependents, 260,000 army, 80,000 police, and their 400,000 dependents, and set up a transportation scheme.

The most suitable location for the exile government was thought to be Cheju Island; however, as there were already 250,000 refugees and prisoners of war on the island, a shortage of potable water created a serious problem, and additional accommodations for the people was beyond the island’s capacity. The only solution seemed to be to move the prisoners to some other offshore island, but in any case the Korean should not evacuate to Japan. General MacArthur, in the process of studying the plan, stated that “the evacuation problem of Koreans must be decided in consultation with UN member countries. The location of evacuation, supply of food, medical support—those final issues would take several years. The expenses for operation of the plan must be disposed of prudently when the UN forces evacuation problem is decided. Since the UN forces are establishing air and sea superiority, they can intercept the lengthened Chinese lines of communication and can hold the Pusan beachhead (the Naktong River defense line) for some time (several months).” He especially stressed that, the solution to the evacuation problem of the Korean people was one of the problems for the UN, and it depended on a political solution.63)

Likewise, “the January 4th retreat” was a fateful crossroads for the Korean nation, and a decisive plan for the Korean people was underway. The war leaders of the UN Command, keeping the evacuation plan top secret, had established plans not only to evacuate the US and UN forces, and the Korean government, military, and police force to the offshore islands, but also to redeploy the UN forces, and to conduct even a next phase movement of the Korean government, military and, police force to cope with a probable general war.
The Evacuation Plan for the ROK Government and Military Forces to the Offshore Islands

19 January 1961

DEPARTMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Consultations with General Harkins

II. FINAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 19

1. Before departing Japan January 19th we had a final conference with General Harkins and his staff.

2. General Collins read a message which he had just sent to the JCS summarizing his findings in Korea (DA III 1108, copy attached as Appendix "A").

3. General Vandenberg outlined briefly the results of his inspection of the Air Force operations which he had found highly satisfactory.

4. a. General Harkins, Chief of Staff, FECOM, then opened discussion of the plans for evacuation of the Korean officials and the ROK army.

b. He gave the following estimate of the numbers that might have to be evacuated:

   - Government officials and dependents: 56,000
   - ROK Police Force: 32,000
   - ROK army: 820,000

   Total: 898,000

5. In addition to the above, 51st Army had estimated there would be approximately 400,000 government clerks and dependents of the ROK army and Police Force.

6. a. General Harkins stated that they had planned to place the ROK and Chinese prisoners of war on the island of Chajado. If this were done it would be impossible to place anyone else on this island, primarily because of the shortage of water (250,000 refugees are now on this island).

b. He pointed out the importance of placing ROK forces on Chajado in order to maintain the legal status of continuing combat in Korea.

c. General Harkins stated they had planned to put the Korean marines on Chajado and also to move the forces away and air forces there. Admiral Joy said it would not be possible to operate naval forces from Chajado since there was no harbor and that personnel and supplies could be landed in quantity only by LST's over open beaches.

d. It was agreed that as many ROK forces as practicable would be placed on Chajado and that further study would be made and recommendations submitted as to the disposition of the remaining ROK forces, ROK officials and dependents.
The UN Command were very worried about the effect on the friendly forces, especially the Korean forces, if a decision on the evacuation were disclosed rather than being concerned merely about the principle that the strategy of evacuation should not be leaked to the enemy, "If the instruction for evacuation were delivered, surely the information would be leaked, and there was real danger of collapse of the morale of the ROK Army if UN forces gave evidence of any intent to abandon Korea. This put the UN forces in a dangerous situation and they would be in peril to secure the Pusan bridgehead for a long enough time for the evacuation of the troops. They kept it top secret even without consulting with the ROK government. Though they estimated the time for decision making of evacuation when the defense line moved down to the Kum River line, they were not to draft a preparatory order until they reached the Pusan bridgehead line.

The UN Command set up a plan for evacuation of the ROK government and the UN forces, and turned their urgent concern to the CCF intention and the development of the frontline situation. However, apart from the UN forces estimation, it had been ascertained that, according to the Chinese Communist's "Resist America and Assist Korea", the CCF had no strength for pressing the UN forces down to the south and did not think of the UN forces retreat as a sign of evacuation but believed it was a strategy of the UN forces to canalize them for destruction. Thus, they pulled up by themselves not to exploit their New Year's Offensive for a pursuit operation.

The Chinese official history stated that the CCF had committed a total of 30 divisions for the first and second phase offensives, and; among them the IX Army Group (12 divisions) had been committed to the second phase offensive and suffered a loss at the Battle at Changjin Reservoir. The IX Army Group could not join the New Year's Offensive for a reorganization near the Hamhung area. The X Army Group (18 divisions), which had been committed
to first phase offensive and advanced as far as the 38th Parallel, suffered heavy losses two times during the winter offensive operations. It still maintained 230,000 troops; however, the ammunition and other supplies were almost totally depleted. The NKPA Forces deployed three corps, about 75,000 troops to the front, but because of an insufficient and brief reorganization period, they were not a threat to the ROK and UN forces.

The Chinese people’s Volunteers Commander Peng Teh Huai, who had not been aware of the UNC intention of evacuation at all, overestimated the UN forces capabilities and, due to Mao’s instruction, terminated the winter offensive only by occupying Seoul for a favorable political status. Peng Teh Huai suggested to Mao Tse Tung, “We must conduct an offensive prudently.” His rationale and an estimation of the UN forces follows:

The Korean War might be a prolonged war and a difficult one. The enemy had turned over their offensive operation to a defensive one. The enemy frontline was reduced in both width and length. The troops were deployed in concentration; naturally the depth of the defense was strengthened, and their combined operation was improved to their advantage.

From the political point of view, if the enemy abandoned Korea, it would create so many disadvantages for imperialism that the United Kingdom and France might insist that the US not abandon Korea. Even though the enemy would be defeated once or twice, and their two or three divisions would collapse, they might conduct successive defense operations along a few bridgehead positions (Pusan, Inch’on, and Kunsan), and they would never evacuate from Korea.

Mao Tae Tung had sent a message to the CCF Command as a response for the commander, “Your estimation about the enemy situation is correct. I agree with your suggestion. You must establish a long term plan and don’t be
hasty to win the war; it will be very harmful for us.” Mao, especially delivering his guideline for the New Year’s Offensive stressed that “after this campaign the main forces might withdraw of their own will for rest and reorganization. And it will be useful for the Spring Offensive to destroy the enemy forces.” It was certain that the purpose of the New Year’s Offensive was not to press the ROK and UN forces into the southern sea but to occupy Seoul.

The above-mentioned Mao’s guideline coincided Peng Teh Huai’s analysis of a outcome of New Year’s Offensive as follow.63)

During the operation through January 8th, the friendly forces pushed back the enemy to P’yongtaek-Ansong-Chech’on-Samch’ok line near the 37th Parallel. Judging from the fact that the friendly forces failed to destroy massive enemy forces during the offensive, the enemy seemed to withdraw intentionally to lure the friendly forces to deep inner positions and was to conduct a landing operation in a flank rear area. Consequently, the friendly forces did not advance far enough to be utilized by the enemy and halted pursuit operation to secure a favorable future operation.

The ‘January 4th Retreat’ was a crisis on which rested the fate of the nation and a critical turning point in history. At that point, the UN forces, as the Chinese participation in the war had become certain, were overwhelmed by the massive Chinese potential with a population of 500 million and 5 million armed forces in addition to the Soviet Union’s backing. The UN forces eventually established a new war strategy to cope with a general war. They established a forced evacuation plan together with a plan of the ROK government’s evacuation to an offshore island, supposing that the Chinese intent was to expel the UN forces. They focused their concern on the changes in the frontline situation. The Kum River line, 50km south of the frontline, was the green light for the execution of this plan and the fate of the Korean nation
hung by a thread.

On the other hand, the Chinese Forces had no strength to pressure the UN forces without additional reinforcements of troops. They set up a strategy to advance down to Seoul south of the 38th Parallel, securing politically, militarily and psychologically favorable position and were to prepare for the Spring Offensive. The CCF then assumed that the UN forces’ retreat was a luring strategy with the intent of enveloping them by employing a second Inch’on landing operation, and so they did not try to advance deep into the enemy positions. Actually as they had suffered a large number of casualties during the New Year’s Offensive, they were impossible to advance any more.

Consequently, at the 37th Parallel just 50km before the starting signal line to execute the evacuation, the ROK and UN forces blocked the enemy advance and the enemy also halted its offensive; ultimately the evacuation of the armed forces and the ROK government was not carried out. The assumptions about the situation on both sides was historical irony. Of course, in execution of this plan, the choice of whether the ROK government and its armed forces would evacuate to an offshore island in keeping with a plan of the UN Command, or the UN forces alone would evacuate from Korea and the Korean government would resist at Pusan beachhead to the end, completely depended on the ROK government. And it could not exclude the possibility of problem developing as a separate situation. The evacuation plan indicated that the problems of the Korean people would be at the disposal of the UN. There was no indication of the possibility that Korean freedom-seeking boat people would be created as was the case in Vietnam, and no indication to cope with a probable situation when it would happen. The evacuation plan contained a lot of problems. At any rate, the situation was a crossroads for the Korea nation: a choice between evacuation of the government to an offshore island or resistance to the end at Pusan beachhead. The situation also left the very valu-
able lesson that a misjudgement of the enemy's intention and strategy during wartime can have a critical impact on both sides and drive a fate of the country into a crossroad of a national ruin.
Notes


8) Ibid., p. 193.


10) Ibid., p. 86.


14) Korea Research Institute for Strategy tr., op. cit., p. 87.


16) Ibid., p. 381.

17) The ROK Army HQ. tr., op. cit., p. 201.


20) The ROK Army HQ. tr., op. cit., 197.

21) Ibid., p. 199.

22) Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 90.

23) The ROK Army HQ. tr., op. cit., p. 205.

24) Ibid., p. 214.

25) Ibid., p. 220.


28) The ROK Army HQ. tr., op. cit., p. 216.

29) The Korea Research Institute for strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 92.


32) Ibid., p. 425.

33) Ibid., p. 422.


35) Ibid., p. 228.

36) Ibid., p. 230.


38) The ROK Army HQ. tr., op. cit., p. 224.


42) The National Defense Army was deactivated on April 30, 1951 and for the incident the Minister of Defense, Shin Song Mo was dismissed from the post. The Commander of the National Defense Army, Brigadier General Kim Yoon Koon and his four key figures were executed.


46) Ibid., pp. 291-299.


49) Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 79.


52) Han Pyo Wook, op. cit., p. 125.

53) Ibid., p. 129.

54) The War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, tr., op. cit., p. 304.

55) Ibid., p. 334.


58) Ibid., p. 315.

59) Ibid., pp. 315~316.
60) Ibid., p. 332.
61) Ibid., p. 329.
64) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., pp. 80-81.
65) Ibid., p. 92.
66) Ibid., p. 92. It was written that during New Year’s Offensive, the communist suffered a damage of 85,000 KIA (including 2,700 NKPA).
Chapter Five  The Re-counteroffensive of the United Nations Forces

I. Prelude to the Counteroffensive

1. The United Nations Command Counteroffensive Policy

On January 1, 1951, the Communist Forces opened the third offensive, commonly called the New Year’s Day Offensive, against the ROK Army units and the UN forces deployed along the main resistance line, roughly along the 38th Parallel. The Communist Forces were then comprised of 18 divisions of the CCF six armies (38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th, and 66th Armies) and 14 divisions of North Korea’s three corps (1st, 2nd, and 5th Corps). These Communist forces, in a combined operation, pushed back the friendly units, and occupied Seoul again on January 4. Subsequently, in order to enlarge and expand the results of the invasion, the North Korean 1 Corps and the CCF 50th and 42nd Armies, crossed the Han River, and pushed back the friendly units toward Suwon and Ich' on; the II and V Corps of the North Korean Forces forced back the friendly forces to Wonju, Chech’ on, Yongwoi and Andong.

The enemy forces’ will to fight had been seriously weakened, however in a series of battles in winter. They were utterly exhausted because of the cold weather and fatigue. In addition, their supplies had virtually been consumed, not only because of the excessive length of the logistic line, but also due to attacks by the UN air forces. The enemy’s main forces, with the exception of the
units on the second front which had infiltrated the eastern front, ceased persuit of the friendly forces when they reached the Suwon–Kumyangjiang-ri–Ich’on–Yuju–Wonju line. The Communist Forces had been worrying about the UN forces’ landing operations in their rear areas. Though the enemy gained the territory located 80 to 110km to the south of the 38th Parallel, the enemy had suffered the tremendous loss of approximately 85,000 lives (2,700 soldiers of the North Korean Army included). As the withdrawal of the UN forces was systematically conducted, the enemy failed in destroying any large units. Their expectations of the offensive attempt not having been met, they terminated their New Year’s Day Offensive January 8, 1951 to prepare for their Spring Offensive. 

By deploying the 1st Corps of the North Korea People’s Army near
Inch'on, with the 50th Army of the CCF along the Suwon-Kumyangjang-ri line and the CCF 42nd Army along the Yoju-Ich'on line, the enemy organized the main resistance line south of the Han River. In their rear areas, the CCF 39th Army was assembled around Uijongbu, the CCF 38th and 40th Armies around Surak-san, and the CCF 66th Army near Yangdeogwon-ri. They were resting and were doing the utmost for organizational maintenance.

Meanwhile, as the 9th Army Group, the enemy's reserve, had suffered a severe loss of lives in the battles near Changjin Reservoir, it was still in the middle of reorganization in the vicinity of Hamhung. The V Corps of the North Korea People's Army and the subordinates of its II Corps, however, were infiltrating Wonju and the Chech'on-Yongju Line, respectively.

Both the ROK Army and the UN forces had estimated that, if the main resistance line was revised from the 38th Parallel to line D along the P'yong'laek-Ansong-Changhowon-Wonju-Chumunjin line, which was near the 37th Parallel, the US I Corps and the US IX Corps on the western front could get out of the threat of being enveloped by the enemy coming from the northeastern, and also the US X Corps and the ROK I and III Corps on the eastern front would be able to secure favorable terrains for their defense. Yet, on the eastern front that had been assigned to the ROK units, the North Korean units had been ceaselessly infiltrating by taking advantage of the steep and lofty cliffs of T'aebaek Mountains, and it was impossible for the friendly forces to build up the defensive line along the Wonju-Chumunjin line. On January 5, the Eighth Army Commanding General ordered the defense line D to be lowered by 64km southward from the Wonju-Chumunjin line, thus changing the Wonju-Samch'ok line to defense line D, and having the ROK I and III Corps occupy that line.

Around this time, the UN forces' battle lines were as follows: the US I Corps (under the command of Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn), which was deployed
along the P’yongt’aeck-Ansong line of the western front; the British 29th Brigade on the westside of Route 1; the US 3rd Division between Route 1 and Route 17 (Ch’onan-Ansong-Kumyangjjang-ri-Kyungan-ri); and the ROK 1st Division to the north of Ansong. And the US 25th Division and the Turkish Brigade, the Corps’ reserve, were located at Ch’onan. At this time, the troops of the ROK 1st Division were reinforcing the defensive positions. In order to erase the disgrace of twice not having able to hold Seoul, that is, at the outbreak of the war and at the time of the ‘Withdrawal on January 4,’ they were doing their best, with a renewed spirit, to cultivate the spirit of never being defeated, retraining themselves and replenishing equipment.

The US IX Corps, under the command of Maj. General John B. Coulter, was deployed along the Changhowon-Namhangang line, being flanked on the right by the US I Corps. General Coulter had the ROK 6th Division locate at Ch’oko-ri, the British 27th Brigade and the US 24th Division in the area of Changhowon, and the US 1st Cavalry Division as reserve at Ch’ungju to cover the Corps’ rear area and main supply route.

At the same time, the US X Corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, deployed along the Namhangang-Wonju line on the right flank of the US IX Corps, had the ROK 5th Division deploy west of Munmak, the ROK 8th Division east of Munmak, and the US 2nd Division south of Wonju. The ROK 2nd Division, a reserve force of the Corps, was positioned in Ch’ungju to cover the military installations and the main supply route in Ch’ungju, while the US 7th Division was in Chech’on to give protection for the main supply route between Chech’on and Andong.

On January 9, the ROK III Corps, under the command of Major General Yu Jai Hung, on the eastern front started to move southward from P’yungch’ang-Changp’yung Line according to the revision order of the defense line, and he had the ROK 7th Division positioned north of Yongwol, the ROK
9th Division north of Chongson, and the 3rd ROK Division assigned from the ROK II Corps at Ch’unyang, as the III Corps’ reserve. Meanwhile, the ROK I Corps on the eastern coast, under the command of Brig. Gen. Kim Paik II, attempted to move its Capital Division from Chumunjin to Samch’ok. In fact, the division was in the process of movement as ordered, but on January 12, it was finally able to occupy the defensive line west of Samch’ok because of the lack of the network of roads. To make matters worse, all available approaches were utterly frozen.

The strength of the defensive line was improved, with the morale of officers and men growing higher, and the front line was being stabilized. It was then that Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway decided to transform defensive operations into offensive ones. He reached the conclusion that it was improbable that the UN forces could increase the number of their troops on a large scale, while the Communist Armies were attempting to expel the UN forces from Korea. For the friendly forces to occupy a fixed defensive line for any extended period of time would only result in their incurring tremendous damage themselves. Instead of securing an area, therefore, attacking the enemy while they were in the process of moving would cause a maximum amount of damage or delay their offensive actions. Besides, this would be the best policy for preserving the fighting power of the friendly forces. The decision was firmly made. It was in keeping with this decision that the following guidelines for operations was given out to the pertinent units:

(1) In order to gain control over the CCF human-wave tactic that is based on outnumbering our troops, our friendly troops will exploit our fire power and maneuverability to the maximum degree. To achieve this bloodshedding tactic of ours with the predominance of fire power and maneuvering, close coordination with all branches of service such as infantry, artillery, cavalry should be accom-
plished, and Air Force and Navy will concentrate upon fire support for ground operations.

(2) My objective is just killing the enemy rather than securing a territory. Likewise, the main goal of the operation lies in minimizing the friendly losses and maximizing the damage to the enemy troops and material.

(3) In any attack, avoiding an adventurous operation and performing a reconnaissance in force in smaller units would be advisable. Only after the enemy situation is confirmed, should more intense combat patrols be conducted and an over-all attack for seizing a limited objective be expanded.

(4) During the period of attack, lateral coordination with, and maintenance of the links with, the adjacent units is more crucial than the speed of attack. In order to attain these important goals, control lines will be gradually established. In order to prohibit attacking echelons from protruding outside the friendly front lines or to prevent them from advancing by by-passing the enemy, all the attacking echelons must obtain prior permission from the Corps-level Commanders before crossing a control line.

(5) When and if the enemy’s offensive on a large scale commences, the friendly units will withdraw in good order to a planned defensive line, while maintaining communication and coordination with adjacent units. In this situation we should not bring forth the imbalance of the front line that could be created by the hasty withdrawal of a unit, nor should we allow the enemy to break through our front line or penetrate into our rear area.

(6) All the units in the process of retreat are not just with drawing for the sake of retreating; while maintaining contact with the enemy, we should dare to carry out a delaying action and seizing every available chance, we should demand the enemy to pay with the maximum bloodshed. By leading the main force of the enemy in the killing zone as we planned, we should strike them with concentrat-
Situation of Friendly and Foe (January 15, 1951)
ed ground and air fire power.

(7) When the enemy’s offensive spirit reaches its limit, the friendly troops should immediately transform tactics into counter-attack; then by continued maneuvering, compel the enemy to consume and bloodshed, finally annihilating their fighting power.

Based upon these guidelines for operations of the commanding general of Eighth Army which was later known as ‘The Crusher Tactics,’ the UN forces, with the expectation that they would return to the state of war prior to the New Year’s Day Offensive, started to apply gradually the offensive operations against limited goals."

2. Reconnaissance in Force

In compliance with the guidelines of operations of the Eighth Army Commanding General, on the western front, reconnaissance parties were dispatched in front of the defensive line. This had two objectives: to maintain contacts with the enemy that had been disengaged due to the enemy’s suspension of the offensive and the withdrawal of the friendly forces, and simultaneously to get a first-hand grasp of plausible attempts of the Communist forces. In the U S 1 Corps sector, on January 7, the reconnaissance party of the ROK 1st Division had a slight contact in the vicinity of Kumyangjang-ri. And then, the US 1 Corps dispatched the 27th Regiment of the US 25th Division (the corps’ reserve) at Ch’onan on both sides of National Road No. 1 and in the area north of Chinwi-ch’ on to widely reconnoiter the area. However, only a meager number of the enemy was encountered. The purpose of this reconnaissance was to establish a combat outpost in Osan and near Chinwi-ch’ on south of Osan. In addition, the reconnaissance party of the US IX Corps on the right flank of the 1 Corps reconnoitered in the Ich’ on-Yoju area several times, but
they confirmed that the region was an empty space.

From January 7 through 15, the US I and IX Corps reconnoitered the region north of line D, but there was no specific contact with the enemy, and it was decided that no enemy troops occupied the area in front of the sectors of either corps. According to the intelligence reports collected from civilians and air observations, it was confirmed that Chinese forces were continuously moving toward the south. And according to other sources of information, it was estimated that 174,000 troops of the CCF were in front of the UN forces; however, their positions and goals were not clarified. Yet, it was not possible to confirm whether or not the Chinese troops were actually deployed. At this time, the most likely places, where the Chinese troops were heavily assembled, was speculated to be along Route 1 between Suwon and Osan, and the junction of Route 13 near Kyongan-ri and Route 17.\footnote{The Eighth Army commander, who was concerned about the scarcity of reported intelligence, planned reconnaissance in force on a limited scale on the western front before he would order the first offensive operation after he had the friendly forces withdraw to the 37th parallel. The plan had two objectives: exploring any enemy deployment, its scale, and future goal, and holding in check the pressure on the eastern front.

The Eighth Army commander decided the enemy being assembled between Osan and Suwon near the front line of the friendly forces, to be the object of offensive. And in order to search the area for the enemy’s unit size and their defensive power, he ordered the US I Corps to closely reconnoiter the area for two days, with a unit strengthened by a minimum of one tank battalion. The fighting power and the reinforcements of each division were still not satisfactory. Thus, considering that the circumstances not yet favorable for the offensive, he emphasized that no more troops were to be included in this reconnaissance mission.\footnote{The Eighth Army commander decided the enemy being assembled between Osan and Suwon near the front line of the friendly forces, to be the object of offensive. 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The US 1 Corps commander assigned this mission to the US 25th Division, the reserve of the Corps. And the Division Commander had organized the 27th Regiment, the Division's reserve, strengthened by one tank battalion reinforced by artillery and engineer supporting units, into reconnaissance patrols. To cover the right flank of the reconnaissance party, the US 3rd Division dispatched a small unit of infantrymen and tanks and ordered it to intercept Route 20 running between Suwon and Kumyangjang-ri. The ROK 1st Division arranged one battalion at Ch'ŏn-ri on Route 17 located 5km south of Kumyangjang-ri. The reconnaissance operation was named 'Operation Wolfhound' after the nickname of the 27th Regiment."

On January 15, the main body of the 27th Regiment was moving north along Route 1; however, there was no encounter whatsoever with the enemy. Yet, roads and bridges had been demolished, the enemy had laid mines, and other obstacles constructed, all of which had contributed to delaying the regiment's movement, which was forced to come to a halt north of Osan in the dark of night. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion, which had been moving along Route 39 on the western front (Pyongtaek-Paranjang-Suwon), had to suspend its advance in the vicinity of Paranjang.

On the same day, the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Regiment, the ROK 1st Division, which had been supporting the reconnaissance in force on its right flank, advanced to Ch'ŏn-ri along Route 17 without any resistance, but one battalion from the 15th Regiment of the US 3rd Division and two tank companies maneuvering toward the same axis encountered an estimated strength of 600 to 800 Chinese armed with small weapons and powerful mortars near Kumyangjang-ri north of Ch'ŏn-ri. The friendly forces were under fire, and firing was exchanged fiercely. The reconnaissance force was brought to a halt, with Route 20 leading to Suwon almost in sight.

On the morning of January 16, the moment the corps ordered the with-
drawal, the commander of the 27th Regiment deployed a motorized infantry company and a tank company into Suwon. This action was intended to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy that had been discovered in Suwon. About the time when the reconnaissance party was advancing 500m south of Suwon, the patrols encountered resistance of the enemy which had been dispatched to that area. And behind these enemy forces, from the buildings in the city, the other CCF were supporting the resistance with machine guns. It was simply not possible to advance any farther. The reconnaissance forces stopped their advance and, only with the support of air-attack, were they able to withdraw. The unit of the reconnaissance in force, which had confirmed the enemy positions, was again dispatched to the corps’ line of outposts extending from the west coast to the Chinwi-Ch’on.

On the other hand, the US IX Corps, adjacent to the US I Corps, in order to cover the latter’s right flank, ordered the 3rd and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division to take positions at Kumyangjang-ri in front of the boundaries of the Corps and north of Paegam-ri, respectively. The Corps also had the 70th Tank Battalion of the US 1st Cavalry Division, the Corps’s reserve that had been located at Sangju, move forward to Chinch’on and support the ROK 6th Division under Brig. Gen. Chang DoYong. The Corps commander, to find out about the enemy activities in the area south of the road connecting Kumyangjang-ri-Ich’on-Yoju, directed one battalion of the US 24th Division to occupy and defend Yoju on the right front, and another battalion reinforced by tanks and infantry to occupy and defend Ich’on on the central front.

On January 22, the IX Corps, not making contact with the enemy, instructed the 8th Cavalry Regiment to organize Task Force Johnson, reinforced by the 70th Tank Battalion, artillery, and engineering units, to move forward Yangji-ri ahead of the outpost positions of the ROK 6th Division then de-
ployed near Paegam-ri and reconnoiter the high ground in the northern section of Route 20 running between Kumyangjang-ri and Ich'on. The reconnaissance patrols received enemy fire in the vicinity of Yangji-ri, but the resistance was very slight; consequently, it was confirmed that there were no occupied enemy forces in the southern section of Route 20 and that only a small faction of the enemy had taken positions generally along the route.

In this reconnaissance in force, the US I Corps killed 1,180 troops by air-attack, and 195 by ground action, capturing 5 POWs; meanwhile, the corps suffered 10 casualties. The US IX Corps killed 50 by air-attack, and 15 by ground operation; the corps suffered 7 casualties.

The Eight Army commanding general commended the significance of this reconnaissance in force in that the officers and men of the UN forces, whose morale had been low because of the Chinese entry into the war, now had recovered the will to attack. The strengthening of morale was more satisfying than the results of the reconnaissance in force. This operation enabled intelligence staff to confirm that enemy units organized on small scales were building defensive positions along the line Suwon-Kumyangjang-ri-Yangji-ri, although large units had not proceeded south of that line. In addition, captured POWs also confessed that the 8th Division, North Korean I Corps, had positioned itself in the south of Seoul. This operation was UN forces' first attack since 'the home by Christmas Offensive' (November 24, 1950), thus forming the starting point of re-counteroffensive.

3. Cut-Off Operations of the North Korean Army Second Front

On the western front, with the stabilization of the battle line, ascertaining the enemy situation by executing a reconnaissance in force, the UN forces were trying to advance to the Han River; on the eastern front, however, at the
time of the New Year’s Day Offensive, the 4 divisions (2nd, 9th, 10th and 31st) under the North Korean II Corps infiltrated deeply along the Hongch’on-Hoengsong-Wonju line, and by making use of rugged terrain, established the second front in the area of Tanyang, Munkyong, Yongju, Andong, south of Chech’on Yongwol. This unexpected situation created a totally new phase in the war.

Because of this, the ROK III and I Corps on the eastern front failed to maintain the defensive line between Hongch’on and Chumunjin. Thus, at 20:00, January 5, in compliance with the ROK Army Headquarters Order (No. 258, Revised Order No. 1) both Corps withdrew to the line connecting Yongwol with Samch’ok (Line Whangwoo).

On January 9, Maj. Gen. Yoo Jai Hung, replacing Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Keun as the III Corps commander, made the following changes along the Namhangang flowing north of Yongwol: the 7th Division (Brig. Gen. Kim Hyung II) on the left front positioned itself in the area of Wantaeksan north-west of Yongwol, and the 9th Division on the left front (Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Kap), near Chongsan. The ROK 3rd Division (Brig. Gen. Ch’oe Sok) having been dispatched in order to reinforce the strength of the Corps, was instructed to occupy Ch’unyang as the reserve force for the Corps. From January 10, the reserve division was able to secure a stronghold to intercept the infiltrating enemy forces through the rugged passes of the Taebaek Mountains.

A word about the infiltrated enemy movement was due here. The North Korean II Corps (Maj. Gen. Ch’oe In) had been retreating by way of the mountainous area in the east since their failure in the Naktong River battles. Along the way, the corps had been collecting stragglers and even segments of the defeated North Korean armies. The corps was then reorganized at Hwa-ch’on, Kimhwa, and Yangdok, and when the UN forces were withdrawing from P’yongyang, the corps launched guerrilla warfare. And the II Corps was the...
unit most familiar with the mountainous terrain on the mid-eastern front, and was the most well versed in infiltrating tactics. With these advantages, they had started their infiltration before they launched the New Year’s Day Offensive, with the determined intention of agitating and dispersing the troops of UN forces behind main resistance line. The North Korean 11 Corps had organized infiltration units: the 10th Division as vanguard, the 2nd Division on the right front, the 9th Division on the left front, and the 31st Division as follow-up troops. Just when the 10th Division, its advance guard, encountered the US 2nd Division in the vicinity of Wonju, it moved eastward in order to avoid the American units moving southward in the Yongwol area, and even their main force followed the 10th Division. By doing this, they succeeded in their infiltration east of Route 29. At this time, the North Korean 11 Corps was able to infiltrate without any contact through the gap created while deploying the ROK III Corps and the US X Corps, the gap space being about 24km between Chech’on and Yongwol.

The Eighth Army commanding general, having analyzed the situation on the eastern front, judged that the greatest danger facing the US X Corps was not the North Korean V Corps coming down to Wonju, but the II Corps that had already infiltrated through this route. He ordered interception of the passages in the sector of the US X Corps and annihilation of the North Korean troops within the corps sector. In order to support the US X Corps, he also ordered the 187th Airborne Regiment Combat Team, which was resting, to move to Andong and attach to the US X Corps. Simultaneously, in order to intercept any enemy movement south of the road along the Andong-Yongdok line, the US 1st Marine Division, which had withdrawn from Hungnam and was in readiness at Masan, was moved to the Yongch’on, Kyungju and Pohang area to reinforce the security of the rear area."

While advancing to Chech’on on January 9, the 27th Regiment, the
vanguard of the North Korean 10th Division, encountered the reconnaissance patrols of the US 7th Division, which resulted in a fierce battle. According to the statements of POWs then captured, the first objective of the 10th Division was Tanyang, and the second was Taegu.

At this time, the ROK Special Attack Battalion (Major Bae Tong Keul) attached to the US X Corps, conducted reconnaissance patrols of Choksong-ri at the foot of Hwangjang-san, which would afford easy approaches to Yongju, Munkyong, Chomch'on and Yech'on for the enemy troops which had already infiltrated Tanyang from Chomch'on, through passages in the valley that would conceal them well. While the battalion was preparing for bivouac, one regiment of the North Korean 10th Division, which had infiltrated into Tanyang was moving southward to advance to Kyongsan. At that point the enemy regiment encountered outposts of the battalion. These North Korean troops had been fighting in this region at the outbreak of the Korean War, and were accustomed to the terrain. Taking advantage of this, they encircled the battalion, and opened surprise attacks. The battalion organized all-around defense positions, fighting desperately for two days. A tank unit coming as reinforcement was helpless. By mines that had been laid by the enemy, the lead tank was destroyed and blockaded the passage. Besides having no tank support, the battalion was outnumbered. In spite of the critical situation, the battalion, however, did not succumb to the enemy. They continued to resist the attacks with the aid of friendly air attacks and air supplies. The enemy regiment finally withdrew, leaving 1,000 bodies killed during the two days, and abandoning a large variety of equipment. On January 15, the battles were about to be brought to a close, and the commander of the reinforcement unit of the US X Corps and the corps commander rushed to the battleground at the victorious news of victory and praised the fighting of the battalion very highly. This greatly encouraged the battalion."
The commander of the US X Corps, at first, planned to deploy troops in the newly created open space; however, in the current situation in which the enemy had penetrated in depth, he judged that it would be more effective to deploy his troops in depth and to expand patrols rather than to defend the Chech'on-Yongwol line. On January 16, the corps commander moved down the corps defense line from the Yoju Wonju line to north of the Woonnam-ri-Chech'on line; subsequently, he ordered the US 2nd Division to be wholly responsible for defending the main resistance line, while he committed the ROK 5th Division (Brig. Gen. Min Ki Shik), which had been in defense of Munmak, to Yongch'un, and the 8th Division, in the area of Hwanggang-ri.16

Despite Friendly Forces' deploying reinforcement units, the enemy continued to penetrate into the rear area by taking advantage of the rugged terrain and the darkness of night. The North Korean 2nd Division advanced to the Wonju-Chech'on-Andong line to link itself with the North Korean 10th Division, which had already penetrated as far down as the Andong-Uisong line and was agitating in the rear area. On January 12, the 2nd Division reached Wonmanhur located west of Hyongje-bong. Meanwhile, the North Korean 9th and 31st Divisions that had penetrated along the Namhan River, the sector boundary of the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps. In order to secure Yongju-Ponghwa-Ch'unyang, which constituted the ROK III Corps rear boundaries, the NK 9th Division was gathering at Oktong-ri southeast of Yongwol, while the NK 31st Division was assembling in the neighborhood of Namdae-ri.17

The area infiltrated by the enemy was the region of Sobaeck Mountains embracing Sokri-san-Jhwa-ryong-Chuk-ryong-Sobaek-san-Taebaek-san. The enemy, having occupied the mountaineous strongholds, were able to do as they pleased. To cope with this situation, the US X Corps ordered its subordinate units to conduct their reconnaissance patrols as follows: the US 7th Division from Chech'on toward Yongwol, the 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team
around Route 29 between Chech' on and Yongju, the 17th Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division along the road from Tanyang extending to Ch'ungju. In addition to these units, the main force of the ROK 5th Division was ordered to conduct the reconnaissance patrols in the corps' rear area in the north of Yongju, and the main body of the ROK 2nd Division (Maj. Gen. Ham Byung Son) was ordered to deploy with concentration in Cho-ryong, Munkyong and to cut off the enemy stragglers' advance to the vicinity of Tanyang.

Around this time, the commander of the ROK III Corps, realizing that there was no strong resistance by the enemy in front of the defensive line running from Tup'yong, Huch' on, Chongson and Songgae-ri, committed the 3rd Division, the reserve unit of the corps for offensive actions, in order to eliminate any threat in the corps rear area and to block any reinforcement of the enemy follow-up elements. On January 18, the 3rd Division opened its attack to annihilate the NKPA 31st Division that had been active in the vicinity of Namdae-ri: the 18th Regiment with Namdae-ri as its objective, the 22nd Regiment with Oksok-san as its objective, and the 23rd Regiment with Orae-san as its objective. To this offense, the enemy who had hidden in the mountains resisted by surprise attacks in the dead of night. They dispersed and escaped into the mountains, however, after suffering enormous damage from artillery fire and air support. Part of these North Korean troops withdrew inadvertently into the area of the ROK 5th Division, which had occupied the interdiction positions on the left flank and was patrolling; consequently, these dispersing enemy troops received even heavier damage. On January 17, the 7th Division conducted successful operations as well. While the 8th Regiment was defending the division's rear area, the 3rd Regiment and the 23rd Regiment of the 3rd Division assigned to the 7th Division, opened the offensive attack from Sukhang toward Yongwol as its objective, finally capturing Manggyongdae-san and Maebong-san. The ROK 7th division originally planned to pursuit the enemy
Korean II Corps, had its lines of communication cut off and part of its command facilities and supply points raided. The result was chaos, and the areas on the east side of the corps were in danger. To resolve the crisis, the Corps invited contact with the enemy by mounting a reconnaissance in force, and then damaged the enemy by destroying troops and ammunition with artillery fire and bombing. Around this time, as the severe cold persisted with thick snow and the temperature falling to 21° Celsius below zero, the friendly side destroyed all buildings within the area of operation that could be used by the enemy troops for shelter.

The Frontline Headquarters of the North Korea People’s Army, realizing its II Corps, which had penetrated deeply, had been weakened in its fighting power by receiving enormous damage in combat, had the 17th Division of the V Corps moved into Chech’on and attached to the II Corps, which continued to resist. Yet the activities of the II Corps gradually decreased. By January 22, the troops were scattered, and it looked as if the organization had collapsed with little resistance.1 According to new POWs, the total annihilation operation of the UN forces, along with the cold weather and sickness among the soldiers, caused the morale of the People’s Army to deteriorate.

The Frontline Headquarters of the North Korea People’s Army, whose situation was growing worse, ordered the II Corps to terminate its infiltration operation in the rear area and to reorganize by withdrawing to the vicinity of P’yongch’ang; however, four divisions (2nd, 9th, 27th, 31st) that had encountered the worst situations, were not able to withdraw until as late as the end of January. The greater part of their units had disintegrated by then, when the Eighth Army estimated that of the original 16,000 strength of the four divisions, some 8,600 were still alive. The NKPA 10th Division, an advance unit of the attack, was hit especially hard while moving to Andong, and was planning to withdraw to P’yongch’ang; however, in the north the division was blocked in its re-
treat route by the US X Corps, while in the south the division’s movement was checked by the US 1st Marine Division.

In short, the 10th Division was utterly entrapped and isolated. Then the North Korean II Corps Commander ordered his troops to begin to guerrilla activities in the mountainous area that was in the US X Corps rear if they could not possibly break through the entrapment. The 10th Division was then completely dispersed by the reconnaissance operations jointly conducted by the US 1st Marine Division and the ROK 1st Marine Regiment (reinforced with the 5th Battalion) that was dispatched to the US Marine Division. The battle had lasted for 3 weeks beginning January 18 in the P’ohang-Andong-Yongduk area.

By around the end of January, the enemy Second Front were cleaned up, and, with the restoration of the security of the rear area, the US X Corps established a stronger defensive position along the Namhan River-Ch’ech’on-Yongwol line, and the ROK III Corps established a position adjacent to the right along the Yongwol-Chongson line; thus the recovery of the eastern frontline was finally achieved.

II. The Re-counteroffensive

1. Return to the Han River

By the middle of January in 1951, both the ROK forces and the UN forces, had performed several reconnaissance in force on the western front. On the eastern front as well, the Eighth Army blocked the units of the North Ko-
rean Second Front; consequently, Eighth Army completely cleaned up the enemy. Thus, a chance for a counteroffensive operation was created. General Ridg-way, however, prior to his transferring into all-out offensive operations, had held a cautious posture in order to clearly ascertain the enemy's defensive positions south of the Han River.

On January 23, the intelligence staff of the Eighth Army reported that the main body of the CCF 10 Army Group had been sighted between the Han River and the Suwon-Yoju line. Air patrols had also witnessed the enemy forces moving south of the Han River. However, the enemy had not yet been seen in this area on a large scale. In addition, even with the reconnaissance in force that had recently been conducted in the southern edge of the area, no organized defensive activities of the enemy had been confirmed. There had been only sporadic enemy encounters. The enemy situation being ambiguous to some degree, the Eighth Army commander initiated and operation plan called 'Operation Thunderbolt'; a strong reconnaissance in force to be conducted in depth in the area south of the Han River. This operation was so named as it was meant to be carried out like lightning with very strong units rapidly penetrating in depth and with greater destructive power than that of 'Operation Wolfhound.'

In the plan of Operation Thunderbolt, the US I Corps and the US II Corps each with one US Division reinforced with tanks and with one ROK regiment, if judged necessary by the Corps commanders, would start to execute the operation on January 25 by reconnaissance in force up to the Han River. The day was significant, a transitional point of re-counterattacks by the UN forces which had up to that point engaged in retreats ever since the Chinese had intervened.

The Eighth Army commander, with the aim of maintaining the links between operational units and of insuring safe movement of attacking units,
ordered the creation of a five operation phase line every 8km in the forward area of the corps’ sector. Crossing these phase lines depended on the judgment of the corps commander. In order to support the operational units with sufficient fire power, the 5th US Air Force was assigned to insure the maximum degree of close air support for two days beginning January 25. The operation units were also to receive fire support from one cruiser and two destroyers of the Task Force 95 at anchor off Inch'on.

The US X Corps on the mid-eastern front, moreover, in order to cover the right forward area of the units engaged in the movement to the Han River, was to intercept the enemy infiltration south of the Yoju-Wonju line while maintaining close contacts with the US IX Corps.

On January 24, the army commanding general himself, prior to the operation, with the aim of reconfirming the enemy positions, flew in a patrol plane for two hours, conducting air reconnaissance 32km forward of the US I Corps and IX Corps. The result of the patrol was that south of the Han River the enemy troops could not be found on a large scale. He was convinced that his operating units would easily secure the area. The attack elements of each corps, in order to advance to the Han River which was the final objective, occupied the line to initiate an attack along the West Coast-Osan-Yoju line which was in the forward sector of the defensive line. This grounds had already been reconnotered by performing Operation Wolfhound.

(1) The Advance to Suwon-Ich’on

On 25th of January the US I Corps, having withdrawn to line D and reorganized its units for three weeks, started to attack with the 35th Regiment of the US 25th Division along Route 1 and Route 39 and the Turkish Brigade on secondary road between Routes 1 and 17. At first the enemy contact was
slight as the area had already been cleared by the reconnaissance in force; thus the 1st phase line was easily occupied by these units. The POWs captured at the time reported that two divisions of the CCF 50th Army were located in the area 48km forward, stating that their outposts were located 3 to 8km to the north. It so happened that those positions coincided with the friendly forces' second phase line extending from Suwon along Route 20 to the shores of the Han River north of Yoji. When the Corps started to attack toward the 2nd phase line, the enemy's resistance gradually strengthened. The Turkish Brigade in the right forward had a severe engagement with the CCF troops in the vicinity of Shingal.

The Turkish Brigade attached to the US 25th Division was the unit attacking on the right front in the operation to advance to the Han River. The Brigade was to attack Hill 151 and Kumyangjiang-ri, south of Shingal. On January 26, the Turkish Brigade was approaching Hill 151 near Komae-ri amidst shouts of joy from those villagers that had not been quick enough to depart from that area. Quite unexpectedly, the enemy strongly resisted the Turkish troops. At this time the advance party of the attack, the 3rd Battalion which
was determined to recover from the Islamic unpardonable disgrace brought by
retreat in the battle of Kunu-ri without order, was advancing bravely under
barrage. Later, it was confirmed that the enemy had constructed fortified posi-
tions on this hill that could withstand the gun fire of the UN forces and that
machine guns had been installed at every position. Inside of the circular posi-
tions that were capable of being defended all around, the mortar positions had
been constructed. The hill was fortified in such a manner. At 17:30, with the
fire support of US tanks, the brigade was able to occupy the Hill 151 after se-
vere hand-to-hand combat, marked by the sounds of rifles and clashing bayo-
nets.

In this battle, the number of confirmed enemy corpses was 474. Most of
the dead bodies had thier jawbones broken by the butts of rifles. And there
was much evidence of the dead soldiers pierced by bayonets. In this battle, the
bravery of the Turkish troops was exemplified to all the UN forces. Detailed
and vivid scenes of the close combat were sent out to all the world by a UPI
journalist. In September 1952, President Syngman Rhee presented the unit cita-
tion to the Turkish Brigade for rendering distinguished military service, and
they were also honored with a unit citation from President Harry S. Truman of
the United States.\textsuperscript{26}

As a result of this, the Corps advanced up to the second phase line. The
main purpose of this operation, however, was not to expel the enemy
counterattack, but to patrol the prospective area of a large-scale enemy de-
ployment. In consideration of this purpose, the advance had been conducted
too slowly. The Corps commander, in expectation of growing encounters with
the enemy as the friendly troops would approach the Han River and to secure
the newly gained area, put the US 3rd Division positioned along the original
defensive line newly on the right front as attack units along the axis of Route
55, east of Suwon, where strong enemy resistance had been encountered.
Simultaneously, he ordered the Turkish troops which had experienced the bloody combat in the Shingal-Kumyangjang-ri area, to move to the west coast. In addition, the 15th Regiment (Col. Kim An II) of the ROK 1st Division, which had been guarding the main supply route and was stationed at Ansong as the reserve force of the corps, was ordered to join the US 25th Division. In addition to these measures, the 25th Division's two armored units were ordered to attack along the Seoul-Pusan National Highway and along the Anyang-Sosa-Inch'on road, and prior to reaching the Han River line, to occupy the area of Suri-san and to inflict on the CCF units the maximum damage possible. Yet, because of the stubborn resistance of the enemy that had occupied the advantageous terrain of Suri-san before the friendly troops did, the corps reached the third control line as late as January 31.

Meanwhile, the US IX Corps started the attack on the right flank of the US I Corps. On January 26, the US IX 1st Cavalry Division's 8th Cavalry Regiment met unexpected strong resistance from the enemy in a highground near Yangji-ri on the first phase line. In occupying part of the hill, 28 were killed in action and 141 were wounded. Because of this loss, the 8th Cavalry Regiment's offensive was considerably hindered and slowed down. Then, the 5th Cavalry Regiment passed the 8th regiment and fought strongly with the enemy near Yangji-ri, killing some 300 enemy soldiers, and started to advance along Route 17. On January 28, the Corps commander, when the 1st Cavalry Division was about to get to the second phase line, with the aim of expanding the operation, ordered the US 24th Division to move to the right forward of the Corps; however, the enemy's resistance being so stubborn, on January 31, the Corps advanced forward only up to the second phase line or just a little forward of it north of Ich'on.

Around this time (January 29), according to statements made by POWs, the situation of the enemy engaging with the attacking troops in front was clar-
ified. Between the west coast and Route 1, the 8th Division of the North Korean 1 Corps was positioned facing the Turkish troops and the US 35th Regiment, and in the rear area, the 47th Division, which was the main force of the North Korean 1 Corps, was placed in Inch'on, and the 17th Division was deployed in the area of Yongdungp'o. In the area between Route 1 and Route 17, the 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions of the CCF 50th Army were checking the advance of the 25th Division, the 3rd Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. From Route 17 and the Nam Han River east of it, the 112th and 113th Divisions under the command of the CCF 38th Army were checking the advance of the US 24th Division. 

[2] Advances to Inch'on Seoul Koksu-ri

After the New Year's Day Offensive, the Headquarters, Chinese People's Volunteers estimated "that the morale of the UN forces was deteriorating due to a series of withdrawal operations, and that although they had succeeded in withdrawal and the staging of delaying actions, the UN forces would be able to transform into an all-out offensive operation only in February after recovering from damages and reorganizing their troops." Therefore, the CCF had not expected that the ROK forces and the UN forces would start large scale offensive operations by rapid reorganizing their troops. So, when the ROK units and UN forces approached the Han River, the communists forces were taken unawares. Thus, it was only on January 27 that they ceased their rest and reorganization and took actions against the UN forces' offensive operations.  

According to the POWs captured by the US 1 and 11 Corps, estimated the date to reopen the attack by the UN forces was to be February 6, lunar Newyear Day or February 8, the 3rd anniversary of the establishment of the
North Korean Army. Therefore, deploying part of the forces to the south of the Han River, only maintaining contact with the enemy, they planned to apply delaying actions even in the deep interior of the peninsula.\[11\]

The main units of the CCF ⅩⅢ Army Group were mostly assembled north of the Han River, but all of a sudden, their activity increased remarkably north of Chipyong-ri and Kapyong. Seeing these noticeable movements of the enemy troops, the Eighth Army commander judged it to be a sign that the enemy would build up the main resistance line south of the Han River and that with the reinforcements, they would plan to fight with their back to the Han River. The Eighth Army commanding general directed each corps to send the units waiting on line D forward, and to occupy the area gained by units that had conducted the reconnaissance in force, ordering the patrol units which were proceeding to occupy the 5th phase line to shift to an all-out offensive operation.

To the US I Corps commander, in particular, the army commander directed an order to prepare a plan for armor units to advance to the low ground on the west coast. And he further emphasized the US 5th Air Force to isolate the enemy by heavy bombing in the areas south of the Han River. He was determined to expand the scope of the offensive to the entire front line, and so instructed the commanders of the US X Corps and the ROK Ⅲ Corps responsible for the mid-eastern front, to disturb the reorganizing of the North Korean Ⅱ and Ⅴ Corps that were gathering along the axis of Route 29. In order to do so, he asked them to consider an operation similar to that which was employed effectively in advancing to the Han River on the western front.

At that time, the Eighth Army commander judged that the enemy concentration on the north-eastern side seemed to be similar to the situation when the UN forces withdrew to line D in the beginning of January, and that such a concentration would threatened the right flank of friendly forces on the west-
ern front. But this time, as the US X Corps was to develop the offensive operation on the right flank of the US IX Corps, it was possible to break up the concentration of the enemy troops, he judged. He was therefore confident of advancing toward the Han River.\(^{25}\)

The attack echelons consisted of the ROK 15th Regiment (attached to the US 25th Division), the 35th Regiment of the US 25th Division, and the Turkish Brigade under the US I Corps, on the western front of the Eighth Army. started to attack Suri-san and Morak-san located south of Anyang on January 31. Suri-san, which was to be attacked by the Turkish Brigade and the US 35th Regiment, was an important hill enabling them to block the national road leading to Yongdungpo and the road leading to Sosa and Inch’on by way of Panwol-ri. The attack echelons expected the enemy’s rigorous resistance near Suri-san on the first day of attack. On the contrary, the operation turned out to be a bloodless occupation of the height. After that, however, the attack echelons repeated offensive and defensive battles against CCF 150st Division over the hill, night and day. That is the repetition of ebb and flow, advance and retreat, between the friendly and the enemy. With the enemy’s continuing reinforcements, night attacks, and hand-grenade attacks, and the lack of coordination attacks on attacking troops on the account of the language barrier with the Turkish Brigade, the US 25th Division committed the US 27th Regiment, division reserve, to the Turkish area and had the regiment occupy positions in the area of Suri-san, holding the initiative over the enemy.

Almost simultaneously (on January 31), the ROK 15th Regiment also commenced attack on Morak-san under the support of the US tanks, with the regiments’ two battalions keeping pace with each other; however, because of the US 35th Regiment on the left flank was delayed in attacking Suri-san, the ROK regiment had to Shift to a defensive posture for the time being. In five days after the opening of the attack, the ROK regiment occupied Morak-san
Conducting close air support in re-counteroffensive of the UN forces (Jan. 26, 1951)

only after waging fierce hand-to-hand combat.

As soon as the US 25th Division on the left forward progressed up to the Anyang line, the corps commander had Task Force Allen organized 79 to push into the enemy position forward of the US 25th Division. It subsequently advanced toward the Han River, blocking the road from Inch'on to Yongdungp'o, and the corps commander had the task force attack the enemy west of Kimp'o airbase. At the same time he had the US 3rd Division on right forward proceed up to the Han River by way of Kumdan-san and Ch'onggye-san.

Almost at the same time, the enemy that had retreated to the Anyang line merged with the 47th Division that had deployed at Kwanak-san, strengthening these defensive strongholds. The 17th Division, waiting for the next order at Inch'on, was also integrated into this defensive area. The Eighth Army commander, while urging the US I Corps to attack Kwanak-san, the last barrier to the Han River, requested the commander of Naval Forces Far East to arrange amphibious landing demonstration at Inch'on to block the enemy reinforce-
Advance to Han River (2) (Inch'on-South Seoul-Koksu-ri) (Jan. 31-Feb. 11, 1951)
ment, and to compel the enemy to withdraw to the north.

As the 15th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division commenced the offensive operation on 9 January, the enemy held on to Kwanak-san south of the Han River as their last defensive stronghold by placing automatic weapons at the top of the hill and offering desperate resistance with mortar fire. On this particular day, the fog happened to be thick at the top of the hill; thus, the air-support as well as identification of the terrain was impossible. In spite of these adverse conditions, the regiment was able to occupy the hill at 10:20, with the 2nd Battalion left forward and the 3rd Battalion right forward. By overcoming the terrible terrain and maintaining good coordination, they were able to pursue the enemy and expand the results of the battle. On 10 January, the regiment proceeded to the Noryangjin-Yongdungp'o line. It enabled them to link with the US 3rd Division adjacent to the right of the 15th Regiment. Of all the attacking echelons of the Corps, the US 3rd Division had the least encounters with the enemy, reaching the Han River first. It was one month after the January 4 Retreat that the UN forces advanced to the shore of the Han River.

The armored unit of the US 25th Division also reached Inch'on, doing the reconnaissance of the city on January 10 without finding any trace of enemy activities. The enemy had abandoned Inch'on and withdrawn; therefore, the amphibious landing demonstration at Inch'on scheduled for January 10 was cancelled.

Owing to the continuing heavy snow, air support had been called off, yet the offensive operation of the Corps was proceeding as planned. On the tenth of January, the US 25th Division, having met no resistance except for the anti-tank mines laid under the ground, occupied the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road; subsequently the Division continued to move forward to Kimp'o airfield and on to the Kimp'o peninsula. To cope with this advance to the Han River.
the North Korean 1 Corps, giving up resistance, crossed the Han River under the cover of long range artillery fire and retreated. Right after this, the US 1 Corps advanced to Inch'on, Yongdungp'o, and Taemo-san. The attack on Seoul was imminent; therefore they made every effort to prepare to cross the river while consolidating the reconnaissance activities.

As mentioned above, the UN forces and the ROK forces halted south of the Han River because the Eighth Army commanding general concluded that recapturing Seoul would not yield any benefit from the military standpoint. Deploying his army north of the river would hinder the friendly forces, putting the river behind them as an obstacle. It was because of this observation, that the defensive line on the western front was limited to south of the Han River.48

Meanwhile, the US IX Corps which had been attacking in the area adjacent to the right flank of the US I Corps, had expected that its advance to the Han River would be completed with ease by February 8. This expectation was due to the fact that in early February the enemy presence in front of the Corps had been very slight. As the Corps approached the mountaneous terrain connected with Namhan-san and Yangja-san, it found no a network of road, which absolutely restricted the maneuvering of tanks; consequently, the progress of the attacking echelons was not only slow, but also the good artillery positions were hard to find. To make matters worse, since the weather was bad, air-support was limited, and the offensive action was brought to a deadlock. On February 5, the Corps attacked the 19th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division to the US 24th Division and had the regiment resume the attack. Only after the battles lasting two days beginning February 9 was it confirmed that the area was the enemy's strong bridgehead.

The area of the bridgehead extended 24km from Kyongan-ri in the west to Yangpy'ong in the east, which was U-shaped terrain protruding 6 to
10km southward from the Han River. In the forward area of the bridgehead there were several commanding hill such as Taehwa-san and Chondok-bong, in addition to Namhan-san and Yangja-san. The area of the bridgehead, more than anything else, enabled its holder to command Yangp’yong, so it could not only block the offensive efforts of the US IX Corps, but it would also serve as a starting point for enemy future attack. 

Thus the operation for advance to the Han River in the west with objective recapturing the line Inch’on-south Seoul–Yangp’yong closed down without securing Yangp’yong, in front of enemy strong bridgehead including Namhan-san and Yangja-san.

In January, the US 5th Air Force had, only two fighter-bomber wings at Chinhae and Suyong bases. The displacement of all other wings had been taken because of the CCF’s New Year’s Day Offensive. Since the main strength of the US 5th Air Force had withdrawn to Japan, there had been difficulties in obtaining air-support because of the length of flight and lack of arming. With the UN forces commencing the re-counterattack, however, emergency airstrips were constructed at Wonju, Chungju, and Andong to support the fierce ground operations. These bases enabled the US Air Force to render close air support and also to drop air supplies to those units operating in the mountaneous areas. On January 23, in particular, for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War, 33 F–84E fighter bombers on the mission of covering the heavy bombers near the Korea-Manchurian border engaged in an air battle with over 25 MIG–15 fighters, shooting down 3 MIGs.

About this time, the ROK Air Force wing moved its base to Chejudo Island as the Taejon Air Field had been closed down. In order to attain capabilities to execute an operation in a unit, it was first reorganized and concentrated on flight training.

While the UN Naval Forces had the naval supremacy, the ROK Navy
in spite of difficulties of the severe cold and strong winds in the winter, saved many refugees escaping to the sea from Whanghae Province by shipping them to the seashore island including five islands groups of the Western Sea: Paengnyongdo, Taech'ongdo, Soch'ongdo, Yonp'yongdo, and Udo. On the Eastern Sea, as well, the ROK Navy swept up mines along the seashore from the 38th Parallel down to Yongil Bay.

2. The Envelopment Operations for Hongch'on

While on the western front the US I and II Corps were approaching the Han River, the main units of the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps on the mid-eastern front were crushing the North Korean Second Front that had penetrated into the area south of Chech'on and Yongwol in the middle of January. After successfully crushing the enemy, the Corps was advancing toward the Wonju and P'yongch'ang line, whereas the US 2nd Division under the US X Corps occupied the line extending from Yojju to Wonju to cover the east flank of the advance operation to the Han River. At the same time, part of the 2nd Division was executing reconnaissance up to Chip'yong-ri.

The joint reconnaissance party of the US 2nd and 24th Divisions conducted its mission with the twin railroad tunnels near Chip'yong-ri on January 29. The tunnels had been suspected of having been used as places for stockpiling by the CCF. The 125th Division of the CCF 42nd Army overlooked the joint reconnaissance party from the commanding height. After watching the reconnaissance party from above, they blockaded the retreat route of the troops, launching a surprise attack on the party. Although the patrol party was rescued by bombings and with the reinforcement of the 3rd Battalion of the US 23rd Regiment and a French Battalion, losses to these troops were great. On February 1, the Chinese which had withdrawn, returned with two regiments,
resuming the counterattack. Both sides fought a seesaw battle all day long near the twin tunnels. Finally, the Communist suffered serious losses from American artillery fire and air bombing and withdrew to the north.

According to the information gathered toward the end of January, it was estimated that the powerful enemy forces would assemble in the vicinity of Hongch'on, which was an interchange of Route 24 and Route 29. Among those units, the NKPA V Corps would move along Route 24 toward the southwest, march onward to Yoju and Ch'ungju passing through Chip'yon-gi, or along Route 29 would attack Wonju after passing through Hoengsung. The US X Corps commander chose Hongch'on as the main objective of his Corps in order to block such movements of the enemy. Being located in the middle of the defense line linking Seoul-Chip'yon-gi-Kangnung, Hongch'on was a gateway to the hub of communications that lead to Inje in the northeast, Ch'unch'on in the northwest, Yangp'yong in the southwest, and Hoengsung and Wonju in the southeast.

The US X Corps commander planned a coordinated attack with the ROK III Corps, therefore, to envelop the Hongch'on area, from two sides. By enveloping the area, the ROK and US forces could destroy the enemy's concentration and simultaneously, when could pursue and annihilate the NKPA II Corps which failed in infiltrating into rear areas, and was retreating in front of the ROK III Corps. Thus, the UNC troops could advance up to the Hongch'on-Taegwal-ryong Pass-Kangnung line, securing and advantageous starting points for the next attacks. This plan was named the 'Operation Roundup' in the sense that by a double envelopment the enemy would be 'Round up'.

On 1 February, the commanding general of the Eighth Army, while approving the plan of the US X Corps commander, emphasized that the ROK III Corps would be under his operational control, and that he should watch out for the security of the right flank of the US X Corps in the process of the
advance to the Han River. And on 2 February, the commander of the army ordered the ROK I Corps commander to occupy Kangnung on the east coast and support the progress of the ROK III Corps adjacent to the left.

The US X Corps commander deployed the US 2nd Division in Chip'yon-ri, the US 187th Airborne RCT north of Ch'ia-gsan on the southeast side of Hoengsong, and the US 7th Division in the area of Chuch'on-ri on the southeast side of P'yongch'ang. These measures were taken to organize defensive positions. As to the attacking echelon, he positioned the ROK 8th Division on the left front, and the ROK 5th Division on the right front. By doing so, he orchestrated the siege of Hongch'on. At the same time, the US 2nd Division organized the Supporting Force 21 consisting of one artillery battalion (reinforced), an automatic weapons battery, and a motorized infantry unit to help the ROK 8th Division, while the US 7th Division organized the Supporting Force on a similar scale to support the ROK 5th Division. In addition, the US 2nd Division organized two company size infantry-armour teams and attached to the ROK 8th Division. Around this time, the ROK III Corps adjacent to the right of the X Corps, now moving northward from the Yongwol-Chongson line, reached P'yongch'ang, the line of departure, on 5 February, D day, and commenced attack on the NKPA II Corps, and finally provided the cover of the right flank for the US X Corps.

Based upon this plan of operation, all the subordinate units started to move toward their assigned attack positions. The 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division on the left front was moving toward Chip'yong-ri; the US 38th Regiment on the center front occupied Hoengsong; and the US 7th Division, the reserve force of the corps, was moving from Chech'on and Yongwol to P'yongch'ang in order to further advance to the vicinity of Wonju. The ROK 5th and 8th Divisions that were to stage the primary attack transferred their security mission in the rear area of Chech'on and Yongju to the ROK 2nd Di-
vision, and moved to the north of Wonju. In accordance with the plan, the 8th Division occupied the attack positions at Nungu-ri, and the 5th Division at Py'ongjang-ri, and they were preparing for the attack.

The 8th Division on the left front of the Corps and the 5th Division on the right front were scheduled to attack at 08:00 February 5, in order to envelop Hongch'ôn from both right and left.

Brig. Gen. Choi Yong Hee, the commanding general of 8th Division was to attack Hongch'ôn from the left and from the center. The area of operation was a mountaineous zone inside the triangle linking Hongch'ôn, Yongdu-ri and Hoengsong. And on the axis of advance the small and large groups of hills such as Songji-san, Kalgi-san, Maehwa-san, and Oum Mountain were scattered lengthwise and crosswise. In view of rugged terrain and wide frontage, some 21km, he decided to conduct abreast advance with three regiments. The 21st Regiment, the main attack, was ordered to organize an infantry and tank platoon teams, and to occupy Hongch'ôn by maneuvering rapidly to Pyokhak-san -Tokchae-bong-Oum Mountain along Route 29 (from Hoengsong to Hongch'ôn). The 10th Regiment in the center was ordered, upon occupying Songji-san, to proceed up to Sangoan-ri-Yangdeokwon-ri. In addition, the 16th Regiment was ordered to advance toward Chungan-ri along Route 2 (Hoengsong-Yongdu-ri) and then to secure Yongdu-ri by climbing over Hwach'ae-bong.  

The 8th Division, having opened the attack along Route 29 in the order of the 21st, 16th, and 10th Regiments, overcame slight resistance from the enemy, marched to the three-way junction at Shinch'ôn, and secured first objective. The moment the 16th Regiment on the left front pushed up to the general area of P'ungsuwon, it encountered the enemy and engaged in fierce battle. Fortunately, however, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 10th Regiment in the center captured Songji-san, the height of which enabled them to command the zone of operations, and allowed the 16th Regiment to make progress. On
February 8, the 21st Regiment on the right front opened an attack of Taesamma-ch'ı pass on Route 29 as a gateway to Hongch'ón and Oum Mountain (Hill 930) which commanded all the hills in its vicinity.

These Mountains had been occupied by the 198th Division of the CCF 66th Army, and they had constructed defensive positions on these advantageous terrain; therefore, from the very moment of the attack, the ROK regiments fought severe seesaw battles with the CCF. Recognizing the importance of the terrain, the enemy had not only resisted but also had continuously reinforced its personnel strength. ROK 8th division, so as to capture two of the most crucial and difficult strongholds of this operation, developed a coordinat-
ed offensive with the support of air, tanks, and artillery on the 10th. The effort to capture the objective, however, was in vain. While the 21st Regiment was fighting for Oum Mountain, the 16th and 10th Regiments, though encountering no significant enemy situation to their front, restricted their advance to reconnaissance patrols in the area of Juan-ri and Dowon-ri in fear of getting bulled on their front.

Meanwhile, the ROK 5th Division attacking the right side of Hongch’on had a wide frontage extending some 20km southeast of Hongch’on. Such hills and mountains as Chongnim-san (Hill 640), Eodap-san (Hill 789), Pongbok-san (Hill 1028), Balkyo-san (Hill 998) and Deoggo-san (Hill 668) were scattered and linked together to constitute mountainous terrain where it was almost impossible to carry out a coordinated operation. Division Commander Brig. Gen. Min Ki Shik’s plan of attack was to move the 27th Regiment speedily to the Chohang-ri-Sosa-ri-Dunbangnae-ri-Hwadong-ri area on the east side, and occupy the line Hwandong-ri-Sapkyo-ri, cutting off the enemy’s retreat route. The 36th Regiment, the main attack, was ordered to move along the road leading to Sanjon-ri, P’odong-ri, and Yudong-ri, and occupy the line between Ch’ohyon-ri-Yudong-ri. At this time, the 35th Regiment was secured at Kyohang-ri as reserve. If and when the attacking echelons occupied the Ch’ohyon-ri-Yudong-ri-Hwadong-ri-Sapkyo-ri line, they would, upon completing adjustments of the battle lines, attack Hongch’on in the second phase of the operation.13

However, from the first day of the division’s opening the offensive, the 6th Division of the NKPA V Corps opposed the attack strongly. On the 7th of February, therefore, by committing the reserve 35th Regiment to the left front, the division ordered the three regiments to resume the attacks in abreast advance form. Part of the 27th Regiment on the division’s right front occupied Hwadong-ri and attempted a surprise attack on Yudong-ri, the enemy’s strong
point in the rear, but failed in the attempt because of an enemy counterattack. About this time, the division commander, discovering that the 36th Regiment’s main attack had been delayed and that the 27th Regiment had created a dangerous salient, immediately ordered the 27th to withdraw to the Sosa-ri-Chohang-ri-Wuyong-ri line. The attack of the 36th Regiment in the center made no progress except for repeating the indecisive battle with one regiment of the North Korean 6th Division for three days. The North Korean regiment had built delaying positions along a corridor-type ridgeline that was linked to the rear of Amgok-san. The 35th Regiment on the left front advanced to Kooksa-bong, a height that enabled it to command the enemy’s strong point from the west side.

On 10 February, 5 days from D-day, the 35th and 36th Regiments penetrated the enemy’s defensive strong points such as Hill 317, Hill 412, Hill 247, where the enemy’s main force had fiercely fought for four days, and made progress to the south side of the Som River. Thus, they were able to start enveloping attacks from two sides at P’odong-ri where the command post of the North Korean 6th Division was located. Under the cover of the 36th Regiment, the 35th Regiment occupied P’odong-ri at about 10:00; however, it was after the North Korean 6th Division had already withdrawn. Then, the 5th division did search of the enemy’s command post, capturing many documents and 25 boxes of ammunition.

About this time, the US X Corps commander discovered that the attacking echelons had advanced 5 to 10km from the line of departure under the support of the US artillery and armored units for the first three days, but that from February 8, unlike the initial stage of the attack, the enemy that was holding the hills put up intense resistance to the attack. The more friendly attacking regiments advanced, the more forcefully the enemy resisted. In addition, the terrain became increasingly rugged, so that maneuvering of tanks
and movements of Artillery were limited. Fire support was also hard to get. Encountering this difficult situation, the attacking regiments made less progress than had been expected. Aware of this, the corps commander considered committing additional troops to Route 29 to support the ROK 8th Division, the primary attack.

The unit to be committed at this time was the ROK 2nd Division, the corps's reserve. However, since the reserve division had taken many casualties during the CCF's New Year's Day Offensive, it was impossible for the 2nd Division to be committed until it regained its combat power. Moreover, part of the US 2nd and 7th Divisions, having so far supported the attacking units in the rear area of the ROK attacking echelons, could not be committed. In addition to this, the Eighth Army commanding general had reported that the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team attached to the corps would be withdrawn from the US X Corps in order to carry out a different mission. The corps commander, therefore, requested the ROK 3rd Division, a reserve force of the ROK III Corps.

On 8 February, the ROK 3rd Corps advanced against sporadic and light resistance from the enemy. The ROK 7th Division was moving toward Ch'angdong, which was north of P'yŏngch'ang, while the ROK 9th Division on the right front, having passed the valley of the Han River near Chongson, was marching to the south of Hajinbu-ri. The 17th Regiment of the US 7th Division, which had been following the ROK 7th Division, advanced toward the north of P'yŏngch'ang, now being able to reinforce the ROK 7th Division. Considering this situation, the Army commanding general ordered the ROK 3rd Division to be temporarily attached to the US X Corps during Hongch'ŏn operation.69

While the attacking echelons of Hongch'ŏn were fighting pitched battles against the CCF troops, the ROK 3rd Division under Brig. Gen. Ch'oi Sok
moved to the vicinity of Ch'ang-ri. On 10 February, the division as the echelon of the right front in the siege of Hongch' on which was assigned to the right side of the road between Hoengsong and Hongch' on that had been the left front of the ROK 5th Division. The 23rd Regiment commanded by Col. Kim Jong Soon, on the left front, advanced to Songjon-ri, and the 22nd Regiment commanded by Col. Chang Ch' un Kwon on the right front to Taemundong. Meanwhile the 18th Regiment commanded by Col. Im Ch' ung Shik, as division reserve, assembled at the east side of P'y ongj ong-ri. Simultaneously, the 5th ROK Division, having turned over its operational zone, moved to the vicinity of the sector boundary of the ROK III Corps to cut off the NKPA reinforcements into Hongch' on.

When the attacking echelons were adjusting the battle lines, the antitank battalion (serving as infantry) of the ROK 8th Division was patrolling the forward area of the operation zone. At this point, CCF troops in probably division strength were discovered north of Taesammach'i in the vicinity of the boundary between the 21st and 10th Regiments. This was reported to the division on 11 February. Having analyzed all the collected information, the division commander judged that the CCF's great strength was massing in the forward area of each regiments. Immediately, he reported his assessment to the corps commander and recommended defending along the line between Imok-dong and Ch'angbong-ri. The corps commander, General Almond, however, underestimated the enemy's capabilities, and flatly ignored the recommendation. Brig. Gen. Ch'oi Yong Hee, the 8th Division commander, deployed the 16th Regiment in the Chongan-ri-Dowon-ri area, the 10th Regiment in the Dowon-ri-Sangyu-dong area, and the 21st Regiment in the Sangch' ong pong-ri-Oum-san area, asking all regiments to be on their guard. At the same time, the 3rd and 5th Divisions, which had conducted a day-time attack adjacent to the right of the division, were preparing themselves for a night-time defense at
Sambae-ri and at Yudong-ri, respectively.

As shown above, during the Hongch'ŏn operation, seven days after D-day, was making no visible advance even with the commitment of the ROK 3rd Division. However, it was confirmed that a great number of CCF troops and the NKPA units had been gathering in this area. This meant that the Communist troops that had been absorbed in the retreat operation had organized for a counterattack. It was an obvious sign that their counterattack was very imminent.

3. Taegwal-ryong Pass Secured

The ROK III Corps on the west side of the Taebaek Mountains, completing the mopping-up operation of the enemy Second Front, were starting to move northward to cover the right forward of the siege operation of Hongch'ŏn. Simultaneously, the ROK I Corps on the east coast, first to support the advance of the III Corps, and secondly to link themselves to the front line, were to attack Taegwal-ryong and Kangnung, the hub of the Kyong-Kang(Soule-Kangnung) National Road.

The ROK I Corps under Maj. Gen. Kim Baik Il had attacked on the shore of the Eastern Sea on the east side of the Taebaek Mountains during the Chinese New Year's Day Offensive. Yet, contacts with the enemy were comparatively scarce, and the corps was able to hold its positions north of the 38th Parallel line. However, to comply with over-all adjustments of our battle lines, it withdrew southward. By January 10, it had withdrawn to the line connecting Songkae-ri with Samch'ŏk.

The Capital Division of the corps had the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Col. Kim Dong Su) occupy the defensive positions in Songkae-ri on left front, the 26th Regiment (Col. Soh Jung Ch'ul) in the vicinity of Muk'ho on the right front.
and the 1st Regiment (Col. Han Shin) as the reserve of the division near Samch'ŏk. All made utmost efforts for organizational maintenance. The regiments in the forward area were maintaining contacts with the enemy by conducting reconnaissance in force with a battalion-sized unit for both front and rear areas to prepare their attack in the future.

At this time, the enemy units in front of Capital division took advantage of the gap which was created when the division withdrew to the new defensive line (Hwangwoo line) near Chumunjin. The North Korean 69th Brigade and Kilwonp'al guerrilla unit, about 6,000 in number, pushed through this gap southward up to Kangnung. Along the line between Kangnung and Kusan-ri they were defending and conducting guerrilla activities.

Based upon the ROK Army Headquarters Operation Order 262 (February 2, 1951), the ROK I Corps, in order not to allow enemy the time for their reorganization and to compel them to suffer the maximum damage, had made its operation plan for the occupation of Kangnung-Kusan-ri-Taegwal-ryong Pass, while maintaining the link with the ROK III Corps adjacent to the left. When this was done, the Corps would further advance to the line of Hwangbyong-san-Ungye-bong north of the Kyong-Kang National Road. Therefore, on 3 February, the Capital Division ordered the 26th Regiment, the main attack, to start to attack Kangnung from line Songgye-ri-Muk'ho and the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the secondary attack, to attack Taegwal-ryong Pass and Kusan-ri. The 26th Regiment moved from Muk'ho to Okgye, opening the attack, but the enemy in front of the regiment had built strong blocking positions along the road between Ch'ongnyang-ri and Asan-ri south of Kangnung. The enemy forces intended to hold onto their positions to death. Fierce battles were expected.

The 1st Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the advance party, moved to Sapdang-ryong on the road leading from Kusan-ri-Imgye, by climb-
Battle in the Vicinity of Kangnung

ing over Paikbong-ryong, giving cover for the primary attack of the regiment to proceed to Kusan-ri. The 1st Battalion then conducted reconnaissance patrols and was able to gather information from villagers: “In the village over the hill there are ROK army soldiers.” Major Park Kyong Ho, the battalion commander, reconnoitered the area on the east side of Hwasan-bong, and discovered an enemy guerrilla unit disguised in ROK soldiers' uniforms. The battalion, by taking advantage of the dark of night, narrowed the network of enveloped enemy, killing some 400 by surprise attack. On this day, the 1st Regiment, the Corps' reserve, advanced up to Songgye-ri to support the 1st Cavalry
Regiment.

The 26th Regiment in the attack of Kangnung encountered meager enemy contacts; therefore, they were able to advance up to 7km southeast of Kangnung on 4 February. Kangnung was just around the corner. The 1st Cavalry Regiment also advanced up to Toma-ri Hoenggye-ri, blocking the road between Hajinbu-ri and Kangnung. On 5 February, the attacking regiments opened an all-out offensive with Kusan-ri and Kangnung as objectives, under the cover of artillery. However, the enemy's resistance was so stubborn that capturing the objectives was not successful; therefore, they resumed the offensive the next day. Around this time, Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch'an, realizing the progress of the attacking echelons was too slow, committed the 1st Regiment following up the 1st Cavalry Regiment, to the center of the operation zone, thus reviving the attack.

Just as the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, after rapidly crossing the Namdae-ch'on, was advancing toward the north of Bukjong-ri bypassing Kangnung, the situation changed suddenly for the better. The North Korean 69th Brigade, fearing that its retreat route was being cut off, gave up the will to defend Kangnung to the death and began to withdraw. Therefore, the 26th Regiment resumed the attack at 06:00, February 7. Crossing the Namdae-ch'on, the regiment recaptured Kangnung at 10:00. And, when the mission of primary attack had been turned over, the 1st Regiment kept on chasing the enemy, advancing to Ungye-bong. The 1st Cavalry Regiment on the left forward of the division, also advanced toward the area of Hwangbyong-san and Yongok-ch'on, blocking the enemy's retreat route.

Meanwhile, as the corps was deploying the offensive operation, the US Task Force 95 located on the east coast, performed amphibious demonstration, in the Kansong-Kosong area on 31 January, and supported the offensive operation of the corps by naval gun-fire as well. Its purpose was two-fold: not only
to block the enemy reinforcements, but also to scatter and disperse the enemy's concentrated fighting power.⁴³

This success enabled the Capital Division to recapture Kangnung, which had a good harbor and an airfield. Kangnung was a tactically significant key point. Moreover, it also enabled the Capital Division to secure Taegwal-ryong and Hoenggye, critical spots on the Kyong-Kang National Road. Besides, not only did the North Korean 69th Brigade suffer numerous fatalities, but their guerrilla activities were also gravely limited.

III. The Chinese Communist Forces February Offensive

1. The Chinese Communist Forces Preparations for the Offensive

With the beginning of February, the enemy movements for redeployment of large units were noticeably active on the front lines. Air reconnaissance also revealed that the enemy was assembling in the Kap'yong and Hongch'on area: it was also observed that the CCF IX Army Group which had been reorganized at Wonsan was in the process of movements to reinforce its mid-western front. Meanwhile according to the 'History of resist-America, Assist Korea', the Communist forces established their strategy as follow: in the western front, a part of the Communist forces contain the UN forces' advance, and another part of their forces build up a bridgehead along the south of the Han River; the main forces gathering on the eastern front, luring the UN forces deeply into enemy positions, mount an offensive.⁶⁵ Based upon this plan, the enemy deployed the North Korean 1 Corps and the CCF 50th Army in the area covering Inch'on and Yongdungpo, and the CCF 38th Army around the
bridgehead of the Han River. The moment the UN forces opened the attack on Hongch'on in the mid-eastern front, the CCF 42nd Army, the primary assault force, deployed in the vicinity of Chipy'ong-ri, and the 39th, 40th, and 66th Armies in the area of Yangdukwon-ri and Hongch'on. And the NKPA 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Corps on the eastern front assembled east of Hongch'on.

As the Communist Forces' activities decidedly increased all over the front lines, the Eighth Army commander made an insightful decision. The US X Corps should perform continuous reconnaissance missions within its area of operation; however, the US X Corps adjacent to the left was in a situation in which the corps had not repulsed the enemy on the bridgehead south of the Han River. In this situation, if the main force of the US 2nd Division or the ROK 8th Division should advance to Route 24, it would make the units bulged, thus eventually isolating them from the rest of the friendly forces. Besides, the Corps' battle frontage would become excessively elongated. This was not all. The ROK main efforts which had launched attack toward Hongch'on when the enemy offensive was imminent, the US supporting units, and the parent troops of supporting units located between the lines of departure had been complicatedly organized. In case of the enemy offensive, therefore, the maintenance of command and control would be difficult. Based on his observation, the Eighth Army commander general ordered the 2nd Division, which was on the extreme left of the attack to halt its progress.46

Right around this time (February 10), the Eighth Army commander received the intelligence estimate concerning the CCF's strategic and tactical plans that he had requested. The estimate was primarily focused on whether the quiet period lasting for one month after the New Year's Day Offensive meant the CCF's strategic change from 'the annihilation of the UN forces' to holding attack or whether it had remained silent simply because the enemy's logistical supports had failed.
The intelligence staff of the Eighth Army evaluated that the Communist Forces’ state of inactivity over an extended period resulted from the CCF’s limited resupply, transportation, and reinforcements. Were the CCF to be supported with sufficient supplies, they would naturally resume their offensive in order to achieve their goal, despite whatever losses they might receive. They had not at all abandoned their original objective of ‘expelling the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula’, the intelligence staff estimated, and their assembly area would be in the area bordered in the northwest Pukhan-gang, and on the southeast by Route 24 between Yangp’yon and Hongch’on. In that area, the CCF Ⅸ Army Group comprised of the 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th Armies had assembled, whose total strength was around 110,000, the intelligence staff also reported.

The staff warned, therefore, that an element of these troops would advance to Yoju along the Namhan-gang, and that after that another element of them would advance to Wonju along Route 29. Both elements would be expected not only to advance to Ch’ungju from both sides, but they could also maneuver toward the southwest in order to envelop the US Ⅰ and Ⅸ Corps. And while they advanced, their line of logistics would be expanded and problems of resupply would ensue. Instead of continuous attacks, therefore, they would have to reorganize and resupply themselves occasionally. Chances were, then, that instead of deep attacks, shallow enveloping ones would be made repeatedly. At the end of the estimate, it was predicted that the CCF’s prospective date of offensive would be February 15, when the CCF Ⅸ Army Group, which had been reorganizing at Wonsan, would be arriving at the front line.473 This estimation later proved very close to the real situation, except for the date of the probable offensive.

In actuality, on 9 February, the CCF realized that on the UN forces’ front, with both sides of Hoengsong exposed, the situation was not only
advantageous to their enveloping operation, but also that the ROK troops operating in this area were weak in fighting power when compared with the US units. Besides, they were in the process of movement, and it would be much easier to annihilate them, the Chinese judged. The primary attack forces (the CCF 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th Armies) were placed along the axis of Hongch’on-Hoengsong-Wonju as well as along that of Hoengsong-Chip’yong-ri, and the secondary attack (the North Korean II, III, and IV Corps) were positioned along P’yongch’ang-Chongson. This concentration of enemy units completed preparations for beginning the CCF February Offensive or Fourth Offense.

2. The Worst Disaster of Hoengsong

Around 20:30 on 11 February, in the dark of night, the main attack divisions of the CCF Army Group commenced their offensive on the line of departure along the Kalgi-san-Maehwa-san-Oum-san line south of Route 24 between Hongch’on and Yangp’yong. Their objective was Hoengsong. Simultaneously, the ROK 8th Division was defending Chungan-ri-Dowon-ri, with the 16th Regiment left forward, Dowon-ri-Sangyu-ri with the 10th Regiment at the center, and with the 21st Regiment right forward at the foot of Sangch’angbong-ri-Oum Mountain. The 42nd Army, the right enveloping unit, moved forward along the road between Yongdu-ri and Hoengsong in order to block the 8th Division’s retreat route. The 40th Army, the penetration unit at the center, attacked the boundary line of the 10th and 21st Regiments. Some elements of the 66th Army, the enveloping unit on the left flank, attacked the front of the 21st Regiment at Oum-san, and its main attack was advancing toward Kuksa-bong and Bonghwa-bong northeast of Hoengsong.

Although the ROK 8th Division had already done its best when it received the CCF surprise attack, the outnumbered division failed to overcome
the attack. The situation, therefore, rapidly turned worse. Around 01:00 12 February, The ROK 8th Division had its communications cut off, being isolated by the CCF troops that had penetrated from both front and rear into its positions. Its command and control systems were completely paralyzed; its officers and soldiers dispersed in small groups or withdrew individually to break through the enemy's enveloping network. With the lapse of time, the situation worsened, and it was impossible to maintain the roop safety and integrity. 

The soldiers of the 21st Regiment on the right started to retreat. The regiment was beginning to assemble in the area of Ch'angbong-ri in the rear where the US Support Force 21 had been concentrated. The 10th Regiment in the center, meanwhile, lost Col. Kwon Tae Soon, regiment commander, and all the staff of the regiment. They were killed in action by the enemy who infiltrated through the gap that had been inadvertently created between the regiment and the 16th Regiment right forward at Kalgi-san. The 16th Regiment was blocked from its retreat route by the enemy who had infiltrated through a space created between the regiment and the US 23rd Regiment to its left, deployed at Chip'yong-ri. Thus, the 16th Regiment was isolated amidst the enemy; however, the regiment held onto its positions to the last, covering the withdrawal of the division's main force.

At the same time, the US X Corps commander, fully aware of the seriousness of the progress of battle in which the ROK 8th Division was unable to control its component units, ordered the Division to withdraw to Chup'o-ri and the temporarily organized Support Force to report back to their parent units. Despite the order, however, these supporting units, already isolated amidst the enemy, and received surprise attacks. Besides, communications having been interrupted, these units failed to withdraw in an orderly and systematic manner.

The 8th Division installed straggler collecting points along Wonju-
Munmak and Wonju-Chech'on, gathering personnel. But, except for a small part of the troops, the majority of them had been enveloped in the mountainous region. They were either killed in action or taken prisoner. The division, now the corps reserve, moved to Chup'o-ri on February 13, doing its best to reorganize.

On the other hand, just as the withdrawal of the ROK 8th Division began, the artillery units and the US Support Force that had been deployed north of Hoengsong were in a great danger. The CCF 198th Division, breaking through the ROK 21st Regiment, rapidly found its way along Route 29, bypassing the Support Force positions in the area of Ch'angbong-ri, occupying the bridge 5km southward. It intercepted the friendly units retreat. Around midnight, the CCF 120th Division, after passing the forward command posts of the ROK 10th and 16th Regiments, built up firm blocking positions between supporting units and Route 29, then cut off the ROK 20th and 50th Artillery Battalions and the US Support Team A. Those units that had been cut off from their paths of retreat fell back to Wonju under the cover of the friendly troops; however, trucks and howitzers blocked the road in the narrow area. There was no means, therefore, of withdrawing for the troops that followed without abandoning their vehicles and weapons. In addition to this, the Support Force, composed of various units, did not have proper chains of command; thus, the order to withdraw was belatedly conveyed, which further added to the group's destruction.

The corps' chain of command had been well maintained during the advance; however, just as the Eighth Army commanding general had feared, ever since the ROK 8th Division had been attacked by the CCF, communications between the units within the division had been interrupted to create a state of confusion. The supporting units, consisting of several branches of service, did not have any well-defined rules governing command channel. The
corps span of control, therefore, was limited only to a few units.

By 03:00, 12 February, the front line was broken. In three hours, the US Fire Support Force had fallen into a state of isolation, and being mixed with forward units, they withdrew. They fell back to Taegok by breaking through the enemy's encircling net; however, they failed to break through the enemy's last blockade a mile north of Hoengsong. At Taegok, they were thrown into utter confusion under enemy fire of small weapons and mortars.

About this time, north of Hoengsong the Netherland battalion was occupying the defensive positions south of Kye-ch'on. The Dutch Battalion had been attached to the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division. The battalion had a mission to defend Hoengsong. Hoengsong was to be the base of operation for the US X Corps attack on Hongch'on. The battalion also had another mission. It was to cover the rear area of the attacking echelons. However, the situation now was so changed that the battalion was to cover the withdrawing units. Thanks to the covering fire of the Dutch, some withdrawing units were able to cross the Hoengsong Bridge. During the daytime, the dispersed troops kept on withdrawing; however, with the fall of night, the withdrawal became extremely disorderly. The disorderly situation was so extreme that the battalion was unable to distinguish friendly troops from the CCF troops. In this situation, the friendly forces' withdrawal became completed, but, taking advantage of the dark of night, Chinese troops disguised themselves as ROK troops and infiltrated the Netherland battalion headquarters. Lt. Col. M.P.A. den Ouden, the battalion commander, was killed in action from the CCF's fire. In danger by being isolated amidst the enemy, the battalion withdrew to Wonju Airstrip upon completion of its rear guard mission of the US 2nd Division.23

The ROK 8th Division at the end of this battle mustered only 263 officers and about 3,000 soldiers. More than half of these survivors were the service personnel of the division. The number of officers either killed or missing
was 323. Among them were included the 10th Regiment commander and all of his staff, the deputy commander of the 16th Regiment, seven battalion commanders, and thirty company commanders. And 7,142 soldiers were killed or missing. The loss of equipment to the division included 14 howitzers, 5 anti-tank guns, 68 trucks, 249 radios, 87 mortars, 137 rockets, 164 machine guns, 102 automatic weapons, 2,389 Carbine rifles, and 4,096 rifles.\(^{32}\)

3. A Melee of P'yongch'ang Vicinity

The ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions, which had been attacking the enemy on the east side of Route 29 (Hongch'on-Hoengsong-Wonju-Chech'on), to the right of Hongch'on, received attacks when the ROK 8th Division was compelled to withdraw. The 3th Division was adjacent to the left of the 5th Division. At first the Communist troops were not aware that the ROK 3rd Division was also committed, and it was as late as midnight of February 11 that they expanded the width of their attack up to 8km east of Route 29. And then, the CCF 197th Division began attacks on the ROK 3rd Division. While the North Korean II Corps, secondary attack of the February Offensive, was fixing and containing the ROK III Corps in the area of Taeki-san (Hill 1261), the North Korean III and V Corps attacked the ROK 5th Division.

At about 09:00, 12 February, the ROK 3rd Division attempted to attack on the CCF 197th Division, but around 13:00, the 3rd Division was strongly attacked by CCF units that had deployed due front: consequently, one regiment of the division was surrounded. Under these circumstances, the division started to withdraw to Hoengsong. Simultaneously, the CCF 66th Army, moved quickly and occupied interdiction positions located between Gokgyo-ri and Deokgo-san in the rear of Hoengsong, expecting to block any retreat by the UN forces. With the ROK 3rd Division's stubborn resistance, however, Chinese
advance was delayed. Thus the enemy failed to block the retreat route on contrary to their expectations.\textsuperscript{59}

While the division was withdrawing, the 23rd Regiment was covering the withdrawal operations in the vicinity of Maok-ri. The 18th Regiment, reattached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team which had deployed to the right of the US 2nd Division, advanced up to the vicinity of the Som River north of Hoengsong, covering the US Support Force that was withdrawing from Changbong-ri.

On the morning of 12 February, meanwhile, the ROK 5th Division adjacent to the right was moving northeast toward an objective near the sector boundary of the corps. Yet, as soon as the two attacking regiments (35th and 36th) encountered a strong counteroffensive by the North Korean V Corps and a threat from the rear by the CCF, both the attacking regiments started to withdraw around noon, in order to evade the North Korean troop's enveloping net.

A little after noon, 12 February, the US X Corps commander was discussing the operations with the Eighth Army commanding general, who was visiting the corps headquarters. During the discussion, the corps commander proposed a plan that his corps give up Hoengsong and defend Wonju. Late that day, the corps commander selected a new defense line between Chip'yong-ri and Wonju, then adjusted the front lines. He planned that the US 2nd Division, after receiving the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, to be deployed along Route 29 from Chip'yong-ri up to north of Wonju, and the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions from Route 29 to the corps sector boundary northeast of Wonju. This was to maintain the balance of front lines between the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps to the east. The ROK III Corps had progressed further northward than the US X Corps. And in order to reinforce the ROK division, he had the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division deploy at Todon-ri south of
P'yonch'ang.

At the meeting with Ridgway, the X Corps commander proposed that in order to reinforce the control of the 3rd and 5th Divisions, the ROK 1 Corps Headquarters be attached to his Corps. The ROK 1 Corps commander and his staff, when withdrawing from Hungnam at the end of the previous year, had worked with the US X Corps and were somewhat versed with joint operations. With the approval of the Eighth Army commanding general, the headquarters of the ROK 1 Corps moved. The Capital Division, the ROK 1 Corps' subordinate, was then placed under the control of the ROK 111 Corps, and was assigned for the defense of the east coast as had been the case earlier. 30

In compliance with the order of the US X Corps commander, the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions started to move from Wonju toward the west, with the North Korean 5 Corps chasing and constantly attacking the two divisions all afternoon on 14 February bypassing them on their right side. Both divisions received great losses and were compelled to continue withdrawing further southward than the Wonju-P’yonch’ang line, which they should have occupied; therefore, the 3rd Division organized new defensive position southeast of Wonju while the 5th Division did the same north of Chech’on.

Due to the enemy's pursuit, the 5th Division had only its artillery battalion intact, but it had lost half its other crew-served weapons and could muster only the equivalent of four infantry battalions. Even under these circumstances, the ROK 5th Division dispatched one temporarily-organized regiment to Malta-ri, in order to link the ROK 111 Corps with its eastern boundary.

The US X Corps commander, expecting the enemy to expand an intensified attack toward the southern part of Hoengsong, emphasized defending Wonju to the death; however, the enemy forces was discouraged by their attack on 14 February, and so the offensive was not having been executed. On 15 February, on the Wonju defensive line, there was some local battles only. On
and after 16 February, there was no engagement whatsoever.

Yet, the three divisions (6th, 7th and 12th Division), subordinate units of the North Korean V Corps, by utilizing the route that had been used by the II Corps in the New Year's Offensive, were expanding the opening for penetration, with Chech'on as their objective. On February 15, the US X Corps commander, fearing the repetition of the failure at the New Year's Day Offensive, assigned the defensive mission of the Wonju–P'yongch'ang line to the ROK I Corps which had moved from Kangnung. He informed ROK I Corps of the situation of the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions, which had suffered severe losses at the battle of Hongch'on, and the presence of North Korean troops to the south of the defensive line. With this, the ROK I Corps regained operational control of the ROK 3rd, 5th, and 8th Divisions at 14:00.

At this time, the 3rd Division on the left front of the corps organized defensive positions near Songnam-ri, and the 5th Division did the same on the right front at Chuch'on-ri, the 8th Division being concentrated as the reserve of the corps at Chup'o-ri. The first-priority objective of the corps was to commit the 8th Division speedily to any gap created by the deployment of the forward divisions, thus containing the enemy's plausible expansion of their penetration route and securing Chech'on.350

The North Korean troops (the 6th, 7th and 12th Divisions) which were concentrated in the forward of the ROK I Corps, opened assaults against the ROK 3rd and 5th Division on the morning of 16 February. Although the 22nd Regiment on the right forward of the ROK 3rd Division lost a part of its area, the regiment held onto its area of responsibility to the last. While the ROK 5th Division was defending Chuch'on-ri, however, the 36th Regiment on the left forward had its flimsy defensive positions broken through by the North Korean troops committed in overwhelming strength. They had to, therefore, withdraw 8km.
The withdrawal of the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions opened up a no-man's land extending 30km in the left forward area of the ROK III Corps. The ROK III Corps, fearing that the North Korean II Corps would rush through the open space, fell back some 20 to 25km in order to build up a new line of defense by linking the 7th and 9th Divisions deployed along the Ch'angdong-ri line in the east of Hoengsong with Todon-ri in the south of P'yongch'ang where the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division had deployed in the rear area of the corps. The North Korean 9th and 27th Divisions, which had been chasing the withdrawing units of the ROK forces, occupied P'yongch'ang. And then, by moving southward along the P'yongch'ang-Yongwol line, they attempted to occupy Yongwol. From February 15 through the dawn of February 18, the enemy divisions repeated a series of assaults in a company or battalion size, succeeding to advance to 13km north of Yongwol.

On the other hand, the 7th Division on the left forward of the ROK III Corps was hardly engaged in containing and holding the North Korean II Corps, which had been advancing southward to Yongwol on the P'yongch'ang-Yongwol road. Therefore the Division could not cope with the enemy threat from the left flank created by the gap extending to 11km with the ROK 5th Division adjacent to the left, due to shortage of the strength. There was no room for the ROK III Corps to take any measure against the threat. On February 17, therefore, the Eighth Army commanding general ordered the US X Corps commander to repulse the North Korean troops by committing the US units to this vulnerable area, linked with the ROK III Corps.56

As the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division was committed to the area, the problem of exposing the flanks between the ROK I and III Corps was satisfactorily solved. Thus, the ROK III Corps contained the North Korean II Corps assaults for two days, February 17-18, holding firmly onto the defensive positions between Todon-ri and Chonson.
From this time on, it was hard for the North Korean units to attack the solid defensive line of the ROK units. The North Korean troops had been despirited in the battles so far fought. Most areas that had been occupied by them began to disintegrate due to the ROK units' counteroffensive. As a result, they commenced to retreat. On the evening of February 18, there were no reports of contact from the subordinating units of the ROK III Corps.

4. The Isolated Defense at Chip'yong-ri

After the 23rd Regimental Combat Team of the US 2nd Division under the US X Corps reconnoitered the Twin Tunnels, deployed at Chip'yong-ri. It was to come even with the US IX Corps to left, as it advanced to the Han River. The division commander judged that the 23rd Regimental Combat Team was in great danger of being isolated from the rest of the friendly units. The reasoning for the judgment was that Chip'yong-ri was a salient, and the defensive frontage was 32km. Besides, a gap of 20km with the US 9th Regiment adjacent to the right, which was in defense of Wonju, was created. The possibility of being isolated amidst the enemy was evident. Therefore, the division commander made a tentative plan to have the 23rd RCT withdraw to Yoju in the south. The Eighth Army commanding general, however, requested that the 23rd Regiment defend Chip'yong-ri instead of withdrawing. The withdrawal from Chip'yong-ri would mean giving up the strong interdiction positions against the Chinese approach to the valley as the enemy was attempting to encircle the UN forces' main units on the west side by infiltrating the Han River near Yangp'yong, said the commanding general. At the same time, the army commanding general told the US IX Corps commander that both the ROK 6th Division and the British 27th Brigade which had no contact with the enemy at the bridgehead south of the Han River, be reassigned to the Yoju area under
the operational control of the US X Corps, in order to fill the gaps to the east.\textsuperscript{57}

Simultaneously, the Communist troops, grasping full control of the operations by attacking the ROK units at the battle of Hoengsong, figured that the UN forces would withdraw southward if they attacked Hoengsong. They further speculated that the UN forces that had gathered at Wonju would continue withdrawing toward the south. The CCF planned, to expand the result of the battle, a total of eight regiments from the CCF 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies would occupy all of the Chip'yong-ri area on the evening of February 13, and the main force of the 42nd and 66th armies and 120th Division of 40th Army would advance to the north of Wonju, further advancing up to the southwest area of the city. Blocking the UN forces' reinforcements from the west side, they intended to immobilize the UN forces in the area of Wonju.\textsuperscript{60}

Chip'yong-ri was a strategically significant point where three routes meet: Route 2 extending westward (Seoul-Yangp'yong-Hoengsong), Route 24 extending toward the northeast (Yojiu-Chip'yong-ri-Hongch'on) and Route 24A extending toward the northwest (Yojiu-Goksubi-Chip'yong-ri). If the Chinese occupied this geographical key point, he would be able to advance along the axis of Yangp'yong-Ch'ungju, and he would also be able to attack not only the rear area of the US X Corps, but also the right flank of the US IX Corps. Chip'yong-ri was, therefore, a most advantageous terrain on the position of CCF to attack UN forces. The reverse situation was also worth considering. If the Eighth Army occupied Chip'yong-ri, the enemy units that had been engaging the US I and IX Corps the south of the Han River would be enveloped. The small village of Chip'yong is surrounded by Pongmi-san in the north, Mangmi-san in the south, Hill 248 in the southwest, and Hill 345 in the northwest. It was a good terrain, consequently, for one-regiment-size unit to defend. At this point in time, the US 23rd Regimental Combat Team consisted of the US 23rd Regiment, the French Battalion, the 1st Ranger Company, the 37th Field Artillery
Battalion, Battery B of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion, Battery B of the 82nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, and Company B of the 2nd Engineer Battalion.\(^9\)

The RCT organized perimeter defensive positions, with mines and barbed wire obstacles were installed to cover open area. In order to reinforce the defense, anti-aircraft guns were placed in fire ground attackers. Preparations were made for the regiment's tanks to be able to fire at any attackers. The artillery planned barrages around the positions.

Making use of artillery fire and air strikes, the regiment contained the enemy attacks on the positions during the daytime on 13 February. At 22:00, after engaging in preparation fire with automatic weapons, mortars, and howitzers, the CCF attacked Company C, blowing horns, whistles, bugles and so forth. A little later, these sounds spread throughout the frontage of the regiment, as Chinese troops narrowed down their encirclement. The enemy troops, despite the mines, barbed-wire obstacles and concentrated artillery fire, continued incessant echelon attacks with squad-size troops, throwing hand grenades. Amid this crisis, the CCF troops penetrated Company G in the south, but they were repulsed eventually by a counterattack conducted by Company F and the tank company.

At almost the same time, the CCF troops attacked the positions of the French Battalion, which had landed at Pusan on November 29, 1950, and then had been attached to the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division. With its victorious battle near the Twin Tunnels on January 28, 1951, it had received unit citations from the President of the US and the Army of the Republic of France. The morale of the French Battalion, therefore, was extremely high. The battalion was defending the open ground on the west side and both sides of the railroad leading to Yangp'yong. At about 22:00, February 13, tightening up the encircling net, the CCF troops attempted to break through the line right in front
of the battalion, yet the battalion repulsed them with artillery fire. At about 02:00 on February 14, the moment the CCF’s second echelon, blowing horns and bugles, resumed its attack, the French Battalion responded with manually operated sirens. Instantly, hand-to-hand combat broke out in the front of the positions, with hand grenades being thrown by both sides. There was no way of telling who were the friendly forces and who were the enemy forces. Despite being inferior in terms of the number of troops, the French Battalion, encouraged with illumination support of the artillery, was able to repulse the enemy and held their position to the last. Because of this meritorious achievement, the battalion was granted a unit citation from the President of the ROK, being honored again with a unit citation from the President of the US.\(^{40}\)

After failing in their attacks, the Chinese withdrew in the morning to the hills around Chip’yong-ri. In that battle, the 23rd RCT had some 100 casualties. The regiment commander had been wounded, but, refusing to be evacuated, he kept on commanding.

Around this time, the US 23rd Regimental Combat Team was completely isolated. The CCF had occupied Route 24 and its supplementary road leading to Chip’yong-ri. The Eighth Army commander then decided that the primary objective was to make the link with the US 23rd Regiment and to secure its supply route, and the commanding general assigned the mission to the IX Corps commander adjacent to the left. The corps commander then dispatched the US 5th Cavalry Regiment reinforced with 2 tank companies, 2 howitzer companies, and 1 engineer platoon.\(^{41}\)

The 23rd RCT, while waiting for the reinforcements, patrolled around the perimeter, performing mopping-up operations during the day. The main force of the 23rd RCT strengthened the defensive positions. On February 14, as darkness fell, the enemy’s night offensive started. Around 22:00, it reached a climax. For the next three hours, all entire sky over Chip’yong-ri was illum-
nated like the daytime by illumination rounds, tracers, and signal flares shot up by both sides; meanwhile, fierce and brutal hand-to-hand combat continued. In spite of being outnumbered, the regiment kept on resisting the enemy, but around 02:00 the Company G boundary in the west was broken through. When morning came, the battle still continued but with less violence as if a wild and heavy storm had passed over. Around the positions Chinese bodies piled up like new hills. While the regiment was reorganizing and maintaining its defensive positions, it was also preparing for a counterattack to recapture Company G's position that had been overrun by the Chinese.

The 5th Regiment of the US 1st Cavalry Division, which had been assigned to reinforce the isolated 23rd Regiment, crossed the Namhan River, and reached Goksu-ri at midnight, February 14. So far, so good. Since the enemy had destroyed the bridge located at the entrance of the village, the attack of the regiment had to be delayed. Though the regiment began to attack with the support of air strikes on the morning of February 15, the enemy's resistance was so fierce that the regiment's efforts were brought to a deadlock. The regiment commander, concluding that a normal attack would not enable his unit to be linked with Chip'yong-ri that day, devised another measure. At 15:00, Company L with 160 troops and 23 tanks formed an infantry/armor team, and the team resumed the offensive. From that point on, along the Goksu-ri-Chip'yong-ri road, US tanks' fire power and mobility faced fierce combat against the CCF's rockets and portable charges. The 5th Regiment commander urged a rapid advance by the tanks. With the tanks rushing on without the infantry, the loss of stragglers of infantry men was great. By 17:00, however, the regiment linked up with the tanks from the US 23rd Regiment, then attacking Mangmi-san south of Chip'yong-ri. The morale of the enemy, which had been deployed at Mangmi-san, was deteriorating because of the reinforcements of the 5th Regiment; consequently, they withdrew from their position. Right after the task
force linked up with the 23rd RCT at Chip’yong-ri, they protected the road from Goksu-ri leading to Chip’yong-ri. Around this time, aerial surveillance also reported that the CCF troops had started to slip away from Chip’yong-ri. At dawn on February 16, a reconnaissance party confirmed the retreat of the CCF.
The total number of CCF casualties caused by the US 23rd Regimental Combat Team was estimated to be 4,946. It was estimated that the US 5th Cavalry Regiment alone had killed more than 500. The American troops on the front line captured 79 POWs, who stated that "our attacking echelons were organized by six regiments. Four of the six regiments belonged to CCF 115th, 116th, 119th and 120th Divisions, two of them came from the 126th Division. These six regiments had not attacked in concert nor any of them thrown a full strength assault against the front line of the UN forces. Almost all attacks had been made by company-size, and during the attacks, some followed by a succession of attacks of the same size in the same or nearby places."

On the morning of February 16, despite bad weather, the friendly troops kept on pursuit and captured stragglers. These POWs stated that "the CCF troops conducted an urgent withdrawal at night." On the other hand, the number of the casualties of the US 23rd Regiment were 52 killed in action, 259 wounded, and 42 missing. The wounded had been evacuated to the area of the US 5th Cavalry Regiment either by helicopter or vehicle.

In another scene, on February 14, the British 27th Brigade under the US IX Corps, which had committed to support the US X Corps, had been attached to the US 2nd Division and completed its movement to the vicinity of Chip'yon'g-ri. The ROK 6th Division also attached to the US X Corps and moved to the no-man's land to the left of the 1st Battalion of 9th Regiment, US 2nd Division under the US IX Corps. On February 15, both the British 27th Brigade and the ROK 6th Division, which had advanced northwest between Chip'yong-ri and Wonju, faced slight resistance from the enemy. The 6th Division (minus the 19th Regiment) defeated the enemy which resisted sporadically on February 16, occupying the objective in the area of Kanhyon-ri west of Wonju. Simultaneously, the British 27th Brigade, adjacent to the left of the division, also progressed to Chuam-ri.
In this battle, the US 23rd Regimental Combat Team, defending its encircled position, played a decisive role in checking the enemy’s February Offensive by repulsing the CCF’s 3-division-size strengths which had kept on approaching like incessant waves. This significant result in the situation came from the regiment’s will to hold its positions, the thorough control of night firing, the appropriate use of the reserves in counterattack, the superiority of firepower, and the close ground-air joint operations.\textsuperscript{54}

The CCF’s February Offensive after the failure of the New Year’s Offensive started when the UN forces, by rapidly completing reorganization for the offensive operations, resumed counteroffensive on the western front, moving toward the Han River. On the other hand the CCF troops had not only been exhausted by their ceaseless offensive operations, but they also had not been resupplied, nor had been reinforced in terms of personnel strength. In spite of such conditions, the CCF made a hasty decision to mount the February Offensive, a counteroffensive on a grand scale, by concentrating their main force on the central front. The decision was made to make up for their retreat from the western front. Of all the UN forces’ front lines, the enemy had chosen the bulged Chip’gyong-ri and Hoengsong as their primary objectives. By assembling their troops four times superior in number to those of the UN forces, the CCF defeated the ROK 8th Division and advanced to Hoengsong. Driving on without stopping, the CCF troops attacked Chip’gyong-ri, and their main forces would advance down to the south of Changhown. They attempted to force the UN forces to withdraw by threatening the flank of the UN forces’ main units in the west front.\textsuperscript{55} However, the piecemeal delaying operations, which were carried out by the ROK and UN forces with close air support on the eastern front, resulted in enormous losses for the enemy in the battles of Chip’gyong-ri and Wonju area, in spite of its utilizing superiority in number. As soon as the Chinese faced stiff resistance they were psychologically devastated, their mor-
ale was miserably and rapidly lowered. Only a week after D-day, they aban-
donied their offensive operations, retreating toward the north.

Although the UN forces checked the Communists’ onslaught along the Chip’yon-ri-Wonju-Yongwol-Chongson line, the number of the casualties counted from the evening of February 11 till the dawn of February 13 amounted to 9,800 ROK soldiers, 1,900 US soldiers, and 100 Netherland soldiers, a total of 11,800 lives. The loss of combat equipment was also great. During the same period of time, the ROK 3rd, 5th, and 8th Divisions lost 14 105mm howitzers, 901 other crew-served weapons, 390 radios, and 88 vehicles, while the US Forces and the Netherland troops lost 14 105mm howitzers, 6 155mm howitzers, 277 other crew-served weapons, 6 tanks, 195 radios, and 280 vehicles.60

These losses of personnel strength and equipment were due to the fact that the friendly forces were inferior to the enemy in number as well as the fact that, having been dispersed in a wide area, they lacked the ability to support one another and to concentrate their forces, power was lacking. This was indeed the case for the ROK 3rd Division and the ROK 8th Division. Against these two ROK divisions, the 4 CCF divisions and the 2 North Korean Divisions not only applied a coup de main, but they also launched overwhelming superior attacks. Yet, the Eighth Army commanding general warned that such enormous losses would not be tolerated, and that so many losses were clear sign of a defect in the leadership. He further emphasized that there-after he shall deal severely with commanders for command responsibility, both ROK and US.61

The battle at Chip’yon-ri, in particular, was the first tactical success for the US Army in fighting with the CCF. The Eighth Army commanding general was now convinced that his Army reached a turning point which the friendly troops could carry out battles successfully by recovering morale lost during the distressing withdrawals on last December and early January.
IV. The Continued Re-counteroffensive and Recapture of Seoul

1. Operation Killer against the Enemy in the Chech’on Area

Both the ROK and the UN forces, which had assumed re-counteroffensive operation on January 25, 1951, secured the Han River line in the western front, and advanced to the Yangp’yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung area in the mid-eastern front, further advancing toward Hongch’on, the next objective. While advancing, however, they encountered the CCF 4th offensive (February Offensive), allowing the Chinese units a massive breakthrough. Yet, around February 18, they were able to halt the Chinese troops along the Yangp’yong-Wonju-Chech’on line.

At this point, the ROK 1st Division under the US I Corps on the western front, which had not been attacked directly in the February Offensive, were defending Kimp’o Peninsula and Yongdungpo’o proper. The US 3rd Division was defending the area of Kyungan-ri; the US 25th Division was also defending Kwangjiwon-ri west of the CCF’s bridgehead on the Han River and the area of Mukap-san on the southwest side. On the middle front was the US 24th Division under the US IX Corps defending the southern and southeast sides of the Chinese bridgehead. On the east side of the Namhan River the US lst Cavalry Division advanced to Hajin proper, the British 27th Brigade to Chuaam-ri, and the ROK 6th Division to the vicinity of P’andae-ri, and they were building up defensive positions. On the mid-eastern front, the US 2nd Division under the US IX Corps occupied blocking positions at the Som River west of Wonju, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (with the 18th Regiment of the
ROK 3rd Division attached) at Wonju, the ROK 3rd Division (minus the 18th Regiment) at Sungnam-ri, and the ROK 5th Division in the area of Ipsuk-ri. And on the eastern front, the 7th Division of the ROK III Corps at Mach’-a-ri, the 9th Division at Chonson, and the Capital Division along the line from Sapdang-ryong to Kangnung were constructing their defensive positions.

Almost at the same time, the enemy 1st echelons eight armies, were on the front line extending from the estuary of the Han River on the west side through Yangp’yong, Chungwon-san, Hoengsong, Bonghwa-san, Chubong and Banglim-ri, and finally to Hajinbu-ri. The North Korean 1 Corps from the mouth of Han River to Tuksom, the CCF 50th Army from Tuksom to Sangp’aldang, the CCF 38th Army from Sangp’aldang to Choiua-ri, the CCF 42nd Army from Choiua-ri to Mae-bong, the CCF 66th Army from Mae-bong to Chungkum-san, the North Korean V Corps from Chungkum-san to Hadaegok, the North Korean III Corps from Hadaegok to Ajidong, and the North Korean II Corps west of Hajinbu-ri, were all exercising mobile defenses in their sectors. The defensive depth of the first echelon was 25–30km. Each Army was to defend its assigned sector for one month.66

In only a matter of a few days after, the CCF’s February Offensive was repulsed, and the UN forces had seized the initiative again. The Eighth Army commander made a plan not only to deny the enemy any time to prepare for a new offensive, but also to envelop and annihilate all the enemy that had broken through friendly line near the north of Chech’on. Therefore, the operation was dubbed ‘Operation Killer’, which emphasized the point that its objective was killing as many enemy troops as possible.67

In order to kill those enemies soldiers withdrawing from the south side of the Arizona line along Yangp’yong–Hoengsong–P’yongch’ang that lay east of the Namhan River, the Eighth Army made plans as follows: the US IX Corps would assault the enemy along the Wonju–Hoengsong–Hongch’on road, while
the US X Corps would assault the enemy along the Chech’on-Yongwol-P’yongch’ang road. In order to provide the units with their roads for maneuvering, the Eighth Army adjusted the sector boundary of the US IX Corps and the US X Corps simultaneously with the commencement of the attack: The boundary of the two US corps was to be relocated on the east side of Route 29, and that of the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps shifted to the east side of Route 60. While the operation was in progress, the west flank of advance would be adequately protected by the US I Corps and the US 24th Division under the US IX Corps along the lower bank of the Han River.

The ROK III Corps on the right flank was to have ROK 7th Division on the left forward advance to the mountainous terrain on the east side of Route 60, and to have this division support the US X Corps’ offensive operation. The main force of ROK III Corps was assigned to defend the Soksa-ri-Hajinbu-ri-Yuch’on-ri road. The US 1st Marine Division which had completed the mopping-up guerrillas in the Andong area, was now attached to the US IX Corps. And the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was to be dropped north of Seoul to block the enemy’s retreat route in the future operation of recapturing Seoul, depending upon how the current operation developed. To comply with the plan, the Airborne Regiment removed to Taegu and concentrated on paratroop training there.

Prior to Operation Killer, the Eighth Army commander’s greatest concerns were the exact location of enemy reserves, the state of their supplies, the morale of their troops, and the trend of their movements; however, except for the fact that enemy reserves had been gathering in the rear area, no precise information was available. So, the Eighth Army had to commence Operation Killer without any accurate information on the enemy reserves; consequently, his attack would have to be cancelled in case the enemy reserves were committed to the front line. Mindful of this probability, General Ridgway, crediting
that enemy reserve units could reach the front line within 24 hours, emphasized to his corps commanders that in order to be deliberate, the main units should not be committed too hastily, and that terrain features should be utilized properly and effectively. He further stressed that each unit's maneuver should be controlled and the link and balance between the units should be maintained. Particularly, he warned corps commanders against being "sucked in and destroyed piecemeal, whether by ruse or the temptation to your own aggressiveness to pursue beyond your capability of providing powerful support, or of timely disengagement and local withdrawal."\[\scriptsize 31\]

On February 21, based upon this guideline, the US IX Corps commenced the offensive operation along the Wonju-P'yongch'ang road.

1) The Occupation of Hoengsong

At 10:00, February 21, the US IX Corps started attack abreast with the US 24th Division on the left, the 1st Cavalry Division (plus the British 27th Brigade), the ROK 6th Division in the central front, and the US 1st Marine Division, the main effort, on the right.

By this time the enemy had been withdrawing for three days since the failure of the February Offensive, and they showed no sign that they would cease the withdrawal until they passed the Hoengsong-P'yongch'ang line. In order to destroy the retreating enemy, the UNC units had to hasten their advance. Ever since the beginning of the attack, weather conditions had been getting worse, and from first day the operation did not meet the schedule. On February 20, the temperature rose to 10°C and even at night it remained over 0°C. It was an unseasonably warm spell. For the next three days, it even rained on and off. Owing to the high temperatures and the resultant rainfall, it was impossible to call in both air reconnaissance and close air support. The condi-
tions of road surface worsened. In addition, rivers transformed themselves suddenly into rapidly overflowing muddy currents where ice floes drifted. Bridges lost their supporting columns or crumbled into pieces and were not usable at all. Also fords became unusable. Avalanches occurred at many places, blocking tunnels, roads, and railroads repeatedly. All these problems hindered logistical supports.\(^7\)

The case of the US 1st Cavalry Division is noteworthy. The division was the attacking echelon on the left of the US IX Corps. Even before the division was able to remove the command post and a supply point that had been set up on the riverbed, the river overflowed its banks. In consequence, the telephone network was disrupted, and the division’s supplies were totally lost to the flood. To make matters worse, the main supply route of the division became blocked creating enormous difficulties. Despite the difficulties, however, the 1st Cavalry Division successfully occupied Hill 469 located north of the Yangp’yong–Hôngch’ón road.

On the other hand, the US 1st Marine Division in the attack of Hoengsong, the primary attack of the Corps, encountered only slight resistance, the enemy having retreated. But, as they had to pass along a road covered with snow and rain, they met terrible hardships to movement. Besides, the helicopter with the corps commander aboard (Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore) on air reconnaissance crashed into the brown torrents of the Han River. The corps commander died of a heart attack after the crash.

The US Marine division commander (Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith) assumed temporary command of the IX Corps and, as the deputy commander of the division, commanded the division, which was not in good shape. On February 25, when the division was about to attack Hoengsong, the Eighth Army commander adjusted the sector boundary of the US IX and X Corps so that the Marine Division could focus on the assault of Hoengsong, where the enemy’s
strong resistance was expected. The area of the 5th Marine Regiment on the right front went to the US X Corps, and the area of the ROK 6th Division on the left was taken over by the 7th Marine Regiment, which had been committed to the left front of the division. Simultaneously, the division received the resupplies that had been delayed in delivery because of the unexpectedly unseasonable weather changes. The division was to open the offensive on March 1, but due to the CCF’s fierce resistances on the 7th Regiment’s sector forced a decision to suppress the enemy by air bombing. An all-out offensive would begin on March 2. As soon as the division started to attack, the CCF which had been occupied the hill beforehand, resisted the marine attack. The 7th Marine Regiment had some losses. Having also suffered not a little damage from the division’s offensive efforts, the CCF withdrew by making use of the dark of night. Then, the division finally occupied Hoengsong on March 4.

(2) The Advances to Kanglim-Anhung-Bongwha-san

At 10:00, February 21, the US X Corps was to attack with the US 7th Division as the primary attack force on the right forward along the Yongwol-P’yongch’ang road. While the ROK 3rd Division, the secondary attack on the left, was to cover the right flank of the US 1st Marine Division, the main attack of the US X Corps, which was advancing from the left flank along the Wonju-Hoengsong axis, and then the same division was to assault the enemy deployed along Kanglim-Anhung-Bongwha-san located north of the Wonju-Banglim-ri road.

Kanglim-ri, Anhung-ri, and Bongwha-san, the objectives of the ROK 3rd Division, were in an area with the Ch’ikak Mountains in the west stretching long in the north-south direction and linking with Maehwa-san, Ch’ikak-san and Namdae-bong, and with the Chuch’on-gang in the east flowing in a north-
south direction. The area lacked a road network. Although there were roads between mountains, the one-meter-deep snow and steep slopes hindered mobility tremendously.

About the time when the ROK 3rd Division was to commence its attack operation, the North Korean guerrillas were haunting the area of operations. The division had difficulties in carrying out both regular battles and guerrilla warfare at the same time. The division, having been savaged in the February Offensive, had recently been augmented with 2,000 recruits; however, these recruits had not been well trained and the fighting power was greatly weakened. Nevertheless the advance of the US 1st Marine Division adjacent to its left had been delayed. Not until February 23, therefore, was the division able to commence an attack abreast of two regiments: the 18th Regiment on the left forward, the 23rd Regiment on the right, with the 22nd Regiment as the reserve.

By gathering information that the enemy in one-company-strength had been occupying Kanglim-ri, the 18th Regiment, in order to envelop the enemy, started attacks on the left flank and front of it, with the 23rd regiment cutting off the enemy’s escape route. The regiment dislodged the enemy, seized Kanglim-ri, and continued the advance. Although the 18th Regiment faced difficulties maneuvering through the rugged mountain, it advanced to the Maewha-san meeting the light resistance. The 23rd regiment, which was moving along the path in the valley, destroyed the enemies had built up strong positions on the east side of heights where they could command the pass and resisted the friendly forces with a two-company-size unit. After the 23rd Regiment destroyed their position, advanced to the commanding ground from which it could command Anhung-ri.

On February 26, the division made an advance to the Hoengsong-Anhung-ri-P’yonch’ang line, and the 18th Regiment linked itself to the US 1st
Marine Division at Umdalmae. The 23rd Regiment occupied the Anhung area, and in order to support the offensive operation of the US 7th Division, the primary attack of the corps, linked itself with the US 2nd Division that had been committed in the center of the Corps. With these links, the division overcame the enemy's persistent resistance, advancing more than 30km and securing the maneuvering route between Hoengsong and P'yongch'ang. This enabled the division to acquire a base for any future offensive operation.

The Eighth Army's offensive operation was progressing smoothly. On February 28, therefore, the sector boundary of the corps was extended to the left up to Tugok-ri east of Hoengsong. With this measure taken, the 23rd Regiment moved to Wonju, taking over the area of the US 5th Marine Regiment, the regiment right front of the US IX Corps. At this point, the enemy in front of the division was about 5,000 troops of the 6th and 12th Divisions under the North Korean III Corps. They were building strong defensive positions in the general area of Bongwha-san and Deog-san north of Anhung-ri. The division, having reorganized the battle line, resumed the abreast attack with the 23rd Regiment on the left and with the 18th Regiment on the right on March 1. The 23rd Regiment, as the enemy strongly resisted on Hill 479, conducted offensive and defensive battles all day long. But the enemy's defensive positions were so strong that the regiment was compelled to withdraw to the line of departure. After reorganizing rank and file, the attack echelons of the division resumed the attack all over again. The enemy had occupied the advantageous hills earlier and constructed strong defensive positions, so the attacking echelons only repeated the seesaw battles amidst bursting hand grenades and rattling bayonets, not making any further progress, but increasing the casualties. On the other hand, the enemy had constructed a stronghold on every hill linked with Bongwha-san at the center, and desperately resisted the attacking echelons. As the loss of lives increased, the division ceased its all-out attack. After
selecting an objective at one place, personnel strength was concentrated upon that particular objective, eventually occupying it. Adopting this new tactic, they took other hills by surprise in succession. Until March 4, the division repeated this kind of attack several times, but what with the enemy's pitched resistance and the unfavorable terrain features, the offensive of Bongwha-san developed into stalemate.

At the beginning of March, the enemy's resistance had been unexpectedly intensified throughout the front of the corps. The US 2nd Division adjacent to the right of the division, while attacking the hill in the forward area of the road between Wonsu and Banglim-ri, especially put forth every effort possible. The effort, however, was brought to a standstill. Fortunately, on the night of March 5, the North Korean troops withdrew, abandoning their positions. The attacking echelons resumed the offensive, occupying a commanding height north of the road between Wonsu and Banglim-ri, thus advancing to line Arizona. Almost instantaneously, the division returned to the ROK III Corps, turning over the defensive positions to the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division. Then, the division withdrew to the area of Mach'a-ri-Chongson vicinity.²⁵

(3) The Snow and Cold Battle at Soksa-ri

The ROK III Corps was to attack the mountainous terrain west of the T'aebaek Mountains. With Odae-san at center, the Capital Division had been preparing for the attack on the east side, with the ROK 7th Division on the west side, and the 9th Division assembled in the Songgye-ri area as the reserve of the corps. Immediately after Operation Killer commenced, the corps deployed the 26th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division on its right front at Hoenggye-ri, and the 1st Regiment at Kangnung, assigning them to consolidate
defensive positions. To cover the US X Corps adjacent to the left, the 7th Division on the left opened the attack along the P'yongch'ang-Ch'angdong-ri road. The date was February 25. Realizing that the attack of the division was progressing smoothly against only slight resistance by the enemy, the corps commander, with the intention of supporting the offensive operation of the US 7th Division, ordered one regiment of the Capital Division to the vicinity of Soksa-ri to block the retreat route of the enemy. To comply with the order, the Capital Division commander had the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Col. Kim Dong Soo) which had been standing by, to advance from Hoenggye-ri, where the 26th Regiment had been defending, to Soksa-ri. Due to a snow storm that lasted for 5 days, however, the Taegwal-ryong-Hoenggye-ri-Kusan-ri road had been blocked, and the attack was delayed. As late as March 1, when snow removal was completed, two battalions started parallel attacks by committing one battalion each to the north and the south of the Seoul-Kangnung Road.

Simultaneously, the North Korean troops that had withdrawn from the Yongwol area organized positions in depth in the vicinity of Palwang-san, Soksa-ri, and Wolchong-sa, waiting to check the advance of the ROK III Corps. And as part of the NKPA was unable to use good roads along the east coast because of the UN naval gunfire, they formed a Second Front in the mountainous terrain along Kyebang-san-Odae-san-Hwangbyong-san, attempting to develop guerrilla warfare.

While the 1st Cavalry Regiment was heading for Soksa-ri, the corps commanding general urged the regiment to get to Soksa-ri within the day (March 1) to block the retreat route of the enemy. The enemy had been fighting fiercely against the 5th Regiment of the 7th Division in the area of Keomun-ri. Because the snow removal had been delayed, the 1st Cavalry did not make it to Hajinbu-ri until March 2, encountering contact with the enemy.

From this time on, the enemy deployed all over Keomun-ri, resisting
fiercely. The 1st Cavalry regiment, however, repulsed the enemy by calling in air support, and was about to arrive at Balwang-ri located between Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri. Because of the darkness of night, however, the regiment shifted itself into a night defense.

At 22:00, the 3rd Battalion, the 26th Regiment, covering the rear area of the 1st Cavalry Regiment clashed with the enemy attempted to cut off the regiment withdrawl route near Yuch’on-ri all night long until 04:00, March 3. The 3rd Battalion engaged in hand-to-hand fight with the enemy attempting to envelop the battalion, but could not overcome the outnumbered enemy. Subsequently, the battalion was severely reduced in number and had to withdraw to Ch’ahang-ri at 08:00. Because of these unfortunate circumstances, the 1st Cavalry Regiment in the process of attacking Soksa-ri had its withdrawl route blocked. This upset all the plans of the division. The 1st Cavalry Regiment, having had to pass the night in the severe cold, attempted resumption of the offensive at dawn, but the enemy had already enveloped the regiment by taking advantage of the dark of night. The regiment was compelled to shift into an all-around defense, but with the enemy’s encircling net pressing the unit incessantly, the division commander ordered the 1st Cavalry Regiment to withdraw, and the 26th Regiment to proceed again to Yuch’on-ri to link itself with the 1st Cavalry Regiment. The 1st Cavalry, repeating the defense and breakthrough of enemy positions, narrowly escaped the pursuing enemy on March 4. Traveling by way of Wolchungdong-Kangch’on, the regiment finally assembled at Kasadu at the west entry to Taegwal-ryong.

During the withdrawal operation of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, it killed some 300 enemy troops, but it too suffered personnel losses: 59 killed, 119 wounded, 802 missing. And there were heavy losses of equipment as well: 18 60mm mortars, 11 81mm mortars, 10 3.5” rocket launchers and so forth. Fortunately, the majority of the missing soldieryes returned to the regiment the next
During this operation, the regiment experienced a situation in which the Seoul-Kangnung Road had been cut off because of the heavy snow, and supplies had naturally been stopped. Food and ammunitions were in very short. In addition, a great number of patients were suffering from frostbite. In this operation, the Eighth Army operated primarily with the US units that excelled in mobility to pursue the retreating enemy, but because of the unusual change in weather, Operation Killer did not turn out to be two attacking forces abreast to advance in pursuit of enemy, but rather turned out to be a hard march, fighting bad weather conditions.

As a result, the US IX and X Corps engaged in the pursuit operation for over two weeks (February 21 through March 6), and reached the objective line Hoengsong-P’yongch’ang, inflicting serious losses on the enemy. The damage the enemy had received in the US IX Corps sector alone was close to 7,918 killed, 1,469 wounded, and 208 POWs; but the original objective of annihilating all the enemy south of the objective line, line Arizona, was not attained. 

2. Operation Ripper in the Central Front

(1) The UN forces Operational Concept

By shifting to the re-counteroffensive, the ROK and the UN forces shattered the CCF February Offensive. And by executing Operation Killer, they made progress up to the line connecting the south shore of the Han River, through Hoengsong, with Kangnung. They had now attained a straight defensive line. With this success, they were able to rid themselves of the sense of defeat which they had felt since the CCF’s intervention. In addition, they were now able to foresee the advance to the 38th Parallel and the recapture of Seoul as being imminent.
At this juncture, however, the military judgment was that, although the recapture of Seoul might have a significant meaning in terms of politics and psychology, it should not be executed recklessly and at any cost under a situation in which no reinforcements of the UN forces were in sight. According to this judgment, the Eighth Army Headquarters established the strategy for the forthcoming operations. Once making a breakthrough in the central area of the current front line, the UN forces split the enemy front line into two parts and separated the CCF in the west from the North Koreans in the east, and then they would double-envelop Seoul from the south and the east. The new operation was named Operation Ripper in view of rupturing the enemy front line.

The Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, meanwhile, ordered his troops to halt the UN forces’ offensive, maintaining the defensive lines in depth by making use of mountains and rivers advantageous to the defense. Considering the UN forces’ operational characteristic, “first massing concentrated fire with their overpowering artillery, tanks, and airplanes, and then starting the attack by infantry units”, the Chinese Forces commander emphasized the use of tactics like the following: The deployment of troops should observe the principle of “light forward and heavy rearward.” In order to carry out a active defense, troops should observe the control of important strongholds and roads, and concealment, dispersion, and deployment in depth of troops without fail. As to the distribution of fire, the emphasis should always be on destroying the enemy’s tanks and killing their infantrymen, and by dispatching heavy weapons to the front echelons, the deployment of such heavy weapons should be made on the principle of “heavy forward, light rearward.”

The enemy, in keeping with this plan, attempted to carry out delaying actions by the strategy of mobile defense until the CCF which entered to Korea the previous February deployed on the front line. However, due to the
UN forces' overpowering fire power and maneuverability, the delaying warfare based on field fortification reached its limit; therefore, the enemy had no other choice to fight except for withdrawing, while resisting only slightly. At that time their supplies of food and ammunition were limited. The morale of the rank and file was extremely low. Under these circumstances, the enemy deployed the North Korean 1 Corps and the CCF 50th Army in the western region, the CCF 38th, 42nd, and 66th in the central front, and the North Korean II, and V Corps and 69th Brigade in the eastern region.

On the other side, the friendly units had advanced to the Yangp'yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung line with the help of Operation Killer, thus recovering the front line they had held prior to the February Offensive. As for the US I Corps on the western front, the ROK 1st Division, the US 3rd Division, and the US 25th Division (plus the Turkish Brigade attached) were marching along the Han River to occupy Kimp'o Peninsula-Noryangjin-Chamsil-Such'ong-ri south of the Han River. While in the US IX Corps on the central front, the ROK 6th Division, the US 24th Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (plus the British 27th Brigade attached), and the 1st Marine Division occupied the Yangp'yong-Yongdu-ri-P'ungsuwon-Hoengsong line. In the US X Corps on the mid-eastern front, the ROK 5th Division, the US 2nd Division, and the US 7th Division occupied Ch'udong-ri-Anhung-ri-Hasongbin. The ROK III Corps had the 7th Division (plus the ROK 1st Marine Regiment) to occupy Hyongjae-bong-Parkji-san-Yongsan-ri. The ROK I Corps on the eastern front had the 9th Division and the Capital Division to occupy the Kanp'yong-ri-Ch'ahang-ri-Kangnung line. Each corps' shipment of supplies had been limited because of the unusual change in weather. While saving supplies for the next operation, each corps was doing its best for its unit's organizational maintenance.

The Eighth Army planned that, under the circumstances although all the corps would participate in the next operation, the US IX Corps in the cen-
ter would be the main effort and advance up to line Idaho (the objective line) connecting Tokso–Kap’yang–north of Ch’unch’ on–Hangye, not only separating the enemy into two, but also occupying Hongch’ on and Ch’unch’ on, which were deemed to be the enemy troops’ assembly points as well as depots for its supplies. By occupying these two cities, the corps would apply pressure to metropolitan area Seoul from the east. Nevertheless, as the probability of a CCF’s offensive could not be ignored, any future operation should be still carried out step by step, maintaining mutual coordination, which was great importance.

In view of this consideration, the Eighth Army commanding general, primarily emphasizing the control of the main effort groups, established three phase lines: line Albany, line Buffalo, and line Cairo. The first of the three lines was line Albany drawn along Yangsu-ri–Yangdugwon-ri–Noch’ on-ri–T’aegi-san–Soksa-ri 8–20km north of the US I, IX, and X Corps’ front. When occupied, the line would enable the IX Corps to control the vicinity of Hongch’ on, a tactical key point.

The second phase line, line Buffalo, was drawn along Mikum-ri–Chinboli-ri–North of Hongch’ on–Hangye-ri. The line was drawn only in the sectors of the US I and IX Corps. The US 25th Division right forward of the US I Corps would advance up to line Buffalo, and thus extend the enveloping threat to the enemy defending the Seoul area. The main objective of the US IX was Hongch’ on.

The third phase line, line Cairo, was limited to the US IX Corps sector. If this line, drawn along Kap’yang–south of Ch’unch’ on–north of Hangye was occupied, the US IX Corps would advance northward with Ch’unch’ on as its objective. Ch’unch’ on was also the final objective of line Idaho, the ultimate objective for attack. 96

In order to cutting the enemy’s front line and to conduct the double envelopment of Seoul by occupying Ch’unch’ on and Hongch’ on, the Eighth
Army commander placed the US IX Corps, the main attack, under the newly appointed corps commander (Maj. Gen. William H. Hoge) to attack Hongch'on and Ch’unch’on in a three-phase operation along Route 29. On the other hand,
Ridgway had the US X Corps, the secondary effort, attack P'ungam-ri-Taegi-san-Woondu-ryong in a two-phase operation, covering the right flank of the primary attack. He further requested that the main forces of the US I Corps immobilize the enemy along the Han River line and that some units of the US I Corps attack Yeobong-san and Ch'onma-san in a two-stage operation to cover the left flank of the main attack, subsequently preparing for the envelopment of Seoul.

Meanwhile, the ROK III Corps adjacent to the US X Corps, according to the Eighth Army commander, was to attack Woondu-ryong and Hwangbyong-san in mountainous terrain, and the ROK I Corps, which had already reached line Idaho established along the Yongok-ch'on flowing westward from Chumunjin, was to strengthen the defensive positions already occupied. Although the Eighth Army Commander issued the detailed plans of Operation Ripper on March 1, the decision of the D-day had to be withheld because of the shortage of supplies, particularly the shortage of food, gasoline and ammunition in the forward areas. The shortage of supplies had been partly caused by the enemy's February Offensive, but the unusual change in weather during Operation Killer had been the primary reason for the shortage. In repairing the supply routes such as roads, railways, bridges, and tunnels, the fact that the additional material supplies had been consumed could not been ignored. Prior to deciding on the D-day, the commanding general ordered the deployed units in the forward area to secure enough supplies for five days.

In planning Operation Ripper, the UN forces made it a goal that the acquisition of territory was nothing but the means of attaining the objective, and that the focus of the operation lay in inflicting maximum losses on the enemy at a minimum cost while maintaining the combat potential of the friendly forces. So, if indications of the enemy's offensive posture were definitely observed while the UN forces were preparing supplies, Operation Ripper would
be suspended.\textsuperscript{91}

In order to block the enemy's reserves from gathering in the central front while Operation Ripper was in progress, the Eighth Army commander planned a amphibious landing demonstration on the west coast.\textsuperscript{69} To put the demonstration into practice, the mine sweepers of the Task Force 95 demonstrated as if they were sweeping mines along the west coast, entering the estuary of the Taedong-gang outside of Chinnampo. One detachment consisting of a cruiser and a destroyer, following the mine sweepers, even bombarded an imaginary landing point. Next, some transports with personnel and cargo aboard embarked from Inch'on. While they were moving northward, they changed the direction. This operation was repeated on March 5, demonstrating to the enemy that the landing assault was imminent. On the other hand, on the east coast, the Task Force 95 had continued firing on Wonsan since February; meanwhile, the ROK Marine 41st Company occupied islands off the port of Wonsan, thus heightening an atmosphere of threat.

The US Air Force in the Far East, to disrupt the enemy's offensive preparations, stressed destroying bridges on the major railroads that had been transporting personnel and equipment, as well as bridges on the roads. The Air Force destroyed most of the objectives by bombing, and as a result, the total length of the railroads the enemy could use was only 48km.\textsuperscript{36}

Confirming the final completion of securing supplies for 5 days including gasoline and the arrival of some of the units of the US IX and X Corps which had been delayed in reaching Arizona line because of the rugged terrain, the Eighth Army commander decided on March 5 that Operation Ripper would begin March 7, and he had the following consideration in mind. The ROK I Corps that had deployed in the mid-eastern front had already reached line Arizona, and the US X Corps, if moved 32km more, and the ROK III Corps, if moved 16km more, could both reach the objective lines. At this situa-
tion, considering the need to strengthen the fighting power of the ROK Army, the Eighth Army commander returned the ROK 1 Corps Headquarters and the ROK 3rd Division to the ROK Army Headquarters for direct control. Since the middle of February the ROK 1 Corps had been under the operational control of the US X Corps in order to control those ROK divisions attached to the US X Corps.

Then, the ROK Army Headquarters, also assigned the 9th Division right front of the ROK III Corps to the ROK 1 Corps, and the ROK 3rd Division to the ROK III Corps. At the same time, the ROK 5th Division, which had failed in the attack of Hongch'on, had completed its reorganization since then, and was attached to the US X Corps. Then, the rearrangement of the front line was complete.

In order to thoroughly protect preparations of the current operation from security risks, not only was any distribution of the operation plan stringently restricted, but journalists were also strongly requested to have self-restraint on reporting information prior to the commencement of the operation. Finally, it was politely suggested that the visit of the Supreme Commander in the Far East, who normally came to Korea before an important operation began, was requested to postpone his visit until after the D-day.

(2) The Battle of Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on

The primary objective of Operation Ripper—a deep penetration of the enemy battle line—was for the US IX Corps to push onward up to line Idaho extending along Mokdong-ri-north of Ch'unch'on-Naep'yong-ri-Hangye, and then to recapture Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on. The US IX Corps, the main force of this operation, opened its attack by forming an attack of four divisions abreast: the US 24th Division on the left forward (the ROK 19th Regiment at-
tached) toward Yongmun-san, the US 1st Cavalry Division in the middle (the British 27th Brigade attached) and the ROK 6th Division (less the 19th Regiment) toward the mountainous terrain south of Hongch'ŏn-gang flowing west of Route 29, and the US 1st Marine Division on the right forward toward Hongch'ŏn as its object. The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team which was in training in Taegu was to support the Corps on order.

The mission of the US 1st Marine Division, the main attack of the corps, was to inflict the maximum damage to the enemy in retreat, and disrupt the enemy's next offensive in advance, by applying constant pressure on them, and to force those deployed on the western front to withdraw by enveloping enemy flanks. On March 7, the US 1st Marine Division started to attack by forming an attack with two regiments abreast toward line Albany west of Oum-san. The enemy situation at this point was that, while a small number of them were deployed at major strongpoints to block the advance of US Marine division, their main force was already in the process of withdrawing. On March 9, line Albany, the US 1st Marine Division's first objective, was occupied. The US 2d Division of the X Corps adjacent to the right, and the US 1st Cavalry Division adjacent to the left, however, had been delayed in arrival. The Division, therefore, organized defensive positions, and reconnoitered within their boundaries. On March 13, the two divisions made progress to line Albany. With this success, the first phase of Operation Ripper was completed. As there was only slight enemy resistance, all the units of the IX Corps except for the ROK 6th Division advanced onto line Albany.

The ROK 6th Division began the advance with the 2nd and 7th Regiments abreast from south of P'ungsuwon road. A reconnaissance party of the 2nd Regiment recovered seven antitank guns and five 105mm howitzers that had lost in the Ch'ŏwan-ri northwest of Heongsong by the ROK 8th Division during February Offensive.500 Continuing its attack, on the 7th, the division
was advancing toward Kalgis-san-Songji-bong line north of P'ungsuwon on March 11. By the redeployment plan of the corps, on the 12th, the division turned over its area of operation to the adjacent the British 27th Brigade on the left and the US 7th Marine Regiment adjacent to the right, taking over the responsibility of the Changrak-san-Yongsu-ri sector from the US 8th Cavalry Regiment on the left front of the 1st Cavalry Division. And on the 13th, the ROK 19th Regiment, having been attached to the US 24th Division, returned to the division. After reorganizing the front line as deploying the 19th Regiment on the division's left, the 7th Regiment in its center and the 2nd Regiment on its right, the Division resumed the advance.

In the US 1st Marine Division attacking Hongch'on through Hoengsong there was a recovery team dispatched from the US 2nd Division. Its mission was to recover the casualties and the equipments of the US X Corps had been lost in the Hoengsong valley by the Chinese February Offensive during Roundup operation. By 12 March the team recovered more than 250 bodies, the majority of whom were likely to have belonged to the Support Forec 21, five 155mm howitzers, six M-5 tractors, and four of six tanks that had been abandoned. And recovered a number of damaged trucks which could be used for spare parts.80

Upon confirming that the occupation of the line Albany, the first phase line of the Ripper Operation had been completed, the Eighth Army commander immediately ordered his subordinate units to advance to the Buffalo line, the second phase line. That was on the evening of March 13. At once, the US IX Corps commander was about to attack Hongch'on to perform the second phase of the Ripper Operation, expecting that the enemy would strongly resist his attacking echelons by building solid and substantial defensive positions forward of Hongch'on. He had established, therefore, a plan to envelop Hongch'on from two wings by deploying the 1st Cavalry Division on the left
and the 1st Marine Division on the right. He also ordered the US 24th Division and the ROK 6th Division, both on the left forward, to advance from Ch’ongp’yon reservoir in the Pukhan-gang valley to the south of the Hongch’on-gang.

The Corps that opened the attack confirmed on March 14 that there had been no enemy south of Hongch’on, contrary to expectations. At this time, the enemy was returning shots sporadically with nothing but small weapons from a long distance, so the attacking echelons could advance without any hindrance what so ever. In two days (March 15) after the D-day, the US 24th Division secured Ch’ongp’yon reservoir, and the ROK 6th Division secured a group of hills south of Hongch’on-gang. The 1st Cavalry Division, in the process of attacking Hongch’on from the left side, also constructed positions along the shore of Hongch’on-gang waiting for the 1st Marine Division to come up. Although the reconnaissance parties of the ROK 6th Division and the US 24th Division had carefully patrolled Ch’ongp’yon reservoir and north of the Hongch’on-gang, they made no contact. However, the 1st Cavalry Division, ever since it advanced to the vicinity of Hongch’on, had met strong, even if small, resistance all along from the enemy’s units. By committing two battalions to patrol north of Hongch’on-gang, the 1st Cavalry Division tried to analyze the enemy’s responses and the enemy positions confirmed by air reconnaissance. Judging from the patrol reconnaissance and air observations, the division believed that the enemy had constructed strong positions along Route 29 between Hongch’on and Ch’unch’on, attempting to delay the advance.

The US IX Corps commander on March 16, with the goal of supporting the US 1st Marine Division’s offensive operation by dispersing the enemy that had been deployed preponderantly in the vicinity of Hongch’on, drew line Buster, an intermediate line, along Hongch’on-gang, thus connecting with line Buffalo north of Hongch’on. He ordered the ROK 6th Division, the US 24th Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division to occupy line Buster.
The enemy, at this point, blocked the advance of the US 1st Marine Division by constructing strong defensive positions east of Hongch'on along the avenue of approach of the Marine Division. But the 7th Marine Regiment’s patrols broke through the enemy position and rushed into Hongch’on, confirming that the city had been left in a state of ruin as it had been bombed by the friendly air forces. The main units for the division arrived in no time, occupying the hill located northeast of Hongch’on.37

On March 17, the four divisions of the corps started the attack together and encountering slight resistance by the enemy. The ROK 6th Division and the US 1st Marine Division made easy progress. But the 1st Cavalry Division in the center had to go through seesaw battles with the enemy all day long. From March 18, however, the enemy’s resistance grew weaker, and a little later, evidence of their hurried withdrawal were clearly observed. The attack echelons kept on pursuing, occupying all of the division’s objectives by the night of March 19. It was at the height of this advance operation that the 2d Battalion, the 2d Regiment, the ROK 6th Division, discovered a CCF battalion assembling in a narrow valley near Kuun-dong north of the Hongch’on-gang. The battalion swiftly envelop and attack the enemy without casualty, making distinguished military achievements: killed 231, captured 2, and seized 775mm howitzers, 660mm mortars, 482mm mortars, and numerous other weapons.38

As the Chinese rapid withdrawal became evident, the corps commander ordered the friendly forces to pursue the enemy up to line Cairo and not to lessen the pressure of the attack. If the US IX Corps occupied line Cairo, the Eighth Army commander’s idea was that he would drop the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team waiting at Taegu, north of Ch’unch’on on March 22 to block the enemy coming down from Ch’unch’on reservoir and finally to link the 187th RCT with the US IX Corps. But on March 20 and 21, the CCF were withdrawing faster than expected; consequently, the US IX Corps’ speed of
advance was also much faster than expected. With the rapid development of the new situation, the US 1st Cavalry Division reached line Cairo on March 21, and the planned drop of paratroopers was called off as it was clear that the plan would not yield a fruitful result in terms of the military perspective. At about 13:30 that day, a special task force of the US 1st Cavalry Division had already entered the city of Ch’unch’on from which the enemy’s troops and equipments had withdrawn. A little later, the task force was under fire from the northwest, but the enemy was repulsed by the gun fire of the tanks. The task force in Ch’unch’on, facing the enemy’s counterattack, withdrew to the Cairo line. The next day, when the 7th Cavalry Regiment entered Ch’unch’on, they encountered no enemy resistance whatsoever. By occupying Ch’unch’on, the goal of Operation Ripper was achieved.

On the other hand, the US 1st Marine Division, on the right front of the corps committed the ROK 1st Marine Regiment in the central sector. The regiment had been transferred to the US Marine Division at Yeolyang-ri on the eastern front, and arrived at the US Marine Division zone on March 18. The ROK 1st Marine Regiment initiated its attack in the most rugged mountainous terrain, and secured Kari-san, the enemy’s defensive strongpoint on March 24.  

3. Operation for the Recapture of Seoul

The main objective of Operation Ripper was, by making a breakthrough in depth on the central front, to gain terrain that would enable the friendly forces to envelop Seoul from the eastern side, or to induce the enemy’s defensive force to withdraw from Seoul after the breakthrough. The friendly forces had judged that the enemy would be defending Seoul with a strong force. In this operation, while the US IX Corps, the main attack, was developing the breakthrough operation, the US I Corps would occupy of the blocking
positions south of the Han River.

The US I Corps, simultaneously, assigned the ROK 1st Division and the US 3rd Division to guard the Inch'on area where a daily unloading of 500 to 600 tons of supplies was going on, and to keep on defending the positions south of the Han River, while the US 25th Division (plus the Turkish Brigade) on the right front was to cross the confluence of two rivers—the Namhan-gang and the Pukhan-gang—and by advancing to the north of the Han River, to occupy a group of hills commanding the Pukhan-gang to cover the left flank of the US II Corps adjacent to the right, and eventually to envelop the enemy that had been deployed in Seoul. This was the plan of the corps.  

Before daybreak on March 7, the US 25th Division unleashed powerful preparation fire prior to its attack. While the other divisions of the corps conducted feint crossing operations to distract the enemy’s attention, the 25th Division simultaneously started river crossings with three regiments abreast, reaching the other side of the river without any resistance. This was quite different than what had been feared. The attacking echelons were joined by tanks that had followed the echelons in crossing the river. And under the cover of close air support, the attacks continued, breaking through antipersonnel and antitank mines which the enemy had laid. The Americans met the fire of small weapons, machine guns, and mortars. The defense, however, was not that powerful.

On March 10, the fourth day since D-day, the enemy’s resistance had fallen off remarkably. The division continued onward without any difficulties, marching up to the area west of the Pukhan-gang. By the evening of March 15, both the 24th and the 27th Regiments of the US 25th Division had advanced up to Seoul-Ch’unch’on road, when the Turkish Brigade which had taken the area east of Pukhan-gang advanced northward 3.2km beyond the Seoul-Ch’unch’on road, thus reaching the positions secured by the 24th Division of the
US IX Corps adjacent to the right. With the development of the situation, the US I Corps was able to have the 25th Division proceed to Yeabong-san, and was able to threaten the enemy in Seoul from the east side.

At almost the same time as the IX Corps was about to recapture Hongch'on, the enemy began to show some sings of abandoning Seoul. On March 12, a reconnaissance plane flying over the enemy positions north of the Han River and the bridgehead area of the US 25th Division, saw a large scale enemy troops moving northward out of these areas. In addition, a US 3rd Division’s patrol, crossing the Han River, reconnoitered the enemy positions and found enemy positions vacant. Subsequently, five reconnaissance parties from the ROK 1st Division crossed the Han River on March 14, and patrolled around the city of Seoul. One party advanced to the Capitol Building and raised the flag of the Republic of Korea. At the same time, the US 3rd Division’s reconnaissance parties patrolled Mae-bong (Hill 175) and Yongma-bong overlooking the Han River, important commanding heights for the defense of Seoul. But they could not find any enemy in this position. Air reconnaissance could not observe any enemy activity north of Seoul and its adjacent areas, but observed enemy troop and defensive positions disposed in depth east and west side of Route 3 from a point roughly halfway between Seoul and Uijongbu.

The Eighth Army commander, confirming that there was no enemy in Seoul, ordered the 1 Corps commander on March 15 to occupy the major hill mass north of Seoul (the Pukhan-san areas) for the capture of Seoul. To comply with this order, the corps commander set up a phase line (he named it the Lincoln line) from the Han River line northwest of Seoul through Pukhan-san on to Yongma-bong to join line Buffalo. The Army commander set the Lincoln line as the limit for the corps' advance. And he explained the object of the operation was not to attack the enemy, but simply to follow his withdrawal.
Up to the north of this line, the operation was so limited that only reconnaissance parties were to be dispatched to contact with the enemy.

Following the order, the US I Corps commander assigned the ROK 1st Division to Pukhan-san, and the US 3rd Division to Yongma-san. However, the 1st Division was to commit only one regimental sized troops and the 3rd Division only one battalion sized troops with 2 tank platoons, in developing the operation.90

The ROK 1st Division, upon receiving the order to recapture Seoul, had proceeded to the south of Han River overlooking Seoul on 16 February. And it deployed the 15th Regiment on the right at the near bank of Yoido Island located between Han River Bridge and Yongdungp’o, and the 12th Regiment on the left in the Yeomch’ang-Kimp’o area, carrying out both of security and Mopping-up operations for over a month.

While the units on the mid-eastern front had been starting their offensive operations, the ROK 1st Division had been dispatching reconnaissance parties, which were either platoon or squad sized, to the north of the Han River to explore the enemy situation. This had been done in preparations for the expected recapture of Seoul. The main elements of the 15th Regiment, in particular, had been concentrating on training themselves in street fighting. Simultaneously, the US 3rd Division adjacent to the right, while maintaining close coordination with the ROK 1st Division, had been preparing for the entering of Sangmun-dong and Toekyewon located northeast of Seoul.

With the mission of recapturing Seoul, the 15th Regiment started the operation with the 6th Company’s crossing of the Han River on March 15. By dispatching part of each battalion across the river, they tried to search the enemy situation. On March 16, in the order of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion, they crossed the river, entered the streets of Seoul, and finally dominated the entire area of Seoul. Then around 13:00, the Minis-
ter of National Defense and his party inspected the Regiment’s crossing the Han River; the division received a congratulatory telegram from President Rhee of the Republic of Korea.96)

The 15th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division, passing through Seoul, further advanced to the outer districts, and the 2nd Battalion of the 65th Regiment, US 3rd Division also occupied Yongma-bong. By making use of the bridge built in each division, the 1st division additionally committed the 11th Regiment to the front; the US 3rd division increased his bridge head force to one regiment.

Seoul, having been occupied four times since the outbreak of the War, was nothing but ruins. The buildings in the city looked like skeletons ruined by gunfire and bombing. Transportation and communication facilities and other public facilities—all of them—were utterly destroyed. Facilities for
power generation and for water supply, even to be repaired to a minimum, would take more than two months, it was estimated. A total population of Seoul, 1.5 million before the invasion of the North Koreans, had been reduced to 200,000. Food for those remaining in Seoul was completely insufficient. After the recapture of Seoul, it was announced on the radio and by the police that the citizens who had left the city should not return to Seoul from their refugee homes until living conditions had returned to normal and administrative services had begun to function.\footnote{65}

President Rhee sent a letter of gratitude to General Douglas MacArthur and received the following reply from him:\footnote{66}

I am glad that the outrageous military forces have retreated. But we need to be cautious about the fact that the enemy forces this time, quite different from last September, have not been defeated. The recapture of Seoul has a significant meaning psychologically; however, from the military point of view, it means nothing but the circumstantial fact of a battle. Seoul cannot be completely safe hence onward, so the immediate return of the Korean government would not be wise.

4. Operations in the Eastern Mountainous Area

(1) The Battle of T'aegi-san

The US IX Corps, a secondary attack of Operation Ripper was to attack its objective of the line Idaho, the line connecting Hangye-P'ungam-ri-T'aegi-san Kyebang-san. The Corps commander emphasized that strong drive should direct along the narrow road between Hoengsong and P'ungam-ri on the left zone and along the road leading from P'yongch'ang through Panglim-ri to Soksa-ri on the right. Along the axes of these roads he deployed the US 2d and 7th Divisions respectively and assigned the ROK 5th Division to the
mountainous zone between the two roads.

Since the Chinese February Offensive, the ROK 5th Division had been attached to the ROK 1 Corps. While securing the main supply route between Tanyang and P'ungam-ri, the division had been doing its organizational maintenance, when on March 3, it was ordered to join the US X Corps again. Thus, on March 5, it moved to the area of Wunkyo-ri and Anhung-ri, and was preparing for Operation Ripper by relocating the 36th Regiment at Chigu-ri on the left forward and the 35th Regiment at Wolamdong on the right forward. 93

With Paigyong-san-Taegi-san-Soksa-ri as objectives, the Corps commander on March 7 launched the attack with three divisions abreast with the US 2nd Division on the left, the ROK 5th Division in the center, and the US 7th Division on the right forward. With this arrangement, the corps commenced parallel attacks with three divisions. The area of operation for the ROK 5th Division, in particular, was a mountainous terrain linked mostly with hills whose heights were between 900 and 1,000 meters. The network of roads, therefore, was extremely limited. The maneuvering of units as well as the employment of amoured unit were limited. The terrain features were, therefore, disadvantageous for attacking. As the division, however, had had the experience of operating in this terrain at the beginning of the previous February, it was well versed with the terrain. It was by coincidence that the enemy in front of the division was the same unit that had confronted the Division at the time of the February Offensive. The enemy was none other than the North Korean 6th Division, now reinforced with one regiment from the 12th Division. This enemy division occupied the delaying positions on the hill mass linked with Taegi-san. The showdown was imminent again.

The ROK 5th Division on March 7 started an attack with two regiments abreast: the 36th Regiment on the left with Pongbok-san (Hill 1028) as its objective, and the 35th Regiment on the right with Taegi-san (Hill 1261) as its
objective. The enemy, occupying the commanding heights along the hilly road between Anhung-ri and Kapch'on-ri, doggedly resisted the division's attack despite artillery fire and air strikes, as if they attempted to conduct a strong delaying action. From the first day, the division's attack turned out to be hard fighting. The 35th Regiment on the right forward, which failed in a daytime attack, repulsed the enemy by staging a night attack in hand-to-hand combat, and finally snatched the first day's objective. On March 8, while the 35th Regiment, was conducting its organizational maintenance, the 36th Regiment on the left forward resumed its attack. However, the enemy, occupying the hill along the road, resisted the attack fiercely, and the 36th Regiment's attack had to be held back. The attacking echelons, upon reorganizing the units, resumed the attack on March 9. Yet, the North Korean fought tenaciously against the attacking forces with the support of mortar fire, so that breaking through the enemy position ended in failure.

In order to recover its honor after the failure of the daytime attack, the 36th Regiment on March 10 resumed an attack at night. No sooner had it reopened the night attack than the enemy caught the 35th Regiment by surprise on the right sector at dawn on that day. Because of this, the division had to shoot close fire on the right and left fronts, finally expanding the combat to hand-to-hand, and winding up in a series of indecisive fights. In this operation, however, the 36th Regiment seized a hill, a stronghold south of Tunbangnae-ri. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment on right forward also secured a stronghold in Tunnae-myon, which would later serve as a stepping stone for the attack of Chaju-bong (Hill 889).

While the attacking echelons, reinforcing their security action, were concentrating on their organizational maintenance, the ROK 5th Division commander, with the purpose of occupying the Yangjich'on-Taegok-Mae-bong line, hit the enemy strongholds hard at 22:00 by requesting night close air sup-
Battle of Taegi-san
port all over Chaju-bong. The regiments resuming the attack on March 12, had expected resistance would be slight due to the previous night's bombing. Yet, most likely, the enemy had been reinforced during that very night. The attacking echelons, therefore, encountered much stronger resistance than anticipated. After engaging in bloody battles, the 36th Regiment occupied Hill 685 south of Kapch'on-ri, and the 35th Regiment took Chaju-bong. The division commander, realizing that the 36th Regiment on the left front had been weakened in fighting power because it had suffered serious losses in engaging previous decisive battles, ordered the 27th Regiment to relieve the 36th in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. The 27th had been the reserve regiment following the attacking echelons.

It was confirmed from POW reports, that the enemy, at the risk of their lives, had taken delaying actions to cover the withdrawal of their main units started on March 11. The fierce resistance had been part of their withdrawal operation. According to other statements of POWs, "The main forces of the NKPA V, II, and III Corps have already withdrawn north of the 38th Parallel line. While undergoing organizational maintenance, they are preparing for a new offensive."99

As if to prove these POW's statements, around March 13, the enemy that had resisted so stubbornly far in defensive positions started to show some indications of withdrawing from the front. Brig. Gen. Min Ki Shik, the ROK 5th Division commander, read through them. He ordered the 27th Regiment, reserves, to relieve the 36th Regiment on the left forward and to pursue the enemy. And the division, to support the attack of the US 7th Division on the right in the process of advancing toward Ch'angdong-ri, took over the Taemis-san positions of the 17th Regiment of the US 7th Division. Thus, the area of operations was somewhat extended to the east side.

The division, conducting pursuit, occupied Taegi-san, the last strong-
hold of the enemy. Right after ROK soldiers advanced farther to the line of Shindae-ri–Paekun-dong, on March 15 they reached Line Idaho that connected Unmu-san (Hill 980) with Hongjung-san (Hill 1277). Reconnaissance patrols of the 27th Regiment, in ambush on a hill in the vicinity of Komsan-ri above of line Idaho detected enemy troops some 600 which had infiltrated to recover weapons and ammunition the enemy had hidden when they had withdrawn. The patrols attacked them, killed 425, caught 57, and captured various kinds of machine guns, 22 mortars and a great deal of other equipments. The result of the attack was significant indeed.\(^{(10)}\)

Around the same time the ROK 5th Division was conducting the offensive operation, the US 2nd Division on the left forward of the corps and the US 7th Division on the right forward advanced to line Albany on March 13 after overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and unfavorable terrain. After that, the friendly forces were attacked by surprise just once, but both divisions repulsed the enemy. On March 17, the divisions advanced to line Idaho, the final objective, thus concluding Operation Ripper.

(2) The Combat in the Vicinity of Hajinbu-ri

The ROK III Corps, the supporting effort for Ripper Operation, had some 16km advance to reach line Idaho, the final objective, along the line Kyebang-san–Hwangbyong-san. Compared with other corps, the III Corps had a shorter distance to advance, yet it had difficulties in advancing along the rugged Taebaek Mountain range.

The III Corps commander (Maj. Gen. Yu Jai Hung), considering the limitation of maneuver space on the area of operation and frequent appearance of the North Korean stragglers then moving north from the rear area of the corps, committed the ROK 7th Division with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached,
as an attack echelon. The ROK 3rd Division which had returned from the US X Corps was assigned to be the corps' reserve and to take over the positions of Chongson area that had been held by the 9th Division, which was attached to the ROK 1st Corps.

To comply with the order from the ROK Headquarters to rapidly secure the line along Soksa-ri-Kangnung, the Corps had the 3rd Regiment on the left front of the 7th Division attack from Sangtaewha via Paekchok-san (Hill 1141) and Chamdu-san (Hill 1241) up to Soksa-ri. The 5th Regiment would attack from Taegi via Paeksok-san (Hill 1364)-Pakji-san (Hill 1391)-Hyong-jaebong, and Hajinbu-ri. At 08:00, on March 6, the two regiments opened attacks abreast: the 3rd Regiment on the left front with Soksa-ri as its objective and the 5th Regiment on the left front with Hajinbu-ri as its objective. The 8th Regiment as reserve followed the 3rd Regiment, the primary attack. The attacking echelons confronted the fiercely resisting enemy in the area of Chamdu-san and Pakji-san, but they were able to drive the enemy with the support of artillery fire.

According to the intelligence report of the Corps at this point, the main force of the NKPA 9th Division was moving south from Soksa-ri in order to hold fast to Paekchok-san; meanwhile, the NKPA 27th Division in maintenance in the vicinity of Hajinbu-ri was also moving south toward Hyongjebong and Pakji-san and appeared about to attack the right flank of the ROK 7th Division. Therefore, the Corps commander committed the ROK 1st Marine Regiment to this zone.

The Marine Regiment, in order to occupy such defensive strongholds as Pongsan-ri and Palwang-san (Hill 1458) prior to the enemy's advance, required speedy redeployment. At 08:00 March 5, the regiment started to move, and at 02:00 the next day, the 2nd Battalion on the right proceeded to Palwang-san via Ojang-san (Hill 735), and the 3rd Battalion on the left forward also
advanced to Pongsan-ri via Sangwon-san (Hill 1421). They started to establish
defensive positions and conducted the reconnaissance of the forward area.\(^{(10)}\)

The ROK 7th Division strengthened on the right front with the at-
tached Marine Regiment and resumed its attack on March 7. However, the
NKPA, as if fearful of the concentrated fire of the UNC artillery, deployed a
minimum number of personnel to Paekchok-san and Paeksock-san. Then the
NKPA seemed intent to counterattack and envelop the ROK troops by infil-
trating into the rear area if these hills were occupied by the ROK forces. Thus,
the attack by the division was not easy. As the forward regiment lost the mo-
momentum of the attack, the division commander on March 8 committed the 8th
regiment, division reserve, to the attacking echelons and launched the attack
with three regiments abreast. On this day, the 3rd Regiment of the left cap-
tured Paekchok-san after repeated attacks that lasted 7 hours. Expecting the
enemy's night attack, the division commander withdrew the main force, and
positioned only a small part of the security force, planning artillery concentra-
tion points in this area in order to mass artillery fire, if needed.\(^{(10)}\) The enemy
Opened a night attack with two-battalion size strong, as anticipated. However,
enemy soldiers suffered many losses by the division's concentrated fire and
were forced to withdraw. Despite the failure, the enemy gathered his rein-
forced troops along a path in the valley along Hajinbu-ri and Map'yong-ri, and
attempted to advance to Paeksok-san, an the objective, located to the rear of
the division.

Seeing through this attempt, the corps commander committed the 18th
Regiment of the 3rd Division, the reserve of the Corps, to a mission of rapidly
occupying Hajinbu-ri to block the enemy's route for withdrawal. On March 10,
the enemy resumed an attack with two regiments, but by developing a joint op-
eration of infantry, artillery, and air, the division pushed them back to the
Paekchok-san-Komun-ri-Hyongje-bong line. On March 11, when the division
secured Paekchok-san which enabled it to command Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri, the enemy’s attack immediately grew distinctly weak. The division pursued the enemy and occupied Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri, the final objectives. This was achieved on March 12, a week after the offensive began. Following that, the division controlled the Seoul-Kangnung National Road.

While the 1st Marine Regiment had been defending the right front of the ROK 7th Division, the 3rd Battalion, in defending of Bongsan-ri, was isolated amidst the enemy on March 7, as the 5th Regiment of the 7th Division adjacent to the left of the battalion had temporarily withdrawn. The battalion, however, sustained by air-drop supplies, repulsed a series of North Korean surprise attacks until March 9, when the 18th Regiment of the 3rd Division was committed to the right forward of the corps. When the 18th was committed, the enemy started to withdraw. At that point, the Marine Regiment started to counterattack. At 09:00 March 13, the regiment opened an attack and advanced as far as Oech’araeji, its final objective. On March 15, it moved to Ch’ahang-ri again, transferring its area of operation to the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd Division. And on March 16, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment was ordered to be transferred to the US 1st Marine Division of the US IX Corps. It, therefore, moved to Hongch’on.103

(3) Campaigns Against the North Korean Troops behind UNC Lines

The ROK I Corps, just before the opening of Operation Ripper, was released from the operational control of the US IX Corps and returned to Kangnung. Immediately, the ROK I Corps received the Capital Division which was transferred from the III Corps. The Corps was responsible for the defense of Taegwal-ryong and Kangnung (Yongok-ch’on). Simultaneously, the 9th Division and both the 1st and 10th Security Battalions were also trans-
ferred to the Corps. At about the time the Corps took over the area of opera-
tion from the III Corps, the UNC forces recaptured Seoul on the western front, 
and on the central front other UNC divisions approached the 38th Parallel. 
The III Corps advanced up to Hwangbyong-san and Hapyong-dong, and was 
already on line Idaho, the final objective of Operation Ripper.

At approximately this time, the North Korean 10th Division rallied its 
stragglers and local guerrillas together again. After reorganizing some 2,000 
men, this force moved north to Irwoi Mountain northwest of Andong. At the 
time of the New Year’s Offensive, the 10th Division had infiltrated south of 
Chech’on, but had been blocked in its retreat route along the Andong-
Yongdok line. The division had been seriously reduced by the concentrated at-
tack of the US 1st Marine Division and the ROK 1st Marine Regiment. They 
had been further fragmented in the mopping-up operation of the ROK 2nd Di-
vision.

Accordingly, Maj. Gen. Kim Paik II, the I Corps commander, ordered 
the Capital Division to fortify the forward defensive positions, and the regi-
ment on the left front to support the attack of the ROK III Corps adjacent to 
its left. He further ordered the 9th Division (plus one battalion from the 26th 
Regiment, the Capital Division), with each regiment, to clean up remnants who 
were moving north through the rear area of the corps.

Upon receiving information that some 2,000 to 3,000 men of the enemy’s 
10th Division were in the process of moving north via Samwha-ri north of 
Tuta’san (Hill 1361), Brig. Gen. Lee Song Ga, the 9th Division commander or-
dered the 29th and 30th Regiments to organize blocking positions along 
Sogiam-san (Hill 972)-Chabyong-san (Hill 872) line. The action was taken on 
March 12. Reading the division’s attempt, the main force of the enemy moved 
to Kochokdae in the vicinity of Ch’ongok-san, while part of it attempted a 
breakthrough of the blocking positions. By taking advantage of their skills in
operating in mountainous terrain, the enemy succeeded in breaking through the network of the friendly envelopment, and continued moving north, finally assembling near Sangye-ri.

Because the area of operation was too wide and the terrain features too rugged, the Division failed to catch the enemy. On March 16, the 28th Regiment, which was waiting orders as the reserve at Songgye-ri, was also committed to the fighting.\(^{69}\) Around this time, some 600 enemy troops, whose morale had been lowered by the pursuit of the division, assembled at Kisumun-dong, west of Sokbyong-san. In order to annihilate them, the 29th Regiment blocked the north side of the valley and the 28th Regiment opened an attack from the south and the southeast. These advances pressed the enemy into the enveloping net. The enemy fiercely resisted against the pressure of the ROK forces. While the friendly forces temporarily suspended the attack in the dark of night, the enemy took advantage of the pause by breaking through the encircling net, and escaped northward to Mokgye-ri.

In spite of the division’s attack, as the small unit of 10th Division continued to move northward by way of the T'aebaek Mountains, the Eighth Army commander urged the ROK Army chief of staff to eliminate the North Korean 10th Division units quickly still remained active.\(^{69}\)

By this time, the NKPA 10th Division’s fighting power had shrunk under UN air strikes and the division’s ground attack. However, by taking advantage of the rugged terrain of the T'aebaek Mountains and by increased dispersion, the smaller NKPA units attempted to escape individually northwest. The enemy, which had escaped from the I Corps area, moved to the vicinity of Hwanan-bong (Hill 1069) and Sukdu-san (Hill 1001) around March 17. From that time on, the ROK III Corps started a clean-up operation of stragglers.

The III Corps commander ordered the 3rd Division on the right front
to defend the main resistance line Hwangbyong-san–Noin-bong–Odae-san and simultaneously to destroy the enemy stragglers moving northward. To comply with the order, the division had the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment on its left front hold Hill 1301 south of Odae-san, the 3rd Battalion on Byongdu-san (Hill 988) south of the Seoul-Kangnung National Road to block and destroy the 10th Division moving north from south. The 1st Battalion positioned at Kanpy’ong-ri as the reserve of the regiment. The 22nd Regiment in the center placed the 1st Battalion on the right ridge of Dongdae-san (Hill 1433), the 2nd Battalion at Paikil-dong, and the 3rd Battalion in the vicinity of Palwangch’i in order to block the enemy’s northward movement already infiltrated Palwang-san. The 23rd Regiment on the right front placed the 2nd Battalion in a position south of Hwangbyong-san. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were assigned to cover the division’s rear area, the 3rd Battalion at Yoryang-ri and the 1st Battalion at Yujun-dong. The 5th Regiment under the ROK 7th Division, which was attached to the ROK 3rd Division, was in the process of assembling in Kwangch’on-ri.

While the division was concentrated its effort in the rearrangements of units, Brig. Gen. Choi Sok, the division commander was designated as Chief of the ROK Forward Command Post, and was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Oh. At dawn, March 18, elements of the North Korean 10th Division on moving north, surprised the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment. After capturing supplies, the North Korean 10th Division proceeded up to Changgunam, but its advance halted in area of the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Regiment.\(^{(69)}\)

About the time when the enemy’s infiltration actions in the rear area of division were developing very positively, the corps boundaries were to be expanded up to the north of line Idaho. Simultaneously, the higher command also ordered intensification of reconnaissance activities north of the current defensive line.
At this point, the enemy's first echelon composed of the 10th Division headquarters and the 27th Regiment moved north along the axis of the Pongsan-ri–Palwang-san–Yongsan–Paegilp’yong–Noin-bong line and into the 22nd Regiment's operational zone. To cope with this situation, the ROK 3rd Division deployed the 1st Battalion of 5th Regiment on the first blocking line throughout Pongsan-ri. The 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Regiment set up a second blocking line in the area of Yongsan. Thus, the division organized double blocking positions and put pressure on the enemy. Having been cut off their escape route, they started to withdraw along the axis of Ch’ahang-ri–Noin-bong defended by the 23rd Regiment. While the 1st Battalion of the regiment was chasing the enemy, the 2nd Battalion attacked the retreating enemy's back. When the regiment's enveloping net was squeezing them, part of the enemy escaped to Noin-bong. However, they were heavily damaged by the air bombing of the UNC forces.

When the situation changed for the better, the 5th Regiment of the 7th Division returned to its parent unit on March 20. The 3rd Division, while mopping up the remaining enemy, improved its the positions on the main line of resistance. On March 21, however, the enemy's 2nd echelon, comprised of the North Korean 25th Regiment, the service support unit of the 10th Division, and some artillery units, started to move northward, and the ROK 23rd Regiment had to fight the North Koreans again. After a pitched battle with the 3rd Battalion in blocking Shikdang-dong–Hwangbyong-san east of Tongdae-san, the enemy broke through the interdiction line, and continued its escape farther north, proceeded up to the rear area of the 1st Battalion, then defending the Noin-bong area. Being attacked by the 1st Battalion again, the enemy remnants dispersed and escaped toward north in the direction of Kujil-ri along the passway in the valley. From this day forward, the enemy's main force, which had been seriously damaged by the ROK 3rd Division's pursuit, retreated to
the Inje area, passing through the area of the ROK 3rd Division.

Even after all these actions, while the enemy’s 10th Division was breaking through the area of the ROK 1 and 111 Corps, they could not avoid engagement with the friendly units. In these contacts they were greatly damaged, and around March 23, the enemy soldiers which returned to their front line numbered no more than 1,000.\(^{177}\)

5. Advance toward the Imjin River

(1) Airborne Operation at Munsan

When the ROK and UN forces recaptured Seoul and occupied Ch’unch’on, General Ridgway, having considered other operation of attack, discovered that the NK I Corps and the CCF 26th Army had been gathering around Uijongbu and its northern areas. Among these enemy units, the three divisions of the NK I Corps in the areas west of Uijongbu with the Imjin River at their backs seemed vulnerable to attack. These divisions, situated as they were, had to cross the Imjin River Bridge in case of their withdrawal to the north. So, he estimated if the Eighth Army blocked the bridge and attacked them from the south, the enemy divisions could be eliminated with ease. Based upon this analysis, the Eighth Army Commander conceived Operation Courageous in which, while expanding Operation Ripper, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team would drop behind the enemy’s rear area. The US I Corps would apply pressure to the NKPA divisions and destroy them.\(^{178}\)

To execute this plan, Ridgway ordered: “In the first phase of the operation, line Cairo on the central front will be extended to the vicinity of Haengju-Uijonbu in the forward area of the US I Corps, and then the US I Corps will proceed to that line and prepare for the attack. If and when the 187th Air-
borne Regimental Combat Team is dropped over Munsan and blocks Route 1, the Corps will immediately open the attack. Within 24 hours, when the two units are linked up, they will proceed to line Aspen that connects the estuary of the Imjin River-north of Munsan-north of Uijonbu line. In the second phase, the Corps will occupy line Benton that is drawn along the Imjin River.105

In compliance with the operation plan, at 08:00 March 22, three divisions of the US I Corps started to advance to line Cairo, 10 to 16km north. The ROK 1st Division, which proceeded astride Route 1 as the attacking echelon on the left overcoming light resistance of the enemy, already reached the phase line by noon. The US 3rd Division in the center, proceeding on Route 3, and the US 25th Division on the right, repulsing the enemy’s sporadic attacks on the way, also reached line Cairo. Almost simultaneously, in order to provide a strong armored unit rapidly link up with the airtroopers on Route 1, the 1 Corps commander organized a special task force: The task force composed of the attached 6th Tank Battalion, the 24th Division of the US IX Corps; the 2nd Battalion, the 7th Regiment, the US 3rd Division, 1 battery from the 58th Armored Field Artillery; 1 battery of the 999th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; and Company A of the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion. Among them the 6th Tank Battalion was main force and Lt. Col. John S. Growdon, the 6th Tank Battalion commander, was appointed to command the task force.

Based upon the report made by the Fifth US Air Force commander that the weather conditions on March 23 would be favorable for an airborne operation and upon the proposal made by Col. Gilman C. Mudgett, G-3, that the US I Corps would not only linked with paratroopers within 24 hours but also would be able to advance rapidly to the objective area, the Eighth Army commander made the decision that Operation Tomahawk (the airborne operation) would be put into action at 09:00 on March 23.106

Brig. Gen. Frank S. Bowen, commander of the 187th Airborne Regi-
mental Combat Team had planned to drop the regiment main force northeast of Munsan, and the 1st Battalion south of Munsan, and the regiment took off from Taegu Airfield at 07:00, March 23. As planned, the 3rd battalion with the 4th Ranger Company was dropped to cover the drop zone. On the second serial planes, however, the leading airplane aboard commander and staff of the 1st Battalion had engine trouble above the drop zone and it had to return to Taegu. At a result, the drop did not come off entirely as planned.\(^{[11]}\) On the plane returning to the site of embarkation, the remaining transport planes dropped the 1st Battalion into the northern zone to which the main force of the regiment was assigned. While the paratroopers were coming down, a small number of NK troops that had been deployed on the hills north of Munsan counterattacked the UNC troops with sporadic motar fire, which, however, did not affect the airborne operation. Yet, since the 1st Battalion was dropped northeast of Munsan where the main force was meant to be dropped, the drop zone was congested, creating temporary confusion. However, the regiment rapidly redeployed the units and intensified the security guard.

At this point, the command group of the 1st Battalion which had returned aboard the plane to Taegu, came back to the Munsan area and dropped to the right drop zone. However, they were isolated amidst the enemy. As soon as the battalion command post which had been dropped south of Munsan, was attacked by the enemy, Company B of the 1st battalion which had been dropped beforehand, attacked the enemy deployed around Pongso-san at 15:00. After linking itself up the battalion command post, Company B moved north. By this time, all the objectives assigned to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team were secured. In this operation jump casualties were 84 troopers, but almost half of these returned to duty immediately after treatment. Battle casualties among the airborne troops were light, totaling 19. On the other hand, the enemy casualties 136 dead and 149 taken captive.
Prisoner interrogation indicated that the enemy troops who had been deployed in the objective area belonged to the 36 Regiment of the NKPA 19th Division. Only 300 to 500 troops had defended the area and the remaining troops of the NK 1 Corps had already withdrawn north of the Imjin River long before the friendly airborne drops. For the next operation, the regiment reconnoitered the ferries across the Imjin River and the road between Munsan and Pobwon-ri."

Meanwhile, as soon as the airborne operation in the Munsan area started, the US 1 Corps commander in the morning of 23rd ordered the Task Force Growdon to pass through the ROK 1st Division deployed along line Cairo, and to rapidly proceed along the axis of Route 1 in order to link up with the airborne units. Then, the three divisions under the 1 Corps opened
their attacks: the ROK 1st Division with Munsan as its objective, the US 3rd Division with Tongduch'ón, and the US 25th Division with P'och'on.

While the task force was advancing, its attack seemed to be progressing smoothly without enemy resistance. But about the time it was passing by the destroyed bridge on the Ch'angryong-ch'ón, one tank was damaged by a mine laid by the enemy. After this, the maneuvering of the task force became very cautious for fear of further damage by mines, so slow that the task force barely approached to the vicinity of Shinwol-ri south of Munsan.

While driving along Route 1, Task Force Growdon had not encountered the enemy. Yet, since it had to remove some 150 mines or explode them, so their advance was delayed. The lead unit reached Munsan at 18:30 on March 23, finally reaching the paratroopers.119

Unfortunately, the airborne operation at Munsan had not been conducted at the right time after all, and the link-up operation was also delayed. Therefore, the operation was not fruitful.

(2) The Advance to Munsan-Tongduch'ón-P'och'ón

The ROK 1st Division on the left front of the US I Corps was to take over the positions of the US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team that had been dropped at Munsan. Therefore, The Division launched attack with the Task Force Boone in the lead. It consisted of Company C of the US 64th Tank Battalion, the tank destroyer battalion of the ROK 1st Division and two engineer Platoons. It advanced along Route 1 by following the units of Task Force Growdon. Then, the division repulsed slight resistance near Kup'abal-ri, and advanced up to Tonggo-ri and Kunch'ón. Following that, quite contrary to expectations, there was no contact with the enemy, and in the late afternoon of March 24, the ROK 1st Division had advanced to Munsan-Pobwon-ri, took over
the operational area of the 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team at 17:00, and prepared for the subsequent operation.\(^{14}\)

As the ROK 1st Division met light resistances by the enemy, the US 3rd Division in the middle was advancing toward Uijongbu with Task Force Hawkins ahead of it. Task Force Hawkins was composed of the 64th Tank Battalion, and two tank platoons from each of the 15th and 65th Regiments. Yet, on March 24, the 26th Army of the CCF unexpectedly started stubbornly resisting the American forces, and a pitched battle ensued. During this battle, the Chinese occupied Hill 468 northwest of Uijongbu and northeast of Ch'onbosan. The Chinese was attempting to block the progress of the American division, moving along the Uijongbu–Tongduch'on road and the Uijongbu–P'och'on road. On the morning of March 24, when the division was about to resume the attack, it received the enemy's massive artillery fire. In the attack, the division occupied Ch'onbo-san, however, failed to occupy Hill 468 because of the powerful resistance of the Chinese forces.

The corps commander, realizing that the enemy in front of the US 3rd Division was putting up strong resistance, ordered the 187th Regimental Combat Team assembled north of Munsan, to occupy Hill 228 north of Tokchong-ri and block the enemy's retreat, in order to entrapped the enemy. By evening, the armored unit of the RCT (attached the Task Force Growdon) was in great need of fuel resupply after the operation conducted to that point. Besides, the tanks could not move tactically in the mountainous region from Pobwon-ri to Shinch'on, and the road itself needed repairing. As a result, The armor delayed. On this day, especially, a heavy rain poured down, forcing the tank unit to return to Munsan.

The 187th Regimental Combat Team, on the morning of March 25 advanced to the vicinity of Shinch'on and attacked Hill 228. However, because of the enemy's stubborn resistance with small arms, automatic weapons, and
mortars, the RCT failed to capture the objective. When the 187th Regimental Combat Team opened the attack again, the enemy resistance in front of the 3rd Division markedly decreased, and the enemy, in fact, had started withdrawing, confirmed by air observation. The enemy deployed on Hill 228 still resisted fiercely to cover their withdrawing units; however, the RCT occupied the hill on the morning of March 27, and paratroopers linked finally with the US 3rd Division.

Meanwhile, the US 25th Division started attacking along the Seoul-Ch’unch’ŏn National Road: the 24th Regiment left forward of the Division with Sori-bong and Haeryong-san as its objective, the 27th Regiment at the center with Chugyop-san and Wangbang-san as objective, and the Turkish Brigade attached to the Division with Chukom-san and Kuksa-bong as its objective. At the beginning of the attack, the enemy’s resistance was slight, but it laid mines and other obstacles on the maneuvering road, so that the progress of the Division was a little delayed. As soon as the attacking echelons reached the area of Sori-bong, Chugyop-san, and Chukom-san, which were to be used as stepping stones for the attack of Po’ch’ŏn, the enemy, one regiment had constructed defensive positions and resisted stubbornly. Anti-artillery fire was exchanged and fierce engagements were conducted. The Division occupied hills with massing all available fire power. However, the enemy also realized the tactical importance of those hills, and it opened a counterattack, taking advantage of the darkness of night. Once again fierce battles followed, but the division was finally able to repulse the enemy. Around March 26, the enemy’s resistance gradually weakened, and on March 28, the Division occupied Po’ch’ŏn and started to prepare for the next operation.

The CCF 26th Army executed the last counterattack in order to recapture Uijongbu and Chugyop-san, but suffered enormous damage. The Chinese withdrew to the vicinity of Chonghyun-san north of Po’ch’ŏn, but stragglers
 lingered at Kuksa-bong (Hill 764) and in the area of Soyo-san.10n)

6. Advance toward Yangyang

The Eighth Army, by conducting the Operation, Ripper secured line Idaho, the final objective of the US IX and X Corps in the central front; therefore, the front line of the UNC and the ROK forces formed a half circle with Ch’unch’on in the center. The Army commander, for the purpose of maintaining some alignment in the Army front, had ordered the US I Corps to proceed from south of the Han River toward the shore of the Imjin River and the ROK I and III Corps to proceed from the Seoul-Kangnung National Road to line Idaho along Hyun-ri and Yangyang.

Around this time, the North Korean stragglers, who had moved north along the rugged Taebaek Mountains, approached the rear areas of both the ROK corps, and the Corps had to mop-up these stragglers. Around on March 18, when the mopping up operation drew to a lull, at noon of the day the ROK Army headquarters ordered both Corps to conduct intense reconnaissance patrols in the area south of line Cairo. To comply, the I Corps Commander, with the intention of attacking Yangyang, had the Capital Division execute a thorough reconnaissance patrol in the areas north of the Yongok-ch’on.

At almost the same time, the North Korean 69th Brigade just opposite the Corps, strengthened by part of the NKPA 10th Division which had withdrawn northward, was prepared to defend Yangyang. Along the axis of Hawolch’on-ri-Manwol-san-Myongji-ri, the enemy constructed successive strongholds and was blocking the advance of the division.

The ROK 1st Regiment, which had been engaged in a reconnaissance in force, destroyed the enemy positions under the cover of the US naval gun fire deployed in the Eastern Sea, and proceeded to the line of Osongjong-ri-
Myongji-ri south of Yangyang. To block the progress of the regiment, the enemy did its utmost to resist the regiment; yet because of its loss of troops caused by the US ships’ massive gunfire, North Korean’s morale was at its lowest ebb, and it was unable to resist the regiment’s advance.

With the rapid changes in the situation, the Capital Division commander had the 26th Regiment, which was defending positions at Yuch’on-ri-Ch’ahang-ri near the Seoul-Kangnung National Road, turn over those positions to the 9th Division. Then he moved the 26th Regiment to Ingu-ri south of Yangyang by way of Chumunjin, and he also moved the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the Division reserve to Chumunjin from Kangnung.

When the 1 Corps and the III Corps were engaged mainly in reconnaissance in force, the Eighth Army Commander at 08:00 on March 25 requested of the ROK Army Headquarters that “the ROK Army units on the eastern front advance rapidly to line Cairo.” Upon receiving this request, the ROK Army Headquarters issued Operation Order No. 10: “the 1 and the III Corps will execute the attacks for two days (March 25 to 26) and occupy line Cairo within each responsible sector.” Thus, the 1 Corps commander directed the Capital Division to occupy Yangyang on line Cairo, and the 9th Division, while covering the left flank of the Capital Division, to advance to line Cairo.

On March 26, the Capital Division commander, Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch’-an launched attack, organizing the attack echelons with the 1st Regiment on the left and the 26th Regiment on the right. The enemy, with the intent to hold fast Yangyang, built up strong positions along the line between Wuam-ri-Nogo-bong south of Namdae-ch’on, preparing to fight with their backs to the river and attempting to block the division’s attacks. However, the division, after hitting NKPA with concentrated all available fire, broke the enemy’s last defensive line by dashing assault.

When their last defensive line broke, the North Koreans crossed the
Namdae-ch'ŏn, withdrawing to the entry of Sorak-san, which was connected with a group of hills north of Yangyang and with Hangye-ryong-Inje. Meanwhile, the division crossed the Namdae-ch'ŏn on March 27, advancing to Yangyang, and occupied blocking positions between Yangyang-Inje and Yangyang-Sorim-ri. At this point, the enemy located at Yangyang and Sokch'ŏ could not organize defensive positions, and they were not even able to withdraw because of UNC naval gun fire support on the east coast; therefore, there was nothing for the enemy to do except resistance by securing strongholds along the roads leading to inland areas between Inje and Sorak-san.

In the operation, the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Kim Paik Il, upon inspecting of the 9th Division as it covered the attack of the Capital Division adjacent on its left, left Hajinbu-ri on an L-5 observation plane at 14:40 on his way to the corps command post at Kangnung. Even after a few hours, he had still not arrived at his destination. The corps staff, being apprehensive of an accident due to turbulent air, directed the 9th Division to patrol all over the Taekwal-ryong area and along the Seoul-Kangnung Road, but the search was in vain. Thereupon, deputy corps commander Lee Joon Sik temporarily assumed commander of the 1st Corps.

The enemy troops that had withdrawn from Yangyang had constructed strongpoints on Hill 387 at the entrance to Sorak-san. The hill was key terrain features for controlling the roads to Yangyang-Hangye-ryong-Wont'ong, which were to be used for the withdrawal of the enemy's 11th Corps. It seemed, therefore, that the enemy was prepared and determined to have a decisive battle. After the division concentrated fire on the Hill 387, the 1st Regiment launched an attack. But the enemy's resistance was so stubborn that the attack failed. While the division pounded the enemy with artillery fire, the 1st Regiment reorganized its rank and file, and resumed the attack on March 30. When the division's fire power was extended to the rear area of Hill 387, the main
force of the enemy withdrew to Sorak-san by way of Osack-ri leaving a detachment of one-company on the hill.

While the ROK I Corps started its offensive operation along the axis of the east coast, the III Corps adjacent to the I Corps on the left, sent the 7th Division off to mop up stragglers in the rear area on March 25, and directed the 3rd Division to attack from the Seoul-Kangnung National Road to the road connecting Hyun-ri-Hasorim, which was the Cairo line with their zone.

At 08:00, March 26, the 3rd Division started its attacks with the 18th Regiment as main effort, the 23rd Regiment as supporting effort, and the 22nd Regiment in reserve. The 18th Regiment attacked the mountain ridge connecting Odae-san with Sorak-san, repulsed the enemy which resisted slightly, and secured Hasorim on line Cairo on March 27. The 23rd regiment advanced through Wolchungdong on March 27, before reaching Chogaedong on March 30.

With all these advances, the ROK I as well as the III Corps occupied the Hyun-ri-Sorim line and Yangyang which was a key tactical point on the east coast.

V. The Operations for Securing the 38th Parallel

With Operation Ripper, the US IX Corps in the central area secured Ch’unch’on, the US I Corps in the western area occupied Munsan, and the ROK I Corps in the eastern area advanced to Yangyang; thereafter, the Commanding General of the Eighth US Army decided to have all the forces under his command advance up to the line connecting to the phase lines of Benton in the west and Cairo in the center as the final objective of Operation Ripper.
This line was drawn from Munsan in the west along the upstream trace of the Imjin River and ran through Tongduch'on-Ch'ungh'on-Hyon-ri, and reached at Chosan-ri north of Yangyang. It traced virtually below the 38th Parallel in the west, and hanged slack a little south of the parallel in the central area, but rose north of it in the eastern sector, thus connecting tactical terrain which could virtually control the 38th Parallel.

The UNC forces were able to advance to this line without much enemy resistance up to the end of March as the enemy forces by then had pulled back and reorganized their battered divisions. The UNC forces recaptured Seoul and reached the 38th Parallel through Operation Ripper during the period of March 7 to 31. The UNC forces could not impose as much serious damage on the enemy's manpower and matériel as was expected at the beginning of this operation; however, enemy casualties were estimated to be high and about 4,800 men were captured.\(^{118}\)

Since the ROK and UN forces advanced to the 38th Parallel in smooth progress of their recountercorssive operation, General Ridgway looked for a new strategy for succeeding operations thereafter to secure the 38th Parallel.

1. The United Nations Command Military Strategy

As the ROK and UNC forces resumed the counteroffensive and grasped the initiative in operations in late January 1951, the serious debate of the previous December on the withdrawal of the UNC subsided. Instead, the strategic issues of directing the war along the 38th Parallel were examined from different perspectives, as had been the case before the advance across the parallel the previous October. Thus, the Truman administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following general goals on March 15:
The overall objective was to settle the Korean problem along two lines, politically, by establishing a unified and independent nation, and militarily, by repelling aggression and restoring peace.

The agreement was still on the agenda of the National Security Council for approval. It contained the following military strategic concept:

The UN forces should continue to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and should regain control over territory south of the 38th Parallel; meanwhile the defenses of the Republic of Korea should be built up. UN ground forces should be permitted to conduct 'aggressive defensive operations' approximately 10 to 20 miles north of the parallel 'as may be required by the tactical situation.' When the 38th Parallel is reached in force, the United States should seek a cease-fire along the lines communicated to the UN cease-fire Committee in December 1950. Should the enemy refuse an acceptable *modus vivendi*, UN forces should continue to inflict maximum attrition. They might undertake raids north of the parallel, to keep the enemy off balance and to disrupt its offensive preparations, but there should be no general advance, nor should any attempt be made to hold territory in North Korea.

Consequently, the conflict was to be resolved with a cease-fire after the status quo ante bellum were secured militarily, and then a political solution for a unified Korea was to be sought by negotiation. It was a disappointing, frustrating policy from the standpoint of Koreans, who bore the agony of national division; however, it was an unavoidable pragmatic choice dictated by presence of inexhaustible Chinese forces stationed north of the 38th Parallel.

While these strategic concept being formulated, the UNC ground forces approached to the 38th Parallel, and which offered an auspicious occasion for the Truman administration to try new peace effort. The pre-war territories were almost regained, and both the UNC and Communist forces were in posi-
tions to negotiate on the balanced positions of power. In addition, the members of the UN also strongly supported the proposal for peace before the UNC forces crossed the 38th Parallel again.

On March 20 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that the President was preparing to announce in public that UN was willing to consider a cease-fire upon acquiring agreements on the contents of his declaration from those UN member nations participating in the war. And JCS conveyed him the general position of the UN that the UN forces should not advance north of the 38th Parallel. Also he asked for his recommendations on the conditions to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with the enemy in case the negotiations were to commence. However, on March 24 General MacArthur, who preferred military means to a diplomatic approach to resolve the conflict, released, without prior consultation with his own government, a statement that contained a message discounted Chinese military abilities by pointing out that the CCF could not lead the war to victory and threatening that the friendly forces could attack mainland China in case the conflict continued. Thus, President Truman postponed releasing his planned public statement, because he believed that it could arouse international confusion and cast doubt upon sincerity of President's message. President Truman thought that General MacArthur's behavior was not just a public disagreement over the policy, but deliberate and premeditated sabotage to the US and UN policy. Consequently, MacArthur's statement created a stir, finally cancelling the release of the cease-fire plan by Truman.

By coincidence, President Syngman Rhee made a statement on the same day (March 24) that "the UNC advance should not be stopped at the 38th Parallel. The unification should be achieved by advancing to the north. Rhee asserted that it was the objective of the UN. Under the geographical and economic division of the peninsula along the artificial 38th Parallel, the Republic
of Korea would not be able to survive and prosper politically and economically. The victory so far would be futile, and another war could recur between the north and the south in the future."

At that time, the Eighth Army planned to cross the Imjin River, assault the retreating NK I Corps, and advance to the Yesong River in order to secure the Kaesong area. However, the UNC operation had to be limited to the reconnaissance and combat patrol as the enemy had already withdrew north of the Yesong River and the attack echelons could be encircled by the CCF positioned on the east flank. The commanding general of the Eighth Army chose to attack P'yongyang, Ch'orwon, and Kimhwa in the central area as an alternative. This complex, eventually named Iron Triangle by reporters for dramatic expression, located between Wonsan and Seoul and was a strategic transportation center with its well developed rail and road networks.\(^{(2)}\)

It was the center of enemy logistics for the frontline, and the enemy was transporting concentrated manpower and material in this area. The main concern for the commanding general of the Eighth Army was to occupy this critical terrain, which could guarantee friendly forces' continuing advance toward the Iron Triangle and provide excellent defensive positions in light of growing signs of imminent enemy offensive.

In this time, the selected defense line of UNC, named line Kansas, extended along the southern bank of the Imjin River to the Hwach'on Reservoir, and Yangyang on the eastern coast. This line was drawn 3.2 to 9.6 km north of the 38th Parallel in the western sector, and 16 km north of it in the eastern sector, linking rugged mountains and hill masses. The line joined the selected terrain necessary to defend the 38th Parallel and reflected the new strategic policy of March 15. Those forces that had previously advanced to the 38th Parallel in Operation Ripper were to conduct drive to the new line, Operation Rugged.

In the next phase of the operation, the Eighth Army set up lines Utah
and Wyoming for the US I and X Corps objectives that posed a threat on the
Iron Triangle129 and planned to assault Ch’orwon and Kimhwa. And being
struck by strong enemy during the advance the two corps would return to line
Kansas. This operation was labelled Operation Dauntless.

General MacArthur at that time instructed General Ridgway to limit
the forces to one battalion-size for combat patrol once UNC forces reached
this line.

2. Communist’s War Capabilities Strengthened

Although the enemy was retreating toward the 38th Parallel upon the
resumption of the re-counteroffensive by the UN forces, the enemy was rein-
forcing its forces by deploying the front the NKPA which had been reorga-
nized in Manchuria, and by bringing new Chinese forces across south the Yalu
River.

The NKPA VI Corps (the 18th, 19th & 36th Divisions) crossed the Yalu
in January 1951, entered Ch’ongsongjin, moved to the Namch’onjom and
Yonan areas in mid-February, and assumed the defense mission of the Haeju
area. Following the VI Corps, the VII Corps (the 13th, 32nd & 37th Divisions)
crossed the Yalu, moved southward by division, arrived at the Wonsan area at
the end of February, and took charge of the 3rd and 24th Divisions defending
the coastal area. At the same time the VIII Corps (the 42nd, 45th & 46th Divisions)
also entered Manp’ojin, deployed its main forces to the Hungnam area and
took over the 41st Division and the 63rd Brigade positioned in the vicinity of
Hungnam. The 45th Division moved down to Inje and joined the III Corps.
With the redeployment of these additional forces, NK had two corps, eight di-
visions, and one brigade as reserve along the line of Wonsan and Hungnam;
however, the Eighth Army believed that only two enemy divisions and one bri-
gade were stationed in this area.\footnote{23}

On the western front, the NK VI Corps, which had returned from Manchuria, and the NK IV Corps (the 4th & 5th Divisions, 104th Armored Division, & 26th Brigade), which had moved from the northeastern area to the P'yongyang area at the end of the previous year, were stationed to assume the defense of the western coast. The Eighth Army had no knowledge of their location and strength until mid-March.

The total NKPA strength positioned at the frontline plus those forces which had returned from Manchuria were 8 corps, 27 divisions, and 4 brigades. However, these forces lacked full combat capability, with their divisions at substandard level in manpower and equipment and most of the newly reorganized division without combat experience. Furthermore, the NK 41st and 42nd Divisions were deactivated by the end of March in order to augment other divisions. The NK forces, however, improved their combat power steadily after the fall of 1950.

There were also changes in the NKPA command leadership. As head of its General Chiefs of Staff, succeeded by Lt. Gen. Nam Il, who had served in the Soviet army during WW II, replaced Lt. Gen. Kang Kon, who was killed in action. The commander of Front Headquarters, Kim Ch'aek was also killed in action and was replaced by Lt. Gen. Kim Ung, who had combat experience in the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese Communist Forces and recently led the NKPA I Corps, the main attack in the early stages of the Korean War.\footnote{36}

A surge of fresh Chinese Communist Forces in large numbers began to enter into the peninsula from Manchuria during the period of January and February 1951. In late February the Chinese III Army Group (the 63rd, 64th & 65th Armies) entered at Shinuiju, and assembled in the Koksan, Singye, and Ich'on areas between the Yesong and Imjin Rivers in early March. The CCF 9th and 11th Artillery Regiments also came along with these forces. Simultaneo-
usly the CCF IX Army Group, reorganizing in the Wonsan area, commenced to move the 26th Army, which was in fairly good condition, to the central front near the 38th Parallel in early March. The Eighth Army detected the movement of the CCF 26th Army at an early stage, but did not know anything about the CCF III Army Group up until mid-March.

On March 10, the CCF 38th and 50th Armies which faced the US 24th and 25th Divisions, were replaced by the 26th Army. Both battleworn armies moved northward. Right before the start of Operation Ripper, the CCF 39th and 40th Armies, assembled in the Hongch'on area, replaced the 42nd and 66th Armies and were committed to the central area of the frontline. On the 14th, the 42nd and 66th Armies moved northward after their change of mission. In addition, the CCF 47th Army entered the peninsula in March, was attached to the III Army Group, and was assigned to the construction of airfields in Sunan, Sunch'on, and Namyang-ri as a non-combat force. The CCF 5th Artillery Division, which was nicknamed 'Mule Division' since it carried equipment on mules also crossed the border into the peninsula.125

By the time the Chinese had completed the movement of their forces in March, the total strength of the CCF in the peninsula were 3 army groups, 14 armies, 42 divisions, 4 artillery divisions and 2 independent artillery regiments. These enemy reinforcements appeared on the surface as a signal of offensive preparations, but in reality the enemy was concentrating its effort on building defensive positions. Furthermore, the CCF IX Army Group, with the exception of its 26th Army, was incapable of deployment until the end of March. The other NKPA and CCF were supposed to be occupied with reorganizing their units.

Ridgway estimated that the enemy could launch its counteroffensive by the latter part of April since the CCF III Army Group assembled in the Andong and Pongsong areas to get ready to cross the border into the peninsula.
The CCF Ⅲ Army Group moved to the Kaesong and Yonan area, and the main forces of the Ⅸ Army Group moved to the Kimhwa and P’yonnggang areas in order to arrive at the area of operations by mid-April.

The Headquarters, Chinese People’s Volunteers drew the line of departure for their counterroffensive connecting Changyon-Shinwon-ri-Paekch’ón-ri-Chuch’ón-ri-Sakryong-Hwach’ón-Yanggu-Inje-Yangyang. In order to control this line of departure and to allow time for the newly committed units to prepare for the operation, the Chinese command ordered those armies defending the frontline to block the ROK and UN forces between the second defense line connecting Uijongbu-Chugum-san-Ch’ongu-san—the north side of the Hongch’ón River-P’ungam-ri line and the 38th Parallel until the beginning of April, and also the area between the line of departure and the 38th Parallel for 20 to 30 days.130

3. Advance toward the Kansas Line

Prior to the start of Operation Rugged, the advance to line Kansas, the ROK and UN forces adjusted the sector boundaries between corps and also moved and redeployed critical combat forces. The US Ⅰ Corps in the west commanded the ROK 1st Division, US 3rd Division (with the British 29th Brigade attached), and US 24th and 25th Divisions on the frontline. The US Ⅸ Corps in the central area controlled the ROK 6th Division, US 1st Cavalry Division, and the British 27th Brigade. The US Ⅹ Corps in the central eastern sector commanded the US 2nd Division, ROK 5th Division, and US 7th Division on the frontline. In the eastern area, the ROK Ⅲ Corps had the ROK 2nd and 3rd Divisions as attacking echelons with the ROK 7th Division in reserve, and the ROK Ⅰ Corps assigned the Capital Division to attack with the ROK 9th Division as its reserve.
Having prepared for action, each corps commenced Operation Rugged in order to advance to line Kansas on April 3rd. Two huge armies in Korea now moved against each other in the climatic campaign of the War.

(1) Advancing Operation in the Central Western Area

To begin Operation Rugged, the US I and IX Corps attacked between the Imjin River and the Hwach'on Reservoir. The commanding general of the US I Corps planned to have the ROK 1st Division on the left front and the US 3rd Division in the center, both of which had already advanced to line Kansas, concentrate on the defense of the Imjin River. The US 24th and 25th Divisions on the right front would attack northward along route 3 connecting Uijongbu-P'och'on-Kimhwa. On April 3 the US 25th Division in the west of the route advanced along the valley of Yongp'yong-ch'on and the Hant'an River, and the US 24th Division in the east of the route moved toward Kwanum-san and Kukmang-bong. Against light enemy resistance in the way of sporadic fire, the I Corps was able to advance to line Kansas, linking Yulu-ri-Unsan-ri-Yama-ri-Changam-ri line on the April 6.

The US IX Corps commander planned attack abreast with the British 27th Brigade on the left front, the ROK 6th Division in the center, and the US 1st Cavalry Division on the right front. On April 3 the corps began attack, and the British 27th Brigade on the left and the ROK 6th Division in the center reached line Kansas on April 6, against slight enemy resistance. However, the US 1st Cavalry Division on the right, encountering strong resistance from the CCF 39th Army, advanced near to the Hwach'on Reservoir, but still south of line Kansas.

General Ridgway at that time was concerned about the effect of the Hwach'on Dam on UNC operation when his forces were advancing to the Ch'
unch'ón area. In order to preempt the probable enemy flooding by utilizing the dam, he raised a proposal to destroy the dam before the UNC forces approached the flood plain below it. But the engineer staff of the Eighth Army stressed the fact that the volume of water stored by the dam was below half its total capacity, and that 18 sluice gates jammed shut at that time. It was impossible to blow up the dam with conventional bombing; furthermore, the enemy had limited means to destroy the dam themselves. Thus, it was concluded that the Hwach'ón Dam could not affect UNC operation, and Ridgway excluded the dam from the list of objectives for this operation.\(^{27}\)

However, with the start of Operation Rugged, the engineer staff of the US IX Corps offered a contradictory opinion. He insisted that the areas along line Kansas could be flooded and the Ch'unch'ón area would suffer heavy damage if the enemy opened all the gates simultaneously when the water level in the reservoir reached the top, raising the level in the Pukhan River by 10 to 12 feet. Although the flood would not be disastrous, it would temporarily disrupt lateral movement in the corps zone and the use of the main supply route for the US IX Corps linking Kap'yang-Ch'unch'ón-Hwach'ón. This harassment could be repeated so long as the dam remained in the hands of the enemy.

The commanding general of the Eighth Army finally included the Hwach'ón Reservoir in the list of objectives for Operation Rugged and readjusted the sector boundary between the corps a little bit to the east in order to include the Ch'unch'ón-Hwach'ón route and the Hwach'ón Dam in the area for the US IX Corps. He assigned the mission of capturing the dam to the corps.

Upon being attached the US 4th Ranger Company specially trained to the corps, the commander of the US IX Corps decided to attach the company to the US 1st Cavalry Division and to have it secure the dam. He hoped that the company could secretly infiltrate to the dam and incapacitate the sluice gates and other equipment. However, the commander of the US 1st Cavalry Di-
vision was concentrating on securing line Kansas south of the dam, contrary to the intention of the corps commander.

As anticipated by the IX Corps, the CCF 39th Army opened four gates fully and six gates partly around midnight of April 8. The water level at the Hwach'ŏn Reservoir then was only half full.

Having prepared for the flood, the corps had its forces evacuate from the lower stream areas without suffering damage. But with continuing water flow from the reservoir, the water level of the Pukhan River went up by about 2 meters, washing temporary bridges away in the Ch'unch'on area and causing other damage. On the morning of April 9, an element of the CCF 39th Army occupied the ridge dominating the dam, but its main force retreated to avoid isolation in the flood.

With its retreat, the US 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments were able to advance to line Kansas with ease. Concluding its advance to line Kansas, the US 1st Cavalry Division prepared to transfer its area of operation to the US 1st Marine Division. However, the corps commander ordered the division commander to secure the Hwach'ŏn Reservoir by all means prior to its relief-in-position.

The US 7th Cavalry Regiment began attack by committing a battalion-size three times from April 9 to 11; however, it failed to seize the Hwach'ŏn Dam due to an attack plan prepared in haste, a lack of fire support in the absence of a road network, inadequate equipment for a river-crossing, and so on.\(^{120}\)

On April 12, the corps commander decided to secure the dam in Operation Dauntless, which was to start soon, and approved the relief-in-place of the US 7th Cavalry Regiment by the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, which was committed to this area through its attachment to the US 1st Marine Division. Thus, the US IX Corps occupied line Kansas, linking Sokryong-san-Hwaak-san-Chiam-ri-Shinp'o-ri-Yonghwa-san, and then prepared for the next operation.
(2) Advancing Operation in the Central Eastern Front

With a limited road network and rugged terrain in its operations area, the US X Corps could not advance as rapidly as the other forces in the central-western sector. With an adjustment in positioning its forces on April 7, the corps assigned the US 2nd Division on the left to assault south of the Hwach'on Reservoir as secondary attack, the US 7th Division in the center to attack Yanggu, and the ROK 5th Division on the right to advance on Inje as the main effort.

While the ROK 5th Division was concentrating its effort on rebuilding its units, and conducting reconnaissance-in-force after concluding the battle of Taegi-san, on April 7 it was called upon to displace to Namjon-ri and Wondae-ri south of the Soyang River and to prepare an attack at Inje. At that time, in front of the division deployed the NK 12th Division, and the NK 15th Division and one regiment of the NK 45th Division positioned along the Soyang River in order to support the NK 12th Division. The enemy had a plan to block the UNC advance by establishing strongpoints along the river, and then would shifting to the offensive upon completing the reorganization of its main forces that were pulled back.29

The obstacle in securing the division’s objective of Changp’yong and Ponghwa-bong on line Kansas was the Soyang River running across the operational area. Thus, Brig. Gen. Min Ki shik, the division commander, planned to have the 35th Regiment on the left cross the river first and establish a bridgehead, and then to order the 36th Regiment on the right to cross the river in order to attack Inje. The 35th Regiment as the spearhead crossed the river at Ch’onggu-ri at 23:00 of April 9 upon completion of the intensive preparation fire by the 26th Artillery Battalion and an artillery battalion of the US 7th Division. The regiment defeated the enemy forces of two company-size positioned
at a hill in the Kwandae-ri area, which commanded the crossing site, and secured the bridgehead.

The 6th Company as spearhead of the 36th Regiment stealthily crossed the river at Karo-ri at around 01:00 on April 10. Then the company made a surprise attack on Hill 490, which controlled the route from the river to Inje. The two company-size enemy forces entrenched at the hill resisted stubbornly and stopped the 6th Company’s attack. The regiment then concentrated its support fire on the enemy, but the enemy counterattacked instantly, and the battle continued the whole morning, with no indication of which side was winning. Then Colonel Hwang Yup, the regimental commander, ordered the entire 2nd Battalion to cross the Soyang River and secure Hill 490 and Hill 539, which overlooked Inje. With the arrival of the regiment’s main forces in the afternoon, the situation started to improve, and the 6th Company, which was engaged in a fierce battle at Hill 490, succeeded in securing Hill 539 as well. The 36th Regiment which attacked along the route of Inje-Wont’ong, launch an all-out attack and expelled the enemy who resisted stubbornly, from double and even triple layers of dugouts.

The 35th Regiment on the left attacked along the ridges linking Hills 542, 637, 711, and 742 west of Kaeun-ri, which controlled the route to Yanggu and Inje; however, it was blocked by the enemy resistance in consolidated defensive strong points. The 35th Regiment continued its attack on these enemy strong points under the cover of artillery support until April 13, but failed to secure its objective despite repeated effort.

As the 36th Regiment commenced its assault with Wont’ong as its objective on April 14, the enemy then established strong defensive points at Hill 548 and Hill 664 west of Hapgang-ri overlooking the route of Inje and Wont’ong, and blocked the advancing regiment. On the other hand, the 35th Regiment, with less enemy resistance to its front, seized the enemy defensive strong
points after three days bloody battle.

In spite of devastating the artillery fire of the division, the enemy resisted stubbornly, taking advantage of the rugged mountainous terrain. The attacking regiments of the division were engaged in a fierce see-saw battle at Hills 640, 548, and 664 north of Inje during all of April 15. However, the 2nd Battalion of the 36th Regiment captured an NK soldier and learned the enemy’s challenge and password ‘chestnut tree’, ‘pine tree’ while it was conducting a night attack at Hill 540. Thus, the battalion could approach Hill 540 without shedding blood and killed about 100 enemy forces in a surprise attack.\(^{130}\)

In high spirits, the ROK attacking elements resumed their assault at dawn of April 16. The 36th Regiment on the left maneuvered along the ridge, secured Hill 940, the highest hill in the division sector, and advanced to Hills 586 and 567, which control the mountain trail between Yanggu and Inje. The 36th Regiment on the right also secured Hills 548 and 664, the enemy’s strong points, and advanced to Soho-ri near the three-way junction north of Inje. Thus, the division was within arm’s reach of securing line Kansas. The 36th Regiment reach to line Kansas by securing Ponghwa-bong (Hill 481) north of Wont’ong on April 17, seven days after it started the attack. The 35th Regiment on the left was delayed in its advance, blocked by a strong enemy counterattack at Hill 586, but advanced to the Wolha-ri area and finally occupied line Kansas.

While the ROK 5th Division was engaged in a fierce battle in the Inje area, the US 2nd Division was advancing north toward the Hwach’on Reservoir and the US 7th Division was heading for Yanggu, conducting fierce battles against the NK forces. Most of the friendly forces finally secured line Kansas linking the Imjin River-Chongok-Hwach’on Reservoir-Yanggu-Yangyang. Then the UN forces decided to build strong defense positions along this line as a part of the strategy to seek a cease-fire.
The ROK and UN forces restored the status quo ante bellum for the second time by destroying the Chinese offensive intended to drive away the UN forces from the peninsula, since they had crushed the NK attacks and pushed the enemy north of the 38th Parallel six months earlier.

Restoring the pre-war status was significant for the ROK forces as it meant the recovery of lost territory. But it was more significant in the sense that the ROK and the UN forces were able to understand the enemy situation in detail, and that the friendly forces gained the confidence from the victory against the enemy. Most important of all, the participating UN forces overcame their fear of the Chinese forces and regained the initiative in the war.

4. Attack toward the Iron Triangle Area

The commanding general of the Eighth Army saw indications of a communist offensive increasing significantly across the frontline through ground and air reconnaissance and the interrogation of POWs. He tried to disrupt the enemy preparation for an offensive by occupying the Iron Triangle, the strategic key point with a heavy concentration of enemy forces and material. Thus he intended to increase the depth in his defense on the central front. Accordingly, the general decided to stage a preemptive strike in order to secure line Wyoming connecting Chongok-Ch’orwon-Kimhwa-Hwach’on. If line Wyoming was secured, the enemy in the Iron Triangle area would be placed under severe pressure.

The first-phase objective line leading to the final one was line Utah, which was bent like a bow connecting the Imjin River-Kumhak-san-Kwangdok-san-Paekun-san above line Kansas. For this operation, the 3rd, 24th, and 25th Divisions of the US I Corps were to attack along with the British 27th
Brigade to advance a short distance.\textsuperscript{127}

According to this plan, the attack echelons commenced Operation Dauntless on April 11. Coincidentally on this day President Truman relieved General MacArthur from his positions as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Supreme Command, Allied Powers in Japan; Commander in Chief, US Far East Command, and Commanding General, US Army Forces Far East, and assigned Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the commanding general of the Eighth US Army to all these commands on the same day. On April 14, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet succeeded General Ridgway.\textsuperscript{128}

General MacArthur was an outstanding military leader who served as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command from July 8, 1950 on the two weeks after NKPA’s invasion to April 11, 1951, and he rendered a great contribution to restoring the pre-war boundary by driving out the NKPA and CCF aggressors. He blocked the NKPA offensive along the Naktong River, destroyed the main forces of the enemy by resolutely carrying out the landing operation at Inch’on, and forced the enemy armies all the way back to the Manchurian border, allowing the Koreans to dream of a free and democratic unification of their fatherland. However, he failed to anticipate the entry of the Chinese forces and the Chinese operational methods that pushed the ROK and UN forces down to the 37th Parallel; however, under his command the UNC forces succeeded in repulsing the enemy. General MacArthur had conflicts with the Truman administration several times about strategy as the war progressed; finally, he had to leave his office.

While the first phase of Operation Dauntless was in progress, General Ridgway presided over his last conference with corps commanders in Korea on April 14, and examined the indications of an enemy offensive and the contingency plans to be applied in case the friendly forces had to pull back upon enemy attack. This plan contained three phase lines, which were similar to
those once occupied by the ROK and UN forces at the time of the CCF's New Year's Offensive: line B linking Munsan-Hwach'on-Yangyang; line C connecting the south of Seoul-Hongch'on-Wonp'o-ri; and the bridgehead line for Seoul. The first phase line was Delta, drawn around the Ch'unch'on area and stretching to the coastal areas on the east and the west. The second line was Nevada connecting the south of Seoul, the Han River and Yangyang to the northeast. The third was line Golden, a semi-circle, drawn for the defense of Seoul between Haengju about 10km northwest of Seoul and Yangp'yong on line Nevada. All the commanders participating in the conference arrived at a consensus that the enemy had no intention of launching an offensive in the immediate future.138

Appointed as the commanding general of the Eighth Army, General Van Fleet arrived in Seoul that day and assumed the command. Van Fleet had
distinguished himself as a regimental commander in the landing operation at Normandy in June 1944 at the height of WWII, and was an outstanding leader who was promoted to be the commanding general of a division and of a corps in next nine months. Upon his promotion to lieutenant general, he was assigned as the head of a joint US Military advisory and planning group in Greece, and helped the Greek government crush the anti-government partisan war waged by Greek communists. He was selected as the commanding general of the Eighth Army for his qualification as an able battlefield leader and his experience as a dedicated fighter against communist subversion.

Upon transferring his command, General Ridgway told General Van Fleet to notify him in advance in case his forces were to advance north of line Utah, and to ask for his prior approval when the forces were to move to the north of line Wyoming.

At the frontline the first phase of Operation Dauntless was in progress, and the attacking echelons encountered intensifying enemy resistance as they approached the Iron Triangle. In addition, heavy rain muddied the battlefield and slowed the advance. Under these circumstances, the Anglo-American forces occupied line Utah, with the US 3rd Division advancing to Yonch'on, the US 25th Division to Kumhak-san, the US 24th Division to Munhye-ri, and the British 27th Brigade to Sach'ang-ri on about the 20th.

When the enemy betrayed no signs of an immediate counteroffensive even when the ROK and UN forces had reached or were approaching lines Utah and Kansas, General Van Fleet decided to commence the second phase of Operation Dauntless toward line Wyoming as objective on April 21.136

Accordingly, the US 24th and 25th Divisions of the US I Corps on the left started to attack Ch'orwon and Kimhwa, and the ROK 6th and the US 1st Marine Divisions of the US IX Corps on the right commenced to attack Kimhwa and Hwach'on. The two divisions of the IX Corps advanced 3.2 to 8km
north of line Kansas without engaging the enemy. But the US 24th Division, which maneuvered to Kwangdok-san on the right front of the US I Corps, intentionally avoided engagement with the enemy in order to maintain its link to the ROK 6th Division. However, the US 25th Division (with the Turkish brigade attached) attacked Ch’orwon from Pogae-san on the left front and was blocked by enemy artillery fire. The US I and IX Corps resumed their attack on April 22. The IX Corps advanced a bit, but the two divisions of the I Corps ran into strong enemy resistance.

Then intensifying enemy resistance and signs of an imminent enemy offensive began to appear throughout the battle front. Air reconnaissance confirmed the enemy movement in progress from the north and northwest toward the frontline. In the western sector of the US I Corps especially, the enemy concentrated despite friendly heavy artillery fire, and along the Imjin River the enemy’s reconnaissance activities increased in preparation for river crossing. Furthermore, the number of POW’s captured in the frontline area rose.
and the captives told that the CCF would commence an offensive on a large scale that night.

VI. Operations for Securing the Strategic Islands

When the ROK and the UN forces were conducting counterattacks in early 1951 and the frontline was formulated south of the 38th Parallel, proposals were raised to secure the command of the sea north of 38th Parallel by blockading the enemy harbors and interdicting North Korean naval operations. In addition, it was suggested that ROK troops had to occupy the islands along the coast in the enemy’s rear in order to disperse enemy forces at the front. Furthermore, there were increasing activities of guerrilla by volunteered residents in the enemy rear, and bands of refugees in the coastal areas of the north were searching for a way to the south. The ROK Navy decided to secure the strategic islands north of the 38th Parallel in order to insure safe transit by sea for those left behind. For this mission, two independent ROK Marine units, Companies 41st and 42nd, were activated in Chinhae, and the 41st Company was committed on the western coast and the 42nd Company on the eastern coast for landing operations on those islands.

1. Landing at the Islands in the Eastern Sea

The newly activated Company 42nd under the command of 2nd Lt. Shim Hee T'aek sailed out of Chinhae in LST 801 on February 7, 1951 for the Yonghung Bay to occupy islands in the order of Yodo, Shindo, Sodo, Taedo, and Hwangt’odo, which controlled transit to and from Wonsan Harbor, a stra-
tactic point.

On February 13, the company reached a point 3 miles north of Yodo after having sailed for seven days. This island was the largest of the five and was located at the mouth of Yohung Bay; thus, it was necessary to occupy it before making any landing attempts on the mainland. The company sent out a scouting party to check for enemy presence on the island and confirmed the absence of any enemy occupation forces. On the morning of February 14, the main body of the company landed, followed by ammunition and other supplies.

Later the enemy detected the marines' landing at Yodo, and North Korean artillery from Shindo and the Kalma Peninsula bombarded the island sporadically. Under these conditions the company completed collecting information on the enemy, reorganized its forces, and began attacks on Shindo, Taedo, and Sodo in that order on February 24.

The company occupied Shindo, three kilometers from the Kalma Peninsula, where Wonsan Air Field was located, and Sodo to the south of it as well, without enemy resistance. The marines searched the islands and killed three NK soldiers in ambush, and collected four mortars (76mm), 500 boxes of ammunition stored in a depot, and some documents.\(^{30}\)

The next day the enemy artillery on the Kalma Peninsula fired at the company, which was moving on Taedo. The company requested counter-battery fire from friendly supporting fleet and succeeded in occupying another island. The marines searched the island to confirm that there was no enemy. The marines left two Platoons there, and the main forces returned to Yodo.

As the marines defended occupied islands, an order was issued to launch a landing at Hwangt'Odo. On March 4 the company sailed to the south of Shindo in Vessel 501, then transferred to two LCVP landing craft provided by the US Navy. It landed on the southern coast of Hwangt'Odo at 14:30. At
that time the enemy fired artillery to interdict the landing; however, the naval
gun-fire of the ROK and US navy warships standing nearby silenced the ene-
my artillery.

Having secured all the important islands in the Yonghung Bay, the ROK
marines turned to the work of fortifying their positions. Then the company
spent over one month in reconnaissance to determine the enemy situation.

2. Landing at the Islands in the Western Sea

Having gone through one month of maintenance and special training,
Company 41st, led by 1st Lt. Lee Tong Ho, sailed out to the western coast in
Vessel 801 on March 28. At that time those islands off the west coast were free
from enemy influence and were under the control of friendly guerrilla forces
organized with young volunteers. The intelligence units of the ROK Army and
Navy controlled the guerrilla activities. The company was to conduct landing
operations on Kyodongdo, Paekryongdo, and Sokdo in that order. Contrary to
the expectation, the company landed on these islands without any enemy
resistance.

After a five day voyage, the company succeeded in landing at
Kyodongdo on the morning of April 2, without encountering any enemy. Kyod-
ongdo is an island west of Kangwhado, where friendly guerrillas were in opera-
tion. Having observed the ROK the landing on April 3, the enemy shelled the
island for five hours. Right after consolidating its position, the company con-
ducted psychological warfare on the civilian residents. At that time there were
about 700 refugees trapped there, and the company selected 100 young men
from among this group, and trained and organized them into a guerrilla unit.
These guerrilla forces infiltrated into the Haeju area in order to collect infor-
mation and to harass the enemy rear.
Having completed the defensive mission of Kyodongdo, the company landed at Paekryongdo and established defensive positions. Paekryongdo was then the center of friendly naval operations and intelligence activities. It was the home of ROK army and navy intelligence units, and US army aviation detachment, as well as about 8,000 refugees who chose to reside there. Of those refugees, three hundred young men were trained and armed for self defense.130

Having landed at Sokdo north of Paekryongdo on May 7, the ROK marine company was capable of securing a base camp for gathering information and harassing the enemy rear through sporadic guerrilla activities. Upon completion of the landing operation, the company selected 100 young men who were familiar with the terrain and organized them as guerrilla forces. The marines conducted continuous surprise landings in west coast of enemy territory, and organized guerrilla activities to impose heavy damage on the enemy operation.

The operation of securing islands in the area to the rear of the enemy which was conducted by independent ROK marine companies achieved the following results: the marines' information collection and surveillance activities suppressed the enemy from laying mines in the sea and operating its coastal batteries, and the companies' surprise landings on the mainland harassed the enemy rear. With the increasing effectiveness of the operations in the coastal islands, the ROK Marine activated Company 43rd in August 1951 and committed the new independent company to the eastern coast. Later the marine independent companies were reorganized into a battalion, and became the foundation for the ROK Marine Coastal Forces.
VII. Operations against Communist Guerrilla/United Nations Command Guerrilla Warfare

1. Operations against Communist Guerrillas

Having been cut off their escape route by the Inch'on landing, the NKPA remnants in cooperation with the local guerrilla elements committed a wide range of atrocities. They cut UNC forces' lines of communication, looted food from civilian residents, assaulted government offices, killed innocent civilians, and committed arson in the Honam and Kyongpuk Provinces. Thus, the ROK forces had to conduct extensive anti-guerrilla operations from mid-October to the end of November, 1950, and eliminated out the majority of the enemy guerrillas, but some of them escaped into Chiri Mountain.

However, those NK forces that had advanced to the south of Chech'-on during the CCF New Year's Offensive in late January 1951, including the stragglers of the NK 10th Division, found hide-outs in the nearby mountains, joined the local guerrillas, and resumed harassing the rear area of UNC forces.

(1) Sweeping Operation in the Honam Provinces

The NK stayed-behind forces established strong points in the regged terrain of Peagun-san, Togyu-san, Hoemun-san, Pulkap-san, Paega-san, and Hwaak-san around Chiri Mountain. Anticipating regaining their superiority with the Chinese intervention, the NK forces completed reorganization and commenced aggressive guerrilla activities at the end of January 1951.

In commemoration of the NKPA's anniversary (Feb. 8), they fortified
their underground organizations, and committed murder, arson, theft, and other crimes threatening the peace and order. Starting in mid-February, the guerrillas appeared frequently in bands of over 100 soldiers.

Thus, Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin, the commander of the 11th Division, in charge of anti-guerrilla operations in the area, assigned the 9th Regiment to the Chonnam area, the 13th Regiment to the Chonpuk area, and the 20th Regiment to the Chiri Mountain area. The general’s aim was to destroy the guerrilla bases and to capture or kill their leaders in order to stop the enemy from building a greater threat. He assigned the attached police elements and the youth guards the mission of securing the main lines of communication and signal networks. Then, a full-scale cordon-and-sweep operation began.

In early January the 9th Regiment detected 700 guerrillas operating in the Naenogong-ri and Tog-san areas southeast of Chiri Mountain and pursued the guerrillas into Chiri Mountain. This operation resulted in the death of 35 guerrillas and the capture of 70.

Those who escaped into the mountain reappeared in the northeastern section of Chiri Mountain in early February. The 9th regiment deployed the 1st Battalion to Kahong-ri, Mach’on-myon, Hamyang-kun; the 2nd Battalion to Sadong, Naengch’on-myon, Sanch’on-kun; the 3rd Battalion to Yuri-myon, Hamyang-kun. The regiment conducted operations to sweep the guerrillas up in a single blow. In this 13-day pursuit, the regiment killed 12 guerrillas and captured 180. Most of them had been eliminated.

On the other hand, the 20th Regiment, which was mopping up guerrillas in the Tamyang, Sunch’ang, Hwasun, Changsong, and Naju-kun areas discovered that around 1,350 guerrillas had created a strong point in Hwamun-san and were operating in this area. Upon receiving this intelligence report, Col. Park Ki Byong, the regiment commander, committed the 1st and 2nd Battalions to Hwamun-san on February 9. The regiment began a full-scale mopping up operation on February 13 and so reduced and scattered the guerrilla
forces that it was impossible for them to recover. On February 20 the regiment detected 350 guerrillas in Pulkap-san of Haebo-myon, Hamp’yong-kun, and broke up the bands. An element of the enemy escaped from Pulkap-san and hid in Taech’ong-san, but the 2nd Battalion pursued the survivors and scattered them on March 3 to end the Hoemun-san operation.

While the 9th and 20th Regiments were engaged in their pacification operations, the 13th Regiment was guarding the power plant and sluice gates at Okjong-ri since the guerrillas were threatening the Ch’ilbo and, Unam Plants, Chongup-kun. As guerrilla activities dropped off considerably in late February due to the operation by the division, the 13th Regiment was relocated to the Taejon area.

Starting from mid-March 1951, the guerrilla activities suddenly increased in scope and acting. These forces in groups changed their bases frequently, avoided encounters with the ROK forces, and were mainly engaged in stealing supplies they needed. The aggregated figure of guerrillas was estimated at about 23,000.

These guerrilla activities were concentrated in the area of the 9th Regiment. On March 13 about 160 guerrillas appeared in the Paega-san area of Hwasun-kun. Upon the regimental order, the 2nd Battalion based in Kogsong engaged in a fierce battle for ten hours, and killed 74 guerrillas and captured 21; 20 small arms, 32 sacks of rice, and 6 cows were also collected. On March 17, the battalion on ambushing in the Hwahak-san area engaged around 250 guerrillas for 13 hours. In this fierce battle the battalion killed 86, captured 16, and collected a host of arms and equipment. Included in enemy casualties were the commander, deputy commander, and chief of staff of the Namhae Brigade, a high ranking officer in the office of inspector general of the NKPA Headquarters, and many other senior officers. ¹³⁶

On its way to the home base on March 22 after the operation in Paegasan and Hwahak-san, the 2nd Battalion received an urgent report that 500
guerrillas were to stage a surprise assault at Sunch'on. They dashed to the scene and drove the guerrillas off in a fight that lasted for three hours in a built-up area of the city.

The ROK 11th Division crushed the organized guerrilla activities in the Honam Province in an operation which lasted for 180 days, October 4, 1950 to April 6, 1951, when it transferred the mission to the ROK 8th Division and moved to Taegu. The division achieved significant results in minimizing damage to civilian residents and maintaining peace and order by driving the guerrillas deep into the mountains away from villages. In this operation the 11th Division killed an estimated 1,950 guerrillas, captured 2,178, and collected 261 machine guns and small arms while it suffered the loss of 531 men killed, 85 missing, and 843 wounded.

The so-called "Koch'ang Scandal" occurred during this operation. On February 10–11, 1951, The 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, assisted by the Shinwon Police substation, committed mass murder of those civilians whom they believed to have assisted the guerrilla forces. This elicited public criticism in Korea, and an investigation team of the National Assembly was dispatched to the scene. Those engaged in the incident were brought to justice in court.139

Thus, the ROK Army Headquarters replaced the 11th Division whose morale had been lowered by the Koch'ang Scandal, with the 8th Division completed reorganization in Taegu after the Hoengsong battle in February. The main forces of the 8th Division moved to Chonju, with attached the 1st security Battalion, the 18th Combat Police Battalion, the Ch'ungnam Anti-Guerrilla Police Forces, and the 153rd Branch unit of the Youth Guard, conducted mopping up operation in Kumsan, Chongup, and Puan areas; the 16th Regiment moved to Chinju, with attached the 2nd security Battalion, and conducted mopping up operation in Paegun-san and the Chungsan-ri area.140

Having analyzed the capabilities of his division, and geographical dis-
tribution and activities of guerrillas forces, Brigadier General Ch’oi Yong Hee, the division commander, decided to have the main forces concentrate on education and training and to conduct operations by each regiment. The 16th Regiment that moved to Chinju was assigned an extensive area for its operations; thus, it issued the operational directive to its subordinate units allocating areas of responsibility for battalions to mop up guerrillas.

By that time, about 1,380 guerrillas of the Ch’ungnam Partizans, based in Taedun-san, were popping up in Nonsan, Kumsan, and other areas, plundering material and harassing civilians. The division committed the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment, the engineer battalion, the 18th Combat Police Battalion, and the Ch’ungnam Anti-Guerrilla Police unit to the Taedun-san, Unam-san, and Wondung-san areas, and launched mopping up operation for three days from April 16. However, the guerrillas, extremely familiar with the terrain, avoided contact with mopping up forces and escaped by dispersing. This operation failed to destroy the enemy main forces.

A lull was ensued for a while, but with increasing guerrilla activities in Kuksa-bong and Hoemun-san in May, the division commander decided to sweep up these guerrillas. Recalling the lessons of failure in cutting the escape routes for guerrillas in the Taedun-san area, a plan was set to envelope Kuksa-bong east of Chongup completely, seal the route of retreat, and search the area thoroughly in order to sweep up the main guerrilla forces. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment, the engineer battalion, the reconnaissance battalion, the 1st security Battalion, the 18th Combat Police Battalion, and the 153rd Youth Guard unit encircled Kuksa-bong and Hoemun-san on May 4, and began to tighten the loop. Those 1,200 trapped guerrillas tried desperately to escape, resisting fiercely as the pressure on them increased. An element of them escaped the encirclement, and tried to reorganize in Paegyang-san, Naejang-san, and the Pyonsan Peninsula, but suffering heavy losses in the division’s pursuit, they finally scattered and ran away.
The 16th Regiment, on the other hand, deployed the 1st Battalion to Koch’ang, the 2nd Battalion to Sanch’ong, and the 3rd Battalion to Hadong, and conducted anti-guerrilla operations in Togyu-san, Chiri Mountain, and Paegun-san.

In the one-month period of April 15 to May 15, the ROK 8th Division killed 535 guerrillas and captured 624; it suffered losses of 12 killed and 21 wounded in its anti-guerrilla operation in the Honam Provinces. In this time with increasing pressure along the frontline due to the Chinese spring offensive, the division was relocated to Chech’on, Ch’ungch’ungpuk-do, and was committed to the front upon the order of the ROK Army Headquarters.\(^{143}\)

At that time, the guerrilla forces in the Honam area were on the verge of total collapse due to successive sweeping operations of the ROK 11th and 8th Divisions. Many hid in deep mountains, waiting for verdant season for their activities. Thanks to the cessation of operations by the division, the guerrilla forces had time to recover and reinforce themselves.\(^{145}\)

(2) Anti-Guerrilla Operation in the T’aebaek Mountain Area

The remnants of the NK 10th Division that had been infiltrating along the mountainous terrain of the east since the end of December 1950 constituted the main body of the guerrilla forces in the T’aebaek Mountain area. The 10th Division advanced southward to the Andong and Uisong areas, but with the cut off of its retreat route, it secured strong points in nearby mountains and transformed itself into guerrilla forces. The division integrated with the existing local guerrilla units which had been operating in the south such as the Nambu Forces, the Guerrilla unit of Andong, Yongdok, Yongju, and Ponghwakun Parties under the Kyongsangpuk-do Party. These forces were conducting guerrilla operations in T’aebaek Mountain, Ilwol-san, Sokri Mountain and the rugged terrain connecting Hyongje-bong, Pohyon-san, and Tongdae-san.\(^{149}\)
With increasing activities of the NK 10th Division in the UNC forces rear area, the ROK 2nd Division was attached to the ROK Army Headquarters and simultaneously relocated to Andong on February 13 in order to destroy the guerrilla forces. The ROK 2nd Division suffered damage in the last Chinese New Year's offensive and reorganized in P'unggi as a reserve division for the US X Corps.

The 2nd Division got attachments of the 5th, 6th, and 7th security Battalions, the 1st Regiment of the National Defense Army 1st Division, and two battalions of the Combat Police. For one month the division guarded the main supply routes of Yongch'on-P'ohang, Yongch'on-Andong, and Andong-Yongdok, and conducted an operation against the remnants of the NK 10th Division in the Pohyon-san area.146

On February 16 Brigadier General Hahm Byong Son, the division commander, assigned the 31st Regiment the task of guarding the main supply routes of Andong-Yongju-Tanyang, and the 17th and 32nd Regiments to mop up guerrillas in the Pohyon-san area. Thus, the two regiments, started to pursue guerrillas in the Kaesan-dong, Hwasu-dong, Yongsu-dong, Chorak-dong, and Chorim-san areas west of Pohyon-san.

Having been informed on February 28 that the NK 10th Division in the Ch'ongsong area was moving northward, the division commander made up his mind to envelope and destroy it and ordered his forces to block the expected enemy passage near Ilwol-san.

Accordingly, the 31st Regiment which had been on guard at the lines of communication interdicted at Changgai-ryong southwest of Ilwol-san, and inflicted heavy damage on 1,500 enemy forces in a surprise attack on the morning of March 1. The 17th and 32nd Regiments also maneuvered from the Pohyon-san area to the south of Ilwol-san. Thus the ROK 2nd Division set up triple interdiction lines around Ilwol-san, and the NK 10th Division organized its forces into two groups of 800 and 400 each in an effort to break through the
encirclement. The ROK division committed its whole force in driving the NK forces toward Ilwol-san and T'onggo-san. The enemy ran away in groups of threes and fives.

The division killed about 460 guerrillas, captured 40, and collected 293 arms and equipment; but four ROK soldiers were killed and 25 were wounded. The friendly casualties included Colonel Park No Kyu, the commander of the 31st Regiment, and Lt. Colonel Lee Oh Yol, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, killed in action.

The NK 10th Division ran northward, misleading the pursuers to expect the end of the mopping-up operation in this area. However, in early March the NKPA dispatched the 1st and 3rd Detachments to this area composed of 1,700 soldiers, well trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare. As was disclosed later, the 1st and 3rd Detachments were activated in Maengsan in early November 1950 as a part of three guerrilla brigades, each composed of 2,500 under direct control of the NKPA Headquarters. Subsequently, they were blocked north of Chongson as they tried to infiltrate along the axis of Yanggu-Inje-Odace Mountain under the cover of the NKPA II Corps on the eastern front in mid-November. With the collapse of the NK 2nd Brigade, the guerrilla forces had to be reorganized into the 1st and 3rd Brigades. They were redesignated as the 1st and 3rd detachment of the Choson People's Guerrilla Forces under the direct control of the central party, and sent south with the aim of securing strong points in Pulgong-san.

As the 1st and 3rd Brigades infiltrated southward up to Soch'on-myon and Ponghwa-kun, the ROK Army Headquarters transferred the mission of pursuing the NK 10th Division from the 2nd Division to the 9th Division which attached to ROK I Corps, and assigned the 2nd Division to concentrate its effort on destroying the 1st and 3rd Detachment. On the 20th the commanding general of the 2nd Division ordered the 17th Regiment to destroy the NK 1st Detachment in the T'onggo-san area, the 32nd Regiment to crush the 3rd
Detachment in Yanggu-dong, and the 31st Regiment to guard the route of Andong-Yongju-P'unggi-Tanyang.

While the main forces of the 17th Regiment were reconstituting its units in the vicinity of Namhoeryong-ri west of Tonggo-san in order to get ready to destroy the NK 1st Detachment, the 3rd Battalion encountered about 400 enemy forces near Ssangjon-ri north of Tonggo-san. They were moving southward from Taebaek Mountain through Omi-san. Reacting to a preemptive attack, the enemy escaped back to Sokwang-ri. The regiment thoroughly searched the Tonggo-san, Omi-san, and Sokpo areas. Then the POWs identified: "Having suffered heavy losses by the ROK pursuit, we were retreating along Taedok-san and Koyang-san." As indicated by the POWs, the enemy started to escape northward via Sokpo-ri, north of Omi-san from the 23rd.

The regiment pursued the enemy along Ch'angjuk-ri, Taedok-san, Nomok-ri, and up to Koyang-san east of Chongsan. The enemy was despiritied from extreme exhaustion and hunger; the ROK regiment was also exhausted from around-the-clock pursuit and skirmishes with the enemy but was in high spirits. Having chased the enemy doggedly, the regiment advanced to P'ung-ch'on on the 26th and destroyed the main forces of the NK 1st Detachment in the areas of Koyang-san and Nakdong-ri. The regiment then ceased its pursuit and turned to security duties, preparing for the next operation.

The 7th security Battalion attached to the 32nd Regiment detected the NK 3rd Detachment at Hill 808 as the battalion was reconnoitering the Yanggu-dong area southwest of Yongyang. The battalion started to pursue the enemy, but was interrupted in its maneuver with frozen patches of snow everywhere in the valleys and ridges of high altitude. Major Kang Yong Hoon, the battalion commander, chose to conduct a night attack to avoid discovery. The battalion killed 25 and captured 7 NK guerrillas.

Colonel Cho Jae Mi, the regimental commander, assigned the 1st Battalion to guard Shin-ryong, the 3rd Battalion to guard Kunwi, and the 2nd Bat-
talion to move to Samui-dong and to destroy the NK 3rd Detachment. The enemy which was attacked by surprise by the 7th Security Battalion infiltrated southward into Podo-san. While the regiment was pursuing the enemy forces, the 3rd Regiment of the National Defense Army under the command of Lt. Colonel Kim Mu Yong, the regimental commander, attacked Myongdong-san in the east. The regiment killed the chief of staff and the commander of the 1st Company of the NK 3rd Detachment.

Being pursued by the regiment, the enemy often invaded into civilian residences and resisted fiercely. But around the 23rd they escaped, disengaging with the ROK regiment for a while. Under the regiment’s pursuit, the enemy managed to reorganize 350 men south of Myongdong-san. While the enemy advance party was engaged with the ambush party of the 3rd National Defense Army Regiment in the Shinch’ón-dong area in the early morning of the 24th, the enemy main forces managed to move to Chusan west of Kuyang-dong. Thus, it was assumed that the enemy had given up securing strongholds at Palgong-san and had chosen to retreat along the ridges well covered with trees and bushes northward to Kumjang-san and T’onggo-san.

With the aim of rounding up the enemy in Chusan, the regiment assigned the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd National Defense Army Regiment to encircle the enemy and committed the 7th security Battalion to assault the enemy. Chusan has a terrain with a host of good natural concealment and cover. The enemy had occupied it several times, and the regiment was also very familiar with this terrain as the friendly forces had searched this area frequently. But the enemy had the advantage of occupying it in advance. They resisted stubbornly by throwing hand grenades. Still the 7th security Battalion under the cover of fire support repulsed the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. On the 26th, the 32nd Regiment organized blocking positions, anticipating the NK 3rd Detachment to retreat along Chukp’a-dong-Ponshin-ri-Kumjang-san.

Having reviewed the overall enemy situation on March 29, the divi-
sion commander assumed that about 150 remnants were escaping northward along the path of Tonggo-san, Omi-san, and Yonhwa-san. Thus, he decided to conclude the first phase of the operation, which had commenced on the 21st, and to have his forces get prepared for the next operation. Later on, the division conducted the second phase operation from March 30 to April 8 with the 17th Regiment as its main attacking echelon. In concluding this second phase operation, the regiment killed 120 guerrillas and captured 36 in the P'yeongjon area north of Tonggo-san.

2. Activities of Friendly Guerrillas

By the time the communist guerrilla activities resumed with the Chinese intervention and the withdrawal of January Fourth, the ROK and UN forces also started to organize their own ranger forces and to commit them into the enemy’s rear area. The activities of the enemy guerrilla forces encroached on the combat capabilities of friendly frontline by harassing friendly rear-area and forcing combat forces of the front to be transferred to the rear. The aim of the ROK and UN forces was to overcome the crisis in encountering the Chinese offensive by reducing the enemy pressure on the frontline in a similar manner. In addition, it could maximize the effect of operation by close coordination between the regular and irregular forces in case of a transfer to counteroffensive. Ranger forces could harass the enemy operation by collecting information on enemy forces and logistic facilities and by destroying them.

(1) The Rangers under the Control of the ROK Army

In mid-December, 1950, the ROK Army started to organize ranger forces when the frontline was pushed down to the 38th Parallel after the Chinese intervention. This project was carried out under tight security by the Sec-
tion of Secret Operation, G-2, the ROK Army Headquarters. Assisted by a youth organization, young refugees were recruited mainly from Hwanghae and P’yongan Provinces. A battalion-size unit was organized, trained, and sent to the enemy area, dressed and equipped as NK soldiers, around the end of December. The rangers crossed the Imjin River at Munsan and started their activities; however, they were unable to significantly contribute to friendly operation in the absence of communication and control with the shift of the frontline southward upon the enemy New Year’s Offensive.

- 'Kyol-sa' (Do-or-Die) Rangers of the ROK Army Headquarters

The Section of Secret Operation of G-2, in cooperation with the Section of Organization of G-3, the ROK Army Headquarters that moved down to Taegu began to organize ranger forces on a larger scale, and labelled them as ‘Do-or-Die Rangers’ under the direct control of the ROK Army Headquarters.

By that time along with the enactment of instituting the National Defense Army and the proclamation of a total mobilization order, a large number of patriotic young men, students, volunteer policemen, Railroad Security Police officers, and stragglers flocked to the replacement unit of the Army Headquarters. Among them, 700 physically fit and mentally sound young men were selected for the first group, admitted to Army Intelligence School on January 4, 1951, and trained in a special ranger course for 3 weeks. Apart from the regular forces, they were given temporary ranks and serial numbers, and were organized into the 11th, 12th, and 13th ‘Do-or-Die Ranger’ Regiments.

In late January 1951 when the rangers went through training, the ROK I & III Corps established defensive positions along the line of Yongwol and Samch’ok in the central eastern front. But in the Andong area, an operation was conducted against the remnants of the NK 10th Division, which was disturbing the rear with its route of withdrawal cut off.
On January 30, 1951, Lt. Colonel Ch'ae Myong Shin, the 11th Ranger Regiment Commander, led his 363 rangers, who had just finished the training course, to Yongwol and started to infiltrate along the axis of Ch'ongok-san-Kariwang-san-Pakji-san-Hajinbu. Next came the 12th Ranger Regiment consisting of 330 soldiers under the command of temporary Major Lee Tu Byong to Mukho on February 6; it infiltrated toward its objective of T'ongch'on along the axis of Samyong-san-Yanggu-Shingo-san-Hoeyang. Then the 13th Regiment under the command of temporary Captain Kim Han Ch'ol started to infiltrate in Hoenggye-ri toward its objective of the interior in the central area on February 15.

The 11th Ranger Regiment succeeded in advancing to Taegok-ri west of Chumunjin unnoticed; however, the 12th Ranger Regiment was exposed to the enemy in Tuil-ri north of Hajinbu-ri in the course of breaking through the enemy main line of resistance. It was attacked by the NK 15th Division, and had to retreat to Woljong-sa. To make the situation worse, the 12th Regiment suffered heavy casualties in misbombardment by friendly airplane, but infiltrated into Toegok-ri and made a rendezvous with the 11th Regiment on the 18th. Under intensified pressure from the enemy and restricted of mobility in heavy snow fall in the Taegwal-ryong area, the 13th Ranger Regiment gave up its objective of reaching the central interior and moved to the Woljong-sa area. Then it proceeded to T'oeogok-ri and rejoined the two other regiments on the 20th. The three 'Do-or-Die Ranger Regiments' were integrated into one unit and renamed the 'Baek-Gol' (White Skull & Bones) Army Corps under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Ch'ae Myong Shin.' 

At that time the ROK I and III Corps on the central eastern front, which had retreated for a while upon the Chinese February Offensive, launched a counterattack on the line north of Chech'on-Chongson-Mukho. The reorganized 'White Skull & Bones Army Corps' composed of around 660 rangers moved westward across the rugged Odae Mountains to Chogae-dong
north of Nodu-bong, with the 13th Regiment at the head on February 23. While resting on the morning of the 24th, misbombardment by friendly aircraft again scattered a part of the 12th Regiment, but the main forces swiftly moved to Kuryong-dong, avoiding a second air raid, and occupied the pass. On February 28, as the rangers dressed in NKPA uniforms were checking and searching the passage of the NK troops, they found detailed a combat report of the NK 69th Brigade. The report contributed to destroying the NK Brigade in a joint operation of friendly naval and air forces.

The ranger Army Corps reorganized in the Yaksu-san area, and on March 14 it moved to Kwidun-ri of Inje-kun. Disguised as a NK anti-paratrooper force, it continued the march northward, arriving at Kunyangjon on the March 16. Thereafter, each regiment was assigned its own area of responsibility and conducted its the security and reconnaissance operations.

On March 18, the 13th Ranger Regiment captured 13 NK soldiers in its search of Pillye Village. In interrogation those captured turned out to be a NK high ranking commander and his staff including Lt. Gen. Kihl Won P'al, the commander of the NK Partisan Forces and of the 5th Detachment, and Kang Ch'il Song, his chief of staff. The regiment secured critical documents including directives, cipher texts, a table of scrambled numerals, and a table of organization, among others.¹ᵃ)

However, the rangers had to retreat to Mangdaeam-san under attack by the enemy that evening and were continuously pursued. They finally withdrew to Paekdam-sa along the route of Changsudae-Ansan-Mae-bong-Yongdae-ri. Under this enemy pursuit, a host of rangers were killed or straggled behind in hunger and exhaustion. Lt. Colonel Ch'ae Myong Shin decided to withdraw to Taech'ong-bong in light of the low morale. Moreover they were now unable to engage the enemy due to a lack of ammunition.

On withdrawal, the rangers suffered heavy casualties near Soch'ong-bong and the Pakdai-ryong area in a surprise attack by the enemy. On March
30 the rangers finally succeeded in joining the reconnaissance party of the 3rd Regiment, the 7th ROK Division near Hyon-ri. Those returning numbered only 260.120

Thereafter, the ‘White Skull & Bones Army Corps’ moved to the ROK Army Advance Command Post in Kangnung and was absorbed into the 1st Ulji Army Corps of the ROK Army.

- The Ulji Army Corps of the ROK Army

Separate from the ‘Do-or-Die Rangers,’ the ROK Army organized another ranger unit labelled as the Ulji Army Corps. Under the supervision of the Section of Psychological Warfare, the G3 of the ROK Army Headquarters, the Army Corps was designed to systematize the organizations of armed volunteer forces and anti-communist youth associations, as well as to support the activities of those volunteer forces. Upon the withdrawal of the UNC forces, they escaped to the coastal areas both east and west on leaving their hometown in the north, and conducted their own guerrilla operations spontaneously.121

The ROK Army Headquarters first activated the 1st Ulji Army Corps to support the ROK operation on the eastern front. However, in the absence of any islands on the eastern coast where the armed volunteer forces and refugees could find hideouts, most of them who had lived in the Hamkyong-do and north Kangwon-do managed to move down all the way to the Taegu and Pusan areas after ‘January Fourth Retreat.’ Thus, there was not enough manpower for ranger recruitment.

Major Park Ch’ang Am of the Section of Psychological Warfare, the ROK Army Headquarters, intended to develop the Army Corps as the East Coast Ranger Command by reorganizing the ‘Do-or-Die Rangers’ (the White Skull & Bones Army Corps) upon its return to the south, along with local volunteer forces and youth organizations. But with the transfer of the operational
control of these Ranger troops to the Eighth Army, his efforts ended in vain.

On March 27, 1951, the ROK Army Headquarters activated the 2nd Ulji Army Corps by organizing the spontaneous guerrilla forces and other young men's bands operating in the western coastal islands with their bases in Kanghwa-do. But the day following its activation, on March 28, the operational control of this Army Corps was transferred to the Leopard unit of the Eighth Army which had been activated earlier and was operating in the same area. The 2nd Army Corps was under the command of Major Ch'a Dong Jun and was composed with the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 25th, 26th, and Special Regiments.

After completing basic training, the Army Corps chose Yonbaek-Kun and Kaep'ung-kun as its areas of operation, and conducted guerrilla activities. Confused, the NK forces had to transfer two frontline combat divisions to the coastal area of Hwanghae Province in order to keep the Ulji Army Corps from harassing operations in the rear area on a large scale. These activities of the Army Corps were highly praised by the Eighth Army; however, due to problems caused by friction in command and supply, the commander of the Army Corps was replaced by Lee Hyon Suh of the Ulji 22nd Regiment, and the Army Corps was down-sized into three regiments.

With problems of inner conflict growing, the ROK Army and the Eighth Army decided to place the Ulji Army Corps under the complete command and control of the Eighth US Army. Accordingly the 1st Ulji Army Corps was absorbed in the 'Kirkland Base.' On August 10, 1951, the 2nd Ulji Army Corps was also transferred and subordinated to the 'Wolfpack Base' which was activated in Kanghwa-do in order to control operation in the southeastern part of the Ongjin Peninsula.\(^{154}\)

In addition, the ROK 1st Division organized the 5816 Unit temporarily under its direct control and operated in Kanghwa-do at that time. Rangers of this unit assisted the operation of the division by conducting reconnaissance and surprise assaults north of the Han River up to Kaesong.
(2) The Rangers under the Control of the UN forces

The Eighth US Army decided to support openly and control combat activities in the enemy’s rear and started to organize ranger forces after creating the Section for Attrition Warfare to be in charge of ranger affairs in the Miscellaneous Affairs Agency of G-3, Eighth US Army, on January 15, 1951.

First of all, the Eighth US Army activated the ‘Baker Section (Base)’ in Tongnae, Pusan on January 15, 1951. It was intended to destroy enemy forces, material, and logistic lines in the enemy rear by committing paratrooper forces considering the expected counteroffensive in the future. Recruits among the officer candidates of the National Defense Army who were assembled in Taegu went through airborne and special warfare training, and the successful trainees were labelled as class number one.\(^{(35)}\)

Next was ‘William Able Base’ activated in Paekryong-do on February 15, 1951, in order to control the volunteer forces conducting guerrilla activities on the western coast. This base was officially named the Leopard unit in March, and it reorganized the armed volunteers into Ranger Regiment and code-named the units the ‘Donkey unit’ in April.\(^{(56)}\)

The ‘Donkeys’ were expanded to 15 regiments and conducted operations by infiltrating into the coastal and interior areas around all of the western islands from Hwanghae to P’yonganpuk Provinces.

On April 15, 1951, the Eighth US Army took over the 1st Ulji Army Corps from the ROK forces, and activated the Kirkland Ranger Base in Chumunjin.\(^{(70)}\) These forces concentrated on preparing for infiltration into the eastern coastal and interior areas around Nando and Solsom in front of Kosong.


3) Ibid., p. 224.


9) Ibid., p. 248.

10) Ibid., p. 249.

11) Ibid., p. 250.


15) The War History Compilation Committee, the ROK MND, op. cit, p. 442.
18) Ibid., p. 419.
20) Ibid., p. 235.
22) Ibid., p. 255.
27) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 268.
29) Task Force Allen consisted of two Infantry Battalions, two Tank Battalions, one Artillery Battalion, and one Engineer Company.
31) The ROK Army HQ, tr., p. 260.
32) Ibid., p. 273.
34) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 262.
35) Ibid., p. 263.
37) Ibid., p. 506.
38) Ibid., p. 482.
39) Ibid., p. 496.
40) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 275.
42) Ibid., p. 467.
43) Ibid., p. 468.
46) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 279.
47) Ibid., pp. 278–280.
48) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 112.
49) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 282.
50) Ibid., p. 284.
53) The Korea Strategy Research Institute, tr., op. cit., p. 114.
54) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 294.
56) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 316.
57) Ibid., p. 306.
61) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 312.
63) Ibid., p. 322.
64) The Korea Military Academy, op. cit., p. 536.
66) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 299.
67) Ibid., p. 302.
69) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 327.
70) Ibid., pp. 329-330.
71) Ibid., p. 333.
73) Ibid., p. 544.
74) Ibid., p. 552.
75) In compliance with the ROKA Operation Order No. 263, March 7, 1951 based on the Revised Additional Instruction No. 1 (dated March 5, 1951), the ROK 3rd Division was attached to the ROK III Corps from the US IX Corps.
77) Ibid., p. 576.
79) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 120.
80) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 345.
81) Ibid., p. 337.
82) Ibid., p. 338.
83) Ibid., p. 339.
84) Ibid., p. 345.
86) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., pp. 348-349.
87) Ibid., p. 357.
89) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 362.
91) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 343.
92) Ibid., p. 358.
93) Ibid., p. 359.
95) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 360.
97) Ibid., p. 596.
98) Ibid., p. 599.
103) Ibid., p. 708.
105) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 363.
107) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 364.
108) Ibid., p. 365.
109) Ibid., p. 367.
110) Ibid., p. 369.
111) Ibid., p. 370.
112) Ibid., p. 371.
113) Ibid., p. 372.
114) Ibid., p. 374.
116) Ibid., p. 635.
117) Ibid., p. 643.
120) Ibid., p. 367.
121) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 381.
122) line Utah: a line that connecting Chonkak-Kumhak Mountain-Kwangduk Mountain-Sach’ang-ri.

line Wyoming: a line that connecting the Chonkak-Ch’orwon-Kimhwa-Hwach’on Reservoir.
123) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 352.
124) Ibid., p. 353.
125) Ibid., p. 355.
128) op. cit., p. 395.
130) Ibid., p. 670.
131) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 396.
132) Ibid., p. 398.
133) Ibid., p. 401.
134) Ibid., p. 411.
136) Ibid., p. 238.
138) Ibid., p. 82.
143) Ibid., p. 322.
147) Ibid., pp. 618~619.
148) Ibid., p. 631.
150) Ibid., pp. 94~95.
151) Ibid., pp. 97~98.
152) Ibid., p. 103.
154) Ibid., p. 152.
155) Ibid., p. 139.
156) Ibid., p. 145.
157) Ibid., p. 148.
1. The Strategies of Both Sides

1) Friendly Situation

In mid-March 1951, UN forces recaptured Seoul, which had been deserted in January 4th retreat and advanced to the Kansas line linking the Imjin River-Chongok-Hwach'on Reservoir-Yangyang north of the 38th Parallel in early April. Having restored the pre-war territory and secured advantageous terrain for defense, the UN forces built strong defensive positions along the line with the intention of seeking a cease-fire. In keeping with this plan, the US I Corps (with the ROK 1st Division, the US 3rd, 24th and 25th Divisions, the British 29th Brigade, and Turkish Brigade) established its main line of resistance along the Imjin and Hant'an Rivers in western front; the US IX Corps (with the ROK 6th Division, the US 1st Marine Division, and the British 27th Brigade) along the line of Sokryong-san and Yuch'on-ri on the central front; and the US X Corps (with the ROK 5th and the US 2nd and 7th Divisions) north of the Soyang River. The ROK forces took charge of the eastern sector. The ROK III Corps (with the ROK 3rd and 7th Divisions) built defensive positions in the mountainous inner area to the left of the Taebaek Mountains and the ROK I Corps (with the ROK Capital and 9th Divisions) in the east coast area to
the right of the mountains.

At that point, the US 1st Cavalry Division assembled in the vicinity of Kungok ready to be deployed to the metropolitan area and the US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team assembled in Taegu as the Eighth US Army reserve. The regiments of the ROK 8th Division were conducting anti-guerrilla operations near Taegon, Kwangju, and Chinju, and those of the ROK 2nd Division near Ch’unyang, Chech’on, and Andong in the rear area, under direct control of the ROK Army Headquarters.

As the UN forces were engaged in strengthening the defense line, the Communists were also organizing their defense positions north of the 38th Parallel and were concentrating troops and supplies in the area of the Iron Triangle, a strategic and tactical key point on the central front linking P’yonggang, Ch’orwon, and Kimhwa. Taking note of the shallow depth of the enemy defense positions and the absence of any position having been built in the rear area, it was assumed that the enemy would take an offensive rather than defensive position.

Thus, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet drew a new phase line, the Wyoming line along Chongok-Kodae-san-Wasu-ri-Hwach’on Reservoir that could control Ch’orwon and Kimhwa in order to deepen the depth of Korean defenses and prevent enemy offensive preparation in the central area. The general then prepared a plan for the US I and X Corps to occupy the line. Concurrently, the US X and the ROK III and I Corps deployed east of the Hwach’on Reservoir were to attack to phase line Alabama connecting Yangu-Kajon-ri-Songdojin-ri as of April 24th in order to pin down and contain the enemy deployed on the eastern front so as to block enemy reinforcements moving toward the central front and to relieve the difficulty of logistic support and improve the main supply route for the ROK III Corps by occupying the road of Inje-Kansong.
According to this plan, three US Divisions (3rd, 24th, and 25th) of the 1st Corps and the British 27th Brigade of the IX Corps launched an offensive on April 11 with the objective of the Utah line of Kumbak-san-Kwangdok-san-Paekun-san about 20 kilometers north of the Kansas line. Although the attack echelon fought hard to a certain extent, because of the limited mobility of tanks under enemy fire and heavy rain, it succeeded in securing the Utah line as of April 20. With the success of the initial operation, the US 1st Corps (25th and 24th Divisions) and the IX Corps (ROK 6th and US 1st Marine Divisions) reorganized the attacking units, and began attack on April 21 toward the Wyoming line, the final objective of the operation under the cover of air support and artillery fire. However, their advance was, in slow progress, met with persistent enemy resistance, and signs began to appear by noon that the enemy’s massive offensive was imminent. The reconnaissance party of the US 1st Corps encountered the enemy along the Imjin River, well south of where it had been, and the air observers also sighted the enemy formation in the assembly area, ready to move toward the frontline. It was quite evident that they were deploying forward. In addition, the Chinese POWs captured in forward division area reported in a chorus that a massive Chinese offensive was to commence on the night of the 22nd.

As the attacking forces were bogged down by enemy fire all along the front, in the afternoon of the 22nd, the Eight Army commanding general ordered his forces to cease the offensive before nightfall and to shift to the defensive immediately.

(2) Enemy Situation

While the UN forces were conducting a counter offensive operation across the 38th Parallel, the Chinese were restoring their command channel
and preparing a massive new offensive aimed at recovering the lost prestige from the failure of the February offensive and regaining the initiative in the war.

The Headquarters Chinese People's Volunteers deployed the 3rd Army Group (63rd, 64th & 65th Armies), which had crossed the Yalu River to Sinuiju as reinforcements in early 1951, along the line of Kuhwa-ri-Toksa-ri north of the Imjin River; the 3rd Army Group (12th, 15th & 60th Armies) along the line of Sak-ryong-Shint'an-ri; and the 9th Army Group (20th, 26th & 27th Armies), which had suffered heavy losses in the battle of the Changjin Reservoir at the end of the last year and reorganized in Hamhung along the line of Ch'orwon-Kimhwa on the central frontline. With the death of Kim Ch'aek, Kim Ung who had led, NKPA 1 Corps, succeeded him as commander of the NKPA Front Headquarters and deployed the 3rd and 5 Corps along the Yanggu-Wont'ong line.

With the reorganization of their forces, the enemy substantially increased the number of field artillery pieces and armored and other vehicles in order to improve their inferiority in fire power and mobility. And especially in the mountainous terrain, where mobility was limited, they employed horses as a means of transportation. During this period, they improved their logistic capabilities to a great extent by storing 18,000 tons of grain and securing three to five basic loads of ammunition of various types. 

Early April the Communists made a decision for the 5th phase campaign (spring offensive) at the 5th Extended Military-Party Conference held by the commander of CPV, Peng Teh Huai and Kim Il Sung. At this meeting the Chinese leader ordered immediate preparation for an offensive as the military potential of the UN forces was at a low level due to exhaustion from continuing counter offensives, loss of combat strength, depletion of supplies without adequate restocking, and reserve forces was not reinforced. Peng Teh Huai reportedly promised to present Seoul to Mao Tse Tung as a May Day gift.
The Chinese III and IV Army Groups, the main forces for this offensive, had gone through a familiarization process of terrain and field training in the P'yongyang, Shingye, Ich'on, and P'yonggang areas as they moved toward the front; however, they still carried the disadvantages of being strangers to the situation and terrain and of not having any experience in fighting against the US Forces which had massive firepower and mobility. The Chinese built airstrips in Sinuiju, Uiju, Sinanju, P'yongyang, Wonsan, Yonp'o, and elsewhere in order to mobilized its air forces for the offensive; however, it could not deploy planes for the spring offensive as the newly-constructed airstrips were destroyed by the UN forces bombardment.\textsuperscript{30}

The Chinese surmised, as the central front of the UN forces became salient with the advance of the US I and IX Corps toward the Wyoming line, that the UN forces defense line was thin in depth and thus only mutual support among units moving abreast would have been possible.\textsuperscript{69} Prepared to exploit UN forces weakness, the Chinese commenced its offensive on April 22 against the US I Corps on both flanks and the front with the operation con-
cept of beating back the UN forces south of Seoul by dividing the frontline and enveloping attacks. The CCF III Army Group (63rd, 64th & 65th Armies) deployed along the Imjin River launched attack US I Corps toward Seoul as main effort with the III Army Group (12th, 15th & 60th Armies) north of Yonch'on and the IX Army Group (20th, 26th, 27th, 39th & 40th Armies) in the vicinities of Kimhwa. The NKPA III and V Corps started a secondary attack on the US X Corps south of Yanggu and the ROK III Corps in the Inje area.

The Chinese April offensive was based on the “human wave tactics”, employing 305,000 soldiers (270,000 Chinese and 35,000 North Korean soldiers) as the main weapon. Although the US I and IX Corps anticipated and prepared for the enemy offensive to a certain extent, they fought hard battle in the initial stage of the offensive.

2. Armageddon North of Seoul

The US I Corps in charge of the western front, deploying the ROK Marine 5th Independent Battalion (attached to the ROK 1st Division) in the Kimp'o Peninsula on the left front, the ROK 1st Division along the line of Ogum-ri-Maji-ri south of the Imjin, the British 29th Brigade (attached to the US 3rd Division) along the Maji-ri-Togamp'o line, and the US 3rd Division along the line of Togamp'o-Kunja-san, was focusing its efforts on the defense of the main line of resistance and reconnaissance north of the Imjin River.

While the Turkish Brigade (attached to the US 25th Division) and the US 25th and 24th Divisions in the central and right sectors of the Corps were attacking toward the Wyoming line, they were halted and quickly converted to defensive operations. The Turks set up defense positions on the hills south of Taegwang-ri, the 25th Division at Kumphak-sna and in the basin of the Changhung-ri area, and the 24th Division in Shinsul-li and Munhye-ri. Thus,
the corps was linked on its right with adjoining the ROK 6th Division, which advanced to Panghwa-dong-Paekchok-san on the left front of the US IX Corps.

The enemy commenced the April offensive after dark on April 22, committing the CCF III Army Group, west wing of main effort against the ROK 1st Division and the British 29th Brigade along the Kaesong-Munsan axis, the CCF III Army Group against the US 3rd Division and the Turkish Brigade along the axis of Yonch’on-Chongok-Tongduch’on, and the CCF IX Army Group, left wing of main effort, against the US 25th and 24th Divisions along the Kimhwa-P’och’on-Uijongbu axis.

Upon encountering massive Chinese forces, the US I Corps was to conduct successive withdraws as planned along the phase lines of Kansas, Delta, and Golden, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy with its superiority in air support, artillery fire, and mobility. At the initial stage of this grand encounter, the British 29th Brigade (with the Belgian battalion attached) in the area of Solma-ri, Kamak-san and Kumgul-san, and the ROK 1st Division at P’ap’yong-san, were engaged in desperate bloody battles.

1. The Battle of Kumgul-san

The British 29th Brigade was defending the Imjin River with one battalion deployed near Choksong north west Kamak-san, another battalion north of Kamak-san, the attached Belgian battalion in Kumgul-san, and the third British battalion in Pongam-ri as a reserve. Among them the Belgian battalion would have been exposed to the danger of isolation if attacked by the Chinese, since Kumgul-san (Hill 194), where the Belgians were deployed was a commanding hill protruding north of the Imjin River, with the river east and south and the two bridges installed at Togamp’o, the only pass toward the south. But once this hill had fallen into Chinese hands, not only would the brigade’s de-
fense area be under enemy surveillance but the main supply route of Yonch’on-Uijongbu for the adjacent US 3rd Division would also be cut off by flank attacks. In light of this critical tactical consideration, the Belgians fortified a strongpoint in the Kumgul-san area by installing barbed wire entanglements and mines.

The battle of Kumgul-san started around midnight of the 22nd April with the explosion of flare mines, alerting the infiltration of the Chinese 188th Division’s patrol party. An element of the invading forces made a detour to the right flank reaching Togamp’o, secured the bridges by 01:30 on the 23rd, and began to attack Hill 257 south of the Imjin River, which was defended by Company Z of the Fusilier battalion, on the right front of the British 29th Brigade.

With the route for withdrawal blocked, Lt. Col. Albert Crahay, Belgian battalion commander, requested the British 29th Brigade to clear the withdrawal route, but Brig. Gen. Thomas Brodie ordered the defense in place until the main body of the US 3rd Division adjacent to the right of the brigade withdrew from line Utah to Chongok, explaining that there were no support forces available since the brigade reserve was already committed forward to support Company Z.

Maj. General Robert H. Soule, the 3rd Division Commander considering the British 29th Brigade engaged on its entire front in a bloody battle and thus unable to support the Belgians, committed his one infantry replacement company and two tank platoons of the 7th Regiment, its reserve, to support the Belgian battalion. However, as the resistance of the Chinese occupying Hill 257 was so persistent, only one tank platoon succeeded in penetrating and reaching the Belgian position.

The arrival of the tank platoon just when the Chinese pressure was mounting boosted the esprit de corps of the battalion. Around noon they re-captured the lost forward position through a coordinated operation of tanks
and infantry. With the faltering Chinese attack, the battalion quickly reorganized, and helicopters from the US 3rd Division evacuated the wounded.

The Commander of the Brigade asked the commanding general of the Division for permission to allow the battalion to destroy its vehicles and equipment and then to evacuate the men to Chongok, east of the Imjin River. The division commander, however, confident of securing the route of withdrawal turned down the request for the battalion's withdrawal as the 1st Battalion, US 7th Regiment was assaulting Hill 257 located in the path of the retreat."
Although the Belgians finally received the order for withdrawal at 17:00, they had much difficulty to break contact with the enemy. The battalion commander made the decision that drivers would rush to the vehicles over the bridge area under air and tank cover, and that the troops would ford the Imjin toward the east and then climb the 15 meter natural cliff to reach Chongok.

With close air support starting precisely at 17:30 to aid the withdrawal the convoy of 80 vehicles, led by the tank platoon, along with the columns of infantry, escaped from their defense position at Kungul-san. As the foot soldiers began to wade the Imjin River in the east, the northwesterly wind helped conceal them from enemy observation by covering smoke of fire when napalm dropped in the forward area. Then the enemy began to concentrate mortar fire toward the cliff, and the Belgians had to climb the rugged cliff. Leveling the cliff would have taken the army engineers one whole week; however, the Belgians ascended the cliff and succeeded in returning to the position of the 65th Regiment of the US 3rd Division in the Namgye-ri area west of Chongok by 18:30. The vehicle echelon also succeeded in reuniting with the main body with a loss of only four vehicles to enemy artillers fire.

The battalion escaping Kungul-san and assembling in Chongok had to move via Tongduch'on by car and redeploy in the Pongam-ri area without a rest as the brigade's reserve when the situation of the 29th Brigade worsened.

(2) The Battle of P'ap'yong-san

When the main Forces of the US 1 Corps were attacking line Wyoming south of Ch'orwon, the ROK 1st Division was concentrating on patrolling along the line of Taedok-san-Paekhak-san-Kangjong-ri north of the Imjin River and also strengthening the defense position along the main line of resistance between Ogum-ri and Maju-ri. The division deployed the 11th Regi-
ment at a hill mass north of Munsan on its left front, the 12th Regiment at P'ap'yongsan (496m) on its right, and the 15th Regiment in the Kodae-ryong area as a reserve. Abreast of the ROK 1st Division on its right, the British 29th Brigade was also defending the Imjin River.

Around 20:00 on April 22, an element of the CCF 64th Army tried to intercept and envelope the reconnaissance party of the ROK division, and the CCF 192nd Division advanced to the Imjin River under the cover of darkness. In the area of the ROK 11th Regiment on the left front, the Imjin was wide, deep, and fast and, thus, not suitable for crossing; therefore, the enemy concentrated on the area of the 12th Regiment on the right front to secure crossing sites at Sokp'o, Chajip'o, and Sokgyo around Koryangp'o.

About midnight the reconnaissance party of the division and regiment returned after escaping the Chinese encirclement in dispersion and crossing the river either in small boats or by swimming in the freezing temperatures.\(^2\)

After crossing the river, the division delivered planned artillery bar-
rage on the Koryangp'o area and the river basin to block the Chinese crossing. But having completed preparations for crossing, about two company-sized Chinese forces started to cross in the Chajip'o area at around 02:30 on the 23rd, at low tide. ROK forces south of the Imjin persisted in their attempt to block the Chinese crossing; however, due to overwhelming enemy manpower, the ROK forces had to withdraw to their main position, allowing the enemy to build a beachhead in Changjwa-ri south of the Imjin.

Concurrently the Chinese attacked the British 29th Brigade and secured Chungsong-san; then, the Chinese tried to break through right flank on the adjoining 12th Regiment. The regiment, however, lured the enemy to a pre-planned killing zone, the open ground in the Maji-ri area, and drove them away with concentrated fire power. Having suffered heavy losses from fierce air strikes and artillery fire the Chinese offensive was blunted considerably, but a small Chinese element infiltrated into P'ap'yon-ri where they could command the zone of operation for the Chinese division. Engaged in a fierce battle of offense and defense, the 2nd Battalion, the reserve of 12th Regiment and the attached Company C of the US 73rd Tank Battalion conducted an infantry-armor coordinate attack from 14:00 till dusk in order to recapture the outposts south of the river. The division blocked the enemy offensive, killing 3,000 Chinese, with air strikes and artillery fire and tank-infantry task force attack.

As the enemy concentrated its attacks on the 12th Regiment on the right front, Brigadier General Kang Moon Bong, the division commander, deployed the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment, the division reserve, forward to the Pobwon-ri area to support the 12th Regiment. On the 23rd, the Chinese began to amass their forces as if getting ready for a decisive battle while Kang's division was strengthening its defense positions and intensifying security in anticipation of an enemy offensive at night. Around midnight, the CCF 192nd Di-
vision committed its follow-on forces and crossed the river in the Chajip'o and Kuya areas on the right front in support of their attacking echelon in spite of the concentrated an available fire from friendly side. Soon the CCF 190th Division, assembling in Changdan, also began fording the Imjin River.

The Chinese 64th Army attacked the ROK 1st Division for two days, but it was unable to make a frontal breakthrough to the division's stubborn resistance. Then they had the 192nd Division which had crossed at Koryangp'o attack P'ap'yong-san on the front and the newly committed 190th Division attack the boundary between the 11th and 12th Regiments along the axis of Tup'o-ri-Masan-ri-Pobwon-ri. They intended to divide division sector and then to destroy the 12th Regiment defending P'ap'yongsan by link-up operation. Reading the enemy intention, the ROK 1st Division ordered the 15th Regiment (minus 2 battalions), which was ready to support the frontline regiments in the Chukwon-ri area from south of Pongilch'on to move to Pobwon-ri. The frontline regiments, however, were suffering from increasing casualties by Chinese attacks in wave and with breaches created in certain areas, their defensive front was beginning to shrink near the peaks of P'ap'yong-san.

The Chinese 568th Regiment of the 190th Division, on the other hand, made a breakthrough in the boundary between regiments and advanced four kilometers; however, having suffered severe damage from UNC air bombardment and massive artillery fire commenced at dawn, it had to build defensive positions at Yongp’yong-san (Hill 276) and nearby hills. The 1st Division launched counterattack to regain the breach created in its sector, with one tank company and two battalions of the 15th Regiment under air support and artillery cover.

Worried that the 11th Regiment could interdict the Chinese route of retreat and that the coordinated attack of tank-infantry of the 15th Regiment would envelope them, the Chinese hastily withdrew and the ROK 15th Regi
ment that pursued the Chinese restored the breach by 17:00. But the 12th Regiment, hard pressed by persistent enemy attacks, gave up p'ap'yon-gsan, a critical terrain for the defence of the division and the main line of resistance east of the mountain, thus, tolerating a penetration in the division's main line of resistance.

Upon the loss of the 12th Regiment area on the right front, an order to prepare for an attack was issued by the division commander in the evening "... for the division to begin counter attack at 06:30 of the 25th, wipe out the Chinese advanced south of the Imjin River, and restore the main line of resistance by 17:00." As the division was preparing for the attack, the enemy sent forward to the Imjin River area the NKPA 1 Corps which completed reorganization along the Yesong River area in order to support the attacking Chinese, as the CCF 63rd and 64th Armies' attempt to create an opening was delayed by the strong resistance of the ROK 1st Division and the British 29th Brigade.

In the evening of the 24th, there were clear indications that the NK forces were crossing the railroad bridge of the Imjin River, and by midnight the NKPA 8th Division, the spearhead of the NK 1 Corps (8th, 19th & 47th divisions) crossed over the bridge, and attacked the left front of the 11th Regiment. Another regiment of the NKPA 47th Division crossed the Imjin River at Ch'ongun-dong and assaulted the right front of the 11th regiment. The North Korean, taking advantage of the dense fog along the Imjin River that limited the visibility to a few feet, approached the main line of resistance. There was a seesawed bloody battle from the outpost with bayonets and handgrenades. Around noon the fog began to lift, and with the improving weather conditions, the North Korean offensive was slowed down by close air support and artillery fire; thus, the regiment could reorganize its defense positions to be ready to meet the next enemy attack. On the other hand, the efforts of the 12th and 15th
Regiments, advancing in the central sector of the division to restore the breach, were futile in the face of strong resistance by the CCF.

By then, the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment moved up Pukam-ri east of P'ap'yong-san confronting the enemy. All of a sudden, an unidentified group of soldiers came down along the stream with a loud of shooting. Having been informed from the air observer that the soldiers were the British escaping from the Chinese encirclement, the battalion immediately conducted an infantry-armor coordinated operation with a US tank company and rescued 40
members of Company D of the G lostershire Battalion. However, during the rescue, the Chinese managed to detour a part of their forces to the right and cut off the withdrawal route for the regiment; thus, the regiment had to cease the attack and withdrew to Kungok-ri.

The division commenced a counterattack on the morning of the 25th in order to recapture the lost defense area but failed as the situation worsened with the addition of the NKPA 1 Corps to the scene. After three days of bloody fighting, around noon the division withdrew to the Delta line connecting Wollyong-san-Pugok-ri-Sambang-ri between Kumch' on and Munsan by the Corps withdrawal order.

The CCF later described the situation in its war history as follows: "The 64th Army, with a mission designed to detour the theater of campaign, occupied the Changp'a-ri and Kosa-dong areas but failed to make a quick breakthrough in the main position blocked by the ROK 1st Division north of Mit'asa (temple)." The Chinese offensive failed due to the stubborn resistance of the 1st ROK Division.

(3) The Solma-ri Battle

Adjacent to the right of the ROK 1st Division, the British 29th Brigade was in charge of the defense of the 11 kilometer wide front between Maji-ri and Tongamp'o. The brigade organize a strong point defense for each battalion along the routes connecting Choksong-Shinsan-ri and Togamp'o-Pongam-ri in front of Kamak-san (Hill 675); thus, the gaps not only between their own battalions but also with adjoining units on the left and right betrayed weaknesses vulnerable to enemy infiltration and breakthrough.

The scouts frequently encountered the Chinese along the Imjin River on the brigade front from the early morning of April 22. Tensions were rising
as the full moon shone over the Imjin. The 22nd was the eve of St. George's day for the British; thus, even some units in main positions were busy with preparations for the traditional feast of turkey and the wearing of roses on hat. At 22:00 an unidentified number of Chinese tried to cross the river in front of the Gloster Battalion on the Brigade left front in the Kayoul area but were blocked by concentrated ambush and artillery fire. As the ambushing soldiers had to withdraw when their ammunition was exhausted, the enemy next started an assault of one regimental-size crossing the river.

The Gloster Battalion* tried desperately to hold on to its defense position, but suffered heavily from the Chinese human-wave-tactic attacks. Company A defending Chungsong-san (Hill 148), an important height overlooking the ford site of Kayoul, was on the edge of the worst situation, with increasing casualties including its company commander Major P.A. Angier, who was killed in action. Concurrently, Company Z of the Fusilier Battalion,* on the Brigade right front south of the Imjin River, lost Hill 257 to the CCF 188th Division in a fierce engagement, thereby allowing the Chinese to establish a bridge south of the Imjin in the early hours of the 23rd.

With dawn the UN forces started air strikes, the enemy broke contact and disappeared into the forests and valleys, and the forward battalion withdrew to the Kamak-san area. During the day the Gloster Battalion on the left front organized a defense position around Hill 314 in anticipation of a Chinese attack at night, and the Fusilier Battalion on the right front started counterattack around noon in an infantry-tank coordinated operation to recapture the lost Hill 257. The battalion failed, however, as the firmly entrenched enemy resisted fiercely. The brigade commander deployed the Ulster Battalion, the reserve, at Hill 398 to control the route between Togamp'o and Pongam-ri in order to deter enemy penetration into the rear area.

As the Fusilier Battalion had failed in the counterattack, the US 3rd
Division commander tried another counterattack by the 1st Battalion, US 7th Regiment, the division reserve, but to no avail. In order to reinforce the British 29th Brigade, the division commander attached the Philippine 10th Battalion, which, in a heavy engagement with the Chinese near Yultong south of Taegwang-ri on the 22nd, withdrew to Anhung-ri. The battalion assembled in the Shinsan-ri area at 20:00 as brigade reserve.

On the enemy side, the CCF 63rd Army committed its reserve division, reorganized attack echelons, in an intensive assault on the Gloster Battalion on the left around midnight on the 23rd. This action was taken since their efforts to occupy Kamak-san had been delayed by the persistent resistance of the 29th Brigade, even though a part of the bridge head had been secured south of the Imjin River. The Glosters, under the pressure of Chinese wave attacks, withdrew, re-assembled in Solma-ri hill (Hill 235) so that they could control the route of Choksong-Shinsan-ri, and organized a perimeter defense. The Fusilier Battalion, as well, withdrew to Songsan-ri in the rear of the Ulster Battalion, and thus Kamak-san, which could control the zone of operation, fell to enemy hands. In the early morning of the 24th, the Gloster Battalion was surrounded by the CCF 63rd Army.¹⁴

To rescue the isolated Glosters, the Philippine 10th Battalion and Company C of the British 8th Tank Battalion commenced an attack in a coordinating infantry-tank effort at 07:30. The Chinese advanced 4.8 kilometers south of Hill 235 and stubbornly resisted; in addition, the defile near the pass of Sagimak was too narrow for the Centurion tank to pass, discouraging the assault effort. Then the brigade commander briefed Lt. Col. Carne, the battalion commander, on the rescue operation and advised him to penetrate the Chinese siege on his own and retreat to link up the supporting forces. However, the battalion commander, judging that the battalion would be unable to break through the siege due to the low combat capability resulting from exhaustion
accumulated in successive engagements, requested a resupply of ammunition, food, and other items which were almost exhausted in the hope of joining with friendly forces in the present location.\textsuperscript{27}

Having failed in the morning attack, the Philippine 10th Battalion resumed the attack in the afternoon; however, the leading M-24 tank was destroyed at the defile and dampened the attack.

While the Filipino battalion was conducting the rescue operation, these isolated Glosters, relying on close air and artillery support fire, hoped to meet reinforcements, but when the attack echelon failed and withdrew, their morale was dispirited.

Analyzing the overall situation and consulting the Gloster commander, the brigade commander recommended that the division allow a night withdrawal of the battalion, but the division commander ordered the Glosters to stick to their present position until the rescue by the US 65th Regiment scheduled to begin at 06:30 on the 25th. The decision was made on the basis that night withdrawal tend to cause heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{28} The Glosters repulsed enemy assaults several times that night and held fast to their position.

In the early hours of the 25th, the CCF 63rd Army started an all-out attack, committing its reserve, the 189th Division, because its offensive plan was deadlocked by the delay in creating a breakthrough in this area. As the situation was worsened for the 29th Brigade and a part of the main line of resistance was breached by persistent Chinese attacks, Maj. General Frank W. Milburn, the US 1 Corp commanding general, ordered withdrawal to line Delta, 6 to 18 kilometers south of line Kansas. The ROK 1st and US 3rd Divisions, however, were ordered to stick to their current positions until the Glosters were rescued. Particularly he emphasized to the US 3rd Division commander that the Glosters had to be rescued even if it meant a counterattack by the Division.\textsuperscript{27}
Solma-ri Battle (April 22–25, 1951)
Right after the issuance of this order, one division of the CCF 63rd Army, crossed the Imjin River and began to move along the axis of Chongok-Tongduch'on in order to cut off the retreat route for the US 3rd Division. The Commander of the US 3rd Division deployed to this area its 65th Regiment and the Filipino battalion, which had been preparing a counterattack for Solma-ri hill, to block the enemy advancing along the axis of Chongok-Tongduch'on. Thus, only the 64th Tank Battalion and a tank company of the 65th Regiment were available with artillery support and air cover for the rescue of the Gloster Battalion.

Reviewing the on-going operations, the brigade commander, with a conviction that tanks alone without strong infantry support could not break the Chinese siege, issued a withdrawal order to line Delta to the frontline battalions to assemble in the brigade headquarters area in Pongam-ri. Prior to withdrawal to line Delta, the brigade commander gave the Gloster Battalion commander a choice between two alternatives: break through the Chinese siege and withdraw to the south, or if that was impossible, surrender to the Chinese. Unaware of the rescue operation being conducted by a tank platoon of the 65th Regiment, the battalion commander ordered withdrawal in vague expectation of safe passage to the ROK 1st Division area once the battalion crossed the valley in the south. The battalion commander finally told the company commanders, "I'll stay on this hill with the wounded, and wish you a safe withdrawal."

As Company A led the way down the hill around 10:00, the chaplain, a surgeon, and medics volunteered to remain behind along with 50 wounded. Company D retreated toward the north, the opposite direction of the main body, after covering the retreat of other companies. The main body that withdrew southward along with those remaining at Solma-ri hill later became POWs of the Chinese, but Company D, which moved northward, escaped by
turning around toward the south into the ROK 1st Division area.30

The main forces of the brigade also withdrew to Pongam-ri, cutting off the CCF's siege and carrying about 200 wounded on the tops of their tanks. The tanks were so overcrowded that they were unable to rotate turrets or to speed up; thus, a large number of the wounded were killed. Out of the frying pan into the fire, in hot pursuit of the Chinese on the withdrawal to line Delta, the dispersed brigade assembled in Uijongbu, having suffered substantial loss of manpower and equipment.

In sum, the brigade lost one third of its total manpower, including the whole Gloster Battalion (except Company D) which was captured by the Chinese. However, its sacrifice contributed decisively to the safe retreat of the corps' main body and secured time to prepare Seoul's defense by pinning down the CCF as they attacked along the axis of Choksong-Solma-ri-Tongduch'on for three days. The battle of Solam-ri has been recorded as an outstanding example of an isolated defense in the history of the Korean War.

(4) Delaying Actions along the Kimhwa-P'och'on Axis

On the US 1 Corps' Right front, the US 25th (with the Turkish Brigade attached) and 24th Division which were attacking the objective of Ch'orwon-Kimhwa at east of Yonch'on were blocked by stubborn Chinese resistance on April 22. Then US 1 Corps hastily organized a defense position with the Turkish Brigade on the left front at a hill cluster south of Taegwang-ri, the US 25th Division on the central front in the Kumhak-san (Hill 947) area south of Ch'orwon, and the US 24th on the right in Munhye-ri and Shinsul-ri. On the left of the Turkish Brigade was the Philippine 10th Battalion attached to the 65th Regiment of the US 3rd Division defending the Utah line. In spite of heavy support fire provided by corps artillery to cover the preparations of de-
fense positions for the attacking echelons, the CCF launched an offensive under the cover of darkness on April 22. Thus, the main forces of the US 1 Corps was engaged in an unexpected encounter south of Ch'orwon.

At 19:00 on the 22nd, the CCF poured the heavy preparation fire for 40 minutes on the Turkish Brigade deployed in the Changsong-ch'lon area south of Taegwang-ri. The Turks suffered damage to their artillery position and signal facilities, but stood fast on the main line of resistance against the CCF 179th Division of the 60th Army, which was approaching close to their position in a frontal attack. In abreast frontal attack, the enemy committed troops of one regiment-size on the both flank boundaries between the Filipino battalion on the left and the 24th Regiment of the US 25th Division on the right for an envelope of the Turks. Around midnight the Turks were ordered to withdraw to a position on the Kansas line south of the Han'nan River, but they suffered heavy losses on the way as the infiltrating Chinese had already blocked Namihyon, a critical strong point.⁷

While the Turks were engaged in fierce battle, the Philippine 10th Battalion, deployed in the Yultong area on the left of the Turks, from 23:00 was assaulted in wave by the 34th Division of the CCF 12th Army and fought a series of close combat within its positions. In spite of the fact that its communication with the US 65th Regiment had been disconnected by enemy artillery fire and with little friendly fire support, the battalion held fast to its position till early morning, and covered the retreat of the US 3rd Division.⁸ At first light, the Chinese offensive gradually declined, and the battalion started to prepare a counterattack to restore the lost area of Company B.

The Filipinos and the Turks fought admirably. Despite their efforts, however, enemy penetration was created in the defensive position of the US IX Corps in Sachang-ri and then a partial breach in the Kamak-san area of the US I Corps. The commanding general of the Eighth US Army ordered, on the
morning of the 23rd, the two US Corps to withdraw and organize defensive positions on the Kansas line of the Imjin River–Chongok–Hwach‘on Reservoir. Accordingly, the three divisions (the US 3rd, 24th and 25th) of the US I Corps on its right front induced the Chinese to concentrate in forward area of their position and then imposed heavy casulties with air and artillery bombardment. Taking advantage of its superior mobility, the corps conducted successive delaying actions until it occupied its new position on line Kansas.

The US 5th Air Force was responsible for close air support and bombardment of the enemy rear area. As the main force of the 5th Air Force had been moved to Japan during enemy New Year’s offensive, only three air wings in addition to the US 1st Marine Air Wing in Korea, and a host of fighters from the carrier were available for combat at the beginning of enemy April Offensive, but these were well short of the demand. Still the 5th Air Force made an unprecedented 340 sorties on April 23rd in support of the withdrawal of the US I Corps.

The CCF described the situation later on in its history of war as follows: “Though the CCF 9th Army Group pursued the UN forces and encircled 5 companies of the US 24th Division near Yongp’yong, Kumgok, and Kujong-dong, the artillery could not advance in time to encircle the enemy and allowed the besieged to escape because of the threat of the UNC aircraft and the shortage of manpower to cut-off enemy withdrawal route.” This was proof of the great effectiveness of the UNC air power. The CCF failed to prevent the I Corps withdrawal and suffered heavy losses because of UNC massive close air support and artillery fire which lasted for three days; however, the Chinese did not stop their pursuit to destroy the main American forces.

The US 25th Division in the center, following the order of the corps commander, withdrew on the 25th to line Delta without much damage in spite of the Chinese pursuit, but as the US 3rd Division on the left front was sup-
Delaying Action Along Yonch'on-Tongduch'on (April 22-25, 1951)
porting the British 29th Brigade's withdrawal near Hill 412, the 3rd Battalion of its 7th Regiment was endangered when it was isolated by a Chinese surprise attack. However, the imperturbable leadership of the battalion commander and fire support of artillery and air helped them to escape the siege and reach line Delta. The 8th Ranger Company attached to the US 24th Division on the left front was also surrounded by the Chinese as it patrolled Hill 1010 in order to cover the retreating main body of the division. Thus, the 5th Regiment of the US 24th Division committed 5 tanks, saved 65 wounded rangers, and withdrew at the last minute.35

As the US I Corps was encountering the main attack of the CCF April offensive north of Seoul, the ROK 1st Division and the British 29th Brigade along the Imjin River admirably fought to delay the enemy advance for three days, allowing the US divisions (3rd, 24th & 25th) which were attacking the Wyoming line, to withdraw to line Kansas without being enveloped or penetrated by enemy.

Inflicting heavy damage on the enemy by effectively employing air and artillery bombardment, the corps withdrew to the Delta line of Songdong-ri-Nogo-san-Tokchong-P'och'on. On this new line of defense, the ROK 1st and the US 3rd, 25th, and 24th divisions were deployed from left to right to prepare defense for Seoul.

3. Crisis along the Axis of Sach'ang-ri-Kap'yong

On April 21, the units of the US IX Corps in charge of the central front were launching attack abreast of the US I Corps on its left, with the ROK 6th Division beginning its attack on the left toward kimhwa, and the US 1st Marine Division (with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached) on the right attacking its
objective of the Wyoming line north of the Hwach’on Reservoir. On the other side, the Chinese Ⅹ Army Group, the secondary attack force of the April offensive started to move into the area of the US Ⅸ Corps ahead of its main attack forces along the axis of Hwach’on-Kap’yong to prevent mutual support between neighboring UNC forces and in order to cover the east flank of their main forces. With the enemy’s inferiority to the US 1st Marine Division in fire power and mobility and also the burden of fording the Pukhan River, the Chinese chose to focus their attack on the ROK 6th Division on the left, which was comparatively weaker in combat capabilities but was positioned in mountainous terrain advantageous for their mobility.

(1) The Sach’ang-ri Battle

The ROK 6th Division launched to attack from the line of Sokryong-san-Hwaak-san toward its objectives of Yukdan-ri and Pokju-san (Hill 1057) on line Wyoming on April 21st, with its 19th Regiment on the left to secure Sanghae-bong (Hill 1019) and the 2nd Regiment on the right to occupy Paekchok-san (Hill 883) as intermediate objectives. When the division was re-organizing its attack echelons in the afternoon of the 22nd, Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong, the division commander, upon receiving intelligence reports from an air observer that enemy troops were assembling on a large scale in front of the division, instructed his regiments around 16:00 to cease attack and shift to the defense, maintaining links to the neighboring US 24th Division on the left and the US 1st Marine Division on the right.

Accordingly, the 19th Regiment quickly prepared a defense position in the Panghwa-dong area and the 2nd Regiment in the Paekchok-san area. The 7th Regiment, the division reserve, was deployed in anticipation of a Chinese offensive forward in the Turyu-san (Hill 993) area in the rear of the 2nd Regi-
ment, where numerous enemy troops were sighted. The ROK 27th Artillery Battalion, New Zealand Artillery Battalion, and Company C, the US 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion, all attached to the division, were deployed near Sach’ang-ri. As the division’s forward units took their defense positions on critical commanding heights, gaps sprang up between units, flanks were exposed, and the weakness of a shallow depth of defense was created with its reserve deployed too close to the main forces.

Around 17:00 the CCF poured heavy fire in the Panghwa-dong and Shillae-ri areas in keeping with its plan of the April offensive. The CCF 60th Division, the 20th Army, and a part of the 120th Division, the 40th Army, while conducting a frontal attack, concurrently infiltrated the gaps between units and advanced to Sanghae-bong and Turyu-san. In spite of the division commander’s order to stick to the position, the frontline regiments, overwhelmed and in disarray, surged to the south, having confirmed that there were Chinese forces in the rear and being caught up in the obsession arising from the Onjong-ri battle at the end of the previous October that “once surrounded by the CCF, no way out.” The division’s route for withdrawal however, was already cut by the CCF who had advanced to the rear, and communications were cut off; thus, in the confusion it was impossible to control the units. The 19th Regiment on the left was isolated among enemy forces, and the 2nd Regiment on the right and the 7th Regiment, the reserve, abandoning its equipment and vehicles, partly withdrew to the neighboring forces on the right and left, and others broke out of the enemy encirclement and withdrew in disarray. After the breakthrough, the CCF attacked the ROK 27th Artillery Battalion and Company C of the US 2nd Mortar Battalion in the rear of the 7th Regiment. They withdrew along the route of Sach’ang-ri-Ch’unch’ŏn the only way out, to Sinp’o-ri. As the division withdrew from the main line of resistance, the US artillery troops that had reinforced the division artillery with fire were
rushing toward the Pukhan River area to the east. When the units converged with those withdrawing from Sach'ang-ri, confusion reigned with infantry and artillery forces entangled. To make matters worse, upon the enemy’s surprise attack, even the US artillery soldiers abandoned their substantial guns and withdrew.\(^{20}\)

On April 21st, the US 1st Marine Division on the right of the ROK 6th Division attacked the Wyoming line north of the Hwach'on Reservoir, employing its 5th, 7th and the attached ROK 1st Marine regiments. As the division tried to occupy Hwach'on, however, it encountered a frontal attack by the main forces of the CCF 40th Army and was in danger of being enveloped through the exposed flank created by the withdrawal of the ROK 6th Division. Fortunately, the division managed to withdraw to the east of the Pukhan River and occupy line Kansas around Ch'unch'on by fending off the Chinese attack with its fire power.

As the Chinese offensive declined with daybreak on the 23rd, Maj. General William H. Hoge, the IX Corps commander, instructed the ROK 6th Division to reorganize promptly and occupy a defense position on line Kansas to block the enemy’s advance. The division deployed its 19th Regiment in the area of Kukmang-bong (Hill 1168)-Sokryong-san, and the 2nd Regiment in the Hwaak-san-Mae-bong area in the afternoon. At dusk the enemy, taking initiative, resumed its attack. The division stubbornly tried to stick to its defense position; however, the division was despirited and incapable of resisting the enemy’s wave attacks. The division was forced to retreat toward Kap’yong valley under the cover of the British 27th Brigade and occupied the Pulgi-san (Hill 601) area southwest of Kap’yong on the morning of the 24th. In this battle the division lost 2,263 rifles, 168 automatic machine-guns, 66 rocket launchers (2.36”), 2 anti-tank guns, 42 mortars, 13 howitzers and 87 vehicles. Those US artillery units that had supported the division also suffered losses of 15 howit-
zers (105mm), 13 mortars (4.2"), 242 radios, and 73 vehicles. With the stragglers who steadily gathered, the division counted 6,313 by April 25.

It was determined that the deterioration of the ROK 6th Division was caused not by the lack of leadership ability of the division commander alone but by deficiencies in leadership and in combat capabilities on the part of commanders and staff, as well as the low morale of the non-commissioned officers. In sum, the deficient leadership was the most serious weakness inherent in the ROK forces as manifested in this operation.

(2) The Battle at Kap'yong

A decisive encounter developed between the British 27th Brigade defending Kap'yong and the CCF 118th Division in pursuit of the ROK 6th Division. The British brigade assembled in Kap'yong as corps reserve after handing over its defense area west of Sach'ang-ri to the 19th Regiment, 6th Division, on April 19 just prior to the start of the CCF spring offensive. As the Argyll battalion was to return to Hong Kong terminating its detachment in Korea, the brigade was rather distracted.

When it was uncertain till the evening of the 23rd if the ROK 6th Division that withdrew from Sach'ang-ri could occupy its sector of Sokryong-san–Hwaak-san on line Kansas, the commanding general of the US IX Corps ordered the New Zealand 16th Artillery Battalion and the 213th Artillery Battalion of the corps to continue to support the ROK 6th Division, and the British 27th brigade to have its main forces organize a defense position in Kap'yong-ch' on valley in the rear of the 6th Division in order to block the enemy advancing toward the Ch'unch'on–Kap'yong route.

According to this order, the brigade deployed the Canadian battalion at Hill 677 near Naech'on on its left front to control Kap'yong-ch'on, the Aus-
tralian battalion around Hill 504 of Chuktun-ri on its right to block the enemy approaching along the valley from the northeast, and secured the Argyll battalion as reserve assembled near Kap'yong in order to support the ROK 6th Division.

As the ROK 6th Division on line Kansas began to withdraw not long after the CCF 118th Division started its assault on the night of the 23rd, the 16th Field Artillery Regiment of New Zealand which had supported the division with the Middlesex battalion providing the security for the regiment withdrew and occupied the positions along Kap'yong-ch'ong, north of Kap'yong.

The vanguard regiment of the CCF 118th Division in the pursuit of the ROK 6th Division quickly moved along the route and the valley in columns in order to occupy Kap'yong without knowing of the deployment of the Australian battalion at around 22:00 when the ROK division completed its withdrawal. The Australians repulsed the enemy by concentrating not only their own but also supporting tank and artillery fire in an ambush.

Around 01:00 on the 24th, the Chinese in two echelons attempted a siege as soon as the tank platoon withdrew for resupply. The Australians held their defense position around Hill 504 until dawn, conducting counterattacks immediately when a part of their position was penetrated. As UNC air and artillery bombardment intensified at first light, the Chinese ceased its assault and began to withdraw, leaving a host of dead behind. A patrol party immediately went in pursuit and captured 40 Chinese near Chukdun-ri.

Assessing over-all situation, Brig. Gen. B.A. Burke, the 27th brigade commander, ordered the Australian battalion to withdraw to the rear of the Middlesex battalion on the basis that there was a strong possibility of enemy attack through the gap between the Canadians and the Australians even if the enemy withdrew temporarily. And since the Hill 504, a commanding hill, on the right front of the Australian battalion and the Middlesex battalion in the
rear, were within the range of enemy artillery, casualties would rise and there would be problems of evacuating the wounded and resupply." 

Around 22:00, the CCF 354th Regiment attacked in two echelons upon Canadian battalion at Hill 677 on the left front, employing mortars and automatic machine-guns. As the 16th Artillery Regiment poured shells on the enemy crossing Kap'yong-ch'on and the Canadian battalion concentrated all its fire, the enemy attack wavered and then stopped around midnight. The enemy resumed attack on the Canadians around 02:00 on the 25th, but lured by Company D, the enemy under heavy bombardment suffered great losses and retreated.

On the 23rd and 24th, the CCF approached along the comparatively easier approach Kap'yong-ch'on Valley, in an attempt to cut off the Seoul-Ch'unch'on route, but suffering heavy casualties due to the strong resistance of the brigade and artillery fire support, they gave up and retreated at first light on the 25th. Thus the Chinese intention to divide the UN forces frontline was completely shattered, and the friendly forces secured enough time to build a new defense line south of the Pukhan River.

The British 27th Brigade concluded the three-day bloody battle, and on the night of the 25th handed over its operation area to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, the US 1st Cavalry Division, which had been transferred from the reserve of the Eight US Army ordered to the IX Corps. The British brigade then moved down to Yangp'yong as the corps reserve. Brig. Gen. George Taylor took command of the brigade, and it was renamed the British 28th Brigade.  

Encountering an auxiliary attack of the enemy's April offensive, the US IX Corps suffered from enemy's surprise night attacks at the initial stage because although the corps was superior in both mobility and fire power, the maneuverability was restricted in the mountainous terrain. Thus, with a breach made in Sach'ang-ri, Kap'yong also was endangered, but the admirable per-
formance in battle of the former British 27th Brigade frustrated the enemy's intent to divide the friendly frontline by saving Kap'yong.

4. The Battle along the Soyang River

The US X and the ROK I and III Corps of the central eastern front commenced a counter offensive again in early March, but had to reorganize along the Hwach'on Reservoir-Namjon-ri-Hangye-ryong on line Kansas as the terrain on its axis of attack was rugged and the NKPA forces resisted stubbornly when the friendly forces on the central western front launched an offensive from line Kansas toward the Iron Triangle. As the offensive on the central front progressed favorably, on April 20 the commanding general of the Eighth Army ordered an offensive operation starting on the 24th with the objective of the Alabama line connecting Yanggu-Taeam-san-Kajon-ri-Sach' on-ri-south of Ko-song in order to secure the road linking Hongch'on-Inje-Kansong around 10 to 22-kilometers south of line Alabama. This road was the main supply route for the ROK I and III Corps deployed east and west of the Taebaek Mountains.

While the ROK 5th Division attached to the US X Corps and the 3rd and 7th Divisions attached to the ROK III Corps were preparing for an offensive, the NKPA V Corps, which incidentally had staged the auxiliary attack in the April offensive, commenced a preemptive strike on the 22nd along the line of Yanggu-Wont'ong; thus, the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions were engaged in a fierce battle against the NKPA forces again on the eastern front after their first encounter in the central-western sector.

(1) Battle for Inje

The ROK 5th Division, US X Corps crossed the Soyang River on
April 19 and secured Inje, a point of tactical importance, with its 35th Regiment on the left advanced to Kaya-ri and the 36th Regiment on the right to Ponghwa-san (Hill 579) north of Wont’ong. There was by then a partial readjustment in the sector boundary between the US X and ROK II Corps according to the offensive plan for line Alabama. The ROK 5th Division transferred the area of the 36th Regiment north of Inje to the 5th Regiment, the 7th Division, on the left front of the II Corps, and took over the area of the 32nd Regiment, the US 7th Division adjacent to its left, east of Yanggu. Accordingly, the 36th Regiment first of all transferred its area to the 5th Regiment at 18:00 on the 22nd and withdrew to Inje as division reserve, and the 35th Regiment became the right front regiment without changing its area of operation. The regiment was busy preparing a reconnaissance in force and an assault at Taeam-san (Hill 1316). The 27th Regiment as division reserve moved to Namjon-ri to take over the Yach’on-ri area east of Yanggu from the US 32nd Regiment.

The NK V Corps started a night attack on the 22nd, exploiting the vulnerable timing of relief-in-place of ROK-US units, with its 45th Division at Yanggu, the 12th Division at Inje, and the 6th Division at Hansok-san (Hill 1119) as objectives. The NK 12th Division that attacked Inje occupied the outpost (Hill 873) of the 35th Regiment, ROK 5th Division, and approached close to the main line of resistance by 23:00.

Starting at midnight on the 22nd, the 35th Regiment encountered the enemy’s concentrated attacks aimed at a frontal breakthrough, but warded off a breach with fire and hand-to-hand combat. With little progress in their frontal attack, the enemy retreated, and tried to intercept the regiment’s route of retreat from the east by infiltrating a part of its forces through the gap in the sector boundary with the 5th Regiment adjacent to its right. Wary of being surrounded, the 3rd Battalion of 35th Regiment on the right front withdrew to
Wont’ong. As the situation was worsening the main force of the regiment began to withdraw from the main line of resistance. With unfavorable developments not only on the central and western fronts but also in the central eastern area, the commanding general of the Eighth Army, in the early morning of the 23rd, ordered cancellation of the offensive to line Alabama by the friendly forces on the eastern front scheduled for the 24th, and adjusted sector boundaries to effectively deter the enemy offensive.\(^5\)

Following this order, the 3rd and 5th regiments, ROK 7th Division, were attached to the ROK 5th Division, and the division’s area of operation was extended to the east. Division commander Brig. Gen. Min Ki Shik, determined to secure Inje, deployed the 27th Regiment on the left front around a hill mass northwest of Inje, the 36 Regiment in the center around a hill mass north of Inje, and the 5th Regiment on the right front in Wont’ong-ri to organize defense positions. He also deployed the 3rd Regiment at Hanyang-dong south of the Soyang River as division reserve and had the 35th Regiment which had withdrawn to south of Inje reorganize.

While the division was busy organizing its defense position, the enemy reinforced its forces along the axis of Sohwa-ri–Wont’ong and, around noon, focused its attacks on the 36th and 5th Regiments. Both regiments fought doggedly, but when the enemy made a breakthrough on both flanks of the 5th Regiment and advanced to the rear, the regiment wary of encirclement began to withdraw and the situation worsened. With the fall of Inje to the enemy, in the early morning of the 24th, the division redeployed the 27th Regiment on the left front to the north of Kaeun-ri, the 36th Regiment in the center to Nambuk-ri, and the 3rd Regiment on the right front to Kumbal-ri east of Soyang River as reserve. The 35th and 5th Regiments pulled back to the south of Inje, and collected those troops who had withdrawn in scattering for prompt reorganization.

As the North Koreans shifted to the defense, ceasing its offensive after
taking Inje, on the 25th the US X Corps commander ordered the recapture of Inje, a critical tactical point. The 5th division secured Inje again around noon by an infantry-tank coordinated operation beginning at 06:00, employing the 2nd Battalion, the 36th Regiment, and five tanks attached from the US 7th Division. However, the battalion upon enemy counterattack by one battalion-size troop with mortar and artillery support abandoned Inje at 20:00 and returned to the main line of resistance south of the Soyang River. After the fall of Inje into enemy hands, there was a lull in the fighting but the exchange of artillery fire continued.

**Battle along Soyang River (April. 22~26, 1951)**

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The image contains a map illustrating the battle along the Soyang River, showing various locations and movements during the specified period. The map details the geographical layout and the strategic movements involved in the battle.
(2) Battle for Hansok-san

The 3rd Division, ROK III Corps, advanced along the rugged ridge of Taebaek Mountains to the line of Hansok-san–Kari-bong, which could control the road of Inje–Kansong and Wont’ong–Yangyang, and deployed the 22nd Regiment in Hangye-ri on the left front, the 23rd Regiment at Kari-bong on the right front, and the 18th Regiment in Toksan-ri as division reserve. The division was busy defending the main line of resistance and conducting reconnaissance activities. The ROK 7th Division as corps reserve had been engaged in anti-guerrilla operations in the rear, but on the afternoon of April 22 was ordered, in accordance with the Eighth US Army’s offensive plan, toward line Alabama to take over the Wont’ong area from the ROK 5th Division as the left front division of the corps.

That evening, while the 35th Regiment of the 5th Division on the left was engaged in fierce battle, in front of the corps, the outpost element of the 22nd Regiment was also fighting doggedly north Hangye-ri against the enemy of one battalion-size, and withdrew to the main line of resistance. At 08:00 on the 23rd, according to the plan of front readjustment, the 3rd and 5th Regiments, 7th Division, were attached to the 5th Division, and the 8th Regiment, attached to the 3rd Division. The sector boundary restored to its initial situation prior to committing the ROK 7th Division in this area.

Resuming its attack on the morning of that day, the NKPA 6th Division concentrated its efforts on the boundary between the ROK 5th and 22nd Regiments. The 22nd Regiment fought fiercely with air and artillery support in order to hold the main line of resistance, but the situation turned against the friendly forces when the 5th Regiment adjacent to its left was penetrated around 14:00. Having broken through the main line of resistance, an element of the NKPA 6th Division supported the adjacent NKPA 12th Division attacking
the ROK 5th Division on the left while its main forces assaulted the ROK 22nd Regiment. The regiment lost Hansok-san in this battle and retreated 10 kilometers to organize defensive positions in the Mae-bong area.

As the 22nd Regiment was withdrawing, Brig. Gen. Kim Chong Oh the division commander, ordered one battalion of the 18th Regiment to support the 22nd Regiment and the main forces of the regiment to hold off the enemy’s advance to the rear by occupying a hill mass northeast of Hansok-san in a gap between the 22nd and 23rd Regiments. The division finally recaptured Hansok-san by employing the 2nd Battalions of the 18th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of 22nd Regiments in an unpredictable struggle for the hill which began at 14:00 and lasted two hours. While the division was concentrating its efforts on the battle of Hansok-san, an element of the enemy forces tried to infiltrate along the route of Inje-Hyon-ri. The 8th Regiment, attached as division reserve, occupied a position around the Kumusok area and blocked the enemy infiltration to the rear.

The North Koreans that retreated from Hansok-san resumed its attack on the hill with one regiment-size around noon on the 25th. The 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Regiment, fought hand to hand, but had to retreat to Mae-bong (Hill 1064), for fear of an enemy siege at night. Elated on occupying Hansok-san, the enemy tried to take Mae-bong at an early hour on the 26th, but was repulsed by concentrated all available fire of the 22nd Regiment. The North Koreans assumed that the 22nd regiment was exhausted from continuing engagements and demoralized because of its limited supplies of ammunition and food, and resumed its assault around 10:00. After hand-to-hand combat during which it was difficult to tell who was friend or foe, the regiment repulsed the enemy from the Mae-bong area. Encouraged by beating back enemy attacks twice, the 22nd Regiment reorganized the attack echelon and retook Hansok-san at 14:00 on April 26.
For four days both sides struggle for Hansok-san, which controls the lowland around the Inje-Wont'ong route, determined not to yield a single inch. The final victor turned out to be the ROK division. The enemy’s activity on the division’s front declined considerably marked by this turning point, and the division built its defense position along the line of Kumusok-Hansok-san-Kari-bong for future operations.

The ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions were taken by surprise by the NKPA V Corps, the secondary attack force for April offensive, when they had slighted their defense due to their relief-in-place and preparations for their offensive toward line Alabama. Thus, Inje had been recaptured by the enemy. The ROK divisions continued to fight with determination and faced the enemy, with their backs to the Soyang River. The advance of the NKPA forces was thus blocked at the Alabama line.

5. The Defense of Seoul

Well prepared and confident of its success in offensive operations, the CCF started its offensive on April 22. By the 26th, five days after it started its offensive, its supporting forces were blocked along the line of Kap’yong-Ch’unch’on on the central front and along the Soyang River on the central eastern front. There was a temporarily lull on these fronts. The CCF III Army Group and NKPA V Corps, the main forces, on the western front, however, did not halt their pursuit in spite of heavy casualties inflicted by strong resistance of the ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade and air strikes and artillery fire along the Imjin River. As the Chinese boldly shifted to daylight offensive operations on April 26 in expectation of the imminent capture of Seoul, both sides met in a decisive battle on the outskirts of Seoul, a battle which was to be a turning point for this offensive.
(1) Operation Policy of the Commander of the Eighth Army

The concept of operation of the Eighth Army prior to the start of the April offensive was to conduct successive withdrawals under pressure to line Delta of Songdong-ri-Nogo-san-Tokchong-P’och’on-Kap’yong, to line Golden of Susaek-Pukhan-san-Tokso, outskirts of Seoul, and to line Nevada of the Han River-Yangp’yong-Hoensong-Yangyang, inflicting maximum casualties on the Communists. He would then to recover line Kansas by changing to counteroffensive.

Once the US I Corps had occupied line Golden, the other corps were to withdraw to line Nevada, according to preplanned course of action, leaving open the possibility of the Eighth Army giving up Seoul depending upon the situation. However, the commanding general of the Eighth Army amended this concept just before the divisions of the US I Corps withdrew to line Golden, drew a new line of defense, No Name line, 30 to 40 kilometers north of Nevada linking Yongmun-san-Hongch’on-Hangye-ryong-Sokch’o with some adjustments in corps sectors, and ordered to defend lines Golden and No Name.56

Securing the No Name line held great significance from a strategic as well as a tactical point of view. Tactically, it was designed to support the US I Corps in defending line Golden from the right flank; even if the corps was under pressure to withdraw, it was intended to secure a spring board for an offensive to recapture Seoul from the east flank. Strategically, securing the line could prevent the forces on the central eastral front from giving up territory by voluntary withdrawal south of the Pukhan River in order to occupy line Nevada; in addition, it could prevent Seoul being taken a third time, an event which would have severely damaged the morale of South Koreans. In keeping with this strategy, the commanding general of the Eighth Army narrowed the I Corps’ sector by passing the US 24th Division which had been covering the
right flank of the corps, to the US IX Corps in order to have the I Corps concentrate on the defense of Seoul, and added the US 1st Cavalry Division, the army reserve, to the I Corps to strengthen it.

(2) Occupation of Line Golden by the US I Corps

Under pressure from of the CCF's human-wave tactics, the US I Corps occupied line Delta of Songdong-ri-Tokchong-P'och'on on April 25. However, plans did not call for strong resistance or continuous occupation of this line as, unlike line Kansas, the Delta line was not a permanent position with defense facilities. It was a phase line designed to coordinate and control the successive withdrawal of the corps to line Golden on the outskirts of Seoul, and to secure the maximum time necessary for defense preparations by inflicting enemy casualties and delaying their advance.

The commanding general of the I Corps drew two additional control lines between lines Delta and Golden to keep the artillery units within effective range in order to provide the withdrawing infantry with continuous and strong fire support. To maximize the damage to the pursuing Chinese, withdrawal was to be conducted in daylight to facilitate air and artillery fire.55

In spite of heavy losses in manpower and material in massive artillery barrages beyond their imagination, the CCF tried to break through line Delta. An element of the CCF advanced along the Seoul-Ch'unch'on railroad, stepping up the intense pressure toward Seoul. Having failed to defend line Delta, the intermediate position, the US I Corps decided to pull back to line Golden, the final protective line for Seoul. The divisions of the corps started to withdraw, utilizing maximum artillery fire and air support to fend off enemy pursuit, and maintaining lateral contact with adjoining units to minimize friendly losses.
The Communists ceased their nightly attacks, which they had staged every night since they started the April offensive, and the commander of the I Corps took this as a sign that a massive enemy attack was in preparation. Early on April 28, the general ordered his divisions to occupy line Golden and immediately to prepare for decisive defensive battle.\(^{30}\)

The ROK 1st Division on the left front moved in along the mouth of the Han River to Kup'abal, the US 1st Cavalry Division in the center along Kup'abal-Sangmum-dong line, and the US 25th Division on the right along Sangmum-dong-Tokso part of line Golden. The US 3rd Division, which was engaged in a fierce battle against the CCF III Army Group along the axis of Yonch'on-Chongok-Tongduch'on-Uijongbu, was converted to corp reserve and

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deployed by regiments in the rear of the front-line divisions. Thus, the corps created a well coordinated and fortified defense line along Pukhan-san, and with its defense area shortened, was able to concentrate its artillery along with securing a sufficient reserve. Poised on line Golden with the river at its back, the US I Corps was in a stronger defensive position than it had ever been on any other line since the start of the Chinese spring offensive.

(3) The Battle at Hwajon-ri

The ROK 1st Division beat a heavy blow to the 8th Division of the NKPA I Corps in a fierce delaying action in the area of Kumch’on and Tonggo-ri, but had to retreat to the outskirts of Seoul in order to maintain the integrity of the frontline. Following the order of the corps, the 11th Regiment occupied a defense position in the Hwajon-ri area, and the 15th Regiment in the Pulgwang-dong area on line Golden on the April 29. The position the division occupied was complete with covered defense facilities and connecting trenches, which had been dug by civilian residents mobilized under supervision of member of division G-3 according to the plan of the Eighth Army in early April.\(^\text{57}\)

Advancing along the axis of Munsan-Seoul, the NKPA 8th Division reorganized in the Ilsan area, and early on the 28th sent one regiment-size element stealthily to the ferry site of Haengju, in an attempt to cross the river toward Kimp’o Airfield. The enemy was detected by the reconnaissance team of the division, however, and was driven back to the north, leaving behind a large number of dead after two hours of heavy bombardment from the 8-inch guns of the cruiser Toledo, stationed just off Inch’on.\(^\text{58}\)

In spite of the heavy losses inflicted by UNC naval gunfire, the enemy continued its attempt to capture Seoul, committing a small element to assault
the outpost battalion at noon. Reading the enemy’s intention, the 1st ROK division pulled back the battalion to entice the enemy. By midnight one reinforced regimental sized force launched an attack on the 11th Regiment on the left front along the Seoul-Sinuiju road and railroad, maintaining its troops in column in its attempt to advance to Seoul. Soon flare mines exploded, alarming the approach of the enemy vanguard to the barbed wire entanglement, and instantly the whole regiment, tanks and all the artillery of the corps, opened firing.

The NKPA echelon in four columns hurrying toward Seoul took flight, and a part of them hid in the valley between the railroads tracks near Hwajon Station in front of the entanglements. This area was a mine field set by the division engineers and a killing zone for a barrage planned by a frontline company. The NKPA suffered incredible casualties. Following this battle, the North Korean doggedly launched assaults ten times in four hours. Each time they were driven back in hand-to-hand fight with hand grenades and bayonets
fixed to rifles. The NKPA finally began to retreat at first light under cover of thick fog. The frontline battalions of the ROK 11th Regiment dispatched reconnaissance parties for patrol in front of positions and they counted about 900 enemy killed.\(^9\)

While the 11th Regiment was engaged in a bloody battle against the NKPA 8th Division, a part of the CCF 64th Army commenced demonstration on the sector of the 15th Regiment on the right front in support of the attacking NKPA 8th Division. The regiment resisted persistently; however, it lost Aeng-bong, which could dominate a part of the main line of resistance and the division defense sector, under pressure of Chinese wave attacks and repeated misdirected friendly artillery fire. In order to recapture the lost position, on the 30th the division commander committed the 1st Battalion of the 12th Regiment, the division reserve, and one US tank company. The infantry-tank coordinated operation drove the enemy away. This operation confirmed the retreat of the main enemy forces to the line of Kumch'on and Aengmu-bong, leaving behind a detachment left in contact.

At this time, the US 1st Cavalry Division in the center repulsed 39 infiltration attacks committed by small size Chinese troops less than a company through Pukhan and Tobong mountains which had not enough road network. The US 25th Division on the right also secured its defense position by artillery and air bombardment against the CCF 65th Army, which had tried a breakthrough on the main line of resistance in the Toegyewon area, inflicting around 1,000 enemy casualties.\(^10\)

The CCF III Army Group tried the offensive on line Golden as a last resort, but had to retreat in a disastrous defeat, which ended the Chinese April offensive.

The Chinese April offensive, the aim of which was double envelopment along the axes of Kaesong-Seoul, Yonch'on-Seoul, and P'och'on-Seoul
with Seoul as the objective, was overwhelmingly threatening at the initial stage. But as the main CCF attack on the ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade for a breakthrough along the Imjin River had been delayed, and their secondary attack had been intercepted in the Kap’yong and Inje areas, they failed to cut off the withdrawal route of the UN main forces. Furthermore, due to the UN forces’ well-organized delaying operation employing air and artillery fire, the enemy suffered from 75,000 to 80,000 killed and 50,000 wounded north of Seoul alone, not to mention their failure to destroy the UN forces as initially planned. The enemy also was unable to sustain logistic support for more than one week. As a consequence, the UN forces lost 60 kilometers of ground in the central western area and 35 kilometers in the central eastern area; however, they succeeded in the defense of Seoul on line Golden north of Seoul connecting line No Name, Masoku-ri northeast Seoul-Taep’o-ri eastcoast. This action closed the chapter on the Chinese April offensive.

6. Operations to Secure Patrol Bases

When the ROK and the UN forces that had repulsed the Chinese April Offensive on lines Golden and No Name were busy redeploying their forces and strengthening their defense positions, the Communists still fielded 739,000 soldiers (542,000 Chinese and 197,000 NK) in spite of heavy losses in the April offensive. They also had a reserve of 750,000 in Manchuria available for reinforcement, according to the POW statements and intelligence estimates as of May 1st 1951. On the other hand, the friendly count was 503,000 soldiers (269,000 UN forces and 234,000 ROK), much inferior in numbers. In light of this unfavorable comparison, the possibility of the enemy reinforcing and resuming offensive still open even as they retreated.

At that time the ROK and UN forces conducted extensive reconnais-
sance activities five to ten kilometers north of the frontline in order to ascertain the enemy situation, but could gain no intelligence about enemy activity except the presence of the NKPA 8th Division deployed in front of the ROK 1st Division. The commanding general of the Eighth Army ordered each division to establish a regimental-sized patrol base ten kilometers north of its main line of resistance, extending from the estuary of the Han River to Hoenggye, in order to take the initiative in operations and to detect the enemy’s intention.

Accordingly, the frontline divisions of each corps conducted reconnaissance operations deep into the enemy area under the cover of fire by establishing patrol bases in front of the main line of resistance in order to increase their depth of defense and also to detect the enemy situation. The Communists turned out to be passive, avoiding contacts with the UNC forces on all fronts; however, the NKPA 8th Division facing the ROK 1st Division committed its forces along the Munsan-Seoul axis to deter the establishment of the patrol bases. Thus, the ROK 1st Division was engaged once against the NK 8th Division.

In order to secure the 1st Division’s patrol base and defeat the NKPA 8th Division on this opportunity, the commanding general of the US I Corps instructed the ROK 1st Division to hand over its operation sector along the main line of resistance of Tokun-ri-Yongdu-ri-Pulkwang-dong northwest of Seoul to the US 3rd Division, corps reserve, and to conduct an attack. The division deployed the 11th Regiment in the Nunggok area and the 15th Regiment in the Kukas-bong (Hill 109) area for attack and began attack at 06:00 under the cover of the US 3rd Division. The 15th Regiment advanced to the Wondang-ri area with little contact with the enemy, but the 11th Regiment was discouraged temporarily by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, which was well positioned at a strong point around Kobong-san (Hill 209) north of Ilsan that could dominate the low land in the vicinity. The regiment finally dis-
Battle near Pongilch'on
lodged the enemy from Kobong-san after five hours of bloody battle, assisted by strong air strikes and infantry-tank coordinated operations in the afternoon. As the division secured its final objectives of Myongbong-san (Hill 248) and Hill 188 east of Pongil-ch'on and was to close its operation, the US 1 Corps commander ordered it to continue its attack not only to exploit its gain but also to secure advantageous terrain by repulsing the enemy farther north.

In order to secure a hill mass not only as a spring board for the next attack but also to control the open area around Munsan-ch'on, on the 9th the ROK 1st division assigned the 11th Regiment on the left to block the enemy route of withdrawal detouring along Naehwa-san and Tonggori and the 15th Regiment on the right to attack along a series of hills at Tonggori. The 11th Regiment secured the final objectives of Naehwa-san and Tonggori and cut off the enemy’s retreat route without substantial contact with the enemy. However, the 15th Regiment was blocked on its advance around Hill 163 and Pakdal-san by stubborn resistance of the NK forces and Chinese reinforcement in spite of friendly superior artillery and tank fire support. The US 1 Corps commanding general ordered the division to cease its offensive operation, to secure patrol bases with one regiment, and to pull its main forces back to the main line of resistance in order to maintain the alignment between the ROK 1st and the adjacent US 1st Cavalry Divisions.

In the afternoon on the 10th of May, upon taking responsibility for the main line of resistance from the US 3rd Division, again the ROK 1st division deployed its 15th Regiment at patrol bases in the area of Myongbong-san-Taeja-dong-Kwansan-ri along the route of Munsan-Seoul and committed its main forces to defense positions on line Golden. Then the Division concentrated its effort to reconnaissance in force, intensifying defensive line.
7. Operations to Secure Main Supply Routes

When the defense positions on lines Golden-No Name of the central western front had been strengthened, and the occupation of patrol bases completed, the Eighth Army commanding general decided to recapture the Hongch'on-Inje-Kansong road, a critical tactical road in the central eastern front that had been handed over to enemy with the friendly withdrawal to line No Name as a part of the readjustment of the frontline. Having been deployed in mountainous terrain in the east, the ROK I and III Corps had great difficulty in operation, depending upon the rugged valley route of Soksari-Hyon-ri-Inje for their unit movement and logistic support. In order to solve the problems of logistic support, especially for the III Corps, and to secure favorable route of maneuver for the transition to offensive which was to start from east of Hwach'on Reservoir, the Eighth US Army commanding general assigned the following divisions to secure line Missouri of Kari-san-Shinwol-ri-Hill 915-Hill 1037-Taejin-ri, 10 to 25 kilometers north of the route linking Hongch'on-Inje-Kansong: the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to the US X Corps; the ROK 3rd and 9th Divisions to the ROK III Corps; and the ROK Capital and 11th Divisions attached to the ROK I Corps.\(^5\)

Accordingly, six ROK divisions (3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th and Capital) began their attack with the line Missouri as their objective on May 7. The 5th and 7th Divisions, which attacked from left of Hansok-san toward the P'young-ri and Ch'onggu-ri area south of the Soyang River, advanced to their objective without difficulty with only slight contact with the enemy. But the 9th Division, attacking Hansok-san, and the Capital Division, attacking Sorak-Mountain, engaged in a fierce battle with the NKPA forces.
(1) The Battle of Mae-bong and Hansok-san

During the Chinese April offensive, the ROK 9th Division reorganized as the I Corps' reserve in Kangnung, then joined to the ROK III Corps on April 25, and Brig. Gen. Ch'oi Suk assumed the command of the division, replacing Brig. Gen. Lee Song Ka on the 27th. On May 2, the division took over the area from the 8th Regiment of the 7th Division and defended the mountainous area, which extended seven kilometers north of Hyon-ri as the left front division of the III Corps. The 9th Division was to attack line Missouri north of Inje on the 7th.

The division's objectives, Hansok-san (Hill 1119) and Mae-bong (Hill 1066) to the south, which were critical commanding heights, dominating over Hyon-ri, Inje, and Wont'ong, and which were to serve as spring boards for future offensives, were lost by the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd Division into enemy hands on April 25. Well aware of the tactical importance of these heights, the NKPA 6th Division was building a strong point defense position on the hills with forces of two regimental size with their back on the Soyang River.

At 07:00 on May 7, the 3rd Battalion, the 30th Regiment, attacked Hill 910, a foothold for the attack at Mae-bong, moving under cover of dense fog for stealth and surprise along the steep and narrow trail on the ridgeline. As the fog dissipated around 10:00, the enemy's resistance grew stronger as the battalion was confined in a narrow maneuver space with increasing casualties. The attack ceased for the time being, but the battalion quickly reorganized, resumed its assault, concentrating 3.5-inch rocket fire on the enemy and occupied Hill 910 around 13:00. To maintain the momentum of its attack, the 9th Company of the battalion assaulted Mae-bong, but had to withdraw in disarray in the face of an unexpected shower of enemy handgrenades. Following this attack, visibility was limited in the area of operations by smoke cause
from gun fire and forest fires. In this situation, those civilian laborers recruited for the ammo supply platoon of the battalion struggled to the top of Hill 910 carrying ammunition. They accomplished their mission without uttering a single word of complaint, setting an example for those in uniform to emulate.

On the 8th, the 3rd Battalion resumed attack to seize Mae-bong, but the attack was in vain against strong resistance of the enemy having occupying advantageous positions in advance, and casualties increased on friendly side. As the 3rd Battalion was reorganizing, enemy forces of battalion-size tried counterattacks from Hill 850 left of Hill 910 twice in the morning and afternoon, creating a crisis situation for the battalion, but it repulsed the enemy by concentrating all the fire power available.

From reconnaissance patrol and interrogation of POWs Lt. Col. Kim Jin Dong, 3rd Battalion commander confirmed that the enemy was heavily deployed in the Mae-bong area, and thus, concluded that it was impossible to seize the objective with a frontal attack. In the early hours of the 9th, the 10th Company, in a detour toward Hill 856 right of Mae-bong, assaulted the enemy’s flank. As the 10th Company advanced toward the flank, the enemy’s resistance in the front area subsided markedly. The battalion enveloped Mae-bong with close air support, dislodged the stubborn enemy, and finally occupied Mae-bong three days after it had begun the attack. Disclosed later was cruelty committed by the enemy in building positions without connecting trenches and in tying the crew’s ankles to weapons to discourage escape from battle so that the enemy could hold fast to Mae-bong, a critical strong point for defense. Taking the initiative in operation, the 30th regiment, by committing the 1st Battalion, regimental reserve, occupied Hansok-san on the evening of the 10th and secured control over Inje across the Soyang River.

The 3rd Battalion, 30th Regiment, suffered about 390 casualties in this battle, inflicting heavier losses on the enemy with 895 killed and capturing a
great deal of ammunition and equipment. All the members of the battalion were promoted.62

(2) The Battle in the Sorak Mountain Area

Resuming its counteroffensive along the east coast, the ROK 1 Corps advanced to a line of Hangye-ryong-Osaek-ri-Kwanmo-bong and established a main line of resistance on April 15, deploying the Capital Division on the left front and the 11th on the right. The corps also encountered the Chinese April offensive, but compared to other areas, its contact with the enemy was slight. Thus the corps could easily convert to offensive operation. As the corps’ main effort, the Capital Division moved to the Yaksu-ri area in order to occupy Sorak Mountain, which was considered an enemy assembly area for supply and troops, and then to advance Kari-bong and Yongdae-ri. At the same time, the NKPA 6th Division was building an extensive strong-point defensive position along the line of Kari-bong-Taesung-ryong-No-dong, fully utilizing cliffs, gorges, and dense forest.

Delayed due to rugged terrain and dense fog typical of the high mountains, the division was to begin its attack on the 8th, with the 1st Regiment toward Kari-bong (Hill 1519) and the 1st Cavalry Regiment toward No-dong near Paekdam-sa (temple). If the 1st Regiment took Kari-bong, so the regiment could control not only the route linking Yongdae-ri-Yangyang, Inje-Karisan-ri-Hyon-ri, but also could support the advance of the ROK 3rd Division attacking abreast on the left and the 1st cavalry Regiment on the right. The 1st Regiment faltered for a while by persistent enemy machine-gun fire, but it finally occupied Kari-bong with close combat and bloody hand-to-hand fighting under artillery fire support. The 1st Cavalry Regiment with the support of artillery also secured Hill 972, which could control No-dong.
The 1st Regiment of the NKPA 6th Division, which retreated from Kari-bong, reorganized with stragglers and reinforcements and built a strong defense position along the line of Taesung-p’okp’o (water-fall)—Paekdamsa—No dong in order to secure the road linking Yongdae-ri—Kansong, its main route of supply.\textsuperscript{98}

The division pursued the enemy to exploit its gains in battle, but it made little progress by enemy stubborn resistance with machine-guns well positioned at critical locations. The sound of enemy machine-gun fire, especially in mountainous terrain, had an adverse psychological impact on the soldiers who were exhausted from maneuvering in rugged terrain and despirited by lack of rations and ammunition, and thus hindered the division’s attack effort. When the division ceased its attack temporarily in order to reorganize the attacking echelons, enemy forces of two company-size conducted a surprise attack in an attempt to recover Kari-bong on the morning of the 10th. An intense see-saw battle developed. An unfortunate enemy blow in the process of relief-in-position of Kari-bong from the 2nd Battalion to the 1st Battalion, the reserve of the 1st Regiment, forced the regiment to withdraw under adverse conditions but the 1st battalion recaptured Kari-bong in the third counteroffensive at an early hour on the 11th. Not to allow the retreating enemy time for reorganization, the division then began coordinated attacks of infantry and artillery starting in the early hours of the 11th, with the 1st Regiment on the left securing An-san (Hill 1430) and the 1st Cavalry Regiment on the right occupying No dong. The division thus secured a spring board for the next offensive.

Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment, the 11th Division, advancing abreast on the right of the Capital Division pursued the enemy along the rugged ridges of Sorak Mountain above an altitude of 1,000 meters. It was spring, but the pursuit was slowed down by snow patches on the high rugged terrain which
made the troops difficult to find the pass and the trail slippery. As space for maneuvering and the supply of ammunition and food rations were severely limited, the pursuit operation was conducted in turn among companies. On May 11th, the 5th Company was engaged with the enemy in a bloody battle for 31 hours near Chohang-nyong. The company was short of reserve troops, ammunition and food, but advanced to Hill 989 dislodging the enemy and covering the advancing 1st Cavalry Regiment on the adjoining front to the left.⁹⁹

Prior to this development, when the ROK forces on the eastern front
was imminent to occupy line Kansas which running along the 38th Parallel in the operation for securing the Missouri Line, the Commanding General of the Eighth US Army set up a plan for an offensive to attack the line running from Munsan through Ch'unch'on, then toward Inje for a return to line Kansas with forces on the west and central front. But upon receiving an intelligence report on May 14th that the enemy was to resume offensive in a few days, the general cancelled the offensive plan for the forces in the central western front and stopped the ROK forces on the eastern front from attacking line Missouri.

Concluding the seven-day offensive operation, the ROK III and I Corps organized their defense positions along Line No Name linking Inje-Kari-bong-Sorak Mountain-Taep'o-ri in order to maintain the alignment with the central western front by 06:00 on May 13.

After stopping the Chinese April offensive along Lines Golden and No Name linking Kup'abal-Masoku-ri-Yongmun-san Hangye-ri-Sorak Mountain-Taep'o-ri at the end of April, the ROK forces conducted reconnaissance activities in the forward area up to the line of Pongil-ch'on-Uijongbu-P'och'on-Kap'yong-Ch'unch'on-Inje-Sokch'o.

II. The Chinese May Offensive

1. Situation of Both Sides

(1) Friendly Situation

While the ROK and UN forces were devoting all their efforts to blocking the Chinese Spring Offensive at the front in April and the early part of
May, Minister of Defense Shin Sung Mo was fired and replaced by Lee Ki Bung on May 7. This change was made in order to establish discipline and to concentrate on enhancing combat capabilities of the ROK armed forces in the midst of intense political conflict in Korea during the process of investigating and concluding the National Defense Army Scandal and the Koch’ang Incident. 3

By this time, the enemy at the front had spread a smoke screen over a vast area, and air observers frequently sighted massive enemy forces moving southward in the central and central eastern frontline in a fashion similar to that prior to the start of the April offensive. These observations supported the intelligence reports from the front of an impending Chinese offensive.

Since the ROK and UN forces had experienced concentrated Chinese attack for a breakthrough on main line of resistance at the initial stage of the April offensive, they focused their efforts on consolidating defense positions, including outposts, main and blocking positions, in addition to intensifying long-distance reconnaissance activities.

Upon receiving intelligence reports that the enemy was amassing its forces west of the Pukhan River, the US IX Corps, in particular, conducted more than five times the amount of routine harassing fire on suspected enemy assembly areas for seven days in order to interrupt enemy preparation for the offensive and to impose maximum damage to the enemy. 4

Defending the outskirts of Seoul, the US I Corps deployed the ROK 1st Division along the Munsan axis, the US 1st Cavalry and 25th Divisions with the Turkish brigade attached along the Uijongbu axis, and placed the British 29th Brigade as corps reserve. The US IX Corps, in defense of the corridor of the Pukhan River valley, deployed the following units along the line of Tokso-Yebong-san-Yongmun-san-Kumhak-san: the British 28th Brigade, US 24th Division, ROK 2nd and 6th Divisions, and US 7th Division from left to
right. The US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was assembled in the Okch'on area along the Namhan River as corps reserve.

The US X Corps assigned the US 1st Marine and US 2nd Divisions to defend the probable enemy avenue of approach, the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis, and the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to defend south of the Soyang River. On the eastern front, the ROK III Corps secured the main line of resistance along the mountain ridgeline linking Kari-bong and Hansok-san south of Inje by deploying its 9th and 3rd Divisions. The ROK I Corps occupied line No Name connecting Sorak Mountain and Taep'o-ri by deploying the Capital and 11th Divisions, and concentrated its efforts on consolidating their positions.

Considering enemy deployment, the Eighth Army commander, General Ridgway concluded that the next enemy offensive would be conducted along the main avenues of approach of Uijonbu-Seoul, the Pukhan River corridor, or the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axes in the western and central areas as had been the case in the April offensive; thus, he moved most of units including the US divisions with strong combat capabilities to these areas for reinforcement. By concentrating the main forces in the western and central areas, the defense capabilities of the ROK forces in charge of the eastern sector thinned down comparatively. The Eighth Army Commander estimated that the six ROK Divisions (the 5th, 7th, 9th, 3rd, Capital, and 11th) could hold fast the main line of resistance by utilizing the rugged terrain in organizing defense positions as the combat capability of the NKPA forces deployed in this area east of Hongch'on was insignificant.

The Eighth Army G-2 also concluded that it would be impossible for the enemy to commit forces on a large scale in the mountainous eastern sector which had little in the way of road network since the Chinese had suffered difficulties with logistics even under favorable road conditions elsewhere. However, as of the 13th massive Chinese forces were moving from the western and cen-
tral areas to the east, according to intelligence agents, refugees, and POW's. To make the situation worse, continuing rain and frequent fog on the 14th and 15th not only made air observation impossible, but also ground detection difficult. There was no means available to confirm the fact that the enemy was moving east toward the Pukhan River.

(2) Enemy Situation

As the central and eastern frontline of the ROK forces had created a salient in the UN forces front, the CCF headquarters, around the end of April, decided to commence the May offensive in order to redeem itself after their disastrous defeat in the April offensive by destroying ROK forces and to take the initiative by isolating the US forces.

Under the basic concept of double-enveloping and destroying four ROK division (3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th) deployed around Hyon-ri, the CCF IX Army Group on the left wing at Yanggu-Inje, as the main attack force, would detour along the axis of Sangnam-ri-Soksa-ri, Hangye-Pungam-ri, and the NK II and V Corps on the right wing at Inje-Hangye-ryong would move toward east of the Hyon-ri-Soksa-ri area in order to make multi-double envelopment. To support this operation, the enemy planned to employ the CCF III Army Group and NKPA I Corps deployed on the western front to feint a main attack; the NKPA III Corps, army reserve, to follow the NKPA II Corps to prevent the ROK I Corps deployed on the east coast from moving into the Hyun-ri area as reinforcement. In addition, the CCF III Army Group east of Ch'unch'on, as a part of the main attack, was employed to fix the US X Corps to prevent it from reinforcing toward the Hyon-ri area.  

Accordingly, with their main effort on a double envelopment, their favorite tactic, the enemy feinted their main attack by employing the NK I
Corps west of Seoul and the CCF III Army Group east of Seoul to pretend to prepare to cross the river and the CCF 39th Army, the reserve, to prepare to attack along the Ch’unch’ŏn–Hongch’ŏn axis.

Having distracted UNC forces attention to these areas, the CCF III and IX Army Groups, to be committed as the main effort for the May offensive, completed maintenance for ten days, started to move eastward on May 9 under the cover of the 39th Army, and, on the 15th, stealthily reached the area of the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers, extending from Ch’unch’ŏn to Namjon-ri. The NK I, III, and V Corps also moved to Inje and to the east of it, deployed and completed preparations for attack.

Around May 9, the CCF III and IX Army Groups commanders along with the NKPA Front Headquarters held a conference for combined operations to set up a detailed plan for the offensive.

2. Chinese Breakthrough in the Hyon-ri Area

Through five offensive operations since the Chinese entered the war, the Communist had learned that superiority in manpower alone with inferior fire power could not achieve victory. This time, they chose the rugged mountainous central eastern sector for their offensive in the hope that the rugged terrain and poor network of roads would diminish the effects of the superior mobility, artillery fire, and support of the UN forces. Meanwhile, the Eighth US Army was anticipating that the enemy’s main attack would be directed toward the central and western sectors along the Pukhan River, and that the secondary attack would be made along the axes of Munsan-Seoul, Uijongbu-Seoul, and Ch’unch’ŏn–Hongch’ŏn.

Contrary to the expectation of the UN forces, the CCF opened the May offensive with preparatory fire on May 16. The 81st Division of the CCF
27th Army, the vanguard, crossed the Soyabg River near Kanmu-bong in spite of fierce defensive fire by the ROK forces, and attacked the sector boundary between the ROK 5th and 7th Division, while the NKPA Y Corps in Inje-Wont'ong attacked by surprise at Kari-bong around the boundary between the ROK ill and I Corps. The ROK 3rd, 7th, and 9th Divisions encountered the enemy’s main attack of the May offensive in a bloody battle south of the Soyang River, without having consolidated their positions upon transfer from offensive toward line Missouri to defensive.

(1) The Battle in Oron-ri

The ROK 5th Division, attached to the US X Corps, secured the route of Hongch'on-Inje in its attack line Missouri and advanced to a hill mass north of Oron-ri, and then reverted to defense on May 7. At that time, the 35th and 27th Regiments deployed on the main line of resistance linking Mac-bong (Hill 800) and Sangsunae-ri, and the main forces of the 36th Regiment (with its 3rd Battalion attached to the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division on its left), the division reserve, occupied Hill 1076 on line No Name. On the left of the division Task Force Zebra of the US 2nd Division was positioned and on the right was the 8th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division.

On the morning of May 16, Communist artillery opended fire. This type of artillery fire was quite unusual and appeared to be fire for registration. Utilizing this barrage as an opportunity, a small element of enemy forces assaulted the outpost position of the 35th Regiment on the left. In response, a company of the ROK 27th Regiment on the right attacked around noon at Hill 662, south of the Soyang River, which controlled the defense sector of the division. Around 20:00 the battle initiated by the CCF surprise attack in the sector of the 35th Regiment extended to the whole division front instantaneously. The
division tried to hold the main line of resistance and engaged in close combat against the Chinese, but as time passed, the situation deteriorated.

To make matters worse, around 20:00 enemy forces of one division crossed the Soyang River close to the boundary with the 7th Division on the right, made a frontal breakthrough on the 8th Regiment on the right, and then its forces of one regiment-size attacked the 27th Regiment on its right flank. As the frontline regiments had been attacked on the front and on both flanks as well, the 27th Regiment wary of encirclement started to withdraw around 22:00, and then the 35th Regiment after midnight, to Koesok-ri. The 27th Regiment was supposed to occupy the blocking position on Soppul-san (Hill 1122) on the right under the cover of the 36th Regiment deployed on line No Name; however, with its route for withdrawal already interdicted by the Chinese forces, which had advanced to Oron-ri ahead of the regiment, it had to head for Kwangam-ri.

The division reorganized its units under the cover of the 36th Regiment during daylight on the 17th, deployed and organized a defense position in the evening with the 36th Regiment in Changam-ri south of line No Name, the 27th Regiment in Kwangam-ri and the 35th Regiment in Waya-ri, in order to block the enemy from exploiting the breach and to cover the right flank of the US 2nd Division. In its pursuit of the division, after midnight the enemy made a concentrated attack on the 27th Regiment in Kwangam-ri and the 35th Regiment in Waya-ri area. Early on the 18th, enemy forces of one battalion-size made a surprise attack on the tactical command posts of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 35th Regiment, paralyzing command channels for a while, but their command functions were restored thanks to the dedicated endeavors of the administration and signal personnel.70

Both regiments fought battle with every efforts in order to hold on to their position, but were overwhelmed by Chinese attack, being demoralized by
Battle in Oron-ri (May 16–19, 1951)
failures at an initial stage of the encounter. By then the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 35th Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 36th Regiment were again isolated among enemy forces. In spite of the adverse situation, they managed to retreat to south of the Naech' on River by conducting company-size surprise attacks without losing fighting spirit for breaking out Chinese encirclement. As the frontline regiments completed withdrawal, the division deployed the 27th Regiment in Oesamp'o-ri, the 35th Regiment in Changp'yong-ri, and the 36th Regiment in Oron-ri to get prepared for an enemy night attack.

On May 18, the Eighth Army instructed the US X and ROK III Corps to occupy line Waco, a new defense line, linking Hill 778-Hangye-Changp'yong-ri-Hill 1009 to block the enemy advance as the two corps continued to withdraw. According to the redeployment plan of the US X Corps, the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division was deployed in front of the ROK 27th Regiment, and the US 9th Regiment in the rear of the main forces of the ROK 5th Division. By that time, while the ROK 5th Division still continued delaying actions in its blocking positions in spite of a massive Chinese night attack which lasted for two days, the Chinese, having been reinforced, resumed attack in wave from the night of the 18th until the following morning in order to completely destroy the division in the Changp'yong-ri area. Though officers and men of the 5th ROK Division were exhausted from successive withdrawals, they finally succeeded in blocking the Chinese attack, for the first time since the start of the May offensive in an ebb and flow of attack and defense under the fire support of the US 9th Regiment, as if demonstrating the excellence of ROK forces to the American soldiers covering rear area.

After this battle the division transferred its area of operation to the US 9th Regiment, pulled back to Haanhung-ri, and reorganized to be ready for the next operation.
(2) The Battle in Umyang-ri

The ROK 7th Division, the right front of the US X Corps, attacked line Missouri with the 8th and 5th Regiments abreast at the front and the 3rd Regiment as reserve, and advanced to the line linking Sangsunae-ri-Kuman-ri-Namjon-ri south of the Soyang River on May 11. Then the division converted to defense and concentrated on consolidating its position on the main line of resistance, setting up entanglements, laying mines, and planning barrages on the suspected enemy river crossing sites.

On the day of the 16th, the visibility was severely limited in the division front with sleet, drizzle, and dense fog along the Soyang River area. As the division reconnaissance party withdrew south of the Soyang River, enemy scouts began to show up along the Soyang, and around 16:00 the enemy commenced unprecedented massive preparation fire. The enemy shelled the routes of maneuver linking Shinp’ung-ri-Umyang-ri and Umyang-ri-Sochi-ri, and in the Shinp’ung-ri area, where the command post of the 8th Regiment and the 16th Artillery Battalion were located, as if the enemy had read the locations of units in advance. In this bombardment, communication lines between neighboring units as well as between higher and lower echelons were destroyed, paralyzing the command system for a while, and the 16th Artillery Battalion withdrew to Oron-ri, unable to provide fire support.132

Having wiped out a variety of obstacles set up along the Soyang River with his bombardment, the Chinese began to cross the river and attack around 19:30. The Soyang, once believed to be a natural barrier, was low in the dry season, so in spite of its width of 100 to 200 meters, the depth shrank to an average of one meter, which allowed crossing at most places. The frontline regiments repulsed the first wave of enemy attack by concentrating mortar and artillery fire on the river bank. The river instantly turned red. Moments later a
second wave led by cavalry on horseback tried to penetrate the main line of resistance. Although the troops on the main line of resistance did their utmost to hold fast to the position, they were overwhelmed by the waves of enemy surging over the dead bodies of their comrades. To make the situation even bleaker, communication lines to the higher headquarters were cut off, so there was no support at hand.

Under concentrated enemy assault, the 5th Regiment on the right front did its best in hand-to-hand combat outnumbered by the enemy, but was faced with a crisis situation with ammunition exhausted and the wounded on the rise. Then while the main forces of the enemy were trying a frontal breakthrough, a segment of the enemy forces infiltrated the rear through the flank, assaulted the regiment command post by surprise, and cut off the route of retreat, isolating the regiment among the enemy. At this point, with the command and control of the regiment paralyzed, the 2nd Battalion in disarray escaped the enemy’s encirclement, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions withdrew into the 9th Division area on the right.

The 8th Regiment on the left front had built a consolidated position covered with oak trees along the entire main line of resistance. But when the neighboring unit on the right was breached, the 8th Regiment could not hold the main line of resistance. The 5th Company, deployed near the boundary with the 5th Division, especially suffered heavy losses in fierce hand-to-hand fight against enemy forces of two battalion-size, spearheaded by six tanks. The regiment withdrew to the Shin’ung-ri area and tried in vain to establish a blocking line, while a part of the CCF that had broken through the adjacent units on the left and right advanced to the rear area ahead of the regiment.

Later the regiment was surrounded completely with the Chinese force in pursuit in the Kapdun-ri. The regiment then engaged in a fierce battle with the follow up enemy forces that were pursuing stragglers. In this turmoil, the
1st Battalion withdrawing to Hill 888, suffered heavy casualties from the Chinese encirclement and the misdirected barrages aimed at the CCF by the 36th Regiment of the 5th Division that pulled out earlier to the rear, and thereafter completed withdrawal to the area of the 36th Regiment. The 7th Division did

**Battle in Umyang-ri (May 16~18, 1951)**
not fully comprehend this situation of the 8th Regiment until the next day.

With communication network cut off and thus unable to ascertain the combat situation of the frontline regiments, Brig. Gen. Kim Hyung Il, 7th Division commander, at 03:00 on the 17th deployed the 3rd Regiment, division reserve, which was assembling at Chongja-ri, along line No Name linking Kama-bong-Taem-san, in order to cover the withdrawal of the frontline regiments. Having maneuvered to line No Name, but unable to deploy forces in darkness, the 3rd Regiment organized a strong point defense at Hill 930 and Hill 1030 in the its 10 kilometer wide defense sector, creating substantial gaps on the division’s second defense line.

The CCF penetrated these gaps and encircled the regiment. In addition, an element of one company-size enemy infiltrated up to the rear of the division, occupied Omach’i, and set up obstacles on the road, blocking the route from Hongch’on and Soksa-ri through this area to Hyon-ri and Inje. Thus, the route of withdrawal for the ROK III Corps operating in the Hyon-ri area was cut off.

The 3rd Regiment intended to withdraw to Sangnam-ri and to assault the enemy infiltrated Omach’i, but gave up, only to find itself surrounded by the CCF advanced to its rear. The ROK 7th Division was caught in a worst crisis with command and control disrupted due to the disarray of the frontline regiments and with the 3rd Regiment, the reserve, encircled by the enemy. The 3rd regiment narrowly managed to escape the siege by conducting a desperate hide-and-seek type battle with the enemy and retreated to Sangnam-ri by 15:00. Later on, the 7th Division attacked Omach’i in with the 2nd Battalion of 3rd Regiment in order to secure the withdrawl route for the III Corps, but failed and withdrew disengaging from the enemy. In the afternoon, the division organized its blocking position in the Yulchon-ri area with the 3rd Regiment and a part of the 5th Regiment reorganized at Pangnae-ri, in order to block the
CCF's advance, but in vain. It pulled back to Pungam-ri on the early morning of the 18th.

Having been deployed along the axis of the enemy's main attack of the Chinese May offensive, the ROK 7th Division fought courageously against the concentrated assault of the CCF 27th and a part of the 20th Armies for two days, though overwhelmingly outnumbered. With heavy losses, as in the raids on its regiment command post, it finally withdrew 50 kilometers was to defend Pungam-ri, the base of the enemy penetration.

(3) The Battle around Hansok-san

Elated by repulsing the NKPA forces at the battle of Mae-bong-Hansok-san, the ROK 9th Division, the left frontline division of the III Corps, advanced to the Soyang River south of Inje and deployed the 28th Regiment at the bend of the Soyang near Inje and the 30th Regiment in the Hansok-san area. The 29th Regiment was transferred from corps reserve back to division reserve, but was still under the corps control. The 2nd Battalion of 29th Regiment attached to the 30th Regiment was deployed near the confluence of the Soyang and Naerin-ch'ŏn east of Inje as a combat outpost.

On the evening of the 16th May, there was only slight contact with the enemy at the division front, against expectation and in sharp contrast to the heavy exchange of artillery fire in the 7th Division sector. Around 22:00, the 5th Regiment adjacent to the left made a request to the 28th Regiment to relay its communications because it was unable to make situation report to the division. Furthermore, some of the subordinate units of the 7th Division were withdrawing into the 9th Division area. Thus, the 9th division concluded that the enemy had made a penetration on the main line of resistance of the 7th Division and was advancing to the rear. Around 02:00 on the 17th, the CCF began
artillery fire intermittently as if announcing that the 7th Division's deterioration was spreading into 9th Division areas. The frontline regiments held fast to the main line of resistance, engaged in attacking and defending to deter enemy infiltration at Hills 596 and 958 south of the Soyang River. However, Brig. Gen. Choi Suk, the 9th Division commander, hurriedly ordered a withdrawal at 04:00, wary of encirclement as the battle turned fiercer with time, and as an element of the CCF that had broken through the 7th Division infiltrated the rear on the left of 9th Division.

Sensing something ominous approaching, the 9th Division commander instructed Colonel Lee Yong Moon, his deputy, to lead an all vehicle echelon to withdrawal to Sangnam-ri. As the echelon approached Omach'i, it was blocked by the obstacles set up by the enemy and was under concentrated fire from the hill-tops which the enemy had occupied in advance. The deputy division commander tried a breakthrough at Omach'i, employing an element of his forces, but failed due to stubborn enemy resistance. Thus, after suppressive fire by friendly artillery, Lee led his echelon back to the division in order to try again later."

The ROK 9th Division suffered only very slight damage on its main line of resistance as the enemy had not pressed on its front in order to double-envelope the Hyon-ri area at the initial stage of the enemy offensive. But in its process of withdrawal, some of the battalions were blocked and, thus, were scattered; however, the main forces withdrew and assembled in the Yongp'o area south of Hyon-ri in the morning, keeping their combat capabilities intact. As these officers and men of the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Regiment were withdrawing, they passed by Mae-bong, and were angered to see Mae-bong, which they had taken at the sacrifice of their comrades-in-arms, slip into enemy hands without engagement.

By the time the division's main forces completed assembly in the
Yongpo area on the morning of the 17th, it was crowded with a part of the 7th Division. As the enemy which advanced to the west of Yongpo delivered harassing fire, confusion arose among the troops assembled in this area. The commander of the 9th Division immediately ordered one battalion of the 29th Regiment to attack the enemy and the rest of his forces to move to Hyon-ri. The main forces marched northward to arrive at Hyon-ri in an hour.

(4) The Battle around Kari-bong

As the right front of the III Corps, the 3rd Division organized its main line of resistance linking Tokchok-ri and Kari-bong, deploying the 18th Regiment around Hill 1226, the 22nd Regiment on the right along the ridgeline west of Kari-bong, and the 23rd, as division reserve in the rear of frontline regiments, occupying strong points battalion by battalion. Adjacent on the right of the division, the 1st Regiment, the Capital Division of the I Corps was deployed along the ridgeline east of Kari-bong. Kari-bong (Hill 1519) was critical terrain in the zone of operation, not only for the defense of the present frontline, but also as a springboard for future offensive operation. Thus, two regiments of the 3rd and Capital Division were deployed for the defense of this hill, but without proper functioning of lateral communication, systematic cooperation between the two was impossible.

Having confirmed that Kari-bong was to be the objective of the next enemy attack through interrogations of POWs caught right before the start of the attack and radio monitoring, the division consolidated its defense posture and got prepared for the enemy attack.

The 5th, 7th, and 9th Division south of the Soyang River encountered the CCF in a fierce battle starting the evening of May 16, but the 3rd Division east of Inje encountered the NKPA V Corps (6th, 12th and 32nd division) at
Kari-bong one day earlier. This battle started on the 15th, one day prior to the
start of the May offensive when one battalion size enemy troops attacked the
ROK 1st Regiment on the right. The assault speedily extended to the whole di-
vision front after the midnight on the 15th.\textsuperscript{33}

The battle seemed to be coming to a close as the division repulsed the
stubborn enemy assaults a few times during daylight, but the enemy began an
all-out attack with reinforcements around midnight. The 18th Regiment on the
left held out its main line of resistance against light enemy assault, but the
22nd Regiment on the right faced massed enemy attack. Taking advantage of
its terrain and the light of the full moon, the regiment blocked enemy attacks a
few times; however, a part of its position was breached by 04:00 under drasti-
cally worsening situations as the main line of resistance of the 1st Regiment of
the Capital Division adjacent to its right was broken through in a fierce battle which continued from the afternoon of the 16th. Having breached the main line of resistance, the enemy of two company-size penetrated into Hoejon-dong where the regiment command post located the next morning, but was driven away by the 23rd Regiment in reserve, which was defending the road of Karisan-ri and Hyon-ri.

Though partly breached, the division was defending its main line of resistance by utilizing the advantageous terrain to overcoming an adverse situation. Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, the division commander was confident that the division could maintain the main line of resistance by repulsing the enemy; however, he made the decision to withdraw because he was wary of being double-enveloped by the enemy, having been informed of the situation of the 7th and 9th Division and the road block of Omach'î on its route of withdrawal. The division withdrew in order of the 18th and 22nd Regiments to Hyon-ri under the cover of the 23rd Regiment.

Thus, with the block of Omach'î on the main supply route for the III Corps, the 9th and 3rd Divisions were forced to retreat to Hyon-ri, abandoned the main line of resistance connecting Namjon-ri Hansok-san-Kari-bong. Furthermore, the corps was caught in a crisis situation, in danger of encirclement on the left by the CCF and on the right by the NKPA forces.

(5) Failure to Breakthrough at Omach'î

Having been informed about the breakthrough on the main line of resistance of the ROK 7th Division attached to the adjacent US X Corps, Maj. Gen. Yu Jai Hung, the commanding general of the III Corps, expected that the 3rd Regiment, the 7th Division reserve, could occupy a blocking position and hold the frontline at least until the morning on May 17. The general did not
comprehend the seriousness of the situation, however.\textsuperscript{50} Even with the receipt of the report on the block of Omach’i at 04:00, he still had the misjudgment that it was totally impossible at that point for the enemy which had penetrated the 7th Division around midnight to maneuver in darkness through the rugged mountainous terrain to occupy Omach’i in the rear.

When the loss of Omach’i was confirmed, the corps commander, accompanied by the senior American advisor visited Hyon-ri and received a situation report from the commander of the 3rd Division at 14:00 on the 17th. The corps commander ordered the 3rd and 9th Divisions to regain Omach’i under the leadership of the commander of the 3rd Division, and then to withdraw to Ch’angch’on along that road, expecting that two divisions and the fire power of two artillery battalions would be sufficient to breach Omach’i. Then he headed for corps headquarters. According to the Chinese War History of Anti America and Assist Korea, the enemy forces occupying Omach’i was a battalion (the 2nd Battalion, 178th Regiment, 60th Division, the 20th Army).\textsuperscript{58}

The two commanders of the 3rd and the 9th Divisions in coordination confirmed the plan to make a breakthrough at Omach’i; the 30th Regiment was to launch the attack at Omach’i at 21:00 under protection of its flanks by the 18th Regiment and withdrawal was to be in the order of the 28th, 29th, 22nd, 23rd and 18th Regiments once the breakthrough was made. But this plan turned out to invite disastrous results in the absence of close coordination and adequate control between the two divisions.\textsuperscript{59} While the 30th Regiment was preparing the attack, the 29th Regiment occupied Hills 631,558 and 839 in order to cover the right flank and rear of the attacking regiment. And the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Regiment deployed on Hill 736 and 562 in front of the line of departure at 21:00, ready to cover the attack.

Prior to the start of the attack by the 30th Regiment, however, the CCF 60th Division of the 20th Army launched preemptive attack at the covering
ROK III Corps' Failure to Breakthrough at Omach'i (May 17, 1951)
position occupied by the 29th Regiment with a concentrated mortar fire along the road of Yongp'o-Hyon-ri, causing confusion among the friendly forces. Then the main forces of the 30th Regiment, the vanguard, gave up the attack and began to withdraw to the Pandae-san area. Having witnessed the development, the 18th Regiment reported it to the commander of the 3rd Division visiting the regiment command post. By that time confusion was rife along the road, was congested with soldiers and equipment of the two withdrawing divisions—-a situation out of control. Part of the units started to withdraw in disarray without the order toward the Pandae-san area.

The commander of the 3rd Division cancelled the attack by the 18th Regiment, in the belief that the breakthrough operation could not possibly succeed under the current situation. At 03:00 of the 18th, he ordered all his forces to withdraw via Pandae-san to Ch'angch'on.57

Exploiting this opportunity, the enemy tightened its loop of encirclement from the north, west and south around the Hyon-ri area. At the same time, an element of the enemy pursued the retreating ROK forces headed for Pandae-san. There were no commanding officers to control the situation nor was it controllable, for those who escaped enemy pursuit and assembled in total disorder in the Pandae-san area were unable to identify their own assigned units. In the early hours of the 18th, the enemy continued to pursue and some of the friendly units resisted to block the enemy pursuit, but most of them withdrew in groups of a platoon-size over Chuok-bong (Hill 1443) and Kuryong-bong (Hill 1388) toward Kwangwon-ri.

Even in this turmoil, the 30th Artillery Battalion in support of the 9th Division and the 11th Artillery Battalion in support of the 3rd Division conducted harassing fire south-eastward against the Chinese to exhaust their ammunition and exploded the barrels of their artillery pieces with explosives and handgrenades, saving only firing pins and sights; thus, they could withdraw to
Pangdae-san after midnight.

In sum, the ROK 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions responsible for about 40 kilometers of the frontline linking Mae-bong-Kuman-ri-Hansok-san-Kari-bong south of the Soyang River had their communications network between some subordinates broken at an early stage of battle by enemy bombardment, were paralyzed due to the inability to command and control, and were penetrated on the main line of resistance, thus unable to exercise their combat capabilities. Incapable of overcoming the enemy’s night infiltration attacks, their stereotypical tactics, overwhelmed by the enemy’s superiority in manpower, and unable to dislodge the enemy and recapture Omach‘i, the ROK III Corps finally encircled by the enemy. It was obvious that there were serious problems in the leadership, command and control of the ROK forces.

Thus, with such a crisis in the ROK forces, how to stop the exploitation of the breakthrough loomed as an urgent task ahead.

3. The Offensive and Defensive Battle North of Hongch’on

While the ROK forces were engaged in a fierce battle in the Inje and Hyon-ri areas, the US 2nd Division of the US X Corps adjacent to the left was also engaged against the CCF in a grand encounter north of Hongch’on. The division deployed the 9th Regiment on the left, and the 38th Regiment (with a ROK ranger company and the Netherlands Battalion attached) in the center on its front linking Taeryong-san (Hill 899)-Kari-san (Hill 1051)-Mae-bong (Hill 800). As the division’s right front area had the roads linking Chaun-ri-Inje and Chaun-ri-Yangu advantageous for maneuvering, Task Force Zebra, an infantry-tank group, consisting of one company of the US 72nd Tank Battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the US 23rd Regiment, and the US 1st Ranger Company, was
deployed on the main line of resistance. In addition, the Ivanhoe Security Force and the 3rd Battalion of the ROK 36 Regiment, both attached to Task Force Zebra, were deployed at the outpost on line Missouri, consolidating their defense position by installing mines on roads and in valleys in the area.
The main forces of the 23rd Regiment, division reserve, occupied a position on line No Name.

On the evening of the 16th, in concert with their attack aimed at those four ROK divisions south of the Soyang River, the CCF launched attack, committing the CCF 45th Division of the 15th Army against the 38th Regiment on the left, the CCF 35th Division against the boundary between the 38th Regiment and Task Force Zebra, and the CCF 31st Division along the road of Yanggu-Chaun-ri. The US 2nd Division was involved in a hard defensive battles in order to block the exploitation of enemy penetration and to secure Hongch'on, a point of strategic importance.

(1) The Battle of Bunker Hill

In spite of heavy losses in their attack at the outpost battalion of the 38th Regiment on the central front and in passing through mine fields and obstacles, the elements of the CCF 45th Division occupied the outpost position in continuous attacks on the evening of May 16. After the withdrawal of the outpost units, the enemy faltered in its pursuit, probably because of heavy American bombardment. At around 02:00 on the 17th, the enemy launched an all-out offensive on the right front, and breached the main line of resistance. Having occupied Kari-san (Hill 1051), the commanding height of the area, around 09:30, the enemy tried to exploit the breakthrough in an attempt to take the initiative in the offensive.

Major General Clark L. Ruffner, the commander of the US 2nd Division, committed the Netherlands and the French battalions to block the enemy exploitation of the breakthrough. The artillery concentrated its fire on the assembly area and avenue of approach of the enemy reinforcements in front of the 38th Regiment and on close targets designated by the corps. In spite of
heavy artillery fire, about 3,000 enemy forces continued to flow in through the saddle between Kari-san and Hill 914 and along the valley, stepping over the corpses of their comrades.

Having concluded that it would be impossible to block the enemy without reinforcing the central and right front areas that had suffered concentrated enemy attacks, the commanding general of the corps asked the Army Headquarters to send one regimental combat team in anticipation of the next enemy attack and authorized both divisional and corps artillery unit to expend ammunition five times the normal day of fire by directives of General vanfleet (the Van Fleet day of fire) and directed them to concentrate fire on likely avenues of enemy approach within 3,000 yards of friendly defensive positions. Thus, the Americans were able to stop the Chinese human-wave tactics, but all the units suffered serious problems of ammunition supply.

Having analyzed the overall situation, the Eighth Army Commanding General on the 17th readjusted the frontline sector by moving the right boundary of the US IX Corps, which had slight contact with the enemy four miles east and abridging the area for which the US X Corps was responsible in order reinforce the US 2nd Division area. The general also ordered the ROK III Corps which had failed in the Hyon-ri battle, and the ROK I Corps which had slight contact with the enemy withdraw to line Waco linking Hill 1009-1,angch'on-Oldae Mountain-Namae-ri south of line No Name. In addition, he ordered the ROK 8th Division, which had been conducting anti-guerrilla operations by regiment in the Taejon, Kwangju, and Chinju areas, and the 15th Regiment of the US 3rd Division, army reserve, to head for the central eastern part in order to reinforce the US X Corps.

There was a day's lull in front of the US 38th Regiment thanks to enemy artillery and air bombardment, but with dusk at 21:30 on the 17th, the enemy resumed its night attack, with its vanguard approaching Hill 800,
named 'Bunker Hill', defended by Company K of the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment. The regiment had established a position on this hill with 20,000 sandbags during last two weeks. Thus, the bunker could survive direct hit by howitzers because the sandbags, reinforced with other obstacles, provided enough overhead cover.

The 133rd Regiment of the CCF 45th Division, the spearhead of the CCF attack, launched massed assaults, but withdrew from the hill with its initiative deprived by concentrated friendly fire. Having reorganized with substantial reinforcement, the enemy dashed to the top of the hill around midnight. Company K of the US 38th Regiment declined to confront the CCF, inducing the enemy into the company's position. Then, upon the request for fire-within-the-position, the artillery concentrated a blanket of shells which were set with the variable time fuse for automatic explosion 25 meters above ground level. But showers of shells could not stop the stubborn surge of the enemy. The company had to withdraw, leaving Bunker Hill in enemy hands.

The company, without pause, conducted a night counterattack with its reserve platoon. It crawled ahead under the enemy cross fire, assaulting to the top of the hill, and recaptured it in close hand-to-hand fight. It was a priceless victory for the friendly forces, achieved by heroic action of risking their lives.

With dawn, scouts identified 29 enemy soldiers killed in the close combat on the top alone, and about 50 killed in their escape around entanglement. On the other hand, the company had relatively light casualties, with one killed and 8 wounded. A lull returned for a while, but around midnight on the 18th, the Chinese resumed their attack and engaged in a fierce battle at Bunker Hill. Having anticipated the enemy attack, soldiers of the company ran into foxholes and covered the entrances with sandbags which had been prepared in advance. The company requested fire-within-the-position taking the opportunity to leave only the enemy exposed. Instantly, the artillery concentrated high
explosive shells set with variable time fuse on the hill. Artillery blasts and groans of the enemy's wounded disturbed the silent night. The enemy withdrew early on the 19th, leaving behind some 800 dead. This was the last enemy attack at Bunker Hill.

With an extensive breakthrough created by the enemy, including Hyon-ri east of this hill, Bunker Hill became the left shoulder to the breach. In other words, with the hill secured by Company K, stopping the enemy exploitation of the breach westward, the friendly forces escaped narrowly the crisis of the collapsing frontline.

(2) The Battle of Chaun-ri

By the time the CCF 45th Division attacked the 38th Regiment on the left front of US 2nd Division, the CCF 31st and 35th Divisions attacked Task Force Zebra on the right front; but, the Chinese retreated with heavy losses due to mine fields and other obstacles and concentrated fire from tanks and artillery. However, the enemy, not frustrated enough to give up and reinforced by the 92nd Regiment of the CCF 31st Division, tried to break through the tank unit deployed along the route of Yanggu–Hongch'on. The task force condensed tank and artillery fire throughout the night, and then the enemy gave he breakthrough attempt and retreated, leaving about 450 bodies behind. By the day, the 38th Regiment on its left engaged in a fierce battle, but the force enjoyed a lull on its front. However, the commander of the division consolidated the right front by committing the main forces of the 23rd Regiment, the division reserve, in this area in the afternoon of the 17th in anticipation of enemy counterattack and in light of the exposure of his right flank created by the withdrawal of the ROK 5th Division.

In the evening, after penetrating the main line of resistance of the 38th
Regiment and reaching Kari-san on the left, a part of CCF attacked the French battalion defending the regiment rear and flank, another enemy element that advanced to Chaun-ri along Inje-Hongch'on route cut off the rear of the regiment's main forces and raided, the command post and ammunition storage of the frontline battalion causing disorder. To make matters worse, with the French battalion being penetrated, the 23rd Regiment became isolated among enemy forces on the early morning of the 18th by withdrawal route blocked by the CCF 181st Division.

By this time the regiment received the order to move to a new defense line linking from Hill Bunker held by the US 38th Regiment southeast to Hill 683 east of the Inje-Hongch'on road. In order to disengage with the enemy in pursuit, the regiment began to withdraw under the cover of tanks, artillery, and air support, but it encountered the difficult problem to pass through road blocks built by the enemy south of Chaun-ri. The road of Hongch'on-Inje was the only possible passage for moving heavy equipment such as tanks and other vehicles with no alternate by passing road. Having read the terrain feature the enemy persistently blocked the withdrawing regiment by deploying its forces on the commanding heights and setting up a host of obstacles. When the tank leading the withdrawing echelon hit a mine, the trail of following vehicles halted, inviting concentrated enemy fire from the surrounding hills. Under enemy assault, the echelon turned into chaos with drivers deserting their vehicles and ammunition loaded on vehicles exploded, inflicting substantial damage on the regiment. In addition, heavy evening rain turning the road into muddy fields made the retreat more difficult. Thus, they could not occupy a new defense position around Hill 683 until midnight.3

With their superiority in manpower, the Chinese used attacks in ware to create a breach in part of the main line of resistance of the US 2nd Division, and some elements of the division had to escape the enemy encirclement. Fur-
thermore, the division commander’s helicopter had to make an emergency landing while he was directing the operation. In spite of these difficulties, the friendly air and massive artillery fire inflicted the enemy heavy casualties. On the 19th the division occupied its new defense position on modified No Name line extending southeast from Bunker Hill and blocked the enemy attack.

4. Cut-Off Operations in the Breakthrough Area

(1) Withdrawal Operation of the ROK III Corps

Still under Chinese pursuit from Hyon-ri on ROK III Corps’ retreat to rugged Pangdae-san (Hill 1436) on the night of May 17, officers and men of the corps assembled at the hill top with a great number of crew-served weapons and radios abandoned and a portion of its troops left behind as stragglers. This withdrawal operation came to a close on the morning of the 18th when the 18th Regiment, which had covered those forces retreating from Suri-bong to the Yongp’o and Hyon-ri area, reunited with the main body.

By that time the US bombers had detected enemy columns moving north with vehicles, howitzers, and other equipment which had been abandoned by the III Corps, and strafed and dropped napalm to destroy them. While the US planes continued their strikes, an element of the ROK forces assembled at Pangdae-san took the mountainous course of Pangdae-san-Kuryongduk-bong-Kwangwon-ri-Ch’angch’on, and the main forces chose the easier route for movement along Naerin-ch’on through Pangdae-san-Namjon-dong-Kwangwon-ri-Ch’angch’on in order to occupy line Waco linking Hill 1009-Ch’angch’on-ri-ODae Mountain in keeping with the order of the corps. The echelon that took the mountainous route assembled in Kwangwon-ri, the intermediate assembly area without enemy pursuit; however, the main forces
that chose to retreat along Naerin-ch’on suffered heavy losses due to continued enemy pursuit.

Under unfavorable conditions, the ROK III Corps endeavored to assemble at Kwangwon-ri, surrounded by hills over 1,000 meters, but an element of the CCF, which had penetrated the main line of resistance, advanced to Ch’angch’on one step ahead of the corps and cut the corps’ withdrawal route linking Kwangwon-ri and Ch’angch’on. Preoccupied with withdrawal, the soldiers of the corps were not aware that they had been marching into enemy encirclement under their surveillance. Thus, the corps was enveloped by the enemy again except for the element that had arrived at Kwangwon-ri and hurriedly left for Ch’angch’on prior to the interdiction of the withdrawal route. Under these circumstances, the corps tried to reorganize a part of the forces that had withdrew from Kwangwon-ri but failed because the soldiers were worn out by exhaustion and hunger and had lost the will to fight. As groups of forces flowed into Kwangwon-ri, a number of commanders including Brig. Gen. Choi Suk, the 9th Division, Commander, prepared a withdrawal plan from Kwangwon-ri to Ch’angch’on.

When the 18th Regiment and those stragglers that had marched the whole night to the three-way junction of Kwanwon-ri tried to cross Kyebanch’on, about 2,000 of them were ambushed by the enemy, and they informed the corps that its route of withdrawal had been blocked. Thus, the corps gave up its plan of taking the road of Kwangwon-ri Ch’angch’on and instead, under the cover of its element on night, took the rugged Ulsu-jae (pass) between Kyebang-san (Hill 1577) and Odae Mountain (Hill 1563), the final bottle neck to reach Hajinbu-ri. With only slight enemy pursuit, they reached Ulsu-jae safely, but many officers and men, overcome by exhaustion and hunger following their two-day retreat, chose to remain behind to become POWs rather than to retreat. The corps finally reached Soksari and Hajinbu-ri around 1500 on
the 19th, after an arduous four days of withdrawing 65 kilometers and disengaging Chinese pursuit.

As of 16:00 on the 20th, the 3rd Division had collected 3,621 soldiers (34.3% of its original strength), and the 9th Division counted 4,582 (49%); later, the figure went up with the arrival of additional stragglers. As the corps was hurriedly reorganizing, combined forces of four regiment-size composed of the NKPA and CCF resumed attacks in an attempt to penetrate the blocking line of the corps and to cut off the road connecting Hajiinbu-ri and Kangnung. The 3rd Division, with its three regiments deployed in depth north of Yuch'on-ri, and the 9th Division, with its 30th and 28th Regiments in the Soksa-ri area, tried to repulse the enemy but failed. Thus, the 3rd Division pulled out to Chongsan and the 9th Division toward Taehwa again, the corps’ blocking line linking Soksa-ri and Hajiinbu-ri having crumbled.

(2) Blocking Breakthrough by the US 3rd Division

Due to the Hyon-ri withdrawal of the ROK III Corps, an extensive rupture opened on the central eastern front of the UN forces along the line of Bunker Hill–P’ungam-ri–Soksa-ri–Ch’olgam-nyong. In order to block the exploitation of this breach, the commanding general of the Eighth Army at midnight on the 18th ordered the 7th Regiment of the US 3rd Division, which was on stand-by in Seoul as the Eighth Army reserve, and the 65th Regiment, assembling in Kyongan-ri to the right front of the US X Corps, to join the main forces of the division.

On the morning of the 19th, when its scouts made slight contacts with the enemy, the US 3rd Division (minus the 7th & 65th Regiments) deployed the 15th Regiment forward to Nabon-ri north of P’ungam-ri and repulsed the enemy along the line of Hoengsong and P’ungam-ri in coordination with the ROK
7th Division deployed in the Habae-jae area. The 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division blocked the attack of the CCF 181st Division in Hangye-ri, and the French battalion repulsed that of the CCF 31st Division as well.

Ever since the start of the Chinese May offensive, the enemy had continuously launched only night attacks that appeared to be routine tactics. But on that night, a lull was sustained after enemy attacks during daylight had been repulsed. It was later disclosed that those four divisions (31st, 34th, 35th, & 181st) of the CCF 40th Army, which had carried out the main attack during the four-day offensive, suffered heavy losses by massive friendly air and artillery fire, and thus had to wait for reinforcements.

Around the 19th, the Chinese offensive pressure subsided considerably, and the US 3rd Division prepared a plan to block the enemy breakthrough near Soksa-ri upon assembly of the 7th Regiment and the 65th Regiment in Changp'yong-ri. The division (minus the 15th Regiment) repulsed slight enemy resistance at first. When the 65th Regiment advanced to north of Changp'yong-ri and the 7th Regiment to Paekchok-san, the Division confirmed that the enemy main forces were concentrated in the Undu-ryong area. On the 21st, the division attacked with its two regiments abreast, starting from Changp'yong-ri and Paekchok-san with Undu-ryong as its objective. As the attacking echelons advanced smoothly, repulsing slight enemy resistance, the defense line of the ROK III Corps, which was covering the right flank of the attacking troops deployed at Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri, was unfortunately penetrated by an enemy surprise attack.

The US 3rd division halted the attack for a while and then resumed on the 22nd after consolidating its flank by redeploying the 65th Regiment on its left in Soksa-ri that had slight contact with the enemy. The 7th Regiment's attack faltered momentarily due to stubborn enemy resistance as it approached Undu-ryong, but finally took Undu-ryong around 18:00 with a concentration of
Interception of the Breach at Hyon-ri (May 20~22, 1951)
heavy artillery fire.96

Undu-ryong is a winding pass ten kilometers northwest of Soksa-ri, linked to Hoeryong-bong (Hill 1324) on the west and to Kyebang Mountain (Hill 1577) on the east, and is located on the road linking Hyon-ri and Soksa-ri. Thus, securing Undu-ryong implied blocking of the breakthrough created by the enemy along the axis of Inje-Hyon-ri-Soksa-ri and, in addition, blocking of the retreat route for the enemy forces which had advanced to the Seoul-Kangnung national road south of this hill in order to attack Kangnung.

In a similar fashion, when Omach’i in the rear of the corps had been taken at the initial stage of the CCF offensive, the ROK Ⅲ Corps had to withdraw disorganizedly. This time the enemy was to follow suit. The US 3rd Division’s battle of Undu-ryong was a turning point not only in blocking the enemy May offensive, but also in redirecting friendly forces to a countertoffensive.

(3) Defensive Battle at Taegwal-ryong

The ROK Ⅲ Corps fought desperately against the Chinese in the May offensive along the line of Sorak Mountain and Sokch’o, but withdrew and organized a defense position on line Waco linking Odae Mountain-Turo-bong-Namae-ri upon the order of the ROK Army headquarters on the 19th in order to readjust frontline sectors with the ROK Ⅲ Corps.

To deter the enemy approaching along the boundary between the ROK Ⅰ and Ⅲ Corps, the Ⅰ Corps deployed the 20th Regiment of the 11th Division on the east coast, in the Yuch’on-ri-Hoenggye area, in the left rear of the corps. On the 21st, a part of the CCF that had penetrated the defense line of the ROK Ⅲ Corp (Soksa-ri-Hajinbu-ri), encountered the 20th Regiment as it approached along the Seoul-Kangnung national road with Taegwal-ryong and Kangnung as objectives.
Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, the commanding general of the ROK I Corps, concluded that the enemy objective must have been Kangnung where the airfield K-18 operated by the ROK Air Force located, and massive ammunition and war material stockpiled. Reasoning that to secure Taegwal-ryong, the gateway to Kangnung, was a pre-requisite for the defense of Kangnung itself, he ordered the Capital Division to secure Taegwal-ryong and the 11th Division to block the enemy on the front, adjusting deployment of his units. 56

The 1st Regiment of the Capital Division, which was reorganizing in Kangnung unaware of the impending situation or enemy intention, quickly moved to Taegwal-ryong upon order of the corps.

In the engagement on the early morning of the 22nd, the 20th Regiment (reinforced with the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment) of the 11th Division resisted stubbornly along the line of Packilp'yong–Taegi-ri, but the CCF of one regiment-size penetrated the defense line and advanced to Taegwal-ryong. Upon the return of its reconnaissance party who had detected enemy situation, the 1st Regiment repulsed the enemy in fierce close combat for three hours by concentrating all the fire available. The Chinese returned with reinforcements of two battalion-size, tried a turning attack through Nunghang-bong, but were driven back. As the regiment was busily preparing night defense after dark, the enemy committed forces of two battalion-size to attack the 3rd Battalion in defense of Hwanggyech'ile for a siege not-withstanding heavy damage suffered in the daylight attack. And a fierce close quarters combat took place.

The 3rd battalion repulsed the enemy and secured Taegwal-ryong by conducting a concerted operation with the 1st Battalion positioned Taegwal-ryong under the support of illumination. The first victory of the regiment against the Chinese in spite of inferiority in strength was due to the close infantry-tank cooperation and the soldiers' conviction of a sure victory. 57

Having grasped the initiative in battle, the division commenced a sur-
prise attack on the enemy at 10:00 on the 23rd in order not to allow the enemy time for reorganization and to exploit the gains in battle with the support of bombardment of the US 7th Fleet ready on the Eastern Sea as the division had pin-pointed declining enemy combat capabilities with rising casualties and worsening supplies of food and ammunition. The enemy troop of one regiment-size preparing a counteroffensive in the area of Hoenggye-ri - Nodong - Ch'ahang-ri was counterattacked by the friendly forces and withdrew in dispersion.

Thus, the enemy plan to occupy Taegwal-ryong and Kangnung was to-
tally thwarted, and the eastern salient of the Hyon-ri breach was completely sealed off as well. Having secured Undu-ryong by employing the US 3rd Division and Taegwai-ryong by the ROK Capital Division, the Eighth Army established the foothold for a shift from defensive to offensive. In addition, it facilitated a steady supply of war material into the interior central front of through the Seoul-Kangnung national road from Kangnung east coast.

5. The Victory Report from Yongmun Mountain

As the Chinese main attack forces had made a breakthrough on the UNC main line of resistance on the central eastern front from the start of the Chinese offensive on May 16, the Chinese committed its secondary attack forces along the valley of the Pukhan River on the 17th, engaging in a bloody battle in the central western sector in order to fix the UN forces in this area so as to prevent reinforcement to the central-eastern area, thus supporting their main forces' advance. As a part of this effort, three divisions (the 187th, 188th, and 189th) of the 63rd Army, the CCF 4 Army Group, attacked the ROK 6th Division, in the center of the US IX Corps, defending the area of confluence of the Pukhan and Hongch'on Rivers.

At that time, the 6th Division was occupying the Yongmun Mountain (Hill 1157) area on line No Name according to the readjustment of the frontline after its ordeal in Sach’ang-ri during the April Offensive. In addition to recovering their esprit de corps and improving combat capabilities, which had been reduced by the battle of Sach’ang-ri, the division was concentrating on psychological rearmament and training as well.

As signs of the imminent May Offensive surfaced, the division concluded that it would be disadvantageous for defense to have its main line of
resistance 12 to 17 kilometers behind the Pukhan River allowing the enemy a bridgehead upon crossing the river; thus, the division deployed the 2nd Regiment forward south of the Hongch’on River, and the 19th Regiment west of Yongmun Mountain on the main line of resistance, and the 7th Regiment east of it, consolidating defense positions. Then, the reconnaissance company of the division was sent to the north of the Hongch’on River as the general outpost.

Since the 2nd regimental commander and some of the staff were dismissed following the Sach’ang-ri failure, Lt. Col. Song Dae Hu assumed the command of the Regiment and organized the defense position with grim determination. The 2nd Battalion occupied the Urop-san (Hill 381) area on the left front, which dominated the Pukhan River. Each one of the soldiers wore a band on his head inscribed ‘Do or Die.’ The 1st Battalion on the right took its position at Hill 559 near Misa-ri, which could easily maintain surveillance over the Hongch’on River. Its officers swore to the following resolution: “This is the final chance for us to wipe out the disgrace.” The 3rd Battalion in reserve built its defense position at Hill 353 in the rear of Urop-san. On the 17th, the regimental scouts detected one company-size enemy forces that crossed the river, assembled in the Pangha-ri valley while searching the Soch’on-ri and Kangch’on-ri area, the suspected crossing sites, and drove them away. But with the setting sun, the enemy crossed at all points; thus, the scouts returned back to their base.

At that time, as signs of imminent engagement were on the rise along the Pukhan River with the Chinese advance southward, the 31st Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division deployed adjacent to the left at Hwaya-san and also 31st Regiment of US 2nd Division to the right at Dunung-san withdrew to the main line of resistance, leaving only the 2nd Regiment for the defense of the critical terrain south of the Ch’ongp’yong Reservoir.

Delaying the day on the 18th, the Chinese tried crossing with forces of
one company-size at Kosong-ri, Kajong-ri, and Sangbakam-ri, but they were repulsed. With sunset and the spread of darkness, the Chinese resumed river-crossing operations, as if aiming for a siege, committing its forces of one battalion-size at Urop-san on the left front and forces exceeding one regiment-size at
Changanak Mountains on the right. With illumination and fire support of five artillery battalions provided by the division and the corps, the 2nd Regiment repulsed the enemy attack, but a part of it penetrated the barrage and approached into the regiment position. But in hand-to-hand fighting, the ROK soldiers drove the enemy away around midnight. As the 2nd Regiment stubbornly held its position with massive artillery support in spite of its inferiority in strength, the enemy committed the main forces of the 187th and 188th Divisions for a breakthrough on the early morning of the 19th as if the enemy had mistaken the outpost for the main line of resistance. Around 08:00 enemy forces of one regiment assaulted the 1st Battalion at Hill 559 overlooking the Hongch'on River area, but the battalion held fast to the hill with close air support. While the air strikes were going on, the enemy attack faltered momentarily; but as soon as they ended, the enemy immediately committed reinforcements into the valley of the Changanak Mountains and cut off the route of withdrawal for the 1st Battalion. In a bloody battle for three hours, the battalion escaped the encirclement and withdrew to the regimental command post at Na-san.

After its attack on our right front, the Chinese then concentrated its attack on the left front at Urop-san, held by the 2nd Battalion, by committing the 189th Division in reserve. The battalion resisted, but hard pressed by the enemy’s numerical superiority, it withdrew to Hill 427 at 19:00 under the cover of air bombardment. Thus, the defense frontage of the regiment shrank to the Hill 353 and Na-san, on the line of criticality emphasized by the division commander. Though the 2nd Regiment was holding the outpost near Na-san, it was in sore need of reorganization due to increasing casualties created in a fierce battle that had lasted for two days and lack of food and ammunition.

Having ascertained the regiment’s situation, the enemy commenced an all-out attack at 20:00. The 1st Battalion at Na-san, the 3rd Battalion at Hill
353, and the 2nd Battalion at Hill 427 each organized perimeter defense positions and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting against the enemy who approached into their positions under the cover of illumination, pushing and pulling. In a battle that lasted until the early morning of the 20th, the regiment overcame a crisis with an invincible fighting spirit and held its positions, even with a partial breach in its defense positions and its communication lines cut off, hampering command and control.

When the division was searching for ways to reinforce the 2nd Regiment, now isolated among the enemy, the Eighth Army commanding general, on the night of the 19th, ordered the US 1 and IX Corps of the central western front to attack line Topeka linking Munsan P’och’on-Ch’unch’on, while the enemy offensive on the central eastern front slowed considerably.  

Upon receiving the attack order, the division commander issued a preparation order immediately to the 19th and the 7th Regiments on the main line of resistance, and at 05:00 on the 20th, the two regiments took the offensive. Upon the surprise attack by the ROK 6th Division, the CCF, which were enveloping the 2nd Regiment, rapidly retreated to the north of the river in fear of encirclement by the ROK troop. Thus, the attacking echelons reunited with the isolated 2nd Regiment and then pursued the enemy.

The CCF 63rd Army conducted its offensive for five days in order to grab Yongmun Mountain, strategic terrain on the central front, but it began to retreat north in the early hours of the 21st, leaving behind two delaying forces of regimental-size. The Chinese had suffered critical losses inflicted by the courageous ROK 6th Division and air and artillery fire. Thus, the division washed away the dishonor of Sach’ang-ri and achieved a grand victory in the Yongmun Mountain battle.

The battle of Yongmun Mountain is evaluated highly not only as a simple tactical victory but even more from a strategic point of view because by
blocking the probable enemy breakthrough on the central front, the ROK 6th Division prevented the frontline from breaking into pieces, and thus, eliminated the danger to the metropolitan area.

With the intention of occupying positions advantageous for the anticipated cease-fire conference, the CCF mobilized the largest contingent of manpower since its intervention in the Korean War for the Spring offensive. The Chinese advanced to the outskirts of Seoul in the April offensive, and in the May offensive, they exploited the breakthrough in the central eastern area up to the line of Soksor and Hajinbu; however, they had to pay with enormous losses in manpower and material in these offensives. On the other hand, the UN forces still maintained a posture to go on the counteroffensive even after breaches in parts of its front and a withdrawal of 30 to 65 kilometers to the south. It had not suffered substantial losses in its combat capabilities, due to well organized delaying actions utilizing superior fire and mobility.

These decisive victories by the ROK forces at Yongmun Mountain and Taegwal-ryong and by the US Forces at Bunker Hill and Undu-ryong created a turning point for the ROK and the UN forces to transition again from defense which lasted for one month from April 22, to offense.

Notwithstanding the examples of ROK courage, the Eighth US Army closed down the ROK Army Forward Command Post which had been in charge of the ROK forces on the central eastern front, deactivated the ROK III Corps as of May 26, and attached the ROK 9th Division to the US X Corps and the ROK 3rd Division to the ROK 1 Corps. This action served as a lesson for all commanders about the consequences of victory and defeat in war and their leadership and responsibility.
1. 戰陣을 중지하고 이 投降證을 가
   져는 中共兵士에게는 如何한 餌
   을 莫論하고 人道的 待遇을 保障
   한다.
2. こ者를 가까이 있는 將校에게 要
   리고 가서 捕虜로서 充分한 待遇
   을 発씨하여 주리라．

大韓民國 陸海空軍總司令官
陸軍少將 丁一 樹

▲ CCF soldiers are coming down a hill showing their Surrender Certificate.
More than 10,000 Chinese surrendered after the initiation
of the grand offensive on April 22, 1951.
Notes

1) Iron Triangle: a triangular area connecting P'yonggang-Ch'orwon-Kimhwa was given the modifier "iron" to emphasize the advantage of the terrain for enemy defense and the disadvantage for friendly offense.


4) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 379.

5) Ibid., p. 379.

6) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 133.

7) The Belgian Battalion is shortened from the Belgian Battalion Luxembourg Infantry Detachment.

8) Fusilier Battalion is shortened from 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.


10) Ibid., p. 67.


13) Ibid., pp. 103-105.
14) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 397.
16) Ibid., p. 60.
20) Mit'asa: A temple near the top of P'ap'yong-san destroyed by fire during this combat.
22) Gloster Battalion is shortened from The 1st Battalion, of The Gloucestershire Regiment (Glosters).
23) See Note 8.
26) Ibid., p. 414.
27) Ibid., p. 419.
28) Ibid., p. 424.
32) Ibid., p. 110.
33) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 389.
35) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., 420.
36) Ibid., p. 382.
38) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 383.
40) Ibid., p. 407.
41) Argyll Battalion is shortened from The 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
43) Canadian Battalion is shortened from The 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.
44) Australian Battalion is shortened from The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.
45) The 16th Artillery Battalion is shortened from The 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery.
46) Middlesex Battalion is shortened from The 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment.
47) Billy Mossman, op. cit., p. 405.
49) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 374.
54) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 431.
55) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 473.
56) Ibid., pp. 476-477.
58) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 435.
59) The War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, op. cit., p. 188.
60) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 436.
61) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 479.
64) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 482.
65) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 439.
67) Ibid., p. 48.
70) Paik Sua Yup, *The ROK Army & Me as a Soldier* (Seoul, Taeryuk Research Institute), 1989, p. 178.
71) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 485.
74) Ibid., p. 444.
77) Ibid., p. 107.
78) Ibid., p. 64.
79) Ibid., p. 75.
81) The ROK 9th Division, *The History of White Horse Division*, vol. 1, 1982, p. 117.

83) The ROK 3rd Division, op. cit., p. 434.


88) Ivanhoe: A ROK company-sized unit organized temporarily for the rear area security of the division.

89) Billy Mossman, op. cit., p. 454.

90) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 497.

91) The ROK Joint Chief of Staff, op. cit., p. 535.

92) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 450.

93) The ROK Army HQ, tr., op. cit., p. 503.


95) Ibid., p. 191.

96) Ibid., p. 201.

97) Paik Sun Yup, op. cit., p. 186.


102) Ibid., p. 468.
Chapter Seven  Return to the Pre-War Line and Stalemate

1. Policy and Direction of Both Sides

After fighting a see-saw war from the outbreak of the war to the time of the Spring Offensive, from the Naktong to the Yalu, each side became convinced that a decisive victory was impossible and would entail unbearable colossal human and material losses.

As for the United States, not only was it pressed by Free World countries to put an early end to the war, but it also became no longer confident of winning the war against the combination of Communist China, which could mobilize unlimited human resources, and the Soviet Union, which provided material support. As for Communist China, although it carried out a total of five offensives committing a maximum of 80 divisions (including the North Korean People's Army), it was unable to achieve its initial objective of driving out the UN forces from Korea and came to realize that there was a limit to which it could secure reinforcements and logistical support.

When the frontline was reverted to the status quo ante bellum and stabilized around the 38th Parallel a year after the outbreak of the war, the two sides began to pursue political, rather than military, means to resolve the war.

1. Policy and Strategy of the United Nations Command

In the early part of 1951, the ROK and UN forces overcame the critical situation (so-called January Fourth Retreat) created by the CCF's New Year's
Day offensive. After switching to a counteroffensive operation from the P'yon'g'aek-Samch'ok line at the end of January, they successfully recovered Seoul, and at the end of March, ROK and UN troops restored the pre-war status quo by advancing to the 38th Parallel. In early April, they occupied the so-called Kansas line,\(^4\) connecting tactically favorable terrain crucial for the defense of the 38th Parallel, and, in order to strengthen defense along the central front, continued to advance to the Wyoming line,\(^5\) corresponding to the base of the Iron Triangle.

At the same time, the US government was revising its Korea policy and beginning to consider measures “to end the war under an appropriate armistice mechanism and return to the status quo ante bellum.” Accordingly, the Eighth US Army’s mission was limited to that of inflicting enough damage on the enemy so that it would accept the US terms for peace.\(^6\)

The ROK government’s unification policy, however, did not change, and the Korean people’s yearning for unification and opposition to an armistice grew stronger. Finally, on April 3, 1951, Prime Minister Chang Myon made a statement that the ROK government was opposed to any decision that would result in the division of the Korean Peninsula. In essence, he stated:

The ROK government and the Korean people extend the deepest gratitude to all our friends fighting in the Korean War. The sole purpose of the Korean War is to establish an independent democratic Korea, as repeatedly confirmed by the United Nations. At the time of liberation after World War II, the Korean people had no prior knowledge of a plan to divide their country, and war became inevitable due to this division. We believe that nothing should stand in the way of reunification, and as citizens of a legitimately established independent nation, we will never agree to any decision that will result in the division of our land.\(^7\)

While friction was surfacing between the ROK and US governments in
regard to future policy on the conduct of the war, General Douglas MacArthur was removed from the post of Commander in Chief, Far East Command and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command on April 11. Gen. MacArthur had been critical of Washington's Korea policy and armistice proposal. General Matthew B. Ridgway, the commander of Eighth US Army, was appointed as his successor.\(^3\) With the appointment of General Ridgway, the United States was now able to pursue its objective of limiting the war without producing disharmony between the field command and the top leadership consisting of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^4\) On April 22, Gen. Ridgway gave "A New Directive for Military Operations in the Korean Peninsula" to Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, the new Eighth Army commander. The mission for the Eighth Army was now limited to that of defending the ROK territory and people against outside aggression, and only for this purpose was the Eighth Army allowed to conduct military operations north of the 38th Parallel.

The new directive, however, emphasized that the advance of major units beyond the Kansas-Wyoming line would be carried out only after an approval was granted by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. In particular, the directive stressed that under no circumstance could the Eighth Army units cross the Manchurian or the Soviet border. Nor could they conduct operations in the North Korean territory near the borders. Accordingly, the new Eighth Army commander was to channel all effort into inflicting the greatest damage on the enemy while respecting these restrictions and preserving his units.\(^5\)

Separate instructions to the Far East Naval and Air Force commanders likewise stressed the importance of confining the war. Except in direct support of UN military operations, forces under their command were not to ap-
approach within 32km of Soviet territory or within 4.8km of Communist Chinese
territory north of 32 degrees latitude. Nor would they cross the Manchurian or
Soviet borders of Korea except with prior authorization from CINCFE. No
action was to be taken against Rashin or against the hydroelectric installations
along the Yalu.

After defeating the enemy's Spring Offensive, policy discussions on the
direction of the UN forces moved ahead. On May 16, after close consultation
with the US Department of State and Department of Defense, approval by the
National Security Council was granted (NSC 48-5). On the next day, US Presi-
dent Truman gave his approval. Thus completed on May 17, after a month-
long review following the interim decision of April 15, the new Korea policy
divided the objective into two parts: as the ultimate objective, the establish-
ment of a unified, independent, democratic nation in Korea would be pursued
through political channels, apart from military means. As the current objec-
tive, resolution of the Korean War and cessation of hostilities through an ap-
propriate armistice would be pursued through the United Nations. For the Re-
public of Korea to exercise secure sovereignty south of the 38th Parallel, the
border would have to be established well north of this line. Until this current
objective could be secured, military action should be continued to penalize the
aggressor.

On June 1, 1951, in accordance with this new policy, the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff redefined the mission of the CINCUNC as follows:

You will, consistent with the security of forces under your command,
inflict maximum personnel and materiel losses on the forces of North
Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic bound-
daries of Korea and adjacent waters, in order to create conditions favor-
able to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would as a minimum:
a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements.
b. Establish authority of the ROK over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel.

c. Provide for withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.

d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

In pursuing this mission, the Command in Chief, United Nations Command was given the authority to conduct naval and air operations deemed necessary or effective in the territory of Korea and its neighboring seas. This authority did not extend to operations in Manchuria, the Soviet Union, or the power generation facilities along the Yalu. By allowing access within 19.2km, rather than the previous 24km, of the border, however, the new directive slightly relaxed the restrictions on operations near the border. As for the operational limit of the ground forces, it was described as a general line 10km to the north of the 38th Parallel past the Hwach'on Reservoir.

Gen. Chung II Kwon, the Chief of the General Staff of the ROK Army at the time, later recalled: "The decision on placing restrictions on the operations of the UN forces was made without any prior consultation with our government, and the fact that a new directive was given to the Command in Chief, United Nations Command was relayed to me only after the event. As Chief of the General Staff, I was deeply hurt by this."

On June 8, 1951, soon after this decision had been made, US Defense Secretary George C. Marshall flew in from Tokyo and visited the Eighth Army commander in Taegu, and, without any consultation with the ROK government, he returned to the United States. It was felt that he had come to explain the new policy to the Eighth Army commander.
After what was seen as a snubbing by Marshall, President Syngman Rhee summoned Defense Minister Lee Ki Bung and Chief of the General Staff Chung Il Kwon to the Kyongmudae (in Pusan). In an angry voice, he exclaimed, "Although many dignitaries have visited Korea since the establishment of our nation, there has never been an insult like this. The US Defense Secretary in charge of conducting the war has ignored us... Even though we are fighting with support from the United States and the United Nations, we cannot condone behavior that ignores or turns its back on our sovereignty. The Defense Minister should appeal to the National Assembly and our people to show our will to fight, and the Chief of the General Staff should prepare independent operations designed to demonstrate our army's determination to advance northward."

The directive to the CINCUNC on June 1 was similar to the ones previously issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to control operations after the UN forces had reached the Kansas and Wyoming lines, but its distinguishing feature was that it defined the operational objective more clearly than ever before. It emphasized that the future operations would focus on providing support to the efforts to negotiate a cessation of the hostilities in spite of strong resistance from the ROK government.

2. The Intent and Strategy of the Communist Forces

From the time of the Chinese entry into the Korean War, Mao Tse Tung launched four large-scale offensives, including the February Offensive. Although the Chinese Communist Forces managed to occupy Seoul and advance as far southward as the 37th Parallel (P'yongt'aeck-Chech'on-Samch'ok), they failed to annihilate and drive out the UN forces. Rather, due to the enormous human and material losses that they had suffered, they were driven back
to the north of the 38th Parallel and forced to set up defensive positions there at the end of March 1951.

Over the next two months, the CCF reorganized the 1st Echelon (consisting of 9 armies of 30 divisions), whose strength had been almost depleted during the offensives, and dispatched the 2nd Echelon (consisting of 9 armies of 27 divisions) to the Korean Peninsula. In order to achieve the original strategic objective of driving out the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula, the CCF launched two successive Spring Offensives with what turned out to be the largest concentration of troops during the Korean War.

On the central western front, the CCF first launched a late April offensive targeted at Seoul, and continued with a mid-May offensive on the central eastern front with the objective of annihilating the main strength of the ROK armed forces. The numerical superiority of the Chinese troops was countered with the formidable firepower of the UN forces, and the Communist forces suffered a heavy loss of 85,000 men without achieving their objectives.\(^{10}\)

The Chinese 'human wave,' or 'sea of men,' tactics was defeated by the 'sea of fire' tactics of the UN forces. The Chinese began to realize that their numerical superiority could not overcome the modern equipment of the UN forces, and also came to acknowledge that with their logistical capability, an offensive lasting more than 7-10 days could not be supported.

Peng Teh Huai, commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army, issued a directive for a total withdrawal of the frontline troops. This directive stated: "The frontline is overextended. Supply of rations and ammunition are met with difficulties due to lack of transportation. Troops are tired and southward advance at this point is impossible." Such problems forced the Chinese to put an early end to the May Offensive and to pull the troops back to the starting point for the April offensive. The Chinese military leadership decided to reorganize over the next one and a half to two months and prepare for a new
battle by improving the army's ability to conduct modern warfare."

The Chinese leadership felt that "although a victory was gained in the five campaigns, the difficult situation faced by friendly forces due to the disparities in equipment has not changed." They decided to make a transition to a 'war of attrition' and accept the US proposal for armistice, determining policy that "friendly forces prepare for a long war and resolve the Korean problem by annihilating US forces." The Chinese thus adopted a new guideline for the conduct of the war in mid-June, deciding to end the war through a war of attrition and peace negotiations. In the area of military operations, the leadership called for a war of attrition and active defense.

That is, on the one hand they established solid defensive positions by taking advantage of favorable terrain and would destroy enemy's combat capabilities employing the means of active defense. On the other hand they would enhance their operational abilities by aggressively improving equipments and strengthening training, and then could narrow the comparison of the combat power between the friendly and foe. The ultimate aim was "to achieve a final victory or force the enemy to face insurmountable difficulties and withdraw." 

In the end, due to the changes in the policy and strategy of the two sides, the Korean War was deadlocked in an operational sense within a year of its outbreak and entered a new phase of War consisting of heated battles on the stalemated front and a war of words at the negotiating table.
II. Return to the Status Quo Ante Bellum

1. Friendly and Enemy Situation

(1) Withdrawal of the Chinese Communist Forces

On May 16, the main strength of the CCF launched the second Spring Offensive (May Offensive) on the central eastern front, and made a large penetration approximately 60km in depth in the Hyon-ri area. Although the Chinese advanced as far as Hajinbu-ri-Yuch'on-ri, there was a noticeable drop in their offensive activity around May 20.

During the first five days of the CCF offensive, the organized delaying action of the ROK and UN troops and their artillery fire and air strikes inflicted a heavy losses on the Chinese. In particular, the CCF 12th and 15th Armies, the main forces of the offensive, suffered such enormous losses that they were unable to continue the offensive. As a result, the CCF 20th and 27th Armies and the NKPA 2nd Corps advancing toward the Seoul-Kangnung National Road were in danger of being cut off by the ROK and UN forces. The enemy thought about committing new reserves but was hesitant, since the losses suffered by the attacking units were due to the incessant artillery fire and air strikes by the UN forces.¹³

After reviewing the situation, Peng Teh Huai decided to end the offensive and issued an order for a rapid withdrawal on May 21.¹⁰ Accordingly, taking the North Han River on the north of the Hwach'on Reservoir as a sector boundary, the CCF and NKPA units withdrew to the west and east of the reservoir, respectively. The east-west line across the Hwach'on Reservoir was
their limited line of withdrawal. In areas essential to securing the withdrawal route for the main units, they established solid strongholds; whereas, in other areas, they deployed only covering forces to conduct a delay operation.

The Withdrawal Plan of the Communist Forces (Excerpt)\[55\]

(1) The CCF 60th Army shall conduct a delaying operation on the Seoul-Ch’unch’on Road and provide security for the withdrawal of the 12th and 15th Armies.

(2) Under the cover of the 60th Army, the 12th and 15th Armies shall withdraw through the west of the Hwach’on Reservoir to Ch’orwon and P’yönggang.

(3) The CCF 20th and 27th Armies shall turn around the eastern end of the Hwach’on Reservoir and withdraw along the northern banks of the reservoir. After the withdrawal, the 20th Army will occupy blocking positions in the vicinity of Hwach’on and cover the withdrawal of the 60th Army.

(4) The NKPA covering force shall protect the withdrawal of the NKPA units on the east of the Hwach’on Reservoir.

(5) After the withdrawal, the NKPA V Corps shall occupy and defend sector from the east of the Hwach’on Reservoir to Inje.

(6) After the withdrawal, the NKPA II Corps shall occupy and defend sector from Inje to the east coast.

In accordance with this plan, the Communist Forces began to withdraw on May 21. The enemy units that had advanced to the Hajinbu-ri-Yuch’on-ri line at the forefront, however, began to withdraw on the night of the 22th as it took time for the order to reach them.\[56\]

On the western side of the North Han River, the CCF \[V\] Army Group also broke contact with the US I and IX Corps and withdrew to the upper Imjin and Ch’orwon area, while the NKPA I Corps withdrew north of the Imjin.
The Chinese official history records the situation at the time as follows:

At this time, friendly forces were quite tired from the two successive operations within one month, and ammunition and rations were depleted. With the onset of the rainy season, it was feared that friendly forces, fighting with rivers and lakes to their rear, would suffer heavy losses if transportation was cut off due to a sudden change in the situation. Moreover, since the offensive this time failed to destroy any higher-than-regiment-level US unit, there was a concern over a possible enemy counterattack. As a further attack in this situation could not annihilate the enemy but would only serve to increase disadvantages for friendly troops, it was deemed worse than withdrawal. Accordingly, friendly troops decided to rest and reorganize the main units and ended the offensive on May 21.

(2) The UNC Counteroffensive

At the peak of the Chinese May Offensive, the Chinese troops advancing to P'ungam-ri on May 18 put heavy pressure on the US 2nd Division, and the leading units delivered a concentrated blow to the ROK troops defending the Soksa-ri-Hajinbu-ri area. The central eastern front seemed on the verge of collapse. According to an intelligence report, however, four Chinese armies were deployed on the central western front, but they showed no clear signs of preparing for an offensive other than conducting small-scale feint operation.

After analyzing the war situation, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command on May 18 ordered the Eighth Army commander to attack Ch'orwon with two divisions in order to threaten the enemy's line of communications from the western front to the Iron Triangle. This move was designed to
weaken the enemy pressure on the central eastern front.

While the US I and IX Corps were preparing to attack in accordance with this order, General Ridgway conducted reconnaissance in person the next day and realized that the enemy line greatly bulged out on the central eastern front. He felt that the UN forces could deliver a decisive blow to the enemy by taking advantage of this weakness, and ordered the Eighth Army commander to expand the scope of attack to the entire front and carry out an all-out counteroffensive.\(^9\)

The Eighth Army commander also felt that although the enemy had broken through the main line of resistance and advanced deep inland, its attack would be delayed or stalled within a few days due to the extension of the line of communications and the limitation of logistical support in mountainous terrain. Accordingly, he believed that if an attack was quickly launched to take advantage of this opportunity by cutting off the line of communications in the enemy rear and trapping the enemy in 'a long bag,' it would deliver a decisive blow to the enemy.\(^9\)

According to the attack plan, the Eighth Army in the first phase would occupy the Topeka line connecting Munsan-Kap'yong-Ch'unch'on, and quickly move toward Ch'orwon in the second phase of the operation and occupy 'the neck area of the long bag,' the Yongp'yong area on the P'oeh'on-Ch'orwon axis and the Hwach'on area on the Ch'unch'on-Kimhwa axis. The Eighth Army would cut off the enemy line of retreat by strangling the neck area.\(^9\)

Charged with the mission of occupying the Topeka line in accordance with this plan, the US I and IX Corps and the 1st Marine Division of the US X Corps launched the attack on May 20, before the enemy main units or reserves were prepared for defense. On the central eastern front, under the strong air and artillery fire support, the US X Corps and the ROK 1 Corps managed to block the enemy's attempt to enlarge the opening along the P'ungam-ri-Habae-jae-
The president Syngman Rhee is visiting the front with Lt. Gen. Van Fleet.

Soksa-ri line around May 21. Immediately, the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps were ordered to attack Yanggu-Inje and Yangyang, respectively.

The ROK and UN forces thus abandoned their defensive posture and began an offensive toward the 38th Parallel.

2. Advance to the Kansas Line

(1) Drive to the Imjin River-Yongp’ryong Line

Having occupied the Topeka line connecting Munsan-P’och’on on May 20, the US X Corps on the western front launched an attack with three divisions abreast to secure Yongp’ryong on the Kansas line. It committed the ROK Ist Division to the Munsan axis, the US 1st Cavalry Division to the Tongduch’on axis, and the US 25th Division (with the Turkish brigade attached) to the P’och’on axis.
The ROK 1st Division attacked from the left front. Under the cover of the 15th Regiment which had secured a reconnaissance base in the vicinity of Wondang-ri, it launched an attack with the 11th and 12th Regiments on the left and the right of the road connecting Samsong-ri-Pongilch'on-Tonggo-ri, respectively. The 11th Regiment encountered and overcame the enemy’s light resistance in the vicinity of Kobong-san and advanced to Kumch'on via Ilsan. The 12th Regiment’s attack, however, stalled due to the enemy’s stiff resistance.

The enemy had established defensive positions in favorable terrain in the vicinity of Kwansan-ri, commanding the Samsong-ri-Pongilch'on road, and blocked the 12th Regiment’s advance with mortars. That afternoon, in order to disperse the enemy’s strength and support the 12th Regiment, Brig. Gen. Kang Mun Bong, commander of the ROK 1st Division, committed the reserve 15th Regiment to the middle of the operational zone.

After advancing to the vicinity of Chukwon-ri and Chiyong-ri on the west of the Kokrungch'on, the 15th Regiment crossed the Kokrungch'on around 17:00 and launched an attack in a northwesly direction. The regiment’s attack also stalled due to the enemy’s strong resistance in the vicinity of Hill 248 east of the Pongilch'on-Samsong-ri road. That night, however, Col. Kim An Il, commander of the 15th Regiment, took the enemy by surprise with a bold attack and occupied the hill around midnight.

At the same time, on the right of the ROK 1st Division, the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the US 1st Cavalry Division was engaged in a fierce battle with the enemy, but its attack was stalled in the vicinity of Chich’uk-ri. Concerned about an enemy surprise attack from the right flank, the ROK 1st Division stopped pursuing the enemy and switched to defense at the Naehwa-san-Myongbong-san line.29

Analyzing the situation that evening, the division commander concluded that the enemy was conducting a delaying operation to cover the withdraw-
all of its main units. He decided to block the crossing of the NKPA 1 Corps at the Imjin River and annihilate the enemy units within the operations zone.

He ordered the 11th Regiment to move quickly through Munsan with an infantry-armor task force and to occupy Choksong, a river-crossing site on the south side of the Imjin. He also ordered the 15th Regiment to occupy Kumgok-ri in the direct rear of the enemy in the vicinity of Pobwon-ri. Thus blocking the enemy’s line of retreat at two places, the commander planned to annihilate the enemy in the operations zone with a frontal attack by the 12th Regiment.

Prior to the planned attack, however, a battalion-strength enemy unit surprised the 11th Regiment preemptively in the vicinity of Oihwasan south of Pobwonri around 03:00, May 21. After a fierce battle, the 11th Regiment managed to repulse the enemy and switch to the attack. The 15th Regiment was not so successful. It came under enemy mortar and heavy artillery fire in the vicinity of Kajwahyon north of the Munsan-ch’on and failed to cross the Munsan-ch’on. Heavy rain that day limited the regiment’s movement, and as the stream swelled, a river crossing became impossible.

To make up for the failure on the previous day, the ROK regiments resumed the attack as morning broke on May 22. By this time, however, the enemy’s main units had crossed the river and fled north, and only security forces remained south of the river. The ROK regiments swept them out and returned to the Munsan-Pobwon-ri section of the Topeka line.

Although the ROK 1st Division failed to annihilate the enemy’s main units due to the enemy’s stiff resistance and lack of air and artillery support in the heavy rain, it was the first to occupy the Topeka line among the attacking units of the corps.

From the start of the attack, the US 1st Cavalry Division in the middle and the US 25th Division on the right met the enemy’s stubborn resistance and
unanticipated counterattacks. This unexpected turn of events delayed the penetration of the enemy’s main line of resistance between Tongduch’on and P’och’on. Finally, around dusk on May 23, a day later than the ROK 1st Division, the US 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Division managed to advance to the Topeka line near Kanap-ri and Sinch’on, respectively.\(^5\)

At this time, Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commander of the US 1 Corps, reattached the Canadian 25th Brigade to the US 25th Division. The Canadian brigade had arrived in Pusan in early May, and after a brief training period to get used to local conditions, it had been attached to the corps. Thus reinforced, the 25th Division was to attack Yongp’yong, the enemy’s expected assembly area, in the second stage of the operation.\(^6\)

Air reconnaissance and intelligence reports around this time, however, found that the NKPA 1 Corps and CCF 65th Army seemed to be withdrawing faster than the US 1 Corps was advancing. It thus became doubtful whether the coordinated infantry-armor team of the US 25th Division would be able to advance ahead of the enemy to Yongp’yong, about 16km away. Nevertheless, the US 1 Corps commander ordered his units to resume attack on the 24th and occupy the line Kansas on the north.

With Task Force, consisting of the US 89th Heavy Tank Battalion (minus), the 1st Battalion of the 27th Regiment, and an engineer company, leading the advance, the US 25th Division attacked and occupied Yongp’yong on the 25th. By this time, however, as the enemy had withdrawn to the north of the 38th Parallel the Division’s attempt to destroy enemy main force did not accomplished.\(^6\) The ROK 1st Division also resumed attack toward the Imjin on the line Kansas as its objective. As the enemy had already crossed the river, the ROK units occupied positions along the river without much difficulty. Thus, a month after the enemy’s April Offensive, the division returned to the banks of the Imjin.
Drive to the Imjin-Yongp'yong Line (May 20~27, 1951)

Around May 27, the US 1st Cavalry Division in the middle, continuing to attack from the Topeka line, occupied the Imjin-Chongok area, and the main units of the US 25th Division also advanced to the Chongok-Yongp'yong section of the line Kansas. Ending the pursuit operation, the corps commander ordered his troops to establish defensive positions along the line Kansas.

Although the corps failed to destroy the main units of the enemy in the operation, it successfully occupied Yongp'yong and drove the CCF 65th Army back to the Hant'an on the evening of the 25th. The operation thus
thwarted the enemy's plan to establish blocking positions along the Ch'ilbong-san-Haeryong-san to the south of Tongduch'on and block the offensive of the friendly units for 15 to 20 days."

(2) Drive to the Kap'yong-Hwach'on Line

Like the US I Corps on its left, the US IX Corps on the central-western front also launched an attack on May 20 to seize Hwach'on after occupying the Kap'yong Ch'unch'on section of the Topeka line. From left to right, the US 24th Division, ROK 2nd Division, ROK 6th Division, and US 7th Division started the attack. Despite the enemy light resistance from the first day, the corps maintained a cautious posture and advanced rather slowly. Maj. Gen. William H. Hoge, the corps commander, emphasized that the success of the operation depended on rapid maneuvering and urged his troops to advance to 3.5 km north of the Hongch'on River and maintain contact with the main units of the CCF by May 22. All four divisions, however, had yet to even reach the banks of the Hongch'on River.

The next day the Eighth Army commander adjusted the boundary between the US IX and X Corps narrowing the front of the X Corps, which had blocked the CCF's May Offensive on the central eastern front and joined the offensive. As a result, the US 7th Division of the IX Corps took over the Hongch'on area from the US 1st Marine Division of the X Corps. The commander of the IX Corps directed the 7th Division to advance along the Hongch'on-Ch'unch'on-Hwach'on road and attack the west side of the Hwach'on Reservoir. He also directed the ROK 6th Division to attack Kyegwan-san-Pukbae-san-Kadok-san Chiam-ri west of the North Han. In addition, he ordered the US 24th Division on the left to form a task force and quickly attack Kap'yong via the Ch'ongp'yong-Kap'yong road, under the cover of the ROK
2nd Division. After providing cover for the US 24th Division, the ROK 2nd Division was to advance to Taebu-ri and connect with the US I Corps on the left. In accordance with this plan, the X Corps carried out a coordinated attack at 07:00 on May 24.7

Realizing that the enemy was quickly withdrawing ahead of the friendly attacking units, the Eighth Army commander urged the corps to secure Hwach'on, a critical point on the enemy's withdrawal route. To maintain the pace of the attack, the corps commander stressed his units to bypass enemy groups below the company level.8

To facilitate a quick seizure of the line Topeka on the north of Kap'yong-Ch'unch'on and Hwach'on, the corps' ultimate objective, he also directed the US 7th Division to attack Ch'unch'on with mechanized units. Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, commander of the 7th Division, organized Task Force Hazel with the 7th Reconnaissance Company, an armored platoon, and an engineer squad, and ordered the unit to conduct a reconnaissance around Ch'unch'on.

When the task force started its attack, a regiment of the CCF 60th Army put up stiff resistance from blocking positions on a chain of hills from Sinjom-ri to Wonch'ang Pass on the south of Ch'unch'on. Delayed by this enemy resistance, the task force arrived in Ch'unch'on in the late afternoon. In the downtown and nearby hill areas, the task force attacked the withdrawing Chinese troops and killed or captured many of them.

Around this time, the US 7th Division commander was on his way to Ch'unch'on to see the task force in action, when he was ambushed by the Chinese in the vicinity of Sinjom-ri around 16:00. Fortunately, he was rescued by an armored platoon. In the evening, the task force returned from Ch'unch'on and was redeployed on the morning of the 25th.8

After sunrise, aerial observers reported that more than 10,000 Chinese
troops were assembled on the Ch'unch'on-Hwach'on road and its branches, and a number of Chinese were also located to the west and northwest of Ch'unch'on. It was later learned that these Chinese troops had taken Task Force Hazel for the leading attack unit and moved through the night to the assembly area to carry out a rapid withdrawal to the north of Hwach'on.

Beginning the morning, the US IX Corps delivered a devastating artillery and aerial attack on the Chinese, throwing the withdrawing units into chaos. Seizing this opportunity, the US 7th Division provided tanks and trucks to the 17th Regiment and made it the lead element for the corps attack. At this time, the 21st Regiment of the US 24th Division, after advancing to Kap'yong under the cover of the ROK 2nd Division, was continuing its attack along the Kap'yong-Chiam-ri road to make contact with the 17th Regiment.

While the adjacent US 21st and 17th Regiments were attacking Chiam-ri and Hwach'on from the left and right, respectively, the ROK 6th Division started attacking the mountain area between Kap'yong and Ch'unch'on north of the North Han. While the 2nd and 7th Regiments were attacking the enemy's defensive stronghold on the chain of hills between Kyegwan-san-Pukbae-san, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong, directed the 19th Regiment to turn around the enemy and advance to the rear of Pukbae-san to block the enemy's escape route.125

Following up on their earlier sightings, the aerial observers reported in the morning that some 10,000-12,000 enemy troops, with a number of vehicles and field artillery pieces, were moving in long columns through the ground below the Hwach'on Reservoir toward Hwach'on. The corps commander decided to occupy the road junction at the west end of the reservoir ahead of the enemy and to block the enemy's retreat while aerial strikes and artillery fire savaged the enemy formation. To achieve this objective, he directed the 19th Regiment, 6th Division, to continue to attack Chiam-ri from the west, and or-
ordered the main units of the 6th Division to assemble in Ch’unch’on and carry out an attack on the Hwach’on Reservoir with the US 7th Division.

Leading the attack, the 21st Regiment of the US 24th Division and the 17th Regiment of the US 7th Division joined in Chiam-ri in the morning of May 26. At the same time, the 19th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division also advanced to the vicinity of Chiam-ri. These three regiments forced the Chinese into a triangular trap defined by the Ch’unch’on–Hwach’on road, the Kap’yong–Chiam-ri road, and the ROK line to the south of Chiam-ri.

To block the enemy’s withdrawal route, the US 17th Regiment organized infantry-armor units and attempted to advance to Hwach’on. The enemy’s stubborn resistance and lack of air support due to heavy clouds, however, delayed the regiment’s advance.

Around the morning of the 27th, the Chinese attempted to break out of the trap in battalion-size units, but they were quickly annihilated by the ROK and US forces blocking the escape route. The Chinese no longer attempted an organized escape, but only wandered about in small groups in search of way out. After the US 21st and 17th Regiments advanced northward, the ROK 19th Regiment followed and, with the US 5th Regiment sent in as a reinforcement, carried out sweep-out operation and captured more than 2,000 enemy troops. On the 28th, as the 5th Regiment was carrying out the last phase of the sweep-out operation, the enemy surrendered in large groups, for a total to near 38,000. The enemy thus showed that they had totally lost the will to fight.

The overall operation of the corps was focused along the Ch’unch’on–Hwach’on road, which was critical to the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the south of the Hwach’on Reservoir to the northwest. This axis thus became the key to the success of the counteroffensive.

As heavy clouds and rain cleared in the afternoon, resumed aerial strikes inflicted heavy damage on the Chinese. Finally overcoming the enemy’s
resistance, the US 17th Regiment began to advance to Hwach'on at 14:00. Further advances, however, were blocked by the formidable resistance put up by a division of the CCF 20th Army.

The Chinese war history records: “On the morning of the 27th, the CCF 180th Division occupied Maebong on the right of Hwaak-san, but was encircled by the enemy, who occupied the Sach’ang-ri-Hwach’on line on the north. Shaken up and hesitant, the leaders of the division did not accurately assess the situation. By choosing to break through in separate groups instead of seeking to penetrate the gaps of enemy positions by massing the strength, the troops suffered heavy damage.” In fact, the CCF 180th was totally encircled and collapsed in this battle.

In the meantime, the ROK 6th Division (minus 19th Regiment) had moved to the south of the Hwach’on Reservoir and started its attack on the 27th. After repulsing the enemy, the division advanced to the line Kansas connecting Kumanri power station and Pyongp’ung-san.

Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong recalled: “We pursued the retreating Chinese, and picked up Chinese troops from the roadside into the truck as if collecting garbage. Our platoon-strength units staged an interesting scene by capturing the enemy’s battalion-strength units.”

Upon receiving the news of the victory, President Rhee commemorated the success of the operation by renaming the Hwach’on Reservoir P’aro Lake (literally, lake where barbarians were defeated).

In the meantime, the ROK 2nd Division defeated the Chinese troops on Hill 174 to the north of Ch’ongp’yong Lake and exploited this momentum to occupy the enemy stronghold on Homyong-san on the 23rd. On the 24th, according to the realignment of corps front the division provided cover for the US 24th Division’s advance to Kap’yong and took over the Hyon-ri-Wohnhong-ri-Kaeju-san area from the British 28th Brigade on the corp left front.
On the 26th, the ROK 2nd Division attacked Unak-san, which consisted of huge rocks, but was unable to make little progress from the start. The enemy used the rocks as cover, and friendly air strikes and artillery fire barely made a dent in the enemy's defense. Leading the attack, the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment organized special attacking teams and began to assault the
successive enemy positions with hand-grenades. After the division occupied Unak-san, the morale of the Chinese troops plummeted, and they began to disperse and retreat. The division pursued the enemy and advanced to Sokryongsan-Packjok-san on the 28th via Ch'onggye-san, Kangssi-bong, Chokmok-ri, and Sumil-ri.

In this process, the 2nd Platoon, 1st Company, 31st Regiment, which was attacking Hill 174 commanding the Ch'ongp'yong-Kap'yong road, lured two enemy companies to an open area and annihilated them. It became the first ROK unit to receive a US presidential award.

Aerial reconnaissance on May 28 confirmed that there was no enemy on the south side of the Hwach'on Reservoir, and the ROK 6th Division also confirmed the withdrawal of the enemy's main units from the west side of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Thus, the drive to Kap'yong-Hwach'on line of the US XX Corps came to an end, and the corps now began to focus on the defense of the line Kansas.

Although the Chinese units coming from the US XX Corps zone escaped encirclement due to the delayed occupation of Hwach'on, the XX Corps achieved a spectacular victory by killing and wounding or capturing a total of 62,000 enemy troops during the counteroffensive. For its part, the corps suffered 341 KIAs, 2,011 WIAs, and 195 MIAs.

(3) Drive to the Yanggu-Inje Line

As the war situation seemed to improve on May 22 with the blocking of the CCF May Offensive by the US XX Corps on the central eastern front, the Eighth Army commander decided to switch to an offensive after narrowing the defensive front of the XX Corps. He ordered XX Corps to advance quickly to the Soyang line, block the enemy's withdrawal route, and envelop and destroy the
enemy in the zone as well as to block the enemy’s reinforcement.

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander of the US X Corps, set up an attack plan to use two of his divisions to occupy Yanggu and Inje, two strategically important towns located on the enemy’s main supply route along the Hongch’on-Inje-Kansong road. He planned to use a third division to destroy the enemy trapped on the south side of the road. In accordance with this plan, the US 1st Marine Division (with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment) would advance to the west of the Hangye-Inje road and occupy Yanggu, while the US 2nd Division (with the US 187th Airborne Regimental combat team and the 3rd and 5th Regiments of the ROK 7th Division) would advance to the east of the Hangye-Kansong road and occupy Inje. Also, after occupying Undu-ryong, the US 3rd Division (with the ROK 8th and 9th Division) would occupy Ch’angch’on in the vicinity of the junction between the Soksa-ri-Hyon-ri and Habae-jae-Yang- yang roads. As the corps reserve, the ROK 5th Division and 7th Division (minus two regiments) would continue to reorganize at Haanhung-ri and Yudong, respectively.

Having completed the preparations, the attacking units launched a coordinated attack at 08:00 on May 23. Due to the rough terrain and the enemy’s stiff resistance, however, they made little progress. Urged by the Eighth Army commander to advance, the corps commander ordered the US 2nd Division to organize a task force around two tank companies and to seize the bridge on the Soyang at Umyang-ri as soon as possible.

Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, commander of the US 2nd Division, organized Task Force Gerhardt with two tank companies and the 2nd Battalion of the 187th Airborne Regiment. One tank company each was provided by the 72nd Tank Battalion, which had reinforced to the 187th Regiment advancing to the Hangye-Inje road, and the 64th Tank Battalion, which was attached to the division. As the arrival of the tank company of the 72nd Tank Battalion
was delayed, however, the attack did not get underway until noon of May 24. Upon reaching the north of Hangye, the advance unit called off the attack temporarily to check the road. They recalled that antitank obstacles laid by the Chinese had inflicted heavy losses on the friendly units in the previous withdrawal operation.

Observing this scene from a helicopter, the corps commander ordered Maj. Charles A. Newman, the point commander, to continue to move his tanks forward at maximum speed and to keep going until he reached enemy’s mine field. Seeing that his main units had yet to complete their organization, he urged that at least the tanks resume the attack as soon as possible.

Newman’s point force blazed north, according to the corps commander’s order, and was able to block the rear passage of around 4,000 disorganized Chinese troops on the retreat under punishing air attacks below Umyang-ri. Newman’s advance unit immediately fired on them, and the enemy hastily moved to the hills on both sides of the road or fled north across the Soyang River, leaving behind a litter of dead, supplies, pack animals, and vehicles.

The CCF War History records the situation as follows: “On the 24th, the enemy occupied Pup’yong-ri and Kuman-ri, river-crossing sites for the Soyang, and blocked the line of retreat, trapping the CCF 27th Army, IX Army Group, on the hills on both sides of the Hongch’on-Inje road on the south of Pup’yong-ri. Due to this development, friendly units could not carry out the original mission of blocking the enemy at the Soyang.”

The US 2nd Division pursued the enemy from that point on, and its 23rd Regiment secured a bridgehead north side of the Soyang-gang on May 25. Delayed by the enemy’s resistance, the 38th Regiment advanced to the vicinity of Hyon-ri. After the 23rd Regiment secured the Soyang bridgehead, the 187th Airborne Regimental combat Team became a corps reserve and assembled on the south of the Umyang-ri to organize Task Force Baker for rapid drive to
seize Kansong on the east coast.

At the same time, on the left of the US 2nd Division, the US 1st Marine Division could manage to advance only to Chaun-ri due to rough terrain and fierce battles with the enemy. The US 3rd Division on the right also could not make much advance either and was attacking from Hajinbu-ri-Soksa-ri with Ch'angch'on as the objective.

Although the overall progress of the attack was slow, the corps commander still entertained the hope of annihilating the enemy and pressured the US 1st Marine Division to occupy Yanggu. He also urged the 2nd Division to bridge the Soyang and seize Inje so that Task Force Baker could form and open its drive on Kansong. In addition, he planned to use the 3rd Division to encircle and attack the enemy in front of the ROK I Corps. To carry out this lower encirclement along the road from Hadaeje to Yangyang, Task Force Charlie was to be formed.

On the afternoon of May 26, after rain stopped, a close aerial observation of the operational zone revealed that the enemy troops and vehicles were moving en masse along the Hyon-ri-Inje road and the roadside to the north of Inje. Fighter-bombers carried out massive air strikes in the vicinity of Inje and Hyon-ri and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

Taking advantage of momentum, for the exploitation, the US 38th Regiment carried out a strong reconnaissance in the vicinity of Hyon-ri, but the resistance by the NKPA 19th Regiment, 13th Division, blocked the attack. Due to the enemy’s mines and the demolition of a bridge along the avenue of approach, Task Force Charlie from the US 3rd Division also made little progress toward Yangyang.

To encircle and annihilate the enemy’s main forces south of the Hangye-Inje road, the occupation of Inje was essential. The enemy, however, made the corps’ attack even more difficult by establishing a main line of
resistance between the Hwach'on Reservoir and Inje and by redeploying the NKPA II and V Corps in order to cover the withdrawing units.

The terrain between Hyon-ri and Inje was filled with the NKPA units withdrawing from the south and assembling there as well as stragglers in small groups on their way north. To encircle and annihilate the enemy there, the US X Corps commander on May 27 ordered Task Force Baker to leave the sweepout operation to the 23rd Regiment, its follow-on unit. The mission for Task Force Baker was to be focused on quickly occupying Inje and securing Kansong, in coordination with the ROK I Corps on the right.

Task Force Baker resumed the attack as ordered, but due to the enemy's strong resistance, it did not reach Inje until 14:00. The 38th Regiment's attack on Hyon-ri was also met with the enemy's strong resistance, and pursuit was made impossible by the mines placed by the enemy upon withdrawal. Task Force Baker's planned attack on Kansong was called off in the end because the ROK I Corps advancing along the eastern shoreline axis on the right had already reached Kansong.46:

To sum up, although the US X Corps inflicted serious damage on the main units of the communist forces, its delayed occupation of the Yanggu-Inje area allowed the enemy to escape.

(4) Drive to Yangyang-Kansong

By May 25, when the US corps on the central western and eastern fronts were conducting operations to advance to the line Kansas, the ROK I Corps had successfully repulsed at Taegwal-ryong part of the Chinese units which had advanced to Hajiinbu-ri. The corps could thus join the counteroffensive with the line Kansas as the objective.

Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, commander of the ROK I Corps, was pain-
fully aware of the loss of prestige for the ROK Army in the wake of the May Offensive, since the ROK III Corps and ROK Army Forward Headquarters were inactivated and the ROK I Corps also was placed under the operational control of the US XX Corps. He was resolved to restore honor for the ROK Army this time through his counteroffensive operations. Setting the Maeboksan-Kajan-ri-Inku-ri line as the objective in the first phase of the operation, the commander planned to carry out a parallel attack with the Capital Division on the left and the 11th Division on the right. The 3rd Division, newly attached from the III Corps to the I Corps, was set aside as a corps reserve at Songgye-ri, and the general ordered it to complete organizational maintenance as soon as possible.

The attacking units of the corps launched their attack around the Seoul-Kangnung National Road at 06:00, May 26. At this time, after suffering decisive damage at Taegwal-ryong, the 27th Army of the CCF XX Army Group and the NKPA 12th Division lost the will to fight and began a hasty retreat, for fear of being cut off by the US XX Corps on the left.

With its morale boosted by the victory at Taegwal-ryong, the 26th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division attacked Turo-bong-Maeboksan along the rough terrain on the north of Odae-san while the 1st cavalry Regiment carried out its attack on Pogyong-san. As division reserve, the 1st Regiment prepared to reinforce the attacking regiments from Chin-gogae. Overcoming sudden ambushes from small groups of the remaining enemy troops, the attacking units pursued the enemy through the rough terrain of Taebaek Mountain Range and advanced to Maeboksan and Pogyong-san on the 27th.

The ROK 11th Division, the right adjacent unit to the Capital Division, also launched a parallel attack on May 26 with three regiments, on the road by the Yongok-ch’on on the south of Chumunjin, with Kajan-ri-Inku-ri as the objective in the first phase of the operation. Encountering only light
The ROK forces is crossing again the 38th Parallel in the east coast defeating the Chinese Spring Offensive.

resistance from the enemy, the 9th and 20th Regiments passed the first-phase line and crossed the Namdae-ch' on. On the afternoon of the 27th, without shedding blood, they occupied Yangyang on the east coast corresponding to the eastern end of the line Kansas. The 13th Regiment at the center of the attack formation, however, encountered a battalion-strength enemy unit in the vicinity of Hawolch'on-ri on the south of Chumunjin. After a fierce battle, it repulsed the enemy at 02:00 on the 28th.

In the meantime, on the left of the ROK I Corps, the US X Corps' attack was making little progress due to the enemy's strong resistance. In order to disperse the enemy's strength in front and to occupy the strategically important town of Kansong on the east coast, the Eighth Army commander extended the ROK I Corps' sector boundary from Manwol-bong-Sorak-san to Hill 504 on the north. He urged the corps to occupy Hill 504-Parum-ri-Songjuk-ri line
The ROK I Corps in the eastern front is advancing toward Kansong 50 km north of the 38th Parallel. [May 29, 1951]

north of Kansong.

At the same time, according to aerial observation and reconnaissance reports, the NKPA II Corps had quickly committed the 13th Division to the Hangye-ri-Wont'ong line and a regiment-strength from the corps separate unit to the Madung-ryong-Misi-ryong line in the front of the corps. They provided cover for the withdrawing CCF and NKPA troops.

After confirming that a regiment-strength enemy unit was deployed in the vicinity of Sorak-san, Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup adjusted the lines for his corps. To take the pressure off Brig. Gen. Oh Dok Jun, who had recently taken over the command from Brig. Gen. Ch'oi Dok Sin, Maj. Gen. Paik ordered the 11th Division to attack the Sorak-san area. Having repulsed the enemy in this area in early May, 11th Division was familiar with the terrain in the vicinity of Sorak-san. General Paik also directed the Capital Division to attack Kansong, a good harbor on the eastern shore where strong resistance from the enemy
was expected. Having completed reorganization, the 18th Regiment of the 3rd Division was directed to attack the Karap'ì-Masan-ri area south of Sorak-san.\textsuperscript{46}

In accordance with this order, the Capital Division carried out its attack under the cover of the 9th Regiment, 11th Division, which had advanced to Hadomun south of Sokch'o on May 28. The 1st Regiment advanced to Yongp'ò-ri north of Sokch'o while the 1st Cavalry Regiment maneuvered to Samp'ò-ri and the 26th Regiment moved to T'ogyo-ri north of the Ulsan Rock. The 18th Regiment in the meantime took over the 20th Regiment's positions in the Songch'on-ri area. To attack Sorak-san, the 11th Division put the 9th Regiment near Sinhung Temple at the entrance of Sorak-san and assembled the 20th Regiment and 13th Regiment at Tunjon-ri and Kangson-ri, respectively. Having completed these movements, the attacking units prepared in haste to attack.

As dawn was about to break on May 29, the 1st Regiment of the Capital Division launched attack on Hill 504 northwest of Kansong while the 1st Cavalry Regiment on the right attacked Kansong. About the same time, the 20th Regiment of the 11th Division and the 18th Regiment, 3rd Division attacked Sinson-bong and Karap'ì, respectively. In attacking Kansong, the primary objective of the operation, the Cavalry Regiment had expected strong resistance from the enemy. The actual resistance, however, turned out to be surprisingly light, and the regiment was able to occupy Kansong at 09:30, less than 4 hours after the commencement of the attack.\textsuperscript{47}

Continuing the attack, the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the Capital Division advanced to T'ogijom-ri-Hwajinp'ò to the northwest of Kansong on May 30, while the 1st Regiment moved to Och'on-ri-Sinp'yong-ri to the southwest of Kansong, and the division reconnaissance company to Kosong. As for the 11th Division, the 20th Regiment advanced to the vicinity of Sinson-bong, and the 9th Regiment to the vicinity of Madung-ryong. Advancing along the Won'ong-
Drive to Yangyang-Kansong (May 26~31, 1951)
Yangyang road, the 18th Regiment of the 3rd Division reached Masan-ri via Karip'i.

When the operation of the corps was about to come to an end, the Eighth Army commander moved the corps' boundary with the US X Corps 10km to the west. Thus, effective May 30, the line connecting Hill 1098-Maebong-san-Tangjonggok-An-san-Kari-bong became the new boundary, and the ROK I Corps was to join the flank of the US X Corps at the coordination point of Tangjonggok. The Eighth Army commander directed the ROK I Corps to occupy the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge connecting Hyangro-bong-Hill 1079-Konbong-ryong in front of the Inje-Kansong road, the main supply route for the corps. He also emphasized that this line was the limit of advance for the corps.59

As the front of the corps' battle area was extended 10km to the west due to this measure, the corps commander adjusted the deployment of his units to fill the gap. He attached the 13th Regiment, the reserve for the 11th Division, to the Capital Division, and directed the Capital Division to defend the forward area connecting Tangjonggok-Hyangro-bong-Kojin. The flank and rear of the corps were assigned to the 11th Division (minus the 13th Regiment).

In accordance with this plan, Brig. Gen. Song Yo Ch'aa, commander of the Capital Division directed the 13th Regiment to take over the 1st Cavalry Regiment's positions northwest of Kansong, where there was only light contact with the enemy. He also ordered the reserve 26th Regiment to pass the 1st Regiment and occupy the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge and the 1st Regiment to occupy Tangjonggok-Maebong-san-Ch'iljol-bong. The 1st Cavalry Regiment was ordered to turn over its operation zone and to occupy Ch'iljol-bong-Hill 1166-Won-bong on the southwest.59 During this operation, only the 1st Regiment engaged about 50 enemy troops in the vicinity of Yongdae-ri. The other regiments occupied the assigned zones without any contact with the enemy.
and established defensive positions on the afternoon of May 31.

As for the 11th Division, the corps commander took the rough terrain into account and directed the unit to move by company. The 20th Regiment established defensive positions on the hills south of the Yongdae-ri–Misi-ryong road while the 9th Regiment set up positions on the ridge west of Sorak-san. The 18th Regiment of the 3rd Division was deployed on a commanding hill south of the Masan-ri–Karip’i road.

During the six days of the offensive operation, the corps not only secured the line Kansas but also established a line of defense along the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge by advancing a further 40km north to Kansong. As a result, a fan-shaped gap was formed between the corps and the ROK 5th Division on its left, which was under the control of the US 8th Corps. To prepare for a flank attack by the enemy, the troops strengthened their security system.

In short, by continuing their counteroffensive in late May, the ROK and UN forces inflicted heavy personnel and material resources on the enemy. The annihilation of the CCF 180th Division was the most devastating of these losses. The ROK and UN forces were able to secure the line Kansas again and thwart the enemy’s month-long Spring Offensive which had employed the enemy’s maximum strength. The lines were thus restored to the status quo ante bellum. Due to the delayed occupation of the enemy’s expected assembly areas in Yongp’yon, Hwach’on, and Inje, however, the planned grand encirclement of the enemy’s main strength did not materialize. Although the UN forces now had a great opportunity to block the enemy’s reorganization and make a transition to exploitation, they were unable to pursue the enemy due to the operational directive of the top leadership and had to settle for a limited offensive after establishing their defense line.
3. Securing of the Wyoming Line

The Kansas line was tactically suited to the defense of the 38th Parallel, but in order to fortify this line and maintain strategic depth, the commanding heights to the north had to be secured.

At the end of May, as part of this effort, the UN Command and the Eighth Army decided to secure the Wyoming line along Chonkuk-Ch'orwon-Kimhwa-Hwach'on and establish a double line of defenses with the Kansas line. An earlier attempt to secure the Wyoming line before the enemy's Spring Offensive had been unsuccessful. It was felt that the Kansas line could not be securely maintained as long as the Iron Triangle, the base of the enemy's offensive, was under enemy control. Accordingly, to remove this threat to the Kansas line and to cut off the enemy's main supply route from the Iron Triangle to the Hwach'on Reservoir and Ch'unch'on, the US I and IX Corps were directed to carry out a limited offensive operation toward the Wyoming line." The operation was named 'Piledriver' with meaning which drives piles into the ground to strengthen defensive capabilities of the frontline.

Having withdrawn north of the 38th Parallel, the enemy in the meantime came to realize that the UNC counteroffensive had become more limited offensive, and they began to organize stiffer resistance by committing reserves and assembling the withdrawing troops. The two sides thus began another bloody battle over the Iron Triangle.

(1) Drive to Ch'orwon-Kimhwa

The Eighth Army commander decided that the focus of the operation would be the seizure of the Ch'orwon and Kimhwa area by the US 1 Corps. As reinforcement, he transferred the ROK 9th division and US 3rd Division from
the US X Corps to the I Corps effective May 29. The I Corps adjusted the lines by deploying the ROK 1st Division on the south side of the Imjin: the US 1st Cavalry Division (with the British 28th Brigade attached), on the south of Chongok; the ROK 9th Division at Nudae-ri north of Yongp'yong; the US 3rd Division south of Unch'on; and the US 25th Division (with the Turkish Brigade attached), in the Top'yong-ri area.

While the ROK 1st Division was carrying out strong reconnaissance activities north of the Imjin, thus providing cover for the left flank of the corps, the main forces of the corps launched an attack on June 3. The US 1st Cavalry Division on the left advanced along the Chongok-Yonch'on road and attacked the Imjin on the northwest. The ROK 9th Division in the middle moved along the ridge connecting Hyangro-bong and Chijang-bong and attacked Kodae-san. Moving along the Unch'on-P'yonggang road, the US 3rd Division attacked Ch'orwon, while the US 25th Division on the left advanced along the Top'yong-Kumsong road and attacked Kimhwa.

Due to the enemy's strong resistance and deteriorating weather situation, the corps' attack began to suffer setbacks on first day. A downpour on May 30 and 31 turned the roads into pools of mud, and low clouds and fog limited close air support and ground observation. Relatively fair weather prevailed for the next two days, but heavy rain began to fall as soon as the corps resumed the attack and hampered troop maneuver and air and artillery operations. As a result, the corps' attack made little progress until June 5.

The enemy took advantage of this situation to reinforce defensive positions and establish a strong line of defense by committing the reserves. In the mountainous Kach'ihang-Chijang-bong-Kodae-san area, the objective of the ROK 9th division, a division-strength unit of the CCF 65th Army was providing cover for the withdrawal of the main units. To secure the time necessary to set up a main line of resistance in the rear, it occupied successive defense posi-
tions and attempted to carry out a delaying operation.

Brig. Gen. Ch’ôi Sok, commander of the ROK 9th Division, took the rough terrain and the enemy situation into account, and set up a plan to occupy Hyangro-bong with a regiment and carry out a subsequent attack on Ch’-orwon with two regiments abreast.

In accordance with this plan, the 28th Regiment launched an attack on June 5 from the Hant’ân-ch’ôn. Although the attack was temporarily stalled due to stubborn resistance from a battalion-strength enemy unit at the Kach’-ibang (Hill 713)-Hyangro-bong line, the regiment was able to overcome the enemy after a fierce battle and maintained the initiative. On June 6, the 9th Division committed 30th Regiment to the left front and attempted to launch an attack with two Regiment abreast. The attack, however, made little progress as the rough terrain of the operations zone limited movement, and the enemy established formidable defensive positions in the Chijang-bong area and put up strong resistance. Fighting a tough battle against the enemy’s stubborn resistance and unfavorable terrain from the first day of the attack, the 28th Regiment on the right finally secured Chijang-bong on June 7, the third day of the attack. By enveloping attack from the front as well as the two flanks, it was able to occupy Chijang-bong, which would become a foothold for the attack on Kodae-san.

Having overcome the enemy’s stubborn resistance in the strongpoints, the 9th Division expected to have little trouble occupying Kodae-san on the next day. Before morning broke, however, a battalion-strength enemy unit carried out a surprise attack on Chijang-bong. The 28th Regiment had to fight a fierce battle all day long. The 30th Regiment on the left also came under a series of surprise attacks from the enemy at critical points along the maneuvering route and made little progress that day.

When the 9th Division resumed attack on June 9, the enemy estab-
lished a defensive stronghold in the Hill 402 and Hill 638 area on the north of Chijang-bong and put up strong resistance. As a result, the division had to fight the toughest battle since the start of the attack. Carrying out close combat with grenades and bayonets, the 30th Regiment on the left was able to occupy Ch'onkwanggok on the north of Taegwang-ri, from which it was possible to command the road leading to Ch'orwon. For fear of having its flank exposed by the delayed advance of the 7th Regiment of the US 3rd Division to its right, the 28th Regiment, however on the right temporarily switched to defense.

Unfamiliar with moving in mountainous terrain and faced with stiff resistance from the enemy, the 7th Regiment of the US 3rd Division was only able to contact the 28th Regiment on June 11 at Sinhung-dong. On that day, the two regiments quickly continued with their parallel attack and overcame the enemy's light resistance. By occupying Kodae-san, the final objective, they were able to secure the Wyoming line.

Following the success of the US 1st Cavalry Division on the left, which had advanced to the west of Yonch'on, the ROK 9th Division was able to secure the Wyoming line between Ch'onkwanggok and Ch'orwon and to establish defensive positions on the ridge that commanded Ch'orwon from the south. This victory made up for the division's previous defeat at Hyon-ri and boosted the troops' morale.

In the meantime, on the right of the ROK 9th Division, the US 3rd and 25th Divisions had a tough fight with the enemy until June 8, as bad weather limited friendly aerial and artillery support and allowed the enemy to establish defensive positions in depth. As the weather cleared from June 9, however, a formidable attack resumed with close air support and massed artillery fire, and the enemy began to disengage from the line of defense in battalion-sized units. Seizing this opportunity to pursue the enemy, the 3rd and 25th Divisions were able to occupy the left half of the Wyoming line, between Ch'orwon and
Kimhwa.\(^{31}\)

After the main units of the corps advanced to the Wyoming line, the corps commander consolidated defensive positions along this line. On the 13th, an armored-infantry combined task force conducted a reconnaissance in P'yong-gang and found that the streets were empty, for the enemy was organizing a line of defense on the ridge to the north.

(2) Drive to Taesong-san-Ch'ui-bong

The commander of the US IX Corps had initially deployed the ROK
2nd Division, US 24th Division, US 7th Division, and the ROK 6th Division on the Kansas line along Paegun-san-Sach’ang-ri-Hwach’on Reservoir and defended the main line of resistance. For the advance on the Wyoming line, he decided to carry out an attack with three divisions abreast and keep one division as a corps reserve. In reaching this decision, he took into account that the operational zone between Kimhwa and the Hwach’on Reservoir was narrow and the mountainous terrain limited mobile space.

In accordance with his plan, the ROK 2nd Division on the left was to attack the road to the east of Kimhwa; and the US 7th Division in the middle was to attack the hill commanding the road to the south of Chokgun-san; and the ROK 6th Division on the right was to attack Ch’ui-bong, which commanded the nearby roads from north of the Hwach’on Reservoir. As corps reserve, the US 24th Division assembled in the vicinity of Sach’ang-ri.

Having completed troop redeployment and preparations, the corps launched attack on June 5 with the Wyoming line as the objective. Much like the US I Corps, however, the II Corps encountered stiff resistance from the first day of attack and made little progress, but the attacking units continued to advance toward the Wyoming line in spite of limited fire support, due to the rough terrain and adverse weather.

On the left, the 31st Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division advanced along a steep and rough ridge to the left of the valley corridor leading to Sach’ang-ri-Tamok-ri-Kimhwa. The 17th Regiment took over positions in the vicinity of Turyu-san from the 19th Regiment of the US 24th Division and advanced along the ridge to the right of the valley corridor. The 17th Regiment on the right encountered only light resistance, but the 31st Regiment on the left had to fight a series of battles against the Chinese in the Pokju-san area on June 6. After defeating the enemy in the course of seven engagements, the regiment carried out a surprise attack on Hill 853 to the north, killing 113 men and
capturing 20.\textsuperscript{17}

At this time, Brig. Gen. Ham Byong Son, commander of the ROK 2nd Division, switched the tired 31st Regiment with the reserve 32nd Regiment. Committing the 32nd Regiment to the left front, the division resumed attack. This time the 17th Regiment on the right encountered heavy resistance from the enemy at Hill 1041 on the north of Tacsong-san. Thanks to a bold assault by the 5th and 7th Companies, the regiment was able to secure Hill 1041 after fierce combat within the position.

After the division advanced to Pokju-san and Hill 1041 and got in position to attack Tacsong-san, the enemy began to carry out a delaying operation and withdraw. Pursuing the enemy, the 32nd Regiment occupied the Wyoming line in the vicinity of Yukdan-ri on the 10th, and the 17th Regiment secured Tacsong-san and advanced to the Kimhwa-Hwach'on road to reach the Wyoming line.

Tacsong-san was a key terrain feature for the defense of this area, as it commanded the important roads junction in the Kimhwa and Wasu-ri area and enabled observation up to Osong-san.

In the center of the corps operational zone, the 31st Regiment, US 7th Division, on the right turned over part of its zone to the 7th Regiment, ROK 6th Division, and advanced along the Hwach'on-Kimhwa road. When it came under surprise attack from a two-battalion-sized enemy unit at 03:00, June 7, north of Sinup-ri, the reserve 32nd Regiment was quickly put in and ended the crisis.\textsuperscript{18} On the 9th, the attacking units repulsed a battalion-strength enemy unit at a hill to the east of Tamok-ri. Continuing the attack, they reached the Mahyonri-Sabanggori road on the Wyoming line on the 10th.

Of the attacking units, the ROK 6th Division on the right fought the toughest battle. The mountainous area to the west of the North Han was the operational zone for the division. The 7th Regiment on the left took over the
area of operation from the US 7th Division and was to advance along a series of corridor ridges stretching from Paegam-san (Hill 1179) to Hwach’on, along Ch’ui-bong-Hill 922-Hill 887-Hill 643. The 19th Regiment on the right was directed to occupy the commanding hills of Il-san (Hill 1190) and Chae-an-san (Hill 1034) north of the Hwach’on Reservoir and to cover the right flank of the 7th Regiment.  

Directly facing the division at this time was the CCF 20th Army, which committed three of its regiments to set up delaying positions in stages in the Ch’ui-bong (Hill 989) area. As for the Il-san and Chae-an-san areas, there was only light enemy activity because these areas were surrounded by the North Han on three sides.

Upon taking over the positions, Col. Yang Chung Ho, commander of the ROK 7th Regiment, was informed by the US 17th Regiment commander that the enemy was putting up strong resistance from its outpost positions on Hill 643, the regiment’s first objective. Hill 643 not only had a rough terrain and dense forest, but also provided a commanding view of the major and minor ridges leading to Hwach’on. He was further informed that although the US 17th Regiment had attacked from June 3 to 5 with air support and flame throwers, it failed to capture this hill.  

After analyzing the reasons for the US 17th Regiment’s failure, the 7th regiment concluded that an enveloping attack would be more effective than a frontal attack. At 13:00, June 6, the regiment launched a double envelopment. Initially, the enemy’s stiff resistance seemed to stall the attack, but when the 1st Company advanced to the rear, the enemy troops, fearing encirclement, began to leave their positions. Seizing this opportunity, the regiment launched an all out assault and occupied the enemy’s position around evening. Some ROK Soldiers pursued the enemy but had to return when fog suddenly spread. Withdrawing to the successive positions on Hill 887 at this time, the enemy
troops joined reinforcements there to form a regiment-strength unit.

After securing the attack base, the 7th Regiment launched another attack from the front and the right flank in the pre-dawn hours of June 8. The steeply sloped Hill 887, however, offered only narrow maneuver space, and the enemy troops put up formidable resistance from their covered foxholes and connecting trenches that could withstand the Division's artillery bombardment. The unfavorable terrain and the enemy's resistance stalled the regiment's attack. To make matters worse, a heavy fog that day limited air and artillery support. Meanwhile, the enemy continued to consolidate the positions and reinforce their strength.

In spite of these terrible conditions, the 7th Regiment temporarily occupied Hill 887 for a moment but had to withdraw under the enemy's counter-attack. At this time, the 19th Regiment on the right managed to occupy Chae-an-san and began to threaten the enemy's left flank. When the weather cleared on the 9th, the 7th Regiment launched a frontal and double enveloping attack with all three of its battalions. Around noon, the 2nd Battalion destroyed a two-company-sized enemy unit and secured Hill 887. With the seizure of this objective, the regiment gained the initiative, and the enemy's morale began to decline.

On this fifth day of the attack, the 27th Artillery Battalion delivered out preparatory fires for an hour from 05:00 on the ridge between Hill 922 and Suri-bong (Hill 1057) in front and rear Ch'ui-bong. The 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, which was conducting a reconnaissance operation on the right, advanced to Tang-go-ri on the northwest of Ch'ui-bong and completed preparations to provide cover for the regiment. Launching an attack with three battalions abreast, the regiment overcame the unfavorable terrain and repulsed a regimental strength enemy unit. Thus occupying the Ch'ui-bong area, the final objective in the first phase of the operation, the regiment secured the attack.
base for Paegam-san.

Having suffered heavy casualties in the battle, the enemy fled 5-7km back to Paegam-san. The 7th Regiment in the meantime established defensive positions along the line connecting Hill 802-Ch’ui-bong-Hill 1057, and made contact with the 19th Regiment on the right, which had advanced to the vicinity of Tanggo-ri.

Thus, on June 11, the US VIII Corps secured the right half of the Wyoming line to the east of Kimhwa and began to consolidate defensive positions. A reconnaissance party confirmed that the enemy was still deployed south of Kimhwa.
4. Advance to the New Kansas Line

In late May, when the troops on the central-western front were preparing to attack the Wyoming line, the US X Corps advanced to the Kansas line, which connected the Hwach'on Reservoir-Yanggu-Inje. As the ROK 9th Division and the US 3rd Division were reassigned to the US 1 Corps around this time, the X Corps adjusted the lines. On the left, the reserve ROK 7th Division was committed south of the Hwach'on Reservoir. The US 1st Marine Division occupied the positions in the Yanggu area, and, to the east of the Soyang, the ROK 5th Division took over the positions from the US 2nd Division in the Inje-Wont'ong area. 50

After the readjustment of the lines, the Eighth Army commander wanted to maintain the line balance with the ROK 1 Corps in Kansong and secure Route 24 (Hongch'on-Inje-Kansong) as a supply route for the units on the central eastern and western front. For this purpose, he moved the Kansas line to the north of this road to a line connecting Hwach'on Reservoir-southern rim of the 'Punchbowl' (Hae An basin)-Hyangro-bong-Kojin, named the New Kansas line. As part of Operation Piledriver, the US X Corps and the ROK 1 Corps were ordered to secure this line.

The readjustment of the lines according to this plan would not only enable the two corps to use Route 24 as the main supply route, but would also make it possible to receive supplies from the Kansong harbor. It was felt that this operation would solve the problem of supply support on the eastern front where there was a lack of roads. Moreover, control of the Punchbowl would provide an attack base on the central eastern front and offer strategic advantages.

In accordance with this directive, the ROK 7th Division was to attack
Kunryanhyon on the north of the Hwach’on Reservoir. With the attached ROK 1st Marine Regiment, the US 1st Marine Division was to carry out an attack on the Punchbowl north of Yanggu while the ROK 5th Division was to attack the Sohwa-ri area north of Wont’ong.\(^6\)

With the ROK units forming the main forces of the attack this time, the US X Corps began to fight a fierce battle in rough terrain with the NKPA units to secure the New Kansas line.

(1) Kunryanhyon Battle

During the Chinese May Offensive, the ROK 7th Division had come under a concentrated attack from the main units of the communist forces and suffered heavy losses. While reorganizing as a corps reserve in the Haanhung-ri area, the 7th Division received the corps’ order to attack the New Kansas line. Taking over the operational zone of the US 1st Marine Division on the south of the Hwach’on Reservoir, the 7th Division returned to the line as the left front division on May 31.

Around this time, enemy corpses were lying on the ground in the Yanggu area, and contagious diseases like typhoid fever were threatening residents who had yet to evacuate from the area. Br. Gen. Kim Yong Bae, commander of the ROK 7th Division, took preventive measures against epidemics to protect his troops, and also took relief measures for civilians.\(^6\)

While consolidating the defense of the Kansas line south of the Hwach’on Reservoir, the division dispatched some units north of the reservoir on reconnaissance missions. On June 6, they received orders to secure Masok-bong–Hill 504–Hill 757 on the New Kansas line and set up a reconnaissance patrol base at Hill 731 and Hill 931 to the south of Paeksok-san.

The division commander noted that the operational zone, bordered on
the west by the North Han flowing into the Hwach`on Reservoir, was a rough, hilly area with limited mobile space. Accordingly, he decided to commit only the 5th Regiment for the initial attack on the New Kansas line. He planned to commit the 3rd Regiment after securing this line for the subsequent attack on the reconnaissance patrol base.

On the morning of June 7, the 5th Regiment moved from Naep`yong-ri to attack positions in the vicinity of Kach`angch`on south of Yanggu. While the regiment was preparing to attack, the regiment commander, Lt. Col. Kim Sang Bong, and his staff were observing the enemy positions in the vicinity of Hamch`un-ri to the north of Yanggu, when they came under the enemy’s massed artillery fire. The regiment commander and two officers as well as 16 enlisted men were wounded and had to be evacuated. Lt. Col. Kim Yong Bae was appointed as the new regimental commander.

The unexpected change in command somewhat dampened the morale of the troops. Recovering from the shock, however, the 1st Battalion attacked Masok-bong and the 3rd Battalion attacked Hill 757 on June 8. The enemy put up strong resistance from a number of blocking positions set up along the ridge on Hill 757. As the enemy’s positions were covered by rocks and dense forests, friendly artillery fire was ineffective. The 3rd Battalion made little progress, and as the sun was about to set, it had to withdraw. The 1st Battalion on the right was able to occupy Masok-bong without shedding blood. An enemy surprise attack that night, however, forced the battalion back to its original position.66

To secure Hill 757 at all costs, the regiment committed the reserve 2nd Battalion and resumed the attack. A heavy fog that day, however, hampered close air support, and fire support from the division artillery and the US 1st Marine Regiment on the right was not effective enough to overcome the enemy’s strong resistance. Only the 1st Battalion managed to recover Masok-bong
and secure a position for further attack.

With the 5th Regiment making little progress, the division commander directed the 3rd Regiment, which was defending the Kansas line, to pass through the 5th Regiment and occupy Hill 757. He also directed the 5th Regiment to support the 3rd Regiment by attacking Hill 504 on the left flank of Hill 757. The reserve 8th Regiment was ordered to take over the 3rd Regiment’s positions south of the Soyang-gang.

Designated as the new main attack, the 3rd Regiment moved to Kunryanghyon on June 10 and launched an attack at 09:00 after the close air support by the US Marine Corsairs and 155mm howitzer fire were completed. The supporting 5th Regiment also launched an attack from Masok-bong to Songgok-ryong (Hill 504) as its objective. Around 13:00, while the division was advancing to the hills, the commander of the US X Corps visited the troops to see the situation and directed the US 1st Marine Regiment on the right to provide additional fire support such as anti-tank guns. Due to the rough terrain and the enemy’s solid defensive positions, however, the close air support and 155mm howitzer fire by the Marines could not destroy the enemy’s positions.

As the sun was about to set, the attacking units were caught in a dilemma. Maj. Lee Jong Taek, commander of the 1st Battalion, felt that the enemy’s fire would take a heavier toll if his troops withdrew and decided to launch a night attack. The battalion set up a plan to carry out a surprise attack on Hill 757 with two special combat teams. At 21:00, receiving a shouted signal from the special combat teams, the battalion launched an all-out attack. A little after midnight, after fierce close combat, it was able to occupy the hill. While the 3rd Regiment was attacking Hill 757, the 5th Regiment was able to seize Songgok-ryong.

Resuming the attack on June 12, the 3rd Regiment pursued the lightly resisting enemy and advanced to Hill 917, from which a ridge to Paeksok-san
Battles at Kunyanggyon and Tosol-san (Jun. 3~18, 1951)

(Hill 1142) extends. The 5th Regiment also advanced to Hill 731. Turning the operational zone over to the 5th Regiment, the 3rd Regiment withdrew to the New Kansas line.

After this battle, the division occupied forward positions along Hill 731-Hill 917 in front of the New Kansas line between Masok-bong and Hill 757
and concentrated on reconnaissance activities. The enemy, for its part, concentrated on consolidating its positions in the Paeksoke-san area. As a result, with the approach of wet muggy July, the division front went into a lull.

(2) Tosol-san Battle

While the ROK 7th Division was starting the Kunryanhyon Battle, the US 1st Marine Division (with the ROK 1st Marine Regiment attached) on its right was attacking Taeam-san on the north of Yanggu. The ROK 1st Marine Regiment was undergoing troop maintenance as a division reserve at Won-dongjigok south of Yanggu.

Around this time, in accordance with the troop redeployment plan of the corps, the operational zone of the US 1st Marine Division was extended to the west of the Soyang. The 5th Marine Regiment, which had suffered heavy casualties while carrying out an attack on the mountainous area of Taeam-san-Tosol-san-Taeu-san, was moved west of the Soyang-gang, and the ROK 1st Marine Regiment was committed to the 5th Marine Regiment’s zone.69

Along the ridges from Kwangch’idong to Taeam-san, the objective of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, the NKPA 12th Division had occupied favorable terrain. On major hills, the enemy had set up individual and crew-served weapons positions which were strong enough to withstand air strikes and artillery fire. In addition, along the ridge paths, the enemy had buried numerous mines.

On June 4, with Taeam-san as the objective, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment launched an attack in a two-battalion abreast under air and artillery support. Due to the rough terrain and the enemy’s strong resistance, however, the regiment called off the attack at sunset. To disperse the enemy’s strength, Col. Kim Dae Sik, regiment commander, committed the reserve 3rd Battalion
to the right front for a three-pronged attack.

The regiment resumed its attack on the 5th, but the more the regiment advanced, the stronger the enemy's resistance became. Steep slopes also limited movement to ridge paths. To make matters worse, the heavy fog typically found in mountain areas hampered fire support and hampered the regiment's attack. A number of casualties resulted.

As these kinds of conditions were repeated for six days, the US 1st Marine Division Commander pressed the regiment to advance in order to maintain the line's alignment with the adjacent units. The regiment committed its companies in succession and struggled in vain to break through the enemy's main line of resistance between Hill 1121 and 1175. In this process, 2nd Lt. Lee Keun Sik, a platoon leader in the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, destroyed the enemy's light machine-gun position with a bold assault. The 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, managed to occupy the enemy's stronghold at Hill 1121 for a while, but had to disperse and withdraw under the enemy's counterattack just before reinforcements arrived. 36

The regimental commander held an emergency operational meeting on the 10th and decided to plan a night attack to take the enemy by surprise. Aware of the regiment's inexperience with night attacks, the commander of the US 1st Marine Division initially opposed this plan. The regimental commander, however, pleaded with him and finally won his approval. 37

Knowing that this operation would determine the fate of their regiment, the troops completed preparations with grim resolve. At 02:00, June 11, the regiment launched blackout nonsupport night attack along the now-familiar terrain through previous repeated battle. The attacking units encountered surprisingly little resistance from the enemy and were able to occupy the enemy's 'impregnable' line of resistance in three hours.

It was later learned from a POW's account that the NKPA 12th Divi-
sion had deployed only a small number of troops as a security force and let the main units sleep in the rear. The enemy troops did not expect that the ROK 1st Marine Regiment would use a night attack, their own specialty, against them.

With its morale now sky-high, the 1st Marine Regiment pursued and repulsed the enemy. The regiment advanced to the New Kansas line at Taecamsan and made contact with the US 5th Marine Regiment on the right. On June 14, when the ROK 1st Marine Regiment was consolidating its positions and undergoing troop maintenance with new recruits, the division commander ordered the regiment to occupy Tosol-san, which commanded the Punchbowl from the south. To support the ROK 1st Marine Regiment's attack, the US 1st Marine Division committed the US 7th Marine Regiment to its left.

As the ridge path from Taecamsan to Tosol-san was narrow, the commander of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment planned the operation in phases by battalion. On June 15, in accordance with this plan, the 2nd Battalion led the attack. Although dense fog limited visibility to less than one meter, there was little enemy activity and the battalion was able to occupy the intermediate objective hill. After the 2nd Battalion secured the base for attack, the 3rd Battalion began to carry out an attack on Tosol-san. As the battalion's avenue of approach was narrow, air and artillery support, though threatening, was not very accurate. When the 3rd Battalion launched its attack on June 17, the enemy poured mortar barrages and resisted stubbornly. Undaunted, the battalion dug connecting trenches like a mole and approached the enemy's positions. Finally, in the pre-dawn hours of the 19th, the battalion launched its attack and occupied Tosol-san. The 1st Battalion, which had been waiting for attack orders, advanced past the 3rd Battalion to the ridge extending to the left from Tosolsan and took over part of the objective hill from the US 7th Marine Regiment.

In this battle, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment killed or wounded 2,263
A US Marine flame thrower wipes out an enemy pillbox on the central front while white phosphorus mortars shround the attack.

men, captured 42, and seized numerous pieces of equipment such as heavy machine-guns, mortars, and individual weapons. The regiment, however, also suffered heavy casualties, including 123 killed and 582 wounded. The regiment paid the price in blood to secure Taem-san-Tosol-san on the New Kansas line and thus dominated the Punchbowl from the south.

(3) Sohwa-ri Battle

While advancing to the Kansas line with the US 2nd Division, the ROK 5th Division took over the US 2nd Division’s operational area near Wont’ong in accordance with the troop redeployment plan of the US X Corps. As the right front unit of the corps, the ROK 5th Division was to launch an attack with Hudok-ri-Hill 981-Sandugok-san (Hill 1019) on the New Kansas line
as the objective.20

On June 4, the 27th Regiment on the left carried out an attack on Myongdang-san-P’iyangdong-Hil northeast Sohwa-ri on the right side of the Sohwa-ri-Inje road, while the 36th Regiment on the right launched an attack on Hill 1242-Hill 1122-Sandugok-san west of the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge. Advancing along the avenue of approach on the ridge, the 36th Regiment encountered surprisingly little resistance from the enemy and secured a base for further attacks by occupying Hill 1242 north of the Wont’ong-Kansong road. The 27th Regiment, which advanced along the Soyang River valley path, however, met strong resistance from a battalion-sized enemy unit, and its attack stalled when it came under massed 122mm and 82mm mortar fire in the Myongdang-san area.

After the attack blocked under the enemy’s pillbox fire, Maj. Park Won Kwan, commander of the 3rd Battalion, ordered each company to resume the attack with a special attack team in leading equipped only with grenades. Thanks to the effort of the special attack teams, the battalion was able to secure Myongdang-san after five-hours of close combat that cost 136 enemy lives. At this time, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Min Ki Sik, found that part of the enemy blocking the US 5th Marine Regiment on the left was reinforcing the 4th Regiment, NKPA 2nd Division, facing the 27th Regiment. Also learning that the enemy was intending to carry out a delaying operation along the Nonjang-ri-Ch’ondo-ri line, General Min ordered part of the 36th Regiment to attack the rear of the enemy at Sohwa-ri.

While the 36th Regiment was carrying out an attack on Sohwa-ri, the 27th Regiment came under an enemy surprise attack which lasted for two days. With artillery support, the regiment repulsed the enemy’s threat after fierce combat. After the enemy withdrew, the 10th Company found a well-camouflaged and well-stocked armory in the Songhakdong valley to the west of the
hill. The regiment now understood why the enemy had carried out repeated counterattacks to recover Myongdang-san.\footnote{79}

The regiment continued the attack but made little progress due to the enemy’s determined resistance. The division commander noted that cross compartments of hills 700–800 meters in height provided the enemy with favorable terrain to conduct delays in succession against the 27th Regiment. To block the enemy’s retreat as well as possible reinforcements, he committed the reserve 35th Regiment to the Ch’ondo-ri area in the rear.

At the same time, the commander of the US X Corps pressed the division to attack in order to maintain contact with the adjacent units that had already advanced to the New Kansas line. The division commander also urged the 27th Regiment to seize the intermediate objective of Hill 851 and pressed the 35th and 36th Regiments to occupy Ch’ondo-ri and Hill 1122. On June 10, the regiments resumed their attack without air or artillery support due to dense morning fog, but could not easily overcome the reinforced enemy’s resistance and the unfavorable terrain.

Only the 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment was able to occupy the enemy’s stronghold at Hill 851 on this fourth day of the attack. In this combat, despite the enemy’s artillery barrage fire, Pvt. Won Kye Hui crawled through with 12 grenades and destroyed three of the enemy’s weapon positions. For his heroism, he later received a US Silver Star.\footnote{70}

The division resumed the attack on the 11th, but soon had to call it off due to dense morning fog. Guarding against an enemy counterattack, it waited until the weather cleared. On the 12th, the division launched an attack with the 27th Regiment from the front and the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment from the right flank. Fearing envelopment, the main units of the NKPA 4th and 6th Regiments began to withdraw from their blocking positions in the Ch’ondo-ri area. The division’s attack began to gain momentum.
On the 13th, the division quickly switched the 27th Regiment on the left into reserve and sent in the 35th Regiment to press on to the New Kansas line. The attack by the 36th Regiment on the right was repeatedly stalled due to the enemy’s strong resistance from Hill 1122, but on the 14th, thanks to close air support, the regiment was finally able to occupy the hill and secure the position for an attack on Sandugok-san. The 35th Regiment on the left advanced to the enemy’s rear area stronghold in the vicinity of Sohwa-ri and was about to reach the New Kansas line.

On the 15th, with the initiative in their hands, the 35th and 36th Regiments carried out an attack on the final objectives of Hill 840 and Hill 981, respectively, but their attack was blocked by the enemy’s resistance. On the 17th, after troop reorganization and rest, the attacking units staged the decisive battle and occupied the hills after fierce close combat. Finally, after 14 days, the division was able to occupy the New Kansas line. Conducting reconnaissance in force operation along the Soraji-Songnopyong-Ihyonri line, the division consolidated its defensive positions along the main line of resistance.\textsuperscript{17}

A mountainous area in the central eastern part of Korea, the operational zone of the US X Corps had rough terrain and limited maneuvering space. In particular, as the roads were cluttered with mines and were narrow, engineers had to work hard to secure a route for supply vehicles. Heavy rains during this period led to avalanches and compounded the problem. Having occupied favorable hills, the enemy put up strong resistance from their well-organized defensive positions on the hills and repeatedly carried out counterattacks. Overcoming these terrible conditions, however, the attacking units were able to occupy Masok-bong-Songgok-ryong-Hill 757-Tosol-san-Hill 916-Hill 981 on the New Kansas line and establish defensive positions there. Maintaining contact with the adjacent corps, the US X Corps began to focus on reconnaissance activities.
(4) Hyangro-bong Battle

The ROK Capital Division, ROK I Corps, advanced to the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge at the end of May. After deploying the 1st Regiment at Tangjonggok-Ch’iljol-bong, the 1st Cavalry Regiment at Won-bong, and the 26th Regiment at Hyangro-bong-Konbong-ryong, the division concentrated on building formidable defensive positions and conducted a reconnaissance in force in the front area. On the right of the division, the ROK 11th Division was defending the main line of resistance north of Kansong. On the left, the ROK 5th Division, under the control of the US X Corps, was preparing to advance to the New Kansas line from the Inje-Wont’ong line.

Facing the ROK Capital Division and occupying the Sohwa-ri-Sandugok-san area was the 19th Regiment, NKPA 13th Division, which was providing cover for withdrawing CCF and NKPA troops from the central-eastern front. Air strikes by the UN Air Force and a series of defections took a heavy toll on the enemy’s morale. When the ROK 5th Division from the front and the ROK Capital Division from the Hyangro-bong Mountain Ridge threatened an enveloping attack, the enemy sent in reinforcements and strengthened flank security.

At 15:00, June 3, a company-sized enemy unit launched a pre-emptive surprise attack and attempted to break through the main line of resistance of the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, in the vicinity of Ch’iljol-bong. The 1st Regiment committed the reserve 2nd Battalion to repulse the enemy. On the next day, taking advantage of a thick fog, the enemy once again struck. Under the cover of strong mortar fire, the enemy attacked the outpost positions of the 1st Cavalry Regiment at Sandugok-san and Hill 1209 in front of Won-bong as well as the positions of the 1st Regiment at Ch’iljol-bong.

From 09:00, the 1st Regiment fought a fierce battle throughout the
morning against a battalion-sized enemy unit in the Maebong-san and Ch’-iljol-bong area and managed to repulse the enemy. The 1st Cavalry Regiment, however, had to given up the outpost positions and return to the main line of resistance after it was threatened by continuous enemy reinforcements.

In the meantime, the corps commander directed a part of the ROK Capital Division to attack Sohwa-ri in support of the left adjacent ROK 5th Division, a town critical to the defense of the enemy’s rear. At 06:00, June 6, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, in the vicinity of Hill 1166 and the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, in the vicinity of Ch’iljol-bong launched attack along the valley path connecting Ch’iljol-bong-Taegok-ri-P’yongch’on. The attacking units, however, had to return to their original positions when they encountered stiff resistance from a two-battalion-strength enemy unit.

By this time, the activities of the communist troops left behind in the rear of the ROK 1 Corps had declined to a negligible level, but the enemy activities in front were gradually on the increase. In order to consolidate the main line of resistance, the corps commander adjusted his troop deployments. The 9th Regiment, 11th Division, which had been defending the rear flank of the corps in the Taesung-ryong area, was redeployed to the north of Kansong. The 20th Regiment, which had been defending Yongdae-ri-Misi-ryong, was attached to the ROK Capital division and took over the 1st Regiment’s positions at Tangjonggok-Maebong-san. Thus, along the main line of resistance connecting Tangjonggok-Hyangro-bong-Konbong-ryong-Kojin on the New Kansas line, the corps deployed, from left to right, the 20th, 1st, 1st Cavalry, 26th, 13th, and 9th Regiments and consolidated the defense of the main line of resistance.79

Around 09:30, June 8, while the Capital Division was concentrating on consolidating its defensive positions, the enemy delivered massed howitzer and mortar fire on Hyangro-bong and Hill 1079 to its north. A little while later, through the fog, a battalion-sized enemy unit approached Hill 1079 defended
by the 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment. Fierce close combat ensued with foes and friends all tangled up.

As the situation of the 1st Battalion deteriorated, the 1st Cavalry Regiment commander, Col. Lee Yong, sent in the reserve 3rd Battalion to Hyangro-bong as reinforcement. Also, as the rough mountainous terrain made the supply of ammunition extremely difficult, the division commander organized a makeshift ammunition platoon with administrators from the division headquarters and supported the regiment.  

Although the enemy’s surprise attack resulted in a temporary partial rupture of the main line of resistance, the 1st Battalion recovered its fighting spirit after the reinforcement from the 3rd Battalion and was able to repulse the enemy by evening. After the enemy retreated, it seized much of the enemy’s equipment, including heavy firearms. The enemy’s attack on Hyangro-bong resumed on the 9th and the 10th, but the regiment was able to repulse each threat with massed fire. In the end, the enemy lost its main strength in this battle and withdrew to Kosong-ri. Concluding the ten days of fierce combat on June 12, the Capital Division seized the enemy’s stronghold at Sandugok-san and Hill 940 to the west of Hyangro-bong.

Commanding the Nam-gang to the north and Sohwa valleys to the west, and connecting to Kumkang Mountain, Hyangro-bong was the most important terrain on the eastern front. The two opposing sides of the war exerted all their effort to secure this hill, and the victory of the ROK Capital Division in this battle was highly regarded. In particular, the courage of the division troops in repulsing the enemy’s eight counterattacks was reported to the United Nations.  

By securing the Wyoming line on the central western front and the New Kansas line on the central eastern front, the ROK and UN forces advanced to the line connecting the lower estuary of the Han-Munsan-
III. The Effect of Communist China's Entry into War

Chongok-Yonch'on-Ch'orwon-Kimhwa-Sanyang-ri-Punchbowl-Sohwa-Kojin. At this time, the units to the east of Chongok were deployed 16-48km forward of the Kansas line. This new line represented the defensive line in preparation for the armistice planned by the UN forces as well as the limit of advance for the limited offensive designed to force the enemy to the negotiating tables.

The Communist forces, already driven into a corner due to their failed Spring Offensive, reluctantly had to accept armistice negotiations as a way out after this second counteroffensive by the UN forces. Using armistice negotiations as bait, the Communist forces began to take measures to save face and build up strength to turn the tide of the war.

III. The Effect of Communist China's Entry into War

1. Chinese Communist Forces' Entry and Subsequent Development of the War

(1) CCF's Entry

In mid-October 1950, when Kim Il Sung and the North Korean People's Army were fleeing to North P'yongan and Hamgyong Provinces after falling P'yongyang to the UN forces, Communist China organized 'a volunteer army' from its elite regular army units and entered the war to rescue the Kim Il Sung regime and communize the entire Korean Peninsula by driving out the UN forces.

Under the Cold War framework, Kim Il Sung, Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung had already discussed plans to communize the Korean Peninsula. In
April 1950, in completing the war plans at a Moscow meeting with Kim Il Sung, Stalin defined the war as 'a joint task between Korea and China' and approved of Kim Il Sung's plan on the condition that he secure China's agreement. At the Beijing meeting in May between Kim Il Sung and Mao Tse Tung, Mao, after personally confirming Stalin's intent, agreed to Kim's war plan and made promises to extend active support. The most important of these promises was his confirmation that "if the US Forces enter the war in support of South Korea, the Communist Chinese Forces would be dispatched to drive the US Forces out of the Korean Peninsula."

Soon after Mao finalized the war plans with Kim, Communist China began to make preparations to enter the war and move a part of the central strategic reserve to the Manchurian region. When North Korea launched the war of aggression, Communist China postponed even the task of recover Taiwan, which it had pursued as the final objective of the revolution, and decided to organize a supporting force (Northeast Border Defense Army) centered around the 13th Army Group. By the end of August, Communist China had moved all central strategic reserve units to Manchuria and organized a large-scale army consisting of 255,000 men.

In the early phases of the war, Communist China, together with the Soviet Union, claimed that the UN resolutions regarding Korea were illegal and they made diplomatic maneuvers to block the sending of UN forces to Korea and to help North Korea achieve its war objectives. When America's unexpectedly rapid and forceful response in the initial phase of the war and the entry of the UN forces blocked the NKPA's advance at the Naktong, however, Communist China began to consolidate the Northeast Border Defense Army and to hasten war preparations.

On October 1, 1950, the day that the ROK Armed Forces were commencing the operation to advance into the north after the Inch'on Landing had
turned the tables, Stalin urged Mao to dispatch the Chinese Communist Forces. On the same day, Mao received a direct request for assistance from Pak Hon Yong, who was visiting Beijing.

Although Kim Il Sung had requested Stalin to send in the Soviet or International Communist Forces, Stalin wanted to avoid a direct collision with the United States. Reminding Mao that the Korean War had been defined as ‘a joint task for Korea and China,’ Stalin argued that the sending of Chinese Communist Forces should receive priority.

After a sleepless night of anguish following the festive first anniversary of the communist regime in China on October 1, Mao finally decided to enter the Korean War on October 2. At the time, Communist China was in a very difficult situation, faced with the political task of integrating the nation, the economic task of rebuilding industry after the long civil war, and the military task of building up the Navy and the Air Force to move away from the army-heavy structure.

In spite of facing these difficulties, they heralded that 'door destroyed, house in danger,' and "secure home, defend country" and decided to enter the war of 'Resist America, Assist Korea.' However, it would be only a excuse for a war, and real causes of entering the Korean war were derived from their traditional thought. Coming out of their inherited idea of "China is the center of the world," they asserted that they had to play a important role in the expansion of the Asian communism under the antagonistic situation between the communism and democracy. These communist’s compulsory ideology functioned multiple effect in materializing the participation. And their decision was based on the estimates that, through the participating the war, the guarantee of the Soviet support in virtue of Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty would rather solve the urgent internal problems and enhance the status of newborn Communist China.
On October 8, Mao Tse Tung renamed the Northeast Border Defense Army as the Chinese People's Volunteers and ordered the troops to cross the Yalu on October 15. Although the Chinese Communist Forces to be dispatched were composed of elite regular army units, they were called 'a volunteer army' rather than 'a supporting force.' Preparing for the possibility of war with the United States in mainland China as well as the Korean Peninsula, Communist China established a strategy to fight two campaigns and made war preparations under the support of the Soviet Union.

In the final Sino-Soviet negotiations before China's entry into the war, however, Stalin informed the Chinese that the Soviet Air Force's support of Chinese troops would have to be delayed by about two months due to insufficient preparations. Communist China was now caught in a dilemma. In the end, however, the Chinese felt that they could not delay entry and decided to send troops even without the support of the Soviet Air Force. Having been just established, Communist China's Navy and Air Force were not ready to fight a war at the time. On October 19, 1950, the day that P'yongyang was seized by the ROK and UN forces, the main units of the Chinese People's Volunteers secretly crossed the Yalu and entered the Korean War.

(2) Development of the War

China's entry was a total surprise and a great shock. Causing great confusion in the conduct of the war by the UN forces, it reversed the tide of the war. Communist forces seized the initiative and put the UN forces on the defensive. The UN side had not only failed to obtain national strategic intelligence on CCF's entry but also failed to secure battlefield intelligence on its crossing of the Yalu and forward deployment. Moreover, having concluded that China had already lost its best chance to enter the war, the United Na-
tions Command planned and carried out the operation without making proper preparation against CCF. Thus UN forces was completely taken by surprise and fell into serious confusion.

After crossing the Yalu, the Chinese Communist Forces established a Combined Headquarters, North Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers. Exercising operation control over the North Korean People’s Army, the CCF carried out an offensive with the so-called ‘human wave’ or ‘sea of men’ as the main tactic.

From the October Offensive of 1950 to the Spring Offensive of 1951, the Communist forces carried out a total of five large-scale offensives. The first offensive (October Offensive) secured a springboard for attack north of the Ch’ongch’on River. Striking back against the final offensive of the UN forces on November 24, the Communist forces made a transition to the second offensive (November Offensive) and forced withdrawal upon the UN forces. When the UN side carried out a total retrograde, the communist forces changed the initial plans and advanced in spite of the winter weather to reach north of the 38th Parallel by mid-December. On January 1, 1951, they launched the third offensive (New Year’s Offensive) and broke through the ROK and UN line of defense along the 38th Parallel. Although they were able to occupy Seoul and drive the UN forces back to the 37th Parallel (P’yongjae-Samch’ok line), heavy losses of personnel and equipment in the continued winter offensive and limited supplies made, the communist forces call off the offensive and begin to make preparations for a spring offensive.

During this period, the UN side experienced a great deal of confusion in conducting the war. While troops on the battlefield carried out withdrawal operations under a tentative plan to block the enemy in stages at successive lines of defense, the top wartime leadership discussed and explored various options, including escalation, ceasefire, and pullout. In the end, the top leader-
ship decided that the best option was to restore the pre-war status quo and end hostilities through an armistice under the initiative of the UN. The ROK government, of course, expressed its opposition to this armistice plan which would result in the redivision of the Korean Peninsula.

In order to prevent escalation and seek a peaceful resolution of the war, the UN forces supported the UN Armistice Commission established by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Receiving instructions from the Soviet Union, however, Communist China, rejected the UN proposal for an armistice. As the war situation became critical after 'the January 4 Withdrawal,' the UN forces defined the Chinese as aggressor and strengthened the UN's response. At the same time, to prepare for the worst-possible scenario, the UN forces drafted plans to pull the troops out and move the ROK government to an island, and considered partial escalation measures to implement these plans. For Korea, after the withdrawal to the Naktong line in the early phase of the war, this was the second time that the nation's very existence was at stake.

As the frontline stabilized around the 37th Parallel, however, the UN forces realized that the CCF was not in good shape and launched a counteroffensive on January 25, 1951. Advancing to the Namhan-san-Hoengsong-Kangnung line by the beginning of February and approaching Seoul, the UN forces were able to recover from feelings of defeatism and the top leadership became hopeful about the future prospects. The UN forces thus overcame the most critical phase of the war.

To block the advance of the UN forces and to hold on to Seoul, the Chinese launched the fourth offensive (February Offensive). While containing the UN forces on the western front, the CCF committed its main strength to the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis. Although the Chinese troops rushed to Hoengsong and Chip'young-ri, and were able to create an opening to Chech'on,
they were blocked by the UN forces at Wonju-Chip’yon-g-ri and thus failed to achieve their objective of posing a threat to the western front.

Continuing the counteroffensive, the UN forces occupied Seoul on March 15 and advanced to the 38th Parallel at the end of March, and in early April, they occupied the Kansas line stretching from the mouth of the Imjin River through the Hwach’on Reservoir to Yangyang. In mid-April, in order to consolidate the center of this line of defense, the UN forces carried out an offensive to secure the Wyoming line stretching from Ch’orwon and Kimhwa to Hwach’on.

The Chinese Communist Forces launched their final, fifth offensive (Spring Offensive) at this time. Committing the maximum number of troops, including new reinforcements from China, they advanced as far as Kup’abal north Seoul, in April and created a large penetration in the Hyon-ri area in May. The formidable firepower of the UN forces, however, once again inflicted heavy damage on the Chinese and spoiled their plans. Soon after blocking the Chinese attack, the UN forces reached the north side of the 38th Parallel and, in mid-June, recovered the line of defense extending from the mouth of the Imjin River through Ch’orwon, Kimhwa, and Hwach’on to Kansong. The UN forces had planned to secure this line of defense in preparation for a ceasefire in the future. The UN forces thus seized the initiative and put the Chinese on the defensive.

At the same time, the UN side was already pursuing armistice along this line. Under the leadership of the Soviet Union, the communist camp had also agreed to an armistice proposal with the 38th Parallel as a boundary, and was calculating the benefit and cost of various proposals.89

Thus, although the Chinese Communist Forces carried out a total of five offensives from their entry into the war in late October 1950 to late May 1951, and at one time managed to occupy Seoul and advance to the 37th Paral-
Although the UN forces went through a critical situation where they were almost forced to pull out around the time of the January 4 Withdrawal, they were able to repulse the communist threat and restore the status quo ante bellum. The tug of war between the two sides led each side to conclude that forcing its will upon the other side was impossible and would result in a colossal attrition of national power and a huge loss of personnel. As the two sides began to pursue a negotiated end to the war, the frontline was stalemate.

2. The Effect of Communist China’s Entry

First, from a national history perspective, the most decisive consequence of Communist China’s entry and invasion was that it blocked the opportunity to reunify the Korean Peninsula under a free democratic system, 5 years after the division following the liberation of Korea.

ROK and UN forces blocked North Korea’s southward invasion at the Naktong Line. Switching to a counteroffensive, they advanced into the North and annihilated the North Korean People’s Army through an all-out offensive in October and a final offensive in November. Some units had reached Ch’osan and Hyesanjin by the Yalu, and the rest of the ROK and UN forces were closing in on the Korean-Manchurian border.

The Korean people were ecstatic about the prospects of achieving national unification and complete independence. Communist China’s invasion, however, shattered this national dream of achieving unification. This would turn out to be the last opportunity during the war for the Korean people to achieve unification under a free democratic system. Communist China’s entry into the war denied the Korean people this happy outcome.

Second, Communist China’s entry had a decisive effect on returning to
status quo ante bellum, resulting in the redivision of the Korean Peninsula. Communist China's initial plan was to drive the ROK and UN forces out of the Korean Peninsula and establish Kim Il Sung's communist regime for all of Korea. The Chinese carried out a total of five offensives to achieve this objective, but suffered heavy losses during the Spring Offensive and failed to carry out their initial plan. The Chinese, however, secured the pre-war status quo and positively responded to armistice negotiations which would ultimately result in the redivision of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, Communist China's entry prolonged the war and turned it into a war of attrition. When the UN forces launched an all-out offensive at the end of October, 1950, the Korean War seemed to be nearing its end. Communist China’s entry and offensive, however, put the UN forces on the defensive and prolonged the war until it was deadlocked around the pre-war status quo at the end of June, 1951. Moreover, as the armistice negotiations dragged on for the next 2 years and one month before producing the final armistice, Communist China's entry, in the end, had the effect of prolonging the war by 33 months.

Fourth, Communist China's entry produced additional damage and left deeper wounds. As the frontline moved south from the Korean-Manchurian border to the 37th Parallel and then back north to the 38th Parallel, the Korean Peninsula suffered colossal damages. The country was not only severely damaged and ruined, but also suffered many casualties of the Killed, wounded, and missing. The number of refugees increased rapidly with the January Fourth Retreat. In particular, the exodus for freedom of North Korean residents occurred at this time for the most part, and produced ten million families separated by the war. Unable to meet their separated family members, these families continue to feel the pain to this day, almost 50 years after the outbreak of the war.
The refugees live in the deteriorated environment in the war. (above)
The children are being disinfected with DDT on their clothes. (below)
Fifth, Communist China’s entry turned the war into a fullblown international war. The Korean War had its roots in the expansionist strategy of the Communist camp after World War II, but initially it had the appearance of a civil war due to the southward invasion by the North. Following the collective security measures taken by the United Nations, it was transformed into a war between the North Korean People’s Army and the UN forces. Communist China’s entry, in effect, turned the war into one between the communist camp and the free world. By June 1951, Communist China and the Soviet Union (Air Force) had entered the war and other Communist Bloc countries including Eastern Europe provided medical and material assistance. From the free world, 16 UN member nations, including the United States and Britain, had entered the war while many other countries provided medical and material assistance. As combat units from 20 countries, including North and South Korea, collided, the Korean War turned into an international war. Narrowly escaping a catastrophe at the crossroads between ‘regional war and world war’ and between ‘conventional war and nuclear war,’ it was conducted as a limited war of regional, conventional war.

Unable to alter the Cold War balance, the two sides, after Communist China’s fifth offensive, were deadlocked in a situation close to the pre-war status quo around the 38th Parallel. Although the ROK government channeled all energy into repulsing the Chinese Communist Forces and made every effort to avoid the redivision of the peninsula, it was unable to change the situation. From this moment on, the Korean War was transformed into yet another form of war—heated battle at the stalemated front and a war of words at the negotiating tables—which oscillated between the flare-up and calm-down phase.
Notes

1) Line Kansas: a line that stretches approximately 186km from west to east, connecting the lower estuary of the Imjin River-Chongok-Hwach'on Reservoir-Yangyang.

2) Line Wyoming: a limit of advance for the UN forces, connecting the Imjin River bank west of Chongok-Ch'orwon-Kimhwa-Hwach'on Reservoir.


6) Schnabel and Watson, op. cit., p. 482.

7) Ibid., p. 484.


12) Ibid., p. 173.

13) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 469.
18) Billy C. Mossman, p. 465.
19) Ibid., p. 465.
20) Ibid., p. 465.
22) Ibid., p. 299.
23) Ibid., p. 302.
26) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 472.
28) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 472.
30) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 472.
31) Ibid., p. 478.
32) ROK Army Headquarters, History of ROK Army in The Korean War, vol. 6, 1957, p. 62
33) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 478.
34) Ibid., p. 480.
38) Ibid., p. 184.
39) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 480.
40) Ibid., p. 474.
41) Korea Research Institute for Strategy, tr., op. cit., p. 156.
42) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 484.
43) Ibid., p. 485.
46) Ibid., p. 231.
47) Ibid., p. 219
49) Ibid., p. 286.
50) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 486.
51) Ibid., p. 486.
52) Ibid., p. 491.
53) ROK Army Headquarters, *History of ROK Army in the Korean War*, vol. 6, p. 68.
55) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 492.
56) Ibid., p. 491.
58) Ibid., pp. 423-424.
60) Ibid., p. 450.
62) Billy C. Mossman, op. cit., p. 492.

64) Ibid., pp. 390-391.

65) Ibid., p. 425.

66) Ibid., pp. 430-431.

67) The US Marine Division has its own air wing in its organization. This is to secure close air support during landing operations.

68) Ibid., p. 435.

69) Ibid., p. 621.


71) Ibid., p. 133.


75) Ibid., p. 399.

76) Ibid., p. 405.

77) Ibid., p. 418.


80) ROK Army Headquarters, *History of ROK Army in the Korean War*, vol. 6, p. 113.


82) ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Soviet Documents*, vol. 4, p. 120.
# CHRONOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1950</td>
<td>Stalin requested Mao Tse Tung to send CCF troops to Korea. Kim Il Sung asked Mao to send troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>MacArthur demanded Kim Il Sung to surrender. ROK I Corps broke through the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>UNC ordered troops to advance into North Korea. Kim Il Sung ordered NKPA to put up resistance. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky sent an armistice proposal to the United Nations. Mao cabled Stalin about his decision to send troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Chou En Lai, through Panikkar, relayed Communist China’s intention to intervene in the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>ROK II Corps entered into North Korea in the central front. NKPA II Corps formed a second front in the Iron Triangle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>UN General Assembly adopted ‘the Oct. 7 Resolution.’ CCF reorganized the Northeast Border Defense Army into Chinese People’s Volunteers and issued order to dispatch it to Korea. Communist China informed North Korea and the Soviet Union of the organization and sending of Chinese People’s Volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>CINCUNC notified an ultimatum to Kim Il Sung. UN Forces began operations to advance into North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung ordered NKPA to fight to death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October</td>
<td>Communist China and the Soviet Union discussed Soviet air support for the CCF. ROK 1 Corps captured Wonsan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>North Korea's Park Il Woo visited Beijing to request assistance. Chou En Lai reported to Mao on the result of the Sino-Soviet discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mao suspended the sending of troops to North Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Interim Committee resolved to administer restored areas through military government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Communist China decided to send troops without Soviet air support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Mao ordered the Chinese People's Volunteers to cross the Yalu on Oct. 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Mao ordered the advance party of the Chinese People's Volunteers to cross the Yalu on Oct. 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truman held a conference with MacArthur at Wake Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>CCF's advance party crossed the Yalu. ROK III Corps was activated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A martial law was declared in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>CCF's main strength once again suspended river-crossing. ROK 1 Corps recovered Hamhung-Hungnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>CCF's main forces were once again ordered to cross the Yalu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>CCF's main forces started crossing the Yalu. ROK and UN forces captured P'ongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team landed at Sukch'on-Sunch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist China established the Chinese People's Volunteers HQ at Taeyudong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October 1950</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung held a conference with Peng Teh Huai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>UN forces launched an all-out offensive (Thanksgiving Day Offensive).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MacArthur abolished the limit of advance for UN forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK II Corps launched an attack with Ch'osan and Manp'o'jin as objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>CCF launched its 1st offensive (October Offensive).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCF's entry into the Korean War was confirmed (Chinese POWs seized by ROK 1st Division)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 6th Division engaged in a battle at Onjong-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>CCF's additional units (50th and 66th Armies) began crossing the Yalu.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 6th Division (7th Regiment) entered Ch'osan by the Yalu.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US X Corps landed at Wonsan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK and UN forces advanced as far as Pakch'on, Taech'on, Unsan, Onjong-ri, Huich'on, and Iwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK II Corps collided with massive CCF units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>US 7th Division landed at Iwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>President Syngman Rhee visited P'yongyang for a welcoming rally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November 1950</td>
<td>EUSA started withdrawing to the south of the Ch'ongch'on River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN fighters engaged in a first air battle with CCF fighters over Shinuiju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>EUSA decided to withdraw to the south of the Ch'ongch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US 1st Marine Division (7th Regiment) took over the operation area from ROK 26th Regiment at Sudong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>ROK 1st Division moved from Unsan to Anju, as corps reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 November</td>
<td>ROK 7th Division repelled a Chinese division at Piho-san. US IX Corps moved to Sunch'on and advanced to the western front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>British 27th Brigade repelled CCF troops at Pakch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>ROK Capital Division occupied Kilju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>CINCUNC criticized CCF's entry into the Korean War. CINCUNC ordered the bombing of the Yalu Railway Bridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>ROK 6th Division (7th Regiment) completed withdrawal from Ch'osan to Kaech'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>CCF IX Army Group started crossing the Yalu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Six nations, including the US, submitted to the UN Security Council a resolution to demand the withdrawal of CCF troops from Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12nd</td>
<td>ROK Capital Division engaged NKPA at Orang-ch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>US 7th Marine Regiment advanced to Hagaru-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>President Rhee visited Hamhung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>US 7th Division (17th Regiment) entered Hyesanjin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>US 7th Division (32nd Regiment) advanced Shingalp'ajin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>ROK 3rd Division occupied Hapsu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>EUSA launched its final offensive (Christmas Offensive).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK and UN attacks on the western front were stalled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCF launched its 2nd offensive (November Offensive).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK Capital Division occupied Ch'ongjin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUSA started withdrawing to the Ch'ongch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 3rd Division occupied Paegam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1950</td>
<td>US 2nd Division engaged CCF troops at Kujangdong. ROK II Corps' main line of resistance collapsed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>US 1st Marine Division started attacking Mup'yong-ri from Changjin Reservoir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>UNC held an emergency meeting and decides to withdraw to P'yongyang, Wonsan and Hamhung. Turkish Brigade fought its first battle against CCF troops at Wawon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US 2nd Division started the Kunu-ri battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>ROK 3rd Division (26th Regiment) took over the Hyesanjin positions from the US 17th Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>Truman mentioned the possibility of using atomic bombs in Korea, depending on the situation. ROK 3rd Regiment failed to break through the enemy's blocking positions on the south of Kunu-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 1950</td>
<td>US 2nd Division broke through the CCF's encirclement at Kunu-ri. ROK I Corps, while on the way to Musan and Unggi, started withdrawing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUSA established a defensive line along Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songsch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>EUSA established a line of defense for P'yongyang along the Sunan-Sungch'on line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>US-Britain summit was held. ROK and UN Forces withdrew from P'yongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>ROK and UN Forces launched operations to withdraw to the 38th Parallel. US 7th Division completed withdrawal from Hyesanjin to Shinhung-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>ROK government declared a nationwide martial law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December</td>
<td>ROK Navy began evacuation operations for refugees on the western coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>President Rhee requested the US to equip 500,000 ROK troops.  US-Britain summit agreed on a peaceful resolution of the Korean War.  UNC decided to withdraw to the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st</td>
<td>President Rhee demanded UN to punish Communist China.  President Rhee announced resolve to defend Seoul to the end.  US 1st Marine Division completed withdrawal from Yudamri to Hungnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13rd</td>
<td>UN Political Commission adopted a 13-nation proposal for a Korean armistice.  ROK III Corps HQ moved to Yangp’yon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>ROK I Corps and US X Corps began evacuation by sea from Wonsan and Hungnam.  Communist China rejected the UN armistice proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>EUSA established a line of defense along the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>US declared a national emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>ROK I Corps landed at Mukho.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Peng Teh Huai issued a directive to prepare for New Year’s Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>EUSA Commander Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker died of traffic accident in the battle.  Communist China rejected the UN 3-Person Commission’s proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>ROK government issued an refuge order around the capital city.  ROK and UN forces as well as refugees completed evacuation from Hungnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 December 1950</td>
<td>ROK 3rd Division engaged NKPA around Hongch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 9th Division engaged NKPA around Hyon-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway becomes the new EUSA commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>CCF launched its New Year’s Day Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1951</td>
<td>EUSA commander ordered the US I and IX Corps to occupy the Seoul bridgehead line and ROK I, II and III Corps to occupy defense line C (Han R.-Hongch'on-Wonp'o-ri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>ROK 1st and 6th Divisions withdrew to the south of the Han River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>ROK government moved the capital to Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK and UN forces withdrew to the south of Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Seoul fell again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>ROK I and III Corps withdrew to the Wonju-Samch'ok line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>ROK 1st Division engaged CCF troops around Anyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US I and IX Corps on the western front occupy the P'yongtaek-Changhowon line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US 2nd Division fought to seize Wonju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces blocked the communist forces at the P'yongtaek-Ch'ungju-Samch'ok line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>CCF ended the New Year’s Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Yu Jae Hung was appointed to the ROK III Corps commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>ROK 2nd Corps deactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces established a new defense line along P'yongtaek-Samch'ok.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Collins and Vandenberg visited Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUSA conducted a reconnaissance operation in Osan-Suwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>ROK government objected to a ceasefire proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 1951</td>
<td>Thirteen Asian and Arab nations proposed a Korean armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces conducted a reconnaissance in force on the south of the Han River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>President Rhee expressed his wishes to achieve friendly Korea-Japan relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish Brigade engaged in a fierce combat at Kumryangjiang-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>ROK forces concluded Operation to destroy NKPA II Corps(Second Front).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>UN General Assembly adopted the Korean armistice proposal, which was subsequently rejected by Communist China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 1951</td>
<td>UN General Assembly named Communist China as aggressor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>President Rhee opposed the report to halt northward advance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK III Corps and US X Corps started an envelopment operation around Hongch'on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>ROK Capital Division secured Kangnung and Taegwalryong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK Marine Corps launched an operation to secure islands in the Eastern Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>ROK 1st Division advanced to the Han River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st</td>
<td>CCF opened its February Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koch'ang Incident occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12nd</td>
<td>ROK 8th Division withdrew from Hoengsong in dispersion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch Battalion conducted a defensive operation at Hoengsong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 13 February 1951 | US X Corps gave up on Hoengsong and defended Wonju-P'yongch'ang.  
US 2nd Division (23rd Regiment), in isolation, defended Chip'yon-ri.  
18th | ROK and UN forces advanced to Yangp'yong-Wonju.  
CCF's February Offensive was blocked at the Chech'lon line.  
21st | ROK and UN forces began Operation Roundup with Yangp'yong-Hoengsong-P'yongch'ang as objective.  
| 6 March 1951 | ROK and UN forces ended Operation Killer.  
7th | ROK and UN forces began Operation Ripper. |
| 12nd | Ridgway declared that armistice at the 38th Parallel means a UN victory.  
ROK and UN forces occupied the Albany line(Dokso-Soksa-ri).  
15th | Seoul retaken.  
17th | US X Corps concluded Operation Ripper.  
22nd | US I Corps began Operation Courageous.  
24th | MacArthur proposed a ceasefire conference in the field with the commander of Communist Chinese People's Volunteers.  
President Rhee declared that he is opposed to armistice before advancing to the Korea-China border.  
27th | ROK I Corps occupied Yangyang.  
28th | ROK I Corps commander Maj. Gen. Kim Paik II was killed in an airplane accident.  
ROK Marine Corps began an operation to secure islands in the Western Sea.  
31st | ROK and UN forces concluded Operation Ripper.  
3 April 1951 | ROK and UN forces began Operation Rugged. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1951</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces started advancing with the Munsan-Hwach'on Reservoir-Yangyang line as objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>US I Corps advanced to the Kansas line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st</td>
<td>US I and IX Corps began Operation Dauntless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12nd</td>
<td>Truman dismissed MacArthur and appointed Ridgway as CINCUNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US IX Corps advanced to the Kansas line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>UN forces advanced to Ch'orwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>US I and IX Corps occupied the Utah line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>US I and IX Corps started advancing to the Wyoming line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>CCF launched its April Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 6th Division began the Sach'ang-ri battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 5th Division began the Inje battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgian Battalion began the Kungul-san battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British 29th Brigade began the Solma-ri battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish Brigade began the Chongsongch'on battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>British 27th Brigade began the Kap'yong battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>ROK 1st Division rescued 40 men of the British Gloucester Battalion, 29th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>US I Corps occupied the Golden line on the north of Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 1st Division began Hwa-jon-ri battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces blocked the enemy's April Offensive and formed a defense line along Kimp'o-north of Seoul-Kumgok-ri-Taep'o-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1951</td>
<td>ROK and UN resumed counteroffensive and started advancing to the Pongilch'on-Ch'unch'on-Inje-north of Sok-ch'o line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Defense Minister Shin Sung Mo was replaced by Lee Ki Boong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Six ROK Divisions started advancing to the Missouri line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May 1951</td>
<td>ROK 9th Division seized Mae-bong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st</td>
<td>ROK I and II Corps halted the attack on the Missouri line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12nd</td>
<td>The Law of establishment of the National Defence Corps abolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>CCF launched its May Offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Truman adopted a new Korea policy (NSC 48/5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has</td>
<td>US 2nd Division fought at Bunker Hill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>A large Penetration was made around Hyon-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>ROK 6th Division began the Yongmun-san battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces began attacking with the Topeka line (Munsan-Ch’unch’on-Inje-Oho-ri) as objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>ROK I Corps secured Taegwal-ryong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>ROK 1st Division advanced to the Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>ROK III Corps was deactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>US II Corps occupied the Kansas line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>ROK I Corps occupied Kansong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jun 1951</td>
<td>UN Secretary General issued a statement supporting armistice at the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US JCS issued a new directive to CINCUNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>US I Corps began Operation Piledriver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>ROK Capital Division began the Hyangro-bong battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Rhee issued a statement opposing armistice at the 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US Defense Secretary Marshall visited EUSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK 7th Division began the Kunryanhyon battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>US II Corps occupied the left half of the Wyoming line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>ROK government held an anti-armistice rally in Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st</td>
<td>US II Corps occupied the right half of the Wyoming line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13rd</td>
<td>ROK and UN forces established a defense line along the lower estuary of the Imjin River-Ch’orwon-Kimhwa-P’unchbowl-north of Kojin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jun 1951</td>
<td>US X Corps occupied the Kansas line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Lee Jong Ch'an was appointed to the new Chief of the General Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malik stated that soviet people believed that a peaceful settlement could be achieved in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>President Rhee issued a statement opposing armistice talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ridgway proposed an armistice conference to the commander of the Communist forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

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